View source for Chinese nationalism

{{Short description|none}}
{{About|nationalism that asserts all Chinese, including ethnic minorities, are a nation|Chinese nationalism applied exclusively to the Han Chinese ethnicity|Han nationalism|the diplomatic system and ideology that emphasized China's centrality in the world|Sinocentrism|the political party commonly known as the Chinese Nationalist Party|Kuomintang}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=June 2020}}
{{Infobox Chinese
| s = 中国民族主义
| t = 中國民族主義
| w = {{Tone superscript|Chung1-kuo2 min2-tsu2 chu3-i4}}
| p = Zhōngguó mínzú zhǔyì
| bpmf = ㄓㄨㄥ ㄍㄨㄛˊ ㄇㄧㄣˊ ㄗㄨˊ ㄓㄨˇ ㄧˋ
| s2 = 中华民族主义
| t2 = 中華民族主義
| w2 = {{Tone superscript|Chung1-hua2 min2-tsu2 chu3-i4}}
| p2 = Zhōnghuá mínzú zhǔyì
| bpmf2 = ㄓㄨㄥ ㄏㄨㄚˊ ㄇㄧㄣˊ ㄗㄨˊ ㄓㄨˇ ㄧˋ
}}
[[File:Beijing students protesting the Treaty of Versailles (May 4, 1919).jpg|right|thumb|300px|At the beginning of the 20th century, the sentiment of [[nationalism]] in China rose sharply, represented by the [[May Fourth Movement]] in 1919]]
'''Chinese nationalism'''{{efn|There are various translations for "Nationalism" in Chinese:
* 民族主义 or 民族主義 (pinyin: ''mínzú zhǔyì'')
* 国族主义 or 國族主義 (pinyin: ''guózú zhǔyì'')
* 国民主义 or 國民主義 (pinyin: ''guómín zhǔyì'')
* 国粹主义 or 國粹主義 (pinyin: ''guócuì zhǔyì'')
}} is a form of [[nationalism]] that asserts that the [[Chinese people]] are a [[nation]] and promotes the cultural and national unity of all Chinese people. According to [[Sun Yat-sen]]'s philosophy in the [[Three Principles of the People]], Chinese nationalism is evaluated as [[Zhonghua minzu|multi-ethnic nationalism]], which should be distinguished from [[Han nationalism]] or [[local ethnic nationalism]].

Modern Chinese nationalism emerged in the late [[Qing dynasty]] (1644&ndash;1912) in response to China's [[Face (sociological concept)#Chinese 臉面 and 面子|humiliating]] defeat at the end of the [[First Sino-Japanese War]] and the invasion and pillaging of Beijing by the [[Eight-Nation Alliance]]. In the aftermath of both events, China was forced to pay financial reparations and grant special privileges to foreigners. The nationwide image of China as a superior [[Celestial Empire]], which was located at the center of the universe, was shattered, and last-minute efforts to modernize the old system were unsuccessful. These last-minute efforts were best exemplified by [[Liang Qichao]], a late Qing reformer who failed to [[Hundred Days' Reform|reform the Qing government]] in 1896 and was later expelled from China and fled to Japan, where he began to develop his ideas of Chinese nationalism.

The effects of [[World War I]] continually shaped Chinese nationalism. Despite the fact that it had joined the [[Allies of World War I|Allied Powers]], China was again severely [[century of humiliation|humiliated]] by the [[Versailles Treaty]] of 1919, which transferred the special privileges which were given to Germany to the [[Empire of Japan]]. This event triggered the [[May Fourth Movement]] of 1919, which developed into nationwide protests that were marked by a surge of Chinese nationalism. During the [[Warlord Era]], large-scale military campaigns which were led by the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT), overpowered provincial warlords and sharply reduced special privileges for foreigners contributed to the strengthening and aggrandizing of a sense of Chinese national identity.[[File:Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|thumb|right|The current [[Flag of China|national flag]] of the [[China|People's Republic of China]] (1949–present), representing a variety of Chinese nationalism. Currently in use in [[mainland China]], [[Hong Kong]] and [[Macau]]. Closely associated with the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP)]]
[[File:Flag of the Republic of China.svg|thumb|right|The [[Flag of the Republic of China|second national flag]] of the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]] (1928–present), representing a variety of Chinese nationalism. Defunct on [[mainland China]] post-1949. Currently in use in the [[Free area of the Republic of China|Taiwan Area]] of the [[Taiwan|Republic of China]]. Closely associated with the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT), also known as the Chinese Nationalist Party]]After the Empire of Japan was defeated by the [[Allies of World War II|Allies]] at the end of [[World War II]], Chinese nationalism again gained traction as China recovered territories which it lost to Japan before the war, including [[Manchukuo|Northeast area]] and the island of [[Taiwan under Japanese rule|Taiwan]]. However, the [[Chinese Civil War]] (which was paused during the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]]) was resumed, damaging the image of a unified Chinese identity. The [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) was victorious in 1949, as the KMT's government [[Retreat of the government of Republic of China to Taiwan|retreated]] to Taiwan. Under [[Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP Chairman]] [[Mao Zedong]], the CCP began to employ Chinese nationalism as a political tool. Chinese nationalism has become more [[Han Chinese|Han]]-centric since [[Xi Jinping]] became [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP General Secretary]] and assumed power in 2012.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Leibold |first1=James |last2=Chen |first2=Julie Yu-Wen |date=2024-11-18 |title=Han-Centrism and Multiethnic Nation-Building in China and Taiwan: A Comparative Study since 1911 |journal=[[Nationalities Papers]] |language=en |pages=1–18 |doi=10.1017/nps.2024.86 |issn=0090-5992 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Friend |first1=John M. |last2=Thayer |first2=Bradley A. |date=12 June 2017 |title=The Rise of Han-Centrism and What It Means for International Politics |journal=[[Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism]] |language=en |volume=17 |issue=1 |pages=91–114 |doi=10.1111/sena.12223 |issn=1473-8481}}</ref>

==Historical development==
{{See also|History of China}}
[[File:岳飞像.jpg|thumb|Qing dynasty illustration of [[Yue Fei]] who led Chinese [[Southern Song]] army against [[Jurchens]]]]
[[File:A Seated Portrait of Ming Emperor Taizu.jpg|thumb|Portrait of the [[Hongwu Emperor]], who led Chinese movement against [[Mongol]] [[Yuan dynasty]]]]
The first state of China was confirmed as the [[Shang dynasty]] (c. 1570 BC-c. 1045 BC). The Chinese concept of the world was largely a division between the civilized world and the barbarian world and there was little concept of the belief that Chinese interests were served by a powerful Chinese state. Commenter [[Lucian Pye]] has argued that the modern "[[nation state]]" is fundamentally different from a traditional empire, and argues that dynamics of the current [[People's Republic of China]] (PRC) – a concentration of power at a central point of authority – share an essential similarity with the [[Ming Dynasty|Ming]] and [[Qing Dynasty|Qing Empire]]s.<ref>{{cite book |title=Asian power and politics: the cultural dimensions of authority |last1= Pye|first1= Lucian W.|author-link1= Lucian Pye|last2 = Pye | first2 = Mary W.|year= 1985 |publisher=Harvard University Press |page=184}}</ref>

As it emerged in the early 20th century, Chinese nationalism was modeled after [[Japanese nationalism]], especially as it was viewed and interpreted by [[Sun Yat-sen]]. In 1894, Sun founded the [[Revive China Society]], which was the first Chinese nationalist revolutionary society.<ref name=":022">{{Cite book |last=Yang |first=Zhiyi |title=Poetry, History, Memory: Wang Jingwei and China in Dark Times |date=2023 |publisher=[[The University of Michigan Press]] |isbn=978-0-472-05650-7 |location=Ann Arbor}}</ref>{{Rp|page=31}}

Chinese nationalism was rooted in the long historic tradition in which China was considered the center of the world, in which all other states were offshoots of China and owed some sort of deference to it. That sense of superiority underwent a series of terrible shocks in the 19th century, including large-scale internal revolts, and more grievously the systematic gaining and removal of special rights and privileges by foreign nations which proved their military superiority during the [[First Opium War|First]] and [[Second Opium War]]s, based on modern technology that was lacking in China. It was a matter of humiliation one after another, the loss of faith in the Qing dynasty. By the 1890s, disaffected Chinese intellectuals began to develop "a new nationalist commitment to China as a nation-state in a world dominated by predatory imperialist nation states."<ref name=":3">{{Cite book |last=Meisner |first=Maurice J. |author-link=Maurice Meisner |title=Mao's China and After |title-link=Mao's China and After |date=1999 |isbn=0-02-920870-X |edition=3rd |location=New York |pages= |oclc=13270932}}</ref>{{Rp|page=12}} Overall, their concern was not in preserving a traditional Chinese order but instead the construction of a strong state and society that could stand in a hostile international arena.<ref name=":3" />

Unlike many nationalist projects in other countries, the trend among Chinese intellectuals was to regard tradition as unsuitable for China's survival and instead to view tradition as a source of China's problems.<ref name=":3" />{{Rp|page=13}} For the Qing dynasty, ethnicity was a troublesome issue. Some of the ethnic groups within the empire were identified according to language and culture, including the Manchus who originated in a non-Han Chinese population and ruled the dynasty. Most citizens had multiple identities, of which the locality was more important than the nation as a whole.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Westad |first=Odd Arne |author-link=Odd Arne Westad |title=Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750 |date=2012-09-06 |publisher=[[Random House]] |isbn=978-1-4464-8510-1 |language=en}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=29–30}} Anyone who wanted to rise in government non-military service had to be immersed in Confucian classics, and pass the [[imperial examination]]. If accepted, they would be rotated around the country, so the bureaucrats did not identify with the locality. The depth of two-way understanding and trust developed by European political leaders and their followers did not exist.<ref>On how Confucianism was an invented tradition in China see [[Lionel M. Jensen]], ''Manufacturing Confucianism: Chinese traditions & universal civilization'' (Duke UP, 1997) pp. 3–7.</ref>

China's defeat by Japan at the end of the [[First Sino-Japanese War]] (1894–1895) was fundamental to the development of the first generation of Chinese nationalists.<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=132}} The most dramatic watershed came in 1900, in the wake of the invasion, capture, and pillaging of the national capital by the [[Eight-Nation Alliance]] that punished China for the [[Boxer Rebellion]].<ref>Mary Clabaugh Wright, ed. ''China and revolution: the first phase, 1900–1913'' (1968) pp. 1–23.</ref> During the [[Late Qing reforms]], the rise of the national education trend emphasizes instilling national values in education and inspiring patriotic sentiments. For example, the Chinese geography textbooks published during the period usually praised China's superior geographical conditions, and such texts generally came from the first chapters of the textbooks, which were convenient for guiding students to develop a love for their motherland when they first came into contact with China's geography.<ref>{{cite web | url = https://www.sohu.com/a/127415152_488316 | title = 地理书写与国家认同：清末地理教科书中的民族主义话语 | website = [[Sohu]] | access-date = June 5, 2024 | archive-date = 5 June 2024 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20240605050419/https://www.sohu.com/a/127415152_488316 | url-status = live }}</ref> Chinese nationalists drew inspiration from Japan's victory in the [[Russo-Japanese War]], which they broadly viewed as demonstrating the fallacy of a European-centric racial hierarchy.<ref name=":022"/>{{Rp|page=30}}

The [[Second Sino-Japanese War|Second Sino-Japanese war]] was one of the most important events in the modern construction of Chinese nationalism.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Mitter |first=Rana |title=China's good war : how World War II is shaping a new nationalism |date=2020 |publisher=The Belknap Press of [[Harvard University Press]] |isbn=978-0-674-98426-4 |location=Cambridge, Massachusetts |pages=32 |oclc=1141442704 }}</ref> The Chinese experience in the war helped create an ideology based on the concept of “the people” as a political body in its own right, “a modern nation as opposed to a feudal empire.”<ref name=":0" />

==Ideological sources==
{{See also|Sinocentrism}}
[[File:Qingtuiweizhaoshu.JPG|thumb|right|300px|This abdication decree announced the fall of the Qing Dynasty and the succession of the Republic of China, marking the success of the 1911 Revolution]]
[[File:Yuan Shikai2.jpg|thumb|left|[[Yuan Shikai]], a nationalist in the Beiyang Government]]
[[File:Liang Qichao4a.jpg|thumb|right|[[Liang Qichao]], who greatly contributed to creating the foundation of modern Chinese nationalism]]
The discussion about modern Chinese nationalism has dominated many political and intellectual debates since the late nineteenth century. Political scientist [[Suisheng Zhao]] argues that nationalism in China is not monolithic because it exists in various forms, including political, liberal, ethnic, and state nationalism.<ref>{{Cite book|author=Zhao, Suisheng|title=A nation-state by construction : dynamics of modern Chinese nationalism|date=2004|publisher=Stanford University Press|isbn=0-8047-4897-7|location=Stanford, Calif.|oclc=54694622}}</ref>

Chinese nationalism is shaped in part by the Western-derived [[Westphalian system]].<ref name=":12" />{{Reference page|page=50}} During the first half of the twentieth century, Chinese nationalism constituted a crucial part of many political ideologies, including anti-Manchuism, which was espoused during the [[1911 Revolution]], the [[Anti-imperialism|anti-imperialist]] sentiment of the [[May Fourth Movement]] in 1919, and the [[Maoism|Maoist]] thoughts that guided the [[Communist revolution in China|Communist Revolution]] in 1949. The origin of modern Chinese nationalism can be traced back to the intellectual debate about the subjects of race and nation which occurred during the late nineteenth century. Shaped by the global discourse about [[Social Darwinism]], reformers and intellectuals both held debates  about how they should build a new Chinese national subject based on a proper racial order, particularly on Manchu-Han relations.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Duara |first=Prasenjit |title=Rescuing History from the Nation |date=1995 |publisher=[[University of Chicago Press]] |isbn=978-0-226-16722-0 |language=en |doi=10.7208/chicago/9780226167237.001.0001}}</ref> After the collapse of the Qing regime and the founding of the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]] in 1912, concerns about domestic and international threats caused the role of racism to decline and during the 1910s, anti-imperialism became the new dominant ideology of Chinese nationalism. While intellectuals and elites advocated their distinctive thoughts about Chinese nationalism, political scientist [[Chalmers Johnson]] has pointed out that most of these ideas had very little to do with China's majority population—the Chinese peasantry. Thus, he proposes to supplement the [[ideology of the Chinese Communist Party]] in the discussion of Chinese nationalism, which he labels "peasant nationalism."<ref name=":6">{{Cite book |last=Johnson |first=Chalmers A. |author-link=Chalmers Johnson |title=Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945 |date=1962-06-01 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-2058-2 |doi=10.1515/9781503620582}}</ref>
[[File:汪精衛照片.jpg|thumb|[[Wang Jingwei]]]]
In some revolutionary circles in the 19th century, the significance of the development of a Chinese national identity was the result of an attempt to negatively identify  the Han people  by turning them against the Qing dynasty, which was non-Chinese in their view.<ref name=":9">{{Cite book |last=Šebok |first=Filip |title=Contemporary China: a New Superpower? |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2023 |isbn=978-1-03-239508-1 |editor-last=Kironska |editor-first=Kristina |chapter=Historical Legacy |pages=15–28 |doi=10.4324/9781003350064-3 |editor-last2=Turscanyi |editor-first2=Richard Q.}}</ref>{{Rp|page=18}} Under this initial view of Chinese nationalism, the Chinese identity was primarily associated with the majority Han ethnic group.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=18}}

