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Casuistry

2025-10-27T20:52:30Z

2600:1011:A18F:F810:7C12:A30A:D5BF:7C95: Fixed typo

{{Short description|Reasoning by extrapolation}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2020}}
[[File:Le grand docteur sophiste, maistre Thubal Holoferne.jpg|thumb|''Le grand docteur sophiste'', 1886 illustration of [[Gargantua]] by [[Albert Robida]], expressing mockery of his casuist education]]

'''Casuistry''' ({{IPAc-en|ˈ|k|æ|zj|u|ᵻ|s|t|r|i}} {{respell|KAZ|ew|iss|tree}}) is a process of [[reasoning]] for resolving an [[ethical dilemma]] (moral problem) either by extracting or by extending abstract rules from a particular case of conscience, and reapplying those abstract rules to other, different ethical dilemmas.<ref>{{cite web|title=Philosophy-Dictionary.org|url=http://www.philosophy-dictionary.org/casuistry|work=casuistry|access-date=7 December 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120118123139/http://www.philosophy-dictionary.org/casuistry|archive-date=18 January 2012|url-status=dead}}</ref> Casuistry is a method of reasoning common to [[applied ethics]] and [[jurisprudence]]. Moreover, in philosophy, the term ''casuistry'' is a [[pejorative]] criticism of the use of clever, but [[Soundness|unsound]] reasoning, especially in [[ethical]] questions, as in the case of [[sophistry]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-35 |title=Casuistry |website=Dictionary of the History of Ideas |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060618095059/http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-35 |archive-date=18 June 2006 |publisher=[[University of Virginia Library]]}}</ref> As a method of reasoning, casuistry is both the:

<blockquote>Study of cases of conscience and a method of solving conflicts of obligations by applying general principles of ethics, religion, and [[moral theology]] to particular and concrete cases of human conduct. This frequently demands an extensive knowledge of [[natural law]] and [[Equity (law)|equity]], [[Civil law (legal system)|civil law]], ecclesiastical precepts, and an exceptional skill in interpreting these various norms of conduct. . . .<ref>{{cite book | first = J. J. | last = Rolbiecki | editor-last = Runes | editor-first = Dagobert D. | chapter = Casuistry | title = Dictionary of Philosophy | url = http://www.ditext.com/runes/c.html | date = 1942 | access-date = 26 October 2023 }}</ref> </blockquote>

==Etymology==
The term ''casuistry'' and the noun "casuist" date from 1600 and derive from the Latin noun {{Wikt-lang|la|casus}}, ''case'', as used in the phrase a "case of conscience", and the usual sense of the usage was pejorative.<ref name="OED">{{Cite web|last=Harper|first=Douglas R.|title=casuist (n.)|url=https://www.etymonline.com/word/casuist?ref=etymonline_crossreference|access-date=March 14, 2021|website=Online Etymological Dictionary}}</ref>

==History==
Casuistry dates from [[Aristotle]] (384–322 BC), and the peak of casuistry was from 1550 to 1650, when the [[Society of Jesus]] (the Jesuits) used casuistic reasoning, particularly in administering the [[Sacrament of Penance]] (or "confession").<ref>{{cite book|title=The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal|last=Franklin|first=James|publisher=Johns Hopkins University Press|year=2001|location=Baltimore|pages=83–88}}</ref> The term became pejorative following [[Blaise Pascal]]'s attack on the misuse of the method in his ''[[Provincial Letters]]'' (1656–57).<ref>{{cite book|url=https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/p/pascal/blaise/|title=The Provincial Letters of Blaise Pascal|last=Pascal|first=Blaise|publisher=Chatto & Windus|others=M'Crie, Thomas (trans.)|year=1898|series=eBooks@Adelaide|location=London|orig-year=1657|access-date=23 January 2009|archive-date=5 September 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150905104257/https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/p/pascal/blaise/|url-status=dead}}</ref> The French [[mathematician]], religious philosopher and [[Jansenist]] sympathiser attacked priests who used casuistic reasoning in confession to pacify wealthy church donors. Pascal charged that "remorseful" aristocrats could confess a sin one day, re-commit it the next, then generously donate to the church and return to re-confess their sin, confident that they were being assigned a penance in name only. These criticisms darkened casuistry's reputation in the following centuries. For example, the ''[[Oxford English Dictionary]]'' quotes a 1738 essay<ref>{{Cite web |title=Letters on the spirit of patriotism : On the idea of a patriot king : and on the state of parties at the accession of King George the First / Henry St John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke. 1752 |url=https://www.rct.uk/collection/1057691/letters-on-the-spirit-of-patriotismnbspnbspon-the-idea-of-a-patriot-kingnbsp-and |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220620052050/https://www.rct.uk/collection/1057691/letters-on-the-spirit-of-patriotismnbspnbspon-the-idea-of-a-patriot-kingnbsp-and |archive-date=20 June 2022 |website=[[Royal Collection Trust]]}}</ref> by [[Henry St John, 1st Viscount Bolingbroke|Henry St. John]], 1st Viscount Bolingbroke to the effect that casuistry "destroys, by distinctions and exceptions, all morality, and effaces the essential difference between right and wrong, good and evil".<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |title=Oxford English Dictionary |url=http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/28642 |url-access=subscription |access-date=21 September 2017 |article=Casuistry}}, quoting {{cite book |last=St. John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke |first=Henry |url=https://archive.org/details/lettersonspirito00boli/page/187/mode/1up |title=Letters on the spirit of patriotism : On the idea of a patriot king : and on the state of parties at the accession of King George the First |publisher=A. Millar |year=1752 |location=London |page=187}}</ref>

The 20th century saw a revival of interest in casuistry. In their book ''The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning'' (1988), Albert Jonsen and [[Stephen Toulmin]]<ref>Albert Jonsen and [[Stephen Toulmin]], ''The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning'', Berkeley, U. California Press (1990, {{ISBN|0-520-06960-9}}).</ref> argue that it is not casuistry but its abuse that has been a problem; that, properly used, casuistry is powerful reasoning. Jonsen and Toulmin offer casuistry as a method for compromising the contradictory principles of [[moral absolutism]] and [[moral relativism]]. In addition, the ethical philosophies of [[utilitarianism]] (especially [[preference utilitarianism]]) and [[pragmatism]] have been identified as employing casuistic reasoning.{{by whom|date=June 2022}}

===Early modernity===
The casuistic method was popular among [[Catholic Church|Catholic]] thinkers in the early modern period. Casuistic authors include [[Antonio Escobar y Mendoza]], whose ''Summula casuum conscientiae'' (1627) enjoyed great success, [[Thomas Sanchez]], [[Vincenzo Filliucci]] (Jesuit and [[Apostolic Penitentiary|penitentiary]] at [[St Peter]]'s), [[Antonino Diana]], [[Paul Laymann]] (''Theologia Moralis'', 1625), [[John Azor]] (''Institutiones Morales'', 1600), [[Etienne Bauny]], [[Louis Cellot]], [[Valerius Reginaldus]], and [[Hermann Busembaum]] (d. 1668).<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Decock|first=Wim|date=2011|title=From Law to Paradise: Confessional Catholicism and Legal Scholarship|journal=Rechtsgeschichte|volume=2011|issue=18|pages=012–034|doi=10.12946/rg18/012-034|issn=1619-4993|doi-access=free|hdl=11858/00-001M-0000-0013-AE28-C|hdl-access=free}}</ref>

The progress of casuistry was interrupted toward the middle of the 17th century by the controversy which arose concerning the [[Catholic probabilism|doctrine of probabilism]], which effectively stated that one could choose to follow a "probable opinion"{{mdash}}that is, an opinion supported by a theologian or another{{mdash}}even if it contradicted a more probable opinion or a quotation from one of the [[Fathers of the Church]].<ref>Franklin, ''Science of Conjecture'', pp. 74–76, 83.</ref>

