View source for Appeasement

{{short description|Diplomatic policy of concessions}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=May 2022}}
{{Use British English|date= October 2020}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1976-063-32, Bad Godesberg, Münchener Abkommen, Vorbereitung.jpg|thumb|right| [[Adolf Hitler]] greets [[British Prime Minister]] [[Neville Chamberlain]] at the beginning of the [[Bad Godesberg]] meeting on 24 September 1938 in which Hitler demanded annexation of [[Sudetenland|Czech border areas]] without delay, leading to the [[Godesberg Memorandum]].]]
{{Conflict resolution sidebar}}
{{War}}
'''Appeasement''', in an [[International relations|international context]], is a [[diplomacy|diplomatic]] [[negotiation]] policy of making political, material, or territorial concessions to an aggressive [[power (international relations)|power]] with intention to avoid conflict.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.history.co.uk/explore-history/ww2/appeasement.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130404054019/http://www.history.co.uk/explore-history/ww2/appeasement.html|url-status=unfit|title=Appeasement — World War 2 on History|archive-date=4 April 2013|website=www.history.co.uk}}</ref> The term is most often applied to [[Foreign relations of the United Kingdom|the foreign policy]] between 1935 and 1939 of the British governments of [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom|Prime Ministers]] [[Ramsay MacDonald]], [[Stanley Baldwin]] and most notably [[Neville Chamberlain]] towards [[Nazi Germany]] and [[Fascist Italy]].<ref>Mallett, Robert  (1997). "The Anglo-Italian war trade negotiations, contraband control and the failure to appease Mussolini, 1939–40." ''Diplomacy and Statecraft'' 8.1: 137–67.</ref> Under [[United Kingdom|British]] pressure, appeasement of Nazism and Fascism also played a role in [[History of French foreign relations|French foreign policy]] of the period but was always much less popular there than in the [[United Kingdom]].<ref>{{cite book | last1 = Hucker | first1 = Daniel | year = 2011 | title = Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=NEsGDAAAQBAJ | location = London| publisher = Routledge | publication-date = 2016 | isbn = 978-1-317-07354-3 | access-date = 12 October 2020}}</ref>

In the early 1930s, appeasing concessions were widely seen as desirable because of the [[anti-war]] reaction to the trauma of [[World War I]] (1914–1918), second thoughts about the perceived vindictive treatment by some of [[Weimar Republic|Germany]] in the 1919 [[Treaty of Versailles]], and a perception that [[fascism]] was a useful form of [[anti-communism]]. However, by the time of the [[Munich Agreement]], which was concluded on 30 September 1938 between Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, the policy was opposed by the [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]] and by a few [[Conservative Party (UK)|Conservative]] dissenters such as future Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]], Secretary of State for War [[Duff Cooper]], and future Prime Minister [[Anthony Eden]]. Appeasement was strongly supported by the [[upper class (UK)|British upper class]], including [[British royal family|royalty]], [[big business]] (based in the [[City of London]]), the [[House of Lords]], and [[mass media in the United Kingdom|media]] such as the [[BBC]] and ''[[The Times]].''<ref>Andrew Roberts, "'Appeasement' Review: What Were They Thinking? Britain's establishment coalesced around appeasement and bared its teeth at those who dared to oppose it", [https://www.wsj.com/articles/appeasement-review-what-were-they-thinking-11572619353 ''Wall Street Journal'' 1 Nov. 2019).]</ref>{{Better source needed|reason=The current source is insufficiently reliable ([[WP:NOTRS]]).|date=March 2025}} However, it would be mistaken to say that the policy was not similarly supported amongst the working and middle classes as well, who were not enthusiastic about another war until popular opinion changed following events like [[Kristallnacht]] and Hitler’s invasion of rump Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939, and that at the time of Munich elite endorsement rang in concordance with popular opinion.

As alarm grew about the rise of fascism in Europe, Chamberlain resorted to attempts at news [[censorship]] to control [[public opinion]].<ref>{{cite book|author= McDonough, Frank |title= Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement, and the British Road to War|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=3tQoAEo9Y6oC&pg=PA114|year= 1998|publisher= Manchester UP|page= 114|isbn= 978-0-7190-4832-6}}Compare: {{cite book|author= Frank McDonough|title= Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement, and the British Road to War|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=3tQoAEo9Y6oC|year= 1998|publisher= Manchester UP|page= 124|isbn= 978-0-7190-4832-6 | quote = By and large, the Chamberlain government tried to persuade editors to operate an informal self-censorship. [...] Editors of leading national newspapers were asked to support Chamberlain's efforts to gain a peaceful settlement and to avoid critical comment. Yet the freedom enjoyed by the press ensured that total government control was never feasible and critical comment continued to appear. <br /> Government pressure to restrict criticism of appeasement on BBC radio was far more successful. Radio coverage of foreign policy during the inter-war years was severely restricted through a combination of discreet pressure, self-censorship and guidance from Downing Street and the foreign office.}}</ref> He confidently announced after Munich that he had secured "[[peace for our time]]".<ref>Hunt, ''The Makings of the West'' p. 861.</ref>

Academics, politicians and diplomats have intensely debated the 1930s appeasement policies ever since they occurred. Historians' assessments have ranged from condemnation ("[[Lesson of Munich]]") for allowing Hitler's Germany to grow too strong to the judgment that Germany was so strong that it might well win a war and that postponing a showdown was in the best interests of the West.

==History==
===Failure of collective security===
{{Blockquote|quote  = Appeasement policy, the policy of appeasing Hitler and Mussolini, operating jointly at that time, during 1937 and 1938 by continuous concessions granted in the hope of reaching a point of saturation when the dictators would be willing to accede to international collaboration.... It came to an end when Hitler seized Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939, in defiance of his promises given at Munich, and Prime Minister Chamberlain, who had championed appeasement before, decided on a policy of resistance to further German aggression. |source = Walter Theimer (ed.), ''The Penguin Political Dictionary'', 1939}}

Chamberlain's policy of appeasement emerged from the failure of the [[League of Nations]] and the failure of [[collective security]]. The League of Nations was set up in the [[aftermath of World War I]] in the hope that international co-operation and collective resistance to aggression might prevent another war. Members of the League were entitled to the assistance of other members if they came under attack. The policy of collective security ran in parallel with measures conducted since the early 1920s like the [[Washington Naval Conference]] to achieve international disarmament that were stepped up with the largely symbolic [[Kellogg-Briand Pact]] of 1928 and the [[Disarmament Conference]] of 1932-34, and, if possible, was to be based on [[economic sanctions]] against an aggressor.

====Invasion of Manchuria====
{{main|Japanese invasion of Manchuria}}
In September 1931, the [[Empire of Japan]], a member of the League of Nations, invaded [[Manchuria]], in [[northeast China]], by claiming that the regional population was not only [[Han Chinese|Chinese]] but was multi-ethnic. The [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]] appealed to the League of Nations and to the United States for assistance. The [[League of Nations Council]] asked the parties to withdraw to their original positions to permit a peaceful settlement. The United States reminded them of their duty under the [[Kellogg–Briand Pact]] to settle matters peacefully. Japan was undeterred and went on to occupy the whole of Manchuria. The League set up the [[Lytton Commission]], a commission of inquiry that condemned Japan, and the League duly adopted the report in February 1933. In response, Japan resigned from the League and continued its advance into China, with neither the League nor the United States taking any action. However, the U.S. issued the [[Stimson Doctrine]] and refused to recognize Japan's conquest, which played a role in shifting U.S. policy to favour China over Japan during the late 1930s.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Clauss |first1=E. M. |title=The Roosevelt Administration and Manchukuo, 1933?1941 |doi=10.1111/j.1540-6563.1970.tb00380.x |journal=The Historian |volume=32 |issue=4 |pages=595–611 |year=1970}}</ref> Some historians, such as [[David Thomson (historian)|David Thomson]], assert that the League's "inactivity and ineffectualness in the Far East lent every encouragement to European aggressors who planned similar acts of defiance".<ref>[[David Thomson (historian)|Thomson, David]] (1957) ''Europe Since Napoleon'', London: Longans Green & Co. p. 691</ref> However it may be argued that the Lytton Commission’s report and the League’s ineffectual opposition to Japan, while not effective was also highly critical and therefore should not be taken as precedent for the appeasement of Germany in the later 1930s. World opinion never excused Japanese action in 1931-33 anywhere near the way it did German action in 1936-38.

==== Disarmament Conference====
The Disarmament Conference had come at a time when the League, still a recognised arbiter of international disputes was still looking at the Manchurian invasion, as world leaders tried a myopic attempt to forstall war. The key issue that the Conference stuck on was the German delegates’ insistence that everyone either should disarm to levels of Germany (as imposed by the Treaty of Versailles) or Germany be permitted to attain military parity with her neighbours. Well before Hitler’s coming to power Weimar politicians had backed rearmament drives like [[Treaty of Rapallo, 1922|treaties]] of cooperation with the other international pariah, the [[Soviet Union]], and Hitler merely walking out of the Conference signalled that there would be henceforth a new way of diplomacy that did not necessarily involve the League, which anyway had arguably been bound to failure from the exclusion of isolationist America since 1920. From then on a new exploration of this diplomacy by Britain, who did not wish to cut off Germany entirely, was directed by [[National Government (United Kingdom)|National Government]] Foreign Secretary [[Samuel Hoare, 1st Viscount Templewood|Samuel Hoare]] beginning with the 1934 [[Anglo-German Payments Agreement]] stabilised economic relations between Britain and Germany, guaranteeing German interest repayments on bonds arising from [[World War I reparations]] (which Hitler had stopped repaying in any case) and deepening British economic ties to Germany, particularly in the area of trade. [[Herbert von Dirksen]], the German ambassador to Britain, in 1938 characterised the agreement, alongside the 1935 naval agreement, as carrying "the swaying structure of foreign relations [between the UK and Germany] even in critical periods".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Wendt |first=Bernd-Jürgen |url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003212997-17/economic-appeasement-crisis-strategy-bernd-j%C3%BCrgen-wendt |title=The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=1983 |isbn=9781003212997 |page=168 |chapter='Economic Appeasement' – A Crisis Strategy|doi=10.4324/9781003212997-17 }}</ref>

====Anglo-German Naval Agreement====
The 1935 [[Anglo-German Naval Agreement]] had Britain permit Germany to begin rebuilding the [[Kriegsmarine|German Navy]], including its [[U-boats]], despite Germany having repeatedly violated the [[Treaty of Versailles]]. Previously, since the [[Night of the Long Knives]] and the attempted coup against [[Engelbert Dollfuss]] in Austria, a pro-Austria (then an Italian satellite) Mussolini sought a common front with Britain and France against Hitler’s revisionism, the [[Stresa Front]].

However a similar mutual defence [[Franco-Soviet Pact|pact]] with the [[Soviet Union]] by French foreign minister [[Louis Barthou]], killed with King [[Alexander I of Yugoslavia]] in 1934, had been ratified anyway by the French in 1935, this driving Conservative opinion in Britain against the Stresa Front and in favour of direct dealing with Germany, hence the signing of the Agreement. This was the first significant step in a process that had begun with the failure of the Disarmament Conferences which had started with high hopes in 1933-34, that saw British government and large sections of public opinion alike work towards a new arrangement with Germany that would include her equitably as a partner in the affairs of Europe, as opposed to that prescribed by the [[Treaty of Versailles]]. Only then, it was felt would Germany feel at ease and lasting peace be attained- a policy which might indeed have worked had German foreign policy been directed by more moderate and cautious traditional right-wingers, like previously under [[Gustav Stresemann]] during the Weimar era, instead of by Hitler, a gambler “[[va banque]]” and megalomaniac.<ref>Kissinger, Henry Diplomacy (1994)</ref>

According to [[A.J.P. Taylor]], the British government was a key player with agency in the non-fascist camp’s diplomatic scene of the 1930s, as the United States was still overwhelmingly [[isolationist]] following the reaction to interventionism after 1917-18, and France was paralysed by a number of successive governments of the [[French Third Republic]], often with razor-thin political margins that they did not wish to expend it on foreign policy and so chose or were obliged to follow Britain’s lead up until September 1939.<ref>Taylor, A.J.P. The Origins of the Second World War</ref>

