View source for Egyptian Armed Forces

{{Short description|Combined military forces of Egypt}}
{{Pp-pc1|small=yes|reason=years of content pasted without permission}}
{{Infobox national military
| name = Egyptian Armed Forces
| native_name = {{native name|ar|القوات المسلحة المصرية}}
| image = File:Seal of the Egyptian Armed Forces.svg
| alt = 
| caption = Emblem of the Egyptian Armed Forces
| image2 = [[File:Flag of the Army of Egypt.svg|70px]][[File:Naval Flag of Egypt.svg|70px]][[File:Air Force Ensign of Egypt.svg|70px]][[File:Flag of the Egyptian Air Defense Forces.svg|70px]]
| alt2 = 
| caption2 = Flags of the Egyptian Armed Forces
| motto = Victory or Martyrdom
| founded = {{start date and age|1820}}
| disbanded = 
| branches = [[Egyptian Army]]{{efn|Not a separate command, the land forces formations (armies and districts) are under the direct command of the [[Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (Egypt)|Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces]].}}<br>[[Egyptian Navy]]<br>[[Egyptian Air Force]]<br>[[Egyptian Air Defense Forces]]
| headquarters = [[Kobri Al Quba]], [[Cairo]]
| flying_hours = 
| website = {{URL|www.mod.gov.eg/ModWebSite/}}
<!-- Leadership -->| commander-in-chief = {{flagicon image|Flag of the President of Egypt.svg}} [[President of Egypt|President]] [[Abdel Fattah el-Sisi]]
| commander-in-chief_title = Supreme Commander
| minister = General [[Abdel Mageed Saqr]]
| minister_title = [[Ministry of Defense (Egypt)|Minister of Defense]]
| commander = Lieutenant General [[Ahmed Fathy Khalifa]]
| commander_title = [[Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (Egypt)|Chief of Staff]]
<!-- Manpower -->| age = 18
| conscription = 1–3 years depending on circumstances
| deployed = <!-- Financial -->
| amount = 4.82 billion dollars <small>(in addition to 1.3 billion US aid)</small><ref>IISS The Military Balance 2022, p. 336</ref>
| percent_GDP = 
| active = 438,500<ref name=IISS2022E>IISS The Military Balance 2022, p. 337</ref>
| reserve = 479,000<ref name=IISS2022E /> 
<!-- Industrial -->| domestic_suppliers = [[Arab Organization for Industrialization]]<br /> [[National Authority for Military Production]]<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/facility/mark0033.htm|title=Military Factory|access-date=21 April 2020|language=en}}</ref><br /> [[Alexandria Shipyard]]<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/48/320871/--/Yearender--Egypts-burgeoning-domestic-arms-industr.aspx|title=Yearender 2018: Egypt's burgeoning domestic arms industry|access-date=2019-12-31|language=en}}</ref>
| foreign_suppliers = {{collapsible list|title=Current:
|{{flag|Brazil}}|{{flag|China}}|{{flag|Czech Republic}}|{{flag|France}}|{{flag|Germany}}|{{flag|Italy}}|{{flag|Poland}}<br>{{flag|Russia}}|{{flag|South Africa}}|{{flag|Ukraine}}|{{flag|United Kingdom}}|{{flag|United States}}}}{{collapsible list|title=Former:|''{{flag|Czechoslovakia}}''|''{{USSR}}''}}
| imports = 
| exports = <!-- Related articles -->
| history = {{hidden 
|''List of engagements''
| headerstyle=background:#b0c4de
| style=text-align:center; 
|[[Wahhabi War]]<br /> [[Egyptian conquest of Sudan (1820–1824)]]<br /> [[Greek War of Independence]]<br /> [[Egyptian-Ottoman War (1831-1833)]]<br /> [[Syrian Peasant Revolt (1834–1835)]]<br /> [[Ethiopian–Ottoman border conflict|Ethiopian–Egyptian border conflict]]<br /> [[1838 Druze Revolt]]<br /> [[Egyptian-Ottoman War (1839-1841)]]<br /> [[Crimean War]]<ref>{{Cite web | url=http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2014/03/03/Arab-involvement-in-Crimean-War-erased-from-history-.html |title = Arab involvement in Crimean War 'erased from history'|date = 2 March 2014}}</ref><br /> [[Second French intervention in Mexico]]<br /> [[Cretan Revolt (1866-1869)]]<br /> [[Egyptian invasion of the Eastern Horn of Africa]]<br /> [[Serbian-Turkish Wars (1876-1878)]]<br /> [[Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878)]]<br /> [[Egyptian–Ethiopian War]]<br /> [['Urabi revolt]]<br /> [[Anglo-Egyptian War]]<br /> [[Mahdist War]]<br /> [[Anglo-Egyptian conquest of Sudan]]<br /> [[World War I]]<br /> [[Anglo-Egyptian Darfur Expedition]]<br /> [[1919 Revolution of Egypt]]<br /> [[World War II]]<br /> [[1948 Palestine War]]<br /> [[Egyptian Revolution of 1952]]<br /> [[Suez Crisis|Tripartite Aggression]]<br /> [[North Yemen Civil War]]<br /> [[Six-Day War]]<br /> [[Nigerian Civil War]]<br /> [[War of Attrition]]<br /> [[Yom Kippur War|October War]]<br /> [[Shaba I]]<br /> [[Egyptian–Libyan War]]<br /> [[1986 Egyptian conscripts riot]]<br /> [[1999 East Timorese crisis]]<br /> [[Gulf War]]<br /> [[War on terror]]<br /> [[Egyptian revolution of 2011]]<br /> [[2013 Egyptian coup d'état]]<br /> [[Sinai insurgency]]<br /> [[Yemeni Civil War (2014–present)]]<br />[[Egyptian involvement in the Second Libyan Civil War]]}}
| ranks = [[Military ranks of Egypt]]
| image_size = 180
| country = Egypt
| image_size2 = 160
}}
The '''Egyptian Armed Forces''' ({{langx|ar|القوات المسلحة المصرية|Al-Qūwāt Al-Musallaḥah Al-Maṣrīya}}) are the military forces of the [[Egypt|Arab Republic of Egypt]]. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces directs (a) Egyptian Army forces, (b) the [[Egyptian Navy]], (c) [[Egyptian Air Force]] and (d) [[Egyptian Air Defense Forces]]. The Chief of Staff directly supervises army field forces (armies and districts), without any separate [[Egyptian Army]] headquarters.

Since the [[1952 Egyptian revolution]] that led to the overthrow of the [[Muhammad Ali Dynasty|monarchy]], Egypt’s military has centralized Egypt’s governance and dominated its politics and economy.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Al-Shamahi |first=Abubakr |title=Egypt’s military dominates 10 years after revolution |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/26/egypt-revolution-anniversary |access-date=2025-06-05 |website=Al Jazeera |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Wahba |first=Dina |date=2024-12-01 |title=Militarized Governance and Counterrevolutionary Infrastructure in Egypt |url=https://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article/123/857/342/203876/Militarized-Governance-and-Counterrevolutionary |journal=Current History |language=en |volume=123 |issue=857 |pages=342–346 |doi=10.1525/curh.2024.123.857.342 |issn=0011-3530|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Senior members of the military can convene the [[Supreme Council of the Armed Forces]], such as during the course of the [[2011 Egyptian revolution]], when President Mubarak resigned and transferred power to this body on February 11, 2011.<ref name="wt">{{cite news| url=http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/11/crowds-rejoice-egypts-mubarak-steps-down/ |author=Murdock, Heather |title=Crowds rejoice as Egypt's Mubarak steps down, hands power to military| newspaper=[[The Washington Times]]| date=February 11, 2011| access-date=February 11, 2011}}</ref>

The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces directs all branches, forces, armies, regions, bodies, agencies and departments of the Armed Forces. The Commander-in-Chief simultaneously holds the position of Minister of Defence. Since July 2024, [[General officer|General]] [[Abdel Mageed Saqr]] has been Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; [[Ministry of Defense (Egypt)|Minister of Defense]]; and [[Ministry of Military Production (Egypt)|Military Production]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Minister of Defence |url=http://www.mod.gov.eg/ModWebSite/MODL.aspx |website=www.mod.gov.eg}}</ref> The only person above him in the leadership ladder is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, who is the [[President of Egypt|President of the Republic]], and this position is currently held by [[Abdel Fattah el-Sisi]]. The [[Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (Egypt)|Chief of Staff]] is Lieutenant General [[Ahmed Fathy Khalifa]] (since July 2024).<ref>{{cite web |title=Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces|url=https://www.mod.gov.eg/ModWebSite/COSL.aspx|website=www.mod.gov.eg}}</ref> The [[Supreme Council of the Armed Forces]] consists of 23 members, headed by the Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defense, and represented by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, with membership of: Commanders of the main branches of air, navy, and air defense, commanders of the [[Egyptian Border Guard Corps|border guard forces]], commanders of the armies ([[Second Army (Egypt)|Second]] and [[Third Army (Egypt)|Third]]), and commanders of the military regions ([[Central Military Region (Egypt)|Central]], [[Northern Military Region (Egypt)|Northern]], [[Western Military Region (Egypt)|Western]] and [[Southern Military Region (Egypt)|Southern]]) and the heads of the [[Military Operations Authority (Egypt)|Operations]], [[Egyptian Armaments Authority|Armament]], [[Armed Forces Logistics Authority (Egypt)|Logistics and Supply]], [[Armed Forces Engineering Authority (Egypt)|Engineering]], [[Armed Forces Training Authority (Egypt)|Training]], [[Armed Forces Finance Authority (Egypt)|Financial Affairs]], [[Military justice (Egypt)|Military Justice]], [[Armed Forces Management and Administration (Egypt)|Management and Administration]], the directors of the Officers Affairs and [[Military Intelligence and Reconnaissance (Egypt)|Military Intelligence]] departments, the Assistant Minister of Defense for Constitutional and Legal Affairs, and the Secretary of the Council is the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2019-04-14 |title=الرئيس منصور يصدر قرارًا بإعادة تشكيل المجلس الأعلى للقوات المسلحة - بوابة الأهرام |url=http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/461592.aspx |access-date=2024-06-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190414195006/http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/461592.aspx |archive-date=2019-04-14 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2014-02-28 |title=الحياة - مصر: قرار جمهوري بتشكيل المجلس الأعلى للقوات المسلحة برئاسة وزير الدفاع |url=http://alhayat.com/Articles/793873/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1--%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9 |access-date=2024-06-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140228123736/http://alhayat.com/Articles/793873/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1--%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9 |archive-date=2014-02-28 }}</ref>

The armament of the Egyptian armed forces varies between eastern and western sources through weapons deliveries by several countries, led by the [[United States]], [[Russia]], [[France]], [[China]], [[Italy]], [[Ukraine]] and [[United Kingdom|Britain]]. Much of the equipment is manufactured locally at Egyptian factories. The Egyptian armed forces celebrate their anniversary on October 6 each year to commemorate the [[Operation Badr (1973)|Crossing of the Suez]] during the [[Yom Kippur War|October War of 1973]].