<section begin=Alleged corruption in the Catholic Church transclusion/>Certain kinds of casuistry were criticised by early [[Protestant Reformation|Protestant theologians]], because it was used to justify many of the abuses that they sought to reform. It was famously attacked by the Catholic and [[Jansenist]] philosopher [[Blaise Pascal]] during the [[formulary controversy]] against the Jesuits, in his [[Lettres provinciales|Provincial Letters]], as the use of [[rhetorics]] to justify moral laxity, which became identified by the public with '''Jesuitism'''; hence the everyday use of the term to mean complex and [[sophist]]ic reasoning to justify moral laxity.<ref>170 "Casuistry..destroys, by distinctions and exceptions, all morality, and effaces the essential difference between right and wrong." Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, ''Letters on the Spirit of Patriotism 1736'' (pub. 1749), quoted in Oxford English Dictionary, 1989 ed.</ref> By the mid-18th century, "casuistry" had become a synonym for attractive-sounding, but ultimately false, moral reasoning.<ref>Jonsen, Albert R., The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning, University of California Press, 1988. {{ISBN|0-52-006063-6}} (p. 2).</ref><section end=Alleged corruption in the Catholic Church transclusion/>

In 1679 [[Pope Innocent XI]] publicly condemned sixty-five of the more radical propositions (''stricti mentalis''), taken chiefly from the writings of Escobar, [[Francisco Suarez|Suarez]] and other casuists as ''propositiones laxorum moralistarum'' and forbade anyone to teach them under penalty of [[excommunication]].<ref>Kelly, J.N.D., The Oxford History of the Popes, Oxford University Press, 1986. {{ISBN|0-19-282085-0}} (p. 287).</ref> Despite this condemnation by a pope, both Catholicism and Protestantism permit the use of ambiguous statements in specific circumstances.<ref>J.-P. Cavaillé, ''[http://dossiersgrihl.revues.org/document281.html Ruser sans mentir, de la casuistique aux sciences sociales: le recours à l’équivocité, entre efficacité pragmatique et souci éthique]'', in [[Serge Latouche]], P.-J. Laurent, O. Servais & M. Singleton, ''Les Raisons de la ruse. Une perspective anthropologique et psychanalytique'', Actes du colloque international «La raison rusée», Louvain la Neuve, mars 2001, Paris, La Découverte, 2004, pp. 93–118 {{in lang|fr}}.</ref>

===Later modernity===
[[G. E. Moore]] dealt with casuistry in chapter 1.4 of his ''[[Principia Ethica]]'', in which he claimed that "the defects of casuistry are not defects of principle; no objection can be taken to its aim and object. It has failed only because it is far too difficult a subject to be treated adequately in our present state of knowledge". Furthermore, he asserted that "casuistry is the goal of ethical investigation. It cannot be safely attempted at the beginning of our studies, but only at the end".<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZLpcgAQvr_gC&q=%22the+defects+of+casuistry+are+not+defects+of+principle+no+objection+can+be+taken+to+its+aim+and+object+it+has+failed+only+because+it+is+far+too+difficult+a+subject+to%22&pg=PA57|title=Principia Ethica|last=Moore|first=George Edward|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1993|isbn=0-521-44848-4|editor-last=Baldwin|editor-first=Thomas|editor-link=Thomas Baldwin (philosopher)|edition=2|location=Cambridge|page=57|author-link=George Edward Moore|orig-year=1903}}</ref>

Since the 1960s, [[applied ethics]] has revived the ideas of casuistry in applying moral reasoning to particular cases in [[law]], [[bioethics]], and [[business ethics]]. Its facility for dealing with situations where rules or values conflict with each other has made it a useful approach in professional ethics, and casuistry's reputation has improved somewhat as a result.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Casuistry {{!}} Ethics & Moral Decision Making {{!}} Britannica |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/casuistry |access-date=2024-04-11 |website=www.britannica.com |language=en}}</ref>

[[Pope Francis]], a Jesuit, criticized casuistry as "the practice of setting general laws on the basis of exceptional cases" in instances where a more holistic approach would be preferred.<ref>[https://archive.today/20140527185002/http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/1402173.htm "Pope to meet with sex abuse victims for first time in June", Francis X. Rocca]. Catholic News Service. Online.</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|Philosophy|Psychology}}
* {{annotated link|Applied ethics}}
* {{annotated link|Case-based reasoning}}
* {{annotated link|Consequentialism}}
* {{annotated link|Dispensation (Catholic canon law)}}
* {{annotated link|First principle}}
* {{annotated link|List of thought processes}}
* {{annotated link|Pilpul}}
* {{annotated link|Qiyas|''Qiyas''}}
* {{annotated link|Rhetoric}}
* {{annotated link|Rhetorical reason}}
* {{annotated link|School of Salamanca}}
* {{annotated link|Situational ethics}}
* {{annotated link|Talmudical hermeneutics}}
* {{annotated link|Heuristics}}