====Abyssinia crisis====
{{Main|Abyssinia Crisis|Hoare–Laval Pact}}
[[File:Addis Ababa-8e00855u.jpg|thumb|right|upright=1.25|Emperor [[Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia|Haile Selassie]] of [[Ethiopian Empire|Ethiopia]], {{Circa|1942}}]]
Benito Mussolini had [[Abyssinian Crisis|imperial ambitions]] in [[Abyssinia]]. Italy was already in possession of the neighbouring [[Italian Eritrea|Eritrea]] and [[Italian Somaliland|Somalia]]. In December 1934, there was a clash between [[Royal Italian Army]] and [[Imperial Ethiopian Army]] troops at [[Walwal]], near the border between [[British Somaliland|British]] and [[Italian Somaliland]], in which Italian troops took possession of the disputed territory, and about 150 Abyssinians and 50 Italians were killed. Italy demanded apologies and compensation from Abyssinia, which appealed to the League, with Emperor [[Haile Selassie]] famously appealing in person to the assembly in [[Geneva]]. The League persuaded both sides to seek a settlement under the [[Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1928]], but Italy continued troop movements, and Abyssinia appealed to the League again. In October 1935 Mussolini launched an attack on Abyssinia. The League declared Italy to be the aggressor and imposed sanctions, but coal and oil were not included since blocking them was thought, would provoke war. [[Albanian Kingdom (1928–1939)|Albania]], [[Federal State of Austria|Austria]] and [[Kingdom of Hungary (1920–1946)|Hungary]] refused to apply sanctions, and Germany and the United States were not in the League. Nevertheless, the [[Economy of fascist Italy|Italian economy suffered]]. Britain considered closing off the [[Suez Canal]], which would have stopped arms to Abyssinia, but thinking that would be too harsh a measure, failed to do so.<ref name=Taylor />

Earlier, in April 1935, Italy had joined Britain and France in protest against [[German rearmament]]. Britain was less hostile to Germany and set the pace in imposing sanctions and moved a naval fleet into the [[Mediterranean]], but in November 1935, British Foreign Secretary [[Samuel Hoare, 1st Viscount Templewood|Sir Samuel Hoare]] and French Prime Minister, [[Pierre Laval]] had secret discussions in which they [[Hoare–Laval Pact|agreed to concede two thirds of Abyssinia to Italy]]. However, the press leaked the content of the discussions, and a public outcry forced Hoare and Laval to resign. This effectively cancelled out British attempts at resuming traditional non-League diplomatic tactics to keep Italy aboard the Stresa Front, as Britain had taken with the agreements with Germany, and by the three principal remaining guarantors of the League operating so blatantly outside the League at the expense of another member, doomed its already tottering credibility in public eyes. After Abyssinia international crises like the Czechoslovak crisis were barely even referred to the League, the traditional diplomacy having resumed its place in international affairs. Wilsonian idealism was now definitely dead, if it had ever truly been alive.

In May 1936, undeterred by sanctions, Italy captured [[Addis Ababa]], the Abyssinian capital, and proclaimed [[Victor Emmanuel III]] as Emperor of [[Italian East Africa|Ethiopia]]. In July the League abandoned sanctions. The episode, in which sanctions were incomplete and appeared to be easily given up, seriously discredited the concept of collective security also, and more and more countries began to resume the course of traditional diplomacy (which had arguably never been completely suspended even during the League’s prime in the 1920s) that Britain had begun to pursue toward Germany since at least the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. Mussolini was flung in to the arms of the only power willing to not condemn his invasion, Hitlerian Germany by the indignant British public’s obliging the withdrawal of Hoare’s offer, pitting British traditional foreign policy’s resumption against a still pro-Wilsonian public opinion, and while British foreign policy struggled to readjust itself, the [[Rome-Berlin Axis]] was rapidly concluded with the new Italian pro-German foreign minister [[Galeazzo Ciano]].

====Remilitarisation of the Rhineland====
{{Main|Remilitarisation of the Rhineland}}
[[File:Stanley Baldwin 02.jpg|thumb|right|British Prime Minister [[Stanley Baldwin]]]]
Under the [[Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920)|Versailles Settlement]], the [[Rhineland]] was [[demilitarised]]. Germany accepted that arrangement under the [[Locarno Treaties]] of 1925. Hitler claimed that it prevented Germany’s self-defence, and, on 7 March 1936, sent the [[Wehrmacht]] into the [[Rhineland]]. He gambled on Britain not getting involved but was unsure of how France would react. The action was opposed by many of his advisers. His officers had orders to withdraw if they met French resistance. [[French Third Republic|France]] consulted Britain and lodged protests with the League but took no action. Prime Minister [[Stanley Baldwin]] said that Britain lacked the forces (according to intelligence that turned out to have vastly overestimated the German forces’ strength)<ref name="Taylor, Origins">Taylor, Origins</ref> to back its guarantees to France and that in any case, public opinion would not allow so.

In Britain, it was thought that the Germans were merely walking into "their own backyard". [[Hugh Dalton]], a [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]] MP who usually advocated stiff resistance to Germany, said that neither the British people nor Labour would support military or economic sanctions.<ref name=Taylor>Taylor, A.J.P., ''English History, 1914–1945'', 1965</ref> Therefore, unlike over Abyssinia, here public opinion coincided with that of the government’s in not opposing the act of agression for the sake of restoring Germany to an equitable position to create a lasting peace order by overturning that of Versailles.

In the Council of the League, only the [[Soviet Union]] proposed sanctions against Germany. Hitler, who was invited to negotiate, proposed a [[non-aggression pact]] with the Western powers. When asked for details, he did not reply. Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland had persuaded him that the international community would not resist him, and it put Germany in a powerful strategic position.{{Citation needed|date=December 2012}}

====Spanish Civil War====
{{Main|Non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War}}

{{blockquote|It is not so much a case of taking actual steps immediately, as of pacifying the aroused feelings of the Leftist parties... by the very establishment of such a Committee.|[[Otto Christian Archibald von Bismarck]]<ref name="thomas278"/>}}

Many historians argue that the British policy of non-intervention was a product of the Establishment's anti-communist stance. Scott Ramsay (2019) instead argues that Britain demonstrated "[[benevolent neutrality]]" and was simply hedging its bets by avoiding the favouring of one side or the other. The goal was that in a European war Britain would enjoy the "benevolent neutrality" of whichever side won in Spain.<ref>Scott Ramsay. "Ensuring Benevolent Neutrality: The British Government's Appeasement of General Franco during the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939".  ''International History Review'' 41:3 (2019): 604–623.  DOI:  https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2018.1428211.</ref>

It is clear that in either case, “Non-Intervention”, a French proposal gratefully endorsed by Britain on 2 August 1936 to avoid having to do anything,<ref>Alpert, Michael A New International History of the Zephaniah Civil War</ref> amounted to a prejudiced losing game for the legitimate government of Spain, the [[Republican faction (Spanish Civil War)|Spanish Republic]], which was starved of arms, and isolated diplomatically due to Non-Intervention, forcing her to turn to the USSR for supply, thereby further isolating her.

For the Committee of European states that supervised its application were routinely told that the powers who were actively supplying the [[Nationalist faction]] (Germany and Italy) could not have broken a non-binding commitment, and they walked out at least once.<ref>Bolloten, Burnett, The Spanish Civil War</ref> The Republic was not even allowed to bring complaints as only members could do so. The German representative, [[Joachim von Ribbentrop]] later said:

{{blockquote|It would have been better to call this the Intervention Committee, for the whole activity of its members consisted in explaining or concealing the participation of their countries in Spain.|[[Joachim von Ribbentrop]] in his memoirs.<ref>Heydecker, Leeb (1975). p. 174.</ref>}}

All the considerations of the Powers’ behaviour was based on their acting within the scope of extra-League resumption of traditional diplomacy that had become the norm since Abyssinia. A.J.P. Taylor cites the 1937 [[Nyon Conference]] as a rare instance of fascist backing down when confronted by Great Britain over unrestricted submarine warfare.<ref name="Taylor, Origins"/> Germany and Italy went as far as they dared, while [[George Orwell]] criticised the Republic for clinging to traditional diplomacy in regard to its policy in [[Spanish Morocco]], a recruiting base of the Moroccan regulares of Franco, which the Republicans respected to avoid antagonising France over [[French Morocco]].<ref>Orwell, George Homage to Catalonia</ref>

===Conduct of appeasement, 1937–1939===
{{Main|European foreign policy of the Chamberlain ministry}} 
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 119-5243, Wien, Arthur Seyß-Inquart, Adolf Hitler.jpg|thumb|[[Arthur Seyss-Inquart|Seyss-Inquart]] and [[Hitler]] in Vienna, March 1938]]
In 1937, [[Stanley Baldwin]] resigned as Prime Minister. He was replaced by [[Neville Chamberlain]], who pursued a policy of appeasement and rearmament.<ref>Mujtaba Haider Zaidi "Chamberlain and Hitler vs. Pakistan and Taliban" The Frontier Post Newspaper, 3 July 2013 URL: [https://archive.today/20130704120057/http://www.thefrontierpost.com/article/24108/]</ref> Chamberlain's reputation for appeasement rests in large measure on his negotiations with Hitler over [[German occupation of Czechoslovakia|Czechoslovakia in 1938]].

====''Anschluss''====
{{Main|Anschluss}}
When the [[German Empire]] and [[Austria-Hungary]] were broken up in 1918, [[Austria]] was left as a [[rump state]] with the temporary adopted name ''Deutschösterreich'' ("[[German-Austria]]"), with the vast majority of [[Austrians]] wanting to join Germany. However, the victors' agreements of [[World War I]] (the [[Treaty of Versailles]] and the [[Treaty of Saint-Germain]]) strictly forbade union between Austria and Germany without League consent, as well as the name "German-Austria", which reverted to "Austria" after the emergence of the [[First Republic of Austria]] in September 1919. The constitutions of both the [[Weimar Republic]] and the First Republic of Austria, included the aim of unification, which was supported by democratic parties. However, the rise of Hitler dampened the enthusiasm of the Austrian government for such a plan. Hitler, an Austrian by birth, had been a [[pan-German]] from a very young age and had promoted a Pan-German vision of a [[Greater Germanic Reich]] from the beginning of his career in politics. He wrote in ''[[Mein Kampf]]'' (1924) that he would attempt a union of his birth country Austria with Germany by any means possible and by force if necessary. By early 1938, Hitler had consolidated his power in Germany and was ready to implement his long-held plan.

Austrian Chancellor [[Kurt Schuschnigg]] wished to pursue ties with Italy but turned to [[Czechoslovakia]], [[Kingdom of Yugoslavia|Yugoslavia]] and [[Kingdom of Romania|Romania]] (the [[Little Entente]]). To that end, Hitler took violent exception. In January 1938, the [[Austrian Nazis]] attempted a ''[[coup d'état|putsch]]'' following which some were imprisoned. Hitler summoned Schuschnigg to [[Berchtesgaden]] in February and demanded, with the threat of military action, for him to release imprisoned Austrian Nazis and to allow them to participate in the government. Schuschnigg complied and appointed [[Arthur Seyss-Inquart]], a pro-Nazi lawyer, as [[interior minister]]. To forestall Hitler and to preserve Austria's independence, Schuschnigg scheduled a [[plebiscite]] on the issue for 13 March. Hitler demanded for the plebiscite to be cancelled. The [[Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda|German Propaganda Ministry]] issued press reports that riots had broken out in Austria and that large parts of the Austrian population were calling for German troops to restore order. On 11 March, Hitler sent an ultimatum to Schuschnigg that demanded him to hand over all power to the Austrian Nazis or face an invasion. The British Ambassador in Berlin, [[Nevile Henderson]], registered a protest with the German government against the use of coercion against Austria. Schuschnigg, realising that neither France nor the United Kingdom would actively support him, resigned in favour of Seyss-Inquart, who then appealed to German troops to restore order. On 12 March, the German [[Wehrmacht]] crossed the Austrian border. They met no resistance and were greeted by cheering Austrians. The invasion was the first major test of the Wehrmacht's machinery. Austria became the German province of [[Ostmark (Austria)|Ostmark]], with Seyss-Inquart as governor. A [[1938 Austrian Anschluss referendum|plebiscite was held on 10 April]] and officially recorded the support of 99.73% of the voters for the ''Anschluss''.<ref>Richard J. Evans, ''The Third Reich in Power'' (2006) pp. 646–58</ref>

Although the [[Allies of World War I|Allies]] had prohibited the union of Austria and Germany, their reaction to the ''Anschluss'' was mild.<ref>Alfred D. Low, ''The Anschluss Movement 1931–1938 and the Great Powers'' (1985)</ref> Even the strongest voices against annexation, particularly those of [[Kingdom of Italy#Fascist regime (1922–1943)|Fascist Italy]], [[Third French Republic|France]] and Britain (the "[[Stresa Front]]"), were not backed by force. In the [[British House of Commons]], Chamberlain said, "The hard fact is that nothing could have arrested what has actually happened [in Austria] unless this country and other countries had been prepared to use force".<ref>{{cite book |title=Twentieth Century Journey, Volume 2, The Nightmare Years: 1930–1940 |publisher=Little Brown and Company |location=Boston |isbn=0-316-78703-5 |year=1984 |first=William L. |last=Shirer |pages=[https://archive.org/details/nightmareyears1900shir/page/308 308] |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/nightmareyears1900shir}}</ref> The American reaction was similar. The international reaction to the events of 12 March 1938 led Hitler to conclude that he could use even more aggressive tactics in his plan to expand the Third Reich.{{citation needed|date=April 2014}} The ''Anschluss'' paved the way for Munich in September 1938 because it indicated the likely non-response of Britain and France to future German aggression.

