View source for Asymmetric warfare

{{Short description|War between belligerents whose relative military power differs significantly}}
{{See also|Guerrilla warfare}}
[[File:My Tho, Vietnam. A Viet Cong base camp being. In the foreground is Private First Class Raymond Rumpa, St Paul, Minnesota - NARA - 530621 edit.jpg |thumb |upright=1.35|A [[Viet Cong]] [[Military camp|base camp]] being burned during the [[Vietnam War]]. An [[Private first class#United States Army|American private first class]] (PFC) stands by.]]
{{History of war}}

'''Asymmetric warfare''' (or '''asymmetric engagement''') is a type of [[war]] between [[belligerent]]s whose relative military power, strategy or tactics differ significantly. This type of warfare often, but not necessarily, involves [[Insurgency|insurgents]], [[terrorist groups]], or [[resistance movement|resistance]] [[militia]]s operating within territory mostly controlled by the superior force.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Luyt |first=Brendan |date=2015-05-11 |title=Debating reliable sources: writing the history of the Vietnam War on Wikipedia |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jd-11-2013-0147 |journal=Journal of Documentation |volume=71 |issue=3 |pages=440–455 |doi=10.1108/jd-11-2013-0147 |issn=0022-0418|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=School of Advanced Military Studies Monographs |url=https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll3/id/430/rec/1 |access-date=2024-11-15 |website=cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Asymmetry Is Strategy, Strategy Is Asymmetry |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/577565/asymmetry-is-strategy-strategy-is-asymmetry/ |access-date=2024-11-15 |website=National Defense University Press |language=en-US}}</ref>

''Asymmetrical warfare'' can also describe a conflict in which belligerents' material resources are uneven, and consequently, each may attempt to exploit each other's relative weaknesses. Such struggles often involve [[unconventional warfare]], with the weaker side attempting to use [[strategy]] to offset deficiencies in the quantity or quality of their forces and equipment.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Arreguin-Toft |first1=Ivan |title=How the Weak Win Wars |date=2005 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=9780511521645 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/how-the-weak-win-wars/74DFB0B6E3C226A8529F3201188D22AE}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100607224951/http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/Articles/04spring/tomes.pdf |url=http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/Articles/04spring/tomes.pdf|archive-date=2010-06-07|title=Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare|first=Robert|last=Tomes|journal=Parameters|date=Spring 2004}}</ref> Such strategies may not necessarily be militarized.<ref>{{Cite book|url=http://books.sipri.org/files/RR/SIPRIRR23.pdf|last=Stepanova|first=E|title=2008 Terrorism in asymmetrical conflict: SIPRI Report 23|publisher=Oxford Univ. Press|access-date=2016-03-19|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160310143530/http://books.sipri.org/files/RR/SIPRIRR23.pdf|archive-date=2016-03-10}}</ref> This is in contrast to ''symmetrical warfare'', where two powers have comparable military power, resources, and rely on similar tactics and victory standards.

Conventional militaries consider asymmetric warfare a form of [[irregular warfare]] – conflicts in which nominally weaker adversaries are not regular military forces of nation-states. For military analysts the term is most often used as an umbrella term to describe what is also called ''[[guerrilla warfare]]'', ''[[insurgency]]'', ''[[counterinsurgency]]'', ''[[rebellion]]'', ''[[terrorism]]'', and ''[[counterterrorism]]''.
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==Definition and differences==
The popularity of the term dates from Andrew J. R. Mack's 1975 article "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars" in ''[[World Politics]]'', in which "asymmetric" referred to a significant disparity in relative power between opposing actors in a conflict. "Power," in this sense, is broadly understood to mean material power, such as a large army, sophisticated weapons, an advanced economy, and so on. Mack's analysis was largely ignored in its day, but the end of the [[Cold War]] sparked renewed interest among academics. By the late 1990s, new research building on Mack's work was beginning to mature; after 9/11, the [[U.S. military]] began once again to grapple with asymmetric warfare strategy.<ref>{{cite journal|first=James A.|last=Russell|year=2004|title=Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power|journal=Naval War College Review|volume=57|issue=19|url=https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2085&context=nwc-review}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Breen |first1=Michael |last2=A. Geltzer |first2=Joshua |date=1 March 2011 |title=Asymmetric Strategies as Strategies of the Strong |url=https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2565&context=parameters |journal=[[Parameters (journal)|Parameters]] |volume=41 |issue=1 |pages=42}}</ref>

Since 2004, the discussion of asymmetric warfare has been complicated by the tendency of academic and military officials to use the term in different ways, as well as by its close association with [[guerrilla warfare]], [[insurgency]], [[terrorism]], [[counterinsurgency]], and [[counterterrorism]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Arreguin-Toft |first1=Ivan |title="Contemporary Asymmetric Conflict Theory in Historical Perspective |journal=Terrorism and Political Violence |date=July 31, 2012 |volume=24 |issue=4 |pages=635–657 |doi=10.1080/09546553.2012.700624 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2012.700624}}</ref>

Academic authors tend to focus on explaining two puzzles in asymmetric conflict. First, if "power" determines victory, there must be reasons why weaker actors decide to fight more powerful actors. Key explanations include:
*Weaker actors may have secret weapons.<ref name="Paul1994">{{cite book |last= Paul|first=Thazha Varkey |date=1994 |title=Asymmetric conflicts: war initiation by weaker powers |url= http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/international-relations-and-international-organisations/asymmetric-conflicts-war-initiation-weaker-powers|location=New York, NY |publisher= Cambridge University Press |isbn=9780521466219}}</ref>
*Weaker actors may have powerful allies.<ref name="Paul1994"/>
*Stronger actors are unable to make threats credible.<ref name="Allen2011">{{cite journal|title=From Melos to Baghdad: Explaining Resistance to Militarized Challenges from More Powerful States|last1=Allen|first1=Michael A.|last2=Fordham|first2=Benjamin O.|journal=International Studies Quarterly |volume=4 |issue=55 |pages=1025–1045|date=2011|doi=10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00680.x|doi-access=free}}</ref>
*The demands of a stronger actor are extreme.<ref name="Allen2011"/>
*The weaker actor must consider its regional rivals when responding to threats from powerful actors.<ref>{{cite journal|title=Deadly Triangles: The Implications of Regional Competition on Interactions in Asymmetric Dyads|last1=Allen|first1=Michael A.|last2=Bell|first2=Sam R.|last3=Clay|first3=K. Chad|journal=Foreign Policy Analysis|volume=14|issue=2|pages=169–190|date=2016|doi=10.1093/fpa/orw026}}</ref>

Second, if "power," as generally understood, leads to victory in war, then there must be an explanation for why the "weak" can defeat the "strong." Key explanations include:
*Strategic interaction.
*Willingness of the weak to suffer more or bear higher costs.
*External support of weak actors.
*Reluctance to escalating violence on the part of strong actors.
*Internal group dynamics.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Anomalously Slow Attrition Times for Asymmetric Populations with Internal Group Dynamics|last=Zhao|journal=Physical Review Letters |volume=103 |issue=14|article-number=148701 |date=2 October 2009|display-authors=etal|arxiv=0910.1622|bibcode=2009PhRvL.103n8701Z|doi=10.1103/PhysRevLett.103.148701|pmid=19905607|s2cid=2413984}}</ref>
*Inflated strong actor war aims.
*Evolution of asymmetric rivals' attitudes towards time.<ref>{{cite book |last= Resnick|first=Uri |date=2013 |title=Dynamics of Asymmetric Territorial Conflict: the evolution of patience |url= http://www.palgrave.com/uk/book/9781137303981|location=Basingstoke, UK |publisher= Palgrave-Macmillan|page=287 |isbn=978-1-137-30398-1}}</ref>

