View source for Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

{{Short description|Military forces of the DR Congo}}
{{Distinguish|Armed Forces of the Republic of the Congo}}
{{more citations needed|date=December 2019}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=January 2020}}
{{Infobox national military
| name = Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
| native_name = {{lang|fr|Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo}}
| image = FARDC Logo.png
| alt = 
| caption = Insignia of FARDC
| image2 = 
| alt2 = 
| caption2 = 
| motto = 
| founded = 30 June 1960
| current_form = 17 May 1997
| disbanded = 
| branches = [[Land Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo]]<br>[[Democratic Republic of the Congo Air Force]]<br>[[Democratic Republic of the Congo Navy]]
| headquarters = [[Colonel Tshatshi Military Camp]], [[Kinshasa]]
| flying_hours = 
| website = {{URL|fardc.org/}}
<!-- Leadership -->| commander-in-chief = [[Félix Tshisekedi]]
| commander-in-chief_title = [[President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo|President]]
| chief minister = 
| chief minister_title = 
| minister = [[Guy Kabombo Muadiamvita]]
| minister_title = [[Minister of Defence (Democratic Republic of the Congo)|Minister of Defence and Veterans]]
| commander = [[General|Army General]] [[Jules Banza Mwilambwe]]
| commander_title = [[Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo|Chief of General Staff]]
<!-- Manpower -->| age = As of 2008, there are 'nearly 20,000' soldiers that are over 60 years old.{{sfn|Robinson|2012|page=480}}
| conscription = 
| manpower_data = 
| manpower_age = 
| available = 
| available_f = 
| fit = 
| fit_f = 
| reaching = 
| reaching_f = 
| active = 197,380 (30,800 inactive) (mid-2021){{sfn|Hoebeke|Chiza|Mukungilwa|2022|page=25}}
| ranked = 
| reserve = 
| deployed = <!-- Financial -->
| amount = US$93.5 million (2004 est.)
| percent_GDP = 1.34 (2016 est.)<ref>{{cite web| url = https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/congo-democratic-republic-of-the/| title = Congo, Democratic Republic of the| date = 26 January 2018| publisher = [[Central Intelligence Agency]]| access-date = 15 February 2018| df = dmy-all| archive-date = 22 February 2021| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210222023329/https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/congo-democratic-republic-of-the/| url-status = live}}</ref>
<!-- Industrial -->| domestic_suppliers = At least one ammunition plant in [[Likasi]].<ref name="United Nations 2011, p. 148">United Nations, Final Report of the Group of Experts, 2011, S/2011/738, 2 December 2011, p. 148.</ref>
| foreign_suppliers = See "Equipment" below
| imports = 
| exports = <!-- Related articles -->
| history = 
| ranks = [[Military ranks of Democratic Republic of Congo|Military ranks]]
}}

The '''Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo''' ({{langx|fr|Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo}}, '''FARDC''') is the [[armed forces|state organisation]] responsible for defending the [[Democratic Republic of the Congo]]. The FARDC was rebuilt patchily as part of the peace process which followed the end of the [[Second Congo War]], in July 2003.

The majority of FARDC members are land forces, but it also has a small air force and an even smaller navy. In 2010–2011, the three services may have numbered between 144,000 and 159,000 personnel.<ref>IISS Military Balance 2011, p419,</ref> In addition, there is a presidential force called the [[Republican Guard (Democratic Republic of the Congo)|Republican Guard]], but it and the [[Congolese National Police]] (PNC) are not part of the Armed Forces.

The government in the capital city [[Kinshasa]], the [[United Nations]], the [[European Union]], and bilateral partners which include [[Angola]], [[South Africa]], and [[Belgium]] attempted to create a viable force with the ability to provide the Democratic Republic of Congo with stability and security. However, this process has been hampered by corruption,<ref>Ian Johnston (ed.), ''Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007'', Center for International Cooperation – Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 62.</ref> inadequate donor coordination, and competition between donors.<ref>A. AUGÉ and P. KLAOUSEN, eds, Réformer les armées africaines. En quête d'une nouvelle stratégie Paris: Karthala, 2010. {{ISBN|978-2-8111-0340-8}}, pp. 120–122.</ref> The various military units now grouped under the FARDC banner are some of the most unstable in Africa after years of war and underfunding.

The FARDC has been a mix of the former [[Zaire|Zairian]] armed forces, integrated rebel groups from the Second Congo War, and militias that became part of it more recently.<ref name="EA22">{{Cite web |last=Ilunga |first=Patrick |title=Congo's Tshisekedi names new army chief in military reforms |work=[[EastAfrican]] |date=4 October 2022 |access-date=29 January 2025 |url=https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/congo-tshisekedi-names-new-army-chief-in-military-reforms-3972842 }}</ref> Since 2014, it has been organized under three geographic combatant commands known as defense zones, one each covering the western, south-central, and eastern DRC.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Wondo |first=Jean-Jacques |title=Army command reshuffle by Félix Tshisekedi: expectations and disillusions – JJ Wondo |work=Afridesk |date=August 7, 2020 |access-date=January 27, 2025 |url=https://afridesk.org/en/fardc-command-reshuffle-by-felix-tshisekedi-expectations-and-disillusions-jj-wondo/ }}</ref>

To assist post-war governments, the United Nations has had the [[United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo]] (now called [[MONUSCO]]), which until 2023 had a strength of over 16,000 peacekeepers in the country. Its principal tasks were to provide security in key areas, such as the [[South Kivu]] and [[North Kivu]] in the east, and to assist the government in reconstruction. Foreign rebel groups are also in the Congo, as they have been for most of the last half-century. The most important is the [[Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda]] (FDLR), against which [[Laurent Nkunda]]'s troops were fighting, but other smaller groups such as the anti-Ugandan [[Lord's Resistance Army]] are also present.<ref name="autogenerated3">[[International Crisis Group]], Congo: Consolidating the Peace, ''Africa Report'' No. 128, 5 July 2007.</ref>

The legal standing of the FARDC was laid down in the Transitional Constitution, articles 118 and 188. This was then superseded by provisions in the 2006 Constitution, articles 187 to 192. Law 04/023 of 12 November 2004 establishes the General Organisation of Defence and the Armed Forces.<ref>In French, "Loi No 04/023 du 12 novembre 2004 portant Organisation Générale de defence et des forces armées."</ref> In mid-2010, the Congolese Parliament was debating a new defence law, provisionally designated Organic Law 130.

==History==
=== Background ===
[[File:La défense de drapeau, Force publique - Société de Géographie (1928).jpeg|thumb|upright|Congolese soldiers of the colonial-era ''[[Force Publique]]'' pictured in 1928]]
The first organised Congolese troops, known as the {{lang|fr|[[Force Publique]]}}, were created in 1888 when King [[Leopold II of Belgium]], who held the [[Congo Free State]] as his private property, ordered his Secretary of the Interior to create military and police forces for the state.{{sfn|Meditz|Merrill|1993|p=282–285}} In 1908, under international pressure, Leopold ceded administration of the colony to the government of Belgium as the [[Belgian Congo]]. It remained under the command of a Belgian officer corps through to the independence of the colony in 1960. Throughout 1916 and 1917, the ''Force Publique'' saw combat in [[Cameroun]], and successfully invaded and conquered areas of [[East African Campaign (World War I)|German East Africa]], notably present day [[Rwanda]], during World War I. Elements of the ''Force Publique'' were also used to form Belgian colonial units that fought in the [[East African Campaign (World War II)|East African Campaign]] during World War II.{{Citation needed|date=October 2020}}

===Independence and revolt===
{{main|1960 Force Publique mutinies}}
At independence on 30 June 1960, the army suffered from a dramatic deficit of trained leaders, particularly in the officer corps. This was because the ''Force Publique'' had always only been officered by Belgian or other expatriate whites. The Belgian Government made no effort to train Congolese commissioned officers until the very end of the colonial period, and in 1958, only 23 African cadets had been admitted even to the military secondary school.{{sfn|Meditz|Merrill|1993|p=285}} The highest rank available to Congolese was [[adjutant]], which only four soldiers achieved before independence.{{sfn|Kanza|1994|p=192}}{{efn|Willame states that 10 adjutants were nominated shortly before independence due to intense political pressure.{{sfn|Willame|1972|p=62}}}} Though 14 Congolese cadets were enrolled in the [[Royal Military Academy (Belgium)|Royal Military Academy]] in Brussels in May, they were not scheduled to graduate as second lieutenants until 1963.{{sfn|Young|1966|p=35}} Ill-advised actions by Belgian officers led to an enlisted ranks' rebellion on 5 July 1960, which helped spark the [[Congo Crisis]]. Lieutenant General [[Émile Janssens]], the ''Force Publique'' commander, wrote during a meeting of soldiers that 'Before independence=After Independence', pouring cold water on the soldiers' desires for an immediate raise in their status.{{sfn|Meditz|Merrill|1993|p=285}}

Historian Louis-François Vanderstraeten says that on the morning of 8 July 1960, following a night during which all control had been lost over the soldiers, numerous ministers arrived at Camp Leopold with the aim of calming the situation.{{sfn|Vanderstraeten|1985}} Both Prime Minister [[Patrice Lumumba]] and President [[Joseph Kasa-Vubu]] eventually arrived, and the soldiers listened to Kasa-Vubu "religiously." After his speech, Kasa-Vubu and the ministers present retired into the camp canteen to hear a delegation from the soldiers. Vanderstraeten says that, according to [[Joseph Ileo]], their demands (''revendications'') included the following:
*that the defence portfolio not be given to the Prime Minister
*that the name ''Force Publique'' be changed to ''Armée Nationale Congolaise'' (ANC)
*and that the commander-in-chief and chief of staff should not necessarily be Belgians
The "laborious" discussions which then followed were later retrospectively given the label of an "extraordinary ministerial council."{{sfn|Vanderstraeten|1985|p=236}} [[Jules Gérard-Libois|Gérard-Libois]] writes that "...the special meeting of the council of ministers took steps for the immediate Africanisation of the officer corps and named [[Victor Lundula]], who was born in [[Kasai region|Kasai]] and was burgomaster of [[Jadotville]], as Commander-in-Chief of the ANC; Colonel [[Joseph-Désiré Mobutu]] as chief of staff; and the Belgian, Colonel Henniquiau, as chief advisor to the ANC".{{sfn|Libois|1966|p=95}} Thus General Janssens was dismissed. Both Lundula and Mobutu were former sergeants of the ''Force Publique''.

On 8–9 July 1960, the soldiers were invited to appoint black officers, and "command of the army passed securely into the hands of former sergeants," as the soldiers in general chose the most-educated and highest-ranked Congolese army soldiers as their new officers.<ref>Jean-Claude Williame in Kitchen, ed, ''Footnotes to the Congo Story'', New York: Walker & Co., 1967, pp. 166–167.</ref> Most of the Belgian officers were retained as advisors to the new Congolese hierarchy, and calm returned to the two main garrisons at [[Kinshasa|Leopoldville]] and [[Mbanza-Ngungu|Thysville]].{{sfn|DeWitte|Wright|2002|p=7}} The ''Force Publique'' was renamed the ''Armée nationale congolaise'' (ANC),{{sfn|Vanderstraeten|1985|p=235–260}} or Congolese National Armed Forces. However, in Katanga Belgian officers resisted the Africanisation of the army.

There was a ''Force Publique'' mutiny at Camp Massart, in Elizabethville, on 9 July 1960;{{sfn|DeWitte|Wright|2002|p=212}} five or seven Europeans were killed.{{sfn|Libois|1966|p=96}} The army revolt and resulting rumours caused severe panic across the country, and Belgium dispatched troops and the naval Task Group 218.2 to protect its citizens.<ref>Vanderstraeten, 1983, 93–94.</ref> Belgian troops intervened in Elisabethville and Luluabourg (10 July), [[Matadi]] (11 July), Leopoldville (13 July) and elsewhere.{{sfn|DeWitte|Wright|2002|p=212}} There were immediate suspicions that Belgium planned to re-seize their former colony whilst doing so. Large numbers of Belgian colonists fled the country. At the same time, on 11 July, [[Moise Tshombe]] declared the independence of [[Katanga Province]] in the south-east, closely backed by remaining Belgian administrators and soldiers.

[[File:ANC armoured vehicles during the Congo Crisis.jpg|thumb|Armée nationale congolaise (ANC) armoured vehicles during the Congo Crisis]]
On 14 July 1960, in response to requests by Prime Minister Lumumba, the UN Security Council adopted [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 143]]. This called upon Belgium to remove its troops and for the UN to provide military assistance to the Congolese forces to allow them "to meet fully their tasks". Lumumba demanded that Belgium remove its troops immediately, threatening to seek help from the Soviet Union if they did not leave within two days. The UN reacted quickly and established the [[United Nations Operation in the Congo]] (ONUC). The first UN troops arrived the next day but there was instant disagreement between Lumumba and the UN over the new force's [[Mandate (international law)|mandate]]. Because the Congolese army had been in disarray since the mutiny, Lumumba wanted to use the UN troops to subdue Katanga by force. Lumumba became extremely frustrated with the UN's unwillingness to use force against Tshombe and his secession.<ref>Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, ''Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations'', (ABC-CLIO: 1999), p. 54 {{ISBN|0-87436-892-8}}.</ref> He cancelled a scheduled meeting with Secretary General [[Dag Hammarskjöld]] on 14 August and wrote a series of angry letters instead.<ref>Hobbs, Nicole, "[http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/applebaum_award/6 The UN and the Congo Crisis of 1960]" (2014). Harvey M. Applebaum '59 Award.  {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151217233751/http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/applebaum_award/6/ |date=17 December 2015 }}</ref> To Hammarskjöld, the secession of Katanga was an internal Congolese matter and the UN was forbidden to intervene by Article 2 of the [[United Nations Charter]]. Disagreements over what the UN force could and could not do continued throughout its deployment.

A total of 3,500 troops for ONUC had arrived in the Congo by 20 July 1960.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/dag/docs/congo60.pdf |title=Questions relating to the Situation in the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) |last=United Nations |date=1960 |website=United Nations|access-date=29 December 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060524143840/http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/dag/docs/congo60.pdf |archive-date=24 May 2006 |url-status=live}}</ref> The first contingent of Belgian forces had left Leopoldville on 16 July upon the arrival of the United Nations troops. Following assurances that contingents of the Force would arrive in sufficient numbers, the Belgian authorities agreed to withdraw all their forces from the Leopoldville area by 23 July. The last Belgian troops left the country by 23 July, as United Nations forces continued to deploy throughout the Congo. The build of ONUC continued, its strength increasing to over 8,000 by 25 July and to over 11,000 by 31 July 1960. A basic agreement between the United Nations and the Congolese Government on the operation of the Force was agreed by 27 July. On 9 August, [[Albert Kalonji]] proclaimed the independence of [[South Kasai]].

