View source for Electronic voting

{{Short description|Type of voting by election mechanism}}
{{Use DMY dates|date=June 2023}}
{{Use American English|date = March 2019}}
{{Voting}}
'''Electronic voting''' is [[voting]] that uses [[Electronics|electronic]] means to either aid or handle casting and counting [[ballot]]s including voting time.

Depending on the particular implementation, e-voting may use standalone ''[[electronic voting machine]]s'' (also called EVM) or computers connected to the Internet ('''online voting''').  It may encompass a range of Internet services, from basic transmission of tabulated results to full-function online voting through common connectable household devices. The degree of [[automation]] may be limited to marking a paper ballot, or may be a comprehensive system of vote input, vote recording, data encryption and transmission to servers, and consolidation and tabulation of election results.{{citation needed|date=August 2024}}

A worthy e-voting system must perform most of these tasks while complying with a set of standards established by regulatory bodies, and must also be capable to deal successfully with strong requirements associated with [[Computer security|security]], [[accuracy]], [[speed]], [[privacy]], [[Election audit|auditability]], [[accessibility]], [[data integrity]], [[Cost-effectiveness analysis|cost-effectiveness]], [[scalability]], [[anonymity]], [[trustworthiness]], and [[sustainability]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mugica |first1=Antonio |title=The Case for Election Technology |journal=European View |date=2015 |volume=14 |pages=111–119 |doi=10.1007/s12290-015-0355-5 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gibson |first1=J. Paul |last2=Krimmer |first2=Robert |last3=Teague |first3=Vanessa |last4=Pomares |first4=Julia |title=A review of E-voting: the past, present and future |journal=[[Annals of Telecommunications]] |date=2016 |volume=71 |issue=7–8 |pages=279–286 |doi=10.1007/s12243-016-0525-8|bibcode=2016AnTel..71..279G }}</ref>

Electronic voting technology can include [[punched card]]s, [[optical scan voting system]]s and specialized voting kiosks (including self-contained [[#Direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting system|direct-recording electronic voting systems]], or DRE). It can also involve transmission of [[ballot]]s and votes via telephones, private [[computer network]]s, or the Internet. The functions of electronic voting depend primarily on what the organizers intend to achieve.

In general, two main types of e-voting can be identified:

* e-voting which is physically supervised by representatives of governmental or independent electoral authorities (e.g. electronic voting machines located at polling stations);
* remote e-voting via the Internet (also called i-voting) where the voter submits his or her vote electronically to the election authorities, from any location.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://e-estonia.com/component/i-voting/|title=i-Voting|work=e-Estonia|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170211005750/https://e-estonia.com/component/i-voting/|archive-date=11 February 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://nea.gov.ph/issuances/memorandum-to-ecs/category/41-2013?download=750%3Amemo-2013-006-comelec-resolution-no.-9597-promulgated-on-december-21_2012|title=Res. 9597 Philippines concerning grid power requirements for various needs including i-voting|website=nea.gov.ph|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130702042632/http://www.nea.gov.ph/issuances/memorandum-to-ecs/category/41-2013?download=750%3Amemo-2013-006-comelec-resolution-no.-9597-promulgated-on-december-21_2012|archive-date=2 July 2013}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.electoralpractice.ch/2014/02/switzerlands-new-legislation-on-internet-voting/#sthash.FoF0XF9m.i6VEjuJm.dpbs|title=Switzerland's new legislation on internet voting|work=electoralpractice.ch|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402091803/http://www.electoralpractice.ch/2014/02/switzerlands-new-legislation-on-internet-voting/#sthash.FoF0XF9m.i6VEjuJm.dpbs|archive-date=2 April 2015|access-date=5 February 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Buchsbaum|first=T.|title=E-voting: International developments and lessons learnt|journal=Proceedings of Electronic Voting in Europe Technology, Law, Politics and Society. Lecture Notes in Informatics. Workshop of the ESF TED Programme Together with GI and OCG |year=2004}}</ref><ref name="Zissis&Lekkas">{{cite journal|last=Zissis|first=D.|author2=Lekkas|title=Securing e-Government and e-Voting with an open cloud computing architecture|journal=Government Information Quarterly|date=April 2011|volume=28|issue=2|pages=239–251|doi=10.1016/j.giq.2010.05.010}}</ref>