The modern Egyptian armed forces have been involved in numerous military crises and wars since independence, including the [[1948 Arab–Israeli War]], [[Egyptian Revolution of 1952]], [[Suez Crisis]], [[North Yemen Civil War]], [[Six-Day War]], [[Nigerian Civil War]], [[War of Attrition]], [[Yom Kippur War]], [[1977 Egyptian bread riots|Egyptian bread riots]], [[1986 Egyptian conscripts riot]], [[Egyptian-Libyan War]], [[Gulf War]], [[war on terror]], [[Egyptian Crisis (2011–present)|Egyptian Crisis]], [[Second Libyan Civil War]], [[Military intervention against ISIL|War on ISIL]] and the [[Sinai insurgency]].

==History==
===Nineteenth century===
The modern Egyptian military was established by [[Muhammad Ali of Egypt|Muhammad Ali]] during his consolidation of power in Egypt, which significantly reduced Ottoman influence and contributed to [[Ottoman Egypt|Egypt]] becoming an autonomous vassal of the [[Ottoman Empire]] and effectively a de facto independent state.

In the early 19th century, [[Muhammad Ali of Egypt]] undertook comprehensive military reforms aimed at establishing a centralized, European-style army capable of securing his territorial ambitions and consolidating his authority over Egypt and beyond. Though his initial campaigns, such as those in Arabia and Greece, were formally conducted on behalf of the [[Ottoman Empire]], Muhammad Ali progressively distanced himself from the [[Sublime Porte]] and expanded Egypt’s military power through independent campaigns.

Central to his military project was the reorganization of the Egyptian army along modern lines. Recruits were placed under strict discipline and surveillance within newly constructed barracks, subject to multiple daily roll calls and corporal punishment, including the use of the [[bastinado]] and [[whipping]].<ref>Khaled Fahmy, ''All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, his Army and the Making of Modern Egypt'' (Cambridge, 1997), 119–147.</ref> Military regulations and codes of conduct were developed to ensure obedience and uniform discipline, while new administrative practices introduced standardized record-keeping, personal identification numbers for soldiers, and hierarchical unit structures. These measures facilitated internal control, particularly in deterring desertion during forced marches or redeployment.<ref>Fahmy, 142–144.</ref>

Initially, Muhammad Ali relied on [[Bedouin]] groups to monitor troops at training camps, but tensions soon arose, prompting a shift toward a system of internment and self-contained oversight within military facilities.<ref>Fahmy, 123–124.</ref> His reforms extended to logistical administration, including the centralization of salaries, distinctions between officers and enlisted men, and the formalization of career military service.
[[File:Egypt under Muhammad Ali Dynasty map en.png|thumb|left|Map of Egypt under Muhammad Ali Dynasty]]
These internal reforms laid the foundation for a series of expansionist campaigns. In 1811, Muhammad Ali launched a campaign into the Arabian Peninsula to suppress the [[First Saudi State]], recapturing the [[Hejaz]] region and eventually defeating the [[House of Saud]] after a prolonged campaign led by his sons, [[Tusun Pasha]] and [[Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt|Ibrahim Pasha]].<ref>Henry Dodwell, ''The Founder of Modern Egypt'' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 43–48.</ref> This was followed by the [[Turco-Egyptian conquest of Sudan (1820–1824)|Turco-Egyptian conquest of Sudan]] (1820–1824), in which Egyptian forces subdued fragmented tribal entities, establishing Egyptian authority in the region and creating a new source of conscripts and slaves for the Egyptian army, including the formation of the ''Gihadiya'' foot regiments.<ref>Emanuel Beška, "Muhammad Ali’s Conquest of Sudan (1820–1824)," Asian and African Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2019), pp. 30–56.</ref>

Muhammad Ali also participated in the suppression of the [[Greek War of Independence]] on behalf of the Ottomans, deploying a large expeditionary force under Ibrahim Pasha. Despite early advances, the Egyptian navy was decisively defeated at the [[Battle of Navarino]] (1827) by a coalition of European powers, costing Egypt its fleet and forcing withdrawal.<ref>Dodwell, 71.</ref>

From 1831 to 1840, Muhammad Ali engaged in two major wars against the Ottoman Empire, seeking to annex [[Syria]] and eventually challenge Ottoman sovereignty. His forces captured much of the Levant and advanced into Anatolia, winning major victories such as the [[Battle of Konya]] (1832) and [[Battle of Nezib]] (1839).<ref>Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, ''Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali'' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).</ref> However, sustained pressure from the European powers led to diplomatic intervention and the signing of the [[Convention of London (1840)]]. Under its terms, Muhammad Ali was forced to relinquish control of most of his conquests in exchange for recognition of hereditary rule over Egypt and [[Sudan]], thus laying the groundwork for Egypt's de facto autonomy within the Ottoman Empire.<ref>Morroe Berger, ''Military Elites and Social Change: Egypt Since Napoleon'' (Princeton: Center for International Studies, 1960), 11.</ref>

Under Muhammad Ali’s successors, the military remained central to the state but faced constraints. During the reign of [[Abbas I of Egypt|Abbas I]] and [[Sa'id of Egypt|Sa'id Pasha]], modernization slowed, although limited reforms were introduced, including early railway construction and the beginning of land and labor reforms.<ref name="Debs42">{{cite book |last=Debs |first=Richard A. |title=Islamic Law and Civil Code: The Law of Property in Egypt |year=2010 |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=978-0-231-15044-6 |page=42}}</ref><ref name="Tignor222">{{cite book |last=Tignor |first=Robert L. |title=Egypt: A Short History |year=2011 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-15307-0 |page=222}}</ref>
[[File:Anglo-egyptian war.jpg|thumb|right|Egyptian soldiers during the [[Anglo-Egyptian War]].]]
The most ambitious military and infrastructural expansions occurred under [[Ismail Pasha]], who restructured the military academies, supported public works, and briefly pursued naval modernization, ordering ironclads and expanding the military's logistical capabilities.<ref name="Tignor223">{{cite book |last=Tignor |first=Robert L. |title=Egypt: A Short History |year=2011 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-15307-0 |page=223}}</ref> Egypt’s military also played a role in territorial expansion, particularly in Sudan and Darfur.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Royal Geographical Society |work=The Times of London |date=11 November 1874}}</ref> However, this coincided with fiscal mismanagement and rising foreign debt, leading to increasing European oversight, culminating in the sale of Egyptian shares in the [[Suez Canal Company]] to Britain in 1879.

Dissatisfaction with foreign influence, combined with longstanding grievances among Egyptian officers, culminated in the [[Urabi Revolt]] (1881–1882), led by [[Ahmed ‘Urabi]]. Originally sparked by resentment against favoritism toward officers of Turkish origin, the movement evolved into a broader nationalist uprising. Despite initial military resistance, Urabi’s forces were ultimately defeated by the [[British Army]] at the [[Battle of Tel-el-Kebir]], leading to the de facto British occupation of Egypt.<ref>{{cite book |last=Cleveland |first=William |title=A History of the Modern Middle East |year=2013 |publisher=Westview Press |page=92}}</ref> Though nominally autonomous, Egypt effectively became a British protectorate until the [[Unilateral Declaration of Egyptian Independence|unilateral declaration of independence]] in 1922.

===Twentieth century===
[[File:ModernEgypt, Opening of Luxor-Aswan rail line, Album-2-BAL-00000606-0008.jpg|thumb|Egyptian infantry form [[honor guard]], 1926]]
By 1914, the Egyptian military functioned largely as a native home-defence and colonial garrison force. It was organized and equipped under British supervision and staffed primarily with British officers. Its structure included infantry battalions, mounted infantry, camel corps units, support services, and irregular militia components.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Wheal |first1=Elizabeth-Anne |last2=Pope |first2=Steven |date=1997 |title=The Macmillan Dictionary of The First World War |publisher=Macmillan |pages=147–148 |isbn=978-0-333-68909-7}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.ottoman-uniforms.com/1883-till-1914-army-of-egypt-infantry/ |title=1883 till 1914 Army of Egypt Infantry |last=Flaherty |first=Chris |website=Ottoman Uniforms |access-date=29 October 2018 |archive-date=29 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181029191536/https://www.ottoman-uniforms.com/1883-till-1914-army-of-egypt-infantry/ |url-status=dead }}</ref>

The 1922 declaration of Egyptian independence formally ended the British protectorate but still left Egypt’s sovereignty constrained, particularly in military affairs. Britain retained control over Egypt’s defense, foreign relations, and Sudan, effectively limiting Egypt’s autonomy and perpetuating British military presence and influence. Although the declaration ended the legal fiction of Ottoman rule and met some nationalist demands, it failed to satisfy broader aspirations for full sovereignty. The resulting frustrations over continued British dominance, especially regarding the military, fueled further nationalist opposition and anti-British sentiment.<ref name="King">{{cite book |last=King |first=Joan Wucher |title=Historical Dictionary of Egypt |series=Books of Lasting Value |year=1989 |orig-year=First published 1984 |publisher=[[AUC Press|American University in Cairo Press]] |isbn=978-977-424-213-7 |pages=259–260}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Elkins |first=Caroline |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3icqEAAAQBAJ |title=Legacy of Violence: A History of the British Empire |date=2022 |publisher=Knopf Doubleday |isbn=978-0-593-32008-2 |pages=147 |language=en}}</ref>

The [[Egyptian Air Force]] was initially established in 1930 as the Egyptian Army Air Force and formally inaugurated in 1932. In 1937, it was separated from army command and reorganized as an independent service under the name Royal Egyptian Air Force, becoming the third branch of the Egyptian military after the army and navy.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.geocities.com/acrawford0/Egypt.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091021080301/http://geocities.com/acrawford0/Egypt.html |archive-date=21 October 2009 |title=Royal Egyptian Air Force Gladiators |website=www.webcitation.org |access-date=19 April 2020}}</ref>