After Qing China's defeat at the end of the [[First Sino-Japanese War|Sino-Japanese War of 1895]], reformers and intellectuals debated about how to strengthen the nation, the discussion of which centered on the issue of race. [[Liang Qichao]], a late Qing reformist who participated in the [[Hundred Days' Reform]] of 1898, contended that the boundary between Han and Manchu must be erased (''ping Man-Han zhi jie'').<ref name=":7">{{Cite journal |last=Rhoads |first=Edward J. M. |date=2000 |title=Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861-1928 |journal=Studies on Ethnic Groups in China |language=en |pages=404 |doi=10.6069/9780295997483}}</ref>{{Rp|page=3}} Liang was among the most prominent nationalists who viewed earlier conceptions of a Han-focused national identity as too restrictive.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=18}} Liang attributed the decline of China to the Qing dynasty which was founded by the Manchus, who treated the Han as an "alien race" and imposed a racial hierarchy between the Han and the Manchus and ignored the threats which were posed by imperial powers.<ref name=":7" />{{Page needed|date=October 2024}} However Liang's critique of the Qing court and the Manchu-Han relations laid the foundation for anti-Manchuism, an ideology that early Republican and nationalist revolutionaries advocated in accordance with their efforts to overthrow the Qing dynasty and found a new Republic in China. More broadly, Liang's view was that modernity was "an age of struggle among nations for the survival of the fittest" and that therefore the Qing government should support industrialization and develop a Chinese people with strong work ethic, "a strong sense of nationalism, and a militaristic mentality."<ref name=":03">{{Cite book |last=Meyskens |first=Covell F. |url= |title=Mao's Third Front: The Militarization of Cold War China |date=2020 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-108-78478-8 |location=Cambridge, United Kingdom |doi=10.1017/9781108784788 |oclc=1145096137 |s2cid=218936313}}</ref>{{Rp|page=22}}

In his writing "Revolutionary Army," [[Zou Rong]], an active Chinese revolutionary at the turn of the twentieth century, demanded an educational revolution for the Han people who were suffering under the oppressive rule of the Manchus.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Zou|first=Rong|date=1903|title=The Revolutionary Army|journal=Contemporary Chinese Thought|volume=31|pages=32–38}}</ref> He argued that China should be a nation of the orthodox Han Chinese and no alien race shall rule over them. According to Zou, the Han Chinese, as the descendants of the [[Yellow Emperor]], must overthrow the Manchu rule to restore their legitimacy and rights. [[Wang Jingwei]], a Chinese revolutionary who later became an important figure in the [[Kuomintang]], also believed that the Manchus were an inferior race. Wang contended that a state consisting of a single race would be superior to those multiracial ones. Most of the Republican revolutionaries agreed that preserving the race was vital to the survival of the nation. Since the Han had asserted its dominant role in Chinese nationalism, the Manchus had to be either absorbed or eradicated.<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Duara |first=Prasenjit |title=Rescuing History from the Nation |date=1995 |publisher=[[University of Chicago Press]] |isbn=978-0-226-16722-0 |pages=141 |language=en |doi=10.7208/chicago/9780226167237.001.0001}}</ref> Historian [[Prasenjit Duara]] summarized this by stating that the Republican revolutionaries primarily drew on the international discourse of "racist evolutionism" to envision a "racially purified China."<ref name=":02" />
[[File:孙中山肖像.jpg|thumb|[[Sun Yat-sen]], founder of the Kuomintang]]
{{Three Principles of the People}}
After the 1911 Revolution, Sun Yat-sen established the Republic of China, the national flag of which contained five colors with each symbolizing a major racial ethnicity of China. This marked a shift from the earlier discourse about radical racism and the assimilation of the non-Han groups to a discourse about the political autonomy of the five races.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Duara|first=Prasenjit|title=Rescuing History from the Nation|date=1995|publisher=University of Chicago Press|isbn=978-0-226-16722-0|pages=142|doi=10.7208/chicago/9780226167237.001.0001}}</ref> The rhetorical move, as China historian [[Joseph Esherick (historian)|Joseph Esherick]] points out, was based on practical concerns about imperial threats from the international environment and conflicts on the Chinese frontiers.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|author1=Esherick, Joseph|author2=Kayalı, Hasan |author3=Van Young, Eric|title=Empire to nation : historical perspectives on the making of the modern world|date=2011|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|isbn=978-0-7425-7815-9|oclc=1030355615}}</ref> While both Japan and Russia were encroaching China, the newly born republic also faced ethnic movements in Mongolia and Tibet which claimed themselves to be part of the Qing Empire rather than the Republic of China. Pressured by both domestic and international problems, the fragile Republican regime decided to maintain the borders of the Qing Empire to keep its territories intact.<ref name=":1" /> With the increasing threat from the imperialist powers in the 1910s, anti-imperialist sentiments started to grow and spread in China. An ideal of "a morally just universe," anti-imperialism made racism appear shameful and thus took over its dominant role in the conceptualization of Chinese nationalism.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Duara|first=Prasenjit|title=Rescuing History from the Nation|date=1995|publisher=University of Chicago Press|isbn=978-0-226-16722-0|pages=144|doi=10.7208/chicago/9780226167237.001.0001}}</ref> Yet racism never perished. Instead, it was embedded by other social realms, including the discourse of eugenics and [[racial hygiene]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Dikötter, Frank. |title=Imperfect conceptions : medical knowledge, birth defects, and eugenics in China |date=1998 |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=0-231-11370-6 |location=New York |language=en |oclc=38909337 |author-link=Frank Dikötter}}</ref>

The [[Blue Shirts Society]], a [[Fascism|fascist]] paramilitary organization within the Kuomintang that modelled itself after [[Benito Mussolini|Mussolini]]'s [[blackshirts]] of the [[National Fascist Party]], was [[Xenophobia|anti-foreign]] and [[Anti-communism|anti-communist]], and it stated that its agenda was to expel foreign (Japanese and Western) imperialists from China, crush Communism, and eliminate feudalism.<ref name=DaiLi>{{cite book|author=Frederic E. Wakeman|title=Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jYYYQYK6FAYC&pg=PA75|access-date=28 June 2010|year=2003|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-23407-9|page=75|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170205143553/https://books.google.com/books?id=jYYYQYK6FAYC&pg=PA75|archive-date=5 February 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> In addition to being anticommunist, some KMT members, like Chiang Kai-shek's right-hand man [[Dai Li]] were [[Anti-Americanism|anti-American]], and wanted to expel American influence.<ref>{{cite book |author=[[Jonathan Fenby]] |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YkREps9oGR4C |title=Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost |publisher=Carroll & Graf Publishers |year=2005 |isbn=978-0-7867-1484-1 |pages=414 |language=en |access-date=28 June 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170205021230/https://books.google.com/books?id=YkREps9oGR4C |archive-date=5 February 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref> In addition, the [[Sino-German cooperation (1926–1941)|close Sino-German relations]] at the time promoted close ties between the [[Nationalist Government]] and [[Nazi Germany]]. The [[New Life Movement]] was a government-led civic movement in 1930s China initiated by Chiang Kai-shek to promote cultural reform and Neo-Confucian social morality and to ultimately unite China under a centralized ideology following the emergence of ideological challenges to the status quo. The Movement attempted to counter threats of Western and Japanese imperialism through a resurrection of traditional Chinese morality, which it held to be superior to modern Western values. As such the Movement was based upon [[Confucianism]], mixed with [[Christianity]], [[nationalism]] and [[authoritarianism]] that have some similarities to fascism.<ref name="schok">{{Cite book |last=Schoppa |first=R. Keith |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=M6_tAAAAMAAJ&q=New+Life+Movement |title=Revolution and Its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History |date=2006 |publisher=[[Pearson Prentice Hall]] |isbn=978-0-13-193039-1 |language=en |access-date=14 November 2022 |archive-date=3 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230403221205/https://books.google.com/books?id=M6_tAAAAMAAJ&q=New+Life+Movement |url-status=live }}</ref> It rejected [[individualism]] and [[liberalism]], while also opposing [[socialism]] and [[communism]]. Some historians regard this movement as imitating [[Nazism]] and being a neo-nationalistic movement used to elevate Chiang's control of everyday lives. [[Frederic Wakeman]] suggested that the New Life Movement was "Confucian fascism".<ref name=":11">{{Cite journal |last=Wakeman |first=Frederic |author-link=Frederic Wakeman |date=June 1997 |title=A Revisionist View of the Nanjing Decade: Confucian Fascism |journal=[[The China Quarterly]] |language=en |volume=150 |pages=395–432 |doi=10.1017/S030574100005253X |issn=0305-7410}}</ref>

In response to the [[Cultural Revolution]], Chiang Kai-shek launched a [[Chinese Cultural Renaissance]] movement which followed in the steps of the New Life Movement, the movement promoted Confucian values.<ref>
{{cite book
| editor1-last  = De Bary
| editor1-first = William Theodore
| editor1-link   = Ted de Bary
| editor2-last  = Lufrano
| editor2-first = Richard John
| title         = Sources of Chinese Tradition: From 1600 Through the Twentieth Century
| url           = https://books.google.com/books?id=g0aAjW8GU7kC
| accessdate    = 2011-11-05
| edition   = 2
| series    = Introduction to Asian civilizations
| volume    = 2
| year      = 2001
| publisher = Columbia University Press
| isbn      = 978-0-231-11271-0
| page      = 342
| quote         = The meaning of Li, Yi, Lian, and Chi[.] [...] ''li'', ''yi'', ''lian'', and ''chi'' have always been regarded as the foundations of the nation [...] they may be interpreted as follows: ''Li'' means 'regulated attitude.' ''Yi'' means 'right conduct.' ''Lian'' means 'clear discrimination.' ''Chi'' means 'real self-consciousness.'
}}
</ref>

In addition to anti-Manchuism and anti-imperialism, political scientist [[Chalmers Johnson]] has argued that the CCP's rise to power through its alliance with the peasantry should also be understood as "a species of nationalism."<ref name=":6" />{{Rp|pages=19–20}} Johnson observes that social mobilization, a force that unites people to form a political community together, is the "primary tool" for conceptualizing nationalism.<ref name=":6" />{{Rp|page=22}} In the context of social mobilization, Chinese nationalism fully emerged only during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), when the CCP mobilized the peasantry to fight against the Japanese invaders. Johnson contends that early nationalism of the Kuomintang was quite similar to the late nineteenth-century nationalism in Europe, as both referred to the search for their national identities and positions in the modern world by the intelligentsia.<ref name=":6" />{{Rp|page=23}} He argues that nationalism constructed by the intellectuals is not identical to nationalism based on mass mobilization, as the nationalist movements led by the Kuomintang, as well as the May Fourth Movement in 1919, were not mass movements because their participants were only a small proportion of the society where the peasants were simply absent. When the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, the CCP began to mobilize the Chinese peasantry through mass propaganda of national salvation ({{Lang-zh|c=救國|s=|t=|p=Jiùguó}}) Johnson observed that the primary shift of the CCP's post-1937 propaganda was its focus on the discourse of national salvation and the temporary retreat of its communist agenda on class struggle and land redistribution.<ref name=":6" />{{Rp|page=4}} The wartime alliance of the Chinese peasantry and the CCP manifested how the nationalist ideology of the CCP, or the peasant nationalism, reinforced the desire of the Chinese to save and build a strong nation.<ref name=":6" />{{Rp|page=30}}

[[File:Republic of China Administrative Subdivisions.svg|thumb|A map of the 1945 de jure borders of the Republic of China, used by Chinese nationalists as a map of "[[Greater China]]".]]
[[Chinese irredentism|Irredentism]] and [[Chinese expansionism|expansionism]] have also played a role in Chinese nationalism, declaring that China should regain its "lost territories" and form a [[Greater China]].<ref name="source">{{Cite book |last=Tseng |first=Hui-Yi |title=Revolution, State Succession, International Treaties and the Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands |publisher=[[Cambridge Scholars Publishing]] |year=2017 |isbn=9781443893688 |pages=66 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="Source2">{{Cite book |title=China, the United Nations, and World Order |last=Kim |first=Samuel S. |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |year=1979 |isbn=9780691100760 |page=[https://archive.org/details/chinaunitednatio0000kims/page/43 43] |url=https://archive.org/details/chinaunitednatio0000kims/page/43 }}</ref> To this day, the Republic of China maintains its territorial claims since its inception in 1912. Its territorial claims were inherited from the Great Qing government as part of the [[Imperial Edict of the Abdication of the Qing Emperor]].<ref>[[Imperial Edict of the Abdication of the Qing Emperor]], 12 February 1912. ''... May Yuan Shikai organize with full powers a provisional republican Government and confer with the people's army as to the methods of procedure for the Union, such that peace may be assured and restored to the people and country, all while retaining the complete territorial integrity of the lands of the five races—Manchu, Han, Mongol, Hui, and Tibetan—which shall combine to form a great Republic of China. ...''</ref>

In contemporary Chinese intellectual currents, Chinese nationalism is linked to [[Postcolonialism|postcolonial]] and [[Postmodernism|postmodern]] discourses.<ref name=":12" />{{Reference page|page=52}} In these frameworks, Chinese nationalism is viewed as playing a key role in forming the modern Chinese state and is deemed a progressive force.<ref name=":12" />{{Reference page|page=|pages=52-53}}

==Ethnicity==
{{See also|List of ethnic groups in China|Han chauvinism|Hua–Yi distinction|Racism in China}}
[[File:Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek.jpg|thumb|right|Chinese nationalist leaders [[Chiang Kai-shek]] (left) and [[Sun Yat-sen]] (right)]]
[[File:Greatwall large.jpg|thumb|The [[Great Wall]], a national symbol of China]]
Defining the relationship between ethnicity and the Chinese identity has been a very complex issue throughout [[Chinese history]]. In the 17th century, with the help of Ming Chinese rebels, the Manchus conquered [[China proper]] and set up the Qing dynasty. Over the next centuries, they would incorporate groups such as the [[Tibetan people|Tibetans]], the Mongols, and the [[Uyghur people|Uyghurs]] into territories which they controlled. The Manchus were faced with the simultaneous task of maintaining loyalty among the people who they ruled and maintaining their distinct identity. The main method by which they accomplished control of the Chinese heartland was by portraying themselves as enlightened [[Confucian]] sages part of whose goal was to preserve and advance Chinese civilization. Over the course of centuries, the Manchus were gradually assimilated into [[Chinese culture]] and eventually, Manchus identified themselves as a people of China.{{citation needed|date=May 2020}}