Many countries have used electronic voting for at least some elections, including [[Argentina]], [[Australia]], [[Bangladesh]], [[Belgium]], [[Brazil]], [[Canada]], [[France]], [[Germany]], [[India]], [[Italy]], [[Japan]], [[Kazakhstan]], [[South Korea]], [[Malaysia]], the [[Netherlands]], [[Norway]],  the [[Philippines]], [[Spain]], [[Switzerland]], [[Thailand]], the [[United Kingdom]] and the [[United States]]. {{As of|2023}}, Brazil is the only country in which all elections are conducted through electronic voting.<ref>{{cite news|url = https://www.ft.com/content/07533564-2231-47a6-a7b8-2c7ae330efc5|title = The discreet US campaign to defend Brazil's election|last1 = Stott|first1 = Michael|last2 = Pooler|first2 = Michael|last3 = Harris|first3 = Bryan|date = June 22, 2023|accessdate = May 8, 2024|newspaper = [[Financial Times]]|url-access = subscription}}</ref>

==Benefits==
Electronic voting technology intends to speed the counting of ballots, reduce the cost of paying staff to count votes manually and can provide improved accessibility for disabled voters. Also in the long term, expenses are expected to decrease.<ref name="auto"/>
Results can be reported and published faster.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/how-electronic-voting-works/|title=How Electronic Voting Works: Pros and Cons vs. Paper Voting|website=MakeUseOf|date=14 November 2019|access-date=10 June 2019|archive-date=17 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201117150350/https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/how-electronic-voting-works/|url-status=live}}</ref>
Voters save time and cost by being able to vote independently from their location. This may increase overall voter turnout. The citizen groups benefiting most from electronic elections are the ones living abroad, citizens living in rural areas far away from polling stations and the disabled with mobility impairments.<ref>https://Anwar{{Dead link|date=January 2020 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}, N. K. (n.d.). Advantages and Disadvantages of e-Voting: The Estonian Experience. ''Academia.edu''. Retrieved 10 June 2019 from www.academia.edu/35246981/Advantages_and_Disadvantages_of_e-Voting_The_Estonian_Experience</ref><ref name="auto">Cook, T. (7 December 2016). How Electronic Voting Works: Pros and Cons vs. paper Voting. ''MUO''. Retrieved 10 June 2019 from https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/how-electronic-voting-works/ {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201117150350/https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/how-electronic-voting-works/ |date=17 November 2020 }}</ref>

==Concerns and improvements==
{{Further|Vote counting#Errors in optical scans|Vote counting#Errors in direct-recording electronic voting}}
In a 2004 article for [[OpenDemocracy]], security analyst [[Bruce Schneier]] claimed that computer security experts at the time were "unanimous on what to do" about concerns regarding electronic voting. "DRE machines must have [[Voter-verified paper audit trail|voter-verifiable paper audit trails]]," he said, and "software used on DRE machines must be open to public scrutiny"<ref>Schneier, Bruce (September 2004), {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070609085245/http://opendemocracy.net/ |date=9 June 2007 }} [http://www.opendemocracy.net/media-voting/article_2213.jsp What’s wrong with electronic voting machines?] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080522033511/http://www.opendemocracy.net/media-voting/article_2213.jsp |date=22 May 2008 }}</ref> to ensure the accuracy of the voting system. Verifiable ballots are necessary because computers can and do malfunction and because voting machines can be compromised.