Asymmetric conflicts include interstate and [[civil war]]s, and over the past two hundred years, have generally been won by strong actors. Since 1950, however, weak actors have won the majority of asymmetric conflicts.<ref>{{cite web|last=Arreguín-Toft|first=Ivan|title=How the weak win wars: A theory of asymmetric conflict|url=https://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.2/Arreguin-Toft%20IS%202001.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140823020311/http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.2/Arreguin-Toft%20IS%202001.pdf |archive-date=2014-08-23 |url-status=live|access-date=2012-09-17}}</ref> In asymmetric conflicts [[conflict escalation]] can be rational for one side.<ref>{{cite journal | url=https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00375.x | doi=10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00375.x | title=Fully Informed and on the Road to Ruin: The Perfect Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence | date=2005 | last1=Langlois | first1=Jean-Pierre P. | last2=Langlois | first2=Catherine C. | journal=International Studies Quarterly | volume=49 | issue=3 | pages=503–528 }}</ref>

==Strategic basis==
In most [[conventional warfare]], the belligerents deploy forces of a similar type, and the outcome can be predicted by the quantity or quality of the opposing forces, for example, better [[command and control]] of theirs (c2). There are times when this is the case, and conventional forces are not easily compared, making it difficult for opposing sides to engage. An example of this is the standoff between the continental land forces of the [[French Army]] and the maritime forces of the [[United Kingdom]]'s [[Royal Navy]] during the [[French Revolutionary Wars|French Revolutionary]] and [[Napoleonic Wars]]. In the words of Admiral [[John Jervis, 1st Earl of St Vincent|Jervis]] during the [[Campaigns of 1801 in the French Revolutionary Wars|campaigns of 1801]], "I do not say, my Lords, that the French will not come. I say only they will not come by sea",<ref>{{Cite book|last=Andidora|first=Ronald|title=Iron Admirals: Naval Leadership in the Twentieth Century|publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group|year=2000|isbn=978-0-313-31266-3|url=https://archive.org/details/ironadmiralsnava00andi|url-access=registration|page=[https://archive.org/details/ironadmiralsnava00andi/page/3 3]|access-date=2016-03-19}}</ref> and a confrontation that [[Napoleon Bonaparte]] described as that between the elephant and the whale.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Nicolson|first=Adam|title=Men of Honor: Trafalgar and the making of the English Hero|publisher=HarperCollins|year=2005|isbn=978-0-00-719209-0|page=73}}</ref>

==Tactical basis==
{{more citations needed section|date=March 2022}}
[[File:Home-made explosives packed in oil drums being dealt with by EOD Operator. MOD 45159058.jpg|thumb|[[Drum (container)|Oil-drum]] roadside [[Improvised explosive device|IED]] in [[Northern Ireland]] removed from culvert in 1984]]
The tactical success of asymmetric warfare is dependent on at least some of the following assumptions:
*One side can have a technological advantage that outweighs the numerical advantage of the enemy; the [[English longbow]] at the [[Battle of Crécy]] is an example.<ref>{{cite journal|first=Clifford J.|last=Rogers|date=April 1998|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26004334|title=The Efficacy of the English Longbow: A Reply to Kelly DeVries|journal=War in History|volume=5|issue=2|pages=233–242|doi=10.1177/096834459800500205 |jstor=26004334 |s2cid=161286935 |url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|first=Jonathan|last=Sumption|year=1990|title=The Hundred Years War 1: Trial by Battle|location=London|publisher=Faber & Faber}}</ref>
*Technological superiority usually is cancelled by the more vulnerable infrastructure, which can be targeted with devastating results. Destruction of multiple electric lines, roads, or water supply systems in highly populated areas could devastate the economy and morale. In contrast, the weaker side may not have these structures at all.
*Training, tactics, and technology can prove decisive and allow a smaller force to overcome a much larger one. For example, for several centuries, the Greek [[hoplite]]'s (heavy infantry) use of [[phalanx formation|phalanx]] made them far superior to their enemies. The [[Battle of Thermopylae]], which also involved good [[#Use of terrain|use of terrain]], is a well-known example.<ref>{{cite book|first=Tom|last=Holland|author-link=Tom Holland (author)|title=[[Persian Fire|Persian Fire: The First World Empire and the Battle for the West]]|pages=285–287|publisher=Little, Brown Book Group|year=2005|isbn=978-0-349-11717-1}}</ref>
*If the inferior power is in a position of self-defense, i.e., under attack or [[Military occupation|occupation]], it ''may'' be possible to use unconventional tactics, such as [[Hit-and-run tactics|hit-and-run]] and selective battles in which the superior power is weaker, as an effective means of harassment without violating the [[laws of war]]. Perhaps the classic historical examples of this doctrine may be found in the [[American Revolutionary War]] and movements in [[World War II]], such as the [[French Resistance]] and [[USSR|Soviet]] and [[Yugoslavia|Yugoslav]] [[Partisan (military)|partisan]]s. Against democratic aggressor nations, this strategy can be used to play on the electorate's patience with the conflict (as in the [[Vietnam War]], and others since), provoking [[protest]]s, and consequent disputes among elected legislators.
*However, if the weaker power is in an aggressive position or turns to tactics prohibited by the laws of war (''[[jus in bello]]''), its success depends on the superior power's refraining from like tactics. For example, the [[law of land warfare]] prohibits the use of a [[flag of truce]] or marked medical vehicles as cover for an attack or [[ambush]]. Still, an asymmetric combatant using this prohibited tactic to its advantage depends on the superior power's obedience to the corresponding law. Similarly, warfare laws prohibit combatants from using civilian [[Human settlement|settlements]], populations or facilities as [[military base]]s, but when an inferior force uses this tactic, it depends on the premise that the superior one will respect the law that the other is violating, and will not attack that civilian target, or if they do the propaganda advantage will outweigh the material loss.

===Terrorism===
There are two opposing viewpoints on the relationship between asymmetric warfare and [[terrorism]]. In the modern context, asymmetric warfare is increasingly considered a component of [[fourth generation warfare]]. When practiced outside the [[laws of war]], it is often defined as [[terrorism]], though rarely by its practitioners or their supporters.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/asymmetric.cfm|title=Reshaping the military for asymmetric warfare|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040221200111/http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/asymmetric.cfm|website=Center for Defense Information|archive-date=2004-02-21}}</ref> The other view is that asymmetric warfare does not coincide with terrorism.

==Use of terrain==
Terrain that limits mobility, such as forests and mountains, can be used as a [[force multiplier]] by the smaller force and as a force inhibitor against the larger one, especially one operating far from its [[Military logistics|logistical base]]. Such terrain is called ''difficult terrain''. [[Urban warfare|Urban]] areas, though generally having good transport access, provide innumerable ready-made defensible positions with simple escape routes and can also become rough terrain if prolonged combat fills the streets with rubble:

{{blockquote|The contour of the land is an aid to the army, sizing up opponents to determine victory and assessing dangers and distance. "Those who do battle without knowing these will lose."|[[Sun Tzu]]|''[[The Art of War]]''}}
{{blockquote|The guerrillas must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.|[[Mao Zedong]]}}

In the 12th century, irregulars known as the [[Order of Assassins|Assassins]] were successful in the [[Nizari Ismaili state]]. The "state" consisted of [[List of Ismaili castles|fortresses]] (such as the [[Alamut Castle]]) built on strategic mountaintops and highlands with difficult access, surrounded by hostile lands. The Assassins developed tactics to eliminate high-value targets, threatening their security, including the [[Crusaders]].