[[File:Colonel Kokolo funeral 02.jpg|thumb|ANC parade in 1960]]
During the crucial period of July–August 1960, Mobutu built up "his" national army by channeling foreign aid to units loyal to him, by exiling unreliable units to remote areas, and by absorbing or dispersing rival armies. He tied individual officers to him by controlling their promotion and the flow of money for payrolls. Researchers working from the 1990s have concluded that money was directly funnelled to the army by the U.S. [[Central Intelligence Agency]], the [[United Nations]], and [[Belgium]].<ref>For CIA see David N. Gibbs, '[https://fas.org/sgp/eprint/gibbs.html Secrecy and International Relations],' ''Journal of Peace Research'', vol. 32, no. 2, 1995, pp. 213—228. {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150409020402/https://fas.org/sgp/eprint/gibbs.html |date=9 April 2015 }}, 18 March 2012, and for UN and Belgium, De Witte.</ref>{{sfn|DeWitte|Wright|2002|pp=24–25, 27–28}} Despite this, by September 1960, following the four-way division of the country, there were four separate armed forces: Mobotu's ANC itself, numbering about 12,000, the [[South Kasai]] Constabulary loyal to Albert Kalonji (3,000 or less), the [[Katanga Gendarmerie]] which were part of [[Moise Tshombe]]'s regime (totalling about 10,000), and the Stanleyville dissident ANC loyal to [[Antoine Gizenga]] (numbering about 8,000).<ref>Gordon McDonald et al, U.S. Army Area Handbook for the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) [issued by the Foreign Area Studies Division of American University], June 1962, p. 620. For more on the separating armed units, see Jean-Claude Willame, ''Patrimonialism and political change in the Congo'', Stanford University Press, 1972, 64–72, and ''Congo 1960: la sécession du Sud-Kasaï.''</ref>

In August 1960, due to the rejection of requests for UN assistance to suppress the South Kasai and Katanga revolts, [[Lumumba Government|Lumumba's government]] decided to request Soviet help. De Witte writes that "Leopoldville asked the Soviet Union for planes, lorries, arms, and equipment...Shortly afterwards, on 22 or 23 August, about 1,000 soldiers left for Kasai."{{sfn|DeWitte|Wright|2002|p=16}} On 26–27 August, the ANC seized [[Mbuji-Mayi|Bakwanga]], Albert Kalonji's capital in South Kasai, without serious resistance and, according to de Witte, "in the next two days it temporarily put an end to the secession of Kasai."{{sfn|DeWitte|Wright|2002|p=16}}

At this point, the [[Library of Congress]] Country Study for the Congo says, that on 5 September 1960:{{sfn|Meditz|Merrill|1993}}
"Kasavubu also appointed Mobutu as head of the ANC. [[Joseph Ileo]] was chosen as the new prime minister and began trying to form a new government. Lumumba and his cabinet responded by accusing Kasa-Vubu of high treason and voted to dismiss him. Parliament refused to confirm the dismissal of either Lumumba or Kasavubu and sought to bring about a reconciliation between them. After a week's deadlock, Mobutu announced on 14 September that [[1960 Republic of the Congo coup d'état|he was assuming power until 31 December 1960]], in order to "neutralize" both Kasavubu and Lumumba." Mobutu formed the [[College of Commissioners-General]], a technocratic government of university graduates.

In early January 1961, ANC units loyal to Lumumba invaded northern Katanga to support a revolt of Baluba tribesmen against Tshombe's secessionist regime.<ref>Air Combat Information Group.</ref> On 23 January 1961, Kasa-Vubu promoted Mobutu to major-general; De Witte argues that this was a political move, "aimed to strengthen the army, the president's sole support, and Mobutu's position within the army."{{sfn|DeWitte|Wright|2002|p=127}}

[[United Nations Security Council Resolution 161]] of 21 February 1961, called for the withdrawal of Belgian officers from command positions in the ANC, and the training of new Congolese officers with UN help. ONUC made a number of attempts to retrain the ANC from August 1960 to June 1963, often been set back by political changes.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=As8sAAAAMAAJ|title=The UN in the Congo: The Civilian Operations|last=House|first=Arthur|publisher=[[University Press of America]]|year=1978|isbn=0-8191-0516-3|location=Washington DC|pages=145–155|access-date=12 December 2019|archive-date=11 January 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230111165027/https://books.google.com/books?id=As8sAAAAMAAJ|url-status=live}}</ref> By March 1963 however, after the visit of Colonel Michael Greene of the [[United States Army]], and the resulting "Greene Plan", the pattern of bilaterally agreed military assistance to various Congolese military components, instead of a single unified effort, was already taking shape.<ref>House, 1978, 153–154, drawing upon United Nations Secretariat, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General, June 1962 to June 1963, UN document A/5501, 14–15.</ref>

[[File:Congolese soldiers with Chinese propaganda.jpg|thumb|Congolese soldiers with seized rebel propaganda in 1964]]
In early 1964, a new crisis broke out as Congolese rebels calling themselves "[[Simba Rebellion|Simba]]" (Swahili for "Lion") rebelled against the government. They were led by [[Pierre Mulele]], Gaston Soumialot and [[Christophe Gbenye]] who were former members of Gizenga's [[Parti Solidaire Africain]] (PSA). The rebellion affected Kivu and Eastern (Orientale) provinces. By August they had captured Stanleyville and set up a rebel government there. As the rebel movement spread, discipline became more difficult to maintain, and acts of violence and terror increased. Thousands of Congolese were executed, including government officials, political leaders of opposition parties, provincial and local police, school teachers, and others believed to have been Westernised. Many of the executions were carried out with extreme cruelty, in front of a monument to Lumumba in Stanleyville.<ref name = "cyoung">{{cite journal | title = Post-Independence Politics in the Congo | author = M. Crawford Young | journal = Transition | issue = 26 | pages = 34–41 | jstor = 2934325 | year = 1966 | doi = 10.2307/2934325 }} Post-Independence Politics in the Congo, M. Crawford Young, ''Transition'', No. 26 (1966), pp. 34–41.</ref> Tshombe decided to use foreign mercenaries as well as the ANC to suppress the rebellion. [[Mike Hoare]] was employed to create the English-speaking [[5 Commando (Congo)|5 Commando]] at [[Kamina]], with the assistance of a Belgian officer, Colonel Frederic Vanderwalle, while [[6 Commando (Congo)]] was French-speaking and originally under the command of a [[Belgian Army]] colonel, Lamouline.<ref>Dave Renton, David Seddon, Leo Zeilig, "The Congo: Plunder And Resistance", Zed Books, 2007, {{ISBN|1842774859}}, 105, and Mockler, 86–87, 89, 95.</ref> By August 1964, the mercenaries, with the assistance of other ANC troops, were making headway against the Simba rebellion. Fearing defeat, the rebels started taking hostages of the local white population in areas under their control. These hostages were rescued in Belgian airdrops (Operations [[Operation Dragon Rouge|Dragon Rouge]] and [[Operation Dragon Noire|Dragon Noir]]) over Stanleyville and [[Isiro|Paulis]] airlifted by U.S. aircraft. The operation coincided with the arrival of mercenary units (seemingly including the hurriedly formed 5th Mechanised Brigade) at Stanleyville which was quickly captured. It took until the end of the year to completely put down the remaining areas of rebellion during "[[Operation South]]".

After five years of turbulence, in 1965 Mobutu used his position as ANC [[Chief of staff (military)|Chief of Staff]] to seize power in the [[1965 Democratic Republic of the Congo coup d'état]]. Although Mobutu succeeded in taking power, his position was soon threatened by the [[Stanleyville mutinies]], also known as the Mercenaries' Mutinies, which were eventually suppressed.<ref>Anthony Mockler, 'The New Mercenaries,' Corgi Books, 1985, {{ISBN|0-552-12558-X}}, p131-159.</ref>

As a general rule, since that time, the armed forces have not intervened in politics as a body, rather being tossed and turned as ambitious men have shaken the country. In reality, the larger problem has been the misuse and sometimes abuse of the military and police by political and ethnic leaders.<ref>[[Institute for Security Studies]], [http://www.issafrica.org/publications/publication-archives/conference-reports/19-may-2004-report-solidarity-of-defence-officers-from-southern-african-countries-and-members-of-the-drc-defence-force-iss-workshop-kinshasa-17-1 Report On The Solidarity Workshop of Defence Officers from Southern African Countries and Members of the DRC Defence Force, Grand Hotel, Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 17–19 May, 2004] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160323104832/https://issafrica.org/publications/publication-archives/conference-reports/19-may-2004-report-solidarity-of-defence-officers-from-southern-african-countries-and-members-of-the-drc-defence-force-iss-workshop-kinshasa-17-1 |date=23 March 2016 }}, see "Introduction", retrieved May 2013.</ref>

On 16 May 1968 a parachute brigade of two regiments (each of three battalions) was formed which eventually was to grow in size to a full division.{{sfn|Robinson|2021|p=7}}

===Zaire (1971–1997)===
The country was renamed [[Zaire]] in 1971 and the army was consequently designated the {{lang|fr|Forces Armées Zaïroises}} (FAZ). In 1971 the army's force consisted of the 1st Groupement at [[Kananga]], with one guard battalion, two infantry battalions, and a gendarmerie battalion attached, and the 2nd Groupement ([[Kinshasa]]), the 3rd Groupement ([[Kisangani]]), the 4th Groupement ([[Lubumbashi]]), the 5th Groupement ([[Bukavu]]), the 6th Groupement ([[Mbandaka]]), and the 7th Groupement ([[Boma, Democratic Republic of the Congo|Boma]]). Each was about the size of a brigade, and commanded by aging generals who have had no military training, and often not much positive experience, since they were NCOs in the Belgian Force Publique.'{{sfn|Robinson|2021|p=5}} By the late 1970s the number of groupements reached nine, one per administrative region.{{sfn|Robinson|2021|p=11}} The parachute division (Division des Troupes Aéroportées Renforcées de Choc, DITRAC) operated semi-independently from the rest of the army.

In July 1972 a number of the aging generals commanding the ''groupements'' were retired. [[Général d'armée]] [[Louis Bobozo]], and Generaux de Corps d'Armée Nyamaseko Mata Bokongo, Nzoigba Yeu Ngoli, [[Norbert Muké|Muke Massaku]], Ingila Grima, Itambo Kambala Wa Mukina, Tshinyama Mpemba, and General de Division Yossa Yi Ayira, the last having been commander of the Kamina base, were all retired on 25 July 1972.{{sfn|Robinson|2021|pp=5-6}} Taking over as military commander-in-chief, now titled Captain General, was newly promoted General de Division [[Bumba Moaso]], former commander of the parachute division.

A large number of countries supported the FAZ in the early 1970s. Three hundred Belgian personnel were serving as staff officers and advisors throughout the Ministry of Defence, Italians were supporting the Air Force, Americans were assisting with transport and communications, Israelis with airborne forces training, and there were British advisors with the engineers.{{sfn|Robinson|2021|p=6-7}} In 1972 the state-sponsored political organisation, the [[Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution]] (MPR), resolved at a party congress to form activist cells in each military unit. The decision caused consternation among the officer corps, as the army had been apolitical (and even anti-political) since before independence.{{sfn|Young|Turner|1985|p=69}}

On 11 June 1975 several military officers were arrested in what became known as the ''coup monté et manqué.'' Amongst those arrested were Générals Daniel Katsuva wa Katsuvira, Land Forces Chief of Staff, Utshudi Wembolenga, Commandant of the 2nd Military Region at [[Kalemie]]; Fallu Sumbu, Military Attaché of Zaïre in Washington, Colonel Mudiayi wa Mudiayi, the military attaché of Zaïre in Paris, the military attache in Brussels, a paracommando battalion commander, and several others.<ref>Jean-Jacques WONDO OMANYUNDU, DE LA FORCE PUBLIQUE AUX FARDC : ANATOMIE D'UNE ARMEE VIRTUELLE INTRAVERTIE ET PERVERTIE IIIème PARTIE, pp. 3–4.</ref> The regime alleged these officers and others (including Mobutu's ''secrétaire particulier'') had plotted the assassination of Mobutu, high treason, and disclosure of military secrets, among other offences. The alleged coup was investigated by a revolutionary commission headed by Boyenge Mosambay Singa, at that time head of the Gendarmerie. Writing in 1988, Michael Schatzberg said the full details of the coup had yet to emerge.<ref>Michael Schatzberg, ''The Dialetics of Oppression in Zaire,'' Indiana University Press, 1988, p. 108.</ref> Meitho, writing many years later, says the officers were accused of trying to raise Mobutu's ''secrétaire particulier'', Colonel Omba Pene Djunga, from Kasai, to power.<ref>Kisukula Abeli Meitho, 'De Mobutu a Kabila,' 2001, 26.</ref>

[[File:Zairian troops.jpeg|thumbnail|right|Zairian troops in Southern Shaba, April 1977]]
In late 1975, Mobutu, in a bid to install a pro-[[Kinshasa]] government in Angola and thwart the [[Marxist]] [[Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]] (MPLA)'s drive for power, deployed FAZ armoured cars, paratroopers, and three infantry battalions to Angola in support of the [[National Liberation Front of Angola]] (FNLA).<ref>{{cite book|last=Meredith|first=Martin|year=2005|title=The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair, a History of Fifty Years of Independence|url=https://archive.org/details/fateofafricafrom00mere|url-access=registration|page=[https://archive.org/details/fateofafricafrom00mere/page/316 316]|publisher=PublicAffairs |isbn=9781586482466}}</ref>
On 10 November 1975, an anti-Communist force made up of 1,500 FNLA fighters, 100 Portuguese Angolan soldiers, and two FAZ battalions passed near the city of Quifangondo, only {{convert|30|km|mi}} north of [[Luanda]], at dawn on 10 November. The force, supported by South African aircraft and three 140&nbsp;mm artillery pieces,<ref>{{cite book|title=The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale|author=Edward George|year=2005|publisher=Routledge|access-date=11 May 2008|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=u_0yE0vcBQoC|isbn=0-415-35015-8|page=89|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120510003623/http://books.google.com/books?id=u_0yE0vcBQoC|archive-date=10 May 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> marched in a single line along the [[Bengo River]] to face an 800-strong [[Cuba]]n force across the river. Thus the [[Battle of Quifangondo]] began. The Cubans and MPLA fighters bombarded the FNLA with mortar and 122&nbsp;mm rockets, destroying most of the FNLA's armoured cars and six Jeeps carrying antitank rockets in the first hour of fighting.<ref name="deadroad">[https://web.archive.org/web/20110709191501/http://santiago.indymedia.org/news/2007/08/71500.php "CIA man Roberto: Burying the Last of Angola's 'Big Men'"], 9 August 2007. Santiago Indy Media.</ref>

Mobutu's support for the FNLA policy backfired when the MPLA won in Angola. The MPLA, then, acting ostensibly at least as the [[Front for Congolese National Liberation]], occupied Zaire's southeastern [[Katanga Province]], then known as Shaba, in March 1977, facing little resistance from the FAZ. This invasion is sometimes known as [[Shaba I]]. Mobutu had to request assistance, which was provided by [[Morocco]] in the form of regular troops who routed the MPLA and their Cuban advisors out of Katanga. Also important were Egyptian pilots who flew Zaire's [[Dassault Mirage 5|Mirage 5]] combat aircraft.{{sfn|Meditz|Merrill|1993|p=292–3}} The humiliation of this episode led to civil unrest in Zaire in early 1978, which the FAZ had to put down.<ref>[[John Keegan]], World Armies, New York: Facts on File, 1979, pp. 822–823.</ref>

[[File:Mobutu in 1978.jpg|thumb|President Mobutu in military fatigues, 1978|left]]
The poor performance of Zaire's military during Shaba I gave evidence of chronic weaknesses.{{sfn|Meditz|Merrill|1993}} One problem was that some of the Zairian soldiers in the area had not received pay for extended periods. Senior officers often kept the money intended for the soldiers, typifying a generally disreputable and inept senior leadership in the FAZ. As a result, many soldiers simply deserted rather than fight. Others stayed with their units but were ineffective. During the months following the Shaba invasion, Mobutu sought solutions to the military problems that had contributed to the army's dismal performance. He implemented sweeping reforms of the command structure, including wholesale firings of high-ranking officers. He merged the military general staff with his own presidential staff and appointed himself chief of staff again, in addition to the positions of minister of defence and supreme commander that he already held. He also redeployed his forces throughout the country instead of keeping them close to Kinshasa, as had previously been the case. The [[Kamanyola Division]], at the time considered the army's best formation, and considered the president's own, was assigned permanently to [[Katanga Province|Shaba]]. In addition to these changes, the army's strength was reduced by 25 percent. Also, Zaire's allies provided a large influx of military equipment, and Belgian, French, and American advisers assisted in rebuilding and retraining the force.