Concerns regarding security lapses in aging voting machines came to a head shortly before and during the [[2016 United States presidential election]].<ref name="An Incredibly Insecure Voting Machine">{{cite web|last1=Schneier|first1=Bruce|title=An Incredibly Insecure Voting Machine|url=https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/04/an_incredibly_i.html|website=Schneier on Security|date=23 April 2015 |access-date=3 December 2015|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208112521/https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/04/an_incredibly_i.html|archive-date=8 December 2015}}</ref><ref name="Feldman, Halterman & Felten">{{cite web|last1=Feldman, Halterman & Felten|title=Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine|url=http://usenix.org/legacy/event/evt07/tech/full_papers/feldman/feldman_html/index.html|website=[[Usenix]]|access-date=3 December 2015|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208094204/http://usenix.org/legacy/event/evt07/tech/full_papers/feldman/feldman_html/index.html|archive-date=8 December 2015}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Norden |first1=Lawrence |last2=Codrington |first2=Wilfred |date=March 8, 2018 |title=America's Voting Machines at Risk – An Update |url=https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/americas-voting-machines-risk-update |access-date=September 14, 2024 |website=Brennan Center for Justice}}</ref> Cases were reported at the time of machines making unpredictable, inconsistent errors. The expert consensus centered on three primary solutions: the openness of a system to public examination from outside experts, the creation of an authenticable [[Voter-verified paper audit trail|paper record]] of votes cast, and a chain of custody for records.<ref name="What's Wrong With Electronic Voting Machines?">{{cite web|last1=Schneier|first1=Bruce|title=What's Wrong With Electronic Voting Machines?|url=https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2004/11/whats_wrong_with_ele.html|website=Schneier on Security|access-date=3 December 2015|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208155348/https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2004/11/whats_wrong_with_ele.html|archive-date=8 December 2015}}</ref><ref name="Wichita State mathematician says Kansas voting machines need to be audited to check accuracy">{{cite web|title=Wichita State mathematician says Kansas voting machines need to be audited to check accuracy|url=http://cjonline.com/news/2015-07-20/wichita-state-mathematician-says-kansas-voting-machines-need-be-audited-check|website=Topeka Capital-Journal|access-date=3 December 2015|url-status=live|archive-url=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20151203222538/http://cjonline.com/news/2015-07-20/wichita-state-mathematician-says-kansas-voting-machines-need-be-audited-check|archive-date=3 December 2015}}</ref>

Several major reforms took place after the 2016 U.S. election, including the widespread adoption of voting machines that produce [[voter-verified paper audit trail]]s (VVPATs). These paper records allow election officials to conduct audits and recounts, significantly enhancing transparency and security. Congress provided $380 million in funding through the [[Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018|Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018]] under the framework of the [[Help America Vote Act]] to replace old machines with more secure models with modern cybersecurity protections.  By 2020, 93% of U.S. votes had a paper record, and only 0.5 percent of jurisdictions reported using electronic voting machines without paper audit trails.<ref>{{Cite web |date=October 6, 2021 |title=Election Audits Across the United States |url=https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/bestpractices/Election_Audits_Across_the_United_States.pdf |access-date=September 14, 2024 |website=US Election Assistance Commission}}</ref> This reduced the risk of undetected cyber interference or machine malfunction by enabling verification through physical ballots.

In collaboration with the [[United States Department of Homeland Security|U.S. Department of Homeland Security]] and other organizations, election officials also took steps to harden voting systems against potential cyberattacks. This included training election officials, sharing threat intelligence, and establishing secure systems for vote transmission and counting.<ref>{{Cite journal |date=2016-09-13 |title=Protecting the 2016 Elections from Cyber and Voting Machine Attacks |url=https://www.nist.gov/speech-testimony/protecting-2016-elections-cyber-and-voting-machine-attacks |journal=NIST |language=en}}</ref>

In addition to concerns about [[electoral fraud]] and auditability, electronic voting has been criticized as unnecessary and expensive to introduce. While countries like India continue to use electronic voting, several countries have cancelled e-voting systems or decided against a large-scale rollout, notably the [[Netherlands]], Ireland, Germany and the United Kingdom due to issues in reliability or transparency of EVMs.<ref name="Why electronic voting isn't secure">{{cite web|last1=Kobie|first1=Nicole|title=Why electronic voting isn't secure|url=https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/30/why-electronic-voting-is-not-secure|website=[[The Guardian]]|date=30 March 2015|access-date=3 December 2015|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208073412/http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/30/why-electronic-voting-is-not-secure|archive-date=8 December 2015}}</ref><ref name="Should Britain introduce electronic voting?">{{cite web|last1=Hern|first1=Alex|title=Should Britain introduce electronic voting?|url=https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/26/should-britain-introduce-electronic-voting|website=[[The Guardian]]|date=26 February 2015|access-date=3 December 2015|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208080136/http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/26/should-britain-introduce-electronic-voting|archive-date=8 December 2015}}</ref>

Moreover, people without internet or the skills to use it are excluded from the service. The so-called digital divide describes the gap between those who have access to the internet and those who do not. Depending on the country or even regions in a country the gap differs. This concern is expected to become less important in future since the number of internet users tends to increase.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.statista.com/statistics/273018/number-of-internet-users-worldwide/|title=Number of internet users worldwide 2005-2018|website=Statista|access-date=10 June 2019|archive-date=3 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210303091308/https://www.statista.com/statistics/273018/number-of-internet-users-worldwide/|url-status=live}}</ref>