====Munich Agreement====
{{Main|Munich Agreement}}
{{blockquote|How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing.|
[[Neville Chamberlain]], 27 September 1938, 8 p.m. radio broadcast, on Czechoslovak refusal to accept Nazi demands to cede border areas to Germany.}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-R69173, Münchener Abkommen, Staatschefs.jpg|thumb|upright=1.6|
From left to right: [[Neville Chamberlain|Chamberlain]], [[Daladier]], [[Hitler]], [[Mussolini]] and [[Galeazzo Ciano|Ciano]] pictured before they sign the Munich Agreement, which gave the Czechoslovak border areas to Germany]]
Under the Versailles Settlement, [[Czechoslovakia]] was created with the territory of the Czech part more or less corresponding to the [[Czech Crown lands]] as they had existed within Austria-Hungary and earlier. The new country included [[Bohemia]], [[Moravia]], and [[Slovakia]] and had border areas with a majority-German population that was known as the [[Sudetenland]] and areas with significant numbers of other ethnic minorities (notably [[Hungarians]], [[Polish people|Poles]] and [[Ruthenians]]). In April 1938, the [[Sudeten German Party]], led by [[Konrad Henlein]], agitated for autonomy and then threatened, in Henlein's words, "direct action to bring the [[Sudeten Germans]] within the frontiers of the Reich".{{sfn|Grant Duff|1938|p=}} An international crisis ensued.

France and Britain advised Czechoslovak acceptance of Sudeten autonomy. The Czechoslovak government refused and ordered a partial mobilisation in expectation of German aggression. [[Lord Runciman]] was sent by Chamberlain to [[Runciman Mission|mediate]] in [[Prague]] and persuaded the Czechoslovak government to grant autonomy. Germany escalated the dispute, with the country's press carrying stories of alleged atrocities against Sudeten Germans, and Hitler ordering 750,000 troops to the [[Czech Republic–Germany border|Czechoslovak border]]. In August, Henlein broke off negotiations with the Czechoslovak authorities. At a [[Nuremberg Rally|Nazi party rally]] in [[Nuremberg]] on 12 September, Hitler made a speech attacking Czechoslovakia<ref>Donald Cameron Watt, ''How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War'' (1989) ch. 2</ref> and there was an increase of violence by Sudeten Nazis against Czechoslovak and Jewish targets.

Chamberlain, faced with the prospect of a German invasion, flew to [[Berchtesgaden]] on 15 September to negotiate directly with Hitler, who now demanded that Chamberlain accept not Sudeten self-government within Czechoslovakia but the absorption of the Sudeten lands into Germany. Chamberlain became convinced that refusal would lead to war. The [[geography of Europe]] was such that Britain and France could forcibly prevent the German occupation of the Sudetenland only by the invasion of Germany.<ref>A. J. P. Taylor, ''English History, 1914–1945'', p. 415</ref> Chamberlain, therefore, returned to Britain and agreed to Hitler's demands. Britain and France told the Czechoslovak President [[Edvard Beneš]] to hand over to Germany all territory with a German majority. Hitler increased his aggression against Czechoslovakia and ordered the establishment of a [[Sudetendeutsches Freikorps|Sudeten German paramilitary organisation]], which proceeded to carry out terrorist attacks on Czechoslovak targets.

====German annexation of Sudetenland====
On 22 September, Chamberlain flew to [[Bad Godesberg]] for his second meeting with Hitler and said that he was willing to accept the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. He was startled by the response of Hitler that the cession of the Sudetenland was not enough and that Czechoslovakia, which Hitler had described as a "fraudulent state", must be broken up completely. Later in the day, Hitler resiled by saying that he was willing to accept the cession of the Sudetenland by 1 October. On 24 September, Germany issued the [[Godesberg Memorandum]], which demanded cession by 28 September or war. The Czechoslovak government rejected those demands, France ordered mobilisation and Britain mobilised the [[Royal Navy]].

[[File:MunichAgreement.jpg|right|thumb|upright=1.35|British Prime Minister [[Neville Chamberlain]], landing at [[Heston Aerodrome]] on 30 September 1938 after his meeting with Hitler at [[Munich]]. In his hand, he holds the peace agreement between Britain and Germany.]]
On 26 September, Hitler made a speech at the [[Sportpalast]] in Berlin in which he claimed that the Sudetenland was "the last territorial demand I have to make in Europe",<ref name=sudetenland1>{{cite book|author1=Domarus, Max|author2=Hitler, Adolf|title=Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, 1932–1945: The Chronicle of a Dictatorship|year=1990|page=1393}}</ref> and he gave Czechoslovakia an [[ultimatum]] of 28 September at 2:00pm to cede the territory to Germany or to face war.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73">Corvaja, Santi and Miller, Robert L. (2008) ''Hitler & Mussolini: The Secret Meetings''. New York: Enigma Books. {{ISBN|978-1-929631-42-1}}. p.73</ref>

In the atmosphere of growing conflict, Mussolini persuaded Hitler to put the dispute to a four-power conference. On 29 September 1938, Hitler, Chamberlain, French Prime Minister [[Édouard Daladier]] and Mussolini met in Munich. Czechoslovakia was not to be a party to these talks, nor was the Soviet Union. The four powers agreed that Germany would complete its occupation of the Sudetenland but that an international commission would consider other disputed areas. Czechoslovakia was told that if it did not submit, it would stand alone. At Chamberlain's request, Hitler readily signed an agreement for peace between the United Kingdom and Germany. Chamberlain returned to Britain and promised "[[peace for our time]]". Before Munich, U.S. President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] had sent a telegram to Chamberlain that said, "Good man" and he later told the American ambassador in Rome, [[William Phillips (diplomat)|William Phillips]], "I am not a bit upset over the final result".<ref>The Versailles Treaty and its Legacy: The Failure of the Wilsonian Vision, by Norman A. Graebner, Edward M. Bennett</ref>

====First Vienna Award and German annexation of Bohemia and Moravia====
{{Main|First Vienna Award|Occupation of Czechoslovakia (1938–1945)}}
As a result of the annexation of the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia lost 800,000 citizens, much of its industry and its mountain defences in the west. The rest of Czechoslovakia was left weak and powerless to resist subsequent occupation. In the following months, Czechoslovakia was broken up and ceased to exist, as Germany occupied the Sudetenland; Hungary took part of Slovakia, including [[Carpathian Ruthenia]]; and Poland annexed [[Trans-Olza]]. On 15 March 1939, the German ''[[Wehrmacht]]'' moved into the remainder of Czechoslovakia, and from [[Prague Castle]], Hitler proclaimed [[Bohemia]] and [[Moravia]] to be the [[Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia]], completing the [[German occupation of Czechoslovakia]]. Slovakia separated and became  a [[Slovak Republic (1939–1945)|German satellite state]].

In March 1939, Chamberlain foresaw a possible disarmament conference between himself, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini and [[Stalin]]. [[Home Secretary]], [[Samuel Hoare, 1st Viscount Templewood|Samuel Hoare]], said, "These five men, working together in Europe and blessed in their efforts by the [[President of the United States of America]], might make themselves eternal benefactors of the human race".<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20081214212333/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,789498,00.html International: Peace Week], ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' magazine, 20 March 1939</ref>

In effect, the British and French had by the Munich negotiations pressured their ally Czechoslovakia to cede part of its territory to a hostile neighbour in order to preserve peace. Churchill likened the negotiations at [[Berchtesgarten]], [[Bad Godesberg]] and [[Munich]] to a man demanding £1, then, when it is offered, demanding £2, then when it is refused settling for £1.17s.6d.<ref name=Churchill>Winston Churchill, ''The Gathering Storm'', 1948</ref> British leaders committed to the Munich Agreement in spite of their awareness of Hitler's vulnerability at the time. In August 1938, General [[Ludwig Beck]] relayed a message to Lord Halifax to explain that most of the [[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht|German General Staff]] had prepared a [[Oster conspiracy|coup against the Fuhrer]] for if there was "proof that England will fight if Czechoslovakia is attacked". When Chamberlain received the news, he dismissed it out of hand. In September, the British received assurance that the General Staff's offer to launch the coup still stood with key private sector police and army support, even though Beck had resigned his post.<ref name="Nigel Jones Pp. 60-65">{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Wgj8EWapQYgC&q=chamberlain%2C+beck|title=Countdown to Valkyrie: The July Plot to Assassinate Hitler|first=Nigel|last=Jones|date=1 January 2008|publisher=Casemate Publishers|isbn=978-1-84832-508-1 |via=Google Books}}</ref> Chamberlain ultimately ceded to all of Hitler's demands at Munich because he believed Britain and Nazi Germany were "the two pillars of European peace and buttresses against communism".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://winstonchurchill.org/publications/finest-hour/finest-hour-162/munich-timeline/|title=Munich Timeline|date=14 February 2015|website=International Churchill Society}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ILnFyBpfOOwC&dq=pillars+of+peace%2C+buttresses+against+communism&pg=PA18|title=The British Political Elite and the Soviet Union|first=Louise Grace|last=Shaw|date=17 June 2013|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-135-76127-1 |via=Google Books}}</ref>

Czechoslovakia had a modern well-prepared military, and Hitler, on entering [[Prague]], conceded that a war would have cost Germany much blood{{sfn|Grant Duff|1938|p=137}}<ref name=Churchill/> but the decision by France and Britain not to defend Czechoslovakia in the event of war and the exclusion from the equation of the Soviet Union, which Chamberlain distrusted, meant that the outcome would have been uncertain.<ref name=Churchill/> The event forms the main part of what became known as [[Western betrayal|Munich betrayal]] ({{langx|cs|Mnichovská zrada}}) in Czechoslovakia and the rest of Eastern Europe,<ref name="rozhoupaly">[[František Halas]], {{lang|cs|Torzo naděje}} (1938), poem "{{lang|cs|Zpěv úzkosti}}", "{{lang|cs|Zvoní zvoní zrady zvon zrady zvon, Čí ruce ho rozhoupaly, Francie sladká hrdý Albion, a my jsme je milovali}}"</ref> as the Czechoslovak view was that Britain and France had pressured it to cede territory to prevent a major war, which would involve Western Europe. The Western view is that the pressure was done to save Czechoslovakia from total annihilation.

