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Right of self-defense

2025-08-17T16:27:22Z

2A02:C7C:4D0A:A500:183:74BD:EC7D:1342: /* Definition in specific countries */ easier to read without the pipes

{{short description|Right for people to use reasonable force or defensive force}}
{{Distinguish|Self-defence in international law}}
{{Multiple issues|
{{More citations needed|date=September 2008}}
{{Globalize|1=article|2=USA|date=January 2010}}
}}
{{Use American English|date=August 2020}}
{{Criminal defenses}}
{{Rights}}

The '''right of self-defense''' is the right for people as individuals to commit a crime, violent or non-violent, for the purpose of defending their own life ([[self-defense]]) and property, or to defend the lives of others, in certain circumstances.<ref>For the rationale of Self-defense, see: Boaz Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal Law 11 – 106 (Hart Publishing, 2006).</ref> For example, while [[reckless driving]] is usually against the law, it can be justified if it was done to avoid a collision. The right, when it applies to the defense of another, is also called '''alter ego defense''', '''defense of others''', '''defense of a third person'''. Nations and [[state (polity)|states]] also have a [[self-defence in international law|right to self-defense]] in relation to their existence and independence.<ref>Eckersley, F., [https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/we-are-proud-to-support-ukraines-right-to-self-defence-for-as-long-as-it-takes-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council We are proud to support Ukraine’s right to self-defence for as long as it takes: UK statement at the UN Security Council], Statement at the [[UN Security Council]] meeting on Ukraine, 11 December 2023, accessed on 23 March 2025</ref>

In [[criminal law]], if a defendant commits a crime because of a threat of deadly or grievous harm, or a reasonable perception of such harm, the defendant is said to have a "perfect self-defense" [[Justification (jurisprudence)|justification]].<ref name=CL>Criminal Law Cases and Materials, 7th ed. 2012; John Kaplan, Robert Weisberg, Guyora Binder</ref> If a defendant commits a crime because of such a perception, and the perception is not reasonable, the defendant may have "[[imperfect self-defense]]" as an [[excuse]].<ref name=CL/>

== General concepts – legal theory ==
{{blockquote|Justification does not make a criminal use of force lawful; if the use of force is justified, it cannot be criminal at all.<ref>Dennis J. Baker, Glanville Williams Textbook of Criminal Law (London: 2012) at Chapter 21.</ref>}}

The early theories make no distinction between [[civil defense|defense]] of the person and defense of property. Whether consciously or not, this builds on the [[Roman law|Roman Law]] principle of ''dominium'' where any attack on the members of the family or the property it owned was a personal attack on the ''[[pater familias]]''{{spaced ndash}} the male head of the household, sole owner of all property belonging to the household, and endowed by law with dominion over all his descendants through the male line no matter their age.<ref>''See generally'', Frier & McGinn, ''A Casebook on Roman Family Law'', Oxford University Press (2004).</ref> The right to self-defense is phrased as the principle of ''vim vi repellere licet'' ("it is permitted to repel force by force") in the [[Digest (Roman law)|''Digest'' of Justitian]] (6th century). Another early application of this was [[Martin Luther]]'s concept of justified resistance against a [[Beerwolf]] ruler, which was used in the doctrine of the [[lesser magistrate]] propounded in the 1550 ''[[Magdeburg Confession]]''.

In ''[[Leviathan (Hobbes book)|Leviathan]]'' (1651), [[Hobbes]] (using the English term ''self-defense'' for the first time) proposed the foundation political theory that distinguishes between a [[state of nature]] where there is no authority and a modern state. Hobbes argues that although some may be stronger or more intelligent than others in their natural state, none are so strong as to be beyond a fear of violent death, which justifies self-defense as the highest necessity. In the ''[[Two Treatises of Government]]'', [[John Locke]] asserts the reason why an owner would give up their autonomy:

<blockquote>...the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which many call by the general name, property.</blockquote>

In earlier times before the development of national policing, an attack on the family home was effectively either an assault on the people actually inside or an indirect assault on their welfare by depriving them of shelter and/or the means of production. This linkage between a personal attack and property weakened as societies developed but the threat of violence remains a key factor. As an aspect of [[sovereignty]], in his 1918 speech {{Lang|de|Politik als Beruf}} ([[Politics as a Vocation]]), [[Max Weber]] defined a [[State (polity)|state]] as an authority claiming the [[monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force]] within defined territorial boundaries. Recognizing that the modern framework of nations has emerged from the use of force, Weber asserted that the exercise of power through the institutions of government remained indispensable for effective government at any level which necessarily implies that self-help is limited if not excluded.

For modern theorists, the question of self-defense is one of [[moral authority]] within the nation to set the limits to obedience to the state and its laws given the pervasive dangers in a world full of weapons. In modern societies, states are increasingly delegating or privatizing their coercive powers to corporate providers of security services either to supplement or replace components within the power hierarchy. The fact that states no longer claim a monopoly to police within their borders, enhances the argument that individuals may exercise a right or privilege to use violence in their own defense. Indeed, modern [[libertarianism]] characterizes the majority of laws as intrusive to personal autonomy and, in particular, argues that the right of self-defense from [[coercion]] (including violence) is a fundamental [[human right]], and in all cases, with no exceptions, justifies all uses of violence stemming from this right, regardless whether in defense of the person or property. In this context, note that Article 12 [[Universal Declaration of Human Rights]] states:

<blockquote>No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.</blockquote>

The inclusion of defense of one's family and home recognizes the universal benefit claimed to stem from the family's peaceable possession of private property. This general approach implicitly attacks [[Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld|Hohfeld's]] focus on the [[corelative|correlative]] relationship between right and duty as an aspect of human interactiveness as opposed to rights deemed implicitly more important because they attach to a person by virtue of his or her ownership of property. Further, it follows that, in this moral balancing exercise, laws must simultaneously criminalize aggression resulting in loss or injury, but decriminalize qualitatively identical violence causing loss or injury because it is used in self-defense. As a resolution of this apparent paradox and in defiance of Hohfeld, [[Robert Nozick]] asserted that there are no positive [[civil rights]], only rights to property and the right of autonomy. In this theory, the "acquisition principle" states that people are entitled to defend and retain all holdings acquired in a just way and the "rectification principle" requires that any violation of the first principle be repaired by returning holdings to their rightful owners as a "one time" redistribution. Hence, in default of self-defense in the first instance, any damage to property must be made good either in kind or by value. Similarly, theorists such as George Fletcher and Robert Schopp have adopted European concepts of autonomy in their liberal theories to justify the right-holder using all necessary force to defend his or her autonomy and rights. This right inverts the ''felicitation principle'' of [[utilitarianism]] with the responsive violence being the greatest good to the individual, but accurately mirrors [[Jeremy Bentham]] who saw property as the driving force to enable individuals to enhance their utilities through stable investment and trade. In liberal theory, therefore, to maximise the utility, there is no need to retreat nor use only proportionate force. The attacker is said to sacrifice legal protection when initiating the attack. In this respect, the criminal law is not the tool of a [[welfare state]] which offers a safety net for all when they are injured. Nevertheless, some limits must be recognized as where a minor initial attack simply becomes a pretext for an excessively violent response. The [[civil law (legal system)|civil law]] systems have a theory of "abuse of right" to explain denial of justification in such extreme cases.