Expenses for the installation of an electronic voting system are high. For some governments they may be too high so that they do not invest. This aspect is even more important if it is not sure whether electronic voting is a long-term solution.<ref name="auto"/>

===New South Wales 2021 iVote failures===
During the 2021 NSW Local Government Elections the online voting system "iVote" had technical issues that caused some access problems for some voters. Analysis done of these failures indicated a significant chance of the outages having impacted on the electoral results for the final positions. In the Kempsey ward, where the margin between the last elected and first non-elected candidates was only 69 votes, the electoral commission determined that the outage caused a 60% chance that the wrong final candidate was elected. Singleton had a 40% chance of having elected the wrong councillor, Shellharbour was a 7% chance and two other races were impacted by a sub-1% chance of having elected the wrong candidate. The NSW Supreme Court ordered the elections in Kempsey, Singleton and Shellharbour Ward A to be re-run. In the 2022 Kempsey re-vote the highest placed non-elected candidate from 2021, Dean Saul, was instead one of the first councillors elected.<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-08/ivote-system-failure-election-re-runs-to-be-held-july-30/101135812 | title='Angry and disappointed' voters in three NSW local government areas forced back to the polls on July 30 | newspaper=ABC News | date=8 June 2022 | access-date=27 January 2023 | archive-date=27 January 2023 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230127130346/https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-08/ivote-system-failure-election-re-runs-to-be-held-july-30/101135812 | url-status=live }}</ref> This failure caused the NSW Government to suspend the iVote system from use in the [[2023 New South Wales state election]].

==Types of system==

===Electronic voting machines{{anchor|Machines}}===
{{main|Electronic voting machine}}
[[File:2018 Ballots being counted in Santa Clara County.webm|thumb|Counting ballots by an optical scanner, San Jose, California, 2018]]
Electronic voting systems for electorates have been in use since the 1960s when [[Voting machine#Punched card voting|punched card]] systems debuted. Their first widespread use was in the US where 7 counties switched to this method for the 1964 presidential election.<ref>Saltman, Roy (NBS), [http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/NBS_SP_500-30.pdf EFFECTIVE USE OF COMPUTING TECHNOLOGY IN VOTE-TALLYING] {{webarchive|url=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20160211104652/http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/NBS_SP_500-30.pdf|date=11 February 2016}}. ''NIST''.</ref> The newer [[optical scan voting system]]s allow a computer to count a voter's mark on a ballot. [[DRE voting machine]]s which collect and tabulate votes in a single machine, are used by all voters in all elections in Brazil and [[Indian voting machines|India]], and also on a large scale in [[Venezuela]] and the United States. They have been used on a large scale in the [[Netherlands]] but have been decommissioned after public concerns.<ref>{{cite web |title=Re-evaluation of the Use of Electronic Voting in the Netherlands |url=https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/examples/re-evaluation-of-e-voting-netherlands |website=National Democratic Institute |date=25 November 2013 |access-date=15 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210225193912/https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/examples/re-evaluation-of-e-voting-netherlands |archive-date=25 February 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> In Brazil, the use of DRE voting machines has been associated with a decrease in error-ridden and uncounted votes, promoting a larger enfranchisement of mainly less educated people in the electoral process, shifting government spending toward public healthcare, particularly beneficial to the poor.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fujiwara|first=Thomas|date=2015|title=Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence From Brazil|journal=Econometrica|volume=83|issue=2|pages=423–464|doi=10.3982/ecta11520|issn=0012-9682|doi-access=free}}</ref>

====Paper-based electronic voting system====
{{Further|Vote counting#Optical scan counting|Voting machine#Optical scan (marksense)|Electronic voting in the United States#Optical scan counting}}