In the [[American Revolutionary War]], [[Patriot (American Revolution)|Patriot]] Lieutenant Colonel [[Francis Marion]], known as the "Swamp Fox," took advantage of irregular tactics, [[interior lines]], and the wilderness of colonial [[South Carolina]] to hinder larger British regular forces.<ref>{{cite book|first=William Dobein|last=James|title=A Sketch of the Life of Brig. Gen. Francis Marion|date=1821}}</ref>

[[Yugoslav Partisans]], starting as small detachments around mountain villages in 1941, fought the [[Nazi Germany|German]] and other [[Axis powers|Axis]] occupation forces, successfully taking advantage of the rough terrain to survive despite their small numbers. Over the next four years, they slowly forced their enemies back, recovering population centers and resources, eventually growing into the regular [[Yugoslav People's Army|Yugoslav Army]].

The Vietnam war is a classical example of the use of terrain to fight an asymmetrical war, The [[North Vietnamese army]] (NVA) and [[Viet Cong]] (VC) used the forested and mountainous terrain of Vietnam to allow for effective concealment of troop movements in spite of superior enemy air power. This allowed supplying troops to be possible without incurring heavy losses from American airstrikes, who could not effectively identify or track their movements from the air. This was true to such an extent that the US employed defoliation methods such as the use of [[Agent Orange]] and extensive [[Napalm]] use to make forested areas visible from the air. The NVA and VC also used intricate tunnel systems, such as the [[Củ Chi tunnels]], which enabled them to move undetected, store supplies, and evade U.S. search-and-destroy missions.<ref>{{Cite journal |title=Scorched Atmospheres: The Violent Geographies of the Vietnam War and the Rise of Drone Warfare |journal=Annals of the American Association of Geographers|date=2016 |doi=10.1080/00045608.2015.1115333 |last1=Shaw |first1=Ian G. R. |volume=106 |issue=3 |pages=688–704 |bibcode=2016AAAG..106..688S |doi-access=free }}</ref>

==Role of civilians==
Civilians can play a vital role in determining the outcome of an asymmetric war. In such conflicts, when it is easy for insurgents to assimilate into the population quickly after an attack, tips on the timing or location of insurgent activity can severely undermine the resistance. An information-central framework,<ref name="Berman">{{Cite journal|title=The Empiricists' Insurgency|journal = Annual Review of Political Science|volume = 18|pages=443–464|last1=Berman|first1=Eli|last2=Matanock|first2=Aila M.|date=2015-05-11|language=en|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-082312-124553|doi-access=free}}</ref> in which civilians are seen primarily as sources of strategic information rather than resources, provides a paradigm to understand better the dynamics of such conflicts where civilian information-sharing is vital. The framework assumes that:
*The consequential action of [[non-combatant]]s (civilians) is information sharing rather than supplying resources, recruits, or shelter to combatants.
*Information can be shared anonymously without endangering the civilian who relays it.
Given the additional assumption that the larger or dominant force is the government, the framework suggests the following implications:
*Civilians receive services from government and rebel forces as an incentive to share valuable information.
*Rebel violence can be reduced if the government provides services.
*Provision of security and services are complementary in reducing violence.
*Civilian casualties reduce civilian support to the perpetrating group.
*Provision of information is strongly correlated with the level of anonymity that can be ensured.

A survey of the empirical literature on conflict,<ref name="Berman"/> does not provide conclusive evidence on the claims. But the framework gives a starting point to explore the role of civilian information sharing in asymmetric warfare.

==War by proxy==
Where asymmetric warfare is carried out (generally covertly) by allegedly non-governmental actors who are connected to or sympathetic to a particular nation's (the "state actor's") interest, it may be deemed ''[[war by proxy]].'' This is typically done to give the state actor ''[[deniability]]''. The deniability can be crucial to keep the state actor from being tainted by the actions, to allow the state actor to negotiate in apparent good faith by claiming they are not responsible for the actions of parties who are merely sympathizers, or to avoid being accused of [[belligerent]] actions or [[war crime]]s. If proof emerges of the true extent of the state actor's involvement, this strategy can backfire; for example, see [[Iran-contra affair]] and [[Philip Agee]].

==Examples==
===American Indian Wars===
[[File:Colonel Benjamin Church.jpg|thumb|200px|[[Benjamin Church (ranger)|Colonel Benjamin Church]] (1639–1718) from the [[Plymouth Colony]], father of [[Unconventional warfare]], American Ranging, and Rangers]]

Benjamin Church designed his force primarily to emulate Native American patterns of war. Toward this end, Church endeavored to learn to fight like Native Americans from Native Americans. Americans became rangers exclusively under the tutelage of the Native American allies. (Until the end of the colonial period, rangers depended on Native Americans as both allies and teachers.)<ref name="Grenier2005">{{Cite book |last=Grenier |first=John |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JGCin1JJp8cC |title=The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607–1814 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2005 |isbn=978-1-139-44470-5 |pages=33–35}}</ref>

Church developed a special full-time unit mixing white colonists selected for frontier skills with friendly Native Americans to carry out offensive strikes against hostile Native Americans in terrain where normal militia units were ineffective. Church paid special care to outfitting, supplying and instructing his troops in ways inspired by indigenous methods of warfare and ways of living. He emphasized the adoption of indigenous techniques, which prioritized small, mobile and flexible units which used the countryside for cover, in lieu of massed frontal assaults by large formations. Benjamin Church is sometimes referred to as the father of [[Unconventional warfare]]. {{citation needed|date=June 2024}}

===American Revolutionary War===

From its initiation, the [[American Revolutionary War]] was, necessarily, a showcase for asymmetric techniques. In the 1920s, Harold Murdock of [[Boston]] attempted to solve the puzzle of the first shots fired at [[Lexington, Massachusetts]] and came to the suspicion that the few dozen American [[minutemen]] who gathered before sunrise to await the arrival of a column of British regulars were sent to provoke an incident which could be used for Patriot [[propaganda]] purposes.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.americanheritage.com/content/harold-murdock%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9C-nineteenth-april-1775%E2%80%9D|title=Harold Murdock's "The Nineteenth Of April 1775"|access-date=2015-08-05}}</ref> The return of the British column to Boston following search operations at [[Concord, Massachusetts]] was subject to constant [[Skirmisher|skirmishing]] attacks by minutemen gathered from communities all along the route, making maximum use of the terrain (particularly, trees and stone field walls) to overcome the limitations of their weapons – [[musket]]s with an effective range of only about 50–70 meters. Throughout the war, skirmishing tactics against enemy forces on the move continued to be a key factor in American victories, particularly in the [[western theater of the American Revolutionary War]].<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|first=Ted Franklin|last=Belue|title=Crawford's Sandusky Expedition|encyclopedia=The American Revolution, 1775–1783: An Encyclopedia|volume=1|pages=416–420|editor-first=Richard L.|editor-last=Blanco|location=New York|publisher=Garland|year=1993|isbn=0-8240-5623-X}}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia|first=Colin G.|last=Calloway|author-link=Colin G. Calloway|title=Captain Pipe|editor-first=John A.|editor-last=Garraty|editor-link=John A. Garraty|editor-first2=Mark C.|editor-last2=Carnes|encyclopedia=American National Biography|volume=4|pages=368–369|location=New York|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=1999|isbn=978-0-19-512783-6}}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia|first=James A.|last=Clifton|title=Dunquat|editor-first=John A.|editor-last=Garraty|editor-link=John A. Garraty|editor-first2=Mark C.|editor-last2=Carnes|encyclopedia=American National Biography|volume=7|pages=105–107|location=New York|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=1999|isbn=978-0-19-512786-7}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|first=Milo M.|last=Quaife|author-link=Milo M. Quaife|title=The Ohio Campaigns of 1782|journal=Mississippi Valley Historical Review|volume=17|issue=4|date=March 1, 1931|pages=515–529|doi=10.2307/1916389 |jstor=1916389 }}</ref>