== Moral theory ==
The right to armed self-preservation is derived from Graeco-Roman natural rights theory, clearly enunciated by the Roman statesman [[Cicero]] ([[Common Era|BCE]] 106–43) and other stoic philosophers, influenced by [[Aristotle]]. [[Miguel Faria]], author of the book ''America, Guns, and Freedom'' (2019), writing in ''[[Surgical Neurology International]]'' explained that individuals have a right to protect their persons via a natural right to self-defense; that people have not only a right to self-defense but also a moral duty to defend their families and neighbors; that the right to armed self-defense extends collectively to the community to curb or prevent tyrannical government.<ref name="SNI">{{cite web |last1=Faria |first1=Miguel A. |title=The moral philosophy of self-defense and resistance to tyranny in the Judeo-Christian Tradition |url=https://surgicalneurologyint.com/surgicalint-articles/the-moral-philosophy-of-self-defense-and-resistance-to-tyranny-in-the-judeo-christian-tradition-a-review-of-david-kopels-the-morality-of-self-defense-and-military-action-the-judeo/ |website=Surgical Neurology International (SNI) |access-date=10 August 2020}}</ref>

The right of free men to bear arms for self-defense becomes a duty to protect those under their household and care. Most religions, especially in the Judeo-Christian heritage agree on the right to self-defense and home protection with arms. The Catholic catechism derived from inception based on the theological work of [[Thomas Aquinas]]. It reads: "Legitimate defense can be not only a right but also a grave duty for one who is responsible for the lives of others. The defense of the common good requires that an unjust aggressor be rendered unable to cause harm." Furthermore, as "it happens that the need to render the aggressor incapable of causing harm sometimes involves taking his life."<ref>{{cite web |title=Catechism of the Catholic Church, Part Three, Life in Christ, Section Two, The Ten Commandments, Article 5, The Fifth Commandment|url=https://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a5.htm |website=Vatican Archives |access-date=10 August 2020}}</ref>

The English philosopher [[John Locke]] (1632–1704) posited that natural rights were self-evident and gave man the power "to pursue life, health, liberty and possessions," as well as the right to self-defense. This concept was taken by the [[Founding Fathers of the United States|Founders of the United States]] and clearly formulated by [[Thomas Jefferson]] in the [[United States Declaration of Independence|Declaration of Independence]]. In his review of David Kopel's ''The morality of self-defense and military action: The Judeo-Christian Tradition'' (2017), Faria concludes: "Liberty and the right to preserve life through self-defense are natural rights of the people – namely, gifts from God or Nature to man – and governments that attempt to circumvent those rights are no longer legitimate governments but usurpations. Bad governments and usurpations are already in rebellion against God and man, so the people have a legitimate right to self-defense in the form of insurrection to overthrow those governments."<ref name="SNI"/>

== Defense of others ==
{{Tort law|defenses}}

The rules are the same when force is used to protect ''another'' from danger.<ref name=CL/> Generally, the defendant must have a reasonable belief that the third party is in a position where they have the right of self-defense. For example, a person who unknowingly chances upon two actors practicing a fight would be able to defend their restraint of the one that appeared to be the aggressor. However, in many jurisdictions a person who causes injury in defense of another may be liable to criminal and civil charges if such defense turned out to be unnecessary.

== Legal defense for self-defense claim ==
'''Son assault demesne''' ("his own first assault") is a form of a plea to [[justification (jurisprudence)|justify]] an assault and [[battery (crime)|battery]], by which the [[defendant]] asserts that the [[plaintiff]] committed an assault upon him, and the defendant merely defended himself. Claiming a self-defense case will greatly depend on the threat. This includes whether it was a verbal threat that made the person feel threatened, to the extent that they felt the need to defend themselves. It will also depend on if the threat was imminent or not.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Imminent Danger Law and Legal Definition|url=https://definitions.uslegal.com/i/imminent-danger/|access-date=2018-11-29|website=definitions.uslegal.com|publisher=USLegal, Inc.|language=en-US}}</ref> Some questions to ask are was the threat about to happen and was the person's life really in danger? Did they provoke the person for the attack to happen? When the person attacked the person, did his or her self-defense match the threat, or was it to the point where the person ended up dead when they did not need to have been killed? Was it a '[[castle doctrine]]' defense?<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/castle_doctrine|title=Castle Doctrine|last=Ryan|first=Ms. Meghan|date=2009-11-16|website=LII / Legal Information Institute|language=en|access-date=2018-11-29}}</ref> Did they intentionally break in the person's home and try to harm the person or their family to the point where they had to defend themselves or others using deadly force?

When the plea is supported by evidence, it is a sufficient justification, unless the retaliation by the defendant were [[Imperfect self-defense|excessive]],<ref>{{citation|volume=30|publisher=Dick. L. Rev.|pages=191|date=October 1925 – June 1926|url=http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/dlr30&section=25|title=Exemplary Damages|author=Lyman, Robert W.}}</ref> and bore no proportion to the [[necessity (tort)|necessity]], or to the provocation received.<ref>1 East, P. C. 406; 1 Chit. Pr. 595.</ref> [[Character evidence]] that the plaintiff was noted for quarrelsomeness is generally admissible where an answer of son assault demesne is filed.<ref>{{citation|volume=36|publisher=Ky. L.J.|pages=307|date=1947–1948|title=Evidence: Character Evidence in a Civil Trial|author=McCarthy, Giles J.|url=http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/kentlj36&section=40}}</ref>

==Model Penal Code==
In the [[Model Penal Code]] applicable to [[states of the USA]], (MPC) §3.04 contains an elaborate formulation for use of force, including when it is justified, and limitations on the justification.<ref name=CL/> The MPC is neither static nor legally binding in any jurisdiction, however more than half of all U.S. states have enacted criminal codes that borrow heavily from the MPC.{{sfnp|Kadish|Schulhofer|Barkow|2017|p=157}} In general the MPC hold great sway in criminal courts even in states that have not directly drawn from it, as judges often use the MPC as a source of the [[Legal doctrine|doctrines]] and principles underlying criminal liability.{{sfnp|Kadish|Schulhofer|Barkow|2017|p=157}} However this is not the case with regards to the law on self-defense; the MPC's definition has been resoundingly rejected by both courts and legislatures, with only a handful of jurisdictions applying the MPC's definition of self defense. In the U.S., most states apply instead the [[Stand-your-ground law|''stand your ground'']] doctrine of self-defense; whereby an otherwise law abiding individual, while in any location they have a legal right to be, enjoys an extremely broad right to self-defense, being under no legal obligation to retreat from an aggressor regardless of ease or ability to do so.