[[File:ES&S M100 Automark cart.jpg|thumb|A cart holding an [[ES&S]] M100 [[optical scan voting system|ballot scanner]] and an AutoMARK [[assistive device]], as used in [[Johnson County, Iowa]], United States in 2010]]
[[Voting#Paper-based methods|Paper-based voting systems]] originated as a system where votes are cast and [[Vote counting system#Manual counting|counted by hand]], using paper ballots. With the advent of [[Vote counting system#Optical scan counting|electronic tabulation]] came systems where paper cards or sheets could be marked by hand, but counted electronically. These systems included [[Voting machine#Punched card voting|punched card voting]], [[optical scan voting system#Marksense systems|marksense]] and later [[optical scan voting system#Digital pen voting systems|digital pen voting systems]].<ref>{{cite book |author1=Douglas W. Jones |author2=Lorrie Faith Cranor |author3=Rebecca T. Mercuri |author4=Peter G. Neumann |editor1-last=A. Gritzalis |editor1-first=Dimitris |title=Secure Electronic Voting |date=2003 |series=Advances in Information Security |volume=7 |doi=10.1007/978-1-4615-0239-5 |url=https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-1-4615-0239-5 |publisher=Springer New York, NY |isbn=978-1-4613-4981-5 |s2cid=1866859 |url-access=subscription |access-date=16 August 2022 |archive-date=16 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220816131750/https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-1-4615-0239-5 |url-status=live }}</ref>

These systems can include a [[ballot marking device]] or electronic ballot marker that allows voters to make their selections using an [[Voting machine#Direct-recording electronic (DRE)|electronic input device]], usually a [[touch screen]] system similar to a DRE. Systems including a ballot marking device can incorporate different forms of [[assistive technology]]. In 2004, Open Voting Consortium demonstrated the 'Dechert Design', a [[General Public License]] [[Open-source license|open source]] paper ballot printing system with open source [[bar codes]] on each ballot.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Gage |first1=Deborah |title=Voting machine gets LinuxWorld tryout |url=https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Voting-machine-gets-LinuxWorld-tryout-3202455.php |website=SFGATE |access-date=16 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210702171419/https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Voting-machine-gets-LinuxWorld-tryout-3202455.php |archive-date=2 July 2021 |date=2 August 2008 |url-status=live}}</ref>

====Direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting system====
{{main|DRE voting machine}}
{{further|Voting machine#Direct-recording electronic (DRE)|Vote counting#Direct-recording electronic counting|Electronic voting in the United States#Direct-recording electronic counting|Electronic voting in India}}

A direct-recording electronic (DRE) [[voting machine]] records votes by means of a [[ballot]] display provided with mechanical or electro-optical components that can be activated by the voter (typically buttons or a [[touchscreen]]); that processes data with computer software; and that records voting data and ballot images in [[computer memory|memory components]]. After the election it produces a tabulation of the voting data stored in a removable memory component and as a printed copy. The system may also provide a means for transmitting individual ballots or vote totals to a central location for consolidating and reporting results from precincts at the central location. These systems use a precinct count method that tabulates ballots at the polling place. They typically tabulate ballots as they are cast and print the results after the close of polling.<ref>{{cite web|author=U.S. Election Assistance Commission |author-link=Election Assistance Commission |url=http://www.eac.gov/voting%20systems/docs/vvsgvolumei.pdf/attachment_download/file |title=2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines |format=PDF |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080207185930/http://www.eac.gov/voting%20systems/docs/vvsgvolumei.pdf/attachment_download/file |archive-date=7 February 2008 }}</ref>

In 2002, in the United States, the [[Help America Vote Act]] mandated that one handicapped accessible voting system be provided per polling place, which most jurisdictions have chosen to satisfy with the use of DRE voting machines, some switching entirely over to DRE. In 2004, 28.9% of the registered voters in the United States used some type of direct recording electronic voting system,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.kidsvotingoh.org/insidefiles/activities/Voting%20Systems%20Handout-3copy.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101223230616/http://www.kidsvotingoh.org/insidefiles/activities/Voting%20Systems%20Handout-3copy.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=23 December 2010 |title=A Short History of Voting in the United States |author=Kids Voting Central Ohio }}</ref> up from 7.7% in 1996.<ref>{{cite web | author = U.S. Federal Election Commission | author-link = Federal Election Commission | url = http://www.fec.gov/pages/dre.htm | title = Direct Recording Electronic information page | url-status = live | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20071114022451/http://www.fec.gov/pages/dre.htm | archive-date = 14 November 2007 }}</ref>

