View source for Diplomatic recognition

{{Short description|Acknowledgement of one state for another}}
{{More citations needed|date=August 2025}}
{{Redirect|State recognition|state-recognized Native American tribes|State-recognized tribes in the United States}}
[[File:Pedro I of Brazil and Charles Stuart .jpg|thumb|Allegory of the recognition of the [[Empire of Brazil]] and [[Independence of Brazil|its independence]]. The painting depicts British diplomat [[Charles Stuart, 1st Baron Stuart de Rothesay|Sir Charles Stuart]] presenting his [[letter of credence]] to Emperor [[Pedro I of Brazil]], who is flanked by his wife [[Maria Leopoldina of Austria|Maria Leopoldina]], their daughter Maria da Glória (later Queen of Portugal as [[Maria II of Portugal|Maria II]]), and other dignitaries. At right, a winged figure, representing [[History]], carving the "great event" on a stone tablet.<ref>{{Cite book|title=''As barbas do imperador : D. Pedro II, um monarca nos trópicos ''|last1=Schwarcz|first1=Lilia Moritz|date=1998|pages = 181|publisher=Companhia das Letras|isbn=85-7164-837-9|edition=|location=São Paulo|oclc=}}</ref>]]

'''Diplomatic recognition'''  in [[public international law|international law]] is a [[unilateral]] declarative political act of a [[sovereign state|state]] that acknowledges an act or status of another state or [[government]] in control of a state (may be also a recognized state). Recognition can be accorded either on a ''[[de facto]]'' or ''[[de jure]]'' basis. Partial recognition can occur if many sovereign states refuse to recognize an entity as a peer. Recognition can be a declaration to that effect by the recognizing government or may be implied from an act of recognition, such as entering into a [[treaty]] with the other state or making a [[state visit]]. Recognition may, but need not, have domestic and international legal consequences. If sufficient countries recognize a particular entity as a state, that state may have a right to membership in [[international organization]]s, while treaties may require all existing member countries unanimously agreeing to the admission of a new member.

A vote by a country in the [[United Nations]] in favour of the [[Member states of the United Nations|membership]] of another country is an implicit recognition of that country by the country so voting, as only states may be members of the UN.{{cn|date=August 2025}} On the other hand, a negative vote for UN membership does not necessarily mean non-recognition of the applicant as a state, as other criteria, requirements or special circumstances may be considered relevant for UN membership. Similarly, a country may choose not to apply for UN membership for its own reasons, as is the case with [[Holy See|Vatican City]], and [[Switzerland]] was not a member until 2002 because of its concerns to maintain its [[Swiss neutrality|neutrality policy]].

The non-recognition of particular acts of a state does not normally affect the recognition of the state itself. For example, the international rejection of the [[Military occupation|occupation]] of particular territory by a recognized state does not imply non-recognition of the state itself, nor a rejection of a change of government by illegal means.

==Recognition of states and governments==
Diplomatic recognition must be distinguished from formal recognition of states or their governments.<ref>See Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) pages 1–4</ref> The fact that states do not maintain bilateral diplomatic relations does not mean that they do not recognize or treat one another as states. A state is not required to accord formal bilateral recognition to any other state, and some have a general policy of not doing so, considering that a vote for its membership of an international organisation restricted to states, such as the [[United Nations]], is an act of recognition.

===History===
Some consider that a state has a responsibility not to recognize as a state any entity that has attained the qualifications for statehood by a violation of basic principles of the [[UN Charter]]: the [[UN Security Council]] has in several instances ([[United Nations Security Council Resolution 216|Resolution 216]] (1965) and [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 217|Resolution 217]] (1965), concerning [[Rhodesia]]; [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 541|Resolution 541]] (1983), concerning [[Northern Cyprus]]; and [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 787|Resolution 787]] (1992), concerning the [[Republika Srpska]]) issued Chapter VII resolutions (binding in international law) that denied their statehood and precluded recognition.  In the 2010 [[International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Kosovo's declaration of independence]], the [[International Court of Justice|ICJ]] ruled that "general international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence."<ref>[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100821055950/http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf |date=2010-08-21 }}, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 403, para. 84.</ref> The Court carefully noted "that in all of those instances the Security Council was making a determination as regards the concrete situation existing at the time that those declarations of independence were made; the illegality attached to the declarations of independence thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful [[Use of force in international law|use of force]] or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular, those of a peremptory character (jus cogens). In the context of Kosovo, the Security Council has never taken this position.  The exceptional character of the resolutions enumerated above appears to the Court to confirm that no general prohibition against unilateral declarations of independence may be inferred from the practice of the Security Council."<ref>ICJ Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, para. 81.</ref>