Despite these improvements, a second invasion by the former Katangan gendarmerie, known as [[Shaba II]] in May–June 1978, was only dispersed with the dispatch of the French [[2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment]] and a battalion of the Belgian [[Immediate Reaction Cell|Paracommando Regiment]]. Kamanyola Division units collapsed almost immediately. French units fought the [[Battle of Kolwezi]] to recapture the town from the FLNC. The U.S. provided logistical assistance.{{sfn|Meditz|Merrill|1993}}

In July 1975, according to the [[IISS]] Military Balance, the FAZ included 14 infantry battalions, seven "Guard" battalions, and seven other infantry battalions variously designated as "parachute" (or possibly "commando"; probably the units of the parachute brigade originally formed in 1968). There were also an armoured car regiment and a mechanised infantry battalion. Organisationally, the army was made up of the parachute division and the seven ''groupements.''<ref>Robinson 2021, p.11; [[IISS]] Military Balance 1975–76, p. 45.</ref> In addition to these units, a tank battalion was reported to have formed by 1979.<ref>[[John Keegan]], ''World Armies'', New York: Facts on File, 1979, p. 823.</ref>

In January 1979 ''General de Division'' [[Mosambaye Singa Boyenge]] was named as both military region commander and Region Commissioner for Shaba.<ref>Ordonnance no.79-010 du 18 janvier 1979 portant nomination d'un Commandant de la premiere region militaire, ''Official Journal of Zaire'', No. 3, 1 February 1979.</ref>

In 1984, a militarised police force, the [[Civil Guard (Zaire)|Civil Guard]], was formed.<ref>See Ordonnance-loi No. 84-036 du 28 Aout 1984 portant creation et organisation de la Garde Civile du Zaire, Agence Zaire Presse, 29 August 1984. See also Meitho 2001, 44–49.</ref> It was eventually commanded by [[Army General (France)|Général d'armée]] [[Kpama Baramoto Kata]].

Thomas Turner wrote in the mid-1990s that "[m]ajor acts of violence, such as the killings that followed the "Kasongo uprising" in Bandundu Region in 1978, the killings of diamond miners in Kasai-Oriental Region in 1979, and, more recently, the massacre of students in Lubumbashi in 1990, continued to intimidate the population."<ref>Thomas Turner, Chapter 14: Flying High Above the Toads: Mobutu and Stalemated Democracy, in John F. Clark, David E. Gardinier, Political Reform in Francophone Africa, Westview Press, Boulder, CO., 1997, 248, citing Diocese of Idiofa, "Le soulèvement dit Kasongo", La vie diocésaine d'Idiofa, no. 2 ( 1978):7; "Les massacres de Katekalayi et de Luamela (Kasai Oriental)", ''Politique africaine'' 2, no. 6 (1982):72–106; V. Digekisa Piluka, Le massacre de Lubumbashi: Zaïre 11–12 mai 1990: Dossier d'un témoin-accusé (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1993.</ref>

{| class="wikitable"
|+ Ground Forces Order of Battle, 1988<ref>Central Intelligence Agency, '[http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000865335.pdf Zaire: The Military Under Mobutu (Deleted)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924045616/http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000865335.pdf |date=24 September 2015 }}', document created 1 November 1988, accessible via Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov/ {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100527211431/http://www.foia.cia.gov/ |date=27 May 2010 }}. Retrieved 4 June 2010</ref>
! Formation !! Location !! Size !! Notes
|-
! [[Special Presidential Division]]
| Kinshasa || 5,200 || Five battalions, 'appears combat ready'
|-
! [[Kamanyola Division]]
| Shaba || 4,100 || 14th Bde only combat ready formation
|-
! {{ill|31st Parachute Brigade (Zaire)|fr|31e Brigade parachutiste|lt=31st Parachute Brigade}}
| Kinshasa/Kamina || 3,800 ||See State Dept 1978KINSHA06951 (1978). 'High state of combat readiness'
|-
! 32nd Parachute Brigade
| Kinshasa ||1,000 ||Still forming, to be deployed to Kitona. Separate 2008 French source says the brigade was never fully established.<ref>{{cite journal|language=fr|author1=Jean-Pierre Chastenet|title=La 31e Brigade Parachutiste Zaïroise|journal=Bulletin de liaison des Parachutistes Coloniaux et d'Infanterie de Marine|number=28|date=April 2008|pages=31–36|url=http://fr.calameo.com/read/0014251179c03c65f744a|access-date=5 October 2019|archive-date=30 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190930235524/https://fr.calameo.com/read/0014251179c03c65f744a|url-status=live}}</ref>
|-
! [[1st Armoured Brigade (Zaire)|1st Armoured Brigade]]
| Mbanza-Ngungu ||1,300 ||Only 30 of apx 100 tanks operational
|-
! [[41st Commando Brigade (Zaire)|41st Commando Brigade]]
| Kisangani ||1,200 ||Three battalions deployed along Eastern borders
|-
! 13th Infantry Brigade
| Kalemie ||1,500 ||'One of the most neglected units in the Zairean ground forces.'
|-
! [[21st Infantry Brigade (Zaire)|21st Infantry Brigade]]
| Around Lubumbashi ||1,700 ||See State Dept 1979LUBUMB01982 (1979). 'Modest combat capability'
|-
! 22nd Light Infantry Brigade
| Kamina base ||2,500 ||'Role undefined'
|}

The authors of the [[Library of Congress Country Study]] on Zaire commented in 1992–93 that: 
<blockquote>"The maintenance status of equipment in the inventory has traditionally varied, depending on a unit's priority and the presence or absence of foreign advisers and technicians.{{sfn|Meditz|Merrill|1993}} A considerable portion of military equipment is not operational, primarily as a result of shortages of spare parts, poor maintenance, and theft. For example, the tanks of the 1st Armoured Brigade often have a nonoperational rate approaching 70 to 80 percent. After a visit by a Chinese technical team in 1985, most of the tanks operated, but such an improved status generally has not lasted long beyond the departure of the visiting team. Several factors complicate maintenance in Zairian units. Maintenance personnel often lack the training necessary to maintain modern military equipment. Moreover, the wide variety of military equipment and the staggering array of spare parts necessary to maintain it not only clog the logistic network but also are expensive.

The most important factor that negatively affects maintenance is the low and irregular pay that soldiers receive, resulting in the theft and sale of spare parts and even basic equipment to supplement their meager salaries. When not stealing spare parts and equipment, maintenance personnel often spend the better part of their duty day looking for other ways to profit. American maintenance teams working in Zaire found that providing a free lunch to the work force was a good, sometimes the only, technique to motivate personnel to work at least half of the duty day.

The army's logistics corps [was tasked].. to provide logistic support and conduct direct, indirect, and depot-level maintenance for the FAZ. But because of Zaire's lack of emphasis on maintenance and logistics, a lack of funding, and inadequate training, the corps is understaffed, underequipped, and generally unable to accomplish its mission. It is organised into three battalions assigned to [[Mbandaka]], [[Kisangani]], and [[Kamina]], but only the battalion at Kamina is adequately staffed; the others are little more than skeleton" units.</blockquote>

The poor state of discipline of the Congolese forces became apparent again in 1990. Foreign military assistance to Zaire ceased following the end of the [[Cold War]] and Mobutu deliberately allowed the military's condition to deteriorate so that it did not threaten his hold on power.<ref>{{cite book |title=Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002 |publisher=Jane's Information Group |location=Coulsdon |page=289 }}</ref> Protesting low wages and lack of pay, [[1991 Zaire unrest|paratroopers began looting Kinshasa in September 1991]] and were only stopped after intervention by French ('Operation Baumier') and Belgian ('Operation Blue Beam')<ref>Tom Cooper & Pit Weinert, {{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20070730065639/http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_190.shtml Zaire/DR Congo since 1980]}}, 2 September 2003, Air Combat Information Group. Retrieved August 2007.</ref> forces.
[[Image:Congo Democratic Republic Map.jpg|thumb|300px|right|Map of the DR of Congo]]
In 1993, according to the [[Library of Congress Country Studies]],{{sfn|Meditz|Merrill|1993}} the 25,000-member FAZ ground forces consisted of one infantry division (with three infantry brigades); one airborne brigade (with three parachute battalions and one support battalion); one special forces (commando/counterinsurgency) brigade; the [[Special Presidential Division]]; one independent armoured brigade; and two independent infantry brigades (each with three infantry battalions, one support battalion). These units were deployed throughout the country, with the main concentrations in Shaba Region (approximately half the force). The Kamanyola Division, consisting of three infantry brigades operated generally in western Shaba Region; the 21st Infantry Brigade was located in [[Lubumbashi]]; the 13th Infantry Brigade was deployed throughout eastern Shaba; and at least one battalion of the 31st Airborne Brigade stayed at [[Kamina]]. The other main concentration of forces was in and around Kinshasa: the 31st Airborne Brigade was deployed at [[N'djili Airport]] on the outskirts of the capital; the [[Special Presidential Division]] (DSP) resided adjacent to the presidential compound; and the 1st Armoured Brigade was at [[Mbanza-Ngungu]] (in [[Bas-Congo]], approximately {{convert|120|km|mi}} southwest of Kinshasa). Finally the 41st Commando Brigade was at [[Kisangani]].

This superficially impressive list of units overstates the actual capability of the armed forces at the time. Apart from privileged formations such as the Presidential Division and the 31st Airborne Brigade, most units were poorly trained, divided and so badly paid that they regularly resorted to looting. What operational abilities the armed forces had were gradually destroyed by politicisation of the forces, tribalisation, and division of the forces, included purges of suspectedly disloyal groups, intended to allow Mobutu to divide and rule.{{sfn|Ebenga|N'Landu|2005|pp=66–70,73–74}} All this occurred against the background of increasing deterioration of state structures under the kleptocratic Mobutu regime.

===Mobutu's overthrow and after===
Much of the origins of the recent conflict in what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo stems from the turmoil following the [[Rwandan genocide]] of 1994, which then led to the [[Great Lakes refugee crisis]]. Within the largest refugee camps, beginning in [[Goma]] in Nord-Kivu, were Rwandan [[Hutu]] fighters, who were eventually organised into the [[Rassemblement Démocratique pour le Rwanda]], who launched repeated attacks into Rwanda. Rwanda eventually backed [[Laurent-Désiré Kabila]] and his quickly-organised [[Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo]] (AFDL) in invading Zaire, aiming to stop the attacks on Rwanda in the process of toppling Mobutu's government. When the militias rebelled, backed by Rwanda, the FAZ, weakened as is noted above, proved incapable of mastering the situation and preventing [[First Congo War|the overthrow of Mobutu]] in 1997.<ref>''Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002''. Page 289. A good military description of the 1996–97 war was written by William Thom: (1999) [http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get5.cgi?directory=fall99/&filename=THOM.htm#50 Congo-Zaire's 1996–97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060821184303/http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get5.cgi?directory=fall99%2F&filename=THOM.htm |date=21 August 2006 }}, ''Journal of Conflict Studies'', Vol. XIX No. 2, Fall 1999.</ref>

The [[Battle of Kinsangani (1997)|Battle of Kinsangani]] took place in March 1997 during this war. The AFDL rebels, created by the [[Rwandan Patriotic Front]], took the city defended by the [[Zairian Armed Forces]] (FAZ), loyal to President Mobutu. Before the battle itself, the air force, [[Serbs|Serbian]] mercenaries and Rwandan Hutu militiamen were not enough to make up for the FAZ's lack of fighting spirit. After the war, elements of the Mobutu-loyal FAZ managed to retreat into northern Congo, and from there into [[Sudan]] while attempting to escape the AFDL. Allying themselves with the Sudanese government which was fighting [[Second Sudanese Civil War|its own civil war]] at the time, these FAZ troops were destroyed by the [[Sudan People's Liberation Army]] during [[Operation Thunderbolt (1997)|Operation Thunderbolt]] near [[Yei, South Sudan|Yei]] in March 1997.{{sfnp|Prunier|2004|pp=376–377}}

When Kabila took power in 1997, the country was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo and so the name of the national army changed once again, to the ''Forces armées congolaises'' (FAC). [[Tanzania]] sent six hundred military advisors to train Kabila's new army in May 1997. [[Gérard Prunier]] wrote that the instructors were still at the [[Kitona]] base when the [[Second Congo War]] broke out, and had to be quickly returned to Tanzania. Prunier said "South African aircraft carried out the evacuation after a personal conversation between President Mkapa and not-yet-president Thabo Mbeki."<ref>Prunier interview with a French diplomat, Paris, January 2000. Prunier 2009 p.424</ref>{{sfn|Prunier|2009|p=199,424}} Command over the armed forces in the first few months of Kabila's rule was vague. Prunier added that "there was no minister of defence, no known chief of staff, and no ranks; all officers were Cuban-style 'commanders' called 'Ignace', 'Bosco', Jonathan', or 'James', who occupied connecting suites at the [[Intercontinental Hotel]] and had presidential list cell-phone numbers. None spoke French or Lingala, but all spoke Kinyarwanda, Swahili, and, quite often, English." On being asked by Belgian journalist [[Colette Braeckman]] what was the actual army command structure apart from himself, Kabila answered 'We are not going to expose ourselves and risk being destroyed by showing ourselves openly...We are careful so that the true masters of the army are not known. It is strategic. Please, let us drop the matter.'{{sfn|Prunier|2009|p=150}}<ref>Colette Braeckman interview with Kabila in [[Le Soir]], 31 October – 2 November 1997, at Prunier p. 150.</ref> Kabila's new ''Forces armées congolaises'' were riven with internal tensions. The new FAC had [[Banyamulenge]] fighters from South Kivu, ''kadogo'' child soldiers from various eastern tribes, such as Thierry Nindaga, Safari Rwekoze, etc... [the mostly] [[Lunda people|Lunda]] Katangese Tigers of the former [[Front for Congolese National Liberation|FNLC]], and former FAZ personnel.{{sfn|Prunier|2009|p=176}} Mixing these disparate and formerly warring elements together led to mutiny. On 23 February 1998, a mostly Banyamulenge unit mutiniued at Bukavu after its officers tried to disperse the soldiers into different units spread all around the Congo.{{sfn|Prunier|2009|p=176}}<ref>Prunier says 'on the causes of the mutiny, see ''Memorandum de la Communaute Banyamulenge a Son Excellence le President de la Republique Democratique du Congo, eut egard a la situation securitaire qui prevaut au Sud Kivu,'' Bukavu, 24 February 1998. Prunier 2009 footnote p. 416.</ref> By mid-1998, formations on the outbreak of the [[Second Congo War]] included the Tanzanian-supported 50th Brigade, headquartered at Camp [[Bandalungwa|Kokolo]] in [[Kinshasa]],<ref>[[Human Rights Watch]], [https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/congo/Congoweb-02.htm Democratic Republic of Congo Casualties of War: Civilians, Rule of Law, and Democratic Freedoms] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160126021048/https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/congo/Congoweb-02.htm |date=26 January 2016 }}, Vol. 11, No. 1 (A), February 1999. Jane's Defence Weekly, repeating a defence ministry announcement, reported it was conducting 'special security patrols' in Kinshasa as of 24 June 1998.</ref> and the 10th Brigade – one of the best and largest units in the army – stationed in Goma, as well as the 12th Brigade in Bukavu.<ref>See also Tom Cooper, "Great Lakes Conflagration: The Second Congo War, 1998-2003" Africa@War series, Helion Books, 2013.</ref> The declaration of the 10th Brigade's commander, former DSP officer [[Jean-Pierre Ondekane]], on 2 August 1998 that he no longer recognised Kabila as the state's president was one of the factors in the beginning of the [[Second Congo War]].<ref>Herbert Weiss, War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Political Evolution in Rwanda and Burundi, 1998–1999, Nordic Africa Institute, 2000, p. 13. See web reference at [http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_16/weiss/weiss_congo4.html] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080928014921/http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_16/weiss/weiss_congo4.html|date=28 September 2008}}. See also [http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_82098.html OCHA/IRIN] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100629034748/http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_82098.html|date=29 June 2010}} 20 August 1998</ref>