====German annexation of Lithuania's Klaipėda Region====
{{main| 1939 German ultimatum to Lithuania}}
Rumours had reached the [[Lithuania]]n government to the effect that Germany had specific plans to take over [[Klaipėda]]. On 12 March 1939, Foreign Minister [[Juozas Urbšys]] represented Lithuania at the coronation of [[Pope Pius XII]] in Rome. On Urbšys's return to Lithuania, he stopped in Berlin with the hope of clarifying the growing rumours.<ref name=eidintas>{{cite book | last=Eidintas | first=Alfonsas |author2=Vytautas Žalys|author3=Alfred Erich Senn | editor=Ed. Edvardas Tuskenis | title=Lithuania in European Politics: The Years of the First Republic, 1918–1940 | edition=Paperback |date=September 1999 | publisher=[[St. Martin's Press]] | location=New York | isbn=0-312-22458-3 | pages=161–166}}</ref> On 20 March, just five days after the [[Occupation of Czechoslovakia (1938–1945)|German occupation of Prague]], German Foreign Minister [[Joachim von Ribbentrop]] agreed to meet Urbšys but not the Lithuanian Ambassador to Berlin, [[Kazys Škirpa]], who was asked to wait in another room. The conversation lasted for about 40 minutes.<ref name=cd117>{{cite book | last=Skirius | first=Juozas | title=Gimtoji istorija. Nuo 7 iki 12 klasės | url=http://mkp.emokykla.lt/gimtoji/ | access-date=14 March 2008 | year=2002 | publisher=Elektroninės leidybos namai | location=Vilnius | isbn=9986-9216-9-4 | chapter=Klaipėdos krašto aneksija 1939–1940 m. | chapter-url=http://mkp.emokykla.lt/gimtoji/?id=10117 | language=lt | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080226131025/http://mkp.emokykla.lt/gimtoji/ | archive-date=26 February 2008 }}</ref> Ribbentrop demanded the return of Klaipėda to Germany and threatened military action. Urbšys relayed the verbal ultimatum to the Lithuanian government. Because the ultimatum was never set down in writing and did not include a formal deadline, some historians downplay its importance and describe it as a "set of demands", rather than as an ultimatum.<ref name=gerutis>{{cite book | last=Gerutis | first=Albertas | editor=Ed. Albertas Gerutis | translator=Algirdas Budreckis | title=Lithuania: 700 Years | year=1984 | edition=6th | publisher=Manyland Books | location=New York |isbn=0-87141-028-1 | pages=247–249 | chapter=Independent Lithuania| lccn=75-80057 }}</ref> However, it was made clear that force would be used should Lithuania resist, and Lithuania was warned not to seek help from other nations. A clear deadline was not given, but Lithuania was told to make a speedy decision and that any clashes or German casualties would inevitably provoke a response from the [[German military]].<ref name=cd117/>

Lithuania secretly informed the signatories of the [[Klaipėda Convention]] about those demands since technically, Lithuania could not transfer Klaipėda without the signatories' approvals.<ref>{{cite journal |journal=New York Times |title=Lithuania Agrees to Yield Memel to Reich After Berlin Asks Speed to Avoid "Clashes" |date=22 March 1939 |page=2}}</ref> Italy and Japan supported Germany in the matter, and the United Kingdom and France expressed sympathy for Lithuania but chose not to offer any material assistance and followed a well-publicized policy of appeasement. The British treated the issue in the same way as the earlier Sudeten Crisis and made no plans to assist Lithuania or the other [[Baltic States]] if they were attacked by Germany.<ref>{{cite book |title=The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War |first=John |last=Hiden |author2=Thomas Lane |pages=31–32 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HzrpExvg2XgC&pg=PA26 |year=1992 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] | isbn=0-521-53120-9| access-date= 28 June 2010 }}</ref> The Soviets supported Lithuania in principle but did not wish to disrupt their relations with Germany since they were contemplating the [[German-Soviet Pact]].<ref name=cd117/> Without any material international support, Lithuania had no choice but to accept the ultimatum. Lithuanian diplomacy characterized the concession as a "necessary evil" to enable Lithuania to preserve its independence, and it maintained the hope that it was merely a temporary retreat.<ref name=eidintas/>

====Outbreak of World War II and Phoney War====
{{Main|Beginning of World War II|Invasion of Poland|Phoney War}}
By August 1939, Hitler was convinced that the democratic nations would never put up any effective opposition to him. He expressed his contempt for them in a speech that he delivered to his Commanders in Chief: "Our enemies have leaders who are below the average. No personalities. No masters, no men of action.... Our enemies are small fry. I saw them in Munich".<ref>[http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=2287&language=english ''Hitler's Speech to the Commanders in Chief (22 August 1939)''], German History in Documents and Images (GHDI), ''germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org''</ref>

On 1 September 1939, German forces started their [[invasion of Poland]]. Britain and France joined the war against Germany but initially averted serious military involvement during the period known as the [[Phoney War]]. After the [[German invasion of Norway]], opinion turned against Chamberlain's conduct of the war. He resigned after the [[Norway Debate]] in the British House of Commons, and on 10 May 1940 [[Winston Churchill]] became Prime Minister. In July, after the [[Fall of France]], when Britain stood almost alone against Germany, Hitler offered peace. Some politicians both inside and outside the government were willing to consider the offer, but Churchill refused to do so.<ref>Richard Overy, ''"Civilians on the front-line"'', ''The Second World War – Day 2: The Blitz'', The Guardian/The Observer, September 2009</ref> Chamberlain died on 9 November the same year. Churchill delivered a tribute to him in which he said, "Whatever else history may or may not say about these terrible, tremendous years, we can be sure that Neville Chamberlain acted with perfect sincerity according to his lights and strove to the utmost of his capacity and authority, which were powerful, to save the world from the awful, devastating struggle in which we are now engaged".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-hour/neville-chamberlain/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100702233910/http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/104-neville-chamberlain |title=Neville Chamberlain|date=12 November 1940|archive-date=2 July 2010|website=International Churchill Society}}</ref>

==Attitudes==
As the policy of appeasement failed to prevent war, those who advocated it were quickly criticised. Appeasement came to be seen as something to be avoided by those with responsibility for the diplomacy of Britain or any other democratic country. By contrast, the few who stood out against appeasement were seen as "voices in the wilderness whose wise counsels were largely ignored, with almost catastrophic consequences for the nation in 1939–40".<ref name=dnb>{{Cite web|url=http://www.oxforddnb.com/public/themes/95/95646.html|title=Oxford Dictionary of National Biography}}</ref> More recently, however, historians have questioned the accuracy of that simple distinction between appeasers and anti-appeasers. "Few appeasers were really prepared to seek peace at any price; few, if any, anti-appeasers were prepared for Britain to make a stand against aggression whatever the circumstances and wherever the location in which it occurred".<ref name=dnb/>

===Avoiding mistakes of First World War===
Chamberlain's policy in many respects continued the policies of MacDonald and Baldwin and was popular until the failure of the Munich Agreement to stop Hitler in Czechoslovakia. "Appeasement" had been a respectable term between 1919 and 1937 to signify the pursuit of peace.<ref>Medlicott, W.N., Review of "The Roots of Appeasement" by M.Gilbert (1966), in ''The English Historical Review'', Vol. 83, No. 327 (Apr. 1968), p. 430</ref>  Many believed after the First World War that wars were started by mistake, in which case the [[League of Nations]] could prevent them; or that they were caused by large-scale armaments, in which case [[disarmament]] was the remedy; or that they were caused by national grievances, in which case the grievances should be redressed peacefully.<ref name=Taylor/>  Many thought that the [[Versailles Treaty]] had been unjust, that the [[Auslandsdeutsch|German minorities]] were entitled to self-determination, and that Germany was entitled to equality in armaments.{{citation needed|date=April 2023}}

===Government views===
Appeasement was accepted by most of those responsible for British foreign policy in the 1930s; by leading journalists and academics; and by members of the [[British royal family]] such as King [[Edward VIII]] and his successor, [[George VI]].<ref name=dnb/> [[Anti-communism]] was sometimes acknowledged as a deciding factor, as mass labour unrest resurfaced in Britain, and news of [[Great Purge|Stalin's bloody purges]] disturbed the West. A common upper-class slogan was "better [[Hitlerism]] than [[Communism]]".<ref name="bbc.co.uk">{{Cite web|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/higher/history/roadwar/appease/revision/2/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130217064251/http://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/higher/history/roadwar/appease/revision/2/|url-status=dead|archive-date=17 February 2013|title="An evaluation of the reasons for the British policy of appeasement, 1936–1938" BBC History}}</ref> In France, right-wingers were sometimes accused of believing "Better Hitler than [[Leon Blum|Blum]]" in reference to the [[French Section of the Workers' International|French Socialist]] Prime Minister [[Léon Blum]] at the time.<ref name="vanityfair.com">{{Cite magazine|url=https://www.vanityfair.com/news/1999/02/hitchens-199902|title=Imagining Hitler|date=16 February 1999|magazine=Vanity Fair}}</ref> Anti-communism was a motive of a close ally of Chamberlain, [[Lord Halifax]], who said after he had visited [[Göring]] and met Hitler in Germany in 1936 and 1937: "Nationalism and Racialism is a powerful force but I can't feel that it's either unnatural or immoral! I cannot myself doubt that these fellows are genuine haters of Communism, etc.! And I daresay if we were in their position we might feel the same!"<ref>Andrew Roberts, The Holy Fox. The Life of Lord Halifax (Phoenix, 1997), p. 282.</ref>

Most Conservative MPs were also in favour, but Churchill said that their supporters were divided and in 1936 led a delegation of leading Conservative politicians to express to Baldwin their alarm about the speed of German rearmament and the fact that Britain was falling behind.<ref name=Churchill/> Baldwin rejected their sense of urgency and declared that he would not get Britain to war with anybody "for the League of Nations or anybody else" and that if there were to be any fighting in Europe, "I should like to see the Bolshies and Nazis doing it".<ref>{{cite book|last=Gilbert|first=Martin|title=Winston Churchill, The Wilderness Years|year=1981|publisher=Macmillan|page=161|isbn=0-333-32564-8}}</ref> Amongst Conservatives, Churchill was unusual in believing that Germany menaced freedom and democracy, that British rearmament should proceed more rapidly and that Germany should be resisted over Czechoslovakia. His criticism of Hitler began from the start of the decade, but Churchill was slow to attack [[fascism]] overall because of his own vitriolic opposition to communists, "[[International Jewish conspiracy|international Jews]]" and [[socialism]] generally.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://winstonchurchill.org/publications/finest-hour-extras/the-creeds-of-the-devil-churchill-between-the-two-totalitarianisms-1917-1945-1-of-3/|title="The Creeds of the Devil": Churchill between the Two Totalitarianisms, 1917–1945 (1 of 3)|date=1 September 2009|website=International Churchill Society}}</ref> Churchill's sustained warnings about fascism commenced only in 1938 after [[Francisco Franco]], who was receiving aid from Italy and Germany during the [[Spanish Civil War]], decimated the [[Republican faction (Spanish Civil War)|left]] in [[Spain]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://winstonchurchill.org/publications/finest-hour-extras/the-creeds-of-the-devil-churchill-between-the-two-totalitarianisms-1917-1945-2-of-3/|title="The Creeds of the Devil": Churchill between the Two Totalitarianisms, 1917–1945 (2 of 3)|date=13 May 2015|website=International Churchill Society}}</ref>

The week before Munich, Churchill warned, "The partition of Czechoslovakia under pressure from the UK and France amounts to the complete surrender of the Western Democracies to the Nazi threat of force. Such a collapse will bring peace or security neither to the UK nor to France".<ref name=Churchill/> He and a few other Conservatives who refused to vote for the Munich settlement were attacked by their local constituency parties.<ref name=Churchill/> However, Churchill's subsequent leadership of Britain during the war and his role in creating the [[post-war consensus]] against appeasement have tended to obscure the fact that "his contemporary criticism of totalitarian regimes other than Hitler's Germany was at best muted".<ref name=dnb/> It was not until May 1938 that he began "consistently to withhold his support from the [[National Government (1937–1939)|National Government]]'s conduct of foreign policy in the division lobbies of the House of Commons". He seems "to have been convinced by the Sudeten German leader, Henlein, in the spring of 1938, that a satisfactory settlement could be reached if Britain managed to persuade the Czech government to make concessions to the German minority".<ref name=dnb/>

===Military views===
In Britain, the [[Royal Navy]] generally favoured appeasement although it was during the [[Abyssinia Crisis]] of 1937 that it was confident it could easily defeat the [[Royal Italian Navy]] in open warfare. However, it favoured appeasement because it did not want to commit a large fraction of its naval power to the [[Mediterranean Sea]], which would weaken its positions against Germany and Japan.<ref>Arthur Marder,  "The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935–36." ''American Historical Review'' 75.5 (1970): 1327–1356.  [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1844481 online]</ref> In 1938, the Royal Navy approved appeasement regarding Munich because it calculated that Britain then lacked the political and military resources to intervene and to maintain an imperial defence capability simultaneously.<ref>G. A. H. Gordon, "The admiralty and appeasement." ''Naval History'' 5.2 (1991): 44+.</ref><ref>Joseph Maiolo, ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933–39: A Study in Appeasement and the Origins of the Second World War'' (1998).</ref>

Public opinion in Britain throughout the 1930s was frightened by the prospect of German [[strategic bombing|terror bombing]] of British cities, which had started during the First World War. The media emphasised the dangers, and the general consensus was that defence was impossible and, as Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin had said in 1932, "[[The bomber will always get through]]".<ref>John Terraine, "The Spectre of the Bomber," ''History Today'' (1982) 32#4 pp. 6–9.</ref> However, the [[Royal Air Force]] had two major weapons systems in the works: better [[interceptors]] ([[Hawker Hurricane|Hurricanes]] and [[Spitfires]]) and especially [[radar in World War II|radar]]. They promised to counter the German bombing offensive but were not yet ready and so appeasement was necessary to cause a delay.<ref>Zara Steiner, ''The triumph of the dark: European international history 1933–1939'' (2011) pp 606–9, 772.</ref><ref>Walter Kaiser, "A case study in the relationship of history of technology and of general history: British radar technology and Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy." ''Icon'' (1996) 2: 29–52.  [https://www.jstor.org/stable/23790399 online]</ref> Specifically, regarding the fighters, the RAF warned the government in October 1938 that the German [[Luftwaffe]] bombers would probably get through: "the situation... will be definitely unsatisfactory throughout the next twelve months".<ref>N. H. Gibbs, ''Grand Strategy. Vol. 1'' 1976) p 598.</ref>