==Common law cases==
In ''[[People v. La Voie]]'', Supreme Court of Colorado, 395 P.2d 1001 (1964), The court wrote, "When a person has reasonable grounds for believing, and does in fact actually believe, that danger of his being killed, or of receiving great bodily harm, is imminent, he may act on such appearances and defend himself, even to the extent of taking human life when necessary, although it may turn out that the appearances were false, or although he may have been mistaken as to the extent of the real actual danger."

== Definition in specific countries ==
* [[Self-defence (Australia)]]
* [[Self-defence (Czech Republic)]]
* [[Self-defense (Sweden)]]
* [[Self-defence in English law]]
* [[Self-defense (United States)]]

== See also ==
* [[Justifiable homicide]]
* [[Overview of gun laws by nation]]
* [[Pikuach nefesh#Other exceptions|Pikuach nefesh]]
* [[Right to keep and bear arms]]
* ''[[Son assault demesne]]''
* [[Use of force continuum]]

== References ==
{{Reflist}}

==Bibliography==
* {{cite journal |first1=Catherine L. |last1=Carpenter |year=2003 |title=Of the Enemy Within, The Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense |journal=Marquette Law Review |volume=86 |issue=4 |pages=653–700 |url=http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol86/iss4/1}}
* Sir Edward Coke, ''The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, or, A Commentary on Littleton'' (London, 1628, ed. F. Hargrave and C. Butler, 19th ed., London, 1832)
* Dressler, Joshua, ''New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking'', (1984) 32 UCLA L. Rev. 61.
* Fletcher, George P. (1990) ''Crime of Self-Defense: Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial'', Chicago: University of Chicago Press, {{ISBN|0226253341}}.
* Fletcher, George P. (2000) ''Rethinking Criminal Law'', Oxford: Oxford University Press, {{ISBN|0195136950}}.
* {{cite journal |last1=Getman |first1=Julius G |last2=Marshall |first2=F Ray |title=The Continuing Assault on the Right to Strike |year=2001 |volume=79 |issue=3 |journal=Texas Law Review |page=703}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Green |first1=Stuart P. |title=Castles and Carjackers: Proportionality and the Use of Deadly Force in Defense of Dwellings and Vehicles |year=1999 |journal=University of Illinois Law Review |volume=1999 |issue=1 |ssrn=123890}}
*{{cite book |last1=Kadish |first1=Sanford H. |last2=Schulhofer |first2=Stephen J. |last3=Barkow |first3=Rachel E. |date=2017 |title=Criminal Law and its Processes: Cases and Materials |edition=10th |location=New York |publisher=Wolters Kluwer}}
* {{cite encyclopedia |last= Lund|first=Nelson |author-link= |editor-first=Ronald |editor-last=Hamowy |editor-link=Ronald Hamowy |encyclopedia=The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism |chapter= Right to Bear Arms|chapter-url=https://sk.sagepub.com/reference/libertarianism/n269.xml|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=yxNgXs3TkJYC |year=2008 |publisher= [[SAGE Publishing|Sage]]; [[Cato Institute]] |location= Thousand Oaks, CA |doi= 10.4135/9781412965811.n269|isbn= 978-1412965804 |oclc=750831024| lccn = 2008009151 |pages=438–440|url-access=subscription }}
* {{cite journal |last1=McCoy |first1=Scott D. |title=The Homosexual-Advance Defense and Hate Crimes Statutes: Their Interaction and Conflict |year=2001 |volume=22 |issue=2 |journal=Cardozo Law Review |pages=629}}
* {{cite journal |jstor=3312349 |pages=379–486 |last1=Maguigan |first1=H. |title=Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals |volume=140 |issue=2 |journal=University of Pennsylvania Law Review |year=1991 |doi=10.2307/3312349|url=https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review/vol140/iss2/1 |url-access=subscription }}
* {{cite journal |jstor=1600480 |pages=1235–1308 |last1=Nourse |first1=V. F. |title=Self-Defense and Subjectivity |volume=68 |issue=4 |journal=The University of Chicago Law Review |year=2001 |doi=10.2307/1600480|url=http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2010&context=facpub |url-access=subscription }}
* Schopp, Robert F. (1998) ''Justification Defenses and Just Convictions'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, {{ISBN|0521622115}}.
* {{cite journal |last1=Segev |first1=Re'em |title=Fairness, Responsibility and Self-Defense |journal=Santa Clara Law Review |volume=45 |issue=2 |pages=383–460 |year=2005 |ssrn=756947}}
* Semeraro, (2006) [http://wwwdata.unibg.it/dati/bacheca/567/18910.pdf Osservazioni sulla riforma della legittima difesa] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110721043058/http://wwwdata.unibg.it/dati/bacheca/567/18910.pdf |date=2011-07-21 }}
* Vitu, Legitime defense et infraction d'imprudence, Revue de Science Criminelle, 1987, 865.
* "Criminal Law: Self-Defense". Michigan Law Review, vol. 2, no. 8, 1904, pp. 727–28, JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1272411. Accessed 18 May 2023.

== External links ==
* [https://www.useofforce.us/ UseofForce.us], an independent, in-depth breakdown of US self-defense legalities.
* {{CathEncy|wstitle=Self-Defense}}

{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Right Of Self-Defense}}
[[Category:Human rights]]
[[Category:Self-defense]]