==References==
{{Reflist|32em}}

==Further reading==
{{refbegin|20em}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1093/jmp/16.1.29|pmid=2010719|title=Getting Down to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in Bioethics|journal=Journal of Medicine and Philosophy|volume=16|issue=1|pages=29–51|year=1991|last1=Arras|first1=J. D.|s2cid=4542283}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1111/j.1468-0025.1989.tb00206.x|title=A Case for Casuistry in the Church|journal=Modern Theology|volume=6|pages=29–51|year=1989|last1=Biggar|first1=Nigel}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.2307/3562714|pmid=1544801|jstor=3562714|title=The Hospital Ethics Committee Health Care's Moral Conscience or White Elephant?|journal=The Hastings Center Report|volume=22|issue=1|pages=6–11|year=1992|last1=Blake|first1=David C.}}
* Bliton, Mark J. (1993). The Ethics of Clinical Ethics Consultation: On the Way to Clinical Philosophy (Diss. Vanderbilt)
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1207/s15327728jmme0702_4|title=Casuistry: A Case-Based Methods for Journalists|journal=Journal of Mass Media Ethics|volume=7|issue=2|pages=107–120|year=1992|last1=Boeyink|first1=David E.}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1093/jmp/16.5.475|pmid=1779208|title=Who is Entitled to Double Effect?|journal=Journal of Medicine and Philosophy|volume=16|issue=5|pages=475–494|year=1991|last1=Boyle|first1=J.}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.2307/3562015|jstor=3562015|title=Ethical Questions Raised by the Persistent Vegetative Patient|journal=The Hastings Center Report|volume=18|issue=1|pages=33–37|year=1988|last1=Brody|first1=Baruch A.|pmid=3350649}}
* {{cite book|doi=10.1007/978-94-015-7838-7_3|chapter=A Historical Introduction to Jewish Casuistry on Suicide and Euthanasia|title=Suicide and Euthanasia|volume=35|pages=39–75|series=Philosophy and Medicine|year=1989|last1=Brody|first1=Baruch A.|isbn=978-90-481-4039-8}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1080/00335639209383979|title=Creative casuistry and feminist consciousness: The rhetoric of moral reform|journal=Quarterly Journal of Speech|volume=78|pages=16–32|year=1992|last1=Carlson|first1=A. Cheree}}
* Carney, Bridget Mary. (1993). Modern Casuistry: An Essential But Incomplete Method for Clinical Ethical Decision-Making. (Diss., Graduate Theological Union).
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1007/BF00489238|pmid=2339334|title=Interpretive bioethics: The way of discernment|journal=Theoretical Medicine|volume=11|issue=1|pages=51–59|year=1990|last1=Carson|first1=Ronald A.|s2cid=22670761}}
* Carson, Ronald A. (1988). "Paul Ramsey, Principled Protestant Casuist: A Retrospective." Medical Humanities Review, Vol. 2, pp. 24–35.
* Chidwick, Paula Marjorie (1994). Approaches to Clinical Ethical Decision-Making: Ethical Theory, Casuistry and Consultation. (Diss., U of Guelph)
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1093/jaarel/LX.2.313|title=Abortion in Jewish Thought: A Study in Casuistry|journal=Journal of the American Academy of Religion|issue=2|pages=313–324|year=1992|last1=Davis|first1=Dena S.}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1093/jmp/17.5.511|pmid=1431667|title=Moving Forward in Bioethical Theory: Theories, Cases, and Specified Principlism|journal=Journal of Medicine and Philosophy|volume=17|issue=5|pages=511–539|year=1992|last1=Degrazia|first1=D.}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1136/jme.18.2.61|pmid=1619625|pmc=1376108|title=Health care ethics and casuistry|journal=Journal of Medical Ethics|volume=18|issue=2|pages=61–66|year=1992|last1=Downie|first1=R.}}
* Drane, J.F. (1990). "Methodologies for Clinical Ethics." Bulletin of the Pan American Health Organization, Vol. 24, pp. 394–404.
* Dworkin, R.B. (1994). "Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics: Symposium." Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 69, pp. 945–1122.
* Elliot, Carl (1992). "Solving the Doctor's Dilemma?" New Scientist, Vol. 133, pp. 42–43.
* Emanuel, Ezekiel J. (1991). The Ends of Human Life: Medical Ethics in a Liberal Polity (Cambridge).
* Franklin, James (2001). The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal (Johns Hopkins), ch. 4.
* Gallagher, Lowell (1991). Medusa's Gaze: Casuistry and Conscience in the Renaissance (Stanford)
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1097/00012272-199503000-00006|pmid=7778890|title=Casuistry, care, compassion, and ethics data analysis|journal=Advances in Nursing Science|volume=17|issue=3|pages=47–57|year=1995|last1=Gaul|first1=Alice Leveille|s2cid=44950319}}
* Green, Bryan S. (1988). Literary Methods and Sociological Theory: Case Studies of Simmel and Weber (Albany)
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1016/0277-9536(94)90348-4|pmid=7801153|title=The forms and limits of medical ethics|journal=Social Science & Medicine|volume=39|issue=9|pages=1155–1164|year=1994|last1=Hoffmaster|first1=Barry}}
* Houle, Martha Marie (1983). The Fictions of Casuistry and Pascal's Jesuit in "Les Provinciales" (Diss. U California, San Diego)
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1017/S0022046900010216|title=Casuistry in Action: Robert Boyle's Confessional Interviews with Gilbert Burnet and Edward Stillingfleet, 1691|journal=The Journal of Ecclesiastical History|volume=44|pages=80–98|year=1993|last1=Hunter|first1=Michael|s2cid=162420334 }}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1093/jmp/14.2.193|pmid=2769113|title=A Science of Individuals: Medicine and Casuistry|journal=Journal of Medicine and Philosophy|volume=14|issue=2|pages=193–212|year=1989|last1=Hunter|first1=K. M.}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1093/jmp/16.1.113|pmid=2010718|title=American Moralism and the Origin of Bioethics in the United States|journal=Journal of Medicine and Philosophy|volume=16|issue=1|pages=113–130|year=1991|last1=Jonsen|first1=A. R.}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1007/BF00489424|pmid=3704959|title=Casuistry and clinical ethics|journal=Theoretical Medicine|volume=7|issue=1|pages=65–74|year=1986|last1=Jonsen|first1=Albert R.|s2cid=5420360}}
* Jonsen, Albert R. (1986). "Casuistry" in J.F. Childress and J. Macgvarrie, eds. Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics (Philadelphia)
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1007/BF00489890|pmid=1801300|title=Casuistry as methodology in clinical ethics|journal=Theoretical Medicine|volume=12|issue=4|pages=295–307|year=1991|last1=Jonsen|first1=Albert R.|s2cid=7991017}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.2307/3562885|jstor=3562885|title=Of Balloons and Bicycles; or, the Relationship between Ethical Theory and Practical Judgment|journal=The Hastings Center Report|volume=21|issue=5|pages=14–16|year=1991|last1=Jonsen|first1=Albert R.|pmid=1743945}}
* Jonsen, Albert R. and Stephen Toulmin (1988). The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (California).
* Keenan, James F., S.J. and Thomas A. Shannon. (1995). The Context of Casuistry (Washington).
* Kirk, K. (1936). Conscience and Its Problems, An Introduction to Casuistry (London)
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1111/j.1467-9833.1990.tb00263.x|title=How is Applied Philosophy to be Applied?|journal=Journal of Social Philosophy|volume=21|pages=16–26|year=1990|last1=Klinefelter|first1=Donald S.}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1007/BF00999217|pmid=8059430|title=Case method and casuistry: The problem of bias|journal=Theoretical Medicine|volume=15|issue=1|pages=21–37|year=1994|last1=Kopelman|first1=Loretta M.|s2cid=27735131}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1093/jmp/15.2.199|pmid=2351894|title=What is Applied About "Applied" Philosophy?|journal=Journal of Medicine and Philosophy|volume=15|issue=2|pages=199–218|year=1990|last1=Kopelman|first1=L. M.}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1353/ken.0.0082|pmid=11645267|title=Casuistry and Its Communitarian Critics|journal=Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal|volume=4|issue=2|pages=99–116|year=1994|last1=Kuczewski|first1=Mark G.|s2cid=45915303}}
* Kuczewski, Mark G. (1994). Fragmentation and Consensus in Contemporary Neo-Aristotelian Ethics: A Study in Communitarianism and Casuistry (Diss., Duquesne U).
* {{cite book|doi=10.1017/CBO9780511521430|title=Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe|year=1988|isbn=9780521520201|last1=Leites|first1=Edmund|editor1-first=Edmund|editor1-last=Leites}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1111/j.1540-6253.1974.tb00146.x|title=Conscience, Casuistry, and Moral Decision: Some Historical Perspectives|journal=Journal of Chinese Philosophy|volume=2|pages=41–58|year=1974|last1=Leites|first1=Edmund}}
* Long, Edward LeRoy, junior (1954). Conscience and Compromise: an Approach to Protestant Casuistry (Philadelphia, Penn.: Westminster Press)
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1353/hph.1990.0086|title=The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Review)|journal=Journal of the History of Philosophy|volume=28|issue=4|pages=634–635|year=1990|last1=MacIntyre|first1=Alasdair C.|s2cid=144734704}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.5840/monist198467438|title=Does Applied Ethics Rest on a Mistake?|journal=Monist|volume=67|issue=4|pages=498–513|year=1984|last1=MacIntyre|first1=Alasdair}}
* Mackler, Aaron Leonard. Cases of Judgments in Ethical Reasoning: An Appraisal of Contemporary Casuistry and Holistic Model for the Mutual Support of Norms and Case Judgments (Diss., Georgetown U).
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1017/S0963180100005223|pmid=7994464|title=Anchor and Course for the Modern Ship of Casuistry|journal=Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics|volume=3|issue=3|pages=391–402|year=1994|last1=Macpherson-Smith|first1=Malcolm|s2cid=30253302 }}
* {{cite book|doi=10.1075/sc.6.09mah|chapter=Collaboration and Casuistry|title=Peirce and Value Theory|volume=6|pages=61|series=Semiotic Crossroads|year=1994|last1=Mahowald|first1=Mary B.|isbn=978-90-272-1947-3}}
* McCready, Amy R. (1992). "Milton's Casuistry: The Case of 'The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce.' " Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Vol. 22, pp. 393–428.
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1093/jmp/14.6.617|pmid=2614282|title=On Transplanting Human Fetal Tissue: Presumptive Duties and the Task of Casuistry|journal=Journal of Medicine and Philosophy|volume=14|issue=6|pages=617–640|year=1989|last1=Miller|first1=R. B.}}
* {{cite book|doi=10.1017/CBO9780511627842.008|chapter=Medical ethics, moral philosophy and moral tradition|title=Medicine and Moral Reasoning|pages=91–105|year=1994|last1=Murray|first1=Thomas H.|isbn=9780521459464}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1111/j.1540-4560.1993.tb00927.x|pmid=17167922|title=Moral Reasoning in Social Context|journal=Journal of Social Issues|volume=49|issue=2|pages=185–200|year=1993|last1=Murray|first1=Thomas H.}}
* Odozor, Paulinus Ikechukwu (1989). Richard A. McCormick and Casuistry: Moral Decision-Making in Conflict Situations (M.A. Thesis, St. Michael's College).
* Pack, Rolland W. (1988). Case Studies and Moral Conclusions: The Philosophical Use of Case Studies in Biomedical Ethics (Diss., Georgetown U).
* Pascal, Blaise (1967). The Provincial Letters (London).
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1007/BF00999885|title=Feminist cautions about casuistry: The Supreme Court's abortion decisions as paradigms|journal=Policy Sciences|volume=27|issue=2–3|pages=143–160|year=1994|last1=Peach|first1=Lucinda Joy|s2cid=143567140}}
* Río Parra, Elena del (2008). Cartografías de la conciencia española en la Edad de Oro (Mexico).
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1177/004057369405100204|title=Thinking Through the Ethics of Abortion|journal=Theology Today|volume=51|issue=2|pages=235–248|year=1994|last1=Rudy|first1=Kathy|s2cid=146934768}}
* Seiden, Melvin (1990). Measure for Measure: Casuistry and Artistry (Washington).
* {{cite journal|doi=10.5840/thought199267223|title=Women and the New Casuistry|journal=Thought|volume=67|issue=2|pages=148–157|year=1992|last1=Sichol|first1=Marcia}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1111/j.1467-9744.1980.tb00374.x|title=Is Ethics a Science? Ought It to Be?|journal=Zygon|volume=15|pages=29–42|year=1980|last1=Singer|first1=Marcus G.|doi-access=free}}
* Smith, David H. (1991). "Stories, Values, and Patient Care Decisions." in Charles Conrad, ed. The Ethical Nexus: Values in Organizational Decision Making. (New Jersey).
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1007/BF01305396|title=Everyone's conforming to a rule|journal=Philosophical Studies|volume=48|issue=3|pages=375–387|year=1985|last1=Sobel|first1=Jordan Howard|s2cid=170640015}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1177/004056399305400105|title=Notes on Moral Theology: 1992|journal=Theological Studies|volume=54|pages=95–159|year=1993|last1=Keenan|first1=James F.|s2cid=220489972}}
* Starr, G. (1971). Defoe and Casuistry (Princeton).
* {{cite book|doi=10.1007/978-94-009-2715-5_14|chapter=Justification in Ethics|title=Moral Theory and Moral Judgments in Medical Ethics|volume=32|pages=193–211|series=Philosophy and Medicine|year=1988|last1=Strong|first1=Carson|isbn=978-94-010-7723-1}}
* Tallmon, James Michael (2001). "Casuistry" in The Encyclopedia of Rhetoric. Ed. Thomas O. Sloane. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 83–88.
* Tallmon, James Michael (1993). Casuistry and the Quest for Rhetorical Reason: Conceptualizing a Method of Shared Moral Inquiry (Diss., U of Washington).
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1093/jmp/19.1.103|pmid=8201287|title=How Jonsen Really Views Casuistry: A Note on the Abuse of Father Wildes|journal=Journal of Medicine and Philosophy|volume=19|issue=1|pages=103–113|year=1994|last1=Tallmon|first1=J. M.}}
* Taylor, Richard (1984). Good and Evil – A New Direction: A Foreceful Attack on the Rationalist Tradition in Ethics (Buffalo).
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1007/BF00994019|pmid=7997974|title=Clinical ethics as medical hermeneutics|journal=Theoretical Medicine|volume=15|issue=2|pages=93–111|year=1994|last1=Thomasma|first1=David C.|s2cid=11845065}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1007/BF00999216|pmid=8059432|title=Casuistry in medical ethics: Rehabilitated, or repeat offender?|journal=Theoretical Medicine|volume=15|issue=1|pages=5–20|year=1994|last1=Tomlinson|first1=Tom|s2cid=45692}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1353/pbm.1982.0064|pmid=11643854|title=How Medicine Saved the Life of Ethics|journal=Perspectives in Biology and Medicine|volume=25|issue=4|pages=736–750|year=1982|last1=Toulmin|first1=Stephen|s2cid=35014697}}
* Toulmin, Stephen (1988). "The Recovery of Practical Philosophy." The American Scholar, Vol. 57, pp. 337–352.
* {{cite journal|doi=10.2307/3560542|jstor=3560542|title=The Tyranny of Principles|journal=The Hastings Center Report|volume=11|issue=6|pages=31–39|year=1981|last1=Toulmin|first1=Stephen|pmid=7037683}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1007/BF00138918|title=The issue of generality in ethics|journal=The Journal of Value Inquiry|volume=26|issue=4|pages=511–524|year=1992|last1=Van Der Steen|first1=Wim J.|last2=Musschenga|first2=Bert|s2cid=144980478}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1007/BF02382593|title=Courage, relativism and practical reasoning|journal=Philosophia|volume=20|issue=1–2|pages=227–240|year=1990|last1=Walton|first1=Douglas N.|s2cid=144539329}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.2307/2870893|jstor=2870893|title=Measure for Measure: Casuistry and Artistry|journal=Shakespeare Quarterly|volume=43|issue=2|pages=242|year=1992|last1=Watson|first1=Robert N.|last2=Seiden|first2=Melvin}}
* Weinstein, Bruce David (1989). The Possibility of Ethical Expertise (Diss. Georgetown U).
* {{cite journal|doi=10.5840/monist198467440|title=Drawing Lines|journal=Monist|volume=67|issue=4|pages=589–604|year=1984|last1=Weston|first1=Anthony}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1093/jmp/18.1.33|pmid=8433047|title=The Priesthood of Bioethics and the Return of Casuistry|journal=Journal of Medicine and Philosophy|volume=18|issue=1|pages=33–49|year=1993|last1=Wildes|first1=K. Wm.}}
* Wildes, Kevin Wm., S.J. (1993). The View for Somewhere: Moral Judgment in Bioethics (Diss. Rice U).
* {{cite journal|doi=10.5840/teachphil199013220|title=Ethics Committee Simulations|journal=Teaching Philosophy|volume=13|issue=2|pages=127–140|year=1990|last1=Winston|first1=Morton E.}}
* Zacker, David J. (1991). Reflection and Particulars: Does Casuistry Offer Us Stable Beliefs About Ethics? (M.A. Thesis, Western Michigan U).
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1093/jmp/18.1.9|pmid=8433050|title=Voices and Time: The Venture of Clinical Ethics|journal=Journal of Medicine and Philosophy|volume=18|issue=1|pages=9–31|year=1993|last1=Zaner|first1=R. M.}}
{{refend}}