States can exercise their recognition powers either explicitly or implicitly.<ref>See, e.g., Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States, American Law Institute Publishers, 1990, {{ISBN|0-314-30138-0}}, § 202 (Recognition or Acceptance of States), § 203 (Recognition or Acceptance of Governments); and § 204 (Recognition and Maintaining Diplomatic Relations).</ref> The recognition of a government implies recognition of the state it governs, but even countries which have a policy of formally recognising states may not have a policy of doing the same regarding governments.{{cn|date=August 2025}}

[[File:Israel-Palestine Diplomacy.svg|thumb|right|270px|
{{legend|#cdcd9c|Recognition of both [[Israel]] and [[Palestine]]}}
{{legend|#0052ff|Recognition of Israel only}}
{{legend|#FF4500|Recognition of Palestine only}}]]

''De facto'' recognition of states, rather than ''de jure'', is rare.{{cn|date=August 2025}} ''De jure'' recognition is stronger, while ''de facto'' recognition is more tentative and recognizes only that a government exercises control over a territory. An example of the difference is when the [[United Kingdom]] recognized the [[History of Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union (1917–27)|Soviet state]] ''de facto'' in 1921, but ''de jure'' only in 1924.{{cn|date=August 2025}} Another example is the state of [[Israel]] in 1948, whose government was immediately recognized ''de facto'' by the [[United States]] and three days later ''de jure'' by the [[Soviet Union]].{{cn|date=August 2025}} Another example is the [[Republic]] [[Indonesia|of Indonesia]] which was whose government was recognized ''de facto'' by the [[Netherlands]] in 1946 and ''de jure'' by the international community in 1949.{{cn|date=August 2025}} Also, the [[Republic of China]], commonly known as "[[Taiwan]]", is generally recognized as ''de facto'' independent and sovereign, but is not universally recognized as ''de jure'' independent due to the complex [[political status of Taiwan]] related to the United Nations' withdrawal of recognition in favor of the [[People's Republic of China]] in 1971.{{cn|date=August 2025}}

Renewing recognition of a government is not necessary when it changes in a normal, constitutional way (such as an [[election]] or [[referendum]]), but may be necessary in the case of a [[coup d'etat]] or [[revolution]].{{cn|date=August 2025}} Recognition of a new government by other states can be important for its long-term survival.{{cn|date=August 2025}} For instance, the [[Taliban]] government of the [[Islamic State of Afghanistan]], which lasted from 1996 to 2001, was recognized only by [[Pakistan]], the [[United Arab Emirates]], and [[Saudi Arabia]], while far more had recognized the government of ousted President [[Burhanuddin Rabbani]].{{cn|date=August 2025}} India's administration of [[Jammu and Kashmir (union territory)|Jammu and Kashmir]], part of a [[disputed territory]], is not recognized by either [[Pakistan]] or the [[People's Republic of China]], and the [[Republic of Turkey]].{{cn|date=August 2025}}

Recognition can be implied by other acts, such as a visit of the [[head of state]], or the signing of a bilateral treaty. If implicit recognition is possible, a state may feel the need to explicitly proclaim that its acts do not constitute diplomatic recognition, like when the United States commenced its dialogue with the [[Palestine Liberation Organization]] in 1988.{{cn|date=August 2025}}