John McDowell

2025-08-16T14:04:25Z

2A02:C7C:4D0A:A500:183:74BD:EC7D:1342: /* Selected articles */ link

{{Short description|South African philosopher and academic}}
{{About|the philosopher}}
{{BLP sources|date=January 2024}}
{{EngvarB|date=September 2014}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=September 2014}}
{{Infobox philosopher
|region = [[Western philosophy]]
|era = [[20th-century philosophy]]
|image = John McDowell (cropped).JPG
|caption = McDowell in 2007
|name = John McDowell
|birth_name = John Henry McDowell
|birth_date = {{Birth date and age|1942|03|07|df=y}}<ref>[http://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/files/faculty/mcdowellcv.doc John McDowell – Philosophy – University of Pittsburgh] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130603064651/http://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/files/faculty/mcdowellcv.doc |date= 3 June 2013 }}</ref>
|birth_place = [[Boksburg, Gauteng|Boksburg]], [[Union of South Africa|South Africa]]
|alma_mater = [[University of Zimbabwe|University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland]] (as issued by [[University of London]])<br />[[New College, Oxford]]
|school_tradition = [[Postanalytic philosophy]]<br />[[Pittsburgh School]]<br />[[Disjunctivism]]<br />[[Foundationalism]]<ref>John McDowell, ''Mind and World''. Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 29.</ref><ref name=Gibson>Roger F. Gibson, "McDowell's Direct Realism and Platonic Naturalism", ''Philosophical Issues'' Vol. 7, ''Perception'' (1996), pp. 275–281.</ref><br />[[Perceptual conceptualism]]<ref name=McDowellPaper/><br />[[Direct realism]]<ref>John McDowell, ''Mind and World''. Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 26.</ref><ref name=Gibson/><br />[[The New Wittgenstein]]<br /> [[Aristotelian ethics]]<br /> [[Hegelianism]]
| doctoral_students = [[Anita Avramides]], [[Alice Crary]]
| notable_students = [[Sebastian Rödl]]
|main_interests = [[Metaphysics]], [[epistemology]], [[logic]], [[philosophy of language]], [[philosophy of perception]], [[philosophy of mathematics]], [[philosophy of mind]], [[ethics]], [[meta-ethics]]
|notable_ideas = [[Perceptual conceptualism]]<ref name=McDowellPaper>{{Cite journal | last1 = McDowell | first1 = J. | title = What Myth? | doi = 10.1080/00201740701489211 | journal = Inquiry | volume = 50 | issue = 4 | pages = 338–351 | year = 2007 | s2cid = 214653941 }}</ref> [[naturalized Platonism]],<ref name=:0>{{Cite journal|last=Genova|first=A. C.|date=2003-03-02|title=Review of Reading McDowell on Mind and World|journal=Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews|url=https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/reading-mcdowell-on-mind-and-world/|issn=1538-1617}}</ref> [[moral particularism]],<ref>McDowell, J., 1979, "Virtue and Reason", ''The Monist'', 62: 331–50.</ref> [[disjunctivism]]
}}

'''John Henry McDowell''' {{post-nominals|country=GBR|FBA}} (born 7 March 1942) is a South African [[philosopher]], formerly a [[fellow]] of [[University College, Oxford]], and now university professor at the [[University of Pittsburgh]]. Although he has written on [[metaphysics]], [[epistemology]], [[ancient philosophy]], [[Nature (philosophy)|nature]], and [[meta-ethics]], McDowell's most influential work has been in the [[philosophy of mind]] and [[philosophy of language]]. McDowell was one of three recipients of the 2010 Andrew W. Mellon Foundation's Distinguished Achievement Award,<ref>{{cite web|title=Pitt Scholar Honored With Mellon Foundation Distinguished Achievement Award, $1.5 Million Grant for Putting Human Nature Back in Philosophy|url=http://www.news.pitt.edu/news/McDowell-Mellon-achievement-2010}}</ref> and is a Fellow of both the [[American Academy of Arts & Sciences]] and the [[British Academy]].

McDowell has, throughout his career, understood philosophy to be "therapeutic" and thereby to "leave everything as it is" ([[Ludwig Wittgenstein]], ''[[Philosophical Investigations]]''), which he understands to be a form of [[Quietism (philosophy)|philosophical quietism]] (although he does not consider himself to be a "quietist"). The philosophical quietist believes that philosophy cannot make any explanatory comment about how, for example, thought and talk relate to the world but can, by offering re-descriptions of philosophically problematic cases, return the confused philosopher to a state of intellectual perspicacity.

However, in defending this quietistic perspective McDowell has engaged with the work of leading contemporaries in such a way as to [[Therapeutic approach|therapeutically dissolve]] what he takes to be philosophical error, while defending major positions and interpretations from major figures in philosophical history, and developing original and distinctive theses about language, mind and value. In each case, he has tried to resist the influence of what he regards as a [[Scientism|scientistic]], [[Reductionism|reductive]] form of philosophical naturalism that has become very commonplace in our historical moment, while nevertheless defending a form of "Aristotelian naturalism,<ref>{{cite book |last1=McDowell |first1=John |title=Two Sorts of Naturalism |date=1995 |publisher=Clarendon Press}}</ref>" bolstered by key insights from [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]], Wittgenstein, and others.

==Life and career==

McDowell was born in [[Boksburg]], [[Union of South Africa|South Africa]] and completed a B.A. at the [[University of Zimbabwe|University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland]]. In 1963, he moved to [[New College, Oxford|New College]], [[Oxford University|Oxford]] as a [[Rhodes Scholarship|Rhodes scholar]], where he earned another B.A. in 1965 and an M.A. in 1969.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/person/john-mcdowell|title=John McDowell {{!}} Philosophy {{!}} University of Pittsburgh|last=Webteam|first=University of Pittsburgh University Marketing Communications|website=www.philosophy.pitt.edu|language=en|access-date=2018-10-19|archive-date=22 October 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191022044054/http://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/person/john-mcdowell|url-status=dead}}</ref> He taught at [[University College, Oxford]], from 1966 until 1986, when he joined the faculty at the [[University of Pittsburgh]], where he is now a University Professor. He has also been a visiting professor at many universities, including [[Harvard University]], [[University of Michigan]], and [[University of California, Los Angeles]].

McDowell was elected a Fellow of the [[British Academy]] in 1983<ref>[http://www.britac.ac.uk/fellowship/directory/ordinary.cfm?letter=M Directory of Fellows] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110606141050/http://www.britac.ac.uk/fellowship/directory/ordinary.cfm?letter=M |date= 6 June 2011 }}, [[British Academy]]. Accessed 2 April 2011</ref> and a Fellow of the [[American Academy of Arts and Sciences]] in 1992.<ref>[http://www.amacad.org/members/classList.pdf List of Fellows] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111005034430/http://www.amacad.org/members/classList.pdf |date=5 October 2011 }}, [[American Academy of Arts and Sciences]]. Accessed 2 April 2011</ref> In 2010 he received the [[Andrew W. Mellon Foundation]] Distinguished Achievement Award in the Humanities.<ref>[http://www.mellon.org/grant_programs/programs/higher-education-and-scholarship/distinguished-achievement-awards/ Distinguished Achievement Award] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110414061807/http://www.mellon.org/grant_programs/programs/higher-education-and-scholarship/distinguished-achievement-awards |date=14 April 2011 }}, [[Andrew W. Mellon Foundation]]. Accessed 2 April 2011</ref>