[[File:EVM VVPAT.jpg|thumb|right|VVPAT used with Indian [[Indian voting machines|electronic voting machine]]s in Indian Elections]]
In 2004, India adopted [[Indian voting machines|Electronic Voting Machines]] (EVM) for its elections to its parliament with 380 million voters casting their ballots using more than one million voting machines.<ref name="pib.nic.in">{{cite web |url=http://pib.nic.in/elections2009/volume1/Chap-39.pdf |title=Know Your Electronic Voting Machine |access-date=1 September 2010 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605194131/http://pib.nic.in/elections2009/volume1/Chap-39.pdf |archive-date=5 June 2011 }}</ref> The Indian EVMs are designed and developed by two government-owned defence equipment manufacturing units, [[Bharat Electronics Limited]] (BEL) and [[Electronics Corporation of India|Electronics Corporation of India Limited]] (ECIL). Both systems are identical, and are developed to the specifications of [[Election Commission of India]]. The system is a set of two devices running on 7.5 volt batteries. One device, the voting Unit is used by the voter, and another device called the control unit is operated by the electoral officer. Both units are connected by a five-metre cable. The voting unit has a blue button for each candidate. The unit can hold 16 candidates, but up to four units can be chained, to accommodate 64 candidates. The control unit has three buttons on the surface – one button to release a single vote, one button to see the total number of votes cast till now, and one button to close the election process. The result button is hidden and sealed. It cannot be pressed unless the close button has already been pressed. A controversy was raised when the voting machine malfunctioned which was shown in Delhi assembly.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.manoramaonline.com/news/just-in/2017/05/09/aam-aadmi-party-live-applause-in-delhi-assembly-as-aap-mla-proves-evm-tampering.html|title=Aam Aadmi Party "proved" in voting machines in the assembly|work=ManoramaOnline|access-date=19 December 2017|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171222052215/http://www.manoramaonline.com/news/just-in/2017/05/09/aam-aadmi-party-live-applause-in-delhi-assembly-as-aap-mla-proves-evm-tampering.html|archive-date=22 December 2017}}</ref> On 9 April 2019, the Supreme Court ordered the ECI to increase [[voter-verified paper audit trail]] (VVPAT) slips vote count to five randomly selected EVMs per assembly constituency, which means ECI has to count VVPAT slips of 20,625 EVMs before it certifies the final election results.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/count-vvpat-slips-of-5-booths-in-each-assembly-seat-sc/articleshow/68786810.cms|title=Supreme Court: Count VVPAT slips of 5 booths in each assembly seat &#124; India News |website=The Times of India|date=9 April 2019|access-date=28 May 2019|archive-date=9 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190409064533/https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/count-vvpat-slips-of-5-booths-in-each-assembly-seat-sc/articleshow/68786810.cms|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/vvpat-sc-elections-144122|title=SC Directs ECI To Increase VVPAT Verification From One EVM To Five EVMs Per Constituency|date=8 April 2019|access-date=28 May 2019|archive-date=10 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190410141454/https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/vvpat-sc-elections-144122|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.moneylife.in/article/when-the-sc-says-no-for-software-audit-review-of-evms-and-vvpat-at-present/56828.html|title=When the SC Says No for Software Audit Review of EVMs & VVPAT at Present|website=Moneylife NEWS & VIEWS|access-date=28 May 2019|archive-date=29 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190529074108/https://www.moneylife.in/article/when-the-sc-says-no-for-software-audit-review-of-evms-and-vvpat-at-present/56828.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

=====Public network DRE voting system=====
A public network DRE voting system is an election system that uses electronic ballots and transmits vote data from the polling place to another location over a public network.<ref name="Voting Systems Standards 2002 p. 12">{{cite book | title=Voting Systems Standards | publisher=Federal Election Commission, U.S. of America | issue=v. 1-2 | year=2002 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hlR-0sGHrc0C&pg=PA12 | access-date=13 November 2022 | page=12}}</ref> Vote data may be transmitted as individual ballots as they are cast, periodically as batches of ballots throughout the election day, or as one batch at the close of voting. 
Public network DRE voting system can utilize either precinct count or central count method. The central count method tabulates ballots from multiple precincts at a central location.

===Online voting===
{{Distinguish|open-access poll}}
[[File:Electronic voting.jpg|thumb|Smartphones are the mainstream for online voting used by the Japanese private sector, but e-voting is not possible due to the law in public office elections in Japan.]]