During the Revolutionary War, both British and American warships engaged in asymmetric warfare tactics, primarily against civilian targets such as merchant vessels and coastal communities. Small [[Continental Navy]] ships such as [[USS Reprisal (1776)|USS ''Reprisal'']], [[USS Ranger (1777)|USS ''Ranger'']], and [[Surprise (1777 ship)|USS ''Surprise'']] made incursions into British and Irish waters during the war, attacking British-flagged merchantmen and forcing Britain to deploy more warships to the area along with increasing coastal defences. Although these incursions only inflicted minor losses on the Royal Navy and Britain's merchant fleet, they had a disproportionate psychological effect on the British public, which responded by demanding greater protection from American naval attacks. The Royal Navy also used asymmetric tactics to target American coastal communities, such as the [[burning of Falmouth]] by a force under [[Captain (Royal Navy)|Captain]] [[Henry Mowat]]. These attacks, carried out using small, mobile forces, spread terror among the Americans and destroyed vast quantities of buildings and material in exchange for minor losses.<ref> https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2017/february/asymmetric-warfare-early-american-style </ref>

In 1778, France [[France in the American Revolutionary War|entered the Revolutionary War]] on the American side, transforming the conflict into a global one and sharply reducing the asymmetric nature of the war. However, in the backcountry of North America, particularly in the American South, engagements between British and American forces often remained mostly asymmetric in nature.<ref name="Bicheno2003">{{cite book|last=Bicheno|first=Hugh|title=Rebels & Redcoats|year=2003|publisher=HarperCollins|location=London|isbn=978-0-007-15625-2}}</ref>

===American Civil War===
{{more citations needed section|date=October 2014}}
The [[American Civil War]] saw the rise of asymmetric warfare in the [[Border states (American Civil War)|Border States]], and in particular on the US Western Territorial Border after the [[Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854]] opened the territories to vote on the expansion of slavery beyond the [[Missouri Compromise]] lines. Political implications of this broken 1820's compromise were nothing less than the potential expansion of slavery all across the North American continent, including the northern reaches of the [[Mexican Cession|annexed Mexican territories]] to California and Oregon. So the stakes were high, and it caused a flood of immigration to the border: some to grab land and expand slavery west, others to grab land and vote down the expansion of slavery. The pro-slavery land grabbers began asymmetric, violent attacks against the more pacifist abolitionists who had settled [[Lawrence, Kansas|Lawrence]] and other territorial towns to suppress slavery. [[John Brown (abolitionist)|John Brown]], the abolitionist, travelled to [[Osawatomie, Kansas|Osawatomie]] in the [[Kansas Territory]] expressly to foment retaliatory attacks back against the pro-slavery guerrillas who, by 1858, had twice ransacked both Lawrence and Osawatomie (where one of Brown's sons was shot dead).

The abolitionists would not return the attacks and Brown theorized that a violent spark set off on "the Border" would be a way to finally ignite his long hoped-for slave rebellion.<ref>{{cite episode |first=Rapley|last=Rob|year=2012|network=PBS |series=The American Experience |season=24 |number=9, 10, 11 |title=The Abolitionists |url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films/abolitionists/player/ |archive-url=https://archive.today/20141003150151/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films/abolitionists/player/ |url-status=dead |archive-date=October 3, 2014 |transcript=Transcript |transcript-url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/transcript/abolitionists-transcript/ |access-date=2016-03-19}}</ref>{{time needed|date=October 2014}} Brown had broad-sworded slave owners at Potawatomi Creek, so the bloody civilian violence was initially symmetrical; however, once the American Civil War ignited in 1861, and when the state of Missouri voted overwhelmingly not to secede from the Union, the pro-slavers on the MO-KS border were driven either south to Arkansas and Texas, or underground—where they became guerrilla fighters and "Bushwhackers" living in the bushy ravines throughout northwest Missouri across the (now) state line from Kansas. The bloody "Border War" lasted all during the Civil War (and long after with guerrilla partisans like the James brothers cynically robbing and murdering, aided and abetted by lingering lost causers<ref>T.J. Stiles, "Jesse James: Last Rebel of the Civil War," 2002</ref>{{page needed|date=October 2014}}). Tragically the Western Border War was an asymmetric war: pro-slavery guerrillas and paramilitary partisans on the pro-Confederate side attacked pro-Union townspeople and commissioned Union military units, with the Union army trying to keep both in check: blocking Kansans and pro-Union Missourians from organizing militarily against the marauding Bushwhackers.

The worst act of domestic terror in U.S. history came in August 1863 when paramilitary guerrillas amassed 350 strong and rode all night 50 miles across eastern Kansas to the abolitionist stronghold of Lawrence (a political target) and destroyed the town, gunning down 150 civilians. The Confederate officer whose company had joined [[Quantrill's Raiders]] that day witnessed the civilian slaughter and forbade his soldiers from participating in the carnage. The commissioned officer refused to participate in Quantrill's asymmetric warfare on civilians.<ref>Border War Sesquicentennial proceedings at Lawrence, Kan., August 2013</ref>{{Full citation needed|date=October 2014}}

===Philippine–American War===
The [[Philippine–American War]] (1899–1902) was an armed conflict between the [[United States]] and [[Philippine Revolutionary Army|Filipino revolutionaries]]. Estimates of the Filipino forces vary between 100,000 and 1,000,000, with tens of thousands of [[auxiliaries]].<ref name="Deady2005p55">{{Harvnb|Deady|2005|p=55}}</ref> Lack of weapons and ammunition was a significant impediment to the Filipinos, so most of the forces were only armed with [[Bolo knife|bolo knives]], bows and arrows, spears and other primitive weapons that, in practice, proved vastly inferior to U.S. firepower.
[[File:Philippine Revolutionary Army Rifles.jpg|thumb|Remnants of rifles used by [[Philippine Revolutionary Army|Filipino soldiers]] during [[Philippine–American War|the War]] on display at Clark [[Museum]]]]

The goal, or end-state, sought by the [[First Philippine Republic]] was a sovereign, independent, socially stable Philippines led by the ''ilustrado'' (intellectual) [[oligarchy]].<ref name=Deady2005p57>{{Harvnb|Deady|2005|p=57}}</ref> Local chieftains, landowners, and businessmen were the ''[[principalía|principales]]'' who controlled local politics. The war was strongest when ''illustrados'', ''principales'', and peasants were unified in opposition to annexation.<ref name=Deady2005p57 /> The peasants, who provided the bulk of guerrilla forces, had interests different from their ''illustrado'' leaders and the ''principales'' of their villages.<ref name=Deady2005p57 /> Coupled with the ethnic and geographic fragmentation, unity was a daunting task. The challenge for [[Emilio Aguinaldo|Aguinaldo]] and his generals was to sustain unified Filipino public opposition; this was the revolutionaries' strategic [[Center of gravity (military)|centre of gravity]].<ref name=Deady2005p57/> The Filipino operational center of gravity was the ability to sustain its force of 100,000 irregulars in the field.<ref name=Deady2005p58>{{Harvnb|Deady|2005|p=58}}</ref> The Filipino General [[Francisco Macabulos]] described the Filipinos' war aim as "not to vanquish the U.S. Army but to inflict on them constant losses." They initially sought to use conventional tactics and an increasing toll of U.S. casualties to contribute to McKinley's defeat in the 1900 presidential election.<ref name=Deady2005p58 /> Their hope was that as president the avowedly [[Anti-imperialism|anti-imperialist]] future [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of state]] [[William Jennings Bryan]] would withdraw from the Philippines.<ref name=Deady2005p58/> They pursued this short-term goal with [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla tactics]] better suited to a [[Protracted social conflict|protracted struggle]].<ref name=Deady2005p58/> While targeting [[William McKinley|McKinley]] motivated the revolutionaries in the short term, his victory demoralized them and convinced many undecided Filipinos that the United States would not depart precipitously.<ref name=Deady2005p58/> For most of 1899, the revolutionary leadership had viewed guerrilla warfare strategically only as a tactical option of final recourse, not as a means of operation which better suited their disadvantaged situation. On 13 November 1899, [[Emilio Aguinaldo]] decreed that guerrilla war would henceforth be the strategy. This made the American occupation of the Philippine archipelago more difficult over the next few years. In fact, during just the first four months of the guerrilla war, the Americans had nearly 500 casualties. The Philippine Revolutionary Army began staging bloody ambushes and raids, such as the guerrilla victories at [[Battle of Paye|Paye]], Catubig, [[Battle of Makahambus Hill|Makahambus]], [[Battle of Pulang Lupa|Pulang Lupa]], [[Battle of Balangiga|Balangiga]] and [[Battle of Mabitac|Mabitac]]. At first, it seemed like the Filipinos would fight the Americans to a stalemate and force them to withdraw. President McKinley even considered this at the beginning of the phase. The shift to guerrilla warfare drove the U.S. Army to adopt counterinsurgency tactics.