McDowell delivered the [[John Locke Lectures]] in Philosophy at [[Oxford University]] in 1991 (these became his book ''Mind and World''.)<ref>[http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/john_locke_lectures/past_lectures Past Lecturers, John Locke Lectures] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110720171436/http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/john_locke_lectures/past_lectures |date=20 July 2011 }}, Department of Philosophy, [[Oxford University]]. Accessed 2 April 2011</ref> He has also given the Woodbridge Lectures at [[Columbia University]] in 1997<ref>Tim Thornton, [http://www.philosophypress.co.uk/?p=541 Review: New books by John McDowell] {{webarchive|url=http://arquivo.pt/wayback/20091012234722/http://www.philosophypress.co.uk/?p=541 |date=12 October 2009 }}, ''The philosopher's magazine'', no. 36, 2009. Accessed 2 April 2011</ref> and the [[Howison Lectures in Philosophy]] at the [[University of California at Berkeley]] in 2006.<ref>[http://grad.berkeley.edu/lectures/list_series.php?serieslookup=Howison&query=alt_date&order=desc Howison Lectures in Philosophy], Graduate Council Lectures, [[University of California at Berkeley]]. Accessed 2 April 2011</ref>

He received an honorary degree from the [[University of Chicago]] in 2008.<ref>[http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/080612/degrees.shtml University to confer five honorary doctorates at Convocation], [[University of Chicago]] Chronicle, 12 June 2008, vol. 27, no. 18</ref>

==Philosophical work==

===Early work===

McDowell's earliest published work was in ancient philosophy, most notably including a translation of and commentary on [[Plato]]'s ''[[Theaetetus (dialogue)|Theaetetus]]''. In the 1970s he was active in the [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Davidsonian]] project of providing a semantic theory for [[natural language]], co-editing (with [[Gareth Evans (philosopher)|Gareth Evans]]) a volume of essays entitled ''Truth and Meaning''. McDowell edited and published Evans's influential posthumous book ''The Varieties of Reference'' (1982).

In his early work, McDowell was very much involved both with the development of the Davidsonian semantic programme and with the internecine dispute between those who take the core of a theory that can play the role of a theory of meaning to involve the grasp of truth conditions, and those, such as [[Michael Dummett]], who argued that linguistic understanding must, at its core, involve the grasp of assertion conditions. If, Dummett argued, the core of a theory that is going to do duty for a theory of a meaning is supposed to represent a speaker's understanding, then that understanding must be something of which a speaker can manifest a grasp. McDowell argued, against this Dummettian view and its development by such contemporaries as [[Crispin Wright]], both that this claim did not, as Dummett supposed, represent a Wittgensteinian requirement on a theory of meaning and that it rested on a suspect asymmetry between the evidence for the expressions of mind in the speech of others and the thoughts so expressed. This particular argument reflects McDowell's wider commitment to the idea that, when we understand others, we do so from "inside" our own practices: Wright and Dummett are treated as pushing the claims of explanation too far and as continuing [[Willard Van Orman Quine|W. V. O. Quine]]'s project of understanding linguistic behaviour from an "external" perspective.

In these early exchanges and in the parallel debate over the proper understanding of Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following, some of McDowell's characteristic intellectual stances were formed: to borrow a Wittgensteinian expression, the defence of a realism without empiricism, an emphasis on the human limits of our aspiration to objectivity, the idea that meaning and mind can be directly manifested in the action, particularly linguistic action, of other people, and a distinctive [[disjunctivism|disjunctive]] theory of perceptual experience.

The latter is an account of perceptual experience, developed at the service of McDowell's realism, in which it is denied that the [[argument from illusion]] supports an indirect or representative theory of perception as that argument presupposes that there is a "highest common factor" shared by veridical and illusory (or, more accurately, delusive) experiences. (There is clearly a distinction between perceiving and acquiring a belief: one can see an "apparently bent" stick in the water but not believe that it is bent as one knows that one's experience is illusory. In illusions, you need not believe that things are as the illusory experiences represent them as being; in delusions, a person believes what their experience represents to them. So the argument from illusion is better described as an argument from delusion if it is to make its central point.)

In the classic argument from illusion (delusion) you are asked to compare a case where you succeed in perceiving, say, a cat on a mat, to the case where a trick of light deceives you and form the belief that the cat is on the mat, when it is not. The proponent of the argument then says that the two states of mind in these contrasting cases share something important in common, and to characterise this we need to introduce an idea like that of "sense data." Acquaintance with such data is the "highest common factor" across the two cases. That seems to force us into a concession that our knowledge of the external world is indirect and mediated via such sense data. McDowell strongly resists this argument: he does not deny that there is something psychologically in common between the subject who really sees the cat and the one that fails to do so. But that psychological commonality has no bearing on the status of the judger's state of mind from the point of view of assessing whether she is in a position to acquire knowledge. In favourable conditions, experience can be such as to make manifest the presence of objects to observers – that is perceptual knowledge. When we succeed in knowing something by perceiving it, experience does not fall short of the fact known. But this just shows that a successful and a failed perceptual thought have nothing interesting in common from the point of view of appraising them as knowledge.

In this claim that a veridical perception and a non-veridical perception share no highest common factor, a theme is visible which runs throughout McDowell's work, namely, a commitment to seeing thoughts as essentially individuable only in their social and physical environment, so called externalism about the mental. McDowell defends, in addition to a general externalism about the mental, a specific thesis about the understanding of demonstrative expressions as involving so-called "singular" or "Russellian" thoughts about particular objects that reflects the influence on his views of Gareth Evans. According to this view, if the putative object picked out by the demonstrative does not exist, then such an object dependent thought cannot exist – it is, in the most literal sense, not available to be thought.

===Value theory===
In parallel with the development of this work on mind and language, McDowell also made significant contributions to moral philosophy, specifically meta-ethical debates over the nature of moral reasons and moral objectivity. McDowell developed the view that has come to be known as secondary property realism, or sensibility or [[moral sense theory]]. The theory proceeds via the device of an ideally virtuous agent: such an agent has two connected capacities. She has the right concepts and the correct grasp of concepts to think about situations in which she finds herself by coming to moral beliefs. Secondly, for such a person such moral beliefs are automatically over-riding over other reasons she may have and in a particular way: they "silence" other reasons, as McDowell puts it. He believes that this is the best way to capture the traditional idea that moral reasons are specially authoritative.

McDowell rejects the [[Humeanism#Theory of action|Humean theory]] that every intentional action is the result of a combination of a belief and a desire, with the belief passively supplying a representation and the desire supplying the motivation. McDowell, following [[Thomas Nagel]], holds that the virtuous agent's perception of the circumstances (i.e. her belief) justifies both the action and the desire. In order to understand the desire, we must understand the circumstances that the agent experienced and that compelled her to act. So, while the Humean thesis may be true about explanation, it is not true about the structure of justification— it should be replaced by Nagel's ''motivated desire theory''.<ref>Thomas Nagel,''[[iarchive:possibilityofalt0000unse|The Possibility of Altruism]]'' (Oxford University Press, 1970)</ref>

Implicit in this account is a theory of the metaphysical status of values: moral agents form beliefs about the moral facts, which can be straightforwardly true or false. However, the facts themselves, like facts about colour experience, combine anthropocentricity with realism. Values are not there in the world for any observer, for example, one without our human interest in morality. However, in that sense, colours are not in the world either, but one cannot deny that colours are both present in our experience and needed for good explanations in our common sense understanding of the world. The test for the reality of a property is whether it is used in judgements for which there are developed standards of rational argument and whether they are needed to explain aspects of our experience that are otherwise inexplicable. McDowell thinks that moral properties pass both of these tests. There are established standards of rational argument and moral properties fall into the general class of those properties that are both anthropocentric but real.