In France, the [[history of the Armée de l'Air (1909–1942)|Armée de l'Air]] intelligence section closely examined the strength of the [[Luftwaffe]] and decided the German [[Fighter aircraft|pursuit planes]] and [[bomber]]s were the best in the world and that the Germans were producing 1000 warplanes a month. It perceived decisive German [[air superiority]] and so it was pessimistic about its ability to defend Czechoslovakia in 1938. [[Guy La Chambre]], the civilian air minister, optimistically informed the government that the air force could stop the Luftwaffe. However, General [[Joseph Vuillemin]], air force chief of staff, warned that it was far inferior and consistently opposed war against Germany.<ref>Peter Jackson, 'La perception de la puissance aérienne allemande et son influence sur la politique extérieure française pendant les crises internationales de 1938 à 1939', ''Revue Historique des Armées'', 4 (1994), pp. 76–87</ref>

===Opposition parties===
The [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]] opposed the fascist dictators on principle but until the late 1930s also opposed rearmament and had a significant [[pacifist]] wing.<ref name=toye>{{citation |first=Richard |last=Toye |url=https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10036/26952/Rearmament.pdf |title=The Labour Party and the Economics of Rearmament, 1935–1939 |journal=Twentieth Century British History |volume=12 |year=2001 |issue=3 |pages=303–326|doi=10.1093/tcbh/12.3.303 |hdl=10036/26952 |hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref>Rhiannon Vickers, ''The Labour Party and the World: The evolution of Labour's foreign policy'', Manchester University Press, 2003, Chapter 5</ref> In 1935, its pacifist leader, [[George Lansbury]], resigned after a party resolution in favour of sanctions against Italy, which he opposed. He was replaced by [[Clement Attlee]], who at first opposed rearmament by advocating the abolition of national armaments and a world [[peacekeeping]] force under the direction of the League of Nations.<ref>{{cite Hansard |url=https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1935/mar/11/defence |title=Defence |volume=299 |column=35–174 |house=Commons |date=11 March 1935 |access-date=20 March 2013}}</ref> However, with the rising threat from [[Nazi Germany]] and the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations, that policy eventually lost credibility, and in 1937, [[Ernest Bevin]] and [[Hugh Dalton]] persuaded the party to support rearmament<ref>A.J.Davies, ''To Build A New Jerusalem: The British Labour Party from Keir Hardie to Tony Blair'', Abacus, 1996</ref> and oppose appeasement.<ref>''Clem Attlee: A Biography By Francis Beckett'', Richard Cohen Books, {{ISBN|1-86066-101-7}}</ref>

A few on the left said that Chamberlain looked forward to a war between Germany and the [[Soviet Union]].<ref name=Taylor/> Attlee claimed in one political speech in 1937 that the [[National Government (1935–1937)|National Government]] had connived at German rearmament "because of its hatred of Russia".<ref name=toye/> British communists, following the party line defined by [[Joseph Stalin]],<ref>Teddy J. Uldricks, "Russian Historians Reevaluate the Origins of World War II," ''History & Memory'' Volume 21, Number 2, Fall/Winter 2009, pp. 60–82 (in Project Muse)</ref> argued that appeasement had been a pro-fascist policy and that the British ruling class preferred fascism to socialism. The [[Communist Party of Great Britain|Communist]] MP [[Willie Gallacher (politician)|Willie Gallacher]] said that "many prominent representatives of the Conservative Party, speaking for powerful landed and financial interests in the country, would welcome Hitler and the German Army if they believed that such was the only alternative to the establishment of Socialism in this country".<ref>Willie Gallacher, ''The Chosen Few'', Lawrence and Wishart, 1940</ref>

===Public opinion===
British public opinion had been strongly opposed to war and rearmament in the early 1930s, but that began to shift by mid-decade. At a [[King and Country debate|debate]] at the [[Oxford Union Society]] in 1933, a group of undergraduates passed a motion saying that they would not fight for King and country, which persuaded some in Germany that Britain would never go to war.<ref name=Churchill/> Baldwin told the [[House of Commons of the United Kingdom|House of Commons]] that in 1933, he had been unable to pursue a policy of rearmament because of the strong pacifist sentiment in the country.<ref name=Churchill/> In 1935, eleven million responded to the League of Nations "[[Peace Ballot]]" by pledging support for the reduction of armaments by international agreement.<ref name=Churchill/> On the other hand, the same survey also found that 58.7% of British voters favoured "collective military sanctions" against aggressors, and public reaction to the [[Hoare-Laval Pact]] with Mussolini was extremely unfavorable.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=f9RmAAAAMAAJ&q=collective+military+sanctions|title=A History of Europe in the Twentieth Century|first=Eric Dorn|last=Brose|date=14 September 2005|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-513571-8 |via=Google Books}}</ref> Even the left wing of the pacifist movement quickly began to turn with the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, and many peace-balloters began signing up for the [[International Brigades]] to fight Franco. By the height of the Spanish conflict in 1937, the majority of young pacifists had modified their views to accept that war could be a legitimate response to aggression and fascism.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SR40wrSV5IgC&q=fighting+pacifist|title=Crusade of the Left|first=Rosenstone, Robert|last=A|date=14 September 1969|publisher=Transaction Publishers|isbn=978-1-4128-2080-6 |via=Google Books}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-205855360/parting-with-pacifism-in-the-mid-1930s-many-millions |title=Richard Overy, "Parting with Pacifism: In the Mid-1930s Many Millions of British People Voted Overwhelmingly against Any Return to Conflict. but Events in Spain Changed Public Opinion" History Today, Vol. 59, No. 8, August 2009 |access-date=30 October 2017 |archive-date=7 November 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171107023821/https://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-205855360/parting-with-pacifism-in-the-mid-1930s-many-millions |url-status=dead }}</ref>

Czechoslovakia did not concern most people until mid-September 1938, when they began to object to a small democratic state being bullied.<ref name=Taylor/>{{sfn|Grant Duff|1938|p=}} Nevertheless, the initial response of the British public to the Munich agreement was generally favourable.<ref name=Taylor/> As Chamberlain left for Munich in 1938, the whole House of Commons cheered him noisily. On 30 September, on his return to Britain, Chamberlain delivered his famous "peace for our time" speech to delighted crowds. He was invited by the royal family onto the balcony at [[Buckingham Palace]] before he had reported to Parliament. The agreement was supported by most of the press, with only ''[[Reynold's News]]'' and the ''[[Morning Star (British newspaper)|Daily Worker]]'' dissenting.<ref name=Taylor/> In Parliament, the Labour Party opposed the agreement. Some Conservatives abstained in the vote, but the only MP to advocate war was the Conservative [[Duff Cooper]], who had resigned from the government to protest the agreement.<ref name=Taylor/>

===Role of media===
Positive opinion of appeasement was shaped partly by [[media manipulation]]. The German correspondent for ''[[The Times]]'', [[Norman Ebbutt]], charged that his persistent reports about Nazi militarism had been suppressed by his editor, [[Geoffrey Dawson]]. Historians such as [[Richard Cockett]], [[William Shirer]] and [[Frank McDonough]] have confirmed the claim.<ref>{{Cite thesis|url=https://open.library.ubc.ca/soa/cIRcle/collections/ubctheses/831/items/1.0094711|title="Public opinion," appeasement, and The Times: manipulating consent in the 1930s|first=David J.|last=Gossen|date=14 September 1994|publisher=University of British Columbia |doi=10.14288/1.0094711 |via=open.library.ubc.ca}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://richardcockett.co.uk/book/twilight-of-truth-chamberlain-appeasement-and-the-manipulation-of-the-press/|title=Twilight of Truth: Chamberlain, Appeasement and The Manipulation of the Press {{!}} Richard Cockett|work=Richard Cockett|access-date=2 November 2017|archive-date=9 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200209175111/http://richardcockett.co.uk/book/twilight-of-truth-chamberlain-appeasement-and-the-manipulation-of-the-press/}}</ref> The results of an October 1938 [[Gallup (company)|Gallup poll]], which showed 86% of the public believed Hitler was lying about his future territorial ambitions, was censored from the ''[[News Chronicle]]'' at the last minute by the publisher, who was loyal to Chamberlain.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bl86p8IbAt0C&q=media&pg=PA5|title=Troublesome Young Men: The Rebels Who Brought Churchill to Power and Helped Save England|first=Lynne|last=Olson|date=29 April 2008|publisher=Farrar, Straus and Giroux|isbn=978-1-4299-2364-4 |via=Google Books}}</ref> For the few journalists who were asking challenging questions about appeasement, primarily members of the foreign press, Chamberlain often froze them out or intimidated them. When asked at press conferences about Hitler's abuse of Jews and other minority groups, he went so far as to denounce these reports as "Jewish-Communist [[propaganda]]".<ref>Olson, Lynne (2008) [https://books.google.com/books?id=bl86p8IbAt0C&q=jewish-communist&pg=PA5 ''Troublesome Young Men: The Rebels Who Brought Churchill to Power and Helped Save England''] New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. pp. 120–22]</ref>

Chamberlain's direct manipulation of the [[BBC]] was sustained and egregious.<ref>{{Cite journal|url=https://repository.lboro.ac.uk/articles/journal_contribution/A_quietening_effect_The_BBC_and_the_Spanish_Civil_War_1936-1939_/9473972/1|title=A quietening effect ? The BBC and the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939)|first=David|last=Deacon|journal=Media History|date=1 January 2012|via=repository.lboro.ac.uk|doi=10.1080/13688804.2012.663866|s2cid=142206339}}</ref> For example, Lord Halifax told radio producers not to offend Hitler and Mussolini, and they complied by censoring [[anti-fascist]] commentary made by Labour and [[Popular Front (UK)|Popular Front]] MPs. The BBC also suppressed the fact that 15,000 people protested the prime minister in [[Trafalgar Square]] as he returned from Munich in 1938 (10,000 more than welcomed him at [[10 Downing Street]]).<ref>McDonough, Frank (1998). [https://books.google.com/books?id=3tQoAEo9Y6oC&dq=appeasement%2C+public+opinion&pg=PA114 ''Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement, and the British Road to War''.] Manchester: Manchester University Press. pp. 124–33.]</ref> The BBC radio producers continued to censor news of [[Holocaust|persecution of Jews]] even after the war broke out, as Chamberlain still held out [[Phoney War|hopes of a quick armistice]] and did not want to inflame the atmosphere.<ref>Olson, Lynne (2008). [https://books.google.com/books?id=bl86p8IbAt0C&q=media&pg=PA5 ''Troublesome Young Men: The Rebels Who Brought Churchill to Power and Helped Save England''.] New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. p. 258.</ref> As [[Richard Cockett]] noted:

<blockquote>[Chamberlain] had successfully demonstrated how a government in a democracy could influence and control the press to a remarkable degree. The danger in this for Chamberlain was that he preferred to forget that he exercised such influence, and so increasingly mistook his pliant press for real public opinion... the truth of the matter was that by controlling the press he was merely ensuring that the press was unable to reflect public opinion.<ref>Cited in Caputi, Robert J. (2000). [https://books.google.com/books?id=KWQcos95hHsC&q=public+opinion ''Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement''.] Susquehanna University Press, pp. 168–69.</ref></blockquote>

The journalist [[Shiela Grant Duff]]'s [[Penguin Group|Penguin]] Special, ''[[Europe and the Czechs]]'', was published and distributed to every MP on the day that Chamberlain returned from Munich. Her book was a spirited defence of the Czech nation and a detailed criticism of British policy and confronted the need for war if necessary. It was influential and widely read. Although she argued against the policy of "peace at almost any price",{{sfn|Grant Duff|1938|p=201}} she did not take a personal tone, unlike ''[[Guilty Men]]'' two years later.