===20th century===
====Second Boer War====
Asymmetric warfare featured prominently during the [[Second Boer War]]. After an initial phase, which was fought by both sides as a conventional war, the British captured [[Johannesburg]], the Boers' largest city, and captured the capitals of the two [[Boer Republics]]. The British then expected the Boers to accept peace as dictated in the traditional European manner. However, the Boers fought a protracted [[Guerilla warfare|guerrilla war]] instead of capitulating. 20,000-30,000{{Ambiguous|date = January 2015}} Boer guerrillas were only defeated after the British brought to bear 450,000 imperial troops, about ten times as many as were used in the [[Conventional warfare|conventional]] phase of the war. The British began constructing [[blockhouses]] built within [[machine gun]] range of one another and flanked by [[barbed wire]] to slow the Boers' movement across the countryside and block paths to valuable targets. Such tactics eventually evolved into today's [[counterinsurgency]] tactics.<ref name="Dobbie">{{cite journal|title=The Word 'Commando'|first=Elliott V. K.|last=Dobbie|journal=American Speech|volume=19|number=2|date=April 1944|pages=81–90|doi=10.2307/487007 |jstor=487007 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/487007|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

The Boer commando raids deep into the [[Cape Colony]], which were organized and commanded by [[Jan Smuts]], resonated throughout the century as the British adopted and adapted the tactics first used against them by the Boers.<ref name="Dobbie"/>

====World War I====
*[[Lawrence of Arabia|T. E. Lawrence]] and British support for the [[Arab Revolt|Arab uprising]] against the [[Ottoman Empire]]. The Ottomans were the stronger power, and the Arab coalition were the weaker.
*[[Austria-Hungary]]'s [[Serbian Campaign of World War I|invasion of Serbia]], August 1914. Austria-Hungary was the stronger power, and Serbia was the weaker.
*[[German Empire|Germany]]'s [[German invasion of Belgium (1914)|invasion of Belgium]], August 1914. Germany was the stronger power, Belgium the weaker.

====Between the World Wars====
*[[Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi|Abd el-Krim]] led resistance in [[Morocco]] from 1920 to 1924 against [[French colonial empire|French]] and [[Spanish Empire|Spanish]] colonial armies ten times as strong as the guerrilla force, led by General [[Philippe Pétain]].
*[[TIGR]], the first [[anti-fascist]] national-defensive organization in [[Europe]], fought against [[Benito Mussolini]]'s regime in [[Northeast Italy]].
*Anglo-Irish War ([[Irish War of Independence]]) fought between the Irish Republican Army and the [[Black and Tans]]/[[Auxiliaries]]. Though Lloyd George ([[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom|Prime Minister]] at the time) attempted to persuade other nations that it was not a war by refusing to use the army and using the Black and Tans instead, the conflict was conducted as an asymmetric guerrilla war and was registered as a war with the League of Nations by the Irish Free State.

====World War II====
*[[Philippine resistance against Japan]]{{snd}}During the [[Japanese occupation of the Philippines|Japanese occupation]] in World War II, there was an extensive Philippine resistance movement, which opposed the Japanese with an active underground and guerrilla activity that increased over the years.
[[File:Molotov koktail.webp|thumb|A Finnish soldier demonstrating a [[molotov cocktail]] ]]
*[[Winter War]]{{snd}}[[Finland]] was invaded by the much larger [[mechanized military unit]]s of the [[Soviet Union]]. Although the Soviets captured 8% of Finland, they suffered enormous casualties versus much lower losses for the Finns. Soviet vehicles were confined to narrow forest roads by terrain and snow, while the Finns used [[Ski warfare|ski tactics]] around them unseen through the trees. They cut the advancing Soviet column into what they called [[Pocket (military)#Motti|motti]] (a cubic metre of firewood) and then destroyed the cut-off sections one by one. Many Soviets were shot, had their throats cut from behind, or froze to death due to inadequate clothing and lack of camouflage and shelter. The Finns also devised a petrol bomb they called the [[Molotov cocktail]] to destroy Soviet tanks.
*[[Soviet partisans]]{{snd}}resistance movement which fought in the [[Operation Barbarossa|German occupied parts of the Soviet Union]].
*[[Warsaw Uprising]]{{snd}}[[Poland]] (Home Army, [[Armia Krajowa]]) rose up against the [[German occupation of Poland|German occupation]].
*[[German occupation of Yugoslavia|Germany's occupation of Yugoslavia]], 1941–45 (Germany vs. [[Josip Broz Tito|Tito's]] [[Yugoslav Partisans|Partisans]] and [[Draža Mihailović|Mihailović's]] [[Chetniks]]).

=====Britain=====
*[[British Commando]]s and European coastal raids. German countermeasures and the notorious [[Commando Order]].
*[[Long Range Desert Group]] and the [[Special Air Service]] in [[Africa]] and later in Europe.
*[[South-East Asian Theatre of World War II|South East Asian Theater]]: [[Orde Charles Wingate|Wingate]], [[Chindits]], [[Force 136]], [[V Force]]
*[[Special Operations Executive]] (SOE)
*[[Provisional Irish Republican Army]] against British security forces in the [[The Troubles|Northern Campaign]].

=====United States=====
*[[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS)
*[[China Burma India Theater of World War II|China Burma India Theater:]] [[Merrill's Marauders]] and [[OSS Detachment 101]].

===After World War II===
*[[First Indochina War]] (1946-1954) and [[Algerian War of Independence]] (1954-1962); both against France
*The [[Cuban Revolution]] of 1953-1958 became a template of asymmetric warfare.<ref>
{{cite book | last1=Lawson | first1=George | chapter=Revolutionary Trajectories: Cuba and South Africa | title=Anatomies of Revolution | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JjGdDwAAQBAJ | location=Cambridge | publisher=Cambridge University Press | date=2019 | page=149 | isbn=9781108482684 | access-date=2020-04-03 | quote=Like many other radical groups in southern Africa, the ANC was deeply influenced by the Cuban Revolution, in part because of its successful use of asymmetrical warfare, in part because of its transition from a grassroots, nationalist insurgency into a people's war, and in part because of the organic link made by Cuban revolutionaries between its political and military wings [...].}}</ref>
*The [[Hungarian Revolution of 1956]] (or "Russo-Hungarian" war<ref>
{{cite book | last1=Arreguín-Toft | first1=Ivan | title=How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8MzLCgAAQBAJ | series=Cambridge Studies in International Relations | volume=99 | location=Cambridge | publisher=Cambridge University Press | date=2005 | page=232 | isbn=9781316583005 | access-date=2020-04-03 | quote=Table App.1}}</ref>) saw makeshift forces improvising lopsided tactics against Soviet tanks.
*[[Provisional Irish Republican Army arms importation|Libyan support]] to the [[Provisional Irish Republican Army]] during [[the Troubles]] (1960s to 1998) and collusion between British security forces and [[Ulster loyalism|Ulster loyalist]] paramilitaries.
*[[Studies and Observations Group|United States Military Assistance Command Studies and Observations Group (US MAC-V SOG)]] (1964-1972) and [[Viet Cong]] in [[Vietnam]].
*The [[South African Border War]], otherwise known as the Namibian War of Independence (1966-1990) between the [[South African Defence Force|South African Defense Force]] and [[People's Liberation Army of Namibia]].
*United States support of the [[Nicaragua]]n [[Contras]] (1979-1990).