The connection between McDowell's general metaphysics and this particular claim about moral properties is that all claims about objectivity are to be made from the internal perspective of our actual practices, the part of his view that he takes from the later Wittgenstein. There is no standpoint from outside our best theories of thought and language from which we can classify secondary properties as "second grade" or "less real" than the properties described, for example, by a mature science such as physics. Characterising the place of values in our worldview is not, in McDowell's view, to downgrade them as less real than talk of quarks or the Higgs boson.

===Later work: ''Mind and World'' (1994)===
McDowell's later work reflects the influence of [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|G. W. F. Hegel]], [[P. F. Strawson]], [[Robert Brandom]], [[Richard Rorty]], and [[Wilfrid Sellars]]; both ''Mind and World'' and the Woodbridge lectures focus on a broadly [[Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] understanding of intentionality (the mind's capacity to represent). Influenced by Sellars's famous diagnosis of the "[[Wilfrid Sellars#"Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind"|Myth of the Given]]" in traditional empiricism,{{refn|group=nb|In brief, Sellars argues that the world merely causally affecting a being fails to supply rational justification for its beliefs, as only something that involves the use of concepts can serve as a reason for holding a belief.<ref>Sellars, W. (1956). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. In H. Feigl & M. Scriven (eds.), ''Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science'' (pp. 253–329). University of Minnesota Press.</ref>}} McDowell's goal in ''Mind and World'' is to explain how we are passive in our perceptual experience of the world but active in conceptualizing it. In his account, he tries to avoid any connection with idealism, and develops an account of what Kant called the "spontaneity" of our judgement in perceptual experience.

''Mind and World'' rejects a reductively naturalistic account: what McDowell calls "bald naturalism." He contrasts this with his own "naturalistic" perspective in which the distinctive capacities of mind are a cultural achievement of our "second nature", an idea that he adapts from [[Hans-Georg Gadamer|Gadamer]]. The book concludes with a critique of [[Willard Van Orman Quine|Quine]]'s narrow conception of empirical experience and also a critique of [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]]'s view of beliefs as being answerable only to other beliefs, in which Davidson plays the role of the pure [[Coherentism|coherentist]].

In his later work, McDowell denies that there is any philosophical use for the idea of [[Perceptual nonconceptualism|nonconceptual content]]— the idea that our experience contains representations that are not conceptually structured. Starting with a careful reading of Sellars's ''Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'', he argues that we need to separate the use of concepts in experience from a causal account of the preconditions of experience. He argues that the idea of "nonconceptual content" is philosophically unacceptable because it straddles the boundary between these two. This denial of nonconceptual content has provoked considerable discussion because other philosophers have claimed that scientific accounts of our mental lives (particularly in [[cognitive science]]) need this idea.

While ''Mind and World'' represents an important contemporary development of a Kantian approach to philosophy of mind and metaphysics, one or two of the uncharitable interpretations of Kant's work in that book receive important revisions in McDowell's later Woodbridge Lectures, published in the ''Journal of Philosophy'', Vol. 95, 1998, pp. 431–491. Those lectures are explicitly about Wilfrid Sellars, and assess whether or not Sellars lived up to his own critical principles in developing his interpretation of Kant (McDowell claims not). McDowell has, since the publication of ''Mind and World,'' largely continued to reiterate his distinctive positions that go against the grain of much contemporary work on language, mind, and value, particularly in North America where the influence of Wittgenstein has significantly waned.

===Influences===

McDowell's work has been heavily influenced by, among others, [[Aristotle]], [[Immanuel Kant]], [[G.W.F. Hegel|G. W. F. Hegel]], [[Karl Marx]], [[John Cook Wilson]],<ref>{{cite book |last1=Marion |first1=Mathieu |title=John Cook Wilson |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wilson/ |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|date=16 May 2024 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University }}</ref> [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]], [[Hans-Georg Gadamer]], [[Philippa Foot]],<ref>{{cite book |author1-link=Two Sorts of Naturalism |editor1-last=Hursthouse |editor1-first=Rosalind |editor2-last=Lawrence |editor2-first=Gavin |editor3-last=Quinn |editor3-first=Warrenn |title=Virtues and Reasons |date=July 1995 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=9781383013283 |pages=149–179 |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/49757/chapter-abstract/422624057?redirectedFrom=fulltext}}</ref> [[G. E. M. Anscombe|Elizabeth Anscombe]],<ref>{{cite journal |last1=McDowell |first1=John |title=What is the Content of an Intention in Action? |journal= Ratio|date=21 October 2010 |volume=23 |issue=4 |pages=415–432 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00476.x |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00476.x|url-access=subscription }}</ref> [[P. F. Strawson]], [[Iris Murdoch]],<ref>{{cite journal |last1=McDowell |first1=John |title=Virtue and Reason |journal=The Monist |date=1979 |volume=62 |issue=3 |pages=331–360 |doi=10.5840/monist197962319 |jstor=27902600 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/27902600|url-access=subscription }}</ref> [[David Wiggins]], and, especially in the case of his later work, [[Wilfrid Sellars]]. Many of the central themes in McDowell's work have also been pursued in similar ways by his [[University of Pittsburgh|Pittsburgh]] colleague [[Robert Brandom]] (though McDowell has stated strong disagreement with some of Brandom's readings and appropriations of his work). Both have been influenced by [[Richard Rorty]], in particular Rorty's ''[[Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature]]'' (1979). In the preface to ''Mind and World'' (pp. ix–x) McDowell states that "it will be obvious that Rorty's work is [...] central for the way I define my stance here."