According to ''Jane's'', the FAC performed poorly throughout the Second Congo War and "demonstrated little skill or recognisable military doctrine".<ref>''Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa''. Issue 11—2002, p. 284.</ref> At the outbreak of the war in 1998 the Army was ineffective and the DRC Government was forced to rely on assistance from [[Angola]], [[Chad]], [[Namibia]] and [[Zimbabwe]]. As well as providing [[expeditionary warfare|expeditionary forces]], these countries unsuccessfully attempted to retrain the DRC Army. [[North Korea]] and Tanzania also provided assistance with training. During the first year of the war the Allied forces defeated the [[Rwanda]]n force which had landed in [[Bas-Congo]] and the rebel forces south-west of Kinshasa and eventually halted the rebel and Rwandan offensive in the east of the DRC. These successes contributed to the [[Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement]] which was signed in July 1999.<ref>''Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa''. Issue 11—2002. pp. 284–285.</ref> Following the Lusaka Agreement, in mid-August 1999 President Kabila issued a decree dividing the country into eight military regions. The first military region, Congolese state television reported, would consist of the two [[Kivu]] provinces, [[Orientale Province]] would form the second region, and [[Maniema]] and [[Kasai-Oriental]] provinces the third. Katanga and [[Équateur (former province)|Équateur]] would fall under the fourth and fifth regions, respectively, while [[Kasai-Occidental]] and [[Bandundu Province|Bandundu]] would form the sixth region. [[Kinshasa]] and [[Bas-Congo]] would form the seventh and eighth regions, respectively.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin737.html |title=IRIN-CEA Update No. 737 for 17 August (19990817) |date=17 August 1999 |publisher=[[The New Humanitarian|IRIN]] |access-date=17 November 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100627162613/http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin737.html |archive-date=27 June 2010 |url-status=live  }}</ref> In November 1999 the Government attempted to form a 20,000-strong paramilitary force designated the People's Defence Forces. This force was intended to support the FAC and national police but never became effective.<ref name="autogenerated4">''Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa''. Issue 11—2002, p. 289.</ref>

===1999–present===
The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was not successful in ending the war, and fighting resumed in September 1999. The FAC's performance continued to be poor and both the major offensives the government launched in 2000 ended in costly defeats.<ref>''Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa''. Issue 11—2002, pp. 286–287.</ref> President Kabila's mismanagement was an important factor behind the FAC's poor performance, with soldiers frequently going unpaid and unfed while the Government purchased advanced weaponry which could not be operated or maintained. The defeats in 2000 are believed to have been the cause of President Kabila's assassination in January 2001.<ref name="autogenerated4" /> Following the assassination, [[Joseph Kabila]] assumed the presidency and was eventually successful in negotiating an end to the war in 2002–2003.

The December 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Agreement devoted Chapter VI to the armed forces.<ref>See the copy at [http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/2826.pdf] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111109202752/http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/2826.pdf|date=9 November 2011}}. See also Caty Clement, "SSR in the DRC: Forward to the Past", in Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel (eds), ''SSR in Challenging Environments'', GC DCAF/Lit Verlag, 2009, 92.</ref> It stipulated that the armed forces chief of staff, and the chiefs of the army, air force, and navy were not to come from the same warring faction. The new "national, restructured and integrated" army would be made up from Kabila's government forces (the FAC), the RCD, and the MLC. Also stipulated in VI(b) was that the [[Rally for Congolese Democracy|RCD]]-N, RCD-ML, and the Mai-Mai would become part of the new armed forces. An intermediate mechanism for physical identification of the soldiers, and their origin, date of enrolment, and unit was also called for (VI(c)). It also provided for the creation of a ''Conseil Superieur de la Defense'' (Superior Defence Council) which would declare states of siege or war and give advice on security sector reform, disarmament/demobilization, and national defence policy.

A decision on which factions were to name chiefs of staff and military regional commanders was announced on 19 August 2003 as the first move in military reform, superimposed on top of the various groups of fighters, government and former rebels.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20070520024601/http://ospiti.peacelink.it/anb-bia/week_2k3/030703b.htm] {{cite news |date=20 August 2003 |title=New military command for DR Congo |url=https://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3168927.stm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141011173413/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3168927.stm |archive-date=11 October 2014 |access-date=17 November 2009 |work=BBC News}} Original decrees were Decrees no.17/2003 and 18/2003 of 19 August 2003.</ref> Negotiations had been ongoing since June 2003. Kabila was able to name the armed forces chief of staff, Lieutenant General [[Baudoin Liwanga|Liwanga Mata]], who previously served as navy chief of staff under Laurent Kabila. Kabila was able to name the air force commander ([[John Numbi]]), the RCD-Goma received the Land Force commander's position (Sylvain Buki) and the MLC the navy ([[Dieudonne Amuli Bahigwa]]). Three military regional commanders were nominated by the former Kinshasa government, two commanders each by the [[RCD-Goma]] and the MLC, and one region commander each by the RCD-K/ML and RCD-N. However these appointments were announced for Kabila's ''Forces armées congolaises'' (FAC), not the later FARDC. However, troop deployment on the ground did not change substantially until the year afterward.

[[File:Congolese troops at Camp Base, Kisangani 2010-05-05 2.JPG|thumb|Congolese troops raise the [[flag of the Democratic Republic of the Congo]] in 2010]]
On 24 January 2004, a decree created the ''Structure Militaire d'Intégration'' (SMI, Military Integration Structure). Together with the SMI, CONADER also was designated to manage the combined ''tronc commun'' DDR element and military reform programme. The first post-Sun City military law appears to have been passed on 12 November 2004, which formally created the new national Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). Included in this law was article 45, which recognised the incorporation of a number of armed groups into the FARDC, including the former government army Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC), ex-FAZ personnel also known as former President Mobutu's 'les tigres', the RCD-Goma, RCD-ML, RCD-N, MLC, the Mai-Mai, as well as other government-determined military and paramilitary groups.

Turner writes that the two most prominent opponents of military integration (''brassage'') were Colonel [[Jules Mutebutsi]], a Munyamulenge from South Kivu, and [[Laurent Nkunda]], a Rwandaphone Tutsi who Turner says was allegedly from [[Rutshuru]] in North Kivu. In May–June 2004 Mutebusi led a revolt against his superiors from Kinshasa in South Kivu.<ref>{{cite book|ref={{harvid|Turner|2007}}|author=Thomas Turner|title=The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality|publisher=Zed Books|place=London and New York|date=2007|isbn=978-1-842776896|pages=96–101}}</ref> Nkunda began his long series of revolts against central authority by helping Mutebusi in May–June 2004. In November 2004 a Rwandan government force entered North Kivu to attack the FDLR, and, it seems, reinforced and resupplied RCD-Goma (ANC) at the same time. Mutebutsi and Nkunda were seemingly supported by both the Rwandan government, the FARDC regional commander, General [[Obed Rwisbasira]],<ref>Tutsi; military training in Rwanda; became RCD-Goma commander of North Kivu Military Region; named Brigadier General in FARDC 20 December 2003 and appointed commander of 8 MR North Kivu; moved to command 5 MR Kasai Oriental after December 2004 events. Omosombo, ''Biographies des acteurs de la Transition,'' CEP-Africa Museum-CERDAC, 2006, 224.</ref> and the RCD-Goma governor of North Kivu, [[Eugene Serufuli]]. Neither government figure did anything to prevent Nkunda's march south to Bukavu with his military force. In mid-December, civilians at Kanyabayonga, Buramba, and Nyabiondo in North Kivu were killed, tortured, and raped, seemingly deliberately targeted on ethic grounds (the victims came almost exclusively from the [[Hunde]] and [[Nande]] ethnic groups). Kabila dispatched 10,000 government troops to the east in response, launching an operation 11 December that was called "Operation Bima".{{sfn|Turner|2007|p=131–132}} Its only major success was the capture of [[Walikale]] from RCD-Goma (ANC) troops.

There was another major personnel reshuffle on 12 June 2007. FARDC chief General Kisempia Sungilanga Lombe was replaced with General Dieudonne Kayembe Mbandankulu.<ref>U.S. Embassy Kinshasa, 07KINSHASA655 Kabila Replaces Kisempia As Chief of Congolese Defense Forces, 13 June 2007 (UNCLAS/FOUO). See also 07KINSHASA534, Congolese Military Replaces Commander in North Kivu, 16 May 2007.</ref> General [[Gabriel Amisi Kumba]] retained his post as Land Forces commander. John Numbi, a trusted member of Kabila's inner circle, was shifted from air force commander to Police Inspector General. U.S. diplomats reported that the former Naval Forces Commander Maj. General Amuli Bahigua (ex-MLC) became the FARDC's Chief of Operations; former FARDC Intelligence Chief General Didier Etumba (ex-FAC) was promoted to vice admiral and appointed Commander of Naval Forces; Maj. General Rigobert Massamba (ex-FAC), a former commander of the Kitona air base, was appointed as Air Forces Commander; and Brig. General Jean-Claude Kifwa, commander of the Republican Guard, was appointed as a regional military commander.<ref>U.S. Embassy Kinshasa, 07KINSHASA671 Major Reshuffle of Military and Police Leadership, Friday 15 June 2007 (UNCLAS/FOUO).</ref>
[[File:The Congolese National Armed Forces (FARDC) reinforce their positions around Goma following a second day (21 May 2013) of fighting against M23 elements in the town of Mutaho, about 10 km from Goma. (8783002232).jpg|thumb|left|250px|FARDC soldiers near Goma in May 2013]]
Due to significant delays in the DDR and integration process, of the eighteen brigades, only seventeen have been declared operational, over two and a half years after the initial target date. Responding to the situation, the Congolese Minister of Defence presented a new defence reform master plan to the international community in February 2008. Essentially the three force tiers all had their readiness dates pushed back: the first, territorial forces, to 2008–12, the mobile force to 2008–10, and the main defence force to 2015.

Much of the east of the country remains insecure, however. In the far northeast this is due primarily to the [[Ituri conflict]]. In the area around [[Lake Kivu]], primarily in [[North Kivu]], [[Kivu conflict|fighting continues]] among the [[Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda]] and between the government FARDC and [[Laurent Nkunda]]'s troops, with all groups greatly exacerbating the issues of [[Internally displaced person|internal refugees]] in the area of Goma, the consequent food shortages, and loss of infrastructure from the years of conflict.<ref name=IRIN2008>{{cite journal | last = Integrated Regional Information Networks | title = DR Congo Rising food prices | journal = Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series | volume = 44 | issue = 11 | pages = 17623C–17624A | publisher = Wiley-Blackwell | location = New Jersey | date = January 2008}}</ref> In 2009, several United Nations officials stated that the army is a major problem, largely due to corruption that results in food and pay meant for soldiers being diverted and a military structure top-heavy with colonels, many of whom are former warlords.<ref>{{cite magazine | title = Rape of the Congo | url = http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22956 | last = Hochschild | first = Adam | author-link = Adam Hochschild | magazine = [[New York Review of Books]] Volume 56, Number 13 | date = 13 August 2009 | access-date = 30 July 2009 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20090727063951/http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22956 | archive-date = 27 July 2009 | url-status = live}}</ref> In a 2009 report itemizing FARDC abuses, [[Human Rights Watch]] urged the UN to stop supporting government offensives against eastern rebels until the abuses ceased.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.hrw.org/en/node/87142/section/4 |title=You Will Be Punished |publisher=[[Human Rights Watch]] |date=13 December 2009 |access-date=14 December 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091219222411/http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87142/section/4 |archive-date=19 December 2009 |url-status=live  }}</ref>

Caty Clement wrote in 2009:<ref>Caty Clement, "EUSEC RD Congo", in Esra Bulut & Giovanni Grevi, European Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years (1999–2009) (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2009), 247.</ref>
<blockquote>"One of the most notable [FARDC corruption] schemes was known as 'Opération Retour' (Operation Return).  Senior officers ordered the soldiers' pay to be sent from Kinshasa to the commanders in the field, who took their cut and returned the remainder to their commander in Kinshasa instead of paying the soldiers. To ensure that foot soldiers would be paid their due, in late 2005, [[EUSEC DR Congo|EUSEC]] suggested separating the chain of command from the chain of payment. The former remained within Congolese hands, while the EU mission delivered salaries directly to the newly 'integrated' brigades. Although efficient in the short term, this solution raises the question of sustainability and ownership in the long term. Once soldiers' pay could no longer be siphoned off via 'Opération Retour', however, two other budgetary lines, the 'fonds de ménage' and logistical support to the brigades, were soon diverted."</blockquote>

In 2010, thirty FARDC officers were given scholarships to study in Russian military academies. This is part of a greater effort by Russia to help improve the FARDC. A new military attaché and other advisers from Russia visited the DRC.<ref>[http://www.congoplanet.com/news/1597/russia-gets-involved-reform-congolese-armed-forces-mwando-nsimba-fardc.jsp "Russia gets involved in reform of the Congolese Armed Forces"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402092602/http://www.congoplanet.com/news/1597/russia-gets-involved-reform-congolese-armed-forces-mwando-nsimba-fardc.jsp |date=2 April 2015 }}, January 2010. Congo Planet.</ref>