During [[World War I]], Egypt’s strategic importance increased significantly due to the threat posed by Ottoman incursions across the Sinai. Although such offensives were ultimately repulsed, Egyptian forces remained focused primarily on internal security and regional garrison duties, especially in Sudan. By 1917, approximately 15,000 Egyptian volunteers were serving in the regular military, while over 98,000 Egyptians served in logistical capacities through the Egyptian Labour Corps and Egyptian Camel Transport Corps.<ref name="Falls365">{{cite book |last=Falls |first=Cyril |title=Military Operations Egypt and Palestine: From June 1917 to the End of the War |year=1930 |publisher=HM Stationery Office |pages=365}}</ref><ref name="Falls367">{{cite book |last=Falls |first=Cyril |title=Military Operations Egypt and Palestine: From June 1917 to the End of the War |year=1930 |publisher=HM Stationery Office |pages=367}}</ref>

In the interwar period, although military service was technically compulsory, the armed forces remained limited in size and scope. By 1939, the total strength was modest, and British oversight remained extensive. Under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, Britain retained the right to station troops in Egypt for the protection of the Suez Canal and continued to exert influence over training and operations.<ref name="Metz1990">{{cite book |editor=Metz, Helen Chapin |title=Egypt: A Country Study |publisher=Library of Congress |year=1990 |page=295}}</ref>
[[File:ModernEgypt, Farouk I in Military Uniform, DHP13655-10-17 01.jpg|thumb|left|[[King Farouk I]] inspecting soldiers in 1942]]
At the onset of the [[World War II]], Egypt's military capacity remained limited. Following the Italian invasion of western Egypt in 1940, Egypt broke relations with the [[Axis powers]] and increasingly aligned itself with British military operations. While Egypt's forces were not the primary combatants, they contributed to British-led operations, including in the [[Western Desert campaign]]. Axis forces under General [[Erwin Rommel]] made temporary advances into Egyptian territory before being repelled at the [[Second Battle of El Alamein]].

By the late 1940s, internal dissatisfaction with military leadership was growing. Many younger officers, particularly those educated in Britain, became disillusioned with the entrenched senior command, which was perceived as corrupt and incompetent, accusations heightened by Egypt's poor performance in the [[1948 Arab–Israeli War]]. Although a partial purge of the senior officer corps was carried out in 1950, many of the dismissed officers were later reinstated by royal decree, further fueling discontent within the ranks.<ref>{{cite web|author=Alta F. Fowler|title=No. 997 Memorandum by Alta F. Fowler of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs to the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs |work=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2 |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p2/d997 |date=July 28, 1952 |location=Washington DC}}</ref>

In an effort to assert greater independence and reduce British influence, King Farouk dismissed the British Military Mission in 1950 and invited former German [[Wehrmacht]] officers, including Generals [[Wilhelm Fahrmbacher]] and [[Oskar Munzel]], to serve as advisors to the Egyptian military establishment. These advisors remained in the country until 1958.<ref>{{cite book|last=Gerolymatos|first=Andre|title=Castles Made of Sand: A Century of Anglo-American Espionage and Intervention in the Middle East|publisher=Thomas Martin Books/St. Martin's Press|location=New York|date=2010|pages=135, 142}}</ref>

[[File:Free Officers, 1953.jpg|thumb|The [[Free Officers movement (Egypt)|Free Officers]] in 1953, a year after toppling the monarchy]]
The Egyptian military’s failure in the [[1948 Arab–Israeli War]] was a catalyst for the formation of the [[Free Officers Movement (Egypt)|Free Officers]] led by [[Muhammad Naguib]] and [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]]. In the [[Egyptian coup d'état of 1952]], they overthrew King Farouk and initiated sweeping reforms within the military and state. 

One of the early achievements of the new regime was the signing of the [[Anglo–Egyptian Agreement of 1954]], which mandated the phased withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal zone. The agreement allowed for continued British access to the base under specific circumstances and stipulated complete withdrawal by June 1956.<ref>{{cite web |title=Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Egyptian Government regarding the Suez Canal Base |url=https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%20210/0210.pdf |website=United Nations Treaty Series |access-date=5 April 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210220000000/https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%20210/0210.pdf |archive-date=20 February 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Butler |first=J. R. M. |title=Grand Strategy, Volume II: September 1939 – June 1941 |publisher=Her Majesty's Stationery Office |year=2002 |page=112}}</ref>

In 1956, the Egyptian Armed Forces were thrust into a major international conflict during the [[Suez Crisis]], also known as the Tripartite Aggression.<ref name="Ross2004">{{Cite book |last=Ross |first=Stewart |title=Causes and Consequences of the Arab–Israeli Conflict |url=https://archive.org/details/causesconsequenc0000ross_w6z0/page/76/mode/2up |date=2004 |url-access=registration |publisher=Evans Brothers |isbn=978-0-2375-2585-9 |pages=76ff}}</ref><ref name="Isacoff2006">{{Cite book |last=Isacoff |first=Jonathan B. |title=Writing the Arab–Israeli Conflict: Pragmatism and Historical Inquiry |date=2006 |publisher=Lexington Books |isbn=978-0-7391-1273-1 |pages=79ff}}</ref><ref name="Caplan1983">{{Cite book |last=Caplan |first=Neil |title=Futile Diplomacy: Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1954–1956 |date=1983 |publisher=Psychology Press |isbn=978-0-7146-4757-9 |pages=15}}</ref> The crisis erupted after President [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] revoked the concession of the Anglo-French owned [[Suez Canal Company]] and transferred canal operation to the state-owned [[Suez Canal Authority]], prompting a coordinated military response from [[Israel]], the [[United Kingdom]], and [[France]]. On 29 October, Israeli forces invaded the [[Sinai Peninsula]], followed days later by Anglo-French landings in the Canal Zone. The stated aim was to separate the combatants and secure freedom of navigation through the canal, but the operation was widely perceived as a ploy to topple Nasser and restore Western control over the vital waterway.

In the early 1950s, particularly after the [[1952 Egyptian revolution|revolution of 1952]], politics rather than military competence was the main criterion for promotion.{{sfn|Varble|2003|p=17}} Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer in particular was a purely political appointment, whose approach would lead to large-scale problems during the Suez War. Promotions were often based on loyalty rather than merit, and a rigid divide between officers and enlisted men contributed to widespread dysfunction.{{sfn|Varble|2003|p=17}}{{sfn|Varble|2003|p=18}} Although some Egyptian defensive positions, such as at Abu Agelia and Mitla Pass, were organized and offered resistance, the Israeli forces quickly seized the initiative and routed Egyptian positions across the Sinai.{{sfn|Tsouras|1994|p=127}} Nasser ordered a general withdrawal from the peninsula, which allowed Israeli troops to advance rapidly toward the Suez Canal.

The invasion was soon halted under intense international pressure. The [[United States]],{{sfn|Tsouras|1994|p=127}} [[Soviet Union]], and [[United Nations]] condemned the attack, forcing a ceasefire by 7 November. Although Egypt suffered tactical defeats, the crisis ultimately elevated Nasser’s stature in the Arab world and signaled the decline of British and French influence in the Middle East.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Abernathy |first=David |title=The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415–1980 |date=2000 |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=9780300093148 |page=CXXXIX}}</ref><ref name="Economist2006">{{cite news |title=An affair to remember |date=27 June 2006 |url=https://www.economist.com/special-report/2006/07/27/an-affair-to-remember |access-date=3 September 2014 |newspaper=The Economist}}</ref> The Egyptian Armed Forces emerged from the conflict with considerable reputational damage, having revealed deep structural weaknesses, but the political outcome was widely seen as a strategic victory for Egypt. 
[[File:Egyptian army in sanaa 1962.jpg|thumb|left|An Egyptian armored column in Yemen, 1962]]
During the [[North Yemen Civil War]] that began in 1962, the Egyptian Armed Forces undertook one of their most extensive foreign deployments, dispatching tens of thousands of troops in support of republican forces against the royalists backed by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel.{{sfn|Sandler|2002|page=977}}<ref name="ben1987">{{cite book |last1=Beit-Hallahmi |first1=Benjamin |title=The Israeli connection: who Israel arms and why |date=1987 |publisher=Pantheon Books |location=New York |isbn=978-0394559223 |page=[https://archive.org/details/israeliconnectio00beit/page/17 17] |edition=1st |url=https://archive.org/details/israeliconnectio00beit |url-access=registration |access-date=28 September 2019}}</ref> "In addition to Egyptian aid, the Soviet Union supplied 24 MiG-19s to the republicans."{{sfn|Sandler|2002|page=977}} Authorized by President [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]], the campaign involved sustained aerial and ground operations with Soviet support. Within months of the initial deployment in 1962, Nasser recognized that the campaign would demand far more than anticipated and sought a face-saving exit strategy, but the scope of engagement continued to escalate.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/28/how-yemen-was-once-egypts-vietnam/|title=How Yemen was once Egypt's Vietnam|newspaper=Washington Post}}</ref>

Fewer than 5,000 troops were initially deployed in October 1962, rising to 15,000 by December, 36,000 by late 1963, and 50,000 by late 1964. The peak came in late 1965, with approximately 55,000 personnel divided across 13 infantry regiments, an artillery division, a tank division from the [[Egyptian Armoured Corps]], and multiple Special Forces and airborne regiments. Egyptian field commanders reported logistical constraints, notably the absence of reliable topographical maps during the early phase of operations.<ref>{{Cite news | issue = Jan–Feb, 2004 | last = Aboul-Enein | first = Youssef | title = The Egyptian–Yemen War: Egyptian Perspectives on Guerrilla Warfare | work = Infantry Magazine | access-date = 5 August 2016 | date = 2004-01-01 | url = https://www.idmarch.org/document/Gamal+Abdel+Nasser/1aFl0-show/The+Egyptian-Yemen+War%29%3A+Egyptian+Perspectives+on+Guerrilla+Warfare+By+Lt.+Cdr.+Youssef+Aboul-Enein+Lt.+Cdr.+Youssef+Aboul-Enein+is+currently+serving+in+the+U.S.+Navy+as+the+country+director+for+North+Africa+and | archive-date = 2016-09-21 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160921144955/https://www.idmarch.org/document/Gamal+Abdel+Nasser/1aFl0-show/The+Egyptian-Yemen+War):+Egyptian+Perspectives+on+Guerrilla+Warfare+By+Lt.+Cdr.+Youssef+Aboul-Enein+Lt.+Cdr.+Youssef+Aboul-Enein+is+currently+serving+in+the+U.S.+Navy+as+the+country+director+for+North+Africa+and | url-status = dead }}</ref> The prolonged and resource-intensive conflict strained Egypt’s military capabilities and readiness, contributing to its strategic vulnerability ahead of Israel's [[Six-Day War|invasion in 1967]].{{sfn|Sandler|2002|page=977}}<ref name="ben1987"/>

In the period leading up to the [[Six-Day War]] in 1967, the Egyptian Armed Forces were organized into four regional military commands, Suez, Sinai, the Nile Delta, and the Nile Valley up to the border with [[Sudan]], while the remaining 75 percent of Egypt’s territory fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Frontier Corps.<ref>John Keegan, ''World Armies'', Second Edition, MacMillan, 1983, p. 165 {{ISBN|978-0-333-34079-0}}</ref> Tensions escalated in May 1967 when President [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] announced the closure of the [[Straits of Tiran]] to Israeli shipping, an action Israel interpreted as a [[casus belli]] and responded to by mobilizing its forces.{{sfn|Dupuy|1978|p=228}}

In response, Egypt deployed three battalions of commandos to [[Amman]] in coordination with [[Jordan]] on 3 June. According to historian [[Trevor N. Dupuy]], drawing on the memoirs of King [[Hussein of Jordan]], Nasser’s intent was not to initiate a war but to achieve political and rhetorical leverage.{{sfn|Dupuy|1978|pp=229–230}} Nevertheless, Israel proceeded with military action on 5 June.