==External links==
{{Wiktionary|casuistry}}
{{wikiquote}}
{{EB1911 poster|Casuistry}}
{{CE1913 poster|Casuistry}}
{{wiktionary}}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20060618095059/http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-35 ''Dictionary of the History of Ideas'']: "Casuistry"
* [http://www.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/accountancy.html Accountancy as computational casuistics], article on how modern compliance regimes in accountancy and law apply casuistry
* [http://www.thegreatideas.org/apd-casu.html Mortimer Adler's Great Ideas – Casuistry] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110716221246/http://www.thegreatideas.org/apd-casu.html |date=16 July 2011 }}
* [http://www.jeramyt.org/papers/casuistry.html Summary of casuistry by Jeramy Townsley]
* [http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/Cavalier/80130/part2/casuistry/Casuistry.html Casuistry – Online Guide to Ethics and Moral Philosophy] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060618013727/http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/Cavalier/80130/part2/casuistry/Casuistry.html |date=18 June 2006 }}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20160411043635/http://www.she-philosopher.com/library/tallmon.html Casuistry – Oxford Encyclopedia of Rhetoric] catalogued at she-philosopher.com

{{Ethics}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Catholic casuists| ]]
[[Category:Scholasticism]]
[[Category:Applied ethics]]
[[Category:Common law]]
[[Category:Legal reasoning]]
[[Category:Jurisprudence]]
[[Category:Criticism of religion]]