====Cold War (1945–1992) ====
The end of [[World War II]] established the two strongest victors, the [[United States of America]] (the United States, or just the U.S.) and the [[Soviet Union|Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]] (USSR, or just the Soviet Union) as the two dominant global [[superpower]]s.

=====Cold War examples of proxy wars=====
{{see also|Proxy war}}

In Southeast Asia, specifically Vietnam, the [[Viet Minh]], [[Viet Cong|NLF]] and other insurgencies engaged in asymmetrical guerrilla warfare with [[French Fourth Republic|France]]. The war between the [[Afghan mujahideen|Mujahideen]] and the [[Soviet Armed Forces]] during the [[Soviet–Afghan War]] of 1979 to 1989, though claimed as a source of the term "asymmetric warfare,"<ref>{{Cite magazine|first1=Chris |last1=Bray |title=The Media and GI Joe |magazine=Reason |date=February 2002}}</ref> occurred years after Mack wrote of "asymmetric conflict." (Note that the term "asymmetric warfare" became well-known in the West only in the 1990s.<ref>Oxford English Dictionary{{Full citation needed|date=July 2025}}</ref>) The aid given by the [[Operation Cyclone|U.S.]] to the Mujahideen during the war was only covert at the tactical level; the [[Reagan Administration]] told the world that it was helping the "freedom-loving people of Afghanistan." Many countries, including the U.S., participated in this proxy war against the USSR during the [[Cold War]].<ref>{{cite book |last=Scheuer |first=Michael |title=[[Imperial Hubris|Imperial Hubris - Why the West is Losing the War on Terrorism]] |publisher=Brassey's |year=2004 |isbn=978-1-57488-849-2 |location=Washington, D.C. |chapter=2 |author-link=Michael Scheuer}}</ref>

===Post-Cold War===
The [[Kosovo War]], which pitted Yugoslav security forces (Serbian police and [[Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro|Yugoslav army]]) against Albanian separatists of the guerrilla [[Kosovo Liberation Army]], is an example of asymmetric warfare, due to Yugoslav forces' superior firepower and manpower, and due to the nature of insurgency/counter-insurgency operations. The [[NATO bombing of Yugoslavia]] (1999), which pitted NATO air power against the Yugoslav armed forces during the Kosovo war, can also be classified as asymmetric, exemplifying international conflict with asymmetry in weapons and strategy/tactics.<ref>
{{cite book | last1=Bell | first1=Coral | title=First War of the 21st Century: Asymmetric Hostilities and the Norms of Combat | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=77grAAAAYAAJ | series=Working paper (Australian National University. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre) | volume=364 | publisher=Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University | date=2001 | page=5 | isbn=9780731554171 | access-date=2020-04-03 | quote=Until [...] 11 September 2001, the model of asymmetric war held in most analysts' minds was one far more promising for the West: Kosovo.}}</ref>

===21st century===
====Israel/Palestine====
{{main|Israeli–Palestinian conflict}}
The ongoing conflict between [[Israel]] and some [[Palestinians|Palestinian]] organizations (such as [[Hamas]] and [[Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine|PIJ]]) is a classic case of asymmetric warfare. Israel has a powerful army, air force and navy, while the Palestinian organizations have no access to large-scale military equipment with which to conduct operations;<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Lavie|first=Smadar|url=https://www.academia.edu/38988706|title=Gaza 2014 and Mizrahi Feminism - PoLAR 42(1):85-109|journal=PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review |date=January 2019 |doi=10.1111/plar.12284 |s2cid=150473862 |language=en}}</ref> instead, they utilize asymmetric tactics, such as taking hostages, [[paragliding]], small gunfights, cross-border sniping, indiscriminate mortar/rocket attacks,<ref name="upi.com">{{cite news|url=http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/05/06/Hamas-claims-responsibility-for-attack/UPI-59801241613436/|title=Hamas claims responsibility for attack|date=6 May 2009|access-date=2009-05-06}}</ref> and others.<ref>{{cite news|last=McCarthy|first=Rory|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jan/01/israelandthepalestinians.international|title=Death toll in Arab-Israeli conflict fell in 2007|newspaper=The Guardian|date=1 January 2008|access-date=2008-02-18|location=London}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Lavie|first=Smadar|url=https://www.academia.edu/37051595|title=Wrapped in the Flag of Israel: Mizrahi Single Mothers and Bureaucratic Torture -- Revised Edition with a New Afterword|journal=University of Nebraska Press |date=2 July 2018 |language=en}}</ref>

====Sri Lanka====
The [[Sri Lankan civil war|Sri Lankan Civil War]], which raged on and off from 1983 to 2009, between the Sri Lankan government and the [[Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam]] (LTTE) saw large-scale asymmetric warfare. The war started as an insurgency and progressed to a large-scale conflict with the mixture of guerrilla and conventional warfare, seeing the LTTE use [[suicide bombing]] (male/female suicide bombers) both on and off the battlefield use of explosive-filled boats for suicide attacks on military shipping; and use of light aircraft targeting military and economic infrastructure.

====Iraq====
[[File:Cougar Hit By IED.jpg|thumb|This [[Cougar (MRAP)|Cougar]] in Al Anbar, Iraq, was hit by a directed charge IED approximately {{cvt|300|–|500|lb|kg}} in size.]]
The victory by the US-led coalition forces in the [[Gulf War|1991 Persian Gulf War]] and the [[2003 invasion of Iraq]] demonstrated that training, tactics and technology could provide overwhelming victories in the field of battle during modern conventional warfare. After [[Saddam Hussein]]'s regime was removed from power, the Iraq campaign moved into a different type of asymmetric warfare where the coalition's use of superior conventional warfare training, tactics and technology was of much less use against continued opposition from the various partisan groups operating inside Iraq.

====Syria====

Much of the 2012–present [[Syrian Civil War]] has been asymmetrical. The [[Syrian National Coalition]], Mujahideen, and [[Kurdish Democratic Union Party]] have been engaging with the forces of the Syrian government through asymmetric means. The conflict has seen large-scale asymmetric warfare across the country, with the forces opposed to the government unable to engage symmetrically with the Syrian government and resorting instead to other asymmetric tactics such as suicide bombings<ref>{{cite news| url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20205432 | work=BBC News | title=Several killed in Syria car bombings | date=5 November 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/syrian-rebels-emboldened-after-assassinations/ | work=CBS News | title=Syrian rebels emboldened after assassinations | date=19 July 2012}}</ref> and targeted assassinations.