At the time, the Egyptian Army had seven divisions positioned in the Sinai, two armored and five infantry, under the newly established Sinai Front Command, led by General Abdel Mohsin Murtagi, who had recently returned from Yemen.{{sfn|Tsouras|1994|p=191}}<ref>Dupuy (1978) lists the 2nd, 3rd, 7th Infantry Division, 6th Mechanised, 20th Palestinian, and 4th Armoured, plus an armoured task force. Dupuy, 239–240.</ref> In the weeks before the outbreak of hostilities, Field Marshal [[Abdel Hakim Amer]] implemented wide-ranging changes to the command structure, replacing both the commanders and chiefs of staff in six of the seven divisions. Scholars such as [[Kenneth Pollack]] argue that these changes aimed to enhance operational effectiveness by placing veterans of the Yemeni conflict in key leadership roles.{{sfn|Pollack|2002|p=60}}

On the morning of 5 June, Israel launched a coordinated military offensive, targeting Egyptian airbases and achieving a substantial degradation of Egypt’s air power early in the conflict. Ground forces soon advanced into the [[Sinai Peninsula]], where Egyptian units faced mounting pressure across several fronts. Amid the deteriorating situation, Field Marshal Amer issued an order for a general withdrawal to the Suez Canal.{{sfn|Dupuy|1978|pp=267–269}} The execution of this withdrawal, conducted under fire and without coherent coordination, contributed to considerable disruption among Egyptian forces, who sustained further losses during the retreat.{{cn|date=April 2025}}
[[File:Egyptianbridge.jpg|thumb|left|Egyptian military vehicles crossing the [[Suez Canal]] over one of the bridgeheads during [[Operation Badr (1973)|Operation Badr]].]]
In July 1972, President [[Anwar Sadat]] expelled [[Soviet Armed Forces]] advisors from Egypt.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Colonel E.V. Badolato|title=A Clash of Cultures: The Expulsion of Soviet Military Advisors from Egypt|journal=Naval War College Review|volume=37|issue=2|date=March–April 1984|pages=69–81|jstor=44642308}}</ref> On 6 October 1973, during the [[Yom Kippur]] holiday, which coincided with the 10th day of [[Ramadan]], [[Egypt]] and [[Syria]] launched a surprise offensive to recover occupied territory, initiating the [[October War]].{{sfnp|el-Gamasy|1993|p=181}} In the Sinai, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal as part of [[Operation Badr (1973)|Operation Badr]] and established positions on the eastern bank, which it held throughout the conflict.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=467}} On 14 October, Egyptian forces advanced deeper into the peninsula to relieve pressure on the Syrian front; however, the Israelis halted this offensive after three days. Seizing the initiative, Israeli forces crossed the canal through a single crossing point at [[Abu Sultan Air Base|Deversoir]],{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=393}} cleared during the [[Battle of the Chinese Farm]], and proceeded to advance north toward [[Ismailia]] and [[Port Said]] to isolate the Egyptian Second Army, south toward Suez to isolate the Third Army, and westward towards [[Cairo]] but were held at Nefalia.{{sfnmp|Herzog|1975|1pp=236–237|Pollack|2002|2p=122}} They encountered fierce resistance on all fronts and Israel suffered a major setback northwards at the [[Battle of Ismailia]].<ref>[https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a324335.pdf] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200126235235/https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a324335.pdf|date=2020-01-26}} "The experience represents one of the most humiliating failures in Israeli modern history .. Analysis reveals there were three main factors that led to this stunning defeat."</ref> A UN-brokered ceasefire took effect on 22 October, only to collapse soon after amid mutual accusations of violations. When hostilities resumed, Israel managed to achieve a breakthrough southward, effectively threatening the Third Army’s supply lines, but was ultimately unable to capture [[Battle of Suez|Suez]] despite multiple attempts.<ref>{{Cite web | last1 = Spencer | first1 = John |last2=Geroux |first2= Jayson |date=2022-01-13 |title=Urban Warfare Project Case Study #4: Battle of Suez City. |url=https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project-case-study-4-battle-of-suez-city/ |access-date=2024-09-28 |website=Modern War Institute |language=en-US}}</ref> A second ceasefire on 25 October ended the fighting.{{sfnmp|Hammad|2002|1pp=237–276|Gawrych|1996|2p=60}}
[[File:An Egyptian ranger battalion stands in formation during Operation Desert Shield 2.JPEG|thumb|right|Egyptian soldiers in the [[Gulf War]]]]
When Sadat and the Israelis concluded the [[Camp David Accords]] in September 1978, part of the ''quid pro quo'' for Egypt’s acceptance of peace was the provision of substantial U.S. military assistance. Today, the U.S. provides an annual assistance package often quoted at a [[Real versus nominal value (economics)|nominal]] $1.3&nbsp;billion to the Egyptian Armed Forces.<ref>Robert Springborg, "Learning from Failure," 2010, 103; {{cite news|title=Scenesetter: President Mubarak's visit to Washington (09CAIRO874)|date=2009-05-19|publisher=US Department of State (cable)}}</ref> This level is second only to that provided to [[Israel]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.couriermail.com.au/ipad/nation-locked-in-a-deadly-stalemate/story-fn6ck51p-1225997761161|title=Nation locked in a deadly stalemate|work=The Courier-Mail|author=David Costello|date=February 1, 2011|access-date=2011-02-11}}</ref>

Scholars such as [[Kenneth Pollack]], DeAtkine, and Robert Springborg have proposed multiple explanations for the challenges that Arab (and Egyptian) armies encountered in conflicts with Israel from 1948 through the 1970s and beyond. In particular, they suggest that from 1948 onward, junior officers often exhibited limited willingness to manoeuvre, innovate, or act independently.{{sfn|Pollack|2002|p=146}} Ground forces units reportedly struggled with manipulation of information and insufficient attention to intelligence gathering and unbiased analysis. Observers note that elements from two Egyptian divisions sent to [[Saudi Arabia]] in 1990–91, accompanied by U.S. personnel during the 1991 Gulf War, frequently reported intense combat despite facing minimal or no resistance, whether or not U.S. military personnel or journalists were present.{{sfn|Pollack|2002|p=144}} Later studies, such as those by Springborg, indicate that these patterns continued within the Egyptian Armed Forces into the twenty-first century.<ref>Springborg, Robert. "Learning from failure: Egypt." The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations. London: Routledge (2013): 93–109.</ref>

=== Twenty-first century ===
[[File:Multi-national military scenario for BRIGHT STAR 25 (9313657).jpg|thumb|An Egyptian soldier during a military exercise at Mohamed Naguib Military Base]]
During the [[2011 Egyptian revolution]], the Egyptian Army was deployed to restore order in major cities. On 31 January 2011, Israeli media reported that the 9th, 2nd, and 7th Divisions were ordered into [[Cairo]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mako.co.il/news-specials/egypt/Article-64af2c4c648dd21004.htm|title=צפו: סיור וירטואלי במוקדי המהפכה|date=30 January 2011|access-date=27 August 2016}}</ref> Subsequently, on 3 July 2013, the Armed Forces removed President [[Mohamed Morsi]] from office following mass protests demanding his resignation, an action widely described as a [[2013 Egyptian coup d'état|coup d’état]].<ref>{{cite news|title=Coup topples Egypt's Morsy; deposed president under 'house arrest'|url=https://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/meast/egypt-protests|first=Ben|last=Wedeman|work=CNN|date=4 July 2013|access-date=8 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304090828/http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/meast/egypt-protests|archive-date=4 March 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> In the days that followed, several violent incidents occurred, including the [[Republican Guard headquarters clashes]] on 8 July 2013, which resulted in the deaths of 61 protesters.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/12/egypt-raba-killings-likely-crimes-against-humanity|title=Egypt: Rab'a Killings Likely Crimes against Humanity|date=12 August 2014|website=Human Rights Watch}}</ref> On 14 August 2013, security forces, including the army and police, carried out the dispersal of pro-Morsi sit-ins at Rabaa and Nahda Squares, resulting in large-scale casualties. Estimates of the death toll vary, with some reports stating over 2,600 fatalities.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/201381522364486906.html |title=Egypt's Brotherhood to hold 'march of anger' |publisher=Al Jazeera |date=16 August 2013 |access-date=18 August 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130816123944/http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/201381522364486906.html |archive-date=16 August 2013 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=115257 |title=NSF spokesman quits over Rabaa, Nahda massacres |work=World Bulletin |date=14 August 2013 |access-date=18 August 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131002092241/http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=115257 |archive-date=2 October 2013 |url-status=usurped }}</ref> The events of 14 August 2013 are considered the deadliest day in Egypt since the 2011 revolution.<ref>{{cite news|title=Scores dead in Egypt after security forces launch assault on protesters' camp |first=Abigail |last=Hauslohner |author2=Sharaf al-Hourani |date=14 August 2013 |newspaper=The Washington Post|access-date=14 August 2013 |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/egyptian-security-forces-move-against-protesters-camps/2013/08/14/bc079750-04a7-11e3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_story.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130815001337/http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/egyptian-security-forces-move-against-protesters-camps/2013/08/14/bc079750-04a7-11e3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_story.html |archive-date=15 August 2013 |url-status=live}}</ref> The international response included widespread condemnation from foreign governments and human rights organizations.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/201381505130985967.html|title=Global condemnation of Egypt crackdown|publisher=Al Jazeera|date=15 August 2013|access-date=7 September 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130825125046/http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/201381505130985967.html|archive-date=25 August 2013|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/79105/Egypt/Politics-/Most-world-states-condemn-Egypts-violence-.aspx|title=Most world states condemn Egypt's violence|newspaper=Al-Ahram|date=15 August 2013|access-date=7 September 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130823002801/http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/79105/Egypt/Politics-/Most-world-states-condemn-Egypts-violence-.aspx|archive-date=23 August 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>