The Chinese nation has also been referred to as the [[Yan Huang Zisun|descendants of Yan and Yellow Emperors]], legendary rulers who are considered the historical ancestors of the [[Huaxia]] people, an ethnic group whose members were the ancestors of the [[Han Chinese]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Yeo |first1=K.K. |title=Musing with Confucius and Paul: Toward a Chinese Christian theology |date=2008 |publisher=Cascade Books |isbn=9781556354885| page=407 | quote=Zhonghua (Chinese) or huaren (Chinese people) can be inclusive terms that refer to a common ancestry, traceable according to legend to the Yellow Emperor. Sometimes the Chinese are called the Yan-Huang zisun—descendants of the legendary Emperor Yan (a.k.a. Shen Nong, god of husbandry and first pharmacist) and Emperor Huang (whose burial place is in Huangling). [...] The legend of Emperors Yan-Huang can provide only an "imagined" identity for those who wish their genealogy to be traced to the royal gene of the emperors.}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Yuan |first1=Haiwang |title=The magic lotus lantern and other tales from the Han Chinese |url=https://archive.org/details/magiclotuslanter00yuan_633 |url-access=limited |date=2006 |publisher=Libraries Unlimited |isbn=9781591582946 |page=[https://archive.org/details/magiclotuslanter00yuan_633/page/n28 10] | quote=The Chinese believe that they all came from the common ancestors Sanhuang Wudi [...] referring to themselves as Yanhuang zisun (descendants of Yandi and Huangdi).)}}</ref>

The complexity of the relationship between ethnicity and Chinese identity was best exemplified during the [[Taiping Rebellion]] in which the rebels fiercely fought against the Manchus on the ground that they were barbarians and foreigners while at the same time, others fought just as fiercely on behalf of the Manchus on the ground that they were the preservers of traditional Chinese values.
[[File:Boxer-tianjing-left.jpeg|thumb|left|200px|Soldiers of the Yihetuan.]]
The [[Boxers (group)|Yihetuan]], also known as the Boxers, were a Chinese nationalist and pro-Qing [[monarchist]] [[secret society]] which instigated and led the [[Boxer Rebellion]] from 1899 to 1901. Their motivations were [[Anti-Christian sentiment|Anti-Christianism]] and [[Anti-Western sentiment|resistance to Westernisation]]. At their peak, the Boxers were supported by some members of the [[Military of the Qing dynasty|Imperial Army]]. Their slogan was "Support the Qing, destroy the foreigners!".<ref name=":2">{{cite encyclopedia |url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Boxer-Rebellion |series=Boxer Rebellion |title=Significance, Combatants, Definition, & Facts |encyclopedia=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=2017-12-02 |language=en |archive-date=10 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231010113506/https://www.britannica.com/event/Boxer-Rebellion |url-status=live }}</ref>

In 1909, the ''Law of Nationality of Great Qing'' ({{lang-zh|t=大清國籍條例|c=|s=|p=Dà qīng guójí tiáolì}}) was published by the Manchu government, which defined Chinese with the following rules: 1) born in China while his/her father is a Chinese; 2) born after his/her father's death while his/her father is a Chinese at his death; 3) his/her mother is a Chinese while his/her father's nationality is unclear or stateless.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hant/%E5%A4%A7%E6%B8%85%E5%9C%8B%E7%B1%8D%E6%A2%9D%E4%BE%8B|language=zh-Hant|script-title=zh:大清國籍條例|website=Wikisource (Chinese version)|publisher=Qing government|trans-title=Law of Nationality of Great Qing|year=1909|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190929112751/https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hant/%E5%A4%A7%E6%B8%85%E5%9C%8B%E7%B1%8D%E6%A2%9D%E4%BE%8B|archive-date=29 September 2019}}</ref>

In 1919, the May Fourth Movement grew out of student protests against the [[Treaty of Versailles]], especially its terms allowing [[Empire of Japan|Japan]] to [[Shandong Problem|keep territories]] surrendered by [[German Empire|Germany]] after the [[Siege of Tsingtao]], and spurned upsurges of Chinese nationalism amongst the protests.{{citation needed|date=May 2020}}

In the 1920s and 1930s, the official Chinese nationalistic view was heavily influenced by [[modernism]] and [[Social Darwinism]], and it included advocacy of the [[cultural assimilation]] of ethnic groups in the western and central provinces into the "culturally advanced" Han state, a policy which would enable them to become members of the Chinese nation in name as well as in fact. Furthermore, it was also influenced by the fate of multi-ethnic states such as [[Austria-Hungary]] and the [[Ottoman Empire]]. It also became a very powerful force during the Japanese occupation of Coastal China during the 1930s and 1940s and the atrocities committed then.{{citation needed|date=May 2020}}

Influenced by the 1911 Revolution and the appearance of modern nationalist theories, "[[Zhonghua minzu]]" in the early [[Republic of China (1912-1949)|Republic of China]], referred to the [[Five Races Under One Union]] concept. This principle held that the five major ethnicities in China, the Han Chinese, [[Manchu people|Manchus]], [[Mongols]], [[Hui people|Hui]], and [[Tibetans]], all belonged to a single Chinese identity.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=19}} The government promoted Chinese nationalism for these five ethnic groups but with the Han Chinese are main ethnic group of "Zhonghua minzu" or China, this continued by [[Nationalist government|Nationalist rule]] under Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang in all China until the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in Chinese Mainland and the Republic of China retreated to Taiwan.

While it was initially rejected by Mao Zedong and his Chinese Communist Party, it was later accepted, the concept of "Chinese" which was developed during Mao's rule was that of a "huge Chinese family" or a political union which includes the Han Chinese and [[list of ethnic groups in China|55 other ethnic groups]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Zhou Wenjiu, Zhang Jingpeng|date=2007|title=关于"中华民族是一个"学术论辩的考察|trans-title=On the academic argument that "the Chinese nation is one"|url=https://www.ixueshu.com/document/707a828b3050b9d8cfc98c157055c2e3318947a18e7f9386.html|journal=Minzu Yanjiu|volume=3|pages=20–29|access-date=29 October 2019|archive-date=29 October 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191029145113/https://www.ixueshu.com/document/707a828b3050b9d8cfc98c157055c2e3318947a18e7f9386.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the government extended the number of ethnicities comprising the Chinese nation to these 56.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=19}}

Before [[Xi Jinping]] took power in 2012, the People's Republic of China's form of Chinese nationalism was strongly influenced by the Soviet Union's [[Korenizatsiya]] policy. The Chinese Communist Party also criticized the Kuomintang-led Republic of China's support of Han chauvinism. The official ideology of the People's Republic of China asserts that China is a multi-ethnic state, where the majority Han constitute one of many ethnic groups of China, each group's culture and language should be respected (akin to [[Soviet patriotism]]{{sfn|Motyl|2001|pp=501}}). The government also instituted policies of [[Affirmative action in China|affirmative action]], in general, the ethnic policy of the People's Republic of China at the time was strongly influenced by the nature of its [[Marxist-Leninist state]]. Despite this official view, [[Sinicization|assimilationist attitudes]] remain deeply entrenched, and popular views and actual power relationships create a situation in which Chinese nationalism has in practice meant Han dominance of minority areas and peoples and assimilation of those groups.<ref name=":10" /> Since Xi Jinping took power, assimilation of non-Han ethnic groups has been overt and intensified while preferential policies for ethnic minorities have shrunk.<ref name=":10">{{Cite web |author-first1=Mimi|author-last1=Lau |date=2019-12-05 |title=From Xinjiang to Ningxia, China's ethnic groups face end to affirmative action in education, taxes, policing|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3040577/chinas-ethnic-groups-face-end-affirmative-action-education |access-date=2019-12-10 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en |archive-date=23 September 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230923224656/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3040577/chinas-ethnic-groups-face-end-affirmative-action-education |url-status=live }}</ref>

During the 1960s and 1970s, Chinese nationalism within [[mainland China]] became mixed with the rhetoric of [[Marxism]], and as a result, nationalistic rhetoric was largely subsumed into internationalist rhetoric. On the other hand, the primary focus of Chinese nationalism in [[Taiwan]] was the preservation of the ideals and lineage of Sun Yat-sen, the party which he founded, the Kuomintang (KMT), and [[anti-Communism]]. While the definition of Chinese nationalism differed in the [[Republic of China]] (ROC) and the PRC, the KMT and the CCP were both adamant in their claims on Chinese territories such as [[Senkaku Islands|Senkaku (Diaoyutai) Islands]].{{citation needed|date=May 2020}}

In the 1990s, the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]], rising economic standards and the lack of any other legitimizing ideology, has led to what most observers see as a resurgence of nationalism within mainland China.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Segal |first=Gerald |date=1992 |title=China and the Disintegration of the Soviet Union |journal=[[Asian Survey]] |volume=32 |issue=9 |pages=848–868 |doi=10.2307/2645075 |issn=0004-4687 |jstor=2645075}}</ref>

=== Ethnic minorities ===
==== Chinese Muslims and Uyghurs ====
{{See also|Hui pan-nationalism}}
[[File:Hu Songshan.jpg|thumb|[[Hu Songshan]], a Chinese Muslim Imam who was a Chinese nationalist.]]
[[Islam in China|Chinese Muslims]] have played an important role in Chinese nationalism. Chinese Muslims, known as Hui people, are a mixture of the descendants of foreign Muslims like Arabs and Persians, who mixed with Han Chinese who converted to Islam. Chinese Muslims can speak Chinese and practice Confucianism.{{citation needed|date=May 2020}}

[[Hu Songshan]], a Muslim Imam from [[Ningxia]], was a Chinese nationalist and preached Chinese nationalism and the unity of all Chinese people and against foreign imperialism and other threats to China's sovereignty.<ref name="google210">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=90CN0vtxdY0C&pg=PA167|title=Familiar strangers: a history of Muslims in Northwest China|author=Jonathan Neaman Lipman|year=2004|publisher=University of Washington Press|location=Seattle|page=210|isbn=0-295-97644-6|access-date=12 February 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170205041900/https://books.google.com/books?id=90CN0vtxdY0C&pg=PA167|archive-date=5 February 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> He even ordered the [[Flag of the Republic of China|Chinese Flag]] to be saluted during prayer, and that all Imams in Ningxia preach Chinese nationalism. Hu Songshan led the [[Yihewani|Ikhwan]], the Chinese Muslim Brotherhood, which became a Chinese nationalist, patriotic organization, stressing education and independence of the individual.<ref name="google210" /><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lSxYAAAAMAAJ|title=Papers from the Conference on Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance, Banff, August 20–24, 1987, Volume 3|year=1987|page=30|author=Joint Committee on Chinese Studies (U.S|access-date=12 February 2016|archive-date=24 March 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200324234944/https://books.google.com/books?id=lSxYAAAAMAAJ|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=NyhtAAAAMAAJ|title=Devout societies vs. impious states?: transmitting Islamic learning in Russia, Central Asia and China, through the twentieth century : proceedings of an international colloquium held in the Carré des Sciences, French Ministry of Research, Paris, November 12–13, 2001|author=Stéphane A. Dudoignon|year=2004|publisher=Schwarz|page=69|isbn=3-87997-314-8|access-date=12 February 2016|archive-date=5 August 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200805084121/https://books.google.com/books?id=NyhtAAAAMAAJ|url-status=live}}</ref> Hu Songhan also wrote a prayer in Arabic and Chinese, praying for [[Allah]] to support the Chinese Kuomintang government and defeat Japan.<ref>Lipman, ''Familiar Strangers,'' p 200</ref> Hu Songshan also cited a [[Hadith]] ({{lang-zh|labels=no|t=聖訓}}), a saying of the prophet [[Muhammad]], which says "Loving the Motherland is equivalent to loving the Faith" ({{lang-zh|labels=no|t=“愛護祖國是屬於信仰的一部份”}}). Hu Songshan harshly criticized those who were non-patriotic and those who taught anti-nationalist thinking, saying that they were fake Muslims.{{citation needed|date=May 2020}}

[[Ma Qixi]] was a Muslim reformer and a leader of the [[Xidaotang]], and he taught that Islam could be understood only by using Chinese culture such as Confucianism. He read classic Chinese texts and even took his cue from [[Laozi]] when he decided to go on [[Hajj]] to [[Mecca]].{{citation needed|date=May 2020}}

[[Ma Fuxiang]], a Chinese Muslim general and Kuomintang member, was another Chinese nationalist. Ma Fuxiang preached unity of all Chinese people and even non-Han Chinese people such as Tibetans and Mongols to stay in China. He proclaimed that Mongolia and Tibet were part of the Republic of China, not independent countries.<ref>Lipman, ''Familiar Strangers,'' p. 167</ref> Ma Fuxiang was loyal to the Chinese government and crushed Muslim rebels when ordered to. Ma Fuxiang believed that modern education would help Hui Chinese build a better society and help China resist foreign imperialism and help build the nation. He was praised for his "guojia yizhi"(national consciousness) by non-Muslims. Ma Fuxiang also published many books, and wrote on Confucianism and Islam, having studied both the [[Quran]] and the [[Spring and Autumn Annals]].{{citation needed|date=May 2020}}

Ma Fuxiang had served under the Chinese Muslim general [[Dong Fuxiang]] and fought against the foreigners during the Boxer Rebellion.<ref>Lipman, ''Familiar Strangers,'' p. 169</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jVESdBSMasMC&pg=PA182 |title=The origins of the Boxer Uprising|author=Joseph Esherick|year=1988|publisher=University of California Press|location=Berkeley, California|isbn=978-0-520-06459-1|page=182|access-date=28 June 2010}}</ref> The Muslim unit he served in was noted for being anti-foreign, being involved in shooting a Westerner and a Japanese to death before the Boxer Rebellion broke out.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jVESdBSMasMC&pg=PA182 |title=The origins of the Boxer Uprising|author=Joseph Esherick|year=1988|publisher=University of California Press|location=Berkeley, California|isbn=978-0-520-06459-1|page=302|access-date=28 June 2010}}</ref> It was reported that the Muslim troops were going to wipe out the foreigners to return a golden age for China, and the Muslims repeatedly attacked foreign churches, railways, and legations, before hostilities even started.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6WsKAQAAIAAJ|title=The diary of His Excellency Ching-shan: being a Chinese account of the Boxer troubles|author=Ching-shan, Jan Julius Lodewijk Duyvendak|year=1976|publisher=University Publications of America|isbn=978-0-89093-074-8|page=14|access-date=22 August 2020|archive-date=1 August 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200801025547/https://books.google.com/books?id=6WsKAQAAIAAJ|url-status=live}}</ref> The Muslim troops were armed with modern repeater rifles and artillery, and reportedly enthusiastic about going on the offensive and killing foreigners. Ma Fuxiang led an ambush against the foreigners at [[Langfang]] and inflicted many casualties, using a train to escape. Dong Fuxiang was a xenophobe and hated foreigners, wanting to drive them out of China.{{citation needed|date=May 2020}}