===At start of World War II===
Once Germany invaded Poland and so ignited [[World War II]], consensus was that appeasement was responsible. The Labour MP [[Hugh Dalton]] identified the policy with wealthy people in the [[City of London]], Conservatives and members of the [[peerage]] who were soft on Hitler.<ref>Dalton, H. ''Hitler's War'', London, Penguin Books, 1940</ref> The appointment of Churchill as Prime Minister after the [[Norway Debate]] hardened opinion against appeasement and encouraged the search for those responsible. Three British journalists, [[Michael Foot]], [[Frank Owen (politician)|Frank Owen]] and [[Peter Howard (journalist)|Peter Howard]], writing under the name of "Cato" in their book ''[[Guilty Men]]'', called for the removal from office of 15 public figures they held accountable, including Chamberlain. The book defined appeasement as the "deliberate surrender of small nations in the face of Hitler's blatant bullying". It was hastily written and has few claims to historical scholarship,<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.oxforddnb.com/public/themes/70/70401.html|title=''Oxford Dictionary of National Biography''}}</ref> but ''Guilty Men'' shaped subsequent thinking about appeasement, and it is said<ref>David Willets and Richard Forsdyke, ''After the Landslide'', London: Centre For Policy Studies, 1999</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://spectator.org/archives/2010/03/08/epitaph-for-a-liar|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111017233251/http://spectator.org/archives/2010/03/08/epitaph-for-a-liar |title=Hal G.P. Colebatch, "Epitaph for a Liar", ''American Spectator'', 3.8.10|archive-date=17 October 2011}}</ref> that it contributed to the defeat of the Conservatives in the [[1945 United Kingdom general election|1945 general election]].

The change in the meaning of "appeasement" after Munich was summarised later by the historian [[David Dilks]]: "The word in its normal meaning connotes the pacific settlement of disputes; in the meaning usually applied to the period of Neville Chamberlain['s] premiership, it has come to indicate something sinister, the granting from fear or cowardice of unwarranted concessions in order to buy temporary peace at someone else's expense."<ref>Dilks, D. N. (1972). "Appeasement Revisited", ''Journal of Contemporary History''.</ref>{{clear left}}

===Postwar historians===

Historians have subsequently explained Chamberlain's policies in various ways. It could be said that he believed sincerely that the objectives of Hitler and Mussolini were limited, and that the settlement of their grievances would protect the world from war since for safety, military and air power should be strengthened.

One of the first dissents to the prevailing criticism of appeasement was made by [[John F. Kennedy]] in his 1940 [[Harvard College]] thesis, ''[[Why England Slept]]'', in which he argued that appeasement had been necessary because the United Kingdom and France were unprepared for a world war.<ref>{{cite book|last=Kennedy|first=John F.|title=Why England slept|year=2016|publisher=Bloomsbury Academic |isbn=978-1-4408-4990-9|oclc=929588770}}</ref><ref name="Abandon Munich">{{cite web|last=Shachtman|first=Tom|title=It's Time to Abandon 'Munich'|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/29/its-time-to-abandon-munich/|access-date=1 May 2021|website=Foreign Policy|date=29 September 2013 }}</ref>

In 1961, the view of appeasement as avoidable error and cowardice was similarly set on its head by [[A.J.P. Taylor]] in his book ''[[The Origins of the Second World War]]''. Taylor argued that Hitler did not have a blueprint for war and behaved much as any other German leader might have. Appeasement was an active policy, not a passive one, and allowing Hitler to consolidate was a policy implemented by "men confronted with real problems, doing their best in the circumstances of their time". Taylor said that appeasement ought to be seen as a rational response to an unpredictable leader that was both diplomatically and politically appropriate to the time.

His view has been shared by other historians. For example, [[Paul Kennedy]], who says of the choices facing politicians at the time, "Each course brought its share of disadvantages: there was only a choice of evils. The crisis in the British global position by this time was such that it was, in the last resort, insoluble, in the sense that there was no good or proper solution".<ref name=Kennedy>{{cite book|last=Kennedy|first=Paul M.|author-link=Paul Kennedy|title=Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870–1945: Eight Studies|publisher=George Allen & Unwin|year=1983|location=London|isbn=0-00-686165-2}}</ref> [[Martin Gilbert]] expressed a similar view: "At bottom, the old appeasement was a mood of hope, [[Victorian era|Victorian]] in its optimism, [[Burkean]] in its belief that societies evolved from bad to good and that [[progress]] could only be for the better. The new appeasement was a mood of fear, [[Hobbesian]] in its insistence upon swallowing the bad in order to preserve some remnant of the good, pessimistic in its belief that Nazism was there to stay and, however horrible it might be, should be accepted as a way of life with which Britain ought to deal".<ref>Gilbert, M., ''The Roots of Appeasement'', 1968</ref>

The arguments in Taylor's ''Origins of the Second World War'', which have sometimes been described as "[[Historical revisionism|revisionist]]",<ref name=Taylor/><ref name=Dimuccio>Dimuccio, R.A.B. (March 1998). "The Study of Appeasement in International Relations: Polemics, Paradigms, and Problems", ''Journal of Peace Research'', Vol. 35, No. 2.</ref> were rejected by many historians at the time, and reviews of his book in Britain and the United States were generally critical. Nevertheless, he was praised for some of his insights{{By whom|date=November 2025}}. By showing that appeasement was a popular policy and that there was a continuity in British foreign policy after 1933, he shattered the common view of the appeasers as a small degenerate clique that had mysteriously hijacked the British government sometime in the 1930s that had carried out their policies in the face of massive public resistance. Also, by portraying the leaders of the 1930s as real people attempting to deal with real problems, he made the first strides towards explaining the actions of the appeasers, rather than merely condemning them.

In the early 1990s a new theory of appeasement, sometimes called "counter-revisionist",<ref name=Dimuccio/> emerged as historians argued that appeasement was probably the only choice for the British government in the 1930s but that it was poorly implemented, carried out too late and not enforced strongly enough to constrain Hitler. Appeasement was considered a viable policy because of the strains that the British Empire faced in recuperating from World War I, and Chamberlain was said to have adopted a policy suitable to Britain's cultural and political needs. [[Frank McDonough]] is a leading proponent of that view of appeasement, which was described his book ''Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War''<ref>McDonough, Frank (1998). ''Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War'', Manchester University Press.</ref> as a "post revisionist" study.<ref>See, for example, McDonough, F., Brown, R., and Smith, D., ''Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement'', 2002</ref> Appeasement was a crisis management strategy seeking a peaceful settlement of Hitler's grievances. "Chamberlain's worst error", says McDonough, "was to believe that he could march Hitler on the yellow brick road to peace when in reality Hitler was marching very firmly on the road to war". He criticised revisionist historians for concentrating on Chamberlain's motivations, rather than how appeasement worked in practice, as a "usable policy" to deal with Hitler. [[James P. Levy]] argues against the outright condemnation of appeasement. "Knowing what Hitler did later", he writes, "the critics of Appeasement condemn the men who tried to keep the peace in the 1930s, men who could not know what would come later.... The political leaders responsible for Appeasement made many errors. They were not blameless. But what they attempted was logical, rational, and humane".<ref name=levy>Levy, James P. (2006). ''Appeasement and rearmament: Britain, 1936–1939'', Rowman and Littlefield.</ref>

The view of Chamberlain colluding with Hitler to attack the Soviet Union has persisted, however, particularly on the far left.<ref>See, for example, Clement Leibovitz and Alvin Finkel, ''In Our Time: The Chamberlain–Hitler Collusion'', [[Monthly Review Press]], 1997 {{ISBN|0-85345-999-1}}</ref> In 1999, [[Christopher Hitchens]] wrote that Chamberlain "had made a cold calculation that Hitler should be re-armed... partly to encourage his 'tough-minded' solution to the [[Bolshevik]] problem in the East".<ref name="vanityfair.com"/> Consciously encouraging war with Stalin is not widely accepted to be a motive of the [[Downing Street]] appeasers, but there is a historical consensus that anti-communism was central to appeasement's appeal for the conservative elite.<ref name="bbc.co.uk"/> As [[Antony Beevor]] writes, "The policy of appeasement was not Neville Chamberlin's invention. Its roots lay in a fear of bolshevism. The [[general strike of 1926]] and the depression made the possibility of revolution a very real concern to conservative politicians. As a result, they had mixed feelings towards the German and Italian regimes which had crushed the communists and socialists in their own countries".<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Q-mayoYS6eIC&dq=Its+roots+lay+in+a+fear+of+bolshevism.+beevor&pg=PA133|title=The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936–1939|first=Antony|last=Beevor|date=1 June 2006|publisher=Penguin|isbn=978-1-101-20120-6 |via=Google Books}}</ref>

===Postwar politicians===
{{Main|Lesson of Munich}}
Statesmen in the postwar years have often referred to their opposition to appeasement as a justification for firm, sometimes armed, action in international relations.

==== United States ====
U.S. President [[Harry S. Truman]] thus explained his decision to enter the [[Korean War]] in 1950, British Prime Minister [[Anthony Eden]] in his confrontation of [[Egypt]]ian [[President of Egypt|President]] [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] in the [[Suez Crisis]] of 1956, U.S. President [[John F. Kennedy]] his "[[Cuban Missile Crisis|quarantine]]" of [[Cuba]] in 1962, U.S. President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] in [[Vietnam War|his resistance]] to [[communism]] in [[Indochina]] in the 1960s, U.S. President [[Ronald Reagan]] in [[1986 United States bombing of Libya|his air strike]] on [[Libya]] in 1986, and U.S. President [[Donald Trump]] in the [[drone strike]] that led to the [[Assassination of Qasem Soleimani|assassination]] of [[Qasem Soleimani]] in 2020.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Beck |first=Robert J. |date=1989 |title=Munich's Lessons Reconsidered |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538858 |journal=International Security |volume=14 |issue=2 |pages=161–191 |doi=10.2307/2538858|jstor=2538858 |url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name="Pompeo blames">{{cite web|last=Cummings|first=William|title=Secretary of State Pompeo blames current tension with Iran on 'Obama administration's appeasement'|url=https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/01/05/pompeo-blames-obama-iran-situation/2818151001/|access-date=18 October 2020|website=[[USA Today]]}}</ref>

==== Vietnam ====
After the [[Viet Minh]] won the [[Battle of Dien Bien Phu]] in 1954, U.S. President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] wrote in a letter to British Prime Minister Churchill, "We failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini and Hitler by not acting in unity and in time. That marked the beginning of many years of stark tragedy and desperate peril. May it not be that our nations have learned something from that lesson?" Similarly, President Lyndon Johnson said to defend the Vietnam War, "Everything I knew about history told me that if I got out of Vietnam and let [[Ho Chi Minh]] run through the streets of [[Saigon]], then I'd be doing exactly what Chamberlain did in World War II. I'd be giving a big fat reward to aggression".<ref name="Abandon Munich" />

==== Cuba ====
During the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]], U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff [[Curtis LeMay]] and various hawks within the [[Kennedy administration]] for an air strike on Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba compared Kennedy's hesitance to do so to appeasement. That was partially a jab at Kennedy's father [[Joseph P. Kennedy Sr.]], who had supported appeasement while he was [[U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom]] and later supported a negotiated surrender to Germany during the [[May 1940 War Cabinet Crisis]] and the [[Battle of Britain]].<ref>{{cite book|last=Dobbs|first=Michael |title=One minute to midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the brink of nuclear war|date=2008|isbn=978-1-4000-4358-3|edition=1st |location=New York|oclc=176951842}}</ref><ref name="Abandon Munich" />

==== Soviet Union ====
During the [[Cold War]], the "lessons" of appeasement were cited by prominent conservative allies of Reagan, who urged him to be assertive in "[[rollback|rolling back]]" Soviet-backed regimes throughout the world. [[The Heritage Foundation]]'s [[Michael Johns (policy analyst)|Michael Johns]], for instance, wrote in 1987 that "seven years after Ronald Reagan's arrival in Washington, the United States government and its allies are still dominated by the culture of appeasement that drove Neville Chamberlain to Munich in 1938."<ref>Johns, Michael (Summer 1987). "Peace in Our Time: The Spirit of Munich Lives On", ''Policy Review''.</ref> Some conservatives even compared Reagan to Chamberlain after his withdrawal of the [[Multinational Force in Lebanon]] because of the [[1983 Beirut barracks bombing]].<ref name="Abandon Munich" />

==== Argentina ====
British Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]] invoked the example of Churchill during the [[Falklands War]] of 1982: "When the [[American Secretary of State]], [[Alexander Haig]], urged her to reach a compromise with the [[Argentina|Argentines]] she rapped sharply on the table and told him, pointedly, 'that this was the table at which Neville Chamberlain sat in 1938 and spoke of the [[Czechs]] as a faraway people about whom we know so little'".<ref>{{cite book|title=Thatcher|first=Kenneth|last=Harris|isbn=0-00-637457-3|page=135|publisher=Weidenfeld & Nicolson|year=1988}}</ref> Thatcher, along with U.S. National Security Advisor [[Brent Scowcroft]], made similar arguments after the [[Invasion of Kuwait|1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait]] and the planning for the [[Gulf War]].<ref name="Abandon Munich" /> The spectre of appeasement was raised in discussions of the [[Yugoslav wars]] of the 1990s.<ref>Vuilliamy, E. (1998). "Bosnia: The Crime of Appeasement", ''International Affairs '', 1998, pp. 73–91.</ref>