Since the [[2013 Egyptian coup d'etat]], the Egyptian Armed Forces has maintained a prominent role within the state, enjoying a high degree of institutional autonomy and influence across multiple sectors.<ref name="NYT 2011">{{cite news|last=Cambanis|first=Thanassis|title=Succession Gives Army a Stiff Test in Egypt|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html?_r=1&ref=global-home&pagewanted=all|access-date=11 September 2010|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|date=11 September 2010}}</ref> The military also holds a substantial presence in the economy, participating in areas such as infrastructure, housing, consumer goods, and tourism,<ref name="NYT 2011" /> and possesses large real estate holdings. Information regarding its budget, leadership, and force size remains largely undisclosed and is considered classified.<ref name="NYT 2011" /> 
[[File:Bright Star 18 Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise rehearsal 180916-Z-IX878-0026.jpg|thumb|right|An Egyptian [[M1 Abrams]] tank]]
Estimates of the military's economic reach vary; journalist Joshua Hammer reported that the armed forces may control up to 40% of the Egyptian economy,<ref>[http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/aug/18/egypt-who-calls-shots/ Egypt: Who Calls the Shots?] Joshua Hammer | nybooks.com | 18 August 2011</ref> though such figures have been criticized for lacking empirical foundations and for rarely being grounded in systematic analysis.<ref name=carniege>{{cite web | url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/11/owners-of-the-republic-an-anatomy-of-egypts-military-economy?lang=en&center=middle-east | title=Owners of the Republic: An Anatomy of Egypt’s Military Economy | website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | date=November 2019 | access-date=April 4, 2025 }}</ref> These estimates often fail to distinguish between different forms of military economic engagement, such as the annual output of goods and services versus ownership of physical assets.<ref name=carniege/> They also tend to conflate three distinct domains of economic involvement: formally registered military-owned enterprises under the [[Ministry of Military Production (Egypt)|Ministry of Military Production]], the [[Arab Organization for Industrialization]], and other affiliated agencies whose actual production is significantly more modest than often portrayed; a wider group of public and private sector entities led or influenced by retired military officers, whose revenues do not belong to the armed forces; and regulatory privileges that generate income through licensing, leasing, tolls, and partnerships with national and international firms.<ref name=carniege/> 

In 2016, President [[Abdel Fattah el-Sisi]] and military officials estimated that the formal military economy accounted for between 1% and 2% of Egypt’s [[GDP]], likely encompassing the combined output of military agencies and revenues from public works. According to [[Yezid Sayigh]], senior fellow at the [[The Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center|Carnegie Middle East Center]], this estimate is likely closer to the actual scale of the military's formal economic activity.<ref name=carniege/> While the military has expanded its access to extra-budgetary resources and assumed a growing role in state capital expenditure since 2013, analysts argue that its economic footprint is generally smaller, less efficient, and less productive than widely believed, though still of considerable significance.<ref name=carniege/>
[[File:USS Delbert D. Black (DDG 119), top, is underway with the Egyptian navy ships ENS Gamal Adbel Nasser (L 1010) and ENS Al-Galala (FFG 1002) in the Mediterranean Sea.jpg|thumb|left|Egyptian [[Mistral class]] [[ENS Gamal Abdel Nasser]] (middle) sails alongside [[ENS Al-Galala]] (bottom) and American [[USS Delbert D. Black]] (top) and in the Mediterranean Sea, August 29, 2022, during joint operations to enhance regional maritime security.]]
By 2018, analysts observed no overt signs of institutional fragmentation within the Armed Forces. According to Hussein and Martino, the military's entrenched dominance in political and security affairs may be attributed to a combination of factors: its expansive economic interests, long-standing national legitimacy reinforced by its role in welfare and development programs, and a conscription-based recruitment system that facilitates cross-class integration within the armed services.{{sfn|Hussein|Martino|2019}}

In 2019, it was reported that the Egyptian Armed Forces had begun a broad modernization effort under President [[Abdel Fattah el-Sisi]], following a long period of operational stagnation, since the 1970s.<ref name="modernizationcarniege">{{cite web |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/02/the-egyptian-military-a-slumbering-giant-awakes?lang=en&center=middle-east |title=The Egyptian Military: A Slumbering Giant Awakes |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=February 2019 |access-date=2025-04-04}}</ref> This initiative has included a notable increase in military procurement, with purchases from France, Russia, and Germany that have added new fighter aircraft, naval vessels, submarines, and surveillance systems to Egypt’s inventory.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/> These acquisitions have supplemented longstanding military assistance from the United States and reflect a shift toward a more diversified supply strategy.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/> Parallel efforts have focused on doctrinal and structural reforms, including greater emphasis on interoperability, air mobility, maritime operations, and special forces.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/> Joint exercises with both regional and international partners have also expanded during this period.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/> However, the modernization program faces ongoing structural obstacles, such as entrenched command hierarchies, insufficient training regimes, and limited investment in logistical sustainment.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/> Despite these limitations, the current scope of reform is regarded as the most extensive military overhaul in Egypt in decades.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/>

In March 2021, [[Human Rights Watch]] published a report alleging that the Egyptian Armed Forces had committed violations of international law during operations in North Sinai, including the demolition of more than 12,300 residential and commercial structures and the clearance of approximately 6,000 hectares of farmland since 2013.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/17/egypt-massive-sinai-demolitions-likely-war-crimes|title=Egypt: Massive Sinai Demolitions Likely War Crimes|date=17 March 2021|accessdate=17 March 2021|publisher=Human Rights Watch}}</ref>

== Structure ==
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief is the [[President of Egypt]], currently [[Abdel Fattah el-Sisi]]. All branches, forces, armies, regions, bodies, organs and departments of the Armed Forces are under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, who is at the same time the [[Ministry of Defence and Military Production]].

The [[Supreme Council of the Armed Forces]] (SCAF) is composed of 23 members, chaired by the [[Ministry of Defence and Military Production|Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence]], and is represented by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Commanders of military areas ([[Central Military Region (Egypt)|central]], [[Central Military Region (Egypt)|northern]], [[Western Military Region (Egypt)|western]], [[Southern Military Region (Egypt)|southern]]), heads of bodies ([[Military Operations Authority (Egypt)|operations]], [[Egyptian Armaments Authority|armament]], [[Armed Forces Logistics Authority (Egypt)|logistics]], [[Armed Forces Engineering Authority (Egypt)|engineering]], [[Armed Forces Training Authority (Egypt)|training]], [[Armed Forces Finance Authority (Egypt)|finance]], [[Military justice (Egypt)|military justice]], [[Armed Forces Management and Administration (Egypt)|Armed Forces Management and Administration]]), directors of many departments (officers and [[Military Intelligence and Reconnaissance (Egypt)|Military Intelligence and Reconnaissance]]), and assistant secretary of defence for constitutional and legal affairs. The Secretary of the Board is the Secretary General of the Ministry of Defence.

===Army===
[[File:CENTCOM Partner Nations Attend Static Display At Bright Star 2023.webp|thumb|Egyptian soldiers march during [[Exercise Bright Star#Bright Star 23|Bright Star 23]] static display]]
A separate command for the [[Egyptian Army|Egyptian Land Forces]] was created on March 25, 1964.<ref>{{Cite web |date=10 May 2022 |title=القوات المسلحة-الهيئة العامة للإستعلامات |url=https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/234164/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9?lang=ar |website=Egypt State Information Service}}</ref> It was officially abolished after the [[Six-Day War|Six-Day War of 1967]], and the command of land forces was returned directly to the [[Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (Egypt)|Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces]].<ref name="Gwady">[[Muhammed Gwady]], ''The Road to Setback - Memoirs of Egyptian Military Leaders 1967'' (ar: "الطريق إلى النكسة - مذكرات قادة العسكرية المصرية "1967), 2000 edition, 455 pages, ''Dar al-Khayal''.</ref>{{Rp|pages=304:307}}<ref name="Gwady" />{{Rp|pages=142:144}} The ground formations are divided into the [[East Military Canal Zone (Egypt)|forces east of the canal]], under whose command the two armies (the [[Second Army (Egypt)|Second]] and the [[Third Army (Egypt)|Third]]) and the military regions ([[Central Military Region (Egypt)|central]], [[Northern Military Region (Egypt)|northern]], [[Western Military Region (Egypt)|western]], and [[Southern Military Region (Egypt)|southern]]), in contrast to the rest of the forces, bodies, departments, and auxiliary agencies.