Various Muslim organizations in China like the [[Islamic Association of China]] and the [[Chinese Muslim Association]] were sponsored by the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party.{{citation needed|date=May 2020}}

Chinese Muslim imams had synthesized Islam and Confucianism in the [[Han Kitab]]. They asserted that there was no contradiction between Confucianism and Islam, and no contradiction between being a Chinese national and a Muslim. Chinese Muslim students returning from study abroad, from places such as [[Al-Azhar University]] in Egypt, learned about nationalism and advocated Chinese nationalism at home. One Imam, [[Wang Jingzhai]], who studied at Mecca, translated a Hadith, or saying of Muhammad, "Aiguo Aijiao"- loving the country is equivalent to loving the faith. Chinese Muslims believed that their "Watan" {{Langx|ar|وطن|lit=country; homeland}} was the whole of the Republic of China, non-Muslims included.<ref name="Masumi">{{cite web|url=http://science-islam.net/article.php3?id_article=676&lang=fr|title=The completion of the idea of dual loyalty towards China and Islam|last=Masumi|first=Matsumoto|access-date=28 June 2010|url-status=usurped|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110724054724/http://science-islam.net/article.php3?id_article=676&lang=fr|archive-date=24 July 2011}}</ref>

General [[Bai Chongxi]], the warlord of [[Guangxi]], and a member of the Kuomintang, presented himself as the protector of Islam in China and harbored Muslim intellectuals fleeing from the Japanese invasion in Guangxi. General Bai preached Chinese nationalism and anti-imperialism. Chinese Muslims were sent to Saudi Arabia and Egypt to denounce the Japanese. Translations from Egyptian writings and the Quran were used to support propaganda in favour of a [[Jihad]] against Japan.<ref name="Masumi"/>

[[File:Ma Bufang.jpg|thumb|[[Ma Bufang]], a Chinese Muslim general]]
[[Ma Bufang]], a Chinese Muslim general who was part of the Kuomintang, supported Chinese nationalism and tolerance between the different Chinese ethnic groups. The Japanese tried to approach him to gain his support but were unsuccessful. Ma presented himself as a Chinese nationalist who fought against Western [[imperialism]] to the people of China to deflect criticism by opponents that his government was feudal and that it oppressed minorities like the Tibetans and Buddhist Mongols. He presented himself as a Chinese nationalist to his advantage to keep himself in power, as noted by the author Uradyn Erden Bulag.<ref>{{cite book |author=Uradyn Erden Bulag |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g3C2B9oXVbQC&q=patriotism |title=Dilemmas The Mongols at China's edge: history and the politics of national unity |publisher=[[Rowman & Littlefield]] |year=2002 |isbn=0-7425-1144-8 |publication-place=[[City University of New York]] |pages=48 |language=en |access-date=28 June 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110511074059/http://books.google.com/books?id=g3C2B9oXVbQC&dq=ma+bufang+chinese+nationalism&q=patriotism#v=onepage&q=patriotism%20ma%20bufang%20british&f=false |archive-date=11 May 2011 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g3C2B9oXVbQC&q=patriotism|title=Dilemmas The Mongols at China's edge: history and the politics of national unity|author=Uradyn Erden Bulag|year=2002|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|page=49|isbn=0-7425-1144-8|access-date=28 June 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110511074059/http://books.google.com/books?id=g3C2B9oXVbQC&dq=ma+bufang+chinese+nationalism&q=patriotism#v=onepage&q=patriotism%20ma%20bufang%20family%20feudalism&f=false|archive-date=11 May 2011|url-status=live}}</ref>

In [[Xinjiang]], the Chinese Muslim general [[Ma Hushan]] supported Chinese nationalism. He was chief of the [[36th Division (National Revolutionary Army)|36th Division of the National Revolutionary Army]]. He spread [[anti-Sovietism|anti-Soviet]] and [[Anti-Japanese sentiment|anti-Japanese]] [[Propaganda in the Republic of China|propaganda]] and instituted a colonial regime over the [[Uyghurs]]. Uyghur street names and signs were changed to Chinese, and the Chinese Muslim troops imported Chinese cooks and baths, rather than use Uyghur ones.<ref name="google130">{{cite book |author=Andrew D. W. Forbes |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IAs9AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA130 |title=Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: a political history of Republican Sinkiang 1911–1949 |publisher=[[CUP Archive]] |year=1986 |isbn=978-0-521-25514-1 |location=Cambridge, England |page=130 |access-date=28 June 2010}}</ref> The Chinese Muslims even forced the Uyghur carpet industry at [[Khotan]] to change its design to Chinese versions.<ref>{{cite book |author=Andrew D. W. Forbes |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IAs9AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA131 |title=Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: a political history of Republican Sinkiang 1911–1949 |publisher=[[CUP Archive]] |year=1986 |isbn=978-0-521-25514-1 |edition=illustrated |location=Cambridge, England |pages=131 |language=en |access-date=28 June 2010 |archive-date=3 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221103183055/https://books.google.com/books?id=IAs9AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA131 |url-status=live }}</ref> Ma proclaimed his loyalty to Nanjing, denounced [[Sheng Shicai]] as a Soviet puppet, and [[Islamic rebellion in Xinjiang (1937)|fought against him]] in 1937.<ref name="google130"/>

The [[Tungans]] (Hui Chinese Muslims) also had anti-Japanese sentiment.<ref name="google130"/>

General Ma Hushan's brother [[Ma Zhongying]] denounced separatism in a speech at [[Id Kah Mosque]] and told the Uyghurs to be loyal to the Chinese government at [[Nanjing]].<ref>{{cite book |author=[[S. Frederick Starr]] |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GXj4a3gss8wC&pg=PA79 |title=Xinjiang: China's Muslim borderland |publisher=M.E. Sharpe |year=2004 |isbn=0-7656-1318-2 |pages=79 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8FVsWq31MtMC&pg=PA200 |title=Eurasian crossroads: a history of Xinjiang|author=James A. Millward|year=2007|publisher=Columbia University Press|isbn=978-0-231-13924-3|page=200}}</ref><ref name=Forbes>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IAs9AAAAIAAJ|title=Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: a political history of Republican Sinkiang 1911–1949|author=Andrew D. W. Forbes|year=1986|publisher=CUP Archive|location=Cambridge, England|isbn=0-521-25514-7|pages=82, 123, 124, 303|access-date=12 February 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140704173905/http://books.google.com/books?id=IAs9AAAAIAAJ|archive-date=4 July 2014|url-status=live}}</ref> The 36th division had crushed the [[Turkish Islamic Republic of East Turkestan]], and the Chinese Muslim general [[Ma Zhancang]] beheaded the Uyghur emirs [[Abdullah Bughra]] and [[Nur Ahmad Jan Bughra]].<ref>{{cite book |author=Christian Tyler |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bEzNwgtiVQ0C&pg=PA280 |title=Wild West China: the taming of Xinjiang |publisher=[[Rutgers University Press]] |year=2004 |isbn=0-8135-3533-6 |location=New Brunswick, New Jersey |pages=116 |language=en}}</ref><ref name=Forbes/> Ma Zhancang abolished the [[Sharia]], the Islamic law, which was set up by the Uyghurs. He set up [[Martial law|military rule]] instead, retained the former Chinese officials, and kept them in power.<ref name=Forbes/> The Uyghurs had been promoting [[Islamism]] in their separatist government, but Ma Hushan eliminated religion from politics. Islam was barely mentioned or used in politics or life except as a vague spiritual focus for unified opposition against the Soviet Union.<ref name="google130"/>

The Uyghur warlord [[Yulbars Khan]] was pro-Chinese and supported the Republic of China.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IAs9AAAAIAAJ&q=yulbars+khan&pg=PA225|title=Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: a political history of Republican Sinkiang 1911-1949|author=Andrew D. W. Forbes|year=1986|publisher=CUP Archive|location=Cambridge, England|isbn=0-521-25514-7|page=254|access-date=28 June 2010|archive-date=24 August 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200824014542/https://books.google.com/books?id=IAs9AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA225&dq=yulbars+khan|url-status=live}}</ref> The Uyghur politician [[Masud Sabri]] served as the governor of [[Xinjiang Province, Republic of China|Xinjiang Province]] from 1947 to 1949.<ref name="Klimeš2015">{{cite book |author=Ondřej Klimeš |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rdcuBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA197 |title=Struggle by the Pen: The Uyghur Discourse of Nation and National Interest, c. 1900–1949 |date=2015 |publisher=[[Brill Publishers|Brill]] |isbn=978-90-04-28809-6 |pages=197– |language=en |access-date=21 July 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170109175346/https://books.google.com/books?id=rdcuBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA197 |archive-date=9 January 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref>

==== Tibetans ====
[[File:PLA marching into Lhasa.jpg|250px|thumb|right|The [[army of the People's Republic of China|People's Republic of China]] took over the capital [[Lhasa]] during its [[Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China|annexation]] by [[China]] in 1951]]
[[Pandatsang Rapga]], a Tibetan politician, founded the [[Tibet Improvement Party]] with the goal of modernisation and [[Tibet Area (administrative division)|integration of Tibet into the Republic of China]].<ref name=Goldstein>{{cite book|access-date=27 December 2011|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Upwq0I-wm7YC&q=rapga+chinese&pg=PA450|title=A history of modern Tibet, 1913–1951: the demise of the Lamaist state|author=Melvyn C. Goldstein|year=1991|publisher=University of California Press|edition=reprint, illustrated|volume=1 of A History of Modern Tibet|page=450|isbn=0-520-07590-0|archive-date=24 August 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200824014542/https://books.google.com/books?id=Upwq0I-wm7YC&pg=PA450&dq=rapga+chinese|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|access-date=27 December 2011|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rsLQdBUgyMUC&q=shen+in+Chongqing+to+render+clandestine+support+to+pro-Nationalist+underground+forces+led+by+a+Khampa+Tibetan&pg=PA95|title=Modern China's ethnic frontiers: a journey to the west|author=Hsiao-ting Lin|year=2010|publisher=Taylor & Francis|edition=illustrated|volume=67 of Routledge studies in the modern history of Asia|page=95|isbn=978-0-415-58264-3|archive-date=19 August 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200819211055/https://books.google.com/books?id=rsLQdBUgyMUC&pg=PA95&dq=shen+in+Chongqing+to+render+clandestine+support+to+pro-Nationalist+underground+forces+led+by+a+Khampa+Tibetan#v=snippet|url-status=live}}</ref>

The 9th Panchen Lama, [[Thubten Choekyi Nyima, 9th Panchen Lama|Thubten Choekyi Nyima]], was considered extremely "pro-Chinese" according to official Chinese sources.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8YFCAAAAYAAJ&q=panchen+he+is+the+most+pronounced+pro-Chinese+leader+in+Tibet+and+has+rendered+great+assistance+to+the+Chinese+residing+there |title=Who's who in China, 1918–1950: 1931–1950 |author=Chinese Materials Center |year=1982 |publisher=Chinese Materials Center |volume=3 of Who's who in China, 1918–1950: With an Index, Jerome Cavanaugh |access-date=7 June 2011 |archive-date=24 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200824014606/https://books.google.com/books?id=8YFCAAAAYAAJ&dq=he+is+the+most+pronounced+pro-Chinese+leader+in+Tibet+and+has+rendered+great+assistance+to+the+Chinese+residing+there&q=panchen+he+is+the+most+pronounced+pro-Chinese+leader+in+Tibet+and+has+rendered+great+assistance+to+the+Chinese+residing+there |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bCAWAQAAMAAJ&q=he+is+the+most+pronounced+pro-Chinese+leader+in+Tibet+and+has+rendered+great+assistance+to+the+Chinese+residing+there |title=The China weekly review, Volume 54 |year=1930 |publisher=Millard Publishing House |page=406 |access-date=7 June 2011 |archive-date=24 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200824014555/https://books.google.com/books?id=bCAWAQAAMAAJ&q=he+is+the+most+pronounced+pro-Chinese+leader+in+Tibet+and+has+rendered+great+assistance+to+the+Chinese+residing+there&dq=he+is+the+most+pronounced+pro-Chinese+leader+in+Tibet+and+has+rendered+great+assistance+to+the+Chinese+residing+there |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WvaLxatYUiIC&q=he+is+the+most+pronounced+pro-Chinese+leader+in+Tibet+and+has+rendered+great+assistance+to+the+Chinese+residing+there |title=China monthly review, Volume 56 |year=1931 |publisher=Millard Publishing Co., Inc. |page=306 |access-date=5 June 2011 |archive-date=24 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200824014606/https://books.google.com/books?id=WvaLxatYUiIC&q=he+is+the+most+pronounced+pro-Chinese+leader+in+Tibet+and+has+rendered+great+assistance+to+the+Chinese+residing+there&dq=he+is+the+most+pronounced+pro-Chinese+leader+in+Tibet+and+has+rendered+great+assistance+to+the+Chinese+residing+there |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Mongols ====
Many of the Chinese troops that [[occupation of Mongolia|occupied Mongolia in 1919]] were [[Chahars|Chahar Mongols]]; that has been a major cause for animosity between the [[Khalkha Mongols|Khalkhas]] and the Inner Mongols.<ref>{{cite book |last=Bulag |first=Uradyn Erden |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=K3JZIdw8YDkC&pg=PA139 |title=Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia |publisher=[[Clarendon Press]] |year=1998 |isbn=0198233574 |edition=illustrated |pages=139 |language=en |access-date=1 February 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180221091442/https://books.google.com/books?id=K3JZIdw8YDkC&pg=PA139 |archive-date=21 February 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref>

==== Manchus ====
During the late Qing dynasty, revolutionaries, especially [[Zou Rong]], incited anti-Manchuism to overthrow the dynasty.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.chss.iup.edu/baumler/zourong.html |title=Zou Rong The Revolutionary Army |access-date=2008-12-12 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080926224557/http://www.chss.iup.edu/baumler/zourong.html |archive-date=2008-09-26 }}</ref>