On 22 November 2012, Gabriel Amisi Kumba was suspended from his position in the Forces Terrestres by president [[Joseph Kabila]] due to an inquiry into his alleged role in the sale of arms to various rebel groups in the eastern part of the country, which may have implicated the rebel group [[March 23 Movement|M23]].<ref>{{cite news|url=http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/11/22/rdc-le-president-kabila-suspend-le-general-major-amisi-le-chef-de-forces-terrestres/|title=RDC : le président Kabila suspend le général major Amisi, le chef des forces terrestres|publisher=Radio Okapi|date=22 November 2012|access-date=22 November 2012|language=fr|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121127171714/http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/11/22/rdc-le-president-kabila-suspend-le-general-major-amisi-le-chef-de-forces-terrestres/|archive-date=27 November 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> In December 2012 it was reported that members of Army units in the north east of the country are often not paid due to corruption, and these units rarely {{Not a typo|counter attacks}} made against villages by the [[Lord's Resistance Army]].<ref name="NYT Worlds Worst War">{{cite news|last=Gettleman|first=Jeffrey|title=The World's Worst War|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/16/sunday-review/congos-never-ending-war.html?pagewanted=1&hpw|access-date=25 December 2012|newspaper=The New York Times|date=15 December 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121225081515/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/16/sunday-review/congos-never-ending-war.html?pagewanted=1&hpw|archive-date=25 December 2012|url-status=live}}</ref>

The FARDC deployed 850 soldiers and 150 PNC police officers as part of an international force in the [[Central African Republic]], which the DRC borders to the north. The country had been [[Central African Republic conflict (2012—present)|in a state of civil war]] since 2012, when the president was ousted by rebel groups. The DRC was urged by [[France|French]] president [[François Hollande]] to keep its troops in CAR.<ref>[http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20140521-hollande-dicuss-central-africa-military-presence-drc-s-kabila-paris "Hollande discusses Central Africa troop presence with DRC's Kabila in Paris"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140522182647/http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20140521-hollande-dicuss-central-africa-military-presence-drc-s-kabila-paris |date=22 May 2014 }}, RFI, 21 May 2014.</ref>

In July 2014, the Congolese army carried out a joint operation with UN troops in the [[Masisi Territory|Masisi]] and [[Walikale Territory|Walikale territories]] of the North Kivu province. In the process, they liberated over 20 villages and a mine from the control of two rebel groups, the Mai Mai Cheka and the Alliance for the Sovereign and Patriotic Congo.<ref>[https://www.voanews.com/a/military-offensives-free-drc-villages/1966943.html "Military Offensive Frees DRC Villages"], ''Voice of America'', 28 July 2014.</ref>

The UN published a report in October 2017 announcing that the FARDC no longer employed child soldiers but was still listed under militaries that committed sexual violations against children.<ref>{{cite web| url = https://www.digitalcongo.net/article/59d8c6ac7c4ad20004984bdc| title = Les Fardc lavées des accusations et rayées de la liste noire des Nations Unies| author = Radio Okapi| date = 7 October 2017| location = Kinshasa| website = Digital Congo| access-date = 7 October 2017| language = fr| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20171008080519/https://www.digitalcongo.net/article/59d8c6ac7c4ad20004984bdc| archive-date = 8 October 2017| url-status = live| df = dmy-all| author-link = Radio Okapi}}</ref>

Troops operating with [[MONUSCO]] in North Kivu were attacked by likely rebels from the [[Allied Democratic Forces]] on 8 December 2017. After a protracted firefight the troops suffered 5 dead along with 14 dead among the UN force.<ref>McGuinness, Alan (8 December 2017). "Fourteen UN peacekeepers killed in Democratic Republic of Congo attack". [https://news.sky.com/story/fourteen-un-peacekeepers-killed-in-democratic-republic-of-congo-attack-11161884 Sky News website] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171208192535/https://news.sky.com/story/fourteen-un-peacekeepers-killed-in-democratic-republic-of-congo-attack-11161884 |date=8 December 2017 }}. Retrieved 9 December 2017.</ref>

On 10 July 2024, a military court in North Kivu sentenced 25 soldiers to death for charges including theft, fleeing the enemy, and violating orders after a one-day trial. These soldiers were accused of abandoning their posts during fights against the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels. Additionally, one soldier received a 10-year prison sentence for robbery, while four civilian wives and another soldier were acquitted.<ref>{{cite news|title=DR Congo military court sentences 25 soldiers to death for fleeing fighting |date=10 July 2024 |url=https://www.africanews.com/2024/07/04/dr-congo-military-court-sentences-25-soldiers-to-death-for-fleeing-fighting/ |access-date=16 July 2024}}</ref>

== Structure ==
[[Image:Kisempia.jpg|thumb|250px|Gén. [[Kisempia Sungilanga]], former Chief of Staff of the FARDC, in December 2006.]]

The President [[Félix Tshisekedi]] is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The [[Minister of Defence (Democratic Republic of the Congo)|Minister of Defence]], formally Ministers of Defence and Veterans (Ancien Combattants) is Crispin Atama Tabe, who succeeded former minister [[Aimé Ngoy Mukena]].

The [[Colonel Tshatshi Military Camp]] in the [[Kinshasa]] suburb of [[Ngaliema]] hosts the defence department and the Chiefs of Staff central command headquarters of the FARDC. Jane's data from 2002 appears inaccurate; there is at least one ammunition plant in [[Katanga Province|Katanga]].<ref>The inaccurate assessment was located at ''Jane's Sentinel security assessment—Central Africa''. Issue 11—2002, p. 314. The Group of Experts has reported in 2011 about the ammunition plant; see footnote 5.</ref>

Below the Chief of Staff, the current organisation of the FARDC is not fully clear. There is known to be a Military Intelligence branch – Service du Renseignement militaire (SRM), the former [[DEMIAP]]. The FARDC is known to be broken up into the Land Forces (''Forces Terrestres''), Navy and Air Force. The Land Forces are distributed around ten [[military regions]], up from the previous eight, following the ten provinces of the country. There is also a training command, the Groupement des Écoles Supérieurs Militaires (GESM) or Group of Higher Military Schools, which, in January 2010, was under the command of Major General [[Marcellin Lukama]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.icrc.org/Web/fre/sitefre0.nsf/htmlall/congo-kinshasa-newsletter-190410/$File/CICR%20bulletin.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101128134050/http://www.icrc.org/Web/fre/sitefre0.nsf/htmlall/congo-kinshasa-newsletter-190410/$File/CICR%20bulletin.pdf |title=CICR Bulletin, No. 1, 2010 |archive-date=28 November 2010 }} This command was formed in accordance with [http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Public/Defense/D.106.2002.19.08.2002.htm Decret 106/2002 portant création d’un groupement des écoles supérieures militaires des Forces armées congolaises. (Présidence de la République)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111106192052/http://leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Public/Defense/D.106.2002.19.08.2002.htm |date=6 November 2011 }} and is a reformation of a grouping with the same name that was active in the 1980s and potentially before. Claude Lambert, "L'Ecole de Formation d'Officiers 1969–1990", Militaria Belge 2007–08, Societe Royale des Amies du Musee de l'Armée, Brussels, 2008, pp. 267 onwards. For a brief biography of Lukama, seemingly under an alternate name, 'Max Musikani Lukama', see Jean Omasombo, RDC: Biography des acteurs de troiseme republique, [[Royal Museum of Central Africa]], 2009, 152–153.</ref> The Navy and Air Forces are composed of various ''groupments'' (see below). There is also a central logistics base. The [[United Nations Mine Action Service]] supervised the construction of a new ammunition depot on the outskirts of [[Kisangani]] and handed it over to the MOD in October 2013.<ref>{{cite web |title=Large Ammunition Storage Facility Handed Over |url=https://www.unmas.org/en/news/large-ammunition-storage-facility-handed-over |access-date=19 October 2022 |archive-date=19 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221019122610/https://www.unmas.org/en/news/large-ammunition-storage-facility-handed-over |url-status=live }}</ref>

It should be made clear also that [[Joseph Kabila]] does not trust the military; the Republican Guard is the only component he trusts. Major General [[John Numbi]], former Air Force chief, now inspector general of police, ran a parallel chain of command in the east to direct the [[2009 Eastern Congo offensive]], Operation Umoja Wetu; the regular chain of command was by-passed. Previously Numbi negotiated the agreement to carry out the ''mixage'' process with [[Laurent Nkunda]].<ref>See for example CNDP, {{cite web|url=http://www.cndp-congo.org/CNDP/lettre_ban_ki_moon_anglais.pdf |title=Ban Ki-moon letter (English) |access-date=18 December 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110725183341/http://www.cndp-congo.org/CNDP/lettre_ban_ki_moon_anglais.pdf |archive-date=25 July 2011  }}</ref> Commenting on a proposed vote of no confidence in the Minister of Defence in September 2012, Baoudin Amba Wetshi of ''lecongolais.cd'' described Ntolo as a "scapegoat". Wetshi said that all key military and security questions were handled in total secrecy by the President and other civil and military personalities trusted by him, such as [[John Numbi]], [[Gabriel Amisi Kumba]] ('Tango Four'), [[Delphin Kahimbi]], and others such as Kalev Mutond and [[Pierre Lumbi Okongo]].<ref>Baoudin Amba Wetshi, [http://www.lecongolais.cd/un-bouc-emissaire-nomme-luba-ntambo/ "Un bouc emissaire nomme Luba Ntambo"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131101135641/http://www.lecongolais.cd/un-bouc-emissaire-nomme-luba-ntambo/ |date=1 November 2013 }}, 19 September 2012.</ref>

===Arms and Inter-forces Services===
* Signals
* Engineering
* Health Service
* Physical Education and Sports
* Military Chaplains
* Military Justice
* Administration
* Logistics
* Intelligence and Security
* [[Military Band]]
* Veterinary and Agricultural Service
* [[Military Police]]
* Civic, Patriotic Education and Social Actions
* Communication and Information

====General Secretariat for Defence and Veterans Affairs====
The General Secretariat for Defence: is headed by a General Officer (Secretary General for Defence). He oversees the following departments:
* Human Resources Department
* Directorate of Studies, Planning and Military Cooperation
* Budget and Finance Department
* Directorate of Penitentiary Administration
* Directorate of General Services
* IT Department

====General Inspectorate====
The General Inspectorate includes the following people:

* Inspector General
* Two Assistant Inspectors General
* College of Inspectors
* College of Advisers
* Administrative Secretariat
* Administrative, logistics and services unit

===Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff===
{{main|Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo}}
The available information on armed forces' Chiefs of Staff is incomplete and sometimes contradictory. In addition to armed forces chiefs of staff, in 1966 Lieutenant Colonel Ferdinand Malila was listed as Army Chief of Staff.<ref>''Miami News'', 18 June 1966, and Sydney Taylor (ed), ''The New Africans: A Guide to the Contemporary History of Emergent Africa and its Leaders'', London: Paul Hamlyn/Reuters, 1967, pp. 95, 102.</ref>

===Command structure in January 2005===
Virtually all officers have now changed positions, but this list gives an outline of the structure in January 2005.<ref>Source is the [[Institute for Security Studies]], at [http://www.iss.co.za/Af/profiles/DRCongo/SecInfo.html Democratic Republic of Congo Security Information (updated: 12 January 2005)] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070926225131/http://www.iss.co.za/Af/profiles/DRCongo/SecInfo.html |date=26 September 2007 }}</ref> Despite the planned subdivision of the country into more numerous provinces, the actual splitting of the former provinces has not taken place.
*FARDC chief of staff: Major General [[Kisempia Sungilanga|Sungilanga Kisempia]] (PPRD)
*FARDC land forces chief of staff: General Sylvain Buki (RCD-G).<ref>Still in post January 2006. Le Potential (Kinshasa), [http://www.lepotentiel.com/afficher_article.php?id_edition=&id_article=20497 "Le chef d’état-major de la Force terrestre en visite éclair au centre de brassage de Rumangabo"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070930155723/http://www.lepotentiel.com/afficher_article.php?id_edition=&id_article=20497 |date=30 September 2007 }}, 7 January 2006.</ref> Major General [[Gabriel Amisi Kumba]] appears to have been appointed to the position in August 2006, and retained this position during the personnel reshuffle of 12 June 2007. In November 2012 he was succeeded by [[François Olenga]].<ref>[http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/11/26/sud-kivu-le-nouveau-commandant-des-forces-terrestres-appelle-les-fardc-la-discipline/ Sud-Kivu : le nouveau commandant des forces terrestres appelle les FARDC à la discipline] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130530111103/http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/11/26/sud-kivu-le-nouveau-commandant-des-forces-terrestres-appelle-les-fardc-la-discipline/ |date=30 May 2013 }}. Radio Okapi (26 November 2012).</ref>
*FARDC navy chief of staff: General Major [[Dieudonne Amuli Bahigwa]] (MLC) (Commander of the [[2009 Eastern Congo offensive|Kimia II operation]] in 2009)<ref>Twenty-eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2009/335), 30 June 2009, paragraph 3. For Bahigwa, see Omosombo, 2009, 25.</ref>
*FARDC air force chief of staff: Brigadier General Jean Bitanihirwa Kamara (MLC). Military training at the ''[[Military Academy of Kananga|Ecole de formation d'officiers]]'' (EFO), [[Kananga]], and other courses while in the FAZ. Brigade commander in the MLC, then named in August 2003 "chef d'etat-major en second" of the FARDC air force.<ref>Omasombo, 2009, 41.</ref>
*1st Military Region/[[Bandundu (province)|Bandundu]]: Brigadier General [[Moustapha Mukiza]] (MLC)<ref>A Tutsi from South Kivu. Trained at the [[Ecole de formation d'officiers]], Kananaga, and a major in the FAZ. Took part in the airborne arrival of troops at [[Kitona]] in August 1998. Moved from RCD to MLC, succeeded General Alengbia as commander of the Dongo brigade ([[Equateur]]). Sent by J.P. Bemba to the [[Central African Republic]] in 2002. Named commander of 1st Military Region in August 2003 and confirmed in the post in October 2006. Became base commander at [[Kitona]] June 2007. Omosombo, 2009, 200.</ref>
*2nd Military Region/[[Bas-Congo]]: Unknown. General Jean Mankoma 2009.
*3rd Military Region/[[Equateur]]: Brigadier-General Mulubi Bin Muhemedi (PPRD)
*4th Military Region/Kasai-Occidental: Brigadier-General Sindani Kasereka (RCD-K/ML)
*5th Military Region/[[Kasai Oriental]]: General Rwabisira Obeid (RCD)
*6th Military Region/[[Katanga Province|Katanga]]: Brigadier-General Nzambe Alengbia (MLC) – 62nd, 63rd, and 67th Brigades in Katanga have committed numerous acts of sexual violence against women.<ref>{{cite web |title=Legal Submission from Human Rights Watch to Dr. Adolphe Onusumba, Minister of Defence, 21 July 2006 |url=https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/drc/2006/katanga/pdfs/DRC%20FARDC%20Submission%20En.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160311172201/https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/drc/2006/katanga/pdfs/DRC%20FARDC%20Submission%20En.pdf |archive-date=11 March 2016 |access-date= 8 June 2009 |via= HRW "Soldiers who Rape, Commanders who Condone"}}</ref>
*7th Military Region/[[Maniema]]: Brigadier-General Widi Mbulu Divioka (RCD-N)
*8th Military Region/[[North Kivu]]: General [[Gabriel Amisi Kumba]] (RCD). General Amisi, a.k.a. "Tango Fort" now appears to be Chief of Staff of the Land Forces. Brig. Gen. Vainqueur Mayala was Commander 8th MR in September 2008<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://allafrica.com/stories/200809220171.html |work=The New Times (Kigali) |title= Rwanda: War Rages in DRC as Government Forces Seek FDLR Support |date=21 September 2008 |access-date=9 November 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121006092549/http://allafrica.com/stories/200809220171.html |archive-date=6 October 2012 |url-status=bot: unknown  }}</ref>
*9th Military Region/[[Province Orientale]]: Major-General Bulenda Padiri (Mayi–Mayi)
*10th Military Region/[[South Kivu]]: Major Mbuja Mabe (PPRD). General Pacifique Masunzu, in 2010. Region included 112th Brigade on Minembwe plateuxes. This grouping was "an almost exclusively Banyamulenge brigade under the direct command of the 10th Military Region, [which] consider[ed] General Masunzu as its leader."<ref>As of ICG, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, Africa Report No. 128, 5 July 2007, pp. 13–14.</ref>