Meno

2025-10-27T16:35:44Z

2600:1011:A18F:F810:7C12:A30A:D5BF:7C95: Fixed typo

{{short description|Dialogue by Plato}}
{{About|Plato's dialogue|the Thessalian general and character from Plato's dialogue|Meno (general)|other uses}}
{{Italic title}}
{{Primary sources|date=November 2022}}
{{Expand German|Menon|date=October 2023}}
{{Platonism|dialogues=show}}
'''''Meno''''' ({{IPAc-en|ˈ|m|iː|n|oʊ}}; {{langx|grc|[[wikt:Μένων|Μένων]]}}, ''Ménōn'') is a [[Socratic dialogue]] written by [[Plato]] around 385 BC., but set at an earlier date around 402 BC.<ref>Rawson, G., [https://iep.utm.edu/meno-2/ Plato: Meno] in the ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', accessed on 16 December 2024</ref> [[Meno (general)|Meno]] begins the dialogue by asking Socrates whether [[virtue]] (in {{langx|grc|ἀρετή}}, ''[[Arete|aretē]]'') can be taught, acquired by practice, or comes by [[nature (philosophy)|nature]].<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 70a</ref> In order to determine whether virtue is teachable or not, [[Socrates]] tells Meno that they first need to determine what virtue is.<ref name=m71b /> When the characters speak of virtue, or ''aretē'', they refer to virtue in general, rather than particular virtues, such as justice or temperance. The first part of the work showcases [[Socratic method|Socratic dialectical style]]; Meno, unable to adequately define virtue, is reduced to confusion or [[aporia]].<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 80a–b</ref> Socrates suggests that they seek an adequate definition for virtue together. In response, Meno suggests that it is impossible to seek what one does not know, because one will be unable to determine whether one has found it.<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 80d</ref>

Socrates challenges Meno's argument, often called "Meno's Paradox", "Learner's Paradox", or the "Arabic Paradox",{{cn|reason="Arabic Paradox was added by editor 163.123.47.232 on 3 November 2024 alleging the term was found in the book "The Logic of Sense". If so, a full citation is needed|date=December 2024}} by introducing the theory of knowledge as recollection (''[[Anamnesis (philosophy)|anamnesis]]''). As presented in the dialogue, the theory proposes that souls are immortal and know all things in a disembodied state; learning in the embodied is actually a process of recollecting that which the soul knew before it came into a body.<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 81a–e</ref> Socrates demonstrates recollection in action by posing a mathematical puzzle to one of Meno's slaves.<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 82a–86c</ref> Subsequently, Socrates and Meno return to the question of whether virtue is teachable, employing the method of hypothesis. Near the end of the dialogue, Meno poses another famous puzzle, called "the Meno problem" or "the Value Problem for Knowledge", which questions why knowledge is valued more highly than true belief.<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 97b–d</ref> In response, Socrates provides a famous and somewhat enigmatic distinction between knowledge and true belief.<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 98a</ref>

==Characters==
Plato's ''Meno'' is a Socratic dialogue in which the two main speakers, [[Socrates]] and [[Meno (general)|Meno]] (also [[Transliteration|transliterated]] as "Menon"), discuss human virtue: what it is, and whether or not it can be taught. Meno is visiting Athens from [[Thessaly]] with a large entourage of slaves attending him. Young, good-looking and well-born, he is a student of [[Gorgias]], a prominent [[sophist]] whose views on virtue clearly influence that of Meno's. Early in the dialogue, Meno claims that he has held forth many times on the subject of virtue, and in front of large audiences.<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 80b</ref>

One of Meno's [[slavery in antiquity|slave]]s also has a speaking role, as one of the features of the dialogue is Socrates' engagement with the slave to demonstrate his idea of ''[[anamnesis (philosophy)|anamnesis]]'': certain knowledge is innate and "recollected" by the soul through proper inquiry.

Another participant later in the dialogue is Athenian politician [[Anytus]],<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 89e onwards</ref> later one of the [[Trial of Socrates|prosecutors of Socrates]],<ref>Plato, ''[http://faculty.sgc.edu/rkelley/The%20Apology%20of%20Socrates.pdf Apology]'', footnote 3, accessed on 28 December 2024</ref> with whom Meno is friendly.

==Dialogue==
===Introduction of virtue===
The dialogue begins with Meno asking Socrates to tell him whether virtue can be taught. Socrates says that he does not know what virtue is, and neither does anyone else he knows.<ref name=m71b>Plato, ''Meno'', 71b</ref> Meno responds that, according to Gorgias, his Sophist mentor, virtue means different for different people, that what is virtuous for a man is to conduct himself in the city so that he helps his friends, injures his enemies, and takes care all the while that he personally comes to no harm. Virtue is different for a woman, he says. Her domain is the management of the household, and she is supposed to obey her husband. He says that children (male and female) have their own proper virtue, and so do old men—free or [[Slavery in antiquity|slaves]].<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 71e</ref> Socrates objects: there must be some virtue common to all human beings.

Socrates rejects the idea that human virtue depends on a person's sex or age. He leads Meno towards the idea that virtues are common to all people, that ''[[Sophrosyne|sophrosunê]]'' ('temperance', i.e. exercise of [[self-control]]) and ''[[Dike (mythology)|dikê]]'' (aka ''dikaiosunê''; 'justice', i.e. refrain from harming others) are virtues even in children and old men.<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 73b</ref> Meno proposes to Socrates that the "capacity to govern men" may be a virtue common to all people. Socrates points out to the slaveholder that "governing well" cannot be a virtue of a slave, because then he would not be a slave.<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 73c–d</ref>

One of the errors that Socrates points out is that Meno lists many particular virtues without defining a common feature inherent to virtues which makes them thus. Socrates remarks that Meno makes many out of one, like somebody who breaks a plate.<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 77a</ref>

Meno proposes that virtue is the desire for good things and the power to get them. Socrates points out that this raises a second problem—many people do not recognize evil.<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 77d–e</ref> The discussion then turns to the question of accounting for the fact that so many people are mistaken about good and evil and take one for the other. Socrates asks Meno to consider whether good things must be acquired virtuously in order to be really good.<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 78b</ref> Socrates leads onto the question of whether virtue is one thing or many.

No satisfactory definition of virtue emerges in the ''Meno''. Socrates' comments, however, show that he considers a successful definition to be unitary, rather than a list of varieties of virtue, that it must contain all and only those terms which are genuine instances of virtue, and must not be [[circular definition|circular]].<ref name="jmd">Day, Jane Mary. 1994. ''Plato's Meno in Focus''. [[Routledge]]. p. 19. {{ISBN|0-415-00297-4}}.</ref>

===Meno's paradox===
Meno asks Socrates:<ref name=":0">Plato, ''[http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/meno.html Meno]'' (translated by [[Benjamin Jowett|B. Jowett]] 1871).</ref><ref>Plato. [380 BC] 1976. [https://kwanj.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/plato-meno.pdf ''Meno''], translated by [[George Grube|G. M. A. Grube]]. Indianapolis: [[Hackett Publishing Company|Hackett]]. line 80d, p. 9.</ref><blockquote>And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know? What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find what you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not know?</blockquote>Socrates rephrases the question, which has come to be the canonical statement of Meno's paradox or the paradox of inquiry:<ref name=":0" /><ref>Plato. [380 BC] 1976. [https://kwanj.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/plato-meno.pdf ''Meno''], translated by [[George Grube|G. M. A. Grube]]. Indianapolis: [[Hackett Publishing Company|Hackett]]. line 80e:<blockquote>"[A] man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know; He cannot search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for."</blockquote></ref>
{{Quote|text=[A] man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know the very subject about which he is to enquire.|author=translated by [[Benjamin Jowett]], 1871|title=|source=}}

===Dialogue with Meno's slave===
[[File:NAMA Loutrophoros Polystratos.jpg|thumb|250px|Depiction of an Athenian slave from 380-370 BC, [[National Archaeological Museum of Athens]]]]
Socrates responds to this [[sophism|sophistical]] paradox with a ''[[Myth|mythos]]'' ('narrative' or 'fiction') according to which souls are immortal and have learned everything prior to [[Reincarnation|transmigrating]] into the human body. Since the soul has had contact with real things prior to birth, we have only to 'recollect' them when alive. Such recollection requires [[Socratic questioning]], which according to Socrates is not teaching. Socrates demonstrates his method of questioning and recollection by interrogating a slave who is ignorant of geometry.