A controversial topic of Chinese history is the [[Debate on the Chineseness of the Yuan and Qing dynasties|debate on the extent]] to which the Mongol-led [[Yuan dynasty]] and the Manchu-led [[Qing dynasty]] represented China as a nation because of the non-Han identity of the ruling dynasties.{{citation needed|date=August 2025}}

==In Taiwan==
[[File:China unify party P1240412.jpg|thumb|Rally organized by the [[Chinese Unification Promotion Party]] in Taiwan.]]
{{Conservatism in Taiwan|Ideologies}}
{{See also|Taiwanese people|Conservatism in Taiwan}}
One common goal of current Chinese government is the [[Chinese unification|unification]] of mainland China and Taiwan. It is the commonly-stated goal of both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) before 1992, but both sides differ sharply in the form of unification because of their differences in political ideology.{{citation needed|date=May 2023}} Chinese nationalists on Taiwan can be divided between those who uphold the legitimacy of the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]] (i.e. the [[Pan-Blue Coalition]]) and those who support the People's Republic of China.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XczbAAAAQBAJ&dq=%22pro-Beijing%22+%22New+Party%22&pg=PA1954 |author=Bernice Lee |title=The Security Implications of the New Taiwan |quote=Peng, the DPP's pro-independence challenger, secured 21%, while pro-Beijing New Party candidate Ling Tang-Kang polled only 15%. |date=September 13, 2013 |publisher=[[Taylor & Francis]] |pages=1954|isbn=978-1-136-06212-4 }}</ref><ref name="蕭嘉弘">{{Cite news |author=蕭嘉弘 |date=2018-09-21 |title=台灣急統派不是民主極右勢力！ |trans-title=Taiwan's 'radical pro-unification factions' is not a 'democratic far-right'. |quote=標榜大中國民族主義，屬於極右的愛國同心會和統促黨則完全不同，... |trans-quote=The far-right Patriot Alliance Association and Chinese Unification Promotion Party, which advocates Chinese ultra-nationalism, is completely different, ... |newspaper=民報 Taiwan People News |url=https://www.peoplemedia.tw/news/18413dfd-20c1-46df-a456-a0849c4a6881 |archive-date=2023-06-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230618175826/https://www.peoplemedia.tw/news/18413dfd-20c1-46df-a456-a0849c4a6881 }}</ref>

In Taiwan, there is a general consensus to support the [[status quo]] of Taiwan's [[political status of Taiwan|''de facto'' independence as a separate nation]]. However, the relationship between Chinese nationalism and Taiwan remains controversial, involving symbolic issues such as the use of the "Republic of China" as the official name of the government on Taiwan and the use of the word "China" in the name of [[state-owned enterprise|government-owned corporations]]. There is little support in Taiwan for immediate unification. Overt support for formal independence is also muted since the PRC insists on [[war|military action]] if Taiwan makes such a formal declaration. The argument against unification is partly over culture and whether democratic [[Taiwanese people|Taiwanese]] should see themselves as Chinese or Taiwanese; and partly over mistrust of the authoritarian Chinese Communist Party (CCP), its [[human rights in China|human rights record]], and its de-democratizing actions in Hong Kong (e.g. [[2014–2015 Hong Kong electoral reform]], which sparked the [[Umbrella Movement]]).{{citation needed|date=May 2023}} Those misgivings are particularly prevalent among younger generations of Taiwanese, who generally consider themselves to have little or no connection to China.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Randy Mulyanto |title=Generation next: How the young are changing Taiwan's politics |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/generation-nexthow-young-changing-taiwan-politics-200326070158729.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200607172106/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/generation-nexthow-young-changing-taiwan-politics-200326070158729.html |archive-date=7 June 2020 |access-date=2020-07-29 |website=[[Al Jazeera Arabic|Al Jazeera]]}}</ref>

Historically, [[Taiwan under Japanese rule]] had Chinese nationalist groups, such as the [[Taiwanese People's Party]] whose ideology utilised Chinese nationalism from the Three Principles of the People to resist Japanese colonialism and foment the re-annexation of Japanese Taiwan back to Chinese rule.<ref name="socialist">https://nckur.lib.ncku.edu.tw/retrieve/149274/1010515010-000011.pdf {{Bare URL PDF|date=August 2025}}</ref>

There are ultranationalist groups in Taiwan that support immediate unification with China, through more radical means. Some radical Chinese nationalist groups in Taiwan include the [[Patriot Alliance Association]] founded in 1993<ref>{{Cite web |last=李雪莉 |date=2018-07-04 |title=They Used To Be Anti-Communist, But Now They Play To Beijing's Tune - 報導者 The Reporter |url=https://www.twreporter.org/a/about-ilovchinaorg-english |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190716164652/https://www.twreporter.org/a/about-ilovchinaorg-english |archive-date=2019-07-16 |website=[[The Reporter (Taiwan)]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Yimou Lee |last2=James Pomfret |date=2019-06-26 |title=Pro-China groups step up offensive to win over Taiwan |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-taiwan-china-campaign-insight-idAFKCN1TR01D |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230628094322/https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-taiwan-china-campaign-insight-idAFKCN1TR01D |archive-date=28 June 2023 |access-date=14 November 2022 |work=[[Reuters]] |language=en}}</ref> and the [[Chinese Unification Promotion Party]] founded by Taiwanese mafia leader [[Chang An-lo]]. The former has engaged in combating the influence of [[Falun Gong]] in Taiwan,<ref name="China-Taiwan_Rapprochement">{{cite book |author=Min-Hua Chiang |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pavhCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA92 |title=China-Taiwan Rapprochement: The Political Economy of Cross-Straits Relations |date=30 October 2015 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=9781317427940 |page=92}}</ref> while the latter has been accused of violence against [[Pro-democracy camp (Hong Kong)|Hong Kong opposition]] figures such as [[Denise Ho]] and [[Lam Wing-kee]].<ref name="CNA-20200422-1">{{cite web |date=21 April 2020 |title=林榮基在台北遭潑漆：開個書店就要恐嚇 真的很荒謬 |url=https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202004215008.aspx |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200427053109/https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202004215008.aspx |archive-date=27 April 2020 |accessdate=1 May 2020 |website=[[Central News Agency (Taiwan)]] |language=zh-TW}}</ref> Chinese nationalists in both mainland China and Taiwan deem supporters of [[Taiwan independence movement|Taiwan independence]] to be ''[[hanjian]]'' (traitors).<ref>{{cite journal |last=沈 |first=己堯 |date=1996 |title=「台獨漢奸」論 |journal=海峽評論 |issue=63 |pages=54–55 |doi=10.29925/SRM.199603.0013}}</ref> In 2015, Kuomintang legislators and then-incumbent President [[Ma Ying-jeou]] accused former ROC president and Taiwan independence supporter [[Lee Teng-hui]], who had also [[Taiwanese Imperial Japan Serviceman|served in the Imperial Japanese Army]], of being a ''hanjian''.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2015-08-21 |title=國民黨狠批前總統李登輝 |trans-title=The Kuomintang harshly criticized former President Lee Teng-hui |url=https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2015/08/150821_kmt_leetenghui |access-date=2025-09-22 |website=[[BBC News]] |language=zh-Hant}}</ref> The [[National Socialism Association]], a [[Neo-Nazism|neo-Nazi]] and Chinese ultranationalist organisation in Taiwan, follows a mixture of [[Nazism|National Socialism]] and [[Chiangism]].<ref name="AP1437">{{cite news |title=Taiwan Students Launch Neo-Nazi Movement |url=https://www.foxnews.com/story/taiwan-students-launch-neo-nazi-movement |access-date=18 November 2018 |work=Associated Press |via=Fox News |date=14 March 2007 |archive-date=8 November 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181108025658/https://www.foxnews.com/story/taiwan-students-launch-neo-nazi-movement |url-status=live }}</ref> It called for a Chinese reunification under a new [[fascist dictatorship|fascist ROC dictatorship]] and [[Project National Glory|retaking of the mainland]] through military conquest.<ref name="DW">{{cite news |title=台湾的新纳粹组织是怎么回事？ |url=https://www.dw.com/zh/%E5%8F%B0%E6%B9%BE%E7%9A%84%E6%96%B0%E7%BA%B3%E7%B2%B9%E7%BB%84%E7%BB%87%E6%98%AF%E6%80%8E%E4%B9%88%E5%9B%9E%E4%BA%8B/a-2387314 |access-date=27 December 2022 |work=Deutsche Welle |date=16 March 2007 |language=zh-Hans-CN |archive-date=26 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210526080608/https://www.dw.com/zh/%E5%8F%B0%E6%B9%BE%E7%9A%84%E6%96%B0%E7%BA%B3%E7%B2%B9%E7%BB%84%E7%BB%87%E6%98%AF%E6%80%8E%E4%B9%88%E5%9B%9E%E4%BA%8B/a-2387314 |url-status=live }}</ref>

==Nationalist symbology==
{{Gallery
|perrow=4
|File:Jiu Long Bi.JPG|A [[Chinese dragon]] on the [[Nine-Dragon Wall]] at the [[Forbidden City]] in [[Beijing]].
|File:國民革命忠烈祠大殿 20120818.jpg|A martyrs' shrine
|File:Meihua ROC.svg|The plum blossom symbol in the Republic of China}}

In addition to the [[national symbols of China]], the [[National symbols of Taiwan|national symbols of the Republic of China]], and the [[List of Chinese flags|flags of China]], there are many symbols opted for use by Chinese nationalists. Some of these include Chinese legendary or ancient figures such as the [[Yellow Emperor]]<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=19}} and the [[Yan Emperor|Fire Emperor]], [[Yu the Great]], [[Qin Shi Huang]], or more modern figures such as Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, or Mao Zedong. Another symbol often used is the [[Chinese dragon]] as a personification for the Chinese nation.

Militaristic forms of Chinese nationalism have also embraced [[Martyrs' shrines (China)|martyrs' shrines]],<ref>蔡錦堂:〈從神社忠烈祠－－戰前與戰後台灣「國家宗祀的轉換」〉。</ref> which memorialize and praise martyrs (typically Chinese soldiers) who fought for China, such as in the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=李 |first=俊杰 |date=2014-09-03 |title=湖南南岳忠烈祠隆重纪念抗战胜利69周年 |url=http://www.chinanews.com/df/2014/09-03/6558156.shtml |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201116064658/http://www.chinanews.com/df/2014/09-03/6558156.shtml |archive-date=2020-11-16 |work=[[China News Service]]}}</ref> Soldiers and other war heroes of China (both ROC and PRC) are enshrined at these shrines. The martyrs' shrines are the Chinese equivalent to the Japanese [[Gokoku shrines]], such as [[Yasukuni Shrine]].

Similar to the use of the [[chrysanthemum]], which also has cultural significance in China, in [[Japan]] as the [[Imperial Seal of Japan]], the [[Prunus mume|plum blossom]] is also a national symbol of China, as was designated by the [[Legislative Yuan]] in the Republic of China on 21 July 1964.<ref name="roc">[http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/aboutroc/national_flower.htm Government Information Office, Republic of China - National Flower] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110805163640/http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/aboutroc/national_flower.htm |date=2011-08-05 }}</ref> It was also proposed to be the national flower of the People's Republic of China.<ref>*[http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200507/22/eng20050722_197774.html People's Daily Online -- Plum blossom, peony proposed to be national flowers] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130529202913/http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200507/22/eng20050722_197774.html |date=29 May 2013 }}</ref> The Republic of China patriotic song [[The Plum Blossom]] revolves around its symbolism for China.

In the Republic of China, as the [[National Flower of the Republic of China|National Flower]], the plum blossom symbolizes:
* Three buds and five petals – symbolises [[Three Principles of the People]] and the five branches of the [[Government of the Republic of China|Government]] in accordance with the [[Constitution of the Republic of China|Constitution]]
* The plum blossom withstands the cold winter (it blossoms more in colder temperatures) – it symbolises the faithful, the resolute and the holy; it represents the national spirit of Republic of China nationals.
* The five petals of the flower – symbolises [[Five Races Under One Union]]; it also symbolises Five Cardinal Relationships (''Wǔlún''), Five Constants (''Wǔcháng'') and Five Ethics (Wǔjiào) according to [[Confucianism|Confucian philosophy]] (national philosophy of imperial China for two millennia until 1912, when the Qing Dynasty was overthrown and the [[Republic of China (1912-49)|Republic of China]] was established)
*The branches (枝橫), shadow (影斜), flexibility (曳疏), and cold resistance (傲霜) of the plum blossom also represent the four kinds of noble virtues, "originating and penetrating, advantageous and firm" mentioned in the ''[[I Ching]] (Book of Changes)''.<ref name="Flower">{{Cite web|url=https://www.president.gov.tw/Page/98|title=國花|publisher=Office of the President, Republic of China|language=zh-tw|access-date=2018-04-08|quote=我國的國花是梅花。梅有三蕾五瓣，代表三民主義及五權憲法，且梅花凌冬耐寒，其所表現的堅貞剛潔，足為國人效法。梅開五瓣，象徵五族共和，具有敦五倫、重五常、敷五教的意義；而梅花「枝橫」、「影斜」、「曳疏」、「傲霜」同時亦代表易經中「元」、「貞」、「利」、「亨」四種高尚德行。我國在民國53年7月21日，經行政院正式核定將梅花訂為國花。|archive-date=9 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180409171339/https://www.president.gov.tw/Page/98|url-status=live}}</ref>

==Opposition==
{{See also|Category:Opposition to Chinese nationalism}}
There are movements for regional [[Secession in China|secession]] from China and [[Taiwan independence movement|independence]] for Taiwan.