Conscripts for the [[Egyptian Army]] and other service branches without a university degree serve three years as enlisted soldiers. Conscripts with a General Secondary School Degree serve two years as enlisted personnel. Conscripts with a university degree serve one year as enlisted personnel or three years as a reserve officer. Officers for the army are trained at the [[Egyptian Military Academy]]. The IISS estimated in 2020 that the Army numbered 90–120,000, with 190–220,000 conscripts, a total of 310,000.<ref name=IISS2020E>IISS The Military Balance 2020, p. 372</ref>

===Air Force===
[[File:Egyptian Mirage 5 at Cairo-West 1985.JPEG|thumb|Egyptian Mirage V at Cairo-West air base, 1985]]
The Egyptian Air Force (EAF), a key branch of the Egyptian Armed Forces, operates a diverse array of aircraft sourced from the United States, France, Russia, and other countries. Its mainstay platform is the [[F-16 Fighting Falcon]], with Egypt having received 220 aircraft as of 2015, including Block 52 variants.<ref name="auto1">{{Cite web|title=EGYPT F-16 Program {{!}} Turkish Aerospace|url=https://www.tusas.com/en/product/egypt-f-16-program|access-date=2020-09-12|website=www.tusas.com|language=en}}</ref><ref name="auto">{{Cite web|title=F-16 Air Forces - Egypt|url=http://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article4.html|access-date=2020-09-23|website=www.f-16.net}}</ref> 

Since the mid-2010s, Egypt has pursued a comprehensive modernization of its air force to enhance combat readiness, diversify procurement sources, and replace aging fleets.<ref name=airforcemodernization>{{cite web |url=https://www.military.africa/2025/02/israel-wary-of-egypts-burgeoning-air-power/ |title=Israel Wary of Egypt’s Burgeoning Air Power |website=Military Africa |date=February 2025 |access-date=5 April 2025}}</ref> A central component of this effort was the 2015 agreement with France for the acquisition of 24 [[Dassault Rafale]] fighter jets, followed by a second deal in 2021 for an additional 30 units, bringing the total to 54. These aircraft are stationed at [[Gebel el Basur Air Base|Gebel El Basur]] and are equipped with advanced weapon systems supplied by [[MBDA]] and [[Safran Electronics & Defense]], significantly improving Egypt’s multirole strike capabilities.<ref name=airforcemodernization/><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defense/exportation-du-rafale-les-inquietudes-de-l-armee-de-l-air-482410.html|work=La Tribune|title=Exportation du Rafale : les inquiétudes de l'armée de l'air|date=9 June 2015|access-date=16 June 2015|archive-url=https://archive.today/20150615182756/http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defense/exportation-du-rafale-les-inquietudes-de-l-armee-de-l-air-482410.html|archive-date=15 June 2015}}</ref><ref name="dassault">{{cite news|url=https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-05-04/new-rafale-fighter-jet-deal-between-france-egypt-to-see-first-deliveries-from-2024-french-official|title=Cementing Egypt Security Ties, France Seals Large Warplane Deal|date=4 May 2021|access-date=8 May 2021}}</ref>

Complementing these are 46 [[MiG-29|MiG-29M/M2]] fighters acquired from Russia,<ref name="46 MiG-29M/M2s">{{cite news|url=http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2015/05/25/593348-soglasovan-kontrakt-na-postavku-46-istrebitelei-mig-29-v-egipet|title=Согласован контракт на поставку 46 истребителей МиГ-29 в Египет|work=vedomosti.ru|date=24 May 2015|access-date=28 February 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180626164540/https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2015/05/25/593348-soglasovan-kontrakt-na-postavku-46-istrebitelei-mig-29-v-egipet|archive-date=26 June 2018}}</ref> and legacy platforms such as the [[Mirage 2000]], [[MiG-21]], [[F-7 Skybolt]], and [[Mirage V]], though many older aircraft have been retired. The EAF’s rotary wing assets include 46 [[AH-64 Apache]] helicopters upgraded to the AH-64D variant,<ref name="boeing.com">{{Cite web|url=http://www.boeing.com/rotorcraft/military/ah64d/news/2001/q4/nr_011203n.htm|title=Boeing: Boeing, U.S. Army Sign Contract for 35 Egyptian AH-64D Apaches|access-date=3 July 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071111225920/http://www.boeing.com/rotorcraft/military/ah64d/news/2001/q4/nr_011203n.htm|archive-date=11 November 2007}}</ref> as well as 42 [[Kamov Ka-52]] from Russia. The EAF also operates airborne early warning aircraft such as the [[E-2C Hawkeye]] and upgraded F-16s equipped with AGM-84 Harpoon capabilities.
[[File:Egyptian air force pilot.jpg|thumb|left|An Egyptian F16C Pilot]]
Efforts to modernize existing platforms have included the integration of Emirati-supplied Al Tariq precision-guided munitions onto Egypt’s Mirage 2000s, and similar upgrades on later-block F-16Cs.<ref name=airforcemodernization/>

Egypt has also explored expanding its fixed-wing fleet with platforms from multiple suppliers. Planned acquisitions included 24 [[Eurofighter Typhoons]] and 24 [[M-346]] jet trainers from Italy, although these deals were not finalized.<ref name=airforcemodernization/> More recently, Egypt has shown interest in acquiring Chinese [[J-10C]] and [[Shenyang J-31|J-31]] fighter aircraft, potentially to further diversify its arsenal and reduce reliance on traditional Western suppliers.<ref name=airforcemodernization/>

While Egypt has historically faced US-imposed limitations in its access to long-range air-to-air weaponry, recent procurement choices and diversification strategies suggest a growing emphasis on achieving technological parity with regional air forces. This shift in air defense posture reflects a broader goal of reinforcing deterrence and ensuring greater operational independence.<ref name=airforcemodernization/>

In 2024 Israeli media reported that Egypt now possesses long-range [[Meteor (missile)|Meteor]] air-to-air missiles, capable of striking targets beyond visual range at supersonic speeds with high precision and a range of over 150 kilometres.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20241119-israel-expresses-concern-about-egypts-long-range-air-to-air-missiles/ |title=Israel expresses concern about Egypt’s long-range air-to-air missiles |website=Middle East Monitor |date=19 November 2024 |access-date=5 April 2025}}</ref> Egypt has also received a significant amount of Russian [[R-77 (missile)|R-77]] beyond visual range air-to-air missiles as part of its MiG-29M/M2 deliveries.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/aerospace-aerospace/egyptian-mig-29-deliveries-concluded-as-su-35-deliveries-begin/ |title=Egyptian MiG-29 deliveries concluded as Su-35 deliveries begin |website=DefenceWeb |date=20 April 2021 |access-date=5 April 2025}}</ref>

For training, the EAF fields Grob G-115 and K-8 Karakorum aircraft,<ref name=autogenerated2>{{Cite web|url=http://www.scramble.nl/eg.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20031216161315/http://www.scramble.nl/eg.htm|url-status=dead|title=Scramble on the Web – Egyptian Air Force|website=www.scramble.nl|archive-date=16 December 2003}}</ref> and has developed UAV capabilities through various private sector and international partnerships.<ref name="sagem.com">{{cite news|url=https://www.safran-electronics-defense.com/media/20150924_sagem-and-aoi-aircraft-factory-sign-collaboration-agreement-drones-egyptian-defense-market?shadowbox=1|title=Sagem and AOI – Aircraft Factory sign collaboration agreement on drones for Egyptian defense market|date=24 September 2015|access-date=2 April 2018}}</ref> Strategic airlift capabilities have also expanded, with Egypt acquiring two [[Ilyushin Il-76|Il-76MF]] aircraft in 2019.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web|url=https://weaponews.com/news/65353379-jordan-gave-egypt-two-military-transport-il-76mf.html|title=Jordan gave Egypt two military transport Il-76MF|website=weaponews.com|language=en|access-date=5 August 2019}}</ref>

===Air Defense Forces===
The [[Egyptian Air Defense Forces]] is Egypt's military service responsible for air defense. Egypt patterned its force after the [[Soviet Air Defence Force]], which integrated all its air defence capabilities; antiaircraft guns, rocket and missile units, interceptor planes, and radar and warning installations. It appears to comprise five subordinate divisions, 110 surface-to-air missile battalions, and 12 anti-aircraft artillery brigades.{{sfn|Touchard|2017|p=58}} Personnel quality has been assessed as somewhat lower than that of the Egyptian Air Force.{{sfn|Touchard|2017|p=77}} The IISS estimated in 2020 that personnel numbered 80,000 active and 70,000 reserve.<ref name=IISS2020E /> Its commander is [[Lieutenant General]] [[Aly Fahmy Mohammed Aly Fahmi]].

In recent years Egypt has undertaken a broad and sustained modernization of its air defense network, integrating a mix of Western, Russian, and domestic systems into a layered architecture. This includes the acquisition of German-made [[IRIS-T#IRIS-T SLM|IRIS-T]] systems, comprising seven IRIS-T SLM medium-range batteries, six IRIS-T SLS short-range units, and ten IRIS-T SLX long-range batteries. The first systems were delivered in 2021, though subsequent shipments were delayed in 2022 after Germany redirected some systems to Ukraine in response to the Russian invasion.<ref name=airdefensemodernization>{{cite web |url=https://www.military.africa/2024/10/egypt-enhances-air-defence-with-operationalization-of-iris-t-systems/ |title=Egypt enhances air defence with operationalization of IRIS-T systems |website=Military Africa |date=October 2024 |access-date=5 April 2025}}</ref> These platforms are supported by German [[TRML|TRML-4D]] radars and operate alongside French [[Ground Master 400]] AESA radars and Russian 59N6E Protivnik-GE early warning systems.<ref name=airdefensemodernization/>

In addition to European acquisitions, Egypt received the Russian [[S-300VM]] surface-to-air missile system beginning in 2017, offering long-range, high-altitude intercept capabilities. The S-300VM complements Egypt’s existing inventory and significantly boosts its ability to counter ballistic and cruise missile threats.<ref name=airdefensemodernization/>

The United States has also contributed to Egypt’s air defense capacity, supplying surplus systems including the [[MIM-72 Chaparral|Chaparral]] short-range air defense system and associated spare parts. These systems are used primarily for localized defense, particularly along Egypt’s borders,<ref name=airdefensemodernization/> complimenting Egypt's extensive arsenal of American [[MIM-104 Patriot|MIM-104F/PAC-3]] Patriot batteries acquired in 1999.<ref>Wade Boese, "U.S. Announces New Arms Sales to Middle East Worth Billions," ''Arms Control Today'', March 1999, www.armscontrol.org; Anthony Cordesman, "The Military Balance in the Middle East," ''Greenwood Publishing Group'', 2004.</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Cordesman |first=Anthony H. | author-link = Anthony Cordesman | chapter=Current Trends in Arms Sales in the Middle East |date=2019-03-11 |title=Arms Control and the New Middle East Security Environment | editor-last = Feldman | editor-first = Shai |pages=19–60 |chapter-url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429039119-2 |access-date=2024-08-19 |publisher=Routledge |doi=10.4324/9780429039119-2 |isbn=978-0-429-03911-9}}</ref>

In 2025 Egypt confirmed acquiring China’s advanced [[HQ-9B]] long-range surface-to-air missile system. The system significantly enhances Egypt’s air defense capabilities by providing long-range coverage of up to 300 kilometers and the ability to track and engage multiple targets simultaneously, thanks to its advanced HT-233 3D phased-array radar. Its launchers carry a mix of smaller and larger missiles to address various aerial threats, including aircraft, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and stealth targets. The system provides 360-degree radar coverage and cold-launch capability.<ref>{{cite web |title=Egypt Bolsters Air Defense with China's HQ-9B Amid Israel Concerns |url=https://www.aeronewsjournal.com/2025/04/defense-egypt-bolsters-air-defense-with.html |website=Aero News Journal |date=2025-04-17 |access-date=2025-05-29}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Egypt has Chinese air defence system similar to Russia’s S-400, say Israeli reports |url=https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250416-egypt-has-chinese-air-defence-system-similar-to-russias-s-400-say-israeli-reports/ |website=Middle East Monitor |date=2025-04-16 |access-date=2025-05-29}}</ref>

===Navy===
{{see also|List of naval ships of Egypt}}
[[File:Egypt Joins Combined Maritime Forces.webp|thumb|Egyptian frigates, a [[FREMM]] (foreground) and a [[MEKO 200|MEKO A200]] (background), moored at the pier of the Gargoub naval base on the Mediterranean Sea.]]
Organized naval activity in [[Egypt]] can be traced to the [[Early Dynastic Period (Egypt)|Early Dynastic period]], around 2800 BCE, when the state developed rudimentary maritime capabilities to support transport, trade, and military expeditions along the Nile and adjacent coasts.