Socrates begins one of the most influential dialogues of Western philosophy regarding the argument for [[Innatism|inborn knowledge]]. By drawing geometric figures in the ground Socrates demonstrates that the slave is initially unaware of the length that a side must be in order to double the area of a square with 2-foot sides. The slave guesses first that the original side must be doubled in length (4 feet), and when this proves too much, that it must be 3 feet. This is still too much, and the slave is at a loss.

Socrates claims that before he got hold of him the slave (who has been picked at random from Meno's entourage) might have thought he could speak "well and fluently" on the subject of a square double the size of a given square.<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 84c</ref> Socrates comments that this "numbing" he caused in the slave has done him no harm and has even benefited him.<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 84b</ref>

[[File:Meno (Socrates) drawing 29.gif|thumb|The blue square is twice the area of the yellow square.]]
Socrates then adds three more squares to the original square, to form a larger square four times the size. He draws four diagonal lines which bisect each of the smaller squares. Through questioning, Socrates leads the slave to the discovery that the square formed by these diagonals has an area of eight square feet, double that of the original. He says that the slave has "spontaneously recovered" knowledge which he knew from before he was born,<ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 86a</ref> without having been taught. Socrates is satisfied that new beliefs were "newly aroused" in the slave.

After witnessing the example with the slave boy, Meno tells Socrates that he thinks that Socrates is correct in his theory of recollection, to which Socrates agrees:<ref name=":0" /><ref>Plato, ''Meno'', 86b</ref>

{{Quote|text=Some things I have said of which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know; that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power.|author=translated by [[Benjamin Jowett]], 1871|title=Meno.<ref>{{cite book|author=Plato|translator=Benjamin Jowett|title=Meno|publisher=Charles Scribner's Sons|place=New York|date=1871|page=37}}</ref>}}

===Anytus===
Meno now beseeches Socrates to return to the original question, how virtue is acquired, and in particular, whether or not it is acquired by teaching or through life experience. Socrates proceeds on the hypothesis that virtue is knowledge, and it is quickly agreed that, if this is true, virtue is teachable. They turn to the question of whether virtue is indeed knowledge. Socrates is hesitant, because, if virtue were knowledge, there should be teachers and learners of it, but there are none.

Coincidentally [[Anytus]] appears, whom Socrates praises as the son of [[Anthemion]], who earned his fortune with intelligence and hard work. He says that Anthemion had his son well-educated and so Anytus is well-suited to join the investigation. Socrates suggests that the sophists are teachers of virtue. Anytus is horrified, saying that he neither knows any, nor cares to know any. Socrates then questions why it is that men do not always produce sons of the same virtue as themselves. He alludes to other notable male figures, such as [[Themistocles]], [[Aristides]], [[Pericles]] and [[Thucydides (politician)|Thucydides]], and casts doubt on whether these men produced sons as capable of virtue as themselves. Anytus becomes offended and accuses Socrates of [[slander]], warning him to be careful expressing such opinions. (The historical Anytus was one of Socrates' accusers in his [[Trial of Socrates|trial]].) Socrates suggests that Anytus does not realize what slander is, and continues his dialogue with Meno as to the definition of virtue.

===True belief and knowledge===
After the discussion with Anytus, Socrates returns to quizzing Meno for his own thoughts on whether the sophists are teachers of virtue and whether virtue can be taught. Meno is again at a loss, and Socrates suggests that they have made a mistake in agreeing that knowledge is required for virtue. He points out the similarities and differences between "true belief" and "knowledge". True beliefs are as useful to us as knowledge, but they often fail to "stay in their place" and must be "tethered" by what he calls ''[[Causality|aitias]]'' {{Wikt-lang|en|λογισμός|logismos}} ('calculation of reason' or 'reasoned explanation'), immediately adding that this is ''[[Anamnesis (philosophy)|anamnesis]]'', or recollection.<ref>[[Gregory Vlastos|Vlastos, Gregory]]. 1996. ''Studies in Greek Philosophy: Socrates, Plato, and Their Tradition'' 2. [[Princeton University Press]]. {{ISBN|0-691-01938-X}}. p. 155.</ref>

Whether Plato intends that the tethering of true beliefs with reasoned explanations must always involve ''anamnesis'' is explored in later interpretations of the text.<ref>[[Gail Fine|Fine, Gail]]. 1992. "Inquiry in the 'Meno'." In ''The Cambridge Companion to Plato'', edited by R. Kraut. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|0-521-43610-9}}. p. 221.</ref><ref>Kahn, Charles. 2006. "Plato on Recollection" in ''A Companion to Plato'' 37, edited by H. H. Benson. [[Wiley-Blackwell]]. {{ISBN|1-4051-1521-1}}. p. 122.</ref> Socrates' distinction between "true belief" and "knowledge" forms the basis of the philosophical [[definition of knowledge]] as "[[justified true belief]]". [[Myles Burnyeat]] and others, however, have argued that the phrase ''aitias logismos'' refers to a practical working out of a solution, rather than a justification.<ref>[[Gail Fine|Fine, Gail]]. 2004. "Knowledge and True Belief in the ''Meno''", ''[[Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy]]'' 27(winter): 61–62, edited by [[David Sedley|D. Sedley]]. {{ISBN|0-19-927712-5}}.</ref>

Socrates concludes that, in the virtuous people of the present and the past, at least, virtue has been the result of divine inspiration, akin to the inspiration of the poets, whereas a knowledge of it will require answering the basic question, ''what is virtue?''. In most modern readings these closing remarks are "evidently ironic",<ref>[[Robin Waterfield|Waterfield, Robin]]. 2005. ''Meno and Other Dialogues'', (''[[Oxford World's Classics|Oxford World Classics]]''). Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|0-19-280425-1}}. pxliv.</ref> but Socrates' invocation of the gods may be sincere, albeit "highly tentative".<ref>Scott, Dominic. 2006. ''Plato's 'Meno' ''. Cambridge University Press. p 193. {{ISBN|0-521-64033-4}}.</ref>

This passage in the Meno is often seen as the first statement of the problem of the value of knowledge or "the Meno problem": ''how is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief?''<ref>[[Duncan Pritchard|Pritchard, Duncan]], John Turri, and J. Adam Carter. [2007] 2018. "[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/ The Value of Knowledge]" (revised). ''[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''.</ref> The nature of knowledge and belief is also discussed in the ''[[Theaetetus (dialogue)|Theaetetus]]''.

==Meno and Protagoras==
''Meno''{{'s}} theme is also dealt with in the dialogue ''[[Protagoras (dialogue)|Protagoras]]'', where Plato ultimately has Socrates arrive at the opposite conclusion: virtue ''can'' be taught. Likewise, while in ''Protagoras'' knowledge is uncompromisingly this-worldly, in ''Meno'' the theory of recollection points to a link between knowledge and eternal truths.<ref name=jmd />

== Texts and translations ==
* {{StandardEbooks|Standard Ebooks URL=https://standardebooks.org/ebooks/plato/dialogues/benjamin-jowett|Display Name=''{{PAGENAMEBASE}}'', in a collection of Plato's Dialogues|noitalics=true}}
*[[Benjamin Jowett|Jowett, Benjamin]]. 1871. "[http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/meno.html Meno]." – via ''Internet Classics Archive''. [[Project Gutenberg]]: [[gutenberg:1643|1643]].
*Lamb, W. R. M., trans. [1924] 1967. "[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Plat.+Meno&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0178 Meno]." ''Plato in Twelve Volumes'' 3. Cambridge, MA, [[Harvard University Press]]. {{ISBN|0-674-99183-4|0-674-99184-2}}. – via ''[[Perseus Project]]''.
*Woods, Cathal, trans. 2011. "[https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=178085004002127022009069115106013024060082067020068050097080091005006089095007126071031096111043054039035084099011066122027092022055033035034025113008096075007029027075032022121103067116026073005121117069026004031064083105073110082064005068124071001&EXT=pdf Meno]." {{SSRN|1910945}}.