Formal diplomatic recognition can be used as a tool of political influence with examples including [[European Community]]'s conditional recognition of independence of former republics of [[SFR Yugoslavia]] in early 1990s dependent on new states commitment to protection of [[Human rights|human]] and [[national minorities]] rights.<ref name="Caplan">{{cite journal |last=Caplan |first=Richard |date=2002 |title=Conditional recognition as an instrument of ethnic conflict regulation: the European Community and Yugoslavia |journal=[[Nations and Nationalism (journal)|Nations and Nationalism]] |volume=8 |issue=2 |pages=157–177 |doi=10.1111/1469-8219.00044 }}</ref>

==Derecognition of states==
{{See also|Non-recognition}}
[[File:Recognition of Kosovo by UN member states over time.svg|thumb|Recognition of Kosovo by UN member states from 2008 to 2020 (total members 193)]]
States may withdraw diplomatic recognition of another state. States that experience derecognition are typically those excluded from the [[United Nations System]], such as [[Taiwan]], the [[Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic]], [[Kosovo]], [[Abkhazia]], and [[South Ossetia]].<ref name="Visoka"/> Derecognition is achieved through [[checkbook diplomacy]], diplomatic pressure, or military threats.<ref name="Visoka"/> Smaller states have engaged in "rental recognition" by bartering their (de)recognition of states in exchange for aid.<ref name="de Oliveira"/>

There is no clear consensus on the legality of derecognition.<ref name="Visoka">{{Cite book|title=The Derecognition of States|author=Gëzim Visoka|location=Ann Arbor|publisher=[[University of Michigan Press]]|year=2024|isbn=9780472077090}}</ref><ref name="de Oliveira">{{Cite journal|title=Statehood for Sale: Derecognition, "Rental Recognition", and the Open Flanks of International Law|author=Victor S. Mariottini de Oliveira|year=2023|journal=Jus Cogens|volume=5|pages=277–295|DOI=10.1007/s42439-023-00075-y|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name="Visoka2">{{Cite book|chapter=The Derecognition of States|author=Gëzim Visoka|title=Routledge Handbook of State Recognition|year=2019|publisher=[[Routledge]]|ISBN=9781351131759|location=London|editor1=Gëzim Visoka|editor2=John Doyle|editor3=Edward Newman}}</ref> While certain academics argue that recognition of statehood is irrevocable under international law, others contend that derecognition is legal, and that the position that recognition is irrevocable is "outdated" and challenged by current state practices.<ref name="Visoka"/> There is a broader consensus that derecognition is permitted when (a) a state was created through the [[Use of force in international law|use of force]] (e.g. Abkhazia and South Ossetia), or (b) a state ceases to exist (e.g. the United States' derecognition of [[First Republic of Armenia|Armenia]] in 1920).<ref name="Visoka2"/><ref>{{Cite journal|title=De-recognition of States: The Case of Kosovo|author=Tatjana Papic|journal=Cornell International Law Journal|year=2020|volume=53|pages=683–729}}</ref>

The doctrine of non-recognition of illegal or immoral situations is called the [[Stimson Doctrine]], and has become more important since the [[Second World War]], especially in the [[United Nations]] where it is a method of ensuring compliance with [[international law]] – for instance, in the case of [[Rhodesia]] in 1965.{{cn|date=August 2025}} Withdrawal of recognition of a government is a more severe act of disapproval than the breaking of [[diplomatic relations]].{{cn|date=August 2025}}

== Recognition of governments ==
Besides recognizing other states, states also can recognize the governments of states. This can be problematic particularly when a new government comes to power by illegal means, such as a [[coup d'état]], or when an existing government stays in power by fixing an election. States once formally recognized both the government of a state and the state itself, but many no longer follow that practice,<ref>See for example, the oral arguments in the International Court of Justice case on Kosovo's declaration of independence. CR 2009/32, page 39 {{cite web |url=http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15734.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=2009-12-10 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605052109/http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15734.pdf |archive-date=2011-06-05 }}</ref> even though, if diplomatic relations are to be maintained, it is necessary that there be a government with which to engage in diplomatic relations.<ref>Since the 1970s the [[United States Department of State]] has moved away from the practice of recognizing governments. See: [1977] Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law 19–21.</ref> Countries such as the [[United States]] answer queries over the recognition of governments with the statement: "The question of recognition does not arise: we are conducting our relations with the new government."<ref>[1974] Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law at 13; [1975] Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law at 34.</ref>