During the early modern period, [[Muhammad Ali of Egypt|Muhammad Ali]], who became ''wali'' in 1805, established autonomous rule over Egypt and initiated a broad program of state and military development. As part of his efforts to build an empire, he prioritized the creation of a strong military, beginning with the army and followed by the navy. At the outset of his rule, Egypt already possessed a rudimentary naval force primarily used for troop transport. Its first recorded deployment was during the [[Wahhabi War]], facilitating the movement of troops from Egypt to [[Yanbu]] in the Hejaz.
In 1815, Muhammad Ali established the [[Alexandria Shipyard]] to construct warships, marking a significant step toward naval modernization. By the time of the [[Greek War of Independence]], the Egyptian Navy had expanded considerably, fielding more than 100 warships and several hundred transport vessels. In 1827, this fleet participated in the [[Battle of Navarino]], a pivotal engagement during the war.
Following World War II, elements of Egypt’s naval forces were stationed in the [[Red Sea]], although the majority remained concentrated in the Mediterranean. The navy’s main headquarters and operational facilities are based at Ras el-Tin near Alexandria.

The Egyptian Navy also oversees the [[Egyptian Coast Guard]], which is tasked with protecting coastal infrastructure and patrolling territorial waters to counter smuggling. According to the IISS Military Balance 2017, the Coast Guard comprised approximately 2,000 personnel, operating 14 fast patrol boats and 65 additional patrol vessels, including 15 Swiftships, 21 ''Timsah''-class, three Type-89s, and nine ''Peterson''-class boats.<ref>{{cite book|author=IISS|title=The Military Balance 2017|publisher=Routledge|place=London|page=374}}</ref>
[[File:BRIGHT STAR 25- Amphibious Assault (9315821).jpg|left|thumb|Egyptian soldiers taking part in an amphibious assault exercise.|250x250px]]
Since 2014, Egypt has undertaken a broad naval modernization program aimed at addressing structural limitations in its maritime capabilities and enhancing its ability to operate beyond territorial waters. This initiative has included significant investment in new platforms, infrastructure, and training, reflecting a shift toward developing a blue-water navy. Notable acquisitions include [[Mistral class]] amphibious assault ships, [[FREMM]] and [[MEKO A-200]] frigates, [[Gowind-class design|Gowind class]] corvettes, and [[Type 209 submarine|Type 209 submarines]], as well as utility helicopters and coastal patrol vessels.<ref name=":0" /> 

Egypt has also pursued domestic shipbuilding through technology transfer agreements and expanded its naval infrastructure with new bases such as Berenice on the Red Sea and Ras Gargoub on the Mediterranean. These efforts reflect a strategic emphasis on maritime power projection, logistical reach, and the defense of national maritime interests.<ref name=":0">{{cite web |url=https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/14/04/2021/egypt-and-development-its-national-navy-how-cairo-responding-new-challenges |title=Egypt and the development of its national Navy: how Cairo is responding to the new challenges of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea |last=Troisi |first=Flavia |date=14 April 2021 |website=Global Policy |access-date=5 April 2025}}</ref>

=== Other agencies ===
[[File:BRIGHT STAR 25- weapons demonstration and static display (9285195).jpg|thumb|Egyptian soldiers during a MEDEVAC exercise demonstration]]
The [[Armed Forces Medical Service Department (Egypt)|Armed Forces Medical Service Department]] provides many military health services. The [[Armed Forces College of Medicine]] in [[Heliopolis, Cairo|Heliopolis]], Cairo, provides medical training. As of February 2020, the AFCM commandant was Maj. Gen. Dr. Amr Hegab.<ref>{{cite web | title=News Details | website=Armed Forces College Of Medicine | date=2020-02-29 | url=http://www.afcm.edu.eg/EN/NewsDetails.aspx?id=1144 | access-date=2021-09-17}}</ref>

Egypt also maintains 397,000 [[paramilitary]] troops.{{sfn|IISS|2020|p=372}} The [[Central Security Forces]] comes under the control of the [[Ministry of Interior (Egypt)|Ministry of Interior]]. As of 2017, the [[Egyptian Border Guard Corps]] falls under the control of the Ministry of Interior as well. Circa 2020, according to the ''IISS Military Balance 2020,'' they comprised an estimated 12,000, in 18 border regiments, with [[Small arms and light weapons|light weapons]] only (IISS 2020, p.&nbsp;375). However, that listing of numbers has remained the same at least since the 2017 edition (p. 375).

== Military equipment and industry ==
{{main|Military industry of Egypt}}
[[File:Egyptian Mi-8 Hip helicopters after unloading troops.jpg|thumb|Egyptian Mi-8 Hip helicopters after unloading troops]]
The inventory of the Egyptian Armed Forces comprises equipment originating from a diverse array of countries, including the [[United States]], [[France]], [[Russia]], [[Germany]], [[Brazil]], the [[United Kingdom]], the [[Soviet Union]], and the [[People's Republic of China]]. This broad range of suppliers has posed challenges in terms of interoperability and maintenance. However, older systems are being gradually phased out in favor of more modern platforms acquired from multiple sources, with a substantial share produced under license in Egypt, most notably the [[M1 Abrams|M1A1 Abrams]] [[tank]].

In 2023 Egyptian company ACME SAICO released a C5ISR system designed to integrate and coordinate military platforms from both Western and Eastern origins. Developed to address the interoperability challenges of Egypt’s diverse arsenal, the platform uses real-time "interface layers" to translate data across incompatible systems. Already certified and operational within the Egyptian Armed Forces, the system has been integrated into all current air force aircraft and is being expanded to land and naval platforms. It builds on earlier iterations such as RISC3, and a more advanced C6ISR system is under joint development with [[Lockheed Martin]].<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.military.africa/2023/02/egypt-unveils-hybrid-c5isr-system-at-idex-2023/ | title=Egypt unveils hybrid C5ISR system at IDEX 2023 | website=Military Africa | date=February 24, 2023 | access-date=April 4, 2025 }}</ref>
[[File:Eagle 1 RCWS.jpg|thumb|left|Eagle 1, a [[remote controlled weapon station]] developed by Arab International Optronics|297x297px]]
The [[Ministry of Military Production (Egypt)|Ministry of Military Production]] oversees a wide network of factories and companies, including [[Abu Zaabal Specialized Industries]], which manufactures ammunition and small arms; [[Abu Zaabal Engineering Industries]], which produces artillery systems and shells; and the [[Armoured production and repair factory (Egypt)|Armoured Production and Repair Factory]], which builds and maintains armored vehicles such as the [[M1A1 Abrams]], [[K9 Thunder|K9A1EGY]], [[RAAD 200]], and [[SENA 200|Sinai 200]]. The Thales & Benha Electronics S.A.E. joint venture, formed between [[France]]’s [[Thales Group]] and Benha Electronics, specializes in advanced communication systems, research, and training.<ref name=thalesbenha>{{cite news | url=https://breakingdefense.com/2024/07/egypts-benha-electronics-teams-with-frances-thales-to-coproduce-military-comms-devices/#:~:text=The%20statement%20added%20that%20this,%E2%80%9D | title=Egypt’s Benha Electronics teams with France’s Thales to coproduce military comms devices | website=Breaking Defense | date=July 2024 | access-date=1 March 2025 }}</ref> Meanwhile, the [[Arab Organization for Industrialization]] (AOI) supervises multiple enterprises engaged in aerospace, electronics, vehicles, and armaments.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://nuke.fas.org/guide/egypt/agency/aoi.htm | title=Arab Organization for Industrialization | website=Federation of American Scientists | access-date=2 March 2025 }}</ref> AOI’s subsidiaries include [[Kader Factory for Developed Industries|Kader for Developed Industries]], which designs and manufactures armored vehicles; Sakr for Developed Industries, which produces missiles and rockets; and joint ventures such as Arab British Dynamics Co., which specializes in guided weaponry, and Arab American Vehicles Co., which assembles military and civilian vehicles. AOI also has a history of licensed aircraft production in [[Helwan]], manufacturing the [[Alpha Jet]] and [[K-8E]], and now seeks to replace these with the [[KAI T-50 Golden Eagle]].<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.military.africa/2024/12/egypt-plans-local-production-of-light-combat-and-trainer-aircraft/ | title=Egypt plans local production of light combat and trainer aircraft | date=December 2024 | access-date=1 March 2025 }}</ref>

Naval defense production is led by the [[Alexandria Shipyard]], which constructs frigates, corvettes, and patrol boats. Through partnerships with [[France]]’s [[Naval Group]], the shipyard produces the [[Gowind-class design|Gowind 2500]] corvettes,<ref>{{cite web | url=https://alexyard.com.eg/gowind/ | title=Gowind | website=Alexandria Shipyard | access-date=2 March 2025 }}</ref> while cooperation with [[Germany]]’s [[ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems]] enables local manufacturing of the [[MEKO 200|MEKO A200]] frigates.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://alexyard.com.eg/asy-overview/ | title=We are Alexandria Shipyard | website=Alexandria Shipyard | access-date=2 March 2025 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://alexyard.com.eg/meko-a200/ | title=MEKO A200 | website=Alexandria Shipyard | access-date=2 March 2025 }}</ref> In the private sector, [[Robotics Engineering Systems]] develops unmanned aerial vehicles, high-precision [[smart munitions]] such as guided missiles and glide bombs,<ref>{{cite news | url=https://english.defensearabia.com/robotics-engineering-system-makes-quantum-leap-in-defense-manufacturing/ | title=Robotics Engineering System Makes Quantum Leap in Defense Manufacturing | date=September 7, 2024 | access-date=March 2, 2025 }}</ref> while [[Amstone]] specializes in fifth-generation technologies focused on naval and aerial unmanned systems.<ref>{{cite news | url=https://english.defensearabia.com/amstone-an-egyptian-pioneer-in-the-defense-industry/ | title=Amstone: An Egyptian Pioneer in the Defense Industry | date=September 7, 2024 | access-date=March 2, 2025 }}</ref>