==References==
{{Reflist|2}}

===Sources===
* {{cite book |chapter=Introduction| last=Day | first= Jane M. |title=Plato's Meno in Focus |date=1994 |publisher=Psychology Press |isbn=978-0-415-00297-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7bxzvEobDQQC |access-date=12 March 2023 |language=en}}
* Klein, Jacob. 1965. ''A Commentary on Plato's Meno''. Chapel Hill: [[University of North Carolina Press]].

==External links==
{{wikisource|Meno|''Meno''}}
* {{StandardEbooks|Standard Ebooks URL=https://standardebooks.org/ebooks/plato/dialogues/benjamin-jowett|Display Name=''{{PAGENAMEBASE}}'', in a collection of Plato's Dialogues|noitalics=true}}
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20090620053455/http://campus.belmont.edu/philosophy/Book.pdf Approaching Plato: A Guide to the Early and Middle Dialogues]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20110707075804/http://users.hartwick.edu/burringtond/dialogues/meno.html Guides to the Socratic Dialogues: Plato's ''Meno''.] A beginner's guide to the ''Meno''
* [http://www.charlesumlauf.com/classroom.htm Plato's ''Meno'': Contretemps in the Classroom]
* [https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d3/Meno82b-85d.svg Meno 82b–85d] A Visual Representation of the Geometry in Socrates' Interrogation of the Slave
* {{Librivox book |title=Meno |author=Plato}}
* [http://www.iep.utm.edu/meno-2/ Plato's Meno], article in the ''[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''

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Phronesis

2025-10-27T16:25:14Z

2600:1011:A18F:F810:7C12:A30A:D5BF:7C95: Fixed typo

{{short description|Ancient Greek word for a type of wisdom or intelligence}}
{{About||the academic journal|Phronesis (journal)|the band|Phronesis (band)|the album by Monuments|Phronesis (album)}}
{{italic title}}
In [[ancient Greek philosophy]], '''{{transliteration|grc|phronesis}}''' ({{langx|grc|[[wikt:φρόνησις|φρόνησις]]|phrónēsis}}) refers to the type of [[wisdom]] or [[intelligence]] concerned with practical action. It implies good judgment and excellence of [[Moral character|character]] and habits. In [[Aristotelian ethics]], the concept is distinguished from other words for wisdom and intellectual [[virtue]]s (such as {{transliteration|grc|[[episteme]]}} and {{transliteration|grc|[[Sophia (wisdom)|sophia]]}}) because of its practical character.

==Ancient Greek Philosophy==
===Socrates===
In some of [[Socrates]]' dialogues, he proposes that {{transliteration|grc|phronēsis}} is a necessary condition for all virtue,<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{cite book|first=W. K. C.|last=Guthrie|url=https://archive.org/details/historyofgreekph0006guth|url-access=registration|title=A History of Greek Philosophy|volume=6: Aristotle, an Encounter|page=[https://archive.org/details/historyofgreekph0006guth/page/348/mode/1up 348]|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1990|edition=revised|isbn=0-521-38760-4}}
|2={{cite book|first=Troels|last=Engberg-Pedersen|page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oj83D7aBgKMC&pg=PA236 236]|title=Aristotle's Theory of Moral Insight|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=1983|orig-date=1983|isbn=0-19-824667-6}} }}</ref> and that to be good is to be an intelligent or reasonable person with intelligent and reasonable thoughts.<ref>{{cite book|first=Christopher P.|last=Long|title=The Ethics of Ontology: Rethinking an Aristotelian Legacy|url=https://archive.org/details/ethicsofontology0000long/mode/1up|url-access=registration|page=[https://archive.org/details/ethicsofontology0000long/page/123/mode/1up 123)] |publisher=State University of New York Press|year=2004|isbn=0-7914-6119-X}}</ref> In Plato's ''[[Meno]]'', Socrates writes that {{transliteration|grc|phronēsis}} is the most important attribute to learn, although it cannot be taught and is instead gained through the understanding of one's own self.<ref>{{cite book|first=Shaun|last=Gallagher|pages=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rnHarjbLwd0C&dq=Phronesis+Socrates&pg=PA197 197]–199|title=Hermeneutics and Education|chapter=Self-understanding and phronēsis|publisher=State University of New York Press|year=1992|isbn=0-7914-1175-3}}</ref>

===Aristotle===
In Aristotle's work, {{transliteration|grc|phronesis}} is the intellectual virtue that helps turn one's moral instincts into practical action.{{r|NE}}<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kristjansson |first1=Kristján |title=Phronesis as an ideal in professional medical ethics: some preliminary positionings and problematics |journal=Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics |date=2015 |volume=36 |issue=5 |pages=299–320 |doi=10.1007/s11017-015-9338-4 |pmid=26387119 |s2cid=254786871 |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11017-015-9338-4 |access-date=5 October 2022|url-access=subscription }}</ref> He writes that moral virtues help any person to achieve the end, and that {{transliteration|grc|phronesis}} is what it takes to discover the means to gain that end.{{r|NE}} Without moral virtues, {{transliteration|grc|phronesis}} degenerates into an inability to make practical actions in regards to genuine [[good]]s for man.<ref>{{cite book |last1=MacIntyre |first1=Alasdair |title=After Virtue |year=1981 |publisher= University of Notre Dame Press |location=US: Indiana |isbn=978-0-268-00611-2 |page=154 |edition=2nd revised }}</ref>

In the sixth book of [[Aristotle]]'s ''[[Nicomachean Ethics]]'', he distinguished the concepts of {{transliteration|grc|[[Sophia (wisdom)|sophia]]}} (wisdom) and {{transliteration|grc|phronesis}}, and described the relationship between them and other intellectual virtues.<ref name=NE>{{cite book|author=[[Aristotle]]|title=[[Nicomachean Ethics]]}}</ref>{{rp|[https://standardebooks.org/ebooks/aristotle/nicomachean-ethics/f-h-peters/text/book-6 VI]}} He writes that {{transliteration|grc|Sophia}} is a combination of {{transliteration|grc|[[nous]]}}, the ability to discern reality, and {{transliteration|grc|[[episteme|epistēmē]]}}, things that "could not be otherwise".<ref>{{Citation|last=Parry|first=Richard|title=Episteme and Techne|date=2021|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/episteme-techne/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Winter 2021|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2021-11-28}}</ref> He then writes that {{transliteration|grc|Phronesis}} involves not only the ability to decide how to reach a certain end, but the ability to reflect upon and determine "good ends" as well.{{r|NE|at=[https://standardebooks.org/ebooks/aristotle/nicomachean-ethics/f-h-peters/text/book-6 VI] [http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Aristot.+Nic.+Eth.+1140a&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0053 1140a], [http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Aristot.+Nic.+Eth.+1141b&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0053 1141b], [http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Aristot.+Nic.+Eth.+1142b&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0053 1142b]}}

Aristotle also writes that although {{transliteration|grc|sophia}} is higher and more serious than {{transliteration|grc|phronesis}}, the pursuit of wisdom and happiness requires both, as {{transliteration|grc|phronesis}} facilitates {{transliteration|grc|sophia}}.{{r|NE|at=[https://standardebooks.org/ebooks/aristotle/nicomachean-ethics/f-h-peters/text/book-6#chapter-6-1-8 VI.8] [http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Aristot.+Nic.+Eth.+1142a&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0053 1142]}} According to Aristotle's theory of [[rhetoric]], {{transliteration|grc|phronesis}} is one of the three types of appeals to character ({{transliteration|grc|[[ethos]]}}).<ref>{{cite book|author=[[Aristotle]]|title=[[Rhetoric (Aristotle)|Rhetoric]]|at=[http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng1:1378a 1378a]}}</ref>