====Ukraine====
{{main|Russo-Ukrainian War}}
The [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]] has resulted in what could be described in some respects as an asymmetrical warfare scenario. Russia has a much larger economy, population, and has superior military might to Ukraine.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Kessler |first1=Andy |title=Ukraine's Asymmetric War: Moscow has more firepower, but Kyiv is using digital technology better. |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-asymmetric-war-technology-starlink-mariupol-theater-collapse-russia-explosives-internet-drones-weapons-11648400672 |newspaper=Wall Street Journal |date=27 March 2022 |access-date=12 April 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Reporter |title=Asymmetric warfare in Ukraine's population centres |url=https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/9410-the-population-deterrent-asymmetric-warfare-in-ukraine-s-population-centres |website=wct.com.au |date=30 January 2022 |publisher=Defence Connect |access-date=12 April 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=The Brock News |title=How Ukraine's small missiles help defend against a bigger invader |url=https://brocku.ca/brock-news/2022/03/how-ukraines-small-missiles-help-defend-against-a-bigger-invader/ |website=brocku.ca |publisher=Brock University |access-date=12 April 2022}}</ref> The use of [[MAGURA V5]] [[unmanned surface vehicle]]s (USVs) to attack Russian Black Sea Fleet ships such as the ''[[Russian ship Tsezar Kunikov|Tsezar Kunikov]]'' has been cited as example of asymmetrical warfare by analysts.<ref name=":6">{{Cite web |last1=Toussaint |first1=Benoit |last2=Flanagan |first2=Erin |date=2024-02-15 |title=Ukraine lands blows in Black Sea as frontline stagnates |url=https://www.nbcrightnow.com/national/ukraine-lands-blows-in-black-sea-as-frontline-stagnates/article_b1e9b6cf-85e8-5ee0-8b2f-8ea906709847.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240216194334/https://www.nbcrightnow.com/national/ukraine-lands-blows-in-black-sea-as-frontline-stagnates/article_b1e9b6cf-85e8-5ee0-8b2f-8ea906709847.html |archive-date=16 February 2024 |access-date=2024-02-16 |website=[[KNDU|NBC Right Now]] |language=en |agency=[[Agence France-Presse]]}}</ref>

==Semi-symmetric warfare==
A new understanding of warfare has emerged amidst the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]].<ref name="Twitter.com">{{cite news|url=https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1499830924770430982|title=Phillips P. O'Brien describes Semi-Symmetric Warfare|date=2 Mar 2022|access-date=2022-03-05}}</ref> Although this type of warfare does not oppose an insurgency to a counter-insurgency force, it does involve two actors with substantially asymmetrical means of waging war. Notably, as technology has improved war-fighting capabilities, it has also made them more complex, thus requiring greater expertise, training, flexibility and decentralization. The nominally weaker military can exploit those complexities and seek to eliminate the asymmetry. This has been observed in Ukraine, as defending forces used a rich arsenal of anti-tank and anti-air missiles to negate the invading forces' apparent mechanized and aerial superiority, thus denying their ability to conduct combined arms operations. The success of this strategy will be compounded by access to real-time intelligence and the adversary's inability to utilize its forces to the maximum of their potential due to factors such as the inability to plan, brief and execute complex, full-spectrum operations.<ref name="Rusi.org">{{cite news|url=https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-defence-systems/russian-air-force-actually-incapable-complex-air-operations|title=Is the Russian Air Force Actually Incapable of Complex Air Operations?|date=4 Mar 2022|access-date=2022-03-05}}</ref>

==See also==

{{div col|colwidth=20em|content=
*[[Civilian casualty ratio]]
*[[Counter-insurgency]]
*[[Counter-terrorism]]
*[[Foco theory]]
*[[Fourth-generation warfare]]
*[[Free War]]
*[[Grey-zone (international relations)]]
*[[Guerrilla warfare]]
*[[Irregular military]]
*[[List of guerrillas]]
*[[Lawfare]]
*[[Low intensity conflict]]
*[[Military use of children]]
*[[Millennium Challenge 2002]]
*[[New generation warfare]]
*[[People's war]]
*[[Partisan (military)]]
*[[Political warfare]]
*[[Protracted social conflict]]
*[[Reagan Doctrine]]
*[[Resistance movement]]
*[[Scorched earth]]
*[[Unconventional warfare]]
*[[Unconventional warfare (United States)]]
*[[Unrestricted Warfare]]
*[[War amongst the people]]
*[[War on terror]]
*[[Yank Levy]]
*[[Proxy criminal networks]]


'''U.S. organisations:'''
*[[Center for Asymmetric Warfare (CAW)]]
*[[Asymmetric Warfare Group]]
*[[Special Activities Division]]

'''Wars'''
*[[2006 Lebanon War]]
*[[People's War in Nepal]]
*[[Second Gaza war]]

'''Documents:'''
*''[[Management of Savagery]]''
}}

==References==
{{reflist}}

==Further reading==
{{library resources box}}

===Bibliographies===
*Compiled by Joan T. Phillips Bibliographer at [[Air University (United States)|Air University]] Library: ''[https://web.archive.org/web/20060831200153/http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/asw.htm A Bibliography of Asymmetric Warfare]'', August 2005.
*[http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/asymmetric.html Asymmetric Warfare and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Debate] sponsored by the [[Project on Defense Alternatives]]

===Books===
*{{cite book|first=Ivan|last=Arreguin-Toft|title=How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict|location=New York & Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2005|isbn=978-0-521-54869-4}}
*{{cite book |title=Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare |type=Hardcover |first1=I. F. W. |last1=Beckett |location=Santa Barbara, California |publisher=Abc-Clio Inc. |date=15 September 2009 |isbn=978-0-874-36929-8}}
*{{cite book|first=Roger W.|last=Barnett|title=Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power|location=Washington, D.C.|publisher=Brassey's|year=2003|isbn=978-1-574-88562-0}}
*{{cite book|first=George|last=Friedman|author-link=George Friedman|title=America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle between the United States and Its Enemies|location=London|publisher=Little, Brown|year=2004|isbn=978-0-316-72862-1}}
*{{cite book|first=Gagliano|last=Giuseppe|title=Introduzione alla conflittualita' non convenzionale|publisher=Edizioni New Press|year=2007|isbn=978-8-895-38302-6}}
* {{cite book |last1=Hirschberger |first1=Bernd |title=External Communication in Social Media During Asymmetric Conflicts A Theoretical Model and Empirical Case Study of the Conflict in Israel and Palestine |date=2021 |publisher=transcript Verlag |location=[[Bielefeld]] |isbn=978-3-8394-5509-8 |url=https://www.transcript-verlag.de/978-3-8376-5509-4/external-communication-in-social-media-during-asymmetric-conflicts/?number=978-3-8394-5509-8 |access-date=30 March 2025}}
*{{cite book|first=Robert D.|last=Kaplan|author-link=Robert D. Kaplan|title=Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos|location=New York|publisher=Vintage|year=2003|isbn=978-0-375-72627-9}}
*{{cite book|url=http://www.solargeneral.com/library/guerrilla-warfare-by-yank-bert-levy.pdf|author-link1="Yank" Levy|title=Guerrilla Warfare|first1=Bert "Yank"|last1=Levy|first2=Tom (Foreword)|last2=Wintringham|author-link2=Tom Wintringham|year=1964|publisher=Paladin Press|access-date=2014-04-15|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140412013656/http://www.solargeneral.com/library/guerrilla-warfare-by-yank-bert-levy.pdf|archive-date=2014-04-12}}
*{{cite book|first=Gil|last=Merom|title=How Democracies Lose Small Wars|location=New York|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2003|isbn=978-0-521-80403-5}}
*{{cite book|first1=Steven|last1=Metz|author-link=Steven Metz|first2=Douglas V.|last2=Johnson II|url=http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB223.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051109023035/http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub223.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=November 9, 2005|title=Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts|location=Carlisle Barracks|publisher=Strategic Studies Institute/U.S. Army War College|year=2001|isbn=978-1-58487-041-8}}
*{{cite book|first=T. V.|last=Paul|author-link=T. V. Paul|title=Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers|location=New York|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1994|isbn=978-0-521-45117-8}}
*{{cite book|first=Jeffrey|last=Record|title=Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win|location=Washington, D.C.|publisher=Potomac Books|year=2007|isbn=978-1-59797-090-7}}
*{{cite book|first=Uri|last=Resnick|url=http://www.palgrave.com/uk/book/9781137303981|title=Dynamics of Asymmetric Territorial Conflict: the evolution of patience|location=Basingstoke, U.K.|publisher=Palgrave-Macmillan|date=July 12, 2013|isbn=978-1-137-30398-1}}
*{{cite book|first=Josef|last=Schröfl|title=Political Asymmetries in the Era of Globalization|publisher=Lang|year=2007|isbn=978-3-631-56820-0}}
*{{cite book|first1=Josef|last1=Schröfl|first2=Sean M.|last2=Cox|first3=Thomas|last3=Pankratz|title=Winning the Asymmetric War: Political, Social and Military Responses|publisher=Peter Lang|year=2009|isbn=978-3-631-57249-8}}
*{{cite book|first=Daniel|last=Sobelman|url=http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1190276456.pdf|title=New Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizbollah after the Withdrawal from Lebanon|publisher=Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel-Aviv University|year=2004|isbn=978-9-654-59057-0|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121102201703/http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1190276456.pdf |archive-date=2012-11-02 }}
*{{cite book|first=Daniel|last=Sobelman|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FLGNAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA49|chapter=Hizbollah{{snd}}from Terror to Resistance: Towards a National Defence Strategy|editor-first=Clive|editor-last=Jones|editor2-first=Sergio|editor2-last=Catignani|title=Israel and Hizbollah An Asymmetric Conflict in Historical and Comparative Perspective|publisher=Routledge|year=2009|pages=49–66|isbn=9781135229207 }}
*{{cite journal|first=Daniel|last=Sobelman|title=Learning to Deter: Deterrence Failure and Success in the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict, 2006–2016|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26777793|journal=International Security|volume=41|issue=3|date=Winter 2017|pages=151–196|doi=10.1162/ISEC_a_00259 |jstor=26777793 |s2cid=57571128 |url-access=subscription}}