==== Iraq ====
U.S. President [[George W. Bush]] and British Prime Minister [[Tony Blair]] also cited Churchill's warnings about German rearmament to justify their action in the run-up to the 2003 [[Iraq War]].<ref name=ChurchillCollege>{{cite web|title=Appeasement: The Gathering Storm (Teachers Exercises)|url=http://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/churchill_era/exercises/appeasement/|publisher=Churchill College Cambridge|access-date=11 September 2008|archive-date=16 April 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080416020732/http://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/churchill_era/exercises/appeasement/|url-status=dead}}</ref>

==== Syria ====
In 2013, [[Obama|Obama administration]] officials such as Secretary of State [[John Kerry]] and Secretary of Defense [[Chuck Hagel]] claimed that a failure of the United States to intervene in the [[Syrian Civil War]] after the [[Ghouta chemical attack]] would be an act of appeasement towards [[Bashar al-Assad]].<ref name="Abandon Munich" />

==== Iran ====
{{see also|Criticism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action}}
In May 2008, U.S. President George W. Bush cautioned against "the false comfort of appeasement" when dealing with [[Iran]] and 
[[Iranian President]] [[Mahmoud Ahmadinejad]].<ref>Thomas, E. (23 June 2008). "The Mythology of Munich", ''Newsweek'', Vol. 151, issue 25, pp. 22–26.</ref> Opponents of President [[Barack Obama]] later criticized the [[Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]] as an act of appeasement with Iran.<ref>{{cite web|last=Loyola|first=Mario|date=12 January 2020|title=Obama Should Never Have Appeased Iran|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/obama-should-never-have-appeased-iran/604744/|access-date=18 October 2020|website=[[The Atlantic]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last=Picard|first=Joe|date=25 August 2015|title=Appeasing Iran?|url=https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/251828-appeasing-iran|access-date=18 October 2020|website=[[The Hill (newspaper)|The Hill]]}}</ref> U.S. Secretary of State [[Mike Pompeo]] later stated that the [[Foreign policy of the first Donald Trump administration|first Trump administration's foreign policy]] was "trying to correct for what was the Obama administration's appeasement of Iran."<ref name="Pompeo blames" />

==== China ====
[[Tibetan independence movement|Tibetan separatists]] consider the policy of the West towards the [[People's Republic of China]] with regard to [[Tibet]] as appeasement.<ref>McRae, Penny (15 September 2009). "West appeasing China on Tibet, says PM-in-exile", AFP.</ref>

==== Russia ====
The minimal international reactions to the [[Chechen–Russian conflict|invasion of Chechnya]], the [[Russo-Georgian War|invasion of Georgia]] and the [[2014 annexation of Crimea]], as well as the [[Donbas separatism|conflict in the Donbas]], is seen by some as the cause that encouraged Russian president [[Vladimir Putin]] to conduct a [[Russian invasion of Ukraine|full-scale invasion of the rest of Ukraine in 2022]].<ref>{{cite web
	| url = https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-lesson-of-crimea-appeasement-never-works/
	| title = The lesson of Crimea: Appeasement never works
	| last = Goncharenko
	| first = 	Oleksiy
	| date = 27 February 2020
	| website = Atlantic Council
	| access-date = 4 September 2023
}}</ref><ref>{{cite web
	| url = https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/putins-crimea-mythmaking
	| title = Putin's Crimea Mythmaking
	| last = Free
	| first = Anya
	| date = 2 March 2023
	| website = Wilson Center
	| access-date = 4 September 2023
}}</ref> Some commentators have suggested that some [[NATO]] countries are following the policy of appeasement towards [[Vladimir Putin]]'s [[Russia]] by rejecting the support of [[Ukraine|Ukrainian]] [[Government of Ukraine|democracy]] through military operations and aid during the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]].<ref>{{cite web|title=Appeasing Putin in Ukraine would be disastrous for European security|url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/appeasing-putin-in-ukraine-would-be-disastrous-for-european-security/|website=Atlantic Council|date=6 January 2022|access-date=5 March 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=NATO rejects Ukraine no-fly zone, unhappy Zelenskiy says this means more bombing|url=https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/nato-meets-ukraine-calls-no-fly-zone-hinder-russia-2022-03-04/|work=[[Reuters]]|date=4 March 2022|access-date=5 March 2022|first1=Simon|last1=Lewis|first2=Ingrid|last2=Melander}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=The west knows the cost of appeasement. We can't rule out any option for stopping Putin {{!}} Ian Bond|url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/22/west-appeasement-putin-russia-ukraine|website=[[The Guardian]]|date=22 February 2022|access-date=5 March 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last=Bella |first=Timothy |date=25 May 2022 |title=Kissinger says Ukraine should cede territory to Russia to end war |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/24/henry-kissinger-ukraine-russia-territory-davos/}}</ref>

From the beginning of his second term, Donald Trump recognized all Russian conquests in Ukraine. This&nbsp;policy was described as the betrayal of Ukraine,<ref>Editorial (16 April 2025). “Truth, lies and the betrayal of Ukraine.” ''Financial Times'', https://www.ft.com/content/27e5ffff-ad8e-4ef7-bbe4-640bd792577f</ref><ref>Editorial (13 February 2025). “The betrayal of Ukraine is also a betrayal of America’s friends and allies in Europe.” ''Independent'', https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/ukraine-trump-putin-europe-war-zelensky-b2697737.html</ref><ref>Wallace, Ben (13 February 2025) “Ukraine’s betrayal proves we have entered an era of grave danger.” ''Telegraph'', https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2025/02/13/ukraines-betrayal-we-have-entered-an-age-of-appeasement/?msockid=1ab86121362562d50a2b75df37b563f8</ref> capitulation to Russia,<ref>Editorial (25 April 2025). “Ukraine peace deal proposals set out by US at talks in Paris.” ''Reuters'', https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-peace-deal-proposals-set-out-by-us-talks-paris-2025-04-25/</ref><ref>Guardian staff (28 April 2025). “Ukraine war briefing: Berlin says US peace proposal is ‘akin to a capitulation’ to Russia.” ''The Guardian'', https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/28/ukraine-war-briefing-berlin-says-us-peace-proposal-is-akin-to-a-capitulation-to-russia</ref> or, more commonly, "appeasement." A chorus of voices in European&nbsp;capitals warned the US president that such concessions amount to "appeasement."<ref>Ross, Tim et al (14 February 2025). "Trump triggers Western anger over ‘appeasement’ talks with Putin."&nbsp;''Politico'',&nbsp;https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-west-vladimir-putin-nato-ukriane-membership-kyiv-ban-russia/</ref> British&nbsp;former Defence Secretary, [[Ben Wallace (politician)|Ben Wallace]], associated the policy of Trump with Chamberlain’s ‘peace for our time’ moment.<ref>Sheridan, Danielle (2025). "Trump’s Ukraine peace talks have echoes of Nazi appeasement." ''The Telegraph'',&nbsp;https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/02/13/trump-ukraine-peace-talks-echoes-nazi-appeasement-wallace/?msockid=1ab86121362562d50a2b75df37b563f8</ref> For [[Timothy Garton Ash]], Trump’s "appeasement" of Vladimir Putin made Chamberlain look like a "principled, courageous realist." Now, Nash continues, "we see that Trump not only bullies his country’s friends but sucks up to his country’s enemies." Contrary to 1938, the War is already raging. Hence, Ash suggested imagining Franklin Roosevelt making similar concessions to Hitler in 1941.<ref>Ash, Timothy Garton (2025). "Trump’s senseless capitulation to Putin is a betrayal of Ukraine – and terrible dealmaking." ''The Guardian'', https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/feb/13/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-ukraine-us-europe</ref>
The EU’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, noted that appeasement never worked.<ref>Ross, Tim et al (14 February 2025). "Trump triggers Western anger over ‘appeasement’ talks with Putin." Politico, https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-west-vladimir-putin-nato-ukriane-membership-kyiv-ban-russia/</ref> Kallas' generalization might be exaggerated, but on the occasion the appeasement did not work as planned. Russia kept pounding Ukraine. "Vladimir, STOP," begged Trump on Twitter.<ref>Picheta, Rob et al (April 24, 2025). "Trump writes ‘Vladimir, STOP!’ after Russia launches deadliest strikes on Kyiv since last summer." ''CNN'', https://edition.cnn.com/2025/04/24/europe/russia-strikes-kyiv-trump-zelensky-crimea-intl-hnk</ref> The appeal was ignored, Vladimir did not stop. Instead, Russia unleashed the largest aerial attack on Ukrainian cities since the War began.<ref>Northam, Jackie (4 July 2025). "Russia hits Ukraine with largest aerial attack as Trump talks to Zelenskyy and Putin." ''National Public Radio'', https://www.npr.org/2025/07/04/nx-s1-5456846/russia-hits-ukraine-with-largest-aerial-attack-as-trump-talks-to-zelenskyy-and-putin</ref> Having run the experiment with appeasement for half a year, Trump summed up: All negotiations with Vladimir Putin sound nice, "but it turns out to be meaningless."<ref>Blake, Aaron&nbsp;(8 July 2025). "Trump seems to really be losing patience with Putin. But why now?" ''CNN'',&nbsp;https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/08/politics/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-frustration-analysis</ref> In August 2025, Trump appeared to resume appeasement when he hosted Putin in brief bilateral talks in Anchorage, Alaska, without hosting Ukrainian or European delegations. By the end of the three-hour meeting, Trump had rejected his previously espoused stance and adopted the Russian position of rejecting an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine, without securing any major concessions for Ukraine or the United States.<ref>Collinson, Stephen; (16 August 2025), "Putin’s wins leave Trump with hard choices
" ''CNN'',&nbsp;https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/16/politics/donald-trump-putin-russia-war-analysis</ref>

==== North Korea ====
{{Main|Sunshine Policy#Criticism}}

==== Afghanistan ====
{{Main|United States–Taliban deal}}

The 2020 Doha Agreement between the United States and the [[Taliban]] without involvement of the then [[Islamic Republic of Afghanistan|Afghan government]] was criticized as the American appeasement of the Taliban. Over the [[War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)|American war in Afghanistan]], the United States and its [[NATO]] allies ([[ISAF]] and [[Resolute Support Mission|RSM]] periods) along with the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and its [[Afghan National Security Forces|national defense and security forces]] warred against the Taliban and its allied militant groups and later the [[Islamic State – Khorasan Province]]. After [[Donald Trump]] become the president, he decided to wrap up all military operations in [[Afghanistan]] and to begin negotiation with the Taliban, which culminated with the Doha Agreement on 29 February 2020. After President [[Joe Biden]] decided to [[2020–2021 U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan|withdraw all American troops]] from  Afghanistan on 31 August 2021, the Taliban launched [[2021 Taliban offensive|their final offensive of the war]], which brought the fall of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, during which [[Kabul]] was [[Fall of Kabul (2021)|taken over]] by the Taliban on 15 August 2021. The United States completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan and the [[2021 Kabul airlift|evacuation of American citizens and residents and at-risk Afghans]] from [[Kabul International Airport]] on 30 August 2021.<ref>{{cite web |author1=Pavan Chaurasia |title=The Crocodile has been fed, yet again! |url=https://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/crocodile-fed-yet-1502995826.html |website=The Statesman |access-date=27 May 2024 |date=17 August 2021}}</ref>

==Criticism==
In the mid-20th century, appeasement was seen as discredited in the United Kingdom due to its role in contributing to World War II.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hall|first=Ian|date=2006-05-01|title=Power Politics and Appeasement: Political Realism in British International Thought, c. 1935–1955|url=https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2005.00208.x|journal=The British Journal of Politics and International Relations|language=en|volume=8|issue=2|pages=174–192|doi=10.1111/j.1467-856x.2005.00208.x|s2cid=145359825|issn=1369-1481|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

Scholar Aaron McKeil pointed out that appeasement restraint against liberal interventionism would lead to more proxy wars, and fail to offer institutions and norms for mitigating great power conflict.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=McKeil|first=Aaron|date=2021-07-09|title=The Limits of Realism after Liberal Hegemony|journal=Journal of Global Security Studies|volume=7|language=en|article-number=ogab020|doi=10.1093/jogss/ogab020|issn=2057-3170|doi-access=free}}</ref> Alternative strategies to avoid conflict include [[Deterrence theory|deterrence]], where threats or limited force [[coercive diplomacy|dissuades]] an actor from escalating conflict,<ref>{{Cite book|last=Morgan|first=Patrick M.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aNreAAAAMAAJ|title=Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis|date=1977|publisher=SAGE Publications|isbn=978-0-8039-0819-2|pages=26–30|language=en|access-date=2021-08-30|archive-date=2024-02-24|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240224051622/https://books.google.com/books?id=aNreAAAAMAAJ|url-status=live}}</ref> typically because the prospective attacker believes that the probability of success is low and the costs of attack are high.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Mearsheimer|first=John J.|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1rv61v2|title=Conventional Deterrence|date=1983|publisher=Cornell University Press|isbn=978-1-5017-1325-5|pages=23|jstor=10.7591/j.ctt1rv61v2|language=en|access-date=2021-09-05|archive-date=2023-04-05|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230405171209/https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1rv61v2|url-status=live}}</ref>

Appeasement can be seen as promoting [[frozen conflicts]] and rewarding [[aggression]] from a game-theoretical point of view.<ref>{{cite journal | url=https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2023.2192137 | doi=10.1080/0163660X.2023.2192137 | title=A New Concert for Europe: Security and Order After the War | date=2023 | last1=Jung | first1=Karsten | journal=The Washington Quarterly | volume=46 | pages=25–43 | url-access=subscription }}</ref> If the defensive player is willing to appease, the offensive player is incentivised to create the conditions to be appeased by their opponent.