==Publications==

===Books===
* ''Plato, Theaetetus'', translated with notes (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973)
* (Editor) Gareth Evans, ''The Varieties of Reference'' (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982)
*''Mind and World'' ([[Cambridge, Massachusetts|Cambridge]], [[Massachusetts|Mass.]]: [[Harvard University Press]], 1994)
*''Mind, Value, and Reality'' ([[Cambridge, Massachusetts|Cambridge]], [[Massachusetts|Mass.]]: [[Harvard University Press]], 1998)
* ''Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality'' (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998)
* ''Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars'' (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009)
* ''The Engaged Intellect: Philosophical Essays'' (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009)

===Selected articles===
<div style="font-size:90%;">
* (with [[Gareth Evans (philosopher)|Gareth Evans]]) "Introduction", in Gareth Evans and John McDowell, eds., ''[[iarchive:collectedpapers0000evan|Truth and Meaning]]'' (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976), pp. vii–xxiii; translated into Spanish: "Introducción a Verdad y Significado", Cuadernos de Crítica 37 (1984)
* "Truth Conditions, Bivalence, and Verificationism", ''[[iarchive:collectedpapers0000evan|ibid]]'', pp. 42–66
* "On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name", ''Mind'' lxxxvi (1977), 159–85; reprinted in [[Mark de Bretton Platts|Mark Platts]], ed., ''Reference, Truth and Reality'' (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980), pp. 141–66, and in [[Adrian William Moore|A. W. Moore]], ed., ''[[iarchive:meaningreference0000unse w6h0|Meaning and Reference]]'' (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993), pp. 111–36; translated into Spanish: "Sobre el Sentido y la Referencia de un Nombre Propio", ''Cuadernos de Crítica 20'' (1983)
* "On 'The Reality of the Past'", in [[Christopher Hookway]] and [[Philip Pettit]], eds., ''[[iarchive:actioninterpreta0000unse x3v2|Action and Interpretation]]'' (CUP, Cambridge,1978), pp. 127–44
* "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?", ''Aristotelian Society Supplementary'' Volume lii (1978), 13–29
* "Physicalism and Primitive Denotation", ''Erkenntnis'' xiii (1978), 131–52; reprinted in Platts, ed., op. cit., pp. 111–30
*"Virtue and Reason", ''The Monist'' lxii (1979), 331–50; reprinted in Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson, eds., ''[[iarchive:antitheoryinethi0000unse|Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism]]'' (SUNY Press, Albany, 1989), pp. 87–109
* "Quotation and Saying That", in Platts, ed., op. cit., pp. 206–37
* "Meaning, Communication, and Knowledge", in Zak van Straaten, ed., ''Philosophical Subjects: Essays on the Work of P. F. Strawson'' (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980), pp. 117–39
* "The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics", ''Proceedings of the African Classical Associations'' xv (1980), 1–14; reprinted in [[Amélie Rorty|Amélie Oksenberg Rorty]], ed., ''Essays on Aristotle's Ethics'' (University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1980), pp. 359–76
* "Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding", in Herman Parret and [[Jacques Bouveresse]], eds., ''Meaning and Understanding'' (De Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1981), pp. 225–48
* "Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following", in Steven Holtzman and Christopher Leich, eds., ''Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule'' (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981), pp. 141–62
* "Falsehood and Not-Being in Plato's Sophist", in [[Malcolm Schofield]] and [[Martha Nussbaum|Martha Craven Nussbaum]], eds., ''Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy presented to G. E. L. Owen'' (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982), pp. 115–34
* "Truth-Value Gaps", in ''Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science'' VI (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1982), pp. 299–313
* [https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/documents/2301/68p455.pdf "Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge"], ''Proceedings of the British Academy'' lxviii (1982), 455–79; reprinted in part in [[Jonathan Dancy]], ed., ''Perceptual Knowledge'' (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988)
* "Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World", in Eva Schaper, ed., ''[[iarchive:pleasurepreferen0000unse|Pleasure, Preference and Value]]'' (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983), pp. 1–16
* "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule", ''Synthese'' 58 (1984), 325–363; reprinted in Moore, ed., ''[[iarchive:meaningreference0000unse w6h0|Meaning and Reference]]'', pp. 257–93
* "De Re Senses", ''Philosophical Quarterly'' xxxiv (1984), 283–94; also in [[Crispin Wright]], ed., ''Frege: Tradition and Influence'' (Blackwell, Oxford, 1984), pp. 98–109
* "Values and Secondary Qualities", in [[Ted Honderich]], ed., ''Morality and Objectivity'' (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1985), pp. 110–29
* "In Defence of Modesty", in Barry Taylor, ed., ''[[iarchive:michaeldummettco0000unse|Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy]]'' (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1987), pp. 59–80
* ''[https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/12401/Projection%20and%20Truth%20in%20Ethics-1987.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Projection and Truth in Ethics]'' (1987 Lindley Lecture), published by the University of Kansas
* "One Strand in the Private Language Argument", ''Grazer Philosophische Studien'' 33/34 (1989), 285–303
* "Mathematical Platonism and Dummettian Anti-Realism", ''Dialectica'' 43 (1989), 173–92
* "Peacocke and Evans on Demonstrative Content", ''Mind'' xcix (1990), 311–22
* "Intentionality De Re", in Ernest LePore and Robert van Gulick, eds. ''John Searle and His Critics'' (Blackwell, Oxford, 1991), pp. 215–25
* "Intentionality and Interiority in Wittgenstein", in Klaus Puhl, ed., ''Meaning Scepticism'' (De Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1991), pp. 148–69
* "Putnam on Mind and Meaning", ''Philosophical Topics'' xx (1992), 35–48
* "Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy", in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., ''Midwest Studies in Philosophy'' Volume XVII: The Wittgenstein Legacy (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1992), pp. 40–52
* "Knowledge by Hearsay", in [[Bimal Krishna Matilal|B. K. Matilal]] and A. Chakrabarti, eds, ''[[iarchive:knowingfromwordswesternindianphilosophicalunderstandingtestimonybimalakrishnamat 637 w/page/n197/mode/1up|Knowing from Words]]'' (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1993; Synthese Library vol. 230), pp. 195–224
* "The Content of Perceptual Experience", ''Philosophical Quarterly'' xliv (1994), 190–205
* "Might there be External Reasons", in J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison, eds., ''[[iarchive:isbn 9780521479301|World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams]]'' (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995), pp. 68–85
* "Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle's Ethics", in Robert Heinaman, ed., ''Aristotle and Moral Realism'' (University College London Press, London, 1995), pp. 201–18
* "Knowledge and the Internal", ''Philosophy and Phenomenological Research'' lv (1995), 877–93
* "Deliberation and Moral Development in Aristotle", in Stephen Engstrom and [[Jennifer Whiting]], eds., ''[[iarchive:aristotlekantsto00step|Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics]]'' (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), pp. 19–35
* "Two Sorts of Naturalism", in [[Rosalind Hursthouse]], Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn, eds., ''Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory'' (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996), pp. 149–79; translated into German ("Zwei Arten von Naturalismus"), ''Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie'' v (1997), 687–710
* "Another Plea for Modesty", in Richard Heck, Jnr., ed., ''Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett'' (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997), pp. 105–29
* "Reductionism and the First Person", in Jonathan Dancy, ed., ''Reading Parfit'' (Blackwell, Oxford, 1997), pp. 230–50
* "Some Issues in Aristotle's Moral Psychology", in Stephen Everson, ed., ''Companions to Ancient Thought: 4: Ethics'' (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998), pp. 107–28
* "Referring to Oneself", in Lewis E. Hahn, ed., ''The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson'' (Open Court, Chicago and Lasalle, 1998), pp. 129–45
* "The Constitutive Ideal of Rationality: Davidson and Sellars", ''Crítica'' xxx (1998), 29–48
* "Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality" (The Woodbridge Lectures, 1997), ''The Journal of Philosophy'', Vol. 95 (1998), 431–91
* "Sellars's Transcendental Empiricism", in Julian Nida-Rümelin, ed., ''Rationality, Realism, Revision'' (Proceedings of the 3rd international congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy), Walter de Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1999, pp. 42–51.
* "Scheme-Content Dualism and Empiricism", in Lewis E. Hahn, ed., ''The Philosophy of Donald Davidson'' (Open Court, Chicago and Lasalle, 1999), pp. 87–104
* "Towards Rehabilitating Objectivity", in [[Robert Brandom|Robert B. Brandom]], ed., ''Rorty and His Critics'' (Blackwell, Malden, Mass. and Oxford, 2000), pp. 109–23
* "Experiencing the World" and "Responses", in [[Marcus Willaschek]], ed., ''John McDowell: Reason and Nature: Lecture and Colloquium in Münster 1999'' (LIT Verlag, Münster, 2000), pp. 3–17, 93–117
* "Moderne Auffassungen von Wissenschaft und die Philosophie des Geistes", in Johannes Fried und [[Johannes Süßmann]], ed., ''Revolutionen des Wissens: Von der Steinzeit bis zur Moderne'' (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2001), 116–35. (Previously published in Philosophische Rundschau.)
* "Gadamer and Davidson on Understanding and Relativism", in [[Jeff Malpas]], Ulrich Arnswald, and Jens Kertscher, eds., ''[[iarchive:gadamerscenturye0000unse|Gadamer's Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer]]'' (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2002), 173–94.
* "How not to read Philosophical Investigations: Brandom's Wittgenstein", in R. Haller and K. Puhl, eds., ''Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy: A Reassessment after 50 Years'' (Vienna: Holder, Pichler, Tempsky, 2002), pp. 245–56.
* "Knowledge and the Internal Revisited", ''Philosophy and Phenomenological Research'' lxiv (2002), 97–105.
* ''Wert und Wirklichkeit: Aufsätze zur Moralphilosophie'' (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2002). (Translation by Joachim Schulte, with an Introduction by Axel Honneth and Martin Seel, of seven of the papers in his ''Mind, Value, and Reality''.)
* "Hyperbatologikos empeirismos", ''Defkalion'' 21/1, June 2003, 65–90. (Translation into Greek of "Transcendental Empiricism", paper delivered at the Pitt/Athens symposium in Rethymnon, Crete, in 2000.)
* "Subjective, intersubjective, objective", ''Philosophy and Phenomenological Research'' lxvii (2003), 675–81. (Contribution to a symposium on a book by Donald Davidson.)
* ''Mente y Mundo'' (Spanish translation by Miguel Ángel Quintana-Paz of ''Mind and World''), Salamanca: Ediciones Sígueme, 2003.
* "L'idealismo di Hegel come radicalizazzione di Kant", in Luigi Ruggiu and [[Italo Testa]], eds., ''Hegel Contemporaneo: la ricezione americana di Hegel a confronto con la traduzione europea'' (Milan: Guerini, 2003). (Previously in Iride for December 2001.)
* "Naturalism in the philosophy of mind", in [[Mario De Caro|Mario de Caro]] and [[David Macarthur]], eds., ''Naturalism in Question'' (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004), 91–105. (Previously published in German translation as "Moderne Auffassungen von Wissenschaft und die Philosophie des Geistes", see above.)
* "Reality and colours: comment on Stroud", ''Philosophy and Phenomenological Research'' lxviii (2004), 395–400. (Contribution to a symposium on a book by Barry Stroud.)
* "The apperceptive I and the empirical self: towards a heterodox reading of 'Lordship and Bondage' in Hegel's Phenomenology", ''Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain'' 47/48, 2003, 1–16.
* "Hegel and the Myth of the Given", in Wolfgang Welsch und [[Klaus Vieweg]], Herausg., ''Das Interesse des Denkens: Hegel aus heutiger Sicht'' (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2003), pp. 75–88.
</div>