==Unrecognized state==
{{Unreferenced section|date=August 2025}}
{{Main|List of states with limited recognition|l1=Unrecognized states}}

Several of the world's [[Geopolitics|geopolitical]] entities lack general international recognition, but wish to be recognized as [[sovereign states]]. The degree of ''de facto'' control these entities exert over the territories they claim varies.

Most are subnational [[Subregion|regions]] with an [[ethnic]] or [[national identity]] of their own that have [[separatism|separated]] from the original parent [[Sovereign state|state]]. Such states are commonly referred to as "break-away" states. Some of these entities are in effect internally [[Autonomous entity|self-governing]] [[protectorate]]s that enjoy military protection and informal diplomatic representation abroad through another state to prevent forced reincorporation into their original states.

The word "control" in this list refers to ''control'' over the area ''occupied'', not ''occupation'' of the area ''claimed''.  Unrecognized countries may have either full control over their occupied territory (such as [[Northern Cyprus]]), or only partial control (such as [[Western Sahara]]).  In the former, the ''de jure'' governments have little or no influence in the areas they claim to rule, whereas in the latter they have varying degrees of control, and may provide essential services to people living in the areas.

==Other types of recognition==
{{Further|Belligerent|label1=Belligerency}}
Other elements that may be recognized include [[Military occupation|occupation]] or [[annexation]] of territory, or [[belligerent]] rights of a party in a conflict. Recognition of the latter does not imply recognition of a state.

Formal recognition of [[Belligerent|belligerency]], which is rare today, signifies that the parties to the civil war or other internal conflict "are entitled to excise belligerent rights, thus accepting that the rebel group possesses sufficient [[Legal personality|international personality]] to support the position of such rights and duties."<ref name="Solis">[[Gary D. Solis]], ''The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War'' (2d ed.: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 163.</ref> Extension of the rights of belligerency is usually done by other states, rather than by the government fighting the rebel group.<ref name="Solis"/> (A 1907 report by [[William E. Fuller]] for the [[Spanish Treaty Claims Commission]] noted that "A parent state never formally recognizes the insurgents as belligerents, although it may in fact treat them as such by carrying on war against them in accordance with the rules and usages of international warfare."<ref>''[https://books.google.com/books?id=lPCgAAAAMAAJ Special Report of William E. Fuller, Assistant Attorney-General: Being a Condensed Statement of the Work Done, the Questions Considered, the Principles Laid Down, and the Most Important Decisions Made by the Spanish Treaty Claims Commission from the Organization of the Commission, April 8, 1901, to April 10, 1907]'', [[Spanish Treaty Claims Commission]] ([[Government Printing Office]], 1907), p. 262.</ref>)