The [[Milk Tea Alliance]] formed by netizens from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and [[Thailand]] began as a reaction against Chinese nationalist commentators online.<ref>{{cite web |last1=McDevitt |first1=Dan |title='In Milk Tea We Trust': How a Thai-Chinese Meme War Led to a New (Online) Pan-Asia Alliance |url=https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/in-milk-tea-we-trust-how-a-thai-chinese-meme-war-led-to-a-new-online-pan-asia-alliance/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200418213214/https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/in-milk-tea-we-trust-how-a-thai-chinese-meme-war-led-to-a-new-online-pan-asia-alliance/ |archive-date=18 April 2020 |access-date=18 April 2020 |website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Lau |first1=Jessie |date=15 May 2020 |title=Why the Taiwanese are thinking more about their identity |url=https://www.newstatesman.com/international/places/2020/05/taiwanese-independence-taiwan-china-beijing-identity-hong-kong |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200521210800/https://www.newstatesman.com/international/places/2020/05/taiwanese-independence-taiwan-china-beijing-identity-hong-kong |archive-date=21 May 2020 |access-date=15 May 2020 |website=[[New Statesman]]}}</ref>

Elements of [[Japanese nationalism]] are [[Anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan|hostile to China]]. In World War II, the Empire of Japan conquered large swathes of Chinese territory, and many contemporary nationalists in Japan [[Nanjing Massacre denial|deny the events of the Nanking Massacre]].<ref name="Yoshida157-158">Yoshida, pp. 157–158</ref>

==Types of Chinese nationalism==
===Populist nationalism===
Populist nationalism or popular nationalism ({{lang-zh|t=民粹民族主義 or simply "民族主義"}})<ref>{{Cite news |title=中國民粹民族主義與威權韌性; Populist Nationalism and Authoritarian Resilience in China |access-date=2024-04-09 |website=Airiti Library |url=https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail/U0001-3107201912052800 |archive-date=9 April 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240409074051/https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail/U0001-3107201912052800 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author=姜新立 |title=大轉變: 後共産主義與後社會主義研究 |date=2004 |publisher=唐山出版社 |pages=104}}</ref> is a comparatively late development in Chinese nationalism of the 1990s. It began to take recognizable shape after 1996, as a joint result of the evolving nationalist thinking of the early 1990s and the ongoing debates on modernity, postmodernism, postcolonialism, and their political implications-debates that have engaged many Chinese intellectuals since early 1995.<ref>{{cite journal|title=Chinese Populist Nationalism: Its Intellectual Politics and Moral Dilemma |author=Ben Xu|journal=Representations|volume=76|number=1|date=2001|pages=120–140 |publisher=University of California Press |doi=10.1525/rep.2001.76.1.120 |jstor=10.1525/rep.2001.76.1.120}}</ref>

===State nationalism===
{{Infobox Chinese
| title = State nationalism
| s = 国家主义
| t = 國家主義
| l = Statism<ref>{{cite book |author1=Clemens Büttner |author2=Li Fan |author3=Zhang Ke |author4=Tze-Ki Hon |author5=Sun Qing |author6=Zhang Qing |author7=Mirjam Tröster |author8=Huang Xingtao |author9=Zhiyi Yang |author10=Zou Zhenhuan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iQXtDwAAQBAJ&dq=%22statism%22+%22%E5%9C%8B%E5%AE%B6%E4%B8%BB%E7%BE%A9%22&pg=PA270 |title=Discourses of Weakness in Modern China: Historical Diagnoses of the »Sick Man of East Asia« |date=June 24, 2011 |publisher=Campus Verlag |pages=270 |isbn=978-3-593-50902-0 |access-date=7 April 2024 |archive-date=15 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240815013215/https://books.google.com/books?id=iQXtDwAAQBAJ&dq=%22statism%22+%22%E5%9C%8B%E5%AE%B6%E4%B8%BB%E7%BE%A9%22&pg=PA270#v=onepage&q=%22statism%22%20%22%E5%9C%8B%E5%AE%B6%E4%B8%BB%E7%BE%A9%22&f=false |url-status=live }}</ref>
| p = guójiā zhǔyì
| bpmf = ㄍㄨㄛˊ ㄐㄧㄚ ㄓㄨˇ ㄧˋ
| s2 = 中国国家主义
| t2 = 中國國家主義
| l2 = Chinese statism
| p2 = Zhōngguó guójiā zhǔyì
| bpmf2 = ㄓㄨㄥ ㄍㄨㄛˊ ㄍㄨㄛˊ ㄐㄧㄚ ㄓㄨˇ ㄧˋ
}}
{{Neoauthoritarianism in China|Ideologies}}
{{See also|Kuomintang#Chinese nationalism|Dang Guo|Conservatism in China#Neoauthoritarianism}}
[[State nationalism]],<ref>{{cite book |author=N. Serina Chan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fuN5DwAAQBAJ&dq=%22state+nationalism%22+%22%E5%9C%8B%E5%AE%B6%E4%B8%BB%E7%BE%A9%22&pg=PA73 |title=The Thought of Mou Zongsan |date=November 11, 2011 |publisher=Brill |pages=73 |isbn=978-90-04-21212-1 |access-date=7 April 2024 |archive-date=15 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240815013215/https://books.google.com/books?id=fuN5DwAAQBAJ&dq=%22state+nationalism%22+%22%E5%9C%8B%E5%AE%B6%E4%B8%BB%E7%BE%A9%22&pg=PA73#v=onepage&q=%22state%20nationalism%22%20%22%E5%9C%8B%E5%AE%B6%E4%B8%BB%E7%BE%A9%22&f=false |url-status=live }}</ref> state-led nationalism<ref name="Liu Li Fan Hong"/> or simply "statism" is nationalism from above, in contrast to popular nationalism. State nationalism was strongly advocated by incumbent political elites in both the regimes of the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT) and the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP);<ref name="Liu Li Fan Hong">{{Cite book |last1=Li |first1=Liu |title=The National Games and National Identity in China: A History |last2=Hong |first2=Fan |date=2017-07-14 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-1-315-21078-0 |edition=1 |pages=4 |language=en |doi=10.4324/9781315210780}}</ref> past KMT or present CCP-led state nationalism advocates Chinese nationalism and equates 'nation'/'state' (國家) and 'party' (黨) to build a [[one-party system]]. State nationalism has not made the PRC s international behaviour particularly aggressive or inflexible, according to most observers, but rather cautious and opportunistic.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Unger |first=Jonathan |author-link=Jonathan Unger |title=Chinese Nationalism |date=2016-09-16 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-1-315-48041-1 |edition=1 |language=en |doi=10.4324/9781315480411}}</ref> Academic Frances Yaping Wang states that "[i]f we liken nationalism to a pet dragon under the control of state authorities in China, we could say that the state keeps it alive and occasionally provokes it, as long as it does not breathe fire. However, when it does and oversteps its bounds occasionally, the state master reins it in to ensure the flames do not harm them."<ref name=":Wang2">{{Cite book |last=Wang |first=Frances Yaping |title=The Art of State Persuasion: China's Strategic Use of Media in Interstate Disputes |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9780197757512 |doi=10.1093/oso/9780197757505.001.0001}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=247–248}} Academic [[Suisheng Zhao]] writes that the rise of "state-led pragmatic nationalism" in 1990s China was an instrumental response to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.<ref name=":024">{{Cite book |last=Tu |first=Hang |title=Sentimental Republic: Chinese Intellectuals and the Maoist Past |publisher=[[Harvard University Asia Center]] |year=2025 |isbn=9780674297579}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=219–220}}

A feature of Chinese state nationalism in the PRC is that it is CCP-centred; it regards the party as an embodiment of the nation's will and the nation as a means rather than an end in itself. Accordingly, its primary objective is 'stability' for the party-state, even though it is keen to maintain national identity, national unity and national autonomy.<ref>{{cite book |author1=Yingjie Guo |author2=Fan Hong |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xS866sLu9pwC&dq=%22Chinese+state+nationalism%22&pg=PT39 |title=Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China |date=March 2004 |publisher=[[Taylor & Francis]] |isbn=978-1-134-35227-2 |access-date=7 April 2024 |archive-date=15 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240815013214/https://books.google.com/books?id=xS866sLu9pwC&dq=%22Chinese+state+nationalism%22&pg=PT39#v=onepage&q=%22Chinese%20state%20nationalism%22&f=false |url-status=live }}</ref>

A group of Chinese "statist" legal scholars is influencing the authoritarian policies of the Chinese government, which, influenced by the ultraconservative and [[Nazi German]] legal theorist [[Carl Schmitt]], values "state authority". The statists are also related to the Chinese government's reduction of autonomy over [[Hong Kong]].<ref name="nazi">{{cite news|title=The Nazi Inspiring China's Communists|first=Che|last=Chang|date=1 December 2020|work=The Atlantic|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/12/nazi-china-communists-carl-schmitt/617237/|access-date=31 March 2024|archive-date=1 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201201204916/https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/12/nazi-china-communists-carl-schmitt/617237/|url-status=live}}</ref>

[[Hong Kong nationalism|Hong Kong]] and [[Taiwanese nationalists]] who are critical of Chinese nationalism are especially critical of Chinese state nationalism.<ref>{{cite book |author1=Baogang He |title=Governing Taiwan and Tibet: Democratic Approaches |quote=... Chinese state nationalism, whether the Mainland Chinese or orthodox KMT version, is not genuine; only the sentiments of the Taiwanese people can provide the foundations of an authentic nationalism. Contemporary Taiwanese nationalism ... |date=8 July 2015 |publisher=Edinburgh University Press |pages=81 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author1=Daniel Cetrà |author2=Coree Brown Swan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=eJGZEAAAQBAJ&dq=%22Hong+Kong+nationalism%22&pg=PT31 |title=State and Majority Nationalism in Plurinational States |quote=On 1 July 2019, a group of protesters stormed the legislative council, graffitied it with political slogans and calls for reform, and placed a British Hong Kong colonial flag on the central podium-the ultimate statement of Hong Kong nationalism, or at least opposition to Chinese state nationalism. |date=2022 |publisher=[[Taylor & Francis]] |pages=135 |isbn=978-1-000-81250-3 |access-date=7 April 2024 |archive-date=15 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240815013207/https://books.google.com/books?id=eJGZEAAAQBAJ&dq=%22Hong+Kong+nationalism%22&pg=PT31#v=onepage&q=%22Hong%20Kong%20nationalism%22&f=false |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Ethnic nationalism===
{{Main|Han nationalism|Local ethnic nationalism}}

Ethnic nationalism ({{lang-zh|t=族裔民族主義 or 族群主義}}) is divided into two forms in China; based on the dominant ethnic-centered "[[Han nationalism]]" (or [[Han chauvinism]]) and ethnic minorities based "[[local ethnic nationalism]]".{{Citation needed|date=March 2024}} The PRC government and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) opposes these singular ethnic nationalism and encourages multi-ethnic nationalism (more akin to [[civic nationalism]]).{{citation needed|date=April 2024}} However, the CCP portrays itself as the custodian of a [[Conservatism in China|conservative]], Han-centric vision of "China's outstanding traditional culture".<ref>{{cite book |author1=Tina Burrett |author2=Jeff Kingston |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aI-rEAAAQBAJ&dq=conservative+Han+chauvinism&pg=PA200 |title=Routledge Handbook of Trauma in East Asia |quote=Under Xi Jinping, the CCP portrays itself as the custodian of a conservative, Han-centric vision of 'China's outstanding traditional culture' (Vickers 2021a). |date=2023 |publisher=[[Taylor & Francis]] |pages=200 |isbn=978-1-000-85939-3 |access-date=7 April 2024 |archive-date=25 May 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240525135839/https://books.google.com/books?id=aI-rEAAAQBAJ&dq=conservative+Han+chauvinism&pg=PA200 |url-status=live }}</ref>

The Chinese government has also pursued ethno-nationalist policies aimed at appealing to [[overseas Chinese]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=November 19, 2016 |title=The upper Han |url=https://www.economist.com/briefing/2016/11/19/the-upper-han |url-access=subscription |access-date=2024-04-06 |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=14 May 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180514160241/https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21710264-worlds-rising-superpower-has-particular-vision-ethnicity-and-nationhood-has |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Northern and Southern===
{{See also|Northern and southern China}}
American scholar Edward Friedman has argued that there is a northern governmental, political, bureaucratic Chinese nationalism that is at odds with a southern, commercial Chinese nationalism.<ref>{{cite book |last=Friedman |first=Edward |title=National identity and democratic prospects in socialist China |publisher=M. E. Sharpe |year=1995 |isbn=1-56324-434-9 |location=New York |pages=33, 77}}</ref>

===Ultranationalism===
{{See also|Category:Chinese ultranationalism|Confucian fascism|Fascism in Asia#China}}
[[Ultranationalism]] ({{lang-zh|t=極端民族主義|s=极端民族主义}}) was born out of [[Chiang Kai-shek Thought]] and pro-Chiang [[Blue Shirts Society]]<ref>{{cite book|title=Stalin, Japan, and the Struggle for Supremacy Over China, 1894–1945|publisher=Taylor & Francis|first=Hiroaki|last=Kuromiya|year=2022|quote=Blue-Shirt society, an ultranationalist secret society}}</ref> during the [[Nationalist government]], which had [[fascist]] tendencies and influences. Led by [[Chiang Kai-shek]]'s Kuomintang, China had [[China–Germany relations (1912–1949)|friendly diplomatic relations with Nazi Germany]], until the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]] when Germany eventually favoured Japan diplomatically.<ref>{{Cite thesis |last=Rodriguez |first=Robyn L. |title=Journey to the East: The German Military Mission in China, 1927-1938 |date=2011 |url=http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1319222757 |oclc=773097163}}</ref>

Since Xi Jinping took power, the Chinese Communist Party has been accused of cultivating far-right<ref name="The Diplomat"/> ultranationalism.<ref name="The Diplomat">{{cite news |date=April 5, 2022 |title=The Great Translation Movement Shines a Spotlight on China's Propaganda |url=https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/the-great-translation-movement-shines-a-spotlight-on-chinas-propaganda/ |newspaper=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |access-date=30 June 2024 |archive-date=14 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220414221557/https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/the-great-translation-movement-shines-a-spotlight-on-chinas-propaganda/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author1=Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom|author2=Maura Elizabeth Cunningham|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jBBQDwAAQBAJ&dq=%22CCP%22+%22extreme+nationalist%22&pg=PT185|title=China in the 21st Century: What Everyone Needs to Know?|date=March 12, 2018|publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]|isbn=978-0-19-065910-3|access-date=30 June 2024|archive-date=25 May 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240525135838/https://books.google.com/books?id=jBBQDwAAQBAJ&dq=%22CCP%22+%22extreme+nationalist%22&pg=PT185|url-status=live}}</ref>

==Modern times==
[[File:2012 Anti-Japan demonstrations2.jpg|thumb|[[2012 anti-Japanese demonstrations in China|2012 Chinese anti-Japan protest]] in Hong Kong, with protesters waving the flags of the PRC and ROC]]
{{see also|Sinicization||||}}

During the Cold War era, American strategies to contain the spread of communism fueled nationalist sentiment in China, including as a result of the [[Korean War]], the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the PRC's exclusion from the United Nations, and the [[United States sanctions against China|U.S. embargo of China]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lin |first=Chun |title=The Transformation of Chinese Socialism |date=2012-06-01 |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-0-8223-8836-4 |language=en |doi=10.1215/9780822388364}}</ref>{{Rp|page=62}}