==Notes==
{{reflist|group=nb}}

==References==
{{reflist|22em}}

==Further reading==
* [[Marcus Willaschek]] (ed.), ''John McDowell: Reason and Nature'', Munster: Lit Verlag, 1999
* Nicholas Smith (ed.), ''Reading McDowell: On Mind and World'', Routledge, 2002
* [[Tim Thornton (philosopher)|Tim Thornton]], ''John McDowell'', Acumen Publishing, 2004
* [[Robert Maximilian de Gaynesford]], ''John McDowell'', Blackwell / Polity Press, 2004
* [[Sandra Dingli|Sandra M. Dingli]], ''On Thinking and the World: John McDowell's Mind and World'', Ashgate, 2005
* [[Richard Gaskin]], ''[[iarchive:experienceworlds0000gask|Experience and the World's Own Language: A Critique of John McDowell's Empiricism]]'', Oxford University Press, 2006 (See [https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/experience-and-the-world-s-own-language-a-critique-of-john-mcdowell-s-empiricism/ review essay] by Jason Bridges)
* [[Cynthia Macdonald (philosopher)|Cynthia MacDonald]] & Graham MacDonald (eds.), ''McDowell and His Critics'', Blackwell, 2006
*Jakob Lingaard (ed.) ''John McDowell: Experience, Norm and Nature'', Blackwell, 2008
* Chauncey Maher, ''The Pittsburgh School of Philosophy: Sellars, McDowell, Brandom'', Routledge, 2012
* Joseph K. Schear (ed.) ''Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate'', Routledge, 2013
* Charles Macmillan Urban, [https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/596/ Content and Concept: An Examination of Transcendental Empiricism], (PhD Dissertation 2013)
* Anne Le Goff & Christophe Al-Saleh (ed.) ''Autour de l'esprit et le monde de John McDowell'', Paris, Vrin, 2013
* Matthew Boyle & Evgenia Mylonaki (ed.) ''Reason in Nature: New Essays on Themes from John McDowell'', Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2022

==External links==
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20120727052250/http://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/people/faculty/mcdowell.php John McDowell – Philosophy – University of Pittsburgh]
* [http://www.website2.net/mcdowellseesaw.html Summary of Mind and World ch 1]

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