===Updates to command structure in 2014===
In September 2014, President Kabila reshuffled the command structure and in addition to military regions created three new 'defence zones' which would be subordinated directly to the general staff. The defence zones essentially created a new layer between the general staff and the provincial commanders. The military regions themselves were reorganised and do not correspond with the ones that existed prior to the reshuffle.<ref>[https://suluhu.org/2014/09/28/reshuffle-in-the-congolese-army-cui-bono/ Reshuffle in the Congolese army – cui bono?] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180305063805/https://suluhu.org/2014/09/28/reshuffle-in-the-congolese-army-cui-bono/ |date=5 March 2018 }}. Suluhu.org. Published 28 September 2014. Retrieved 4 March 2018.</ref><ref>[https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/5786/Reshaping_the_army Reshaping the army] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171215053310/https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/5786/Reshaping_the_army |date=15 December 2017 }}. ''[[Africa Confidential]]'', vol. 55. Published 26 September 2014. Retrieved 14 December 2017.</ref> New commanders of branches were also appointed:<ref>[http://www.digitalcongo.net/article/103659 Joseph Kabila meets with security council] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402122752/http://www.digitalcongo.net/article/103659 |date=2 April 2015 }} Digital Congo. Published 5 November 2014. Retrieved 29 March 2015.</ref> A Congolese military analyst based in Brussels, Jean-Jacques Wondo, provided an outline of the updated command structure of the FARDC following the shake up of the high command:<ref>[https://ethuin.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/27092014-wondo-fardc-reshuffle.png Commanders of defense zones and military zones as of September 2014] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150110051011/https://ethuin.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/27092014-wondo-fardc-reshuffle.png |date=10 January 2015 }}.</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://ethuin.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/20140919_la_liste_des_officiers_gc3a9nc3a9raux_et_supc3a9rieu-rs-nommc3a9s-c3a0-la-tc3aate-des-grandes-unitc3a9s-militaires-forum_des_as_pp-913.pdf |title=List of general officers appointed to the heads of military units |access-date=4 March 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150110051018/http://ethuin.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/20140919_la_liste_des_officiers_gc3a9nc3a9raux_et_supc3a9rieu-rs-nommc3a9s-c3a0-la-tc3aate-des-grandes-unitc3a9s-militaires-forum_des_as_pp-913.pdf |archive-date=10 January 2015 |url-status=live  }}</ref><ref>[http://www.mediacongo.net/publireportage-reportage-2998.html Général Etumba reconduit chef d’Etat major général] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180305063906/http://www.mediacongo.net/publireportage-reportage-2998.html |date=5 March 2018 }}. MediaCongo.net. Published 20 September 2014. Retrieved 4 March 2018.</ref>

*Chief of General Staff: Army Gen. [[Didier Etumba]]
*Deputy chief of staff for operations and intelligence: Lt. Gen. Bayiba Dieudonné Amuli
*Deputy chief of staff for administration and logistics: Maj. Gen. [[Celestin Mbala Munsense]]
*Chief of operations: Maj. Gen. Prosper Nabiola
*Chief of intelligence: Brig. Gen. Tage Tage
*Chief of administration: Constantin Claude Ilunga Kabangu 
*Chief of logistics: Brig. Gen. Lutuna Charles Shabani
*Land Forces Chief of Staff: Gen. [[Dieudonné Banze]]
*Land Forces deputy chief of staff for operations and intelligence: Maj. Gen. Kiama Vainqueur Mayala 
*Land Forces deputy chief of staff for administration and logistics: Maj. Gen. Muyumb Obed Wibatira
*Navy Chief of Staff: Vice Adm. [[Rombault Mbuayama]]
*Navy deputy chief of staff for operations and intelligence: Rear Adm. Jean-Marie Valentin Linguma Mata Linguma (Vice Adm. from 2018)<ref name="digital" />
*Navy deputy chief of staff for administration and logistics: Rear Adm. Bruno Mayanga Muena
*Air Force Chief of Staff: Brig. Gen. [[Numbi Ngoie]] (Maj. Gen. from 2018)<ref name="digital" />
*Air Force deputy chief of staff for operations and intelligence: Brig. Gen. Maurice René Diasuka Diakiyana (Maj. Gen. from 2018)<ref name="digital" />
*Air Force deputy chief of staff for administration and logistics: Brig. Gen. Jean-Paul Nganguele Mutali (Maj. Gen. from 2018)<ref name="digital" />

Regional commanders:
*'''1st Defence Zone (Bas Congo, Bandundu, Equatuer, and Kinshasa):''' Brig. Gen. [[Gabriel Amisi Kumba]]
**11th Military Region (Bandundu Province): Brig Gen. Dieudonné Kiamata Mutupeke
**12th Military Region (Bas-Congo Province): Brig Gen. Jonas Padiri Muhizi (Maj. Gen. from 2018)<ref name="digital" />
**13th Military Region (Equatuer Province): Brig. Gen. Luboya Kashama Johnny (Maj. Gen. from 2018)<ref name="digital" />
**14th Military Region (Kinshasa): Brig. Gen. Camille Bombele Luwala
*'''2nd Defence Zone (Kasai and Katanga):''' Maj. Gen. [[Jean Claude Kifwa]]
**21st Military Region (Kasai-Oriental and Kasai Occidental Provinces): Brig. Gen. Fall Jikabwe
**22nd Military Region (Katanga Province): Brig. Gen. Philémon Yav (Maj. Gen. from 2018)<ref name="digital" />
*'''3rd Defence Zone (Kivu, Maneima, and Katanga):''' Maj. Gen. [[Leon Mush ale Tsipamba]]
**31st Military Region ([[Bas-Uele]] and [[Tshopo]] Districts): Brig. Gen. Bertin Baseka Kamangala
**32nd Military Region ([[Haut-Uele]] and [[Ituri Province|Ituri]] Districts): Brig. Gen. Jean-Pierre Bongwangela
**33rd Military Region (Maneima and South Kivu Provinces): Brig. Gen. Gaetan Kakudji Bobo
**34th Military Region (North Kivu Province): Maj. Gen. Emmanuel Lombe

===Reshuffle in 2018===
The following changes were announced in July 2018.<ref name="digital">[https://www.digitalcongo.net/article-en/5b4c668e51feed0004abe2b2/ Fardc: Joseph Kabila names Lieutenant-General Celestin Mbala Munsense General Staff] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180820234939/https://www.digitalcongo.net/article-en/5b4c668e51feed0004abe2b2/ |date=20 August 2018 }}. ''Digitalcongo.net''. Published 16 July 2018. Retrieved 21 April 2019.</ref>

*Chief of the General Staff: Lt. Gen. [[Celestin Mbala Munsense]] (Army Gen. from 2019)<ref>[https://www.digitalcongo.cd/article-en/5ce522c8aa0e2f0004788af8/ General Célestin Mbala renewed Chief of Staff of the FARDC]. Digitalcongo.net, 22 May 2019</ref>
*Deputy Chief of Staff for operations and intelligence: Lt. Gen. [[Gabriel Amisi Kumba]]
*Deputy Chief of Staff for administration and logistics: Maj. Gen. [[Jean-Pierre Bongwangela]]
*Chief of operations: Maj. Gen. Daniel Kashale
*Chief of intelligence: Maj. Gen. Delphin Kahimbi Kasabwe
*Chief of administration: Maj. Gen. Jean-Luc Yav
*Chief of logistics: Brig. Gen. Kalala Kilumba

==Land forces==
{{Main|Land Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo}}
[[Image:Congolese soldier.jpg|thumb|upright|left|A Congolese rebel photographed near the Rwandan border in 2001.]]

Circa 2008–09, the land forces were made up of about 14 integrated [[brigade]]s of fighters from all the former warring factions who went through a ''brassage'' integration process (see next paragraph) and a limited number of non-integrated brigades that remain solely made up of single factions (the [[Congolese Rally for Democracy]] (RCD)'s ''Armée national congolaise'', the ex-government former Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), the [[Forces for Renewal|ex-RCD KML]], the ex-[[Movement for the Liberation of Congo]], the armed groups of the [[Ituri conflict]] (the Mouvement des Révolutionnaires Congolais (MRC), [[Forces de Résistance Patriotique d'Ituri]] (FRPI), and the [[Nationalist and Integrationist Front|Front Nationaliste Intégrationniste]] (FNI)), and the [[Mai-Mai]]).{{sfn|Robinson|2012}}

It appears that about the same time that Presidential Decree 03/042 of 18 December 2003 established the National Commission for Demobilisation and Reinsertion (CONADER), "..all ex-combatants were officially declared as FARDC soldiers and the then FARDC brigades [were to] rest deployed until the order to leave for ''brassage''" [the military integration process].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Garrett |first1=Nicholas |last2=Sergiou |first2=Sylvia |author3=Koen Vlassenroot |year=2008 |title=Negotiated peace for extortion: the case of Walikale territory in eastern DR Congo |journal=Journal of Eastern African Studies |publisher=Taylor and Francis |volume=3 |issue=1 |page=9 |issn=1753-1063 |doi=10.1080/17531050802682671|s2cid=154957722 }}</ref>

[[File:Aveba, district de l’Ituri, Province Orientale, DR Congo - Des militaires FARDC en patrouille. (16643921095).jpg|thumb|FARDC soldiers on patrol during the [[Ituri conflict]] in 2015]]
The reform plan adopted in 2005 envisaged the formation of eighteen integrated brigades through the military integration process as its first of three stages.<ref name=ICG104>[[International Crisis Group]], Security Sector Reform in the Congo, Africa Report No. 104, 13 February 2006, 17–18.</ref> The process consisted firstly of regroupment, where fighters are disarmed. Then they were sent to orientation centres, run by CONADER, where fighters took the choice of either returning to civilian society or remaining in the armed forces. Combatants who chose demobilisation received an initial cash payment of US$110. Those who chose to stay within the FARDC were then transferred to one of six integration centres for a 45-day training course, which aimed to build integrated formations out of factional fighters previously heavily divided along ethnic, political and regional lines. The centres were spread out around the country at [[Kitona]], [[Kamina]], [[Kisangani]], [[Rumangabo]] and Nyaleke (within the [[Virunga National Park]]) in [[Nord-Kivu]], and [[Luberizi]] (on the border with Burundi) in South Kivu. The process suffered severe difficulties due to construction delays, administration errors, and the amount of travel former combatants have to do, as the three stages' centres are widely separated. There were three sequential buildup stages in the 2005 plan. Following the first 18 integrated brigades, the second goal was the formation of a ready reaction force of two to three brigades, and finally, by 2010, when MONUC was hoped to have withdrawn, the creation of a Main Defence Force of three divisions.

In February 2008, then Defence Minister Chikez Diemu described the reform plan at the time as:<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ssrnetwork.net/ssrbulletin/dr_congo.php|title=Report on the DRC SSR Roundtable talks: Kinshasa, 25–26 February 2008|work=SSR Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Congo|access-date=1 November 2008|archive-date=30 July 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130730103418/http://www.ssrnetwork.net/ssrbulletin/dr_congo.php|publisher=Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform|year=2008}}</ref>
<blockquote>"The short term, 2008–2010, will see the setting in place of a Rapid Reaction Force; the medium term, 2008–2015, with a Covering Force; and finally the long term, 2015–2020, with a Principal Defence Force." Diemu added that the reform plan rests on a programme of synergy based on the four pillars of dissuasion, production, reconstruction and excellence. "The Rapid Reaction Force is expected to focus on dissuasion, through a Rapid Reaction Force of 12 battalions, capable of aiding MONUC to secure the east of the country and to realise constitutional missions."
</blockquote>

Amid the other difficulties in building new armed forces for the DRC, in early 2007 the integration and training process was distorted as the DRC government under Kabila attempted to use it to gain more control over the dissident general [[Laurent Nkunda]]. A hastily negotiated verbal agreement in Rwanda saw three government FAC brigades integrated with Nkunda's former ANC 81st and 83rd Brigades in what was called ''mixage''. ''Mixage'' brought multiple factions into composite brigades, but without the 45-day retraining provided by ''brassage'', and it seems that actually, the process was limited to exchanging [[battalion]]s between the FAC and Nkunda brigades in North Kivu, without further integration. Due to Nkunda's troops having greater cohesion, Nkunda effectively gained control of all five brigades, which was not the intention of the DRC central government.<ref>Henri Boshoff, ''The DDR Process in the DRC: A Never-ending Story'', [[Institute for Security Studies]], Pretoria, 2 July 2007.</ref>{{page needed|date=October 2020}} However, after Nkunda used the ''mixage'' brigades to fight the [[FDLR]], strains arose between the FARDC and Nkunda-loyalist troops within the brigades and they fell apart in the last days of August 2007. The International Crisis Group says that "by 30 August [2007] Nkunda's troops had left the mixed brigades and controlled a large part of the [[Masisi Territory|Masisi]] and [[Rutshuru Territory|Rutshuru]] territories" (of [[North Kivu]]).<ref>International Crisis Group, Bringing Peace to North Kivu, Africa Report No.133, 31 October 2007, p. 13.</ref>

Both formally integrated brigades and the non-integrated units continue to conduct arbitrary arrests, rapes, robbery, and other crimes<ref>[[Amnesty International]], {{cite web|url=http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR620012007?open%26of%3DENG-COD |title= Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army, AI Index: AFR 62/001/2007 |access-date=13 July 2007 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070821150102/http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR620012007?open&of=ENG-COD |archive-date=21 August 2007 |date= 25 January 2007}}</ref> and these human rights violations are "regularly" committed by both officers and members of the rank and file. Members of the Army also often strike deals to gain access to resources with the militias they are meant to be fighting.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Autesserre|first=Séverine|year=2008|title=The Trouble With Congo|journal=Foreign Affairs|publisher=Council on Foreign Relations|location=New York|volume=87|issue=3|pages=104–105}}</ref>
[[File:WomDay10 (6966402963).jpg|thumb|Female soldiers of the FARDC on parade in 2012]]
The various brigades and other formations and units number at least 100,000 troops.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=10375 |title=FARDC troops estimated at 100,000, says EUSEC ::: 20/03/2006 |publisher=Monuc.org |access-date=29 September 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071013074649/http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=10375 |archive-date=13 October 2007 |url-status=live  }}</ref> The status of these [[brigade]]s has been described as "pretty chaotic."<ref>{{cite news |title=Only just staying in one piece |url=http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9557824 |newspaper=The Economist |page=42 |date=28 July 2007 |access-date=4 August 2007 |archive-date=11 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230111164908/https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2007/07/26/only-just-staying-in-one-piece |url-status=live }}</ref> A 2007 disarmament and repatriation study said "army units that have not yet gone through the process of brassage are usually much smaller than what they ought to be. Some non-integrated brigades have only 500 men (and are thus nothing more than a small battalion) whereas some battalions may not even have the size of a normal company (over 100 men)."<ref name=RomkenaVennhoop>Hans Romkena De Vennhoop, [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1417&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=276321 Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament and Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the DRC] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090101113648/http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1417&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=276321 |date=1 January 2009 }}, Multi Country Demobilization and Recovery Program, April 2007, p. 32.</ref>