Examples of recognition of [[belligerent]] status include:
*In 1823, the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|United Kingdom]] recognized the Greek revolutionaries against the [[Ottoman Empire]] as belligerents during the [[Greek War of Independence]].<ref>Roscoe Ralph Oglesby, ''Internal War and the Search for Normative Order'' (Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 21.</ref>
*The United Kingdom issued a [[wikisource:British proclamation of neutrality in the American Civil War|proclamation of neutrality]] soon after the outbreak of the [[American Civil War]], which "tacitly granted the [[Confederate States of America|Confederacy]] belligerent status, the right to contract loans and purchase supplies in neutral nations and to exercise belligerent rights on the [[high seas]]."<ref name="OfficeHistorian">[https://history.state.gov/milestones/1861-1865/confederacy Preventing Diplomatic Recognition of the Confederacy, 1861–1865] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130828005906/http://history.state.gov/milestones/1861-1865/Confederacy |date=2013-08-28 }}, ''Milestones: 1861–1865'', [[U.S. Department of State]], [[Office of the Historian]].</ref> Another right of significance accorded to belligerents that was seen as potentially significant at the time was the right to issue [[letters of marque]].<ref>Burrus M. Carnahan, ''Act of Justice: Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation and the Law of War'' (University Press of Kentucky 2007), p. 50.</ref> The British extension of belligerent recognition to the Confederacy greatly angered and concerned the United States, which strenuously and successfully worked to prevent full diplomatic recognition.<ref name="OfficeHistorian"/>
*During the [[Nicaraguan Revolution|Nicaraguan Civil War]], the [[Andean Group]] ([[Bolivia]], [[Colombia]], [[Ecuador]], [[Peru]], and [[Venezuela]]) "declared that 'a state of belligerency' existed in [[Nicaragua]] and that the forces of the [[Sandinista National Liberation Front]] (FSLN) represented a 'legitimate army.{{' "}}<ref name="VonGlahn">Gerhard von Glahn & James Larry Taulbee, ''Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law'', 11th ed. (Taylor & Francis, 2017), p. 167.</ref> The declaration, made over the strong U.S. opposition, stated that the Sandinistas were eligible for "treatment and prerogatives" accorded to belligerents under international law.<ref>Robert Kagan, ''A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977–1990'' (The Free Press, 1996), p. 93.</ref> This declaration allowed the Andean countries to provide arms to the FSLN.<ref name="VonGlahn"/>
*During the [[Salvadoran Civil War]], [[France]] and [[Mexico]] recognized the [[Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front]] in [[El Salvador]] as a belligerent in August 1981.<ref>Sewall H. Menzel, ''Bullets Vs. Ballots: Political Violence and Revolutionary War in El Salvador, 1979–1991'' ([[Lynne Rienner Publishers]], 1994), p. 22.</ref>

==See also==
{{Div col|colwidth=30em}}
*[[Constitutive theory of statehood]]
*[[Declarative theory of statehood]]
*[[Diplomacy]]
*[[Montevideo Convention]]
*[[International Organization for Standardization]] (ISO)
*[[International relations]]
*[[Jus legationis]]
*[[List of states with limited recognition]]
*[[Micronation]]
*[[Non-recognition]]
{{div col end}}

==References==
{{reflist|colwidth=30em}}
* Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann, and Henry Srebrnik; ''De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty ,'' Routledge, (2004) [https://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108515019 online edition] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110604220659/https://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108515019 |date=2011-06-04 }}
*{{cite book | author=Edgars Dunsdorfs  | title=The Baltic Dilemma, The case of the de jure recognition of incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Unions by Australia| publisher=Robert Speller & Sons, New York | year=1975 | isbn=0-8315-0148-0}}
*{{cite book | author=Gerhard von Glahn | title=Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law | publisher=Macmillan | year=1992 | isbn=0-02-423175-4 | url-access=registration | url=https://archive.org/details/lawamongnationsi0000vong }}
*{{cite book | author=Daniel Högger | title=The Recognition of States: A Study on the Historical Development in Doctrine and Practice with a Special Focus on the Requirements | publisher=LIT | year=2015 | isbn=978-3-643-80196-8}}
*{{cite book | author=Malcolm N. Shaw  | title=International Law | publisher=Cambridge University Press | year=2003 | isbn=0-521-53183-7}}
* Stefan Talmon; ''Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile'' Clarendon Press, (1998) [https://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=74337106 online edition] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110604220800/https://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=74337106 |date=2011-06-04 }}
* Gregory Weeks; "Almost Jeffersonian: U.S. Recognition Policy toward Latin America", ''Presidential Studies Quarterly,'' Vol. 31, 2001  [https://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5000875262 online edition]
* {{cite book
  | last1 = Schwarcz
  | first1 = Lilia Moritz
  | year = 1998
  | language = pt
  | title = As barbas do imperador: D. Pedro II, um monarca nos trópicos
  | publisher = Companhia das Letras
  | location = São Paulo
  | isbn = 85-7164-837-9
  }}

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[[Category:Diplomatic recognition| ]]
[[Category:International law]]