Appeasement might be more difficult to achieve if the source of conflict is indivisible and can be held by only one party, preventing small concessions.<ref>{{cite journal | url=https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00154.x | doi=10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00154.x | title=The Slippery Slope of Concession | date=2009 | last1=Hirshleifer | first1=Jack | last2=Boldrin | first2=Michele | last3=Levine | first3=David K. | journal=Economic Inquiry | volume=47 | issue=2 | pages=197–205 }}</ref>

The distribution of economic resources to veterans and political groups in [[Timor-Leste]] to resolve the [[2006 crisis in Timor-Leste|2006 crisis]] can be seen as appeasement – avoiding conflict without addressing the underlying grievances.<ref>[https://phrg.padovauniversitypress.it/2018/2/3 Dal Poz A. (2018) "'Buying Peace' in Timor-Leste: Another UN-success Story? " Peace Human Rights Governance, 2(2), 185–219.] ({{web archive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190721103658/https://phrg.padovauniversitypress.it/system/files/papers/2018_2_3.pdf|date=2019-07-21}})</ref>

The [[Minsk agreements]], which failed to prevent the 2022 full-scale phase of the [[Russian invasion of Ukraine]], were suggested in 2015 by ''[[Der Spiegel]]'' to be appeasement,<ref>[https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/minsk-deal-represents-and-fragile-opportunity-for-peace-in-ukraine-a-1018326.html Can Merkel's Diplomacy Save Europe?, Spiegel, 14.02.2015] ({{web archive|url=https://archive.today/20230626090550/https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/minsk-deal-represents-and-fragile-opportunity-for-peace-in-ukraine-a-1018326.html|date=2023-06-26}})</ref> and were stated in 2024 by [[Alya Shandra]] of [[Euromaidan Press]] to have been appeasement.<ref>[https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/02/24/russias-decade-of-war-against-ukraine-exposes-folly-of-appeasement/ It's ten years of Russia's war against Ukraine, not two, Alya Shandra, Euromaidan Press,24.02.2024] ({{web archive|url=https://archive.today/20250330093819/https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/02/24/russias-decade-of-war-against-ukraine-exposes-folly-of-appeasement|date=2025-03-30}})</ref>

Appeasement can face the dilemma where appeasing a group of former rebels can increase grievances with new groups.<ref>{{cite journal | url=https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2024.2308473 | doi=10.1080/10242694.2024.2308473 | title=Who Restarts Violent Conflict? Post-Conflict Government Policy and Two Types of Conflict Recurrence | date=2024 | last1=Koyama | first1=Tatsuya | journal=Defence and Peace Economics | volume=36 | issue=2 | pages=200–226 | url-access=subscription }}</ref>

==See also==
{{div col|colwidth=15em}}
* [[Confidence-building measures]]
* [[Containment]]
* [[Danegeld]]
* [[Détente]]
* [[Deterrence theory]]
* [[Game theory]]
* [[Global Peace Index]]
* [[Hardline]]
* [[International relations (1919–1939)]]
* [[Mutual assured destruction]]
* [[Peace through strength]]
* [[Realpolitik]]
* [[Right of conquest]]
* [[Trust, but verify]]
* [[Why die for Danzig?]]
* ''[[Why England Slept]]''

{{div col end}}

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==Sources==
* {{cite book |last1=Grant Duff |first1=Sheila |title=Europe and the Czechs |year=1938 |publisher=Penguin |location=London }}

==Further reading==
{{div col|colwidth=30em}}
* [[Adams, R.J.Q.]], ''British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement, 1935–1939'' (1993)
* Alexandroff A. and Rosecrance R., "Deterrence in 1939," ''World Politics'' 29#3 (1977), pp.&nbsp;404–24.
* Beck R.J., "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered" in ''International Security'', 14, 1989
* Bouverie, Tim. ''Appeasement: Chamberlain, Hitler, Churchill, and the Road to War'' (2019) [https://www.wsj.com/articles/appeasement-review-what-were-they-thinking-11572619353 online review]
* Cameron Watt, Donald. '' How War Came: Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–39'' (1990)
* Doer P.W.,  ''British Foreign Policy 1919–39'' (1988)
* Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste. ''France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932–1939'' (2004); translation of his highly influential ''La décadence, 1932–1939'' (1979)
* Dutton D., ''Neville Chamberlain''
* Faber, David. ''Munich, 1938: Appeasement and World War II'' (2009) [https://www.amazon.com/Munich-1938-Appeasement-World-War/dp/143913233X/ excerpt and text search]
* Farmer Alan. ''British Foreign and Imperial Affairs 1919–39'' (2000), textbook
* Feiling, Keith. ''The Life of Neville Chamberlain'' (1947) [https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.176384 online]
* Gilbert, Martin, ''Winston Churchill, The Wilderness Years.'' (Macmillan, 1981).
* Goddard, Stacie E. "The rhetoric of appeasement: Hitler's legitimation and British foreign policy, 1938–39." ''Security Studies'' 24.1 (2015): 95–130.
* Hill C., ''Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy: The British Experience, October 1938 – June 1941'', (1991).
* Hucker, Daniel. ''Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France.'' (Routledge, 2016).
* Jenkins Roy, ''Baldwin'' New York: HarperCollins (1987)
* Johns, Michael, "Peace in Our Time: The Spirit of Munich Lives On", ''Policy Review'' magazine, Summer 1987
* Levy J., ''Appeasement and Rearmament: Britain, 1936–1939'', 2006
* McDonough, F., ''Neville Chamberlain, appeasement, and the British road to war'' (Manchester UP, 1998)
* [[W. J. Mommsen|Mommsen W.J.]] and Kettenacker L. (eds), ''The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement'', London, George Allen & Unwin, 1983 {{ISBN|0-04-940068-1}}.
* Murray, Williamson. "Munich, 1938: The military confrontation." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' (1979) 2#3 pp.&nbsp;282–302.
* Neville P., ''Hitler and Appeasement: The British Attempt to Prevent the Second World War'', 2005
* [http://www.oxforddnb.com/public/themes/95/95646.html Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Proponents and Critics of Appeasement]
* Parker, R.A.C. ''Chamberlain and appeasement: British policy and the coming of the Second World War'' (Macmillan, 1993)
* Peden G. C., "A Matter of Timing: The Economic Background to British Foreign Policy, 1937–1939,"  ''History'', 69, 1984
* Post G., ''Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defense, 1934–1937'', Cornell UP, 1993.
* Ramsay, Scott. "Ensuring Benevolent Neutrality: The British Government's Appeasement of General Franco during the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939".  ''International History Review'' 41:3 (2019): 604–623.  DOI:  [https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2018.1428211 Ensuring Benevolent Neutrality: The British Government's Appeasement of General Franco during the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939].  [https://issforum.org/reviews/PDF/AR930.pdf online review in H-DIPLO]
* Record, Jeffrey. ''Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo'' (Naval Institute Press, 2002).
* Riggs, Bruce Timothy. [https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc278388/m2/1/high_res_d/1002720956-riggs.pdf   "Geoffrey Dawson, editor of "The Times" (London), and his contribution to the appeasement movement" (PhD dissertation, U of North Texas, 1993) online], bibliography pp.&nbsp;229–33.
* Roberts, Andrew. '' 'The Holy Fox': A Biography of Lord Halifax'' (1991) [https://archive.org/details/holyfoxlifeoflor0000robe online]
* Rock S.R., ''Appeasement in International Politics'', 2000
* Rock W.R., ''British Appeasement in the 1930s''
* Shay R.P., ''British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits'', Princeton University Press, 1977.
* Shepherd, Robert. ''A Class Divided: Appeasement and the Road to Munich, 1938'', Macmillan, 1988.
* Sontag, Raymond J. "Appeasement, 1937" ''Catholic Historical Review'' 38#4 (1953), pp.&nbsp;385–396 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/25015482 online]
* {{cite thesis |last=Stedman |first=A. D. |title='Then what could Chamberlain do, other than what Chamberlain did'? A Synthesis and Analysis of the Alternatives to Chamberlain's Policy of Appeasing Germany, 1936–1939 |type=PhD |url=http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.440347 |year=2007 |publisher=Kingston University |access-date=24 October 2016 |docket=uk.bl.ethos.440347 |oclc=500402799}}
* Wheeler-Bennett J., ''Munich: Prologue to Tragedy'', New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948
{{div col end}}

===Historiography===
* Barros, Andrew, Talbot C. Imlay, Evan Resnick, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jack S. Levy. "Debating British Decision-making toward Nazi Germany in the 1930s." ''International Security'' 34#1 (2009): 173–98.  [http://www.jstor.org/stable/40389189. online].
* Cole, Robert A. "Appeasing Hitler: The Munich Crisis of 1938: A Teaching and Learning Resource," ''New England Journal of History'' (2010) 66#2 pp.&nbsp;1–30.
* Dimuccio, Ralph BA. "The study of appeasement in international relations: Polemics, paradigms, and problems." ''Journal of peace research'' 35.2 (1998): 245–259.
* Finney, Patrick. "The romance Of decline: The historiography of appeasement and British national identity." ''Electronic Journal of International History'' 1 (2000). [http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/3385/1/Journal_of_International_History_2000-06_Finney.pdf online]; comprehensive evaluation of the scholarship
* Hughes, R. Gerald. "The Ghosts of Appeasement: Britain and the Legacy of the Munich Agreement." ''Journal of Contemporary History'' (2013) 48#4 pp.&nbsp;688–716.
*  Record, Jeffrey. "Appeasement Reconsidered – Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s" (Strategic Studies Institute, 2005)  [https://archive.org/details/Appeasement-Reconsidered-Investigating-the-Mythology-of-the-1930s-2005/page/n3 online]
* Roi, Michael. "Introduction: Appeasement: Rethinking the Policy and the Policy-Makers." ''Diplomacy and Statecraft'' 19.3 (2008): 383–390.
* Strang, G. Bruce. "The spirit of Ulysses? Ideology and British appeasement in the 1930s." ''Diplomacy and Statecraft'' 19.3 (2008): 481–526.
* Van Tol, David. "History extension 2019: Constructing history case study: Appeasement." ''Teaching History'' 51.3 (2017): 35+.
* Walker, Stephen G. "Solving the Appeasement Puzzle: Contending Historical Interpretations of British Diplomacy during the 1930s." ''British Journal of International Studies'' 6#3 (1980): 219–46. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/20096892 online].
*  Watt, D. C. "The Historiography of Appeasement", in ''Crisis and Controversy: Essays in Honour of A. J. P. Taylor'', ed. A. Sked and C. Cook (London, 1976)

==External links==
* {{Commons category-inline|Appeasement}}
{{Munich Agreement|state=collapsed}}
{{anti-war|state=collapsed}}
{{Stanley Baldwin}}
{{International relations}}
{{Game theory}}

{{Authority control}}

[[Category:1930s in the United Kingdom]]
[[Category:1930s in politics]]
[[Category:1930s controversies]]
[[Category:20th century in international relations]]
[[Category:Politics of World War II]]
[[Category:Political terminology]]
[[Category:International relations]]
[[Category:Types of diplomacy]]
[[Category:History of the foreign relations of the United Kingdom]]
[[Category:Late modern Europe]]
[[Category:Munich Agreement]]
[[Category:Neville Chamberlain]]
[[Category:Adolf Hitler]]
[[Category:Interwar Britain]]
[[Category:History of diplomacy]]
[[Category:Strategy (game theory)]]
[[Category:Non-interventionism]]