Egypt is one of the few countries in the [[Middle East]] to possess spy satellites, launching [[EgyptSat 1]] in 2007,<ref>{{cite news |last=Katz |first=Yaacov|url=https://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=48099|title=Egypt to launch first spy satellite|newspaper=The Jerusalem Post|date=15 January 2007}}</ref> followed by [[EgyptSat 2]] in 2014.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://spaceflightnow.com/news/n1404/16egyptsat2/ |title=Egyptian reconnaissance satellite launched by Soyuz |author=Stephen Clark |publisher=Spaceflight Now |date=16 April 2014 |access-date=18 April 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140419013018/http://spaceflightnow.com/news/n1404/16egyptsat2/ |archive-date=19 April 2014 |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2019, Egypt launched [[EgyptSat-A|MisrSat-A]], an observation satellite,<ref>{{cite web |url=https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/egyptsat-a.htm |title=EgyptSat-A |website=Gunter's Space Page |access-date=5 April 2025}}</ref> followed later that year by Tiba-1, a civilian and military communications satellite.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://spaceinafrica.com/2019/11/27/egypt-launches-tiba-1-communications-satellite-on-board-ariane-5-rocket/ |title=Egypt Launches Tiba-1 Communications Satellite on Board Ariane 5 Rocket |website=Space in Africa |date=27 November 2019 |access-date=5 April 2025}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/tiba-1.htm |title=Tiba-1 |website=Gunter's Space Page |access-date=5 April 2025}}</ref> In 2023, Egypt launched Horus-1 and Horus-2, about a month apart. The country also placed MisrSat-2 into orbit later that year. All three of them are high-resolution observation satellites.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.atalayar.com/en/articulo/new-technologies-innovation/egypt-already-has-its-fourth-spy-satellite-orbit-and-emirates-its-second-astronaut/20230304094404182042.html |title=Egypt already has its fourth spy satellite in orbit, and the Emirates its second astronaut |date=4 March 2023 |publisher=Atalayar |access-date=10 March 2025}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://spaceinafrica.com/2023/12/04/egypt-launches-misrsat-2/ |title=Egypt Launches MisrSat-2 |date=4 December 2023 |publisher=Space in Africa |access-date=3 March 2025}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/horus-1.htm |title=Horus-1 |website=Gunter's Space Page |access-date=5 April 2025}}</ref> In 2024, two months after MisrSat-2’s launch, the country successfully completed the initial operational phase of NEXSAT-1, its first experimental Earth observation satellite, achieving milestones such as developing indigenous onboard software, advanced attitude-control systems, and independently capturing and processing satellite imagery, all of which marked a major step forward in Egypt’s national space capabilities.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://spaceinafrica.com/2024/07/31/egypt-marks-milestone-with-its-experimental-satellite-nexsat-1/ |title=Egypt Marks Milestone With Its Experimental Satellite Nexsat-1 |website=Space in Africa |date=31 July 2024 |access-date=5 April 2025}}</ref>

==Military schools==
There is an undergraduate military school for each branch of the Egyptian Armed Forces, and they include:
* [[Commanders and Staff College]]
* [[Reserve Officer College]]
* [[Military Academy for Postgraduate and Strategic Studies]]
* [[Egyptian Military Academy]]
* [[Egyptian Military College]]
* [[Egyptian Air College]]
* [[Egyptian Naval College]]
* [[Egyptian Air Defense College]]
* [[Military Technical College|Egyptian Military Technical College]]
* [[Armed Forces Technical Institute]]
* [[Armed Forces Institute for NCOs]]
* [[Technical Institute of Nursing]]<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.facebook.com/pages/Technical-Institute-of-Nursing-military-of-the-Egyptian-armed-forces/372014859568161|title=Technical Institute of Nursing military of the Egyptian armed forces – Cairo, Cairo Governorate, Egypt – College & University &#124; Facebook|website=www.facebook.com}}</ref>
* [[Thunderbolt School]]
* [[Airborne School (Egypt)|Airborne School]]

==See also==
* [[Flags of the Egyptian Armed Forces]]
* [[Military of ancient Egypt|Military of Ancient Egypt]]
* [[Ptolemaic army]]
* [[Military of the Tulunid Emirate]]
* [[Military of the Mamluk Sultanate]]
* [[Ancient Egyptian navy]]
* [[Ptolemaic navy]]
* [[Fatimid navy]]

==Notes==
{{notelist}}

==References==
{{reflist}}
===Bibliography===
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* {{cite book|last=Fahmy |first=Khaled |title=All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IlQsbY3REP4C&q=Khaled+Fahmy,+All+the+Pasha%E2%80%99s+Men:+Mehmed+Ali,+his+army+and+the+making+of+modern+Egypt |year=1997 |publisher=Cambridge |isbn=9780521560078}}
* {{Cite book| publisher = Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College | url = http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#1973| last = Gawrych| first = George W.| title = The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory | year = 1996 | access-date = 15 December 2010| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20101202050212/http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/content.asp| archive-date= 2 December 2010 | url-status= live}}
* {{Cite book| edition = First| publisher = Dār al-Shurūq| isbn = 977-09-0866-5| pages = 903| last = Hammad| first = Gamal| title = Military Battles on the Egyptian Front| year = 2002|language=ar}}
* {{cite book |last=Herzog |first=Chaim |title=The War of Atonement: The Inside Story of the Yom Kippur War |url=https://archive.org/details/warofatonementoc00herz |url-access=registration |publisher=Little, Brown and Company |year=1975|isbn=978-0-316-35900-9}}  Also 2003 edition, {{ISBN|978-1-85367-569-0}}
* {{cite journal | last1=Hussein | first1=Ebtisam | last2=Martino | first2=Claudia De | title=Egypt's Military Post-2011: Playing Politics without Internal Cracks | journal=Contemporary Arab Affairs | volume=12 | issue=1 | date=2019 | issn=1755-0912 | doi=10.1525/caa.2019.121004 | pages=55–74 | s2cid=150597455 | url=https://online.ucpress.edu/caa/article-abstract/12/1/55/25804/Egypt-s-Military-Post-2011Playing-Politics-without | access-date=2021-09-17| doi-access=free | url-access=subscription }} 
* {{cite book |ref={{harvid|IISS|2020}} |author1=International Institute for Strategic Studies |title=The Military Balance |date= 2020 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-367-46639-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7VNAzQEACAAJ |language=en}}
* {{cite book| last = Pollack | first =Kenneth M. | title = Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness 1948–91 | place= Lincoln and London |publisher= University of Nebraska Press | isbn=0-8032-3733-2| date= 2002 }} See also book reviewed in ''International Security'', Vol. 28, No. 2.
* {{cite book |title=The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East |first=Abraham |last=Rabinovich |location=New York |publisher=Schocken Books |year=2004 |isbn=978-0-8052-4176-1}}
* {{cite book |first=Stanley |last=Sandler |title=Ground Warfare: The International Encyclopedia Vol. 1|date=2002 }}
* {{Cite book|title=Forces Armees Africaines 2016–2017|last=Touchard|first=Laurent|publisher=Laurent Touchard|year=2017|isbn=978-1545499801|location=Paris}}
* {{cite book| last = Tsouras | first =Peter G.| title = Changing Orders: The Evolution of the World's Armies, 1945 to the Present | year = 1994 | publisher = Facts on File | location = New York}}
* {{cite book| last = Varble | first = Derek | title= Essential Histories: The Suez Crisis 1956 | year = 2003 }}

==Further reading==
* Norvell deAtkine, 'Why Arabs Lose Wars,' Middle East Quarterly, 6(4).
* CMI Publications, "The Egyptian military in politics and the economy: Recent history and current transition status". www.cmi.no. Retrieved 2016-01-21.
* Maj Gen Mohammed Fawzy, The Three-Years War (in Arabic)
* Ferris, Jesse, Egypt, the Cold War, and the Civil War in Yemen, 1962–1966, Princeton University. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2008. 3332407.
* H.Frisch, Guns and butter in the Egyptian Army, p.&nbsp;6. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001).
* [[Muhammed Gwady]], ''Road to Setback: Memoirs by Egyptian Military Commanders 1967'' (original: al-Ṭarīq ilá al-naksah: mudhakkirāt qādat al-ʻaskarīyah al-Miṣrīyah 1967) [two editions]
* {{cite book |last=[[International Institute for Strategic Studies]] |title=The Military Balance 2019|year=2019 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1857439885}}
* Dr Mohammed al-Jawadi, In Between the Catastrophe: Memoirs of Egyptian Military Commanders from 1967 to 1972 (in Arabic)
* Hazem Kandil, 'Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen: Egypt's Road to Revolt,' Verso, 2012
* Maj Gen Abed al-Menahim Khalil, Egyptian Wars in Modern History (in Arabic)
* Andrew McGregor, A military history of modern Egypt: from the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006
* "The Egyptian Armed Forces and the Remaking of an Economic Empire". Carnegie Middle East Center. Retrieved 2016-01-21.
* Lt Gen Saad el-Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez
* Witty, David M. "A regular Army in counterinsurgency operations: Egypt in North Yemen, 1962–1967." The Journal of Military History 65, no. 2 (2001).

==External links==
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20170227163604/http://www.mmc.gov.eg/ Egyptian Armed Forces]
* [https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/egypt/ CIA World Factbook]
* [http://www.fas.org/main/content.jsp?formAction=297&contentId=196 FAS]
* Department of State, [https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/171176 Academics see the military in decline, but retaining strong influence], 23 September 2009 (US Embassy Cables, ''[[The Guardian]]'', 2011)
* "[https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/02/10/world/middleeast/20110210-egypt-supreme-council.html Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces]", ''[[The New York Times]]'', February 10, 2011
* [http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/02/201121185311711502.html Egypt's military leadership], ''[[Aljazeera English]]'', February 11, 2011

{{Military of Egypt}}
{{Egypt government ministries and agencies|state=expanded}}
{{Military of Africa}}
{{Military of Asia}}
{{Military of the Arab world}}
{{authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Military Of Egypt}}
[[Category:Military of Egypt| ]]