The end of the [[Cold War]] has seen the revival throughout the world of nationalist sentiments and aspirations, nationalism is seen as increasing the legitimacy of Chinese Communist Party rule. It has been pursued in a more pragmatic and flexible manner compared to policies during the Cultural Revolution.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |date=2007-02-14 |title=Chinese Nationalism and its Foreign Policy Implications {{!}} US-China Institute |url=https://china.usc.edu/chinese-nationalism-and-its-foreign-policy-implications |website=USC US-China Institute |access-date=27 June 2023 |archive-date=27 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230627064555/https://china.usc.edu/chinese-nationalism-and-its-foreign-policy-implications |url-status=live }}</ref> One remarkable phenomenon in the post-Cold War upsurge of Chinese nationalism is that Chinese intellectuals became one of the driving forces.<ref name="FriendThayer2018">{{cite book|author1=John M. Friend|author2=Bradley A. Thayer|title=How China Sees the World: Han-Centrism and the Balance of Power in International Politics|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dS56DwAAQBAJ|date=2018|publisher=University of Nebraska Press|isbn=978-1-64012-137-9|access-date=7 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200303120915/https://books.google.com/books?id=dS56DwAAQBAJ|archive-date=3 March 2020|url-status=live}}</ref> Many well-educated people-social scientists, humanities scholars, writers, and other professionals have given voice to and even become articulators for rising nationalistic discourse in the 1990s. Some commentators have proposed that "positive nationalism" could be an important unifying factor for the country as it has been for other countries.<ref>Niklas Swanstrom. [http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/2005/Positive%20nationalism%20could%20prove%20bond%20for%20Chinese.doc Positive nationalism could prove bond for Chinese] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080227110302/http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/2005/Positive%20nationalism%20could%20prove%20bond%20for%20Chinese.doc |date=27 February 2008 }} . 4 May 2005, Baltimore Sun.</ref>

[[File:Anti-American Protests in Nanjing, 1999 (flickr 2543499638).jpg|thumb|Anti-American protests in Nanjing following the [[U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade]], 1999]]
On 7 May 1999, during [[NATO bombing of Yugoslavia]], the [[United States bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade|United States bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade]] killing three Chinese citizens. The US claimed that the bombing was an accident caused by the use of outdated maps but few Chinese accepted this explanation.<ref name="ChinaJournal">{{cite journal |author=Hays Gries |first=Peter |date=July 2001 |title=Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing |journal=[[The China Journal]] |location=Canberra, Australia |publisher=Contemporary China Center, Australian National University |volume=46 |issue=46 |pages=25–43 |doi=10.2307/3182306 |issn=1324-9347 |jstor=3182306 |oclc=41170782 |s2cid=145482835}}</ref> The incident caused widespread anger and following the attack Chinese officials described the bombing as a "barbarian act"<ref>{{cite news |date=7 May 1999 |title=Chinese demand U.N. meeting after Belgrade embassy attacked |url=http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9905/07/kosovo.05/index.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402163309/http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9905/07/kosovo.05/index.html |archive-date=2 April 2015 |access-date=9 May 2009 |publisher=[[CNN]]}}</ref> and a "war crime"<ref>{{cite news|title=World: Europe; Analysis: Nato's diplomatic blunder |url=http://212.58.226.17:8080/1/hi/world/europe/338712.stm |work=BBC News |date=8 May 1999 |access-date=9 May 2009 }}{{dead link|date=July 2017 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref> while Chinese students in Europe and America demonstrated against '[[NATO]] fascism'.<ref name="ChinaJournal" /> In China thousands were involved in protest marches in Beijing and other provincial capitals, some protesters threw gas bombs and rocks at the diplomatic missions of the United States and other NATO countries<ref>{{cite news | title = Families grieve victims of Chinese embassy bombing as NATO air campaign continues | url = http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9905/10/kosovo.01/ | publisher = CNN | date = 10 May 1999 | access-date = 9 May 2009 | archive-date = 7 December 2022 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20221207070302/http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9905/10/kosovo.01/ | url-status = dead }}</ref> while in [[Chengdu]] the American Consul's residence was firebombed,<ref name="ChinaJournal" /> deepening [[anti-Western sentiment in China|anti-Western]] and [[anti-American sentiment in China]]. China, along with [[Russia]], had already supported [[Slobodan Milošević]] and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the [[Kosovo War]],<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |author-link=Suisheng Zhao |title=Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior |date=2004 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-1-315-70576-7 |edition=1 |language=en |doi=10.4324/9781315705767}}</ref>{{Rp|page=60}} and opposed NATO bombings of Yugoslavia.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Cohen |first=Warren I. |author-link=Warren I. Cohen |title=America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations |date=2010 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |edition=5 |pages=261 |jstor=10.7312/cohe15076}}</ref>

The 1995 book ''[[China Can Say No]]'', itself based on the 1989 essay ''[[The Japan That Can Say No]]'' by [[Shintaro Ishihara]], was a benchmark for 1990s nationalist sentiment.<ref name=":Wang2" />{{Rp|page=69}} Nationalist online forums including Strong China Forum and Iron Blood became popular forums for expression of nationalist sentiment on the internet.<ref name=":Wang2" />{{Rp|pages=69–70}} The internet has since continued to increase in significance as a forum for Chinese nationalism.<ref name=":Wang2" />{{Rp|page=70}}

In the 21st century, notable spurs of grassroots Chinese nationalism grew from what the Chinese public saw as the marginalization of their country from Japan and the Western world. One such event occurred in the [[Hainan Island incident]] of April 1, 2001, in which a United States US [[Lockheed EP-3|EP-3]] surveillance aircraft collided mid-air with a Chinese [[Shenyang J-8]] jet fighter over the South China Sea.<ref name=":22">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |author-link=Suisheng Zhao |title=The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |location=Stanford, California |pages= |doi=10.1515/9781503634152}}</ref>{{Rp|page=64}} China sought a formal apology, and CCP General Secretary [[Jiang Zemin]] accepted United States Secretary of State [[Colin Powell]]'s expression of "very sorry" as sufficient.<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=64}} The incident nonetheless created negative feelings towards the United States by the Chinese public and increased public feelings of Chinese nationalism.<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=64}}

The [[Japanese history textbook controversies]], as well as [[Prime Minister of Japan|Prime Minister]] [[Junichiro Koizumi]]'s visits to the [[Yasukuni Shrine]] was the source of considerable anger on Chinese blogs. In addition, the protests following the [[2008 Tibetan unrest]] of the Olympic torch has gathered strong opposition within the Chinese community inside China and abroad. Almost every Tibetan protest on the Olympic torch route was met with a considerable pro-China protest. Because the [[2008 Summer Olympics]] were a major source of national pride, anti-Olympics sentiments are often seen as anti-Chinese sentiments inside China. Moreover, the Sichuan earthquake in 2008 sparked a high sense of nationalism from the Chinese at home and abroad. The central government's quick response to the disaster was instrumental in galvanizing general support from the population amidst harsh criticism directed towards China's handling of the Lhasa riots only two months earlier. In 2005, [[2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations|anti-Japanese demonstrations]] were held throughout Asia as a result of events such as the Japanese history textbook controversies. In 2012, people across mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan held [[2012 China anti-Japanese demonstrations|anti-Japanese protests]] because of the escalating [[Senkaku Islands dispute]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Branigan |first=Tania |date=2012-08-19 |title=China protests over Japanese activists' visit to disputed island |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/19/china-protest-japan-senkaku-diaoyo-island |access-date=2024-09-18 |work=[[The Guardian]] |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref>

Nationalism was witnessed at the [[2008 Olympic torch relay]] where pro-Olympic protests were held by [[overseas Chinese]] in response to disruptions by anti-China activists in Paris and London.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |date=2008-04-20 |title=Chinese hold pro-Olympic protests in Europe, US |url=https://www.smh.com.au/world/chinese-hold-proolympic-protests-in-europe-us-20080420-27ci.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221119135234/https://www.smh.com.au/world/chinese-hold-proolympic-protests-in-europe-us-20080420-27ci.html |archive-date=2022-11-19 |website=[[The Sydney Morning Herald]] |language=en}}</ref> At least 5,000 Chinese Americans including immigrants from mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Southeast Asia<ref>{{Cite web |last=DAVID PIERSON |date=2008-04-26 |title=Protest reflects a shift in Chinese Americans' views |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-apr-26-me-chinese26-story.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210608205739/https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-apr-26-me-chinese26-story.html |archive-date=2021-06-08 |website=[[Los Angeles Times]] |language=en-US}}</ref> also protested outside CNN's Hollywood offices after CNN commentator [[Jack Cafferty]] described Chinese products as "junk" and the Chinese as “goons” and “thugs” during a segment about China's relationship with America.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Ren |first1=Tianwei |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2fSdDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA96 |title=Media, Sport, Nationalism: East Asia: Soft Power Projection via the Modern Olympic Games |last2=Ikeda |first2=Keiko |last3=Woo |first3=Chang Wan |date=2019-03-01 |publisher={{interlanguage link|Logos Verlag Berlin|de}} |isbn=978-3-8325-4651-9 |pages=96 |language=en |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=11 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230411200734/https://books.google.com/books?id=2fSdDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA96 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":4" /> When the Olympic torch passed through Paris, a pro-[[Tibetan independence movement|Tibetan independence]] protestor attempted to snatch it from a young handicapped Chinese athlete who clung to it.<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=151}} The images were widely televised and led to an internet rumor that accused French supermarket company [[Carrefour]]<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=151}} of funding Tibetan independence groups.<ref name=":8" /> Protests and calls for boycott resulted and ultimately subsided, in part because of efforts by French officials to apologize for the Paris torch attack.<ref name=":8">{{Cite news |last=Jacobs |first=Andrew |date=2008-05-02 |title=Anti-French Boycott Falters in China |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/02/world/asia/02china.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220430165925/https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/02/world/asia/02china.html |archive-date=2022-04-30 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>

A 2013 survey of Chinese adults found that respondents who sourced their information about the dispute from traditional [[mass media in China|mass media]], which are more subject to state regulation, were less supportive of the idea that China should adopt hardline policies in the [[Territorial disputes in the South China Sea|South China Sea territorial disputes]].<ref name=":Wang2" />{{Rp|page=42}} The researchers who conducted the survey concluded that China's state-media coverage of the dispute was "more of a dampener than a driver of nationalistic policy preference."<ref name=":Wang2" />{{Rp|pages=42–43}}

[[File:兩漢服人hanfu.jpg|thumb|Two [[Hanfu]] promoters at the Chinese Cultural Festival in [[Guangzhou]]]]
Another example of modern nationalism in China is the [[Hanfu movement]], which is a Chinese movement in the early 21st century that seeks the revival of [[Ancient Chinese clothing|Chinese traditional clothing]].<ref>{{cite thesis |type=MSc |last=Ying |first=Zhi |date=2017 |title=The Hanfu Movement and Intangible Cultural Heritage: considering The Past to Know the Future |publisher=University of Macau/Self-published |url=https://www.academia.edu/33221410 |page=12 |access-date=21 July 2019 |archive-date=24 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200824014528/https://www.academia.edu/33221410/THE_HANFU_MOVEMENT_AND_INTANGIBLE_CULTURAL_HERITAGE_CONSIDERING_THE_PAST_TO_KNOW_THE_FUTURE |url-status=live }}</ref>

The [[China–United States trade war]] also fueled nationalist sentiment among both CCP leadership and the general public.<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=94}} The external pressure of the trade war allowed Xi Jinping to point to the United States' actions as a reason for China's economic slowdown.<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=94}} The Chinese public responded.<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=94}} Academic Suisheng Zhao summarizes, "Proud of their accomplishments through hard work, tremendous sacrifices, dogged determination, and well-crafted policies, many Chinese are fed up with US criticisms that China's rise is because it did not play by rules, violated international commitments, and tilted the playing field to advantage Chinese firms."<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=94}}

[[Credit Suisse]] has determined through a 2018 survey that young Chinese consumers are turning to local brands as a result of growing nationalism. Local brands like Lenovo have also received backlash from some online Chinese for being unpatriotic.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Jane Li |date=22 March 2018 |title=How China's consumer patriotism is hitting US and international brands |url=https://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/2138267/chinas-young-consumers-are-snubbing-foreign-brands-amid |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191219204827/https://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/2138267/chinas-young-consumers-are-snubbing-foreign-brands-amid |archive-date=19 December 2019 |access-date=19 December 2019 |website=[[South China Morning Post]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Sue Ng |date=7 June 2019 |title=Lenovo branded 'unpatriotic' by Chinese consumers in nationalistic backlash |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3013572/lenovo-branded-unpatriotic-chinese-consumers-nationalistic |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191219204821/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3013572/lenovo-branded-unpatriotic-chinese-consumers-nationalistic |archive-date=19 December 2019 |access-date=19 December 2019 |website=[[South China Morning Post]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/22/credit-suisse-on-chinese-consumers-turning-nationalistic-and-ways-to-trade-the-sector.html|title=Chinese consumers are increasingly preferring to buy domestic: Credit Suisse|date=22 March 2018|website=CNBC|access-date=19 December 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191219204835/https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/22/credit-suisse-on-chinese-consumers-turning-nationalistic-and-ways-to-trade-the-sector.html|archive-date=19 December 2019|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/12/12/apple-iphone-sales-plummet-35-after-huawei-surge-chinas-blacklist-backlash-continues/|title=Apple iPhone Sales Down 35% In China As Huawei Soars|first=Zak|last=Doffman|website=Forbes|access-date=19 December 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191219204838/https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/12/12/apple-iphone-sales-plummet-35-after-huawei-surge-chinas-blacklist-backlash-continues/|archive-date=19 December 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>

On 1 July 2021, Xi Jinping delivered a nationalistic speech at [[Tiananmen Square]] in connection with the celebration of the [[100th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party]]. Xi said, "The Chinese people will never allow foreign forces to bully, oppress, or enslave us," and "whoever nurses delusions of doing that will [[wikt:頭破血流|crack their heads and spill blood]] on the Great Wall of steel built from the flesh and blood of 1.4 billion Chinese people.".{{efn|Chinese: “中国人民从来没有欺负、压迫、奴役过其他国家人民，过去没有，现在没有，将来也不会有。同时，中国人民也绝不允许任何外来势力欺负、压迫、奴役我们，谁妄想这样干，必将在14亿多中国人民用血肉筑成的钢铁长城面前碰得头破血流！”<ref>{{Cite web |date=2021-07-03 |title=中共建党百年：习近平演讲中"头破血流"一词为何引发中外热议 |url=https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world-57703178 |quote=习近平说：“中国人民从来没有欺负、压迫、奴役过其他国家人民，过去没有，现在没有，将来也不会有。同时，中国人民也绝不允许任何外来势力欺负、压迫、奴役我们，谁妄想这样干，必将在14亿多中国人民用血肉筑成的钢铁长城面前碰得头破血流！” |access-date=2024-04-06 |website=[[BBC News]] |language=zh |archive-date=6 April 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240406101125/https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world-57703178 |url-status=live }}</ref>}}<ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Evan Osnos |date=2021-07-01 |title=After a Hundred Years, What Has China's Communist Party Learned? |url=https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/after-a-hundred-years-what-has-chinas-communist-party-learned |quote=Three days later, in Tiananmen Square, before a crowd of seventy thousand, Xi delivered a blunt warning to the outside world. “The Chinese people will never allow foreign forces to bully, oppress, or enslave us,” he said. “Whoever nurses delusions of doing that will crack their heads and spill blood on the Great Wall of steel built from the flesh and blood of 1.4 billion Chinese people.” |access-date=2024-04-06 |magazine=[[The New Yorker]] |language=en |archive-date=6 April 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240406030036/https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/after-a-hundred-years-what-has-chinas-communist-party-learned |url-status=live }}</ref>