Aristotle claims that gaining phronesis requires gaining experience, as he writes:{{quote|...although the young may be experts in [[geometry]] and [[mathematics]] and similar branches of knowledge [''sophoi''], we do not consider that a young man can have Prudence [''phronimos'']. The reason is that Prudence [''phronesis''] includes a knowledge of particular facts, and this is derived from experience, which a young man does not possess; for experience is the fruit of years.<ref>{{cite book|author=[[Aristotle]]|title=The Nicomachean Ethics|url=https://archive.org/details/loeb-classical-library-aristotle-the-nicomachean-ethics-rackham|translator-first=H.|translator-last=Rackham|series=The Loeb Classical Library|at=[https://archive.org/details/loeb-classical-library-aristotle-the-nicomachean-ethics-rackham/page/348/mode/1up VI.8¶5 1142]}}</ref> }}

==Modern Philosophy==
According to philosophers Kristjánsson, Fowers, Darnell and Pollard, ''phronesis'' means making decisions in regards to moral events or circumstances. This four-component philosophical account became known as the ''Aristotelian Phronesis Model'', or ''APM''.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kristjánsso|last2= Fowers|last3= Darnell|last4= Pollard |first1=Kristján|first2=Blaine|first3= Catherine|first4= David |title=Phronesis (Practical Wisdom) as a Type of Contextual Integrative Thinking |journal=Review of General Psychology |date=2021 |volume=25 |issue=3 |pages=239–257 |doi=10.1177/10892680211023063 |s2cid=237456851 |doi-access=free }}</ref> There is recent{{Anachronism inline|reason=avoid "recent" as it is vague and risks going out of date as the article ages|date=August 2023}} work to return the virtue of practical judgement to overcome disagreements and conflicts in the form of Aristotle's ''phronesis''.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Beresford |first1=E.B. |title=Can phronesis save the life of medical ethics? |journal=Theoretical Medicine |date=1996 |volume=17 |issue=3 |pages=209–224 |doi=10.1007/BF00489446 |pmid=8952418 |s2cid=39100551 |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00489446 |url-access=subscription|access-date=5 October 2022}}</ref>

==In Social Sciences==
In [[Alasdair MacIntyre]]'s book ''[[After Virtue]]'', he called for a phronetic [[social science]]. He writes that for every prediction made by [[social science|social scientific]] theory there are usually [[counter-example]]s, meaning that the [[Predictability|unpredictability]] of human beings and human life requires focus on practical experiences.

In psychologist [[Heiner Rindermann]]'s book ''Cognitive Capitalism'', he uses the term {{transliteration|grc|phronesis}} to describe a rational approach to thinking and acting, "a circumspect and thoughtful way of life in a rational manner".<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9781107279339/type/book|url-access=subscription|title=Cognitive Capitalism: Human Capital and the Wellbeing of Nations|last=Rindermann|first=Heiner|date=2018|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-107-27933-9|edition=1st|doi=10.1017/9781107279339|page=188}}</ref>

Critiques of the ''APM''<nowiki/>'s empirical limitations led to McLoughlin, Thoma, and Kristjánsson developing the ''neo-Aristotelian Phronesis Model (neo-APM)'',<ref>{{Cite journal |last=McLoughlin |first=Shane |last2=Thoma |first2=Stephen |last3=Kristjánsson |first3=Kristján |date=2025-01-22 |title=Was Aristotle right about moral decision-making? Building a new empirical model of practical wisdom |url=https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0317842 |journal=PLoS One |language=en |volume=20 |issue=1 |article-number=e0317842 |doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0317842 |issn=1932-6203 |pmc=11753716 |pmid=39841702 |doi-access=free}}</ref> which refines the construct using contemporary psychometric techniques. This updated model empirically identified ten distinct components and employed network analysis to highlight the interconnectedness and centrality of key elements, such as aspired moral identity and moral deliberation. The neo-APM thus provides a more nuanced and empirically valid framework for understanding practical wisdom in psychological and educational contexts.

==See also==
* {{annotated link|[[Casuistry]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Common sense]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Dianoia]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Doctrine of the Mean]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Élan vital]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Judgement]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Rhetorical reason]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Nepsis]]}}
* [[Metanoia (disambiguation)]]

==References==
{{Reflist|30em}}

==Sources and further reading==
* {{cite journal|author-link=Roberto Andorno|first=Roberto|last=Andorno|url=https://www.academia.edu/1488903|url-access=subscription|title=Do our moral judgements need to be guided by principles?|journal=Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics|year=2012|volume=21|number=4|pages=457–465|doi=10.1017/S0963180112000230 |pmid=22828040 |s2cid=29078995 }}
* {{cite journal|author-link=Robert Bernasconi|first=Robert|last=Bernasconi|title=Heidegger's Destruction of Phronesis|journal=Southern Journal of Philosophy|volume=28 supp.|year=1989|pages=127–147}}
* {{cite journal|first=Clifford|last=Geertz|url=http://www.iwp.uni-linz.ac.at/lxe/sektktf/gg/GeertzTexts/Empowering_Aristotle.htm|title=Empowering Aristotle|journal=Science|volume=293|year=2001|issue=5527 |page=53|doi=10.1126/science.1062054 |s2cid=144219739 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110531195118/http://www.iwp.uni-linz.ac.at/lxe/sektktf/gg/GeertzTexts/Empowering_Aristotle.htm |archive-date=2011-05-31 |url-access=subscription}}
* {{cite book|author-link=Martin Heidegger|first=Martin|last=Heidegger|title=Plato's Sophist|location=Bloomington|publisher=Indiana University Press|year=1997}}
* {{cite book | last=Hughes | first=Gerard J. | title=Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle on Ethics | publisher=Psychology Press | publication-place=London | year=2001 | isbn=0-415-22187-0}}
* {{cite journal|author-link=Bruce Krajewski|first=Bruce|last=Krajewski|url=https://revista.classica.org.br/classica/article/view/166|url-access=|title=The dark side of ''phrónēsis'': revisiting the political incompetence of philosophy|journal=Classica|year=2011|volume=24|number=1/2|pages=7–21|doi=10.14195/2176-6436_24_1 |doi-access=free}}
* {{cite book | author-link=Alasdair MacIntyre|last=MacIntyre | first=Alasdair C. | title=After virtue: a study in moral theory | publisher=Duckworth | publication-place=London | year=2000 | isbn=0-7156-1663-3}}
* {{cite book|author-link=William McNeill (philosopher)|first=William|last=McNeill|title=The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory|location=Albany|publisher=State University of New York Press|year=1999}}
* {{cite book|first1=Ikujiro|last1=Nonaka|first2=Ryoko|last2=Toyama|first3=Toru|last3=Hirata|title=Managing Flow: A Process Theory of the Knowledge-Based Firm|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|location=New York|year=2008}}
* {{cite book | editor-link=Amélie Oksenberg Rorty|editor-last=Rorty | editor-first=Amélie | title=Essays on Aristotle's Ethics | publisher=Univ. of California Press | year=1980 | isbn=0-520-04041-4}}
* {{cite journal|author-link=Richard Sorabji|first=Richard|last=Sorabji|title=Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue|journal=[[Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society]]|volume=74|year=1973–1974|pages=107–129|doi=10.1093/aristotelian/74.1.107 |postscript=. Reprinted in Rorty.}}
* {{cite journal|author-link=David Wiggins|first=David|last=Wiggins|title=Deliberation and Practical Reason|journal=Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society|volume=76|year=1975–1976|pages=29–51|doi=10.1093/aristotelian/76.1.29 |postscript=. Reprinted in Rorty.}}

==External links==
* {{Wiktionary-inline}}

{{Ancient Greek philosophical concepts}}
{{Aristotelianism}}
{{Philosophy topics}}
{{Positivism}}
{{Virtues}}

[[Category:Aristotelianism]]
[[Category:Concepts in ancient Greek ethics]]
[[Category:Intelligence]]
[[Category:Philosophy of Aristotle]]
[[Category:Virtue]]