A number of outside donor countries are also carrying out separate training programmes for various parts of the Forces Terrestres (Land Forces). The People's Republic of China has trained Congolese troops at [[Kamina]] in [[Katanga Province|Katanga]] from at least 2004 to 2009,<ref>See ''Africa Confidential'', "A multinational road to army reform", 24 July 2009, p. 9, and Reuters, "Factbox: International efforts at military reform in Congo", 23 December 2009.</ref> and the Belgian government is training at least one "rapid reaction" battalion. When Kabila visited U.S. President [[George W. Bush]] in Washington D.C., he also asked the U.S. Government to train a battalion, and as a result, a private contractor, Protection Strategies Incorporated, started training a FARDC battalion at Camp Base, [[Kisangani]], in February 2010.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art%3D4032%26lang%3D0 |title=U.S. and DRC in Partnership to Train Model Congolese Battalion
|author=  Dalrymple, Nicole |publisher=U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs |access-date=3 August 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110226030732/http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=4032&lang=0 |archive-date=26 February 2011 }} and Protection Strategies Incorporated [http://www.protectionsi.com/main/whats-new What's New] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100730142015/http://www.protectionsi.com/main/whats-new |date=30 July 2010 }}. Retrieved 3 August 2010. For Kabila request to Bush, see {{cite web|url=http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2010/02/10KINSHASA31.html |title=Transcript |access-date=3 September 2011|url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120318200313/http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2010/02/10KINSHASA31.html |archive-date=18 March 2012 }}</ref> The company was supervised by [[United States Special Operations Command Africa]].  Three years later, the battalion broke and ran in the face of [[March 23 Movement|M23]], raping women and young girls, looting, and carrying out arbitrary executions.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-congo-democratic-un/girls-as-young-as-six-raped-by-congolese-soldiers-in-minova-u-n-idUKBRE9470GO20130508 |title=Girls as young as six raped by Congolese soldiers in Minova – U.N. |author=Nichols, Michelle |publisher=Reuters |date=8 May 2013 |access-date=10 October 2020 |archive-date=11 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230111164907/https://www.reuters.com/?edition-redirect=uk |url-status=dead }}</ref> The various international training programmes are not well integrated.

===Equipment===
{{main|List of equipment of the Land Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo}}
Attempting to list the equipment available to the DRC's land forces is difficult; most figures are unreliable estimates based on known items delivered in the past.<ref>Orbat.com's Concise World Armies 2005</ref> The figures below are from the IISS Military Balance 2014.<ref>IISS Military Balance 2014, p.432.</ref> Much of the Army's equipment is non-operational due to insufficient maintenance—in 2002 only 20 percent of the Army's armoured vehicles were estimated as being serviceable.<ref>''Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa''. Issue 11—2002, p. 291.</ref>
*[[Main Battle Tank]]s: 12–17 x [[Type 59 tank|Type 59]] (dropped from 30 listed in 2007), 32 x [[T-55]], 100 x [[T 72]]. Thirty T-55s and 100 T-72 were listed in 2007, thus little new information has reached the IISS in the intervening seven years. In 2022 the IISS listed the 12-17 Type 59s, marking them as often unserviceable; the 32 T-55s; 100 T-72s, but marking them as T-72AVs, and, in addition, 25 T-64BV-1s (page 465).
*Light tanks: 10 [[PT-76]]; 30 [[Type 62]] (serviceability in doubt). "40+" Type 62s were listed by the ''Military Balance'' in 2007. In 2022 the IISS listed 10 PT-76s and 30 Type 62s (page 465).
*Reconnaissance vehicles: Up to 17 [[Panhard AML-60]], 14 [[AML-90]] armoured cars, 19 EE-9 Cascavel; 2 RAM-V-2. In 2022 the IISS listed "up to 52" reconnaissance vehicles, including the "up to 17" AML-60s; and unchanged numbers of AML-90s, the EE-9s, and the two RAM-V-2s (page 465).
*[[Infantry Fighting Vehicle]]s: 20 [[BMP-1]] (number reported unchanged since 2007). The same figure of BMP-1s was listed in 2022 (page 465).
*[[Armoured Personnel Carrier]]s: IISS reports tracked vehicles include 3 BTR-50, 6 MT-LB, wheeled vehicles including 30-70 BTR-60; 58 [[Panhard M3]] (serviceability in doubt), 7 [[Fahd (armored personnel carrier)|TH 390 Fahd]]. Same unchanged figures were listed in 2022 (page 465)
*[[Artillery]]: 16 [[2S1 Gvozdika]] and [[2S3 Akatsiya]] self-propelled; 119 towed field guns, including 77 122&nbsp;mm howitzers [[122 mm howitzer 2A18 (D-30)|D-30]]/[[122 mm howitzer M1938 (M-30)|M-1938]]/[[Type 60 122 mm field gun|Type-60]] and some 130&nbsp;mm [[130 mm towed field gun M1954 (M-46)|Type 59]]; 57 MRL, including 24 [[BM-21|Type 81]]; 528+ mortars, 81&nbsp;mm, 82&nbsp;mm, 107&nbsp;mm, 120&nbsp;mm.

In addition to these 2014 figures, in March 2010, it was reported that the DRC's land forces had ordered US$80 million worth of military equipment from Ukraine which included 20 [[T-72]] main battle tanks, 100 trucks and various small arms.<ref>[https://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j39S49Dfrar8U8VBeazKBr8IZbSA AFP: Ukraine to supply tanks, other weapons to DR.Congo] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140226121208/http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j39S49Dfrar8U8VBeazKBr8IZbSA |date=26 February 2014 }}. Google.com (16 March 2010). Retrieved 4 September 2013.</ref> Tanks have been used in the [[Kivu]]s in the 2005–09 period.

In February 2014, Ukraine revealed that it had achieved the first export order for the [[T-64]] tank to the DRC Land Forces for 50 T-64BV-1s.<ref>[http://www.armyrecognition.com/february_2014_global_defense_security_news_uk/ukraine_to_supply_a_total_of_50_t-64bv1_main_battle_tanks_to_democratic_republic_of_congo_1302143.html Ukraine to supply a total of 50 T-64BV1 main battle tanks to Democratic Republic of Congo] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140303122229/http://www.armyrecognition.com/february_2014_global_defense_security_news_uk/ukraine_to_supply_a_total_of_50_t-64bv1_main_battle_tanks_to_democratic_republic_of_congo_1302143.html |date=3 March 2014 }} – Armyrecognition.com, 13 February 2014.</ref>

In June 2015 it was reported that Georgia had sold 12 of its [[Didgori-2]] to the DRC for $4 million. The vehicles were specifically designed for reconnaissance and special operations. Two of the vehicles are a recently developed conversion to serve for medical field evacuation.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://goodnews.on.ge/news/946-pirvelad-sakartvelos-istoriashi-kartuli-javshanteknika-sazgvargaret-gaiqida |title=პირველად საქართველოს ისტორიაში ქართული ჯავშანტექნიკა საზღვარგარეთ გაიყიდა |trans-title=For the first time in the history of Georgia, Georgian armored vehicles were sold abroad |date=23 June 2015 |access-date=5 July 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150705193714/http://goodnews.on.ge/news/946-pirvelad-sakartvelos-istoriashi-kartuli-javshanteknika-sazgvargaret-gaiqida |archive-date=5 July 2015 |url-status=dead  }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.military-informant.com/army/9232-gruziya-postavila-v-kongo-novye-bronirovannye-mashiny-didgori.html |title=Грузия поставила в Конго новые бронированные машины "Didgori" |trans-title=Georgia delivers new Didgori armoured vehicles to Congo |date=25 June 2015 |access-date=5 July 2015|url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150701180331/http://www.military-informant.com/army/9232-gruziya-postavila-v-kongo-novye-bronirovannye-mashiny-didgori.html |archive-date=1 July 2015 }}</ref>

The United Nations confirmed in 2011, both from sources in the Congolese military and from officials of the Commission nationale de contrôle des armes légères et de petit calibre et de réduction de la violence armée, that the ammunition plant called Afridex in Likasi, Katanga Province, manufactures ammunition for small arms and light weapons.<ref name="United Nations 2011, p. 148"/>

In 2025 reported foreign equipment suppliers to the FARDC included the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, the Czech Republic, India, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates.{{cn|date=July 2025}}

===Republican Guard===
{{Main|Republican Guard (Democratic Republic of the Congo)}}
In addition to the other land forces, President [[Joseph Kabila]] also had a [[Republican Guard (Democratic Republic of the Congo)|Republican Guard]] presidential force (''Garde Républicaine'' or GR), formerly known as the Special Presidential Security Group (GSSP). FARDC military officials state that the Garde Républicaine is not the responsibility of FARDC, but of the Head of State.<ref name="amnesty">[[Amnesty International]], [https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr62/001/2007/en/ Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151004231802/https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr62/001/2007/en/ |date=4 October 2015 }}, Section VII A, 25 January 2007, AI Index: AFR 62/001/2007.</ref> Apart from Article 140 of the Law on the Army and Defence, no legal stipulation on the DRC's Armed Forces makes provision for the GR as a distinct unit within the national army. In February 2005 President Joseph Kabila passed a decree which appointed the GR's commanding officer and "repealed any previous provisions contrary" to that decree. The GR, more than 10,000 strong (the ICG said 10,000 to 15,000 in January 2007), has better working conditions and is paid regularly, but still commits rapes and robberies in the vicinity of its bases.

In an effort to extend his personal control across the country, Joseph Kabila deployed the GR at key airports, ostensibly in preparation for an impending presidential visit.<ref>ICG February 2006 SSR report.</ref> {{As of | 2007 | alt = At the beginning of 2007}} there were Republican Guards deployed in the central prison of [[Kinshasa]], [[N'djili Airport]], [[Bukavu]], [[Kisangani]], [[Kindu]], [[Lubumbashi]], [[Matadi]], and [[Moanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo|Moanda]], where they appear to answer to no local commander and have caused trouble with [[MONUC]] troops there.<ref name="amnesty" />

The GR is also supposed to undergo the integration process, but in January 2007, only one battalion had been announced as having been integrated. Formed at a brassage centre in the Kinshasa suburb of Kibomango, the battalion included 800 men, half from the former GSSP and half from the MLC and RCD Goma.<ref name="amnesty"/>

Up until June 2016, the GR comprised three brigades, the 10th Brigade at Camp Tshatshi and the 11th at Camp Kimbembe, both in Kinshasa, and the 13th Brigade at Camp Simi Simi in [[Kisangani]].<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://radioafrikana.com/la-garde-republicaine-une-epee-de-damocles-sur-lalternance-democratique-en-rdc-jj-wondo/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171024153212/http://radioafrikana.com/la-garde-republicaine-une-epee-de-damocles-sur-lalternance-democratique-en-rdc-jj-wondo/|url-status=dead|archive-date=24 October 2017|title=La Garde Républicaine : une épée de Damoclès sur l'alternance démocratique en RDC – JJ Wondo –|date=16 December 2016|work=RADIO AFRIKANA|access-date=24 October 2017|language=fr-FR}}</ref> It was reorganised on the basis of eight fighting regiments, the 14th Security and Honor Regiment, an artillery regiment, and a command brigade/regiment from that time.

===Other forces active in the country===
[[File:MONUC deployments Dec 2009.png|thumb|left|alt=A map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo marked with military map symbols showing type, nationality and location of MONUC units.|Locations of MONUC units as at December 2009]]
There are currently large numbers of United Nations troops stationed in the DRC. The [[United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo]] (MONUSCO) on 31 March 2017 had a strength of over 18,316 peacekeepers (including 16,215 military personnel) and is tasked with assisting Congolese authorities to maintain security.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/facts.shtml |title=MONUSCO Facts and Figures – United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo |work=un.org |access-date=10 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170630053103/http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/facts.shtml  |archive-date=30 June 2017 |url-status=live  }}</ref> The UN and foreign military aid missions, the most prominent being [[Common Security and Defence Policy missions of the European Union|EUSEC RD Congo]],<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=909&lang=EN |title=EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo |access-date=12 August 2007 |work=The Council of the European Union |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070819131620/http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=909&lang=EN |archive-date=19 August 2007 |url-status=live  }}</ref> are attempting to assist the Congolese in rebuilding the armed forces, with major efforts being made in trying to assure regular payment of salaries to armed forces personnel and also in military justice. Retired Canadian [[Lieutenant General]] [[Marc Caron]] also served for a time as Security Sector Reform advisor to the head of MONUC.<ref>Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, website.</ref>

Groups of anti-Rwandan government rebels like the FDLR, and other foreign fighters remain inside the DRC.<ref name="autogenerated3"/> The FDLR which is the greatest concern, was some 6,000 strong, in July 2007. By late 2010 the FDLR's strength however was estimated at 2,500.<ref>MONUSCO, [http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=1902&mid=2159&ItemID=12277 Over 1800 FDLR armed rebels surrender to MONUSCO in 2010] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111031042926/http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=1902&mid=2159&ItemID=12277 |date=31 October 2011 }}, 3 February 2011.</ref> The other groups are smaller: the Ugandan [[Lord's Resistance Army]], the Ugandan rebel group the [[Allied Democratic Forces]] in the remote area of [[Mt Rwenzori]], and the Burundian Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu—[[Forces Nationales de Liberation]] (PALIPEHUTU-FNL).