===Articles and papers===
*{{cite journal|first=Ivan|last=Arreguin-Toft|title=How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict|journal=International Security|volume=26|number=1|date=Summer 2001|pages=93–128|doi=10.1162/016228801753212868 |s2cid=51776546 }}
*{{cite journal|first=G. J.|last=Bryant|title=Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India|journal=Journal of Military History|year=2004|volume=68|number=2|pages=431–469|doi=10.1353/jmh.2004.0019 |s2cid=144222473 |url=https://muse.jhu.edu/article/54299|via=Project Muse{{subscription required}}|url-access=subscription}}
*{{cite web|first=David|last=Buffaloe|title=Defining Asymmetric Warfare|url=http://www.ausa.org/PDFdocs/LWPapers/LWP_58.pdf|date=September 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070322181810/http://www.ausa.org/PDFdocs/LWPapers/LWP_58.pdf |archive-date=2007-03-22 }}
*{{cite web|first=Marcus|last=Corbin|url=http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/asymmetric.cfm|title=Reshaping the Military for Asymmetric Warfare|website=[[Center for Defense Information|CDI]]|date=October 5, 2001|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120410201159/http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/asymmetric.cfm |archive-date=2012-04-10 }}
*{{cite journal|last=Deady|first=Timothy K.|title=Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899–1902|journal=Parameters|volume=35|issue=1|pages=53–68|year=2005|url=http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/05spring/deady.pdf|access-date=2018-01-13|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161210173710/http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/05spring/deady.pdf|archive-date=2016-12-10|url-status=dead}}
*{{cite journal|first1=J. Paul|last1=Dunne|first2=María D.C.|last2=García-Alonso|first3=Paul|last3=Levine|first4=Ron P.|last4=Smith|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3876996|title=Managing Asymmetric Conflict|journal=Oxford Economic Papers|volume=58|issue=2|date=April 2006|pages=183–208|doi=10.1093/oep/gpi056 |jstor=3876996 |hdl=10419/68097|hdl-access=free}}
*{{cite journal|first=C. A. "Bert"|last=Fowler|url=http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/mar06/3091|title=Asymmetric Warfare: A Primer|journal=[[IEEE Spectrum]]|date=March 2006|access-date=2006-03-05|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080104074839/http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/mar06/3091|archive-date=2008-01-04|url-status=dead}} A mathematical approach to the concept.
*{{cite journal|first=Vincent J.|last=Goulding Jr.|url=http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00winter/goulding.htm |title=Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare|access-date=2006-06-12 |url-status=bot: unknown|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040210162544/http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00winter/goulding.htm |archive-date=2004-02-10|pages=21–30|journal=Parameters|volume=30|number=4|article-number=7}}
*{{cite journal|first=Andrew|last=Mack|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009880|title=Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict|journal=World Politics|volume=27|number=2|date=January 1975|pages=175–200|doi=10.2307/2009880 |jstor=2009880 |s2cid=154410180 |url-access=subscription}}
*{{cite journal|last1=Mandel|first1=Robert|title=Reassessing Victory in Warfare|journal=Armed Forces & Society|volume=33|issue=4|pages=461–495|date=July 2007|publisher=Sage Publications|doi=10.1177/0095327X06295515|s2cid=145246391}}
*{{cite journal|first=Robert|last=Mandel|title=The Wartime Utility of Precision Versus Brute Force in Weaponry|journal=Armed Forces & Society|volume=30|issue=2|date=January 2004|pages=171–201|publisher=Sage Publications|doi=10.1177/0095327X0403000203|s2cid=110384704}}
*{{cite web|first=Montgomery C.|last=Meigs|url=http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/03summer/meigs.pdf|title=Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20031002134644/http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/03summer/meigs.pdf |archive-date=2003-10-02 }}
*{{cite news|first=Richard|last=Norton-Taylor|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/03/afghanistan.socialsciences|title=Asymmetric Warfare: Military Planners Are Only Beginning to Grasp the Implications of September 11 for Future Deterrence Strategy|website=[[The Guardian]]|date=October 3, 2001}}
*{{cite news|first=Michael|last=Novak|author-link=Michael Novak|url=https://www.nationalreview.com/2003/02/asymmetrical-warfare-just-war-michael-novak|title="Asymmetrical Warfare" & Just War: A Moral Obligation|website=[[National Review|NRO]]|date=February 10, 2003}}
*{{cite journal|first=Toni|last=Pfanner|title=Asymmetrical Warfare from the Perspective of Humanitarian Law and Humanitarian Action|journal=International Review of the Red Cross|volume=87|number=857|date=March 2005|pages=149–174|doi=10.1017/S1816383100181238 |s2cid=145126086 }}
*{{cite journal|first=Patricia|last=Sullivan|year=2007|title=War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume=51|issue=3|pages=496–524|doi=10.1177/0022002707300187 |s2cid=37158560 }}
*{{cite web|first=Jonathan B.|last=Tucker|url=http://forum.ra.utk.edu/1999summer/asymmetric.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060515092853/http://forum.ra.utk.edu/1999summer/asymmetric.htm|archive-date=2006-05-15|title=Asymmetric Warfare|date=Summer 1999}}
*{{cite news|first1=Josh|last1=White|first2=William|last2=Branigin|url=http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/21/AR2008042100950.html|title=Gates Assails Pentagon on Resources for Battlefields|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|date=April 22, 2008}}
*{{cite magazine|url=http://jdw.janes.com/subscribe/jdw/doc_view_print.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/jdw/history/jdw2006/jdw30244.htm@current&Prod_Name=JDW&showUpdate=false&|title=Asymmetry and other fables|magazine=Jane's Defence Weekly|date=18 August 2006|access-date=6 May 2021|archive-date=26 January 2013|archive-url=https://archive.today/20130126211147/http://jdw.janes.com/subscribe/jdw/doc_view_print.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/jdw/history/jdw2006/jdw30244.htm@current&Prod_Name=JDW&showUpdate=false&|url-status=dead}}

{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Asymmetric Warfare}}
[[Category:Warfare by type]]
[[Category:Military strategy]]
[[Category:Military science]]
[[Category:Military doctrines]]
[[Category:Asymmetry|Warfare]]