In 2021 Hannah Bailey, a researcher of Chinese internet censorship at the University of Oxford's Internet Institute, noted a shift in China's approach toward deriving [[Legitimacy (political)|legitimacy]] from nationalism, compared to the earlier approach based on its economic performance.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Janis Mackey Frayer |last2=Adela Suliman |date=2021-04-07 |title='Milk Tea Alliance' brews democracy among young activists across Asia |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/milk-tea-alliance-brews-democracy-online-among-young-activists-across-n1262253 |access-date=2021-04-08 |website=[[NBC News]] |language=en |archive-date=17 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230417015231/https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/milk-tea-alliance-brews-democracy-online-among-young-activists-across-n1262253 |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Internet activism===
{{Further|Little Pink|Internet Water Army|50 Cent Party}}

In the 1990s, nationalists among the Chinese public were primarily connected through the internet.<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=150}}

In 2005, twenty-two million Chinese netizens signed an internet petition in opposition to Japan's efforts to join the United Nations Security Council.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2005-03-31 |title=22 Million Chinese Seek to Block Japan's Bid to Join U.N. Council |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/31/international/asia/22-million-chinese-seek-to-block-japans-bid-to-join-un.html |access-date=2023-01-09 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=5 July 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230705195131/https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/31/international/asia/22-million-chinese-seek-to-block-japans-bid-to-join-un.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

In response to protests during the 2008 Olympic Torch Relay, the Chinese blogosphere became filled with nationalistic material, many of which highlighted perceived biases and inaccuracies in the [[Western media]] such as photos of clashes between police and Tibetan independence protestors that took place in Nepal and India but were captioned to seem as if the events happened in China.<ref name=":5">{{Cite web |last=Jay Hauben |date=September 11, 2012 |title=China and Syria: Netizens Expose Media Fabrications and Distortions |url=https://newsghana.com.gh/china-and-syria-netizens-expose-media-fabrications-and-distortions/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221119153221/https://newsghana.com.gh/china-and-syria-netizens-expose-media-fabrications-and-distortions/ |archive-date=2022-11-19 |website=[[News Ghana]] |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Andrew Wei-Min Lee |date=2009 |title=TIBET AND THE MEDIA: PERSPECTIVES FROM BEIJING |url=https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4931&context=mulr |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211206144303/https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4931&context=mulr |archive-date=2021-12-06 |website=[[Marquette Law Review]] |page=221}}</ref> Student-founded website<ref name=":Mao">{{Cite book |last=Mao |first=Lin |title=China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment |publisher=[[Leiden University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9789087284411 |editor-last=Fang |editor-first=Qiang |chapter=From Trade War to New Cold War: Popular Nationalism and the Global Times on Weibo under Xi Jinping |editor-last2=Li |editor-first2=Xiaobing}}</ref>{{Rp|page=305}} [[Anti-CNN]] claimed that news channels such as [[CNN]] and [[BBC]] pushed false narratives about and reported only selectively onn the 2008 Tibetan unrest.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.anti-cnn.com/ |title=Anti-CNN website |access-date=5 August 2017 |archive-date=9 April 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080409202554/http://www.anti-cnn.com/ |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref name=":5" />

Chinese hackers have claimed to have attacked the CNN website numerous times, through the use of [[DDoS]] attacks.<ref>SBS Dateline, 6 August 2008 {{YouTube|-swdOEI5V5g}}</ref> Similarly, the Yasukuni Shrine website was hacked by Chinese hackers during late 2004, and another time on 24 December 2008.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=5937 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040819043343/http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=5937 |url-status=dead |archive-date=19 August 2004 |title=Chinese suspected of attack on Tokyo shrine's Web site |access-date=6 January 2014 |date=7 January 2005 |work=Taipei Times }}</ref>

Nationalists began developing a reputation for cross-platform online "expeditions" through their response to perceptions of [[Taiwan independence movement|Taiwanese independence]] sentiment in 2015–2016.'''<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last=Song |first=Chenyang |title=Nationalist and Popular Culture Practices on Social Media: A Digital Ethnography of Chinese Online Fandom Nationalists |date=2025 |publisher=Transcript |isbn=978-3-8376-7926-7 |edition= |location=Bielefeld}}</ref>'''{{Reference page|page=12}} "Expeditions" are self-organized and intense waves of cross-platform hostile communication towards individuals or groups with different political stances.<ref name=":12" />{{Reference page|page=12}}

During the [[2019–2020 Hong Kong protests]], in response to protestors [[doxing]] police officers and people unsupportive of the protests, some Chinese nationalists in Hong Kong responded by doxing protestors.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/technology/hong-kong-protests-facial-recognition-surveillance.html|title=In Hong Kong Protests, Faces Become Weapons|first=Paul|last=Mozur |work=[[The New York Times]]|issn=0362-4331 |date=26 July 2019 |access-date=7 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190726093243/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/technology/hong-kong-protests-facial-recognition-surveillance.html |archive-date=26 July 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> A game was also created, called ''Everyone Hit the Traitors'', in which players could beat up protestors and their financial and political backers, such as [[Joshua Wong]], [[Martin Lee]], and [[Jimmy Lai]]. The game was made in response to another game, ''[[Liberate Hong Kong (video game)|Liberate Hong Kong]]'', where players play as protestors fighting the police.<ref name="protestgame">{{cite news |author=Josh Ye |date=6 December 2019 |title=China has its own Hong Kong protest game that lets you beat up activists |url=https://www.scmp.com/abacus/games/article/3040864/china-has-its-own-hong-kong-protest-game-lets-you-beat-activists |work=South China Morning Post}}</ref>

During the [[Russo-Ukrainian War]] (in particular the [[Russian invasion of Ukraine]]), [[Little Pink|nationalistic netizens]] disseminated pro-Russian sentiments and posted [[Russophilia|pro-Russian]] posts across the Chinese internet.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/27/business/china-russia-ukraine-invasion.html|title=Why the Chinese internet is cheering Russia's invasion|first=Yuan|last=Li|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=27 February 2022|access-date=21 March 2022|archive-date=28 February 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220228124929/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/27/business/china-russia-ukraine-invasion.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Online representations of Russian women across the Chinese internet have been described as gendered nationalism or nationalistic sexism.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Wang |first1=Vivian |last2=Zhao |first2=Siyi |date=2024-05-20 |title=This 'Russian Woman' Loves China. Too Bad She's a Deepfake. |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/20/world/asia/china-russia-deepfake.html |access-date=2024-05-21 |work=[[The New York Times]] |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=15 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240815013207/https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/20/world/asia/china-russia-deepfake.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Chinese nationalists and [[Russian nationalism|Russian nationalists]] share common anti-Western sentiments.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/Russia-and-China-s-anti-West-partnership-threatens-global-order|title=Russia and China's anti-West partnership threatens global order|website=Nikkei Asia}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://theconversation.com/russia-and-china-present-a-united-front-to-the-west-but-theres-plenty-of-potential-for-friction-157934|title=Russia and China present a united front to the west – but there's plenty of potential for friction|first=Natasha|last=Kuhrt|website=The Conversation|date=29 March 2021 }}</ref>

===Xi Jinping and the "Chinese Dream"===
{{Main|Chinese Dream}}

As Xi Jinping solidified his control after 2012, became the [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party]], the CCP has used the phrase "[[Chinese Dream]]", to describe his overarching plans for China. Xi first used the phrase during a high-profile visit to the [[National Museum of China]] on 29 November 2012, where he and his Standing Committee colleagues were attending a "national revival" (民族复兴; more commonly translated as "national rejuvenation", to differentiate from [[national revival|national awakening]]) exhibition. Since then, the phrase has become the signature political slogan of the Xi era.<ref>{{Cite news |date=4 May 2013 |title=Xi Jinping and the Chinese dream |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/leaders/2013/05/04/xi-jinping-and-the-chinese-dream |access-date=12 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160510092423/http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21577070-vision-chinas-new-president-should-serve-his-people-not-nationalist-state-xi-jinping |archive-date=10 May 2016 |issn=0013-0613}}</ref> In the public media, the Chinese Dream and nationalism are interwoven.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hizi |first=Gil |date=2019-01-02 |title=Speaking the China Dream: self-realization and nationalism in China's public-speaking shows |journal=[[Continuum (journal)|Continuum]] |language=en |location=Camperdown, Australia |volume=33 |issue=1 |pages=37–50 |doi=10.1080/10304312.2018.1536967 |issn=1030-4312 |s2cid=150007367}}</ref> In diplomacy, the Chinese dream and nationalism have been closely linked to the [[Belt and Road Initiative]]. Peter Ferdinand argues that it thus becomes a dream about a future in which China "will have recovered its rightful place."<ref>Peter Ferdinand, "Westward ho{{snd}}the China dream and ‘one belt, one road’: Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping." ''[[International Affairs (journal)|International Affairs]]'' 92.4 (2016): 941–957, quoting p. 955. {{doi|10.1111/1468-2346.12660}}</ref>

{{portal|China|Republic of China|Hong Kong
}}

==Notes==
{{notelist}}

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==Further reading==
{{Library resources box}}

* Befu, Harumi. ''Cultural Nationalism in East Asia: Representation and Identity'' (1993). Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California.
* Cabestan, Jean-Pierre. "The many facets of Chinese nationalism." ''China perspectives''  (2005) 2005.59 [https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/2793 online].
* Chang, Maria Hsia. ''Return of the Dragon: China's Wounded Nationalism'', (Westview Press, 2001), 256 pp, {{ISBN|0-8133-3856-5}}
* Chow, Kai-Wing. "Narrating Nation, Race and National Culture: Imagining the Hanzu Identity in Modern China," in Chow Kai-Wing, Kevin M. Doak, and Poshek Fu, eds., ''Constructing nationhood in modern East Asia'' (2001). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp.&nbsp;47–84.
* Gries, Peter Hays. ''China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy'', University of California Press (January 2004), hardcover, 224 pages, {{ISBN|0-520-23297-6}}
* Duara, Prasenjit, "De-constructing the Chinese Nation," in ''Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs'' (July 1993, No. 30, pp.&nbsp;1–26).
* Duara, Prasenjit. ''Rescuing History from the Nation'' Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
* Fitzgerald, John. '' Awakening China – Politics, Culture and Class in the Nationalist Revolution'' (1996). Stanford University Press.
* He, Baogang. ''Nationalism, national identity and democratization in China'' (Routledge, 2018).
* Hoston, Germaine A. ''The State, Identity, and the National Question in China and Japan'' (1994). Princeton UP.
* Huang, Grace C. ''Chiang Kai-shek's Politics of Shame: Leadership, Legacy, and National Identity in China.'' Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2021.
* Hughes, Christopher. ''Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era'' (2006).
* Judge, Joan. "Talent, Virtue and Nation: Chinese Nationalism and Female Subjectivities in the Early Twentieth Century," ''American Historical Review'' 106#3 (2001) pp.&nbsp;765–803. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2692323 online]
* Karl, Rebecca E. ''Staging the World — Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century'' (Duke UP, 2002) [https://www.amazon.com/Staging-World-Nationalism-Twentieth-Asia-Pacific/dp/0822328674/ excerpt]
* Leibold, James. ''Reconfiguring Chinese nationalism: How the Qing frontier and its indigenes became Chinese'' (Palgrave MacMillan, 2007). {{ISBN?}}
* Lust, John. "The Su-pao Case: An Episode in the Early Chinese Nationalist Movement," ''Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies'' 27#2 (1964) pp.&nbsp;408–429. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/611921 online]
* {{cite book |last=Motyl |first=Alexander J. |author-link=Alexander J. Motyl |title=Encyclopedia of Nationalism, Volume II |year=2001 |publisher=Academic Press |isbn=0-12-227230-7}}
* Nyíri, Pál, and Joana Breidenbach, eds. ''China Inside Out: Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and Transnationalism'' (2005) [https://www.questia.com/library/118489035/china-inside-out-contemporary-chinese-nationalism online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200619032142/https://www.questia.com/library/118489035/china-inside-out-contemporary-chinese-nationalism |date=19 June 2020 }}
* Pye, Lucian W. "How China's nationalism was Shanghaied." ''Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs'' 29 (1993): 107–133.
* Tan, Alexander C. and Boyu Chen."China's Competing and Co-opting Nationalisms: Implications to Sino-Japanese Relations." ''Pacific Focus'' (2013) 28#3 pp.&nbsp;365–383). [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259554837_China's_Competing_and_Co-opting_Nationalisms_Implications_to_Sino-Japanese_Relations abstract]
* Tønnesson, Stein. "Will nationalism drive conflict in Asia?." ''Nations and Nationalism'' 22#2 (2016) [http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:931804/FULLTEXT01.pdf online].
* Unger, Jonathan, ed. ''Chinese nationalism'' (M, E. Sharpe, 1996). {{ISBN?}}
* Wang, Gungwu. ''The revival of Chinese nationalism'' (IIAS, International Institute for Asian Studies, 1996).
* Wei, C.X. George and Xiaoyuan Liu, eds. ''Chinese Nationalism in Perspective: Historical and Recent Cases'' (2001) [https://www.questia.com/library/117355442/chinese-nationalism-in-perspective-historical-and online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190924014402/https://www.questia.com/library/117355442/chinese-nationalism-in-perspective-historical-and |date=24 September 2019 }}
* Zhang, Huijie, Fan Hong, and Fuhua Huang. "Cultural Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Modernization of Physical Education and Sport in China, 1840–1949." ''International Journal of the History of Sport'' 35.1 (2018): 43–60.
* Zhao Suisheng. ''A Nation-State by Construction. Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism'' (Stanford UP, 2004) {{ISBN?}}
* Harvard Asia Pacific Review, 2010. "Nations and Nationalism." Available at Issuu [http://issuu.com/harvard_asia_pacific_review/docs/hapr11.1?viewMode=magazine&mode=embed ''Harvard Asia Pacific Review'' 11.1] {{ISSN|1522-1113}}
* [https://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=258 Chinese Nationalism and Its Future Prospects], Interview with Yingjie Guo (27 June 2012)

==External links==
*{{Commons category-inline|Chinese nationalism}}

{{Ethnic nationalism}}
{{Pan-nationalist concepts}}
{{Cross-Strait relations}}
{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Chinese Nationalism}}
[[Category:Chinese nationalism| ]]