Finally there is a government paramilitary force, created in 1997 under President Laurent Kabila. The National Service is tasked with providing the army with food and with training the youth in a range of reconstruction and developmental activities.{{sfn|Ebenga|N'Landu|2005}} There is not much further information available, and no internet-accessible source details the relationship of the National Service to other armed forces bodies; it is not listed in the constitution. President Kabila, in one of the few comments available, said the National Service will provide a gainful activity for street children. Obligatory civil service administered through the armed forces was also proposed under the Mobutu regime during the "radicalisation" programme of December 1974 – January 1975; the FAZ was opposed to the measure and the plan "took several months to die."{{sfn|Young|Turner|1985|pp=359–360}}

==Air Force==
[[File:DRC Air Force Mil Mi-8.jpg|thumb|A DRC Air Force [[Mil Mi-8]] helicopter in 2011]]
{{Main|Air Force of the Democratic Republic of the Congo}}

All military aircraft in the DRC are operated by the Air Force. In 2007, Jane's World Air Forces stated that the Air Force had an estimated strength of 1,800 personnel and is organised into two [[Group (air force)|Air Groups]]. These groups command five [[Wing (air force unit)|wings]] and nine [[squadron (aviation)|squadrons]], of which not all are operational. 1 Air Group is located at Kinshasa and consists of Liaison Wing, Training Wing and Logistical Wing and has a strength of five squadrons. 2 Tactical Air Group is located at Kaminia and consists of Pursuit and Attack Wing and Tactical Transport Wing and has a strength of four squadrons. Foreign [[Private military company|private military companies]] have reportedly been contracted to provide the DRC's aerial reconnaissance capability using small propeller aircraft fitted with sophisticated equipment. Jane's states that [[National Air Force of Angola]] fighter aircraft would be made available to defend Kinshasa if it came under attack.<ref>{{cite book |title=Jane's World Air Forces. Issue 25, 2007|publisher=[[Jane's Information Group]] |location=Coulsdon |pages=134–135 }}</ref>

Like the other services, the Congolese Air Force is not capable of carrying out its responsibilities. Few of the Air Force's aircraft are currently flyable or capable of being restored to service and it is unclear whether the Air Force is capable of maintaining even unsophisticated aircraft. Moreover, Jane's stated that the Air Force's Ecole de Pilotage is 'in near total disarray'.<ref>{{cite book |title=Jane's World Air Forces. Issue 25|year= 2007|publisher=[[Jane's Information Group]] |location=Coulsdon |page=135 }}</ref>

==Navy==
[[File:FARDC-Lake-02 (7936425388).jpg|thumb|Army patrol on [[Lake Kivu]] in 2012]]
{{Main|Navy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo}}
Before the downfall of Mobutu, a small navy operated on the [[Congo River]]. One of its installations was at the village of [[N'dangi]] near the presidential residence in [[Gbadolite]]. The port at N'dangi was the base for several patrol boats, helicopters and the presidential yacht.<ref>L'Express, 22. December 2008, p. 13.</ref> The 2002 edition of ''Jane's Sentinel'' described the Navy as being "in a state of near total disarray" and stated that it did not conduct any training or have operating procedures.<ref>{{cite book |title=Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002 |publisher=Jane's Information Group |location=Coulsdon }}</ref> The Navy shares the same discipline problems as the other services. It was initially placed under command of the MLC when the transition began, so the current situation is uncertain.

The 2007 edition of ''[[Jane's Fighting Ships]]'' states that the Navy is organised into four commands, based at [[Matadi]], near the coast; the capital [[Kinshasa]], further up the Congo river; [[Kalemie]], on [[Lake Tanganyika]]; and [[Goma]], on [[Lake Kivu]].<ref>{{cite book |editor-last=Saunders |editor-first=Stephen|title=Jane's Fighting Ships Vol. 110|year= 2007–2008 |publisher=Jane's Information Group |location=Coulsdon | page=163 }}</ref> The [[International Institute for Strategic Studies]], in its 2007 edition of the ''Military Balance'', confirms the bases listed in ''Jane's'' and adds a fifth base at [[Boma, Kongo Central|Boma]], a coastal city near Matadi. Various sources also refer to numbered Naval Regions. Operations of the 1st Naval Region have been reported in Kalemie,<ref>DanChurch Aid, [http://www.danchurchaid.org/sider_paa_hjemmesiden/what_we_do/issues_we_work_on/hma/read_more/destruction_of_stockpiles_in_kalemie Destruction of stockpiles in Kalemie] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070929125631/http://www.danchurchaid.org/sider_paa_hjemmesiden/what_we_do/issues_we_work_on/hma/read_more/destruction_of_stockpiles_in_kalemie |date=29 September 2007 }}, 2 May 2006.</ref> the 4th near the northern city of [[Mbandaka]],<ref>Hilaire Kayembe, [http://www.lepotentiel.com/afficher_article.php?id_edition=&id_article=32186 "Naufrage dans une rivière à Mbandaka"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070930154913/http://www.lepotentiel.com/afficher_article.php?id_edition=&id_article=32186 |date=30 September 2007 }}, ''Le Potential'', 7 August 2006.</ref> and the 5th at Goma.<ref>Human Rights Division / MONUC, [http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=14592 Monthly Human Rights Assessment: April 2007] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071013073736/http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=14592 |date=13 October 2007 }}, 17 May 2007. The HR report stated a Goma student was shot by a soldier of the 5th Naval Region for refusing to hand over a cellphone.</ref>

As of 2012, the Navy on paper consisted of about 6,700 personnel and up to 23 patrol craft. The IISS repeated the same 6,700 figure in 2018 (p457) and the 2020 edition carried the same number, unchanged. In reality, The IISS lists the Navy only consists of around 1,000 personnel and a total of eight patrol craft, of which only one is operational, a Shanghai II [[Type 062 class gunboat]] designated "102". There are five other 062s as well as two Swiftships which are not currently operational, though some may be restored to service in the future. According to ''Jane's'', the Navy also operates barges and small craft armed with machine guns.<ref>{{cite book |title=Jane's Fighting Ships Vol. 110, 2007–2008 |title-link=Jane's Fighting Ships |publisher=Jane's Information Group |editor-last=Saunders |editor-first=Stephen |location=Coulsdon |page=163}}</ref>

==Notes==
{{notelist}}

==References==
{{Reflist|30em}}

==Bibliography==
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* {{cite book |last1=Ebenga |first1=Jacques |last2=N'Landu |first2=Thierry |chapter=The Congolese National Army: In search of an identity |publisher=[[Institute for Security Studies]] |date=October 2005 |chapter-url=http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/Evol_Revol%20Oct%2005/Chap3.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070724195103/http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/Evol_Revol%20Oct%2005/Chap3.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=24 July 2007 |editor=Martin Rupiya |title=Evolutions & Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa |location=Pretoria }}
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* [[Human Rights Watch]], [https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/congo/Congoweb-02.htm Democratic Republic of Congo Casualties of War: Civilians, Rule of Law, and Democratic Freedoms] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160126021048/https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/congo/Congoweb-02.htm |date=26 January 2016 }}, Vol. 11, No. 1 (A), February 1999
* [[Institute for Security Studies]], [https://web.archive.org/web/20070926225131/http://www.iss.co.za/Af/profiles/DRCongo/SecInfo.html Democratic Republic of Congo Security Information (updated: 12 January 2005)]
* [[International Crisis Group]], [https://web.archive.org/web/20070711040904/http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3946 Security Sector Reform in the Congo], Africa Report N°104, 13 February 2006
* ''Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa''. Issue 11–2002.
* {{cite book| last = Kanza| first = Thomas R.| author-link = Thomas Kanza| title = The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba: Conflict in the Congo| publisher = Schenkman Books, Inc.| edition = expanded| date = 1994| location = [[Rochester, Vermont]]| isbn = 0-87073-901-8}}
* {{cite book| last = Keegan| first = John| author-link = John Keegan| title = World Armies| publisher = Facts on File| date = 1979| location = New York| isbn = 0-87196-407-4| ref = no| url-access = registration| url = https://archive.org/details/worldarmies00keeg}}
* La Prosperite, [https://web.archive.org/web/20070927213516/http://www.laprosperiteonline.net/commentaires.php?id=1490 Fardc et Police Nationale: la liste complète d'Officiers nommés], 18 June 2007
* {{cite book | last1 = Meditz | first1 = Sandra W. | last2 = Merrill | first2 = Tim | title = Library of Congress Country Study Zaire 1993 | publisher = [[Library of Congress Country Studies|Library of Congress]] | date = 1993 | url = https://www.loc.gov/item/94025092/ | access-date = 14 May 2017 | archive-date = 4 February 2018 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180204124006/https://www.loc.gov/item/94025092/ | url-status = live }}
* Omasombo, Jean, ''RDC: Biography des acteurs de troiseme republique'', Royal Museum of Central Africa, 2009, 152–153.
*{{Cite journal |title = Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986–99) |last= Prunier |first= Gérard | author-link = Gerard Prunier |date = July 2004 |journal = African Affairs |issue = 412 |volume = 103 |pages = 359–383 |jstor = 3518562 |doi= 10.1093/afraf/adh050 }}
* {{cite book|last = Prunier| first = Gerard| title = From Genocide to Continental War: The "Congolese" Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa| publisher = Hurst & Company| date = 2009| isbn = 978-1-85065-523-7}}
* {{cite journal | last = Robinson | first = Colin D. | title = A forgotten decade? Politicking and war for the ANC/FAZ 1967-1977 | journal = [[Small Wars and Insurgencies]] | url = https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2021.1895589 | date = March 2021 | volume = 32 | issue = 7 | pages = 1117–1137 | doi = 10.1080/09592318.2021.1895589 | s2cid = 233822626 | access-date = 9 March 2021 | archive-date = 16 August 2021 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210816150606/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2021.1895589 | url-status = live | url-access = subscription }}
* {{cite journal|last=Robinson|first=Colin|title=Army reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2003–2009|journal=Small Wars & Insurgencies|volume=23|number=3|date=2012|pages=474–499 |doi=10.1080/09592318.2012.661612 |s2cid=145375095 }}
* {{cite book |editor-last=Saunders |editor-first=Stephen|title=Jane's Fighting Ships Vol. 110, 2007–2008 |publisher=Jane's Information Group |location=Coulsdon |title-link=Jane's Fighting Ships |ref=no}}
* {{cite book| last = Willame| first = Jean-Claude| title = Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo| location = Stanford| publisher = Stanford University Press| date = 1972| url = https://archive.org/details/patrimonialismpo0000will| url-access = registration| isbn = 9780804707930}}
* {{cite book| last = Wragg| first = David| title = The World Sea Power Guide| publisher = Pen and Sword| date = 2012| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=XMhD6TYhvmAC| isbn = 9781783035588| access-date = 16 February 2018| archive-date = 11 January 2023| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20230111164926/https://books.google.com/books?id=XMhD6TYhvmAC| url-status = live}}
* {{cite journal| last = Young| first = M. Crawford| author-link = M. Crawford Young| title = Post-Independence Politics in the Congo| journal = Transition| issue = 26| pages = 34–41| publisher = Indiana University Press| date = 1966| jstor = 2934325| doi = 10.2307/2934325}}
* {{cite book| last1 = Young| first1 = M. Crawford| last2 = Turner| first2 = Thomas Edwin| title = The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State| url = https://archive.org/details/risedeclineofzai0000youn| url-access = registration| publisher = University of Wisconsin Press| date = 1985| isbn = 0-299-10110-X}}
* {{cite book| last = Vanderstraeten| first = Louis-François| title = De la Force publique à l'Armée nationale congolaise : histoire d'une mutinerie : juillet 1960| publisher = Académie Royale de Belgique| date = 1985| location = Brussels| language = fr| isbn = 978-2-8011-0557-3}}
{{refend}}

==Further reading==
* Baaz, Maria E. and Stern, Maria (2013), [http://afs.sagepub.com/content/39/4/711.abstract "Fearless Fighters and Submissive Wives: Negotiating Identity among Women Soldiers in the Congo (DRC)"], ''[[Armed Forces & Society]]'', 39, no. 4. 
* Charlier, Thierry, "Défilé militaire à Kinshasa", in ''Raids'' magazine, no. 294, November 2010, pp.&nbsp;46–47 ({{ISSN|0769-4814}})
* Emizet, K. M. F.,  "Explaining the rise and fall of military regimes: civil-military relations in the Congo," ''Armed Forces and Society'', Winter 2000
* [[Human Rights Watch]], [https://www.hrw.org/node/84369 'Soldiers who rape, commanders who condone: Sexual violence and military reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,'] 16 July 2009
* Lefever, Ernest W.  ''Spear and Scepter: Army, Police, and Politics in Tropical Africa'', [[Brookings Institution]], Washington, D.C.
* [[René Lemarchand|Lemarchand, René]],''The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa'', University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, pp.&nbsp;226–228. Concise general description of the FAZ in the 1990s.
* Lemarchand, René, "Forecasting the Future of the Military in Former Belgian Africa," in Catherine M. Kelleher, ed., ''Political Military Systems: A Comparative Analysis'' (Sage Publications, Inc., Beverly Hills, California: 1974), pp.&nbsp;87–104
* Malan, Mark, 'U.S. Civil-Military Imbalance for Global Engagement,' Refugees International, 2008
* McDonald, Gordon C. ''et al.'', ''Area Handbook for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo Kinshasa)'', Washington. Supt. of Docs., U.S. Government Print. Off. 1971. DA Pam 550–67.
* Meitho, Kisukula Abeli, '{{Lang|fr|La desintegration de l'armée congolaise de Mobutu a Kabila}}', L'Harmattan, Paris/Montreal, 2001, {{ISBN|2-7384-8693-2}}
* Meitho, Kisukula Abeli "Les armées du Congo-Zaire, un frein au developpement"
* Mockler, Anthony, ''The New Mercenaries'', Corgi Books, 1985, {{ISBN|0-552-12558-X}} – covers mercenary units titularly part of the Armée National Congolaise in the 1960s
*Stephen Rookes, "Ripe for Rebellion: Political and Military Insurgency in the Congo, 1946-1964," Africa@War #51, Helion & Co., c2021.
* {{cite book |first1=Alain |last1=Rouvez |first2=Michael |last2=Coco |first3= Jean-Paul |last3=Paddack |title=Disconsolate Empires: French, British and Belgian Military Involvement in Post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa |pages=310–313 |location=Lanham, Maryland |publisher= University Press of America |year=1994 |oclc=624665994}}
* Spittaels, Steven and Hilgert, Filip, [https://web.archive.org/web/20090824121315/http://www.ipisresearch.be/download.php?id=203 Mapping Conflict Motives in the Eastern DRC], IPIS, Antwerp, 4 March 2008
* Tshiyembe, Mwayila, '{{lang|fr|Le défi de l'armée républicaine en République Démocratique du Congo}},' Editions L'Harmattan, 2005
* Turner, John W.  ''A Continent Ablaze: The Insurgency Wars in Africa 1960 to the Present'', Arms and Armour Press, London, 1998, {{ISBN|1-85409-128-X}}, further details of FAZ operations in the 1980s and onwards can be found in pages 221–225.
* {{Country study|The Democratic republic of the Congo|CD}}

==External links==
{{commons category|Military of the Democratic Republic of the Congo}}
*{{cite journal|title=Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence|url=https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/4358/5015|volume=19|number=2|date=September 1999 |first=William G. |last=Thom|journal= Journal of Conflict Studies|issn=1715-5673}}
*[http://desc-wondo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Loi-Organique-sur-les-FARDC.pdf Loi Organique FARDC 2013] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141210090444/http://desc-wondo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Loi-Organique-sur-les-FARDC.pdf |date=10 December 2014 }}
*{{cite web |url=http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/Afrika/081212-reisebericht-wittig.html?id=264068&v=3Recent |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090220235819/http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/Afrika/081212-reisebericht-wittig.html?id=264068&v=3 |archive-date=20 February 2009 |author=German Foreign Ministry |title=Pooling assistance for the Congo |access-date=17 October 2020 |url-status=live }}

{{DRC topics}}
{{Armed groups in the Congo wars}}
{{Military of Africa}}
{{authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Military of the Democratic Republic of the Congo}}
[[Category:Military of the Democratic Republic of the Congo| ]]