Internet voting systems have gained popularity and have been used for government and membership organization elections and referendums in [[Estonia]], and Switzerland<ref name="Serdült">{{cite book|last=Serdült|first=U.|title=Fifteen Years of Internet Voting in Switzerland: History, Governance and Use|date=April 2015|pages=126–132|doi=10.1109/ICEDEG.2015.7114487|isbn=978-3-9075-8910-6|s2cid=10195543}}</ref> as well as municipal elections in Canada and party primary elections in the United States and France.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.vote.caltech.edu/events/2007/VendorWkshp/Backert-Handout.pdf |title=Event List |work=caltech.edu |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304050731/http://www.vote.caltech.edu/events/2007/VendorWkshp/Backert-Handout.pdf |archive-date=4 March 2016 }}</ref>{{Failed verification|date=March 2024}}{{citation needed|date=March 2024}} Internet voting has also been widely used in sub-national [[participatory budgeting]] processes, including in Brazil, France, United States, Portugal and Spain.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Spada|first1=Paolo|last2=Mellon|first2=Jonathan|last3=Peixoto|first3=Tiago|last4=Sjoberg|first4=Fredrik M.|date=26 February 2015|title=Effects of the Internet on Participation: Study of a Public Policy Referendum in Brazil|url=https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2571083|language=en|location=Rochester, NY|ssrn=2571083|access-date=20 November 2020|archive-date=12 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210312141312/https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571083|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Peixoto|first=Tiago|date=25 September 2008|title=e-Participatory Budgeting: e-Democracy from Theory to Success?|url=https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1273554|language=en|location=Rochester, NY|doi=10.2139/ssrn.1273554|ssrn=1273554|s2cid=153840747|access-date=20 November 2020|archive-date=12 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210312141305/https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1273554|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Participatory Budgeting in Paris, France – Participedia|url=https://participedia.net/case/5008|access-date=20 November 2020|website=participedia.net|date=3 January 2014|language=en|archive-date=12 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210112222410/https://participedia.net/case/5008|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite thesis|last=Saad|first=Rodrigo|date=June 2020|title=Internet Voting and the Equity of Participatory Budgeting Outcomes: A Study of New York City's Participatory Budgeting Initiative|url=https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3810|type=MA thesis|publisher=City University of New York|access-date=20 November 2020|archive-date=7 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201207233353/https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3810/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Participatory Budgeting in Lisbon, Portugal – Participedia|url=https://participedia.net/case/4967|access-date=20 November 2020|website=participedia.net|date=8 July 2008|language=en|archive-date=12 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210312141307/https://participedia.net/case/4967|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Decide.Madrid.es Online Participatory Budgeting – Participedia|url=https://participedia.net/case/4365|access-date=20 November 2020|website=participedia.net|date=23 February 2016|language=en|archive-date=12 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210312141329/https://participedia.net/case/4365|url-status=live}}</ref>

Security experts have found security problems in every attempt at online voting,<ref name="appel-dem">{{Cite web |last=Appel |first=Andrew |date=8 June 2020 |title=Democracy Live internet voting: unsurprisingly insecure, and surprisingly insecure |url=https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2020/06/08/democracy-live-internet-voting-unsurprisingly-insecure-and-surprisingly-insecure/ |access-date=23 June 2020 |website=Princeton University |archive-date=19 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210119052854/https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2020/06/08/democracy-live-internet-voting-unsurprisingly-insecure-and-surprisingly-insecure/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="vv-int">{{Cite web |title=Internet Voting |url=https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/internet-voting/ |access-date=20 June 2020 |website=Verified Voting |language=en-US |archive-date=23 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200723080825/https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/internet-voting/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="nas-sec">"Secure Internet voting will likely not be feasible in the near future... At the present time, the Internet (or any network connected to the Internet) should not be used for the return of marked ballots" {{Cite book |last=National Academies of Sciences |date=6 September 2018 |title=Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy |doi=10.17226/25120 |isbn=978-0-309-47647-8 |s2cid=158434942 |url=https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy |access-date=23 June 2020 |language=en |archive-date=9 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210309004452/https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="eac-nist">"Electronic ballot return faces significant security risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of voted ballots. These risks can ultimately affect the tabulation and results and, can occur at scale... Even with ... technical security considerations, electronic ballot return remains a high-risk activity." {{Cite web |last=Election Assistance Commission, National Institute of Standards and Technology, FBI, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency |date=11 May 2020 |title=RISK MANAGEMENT FOR ELECTRONIC BALLOT DELIVERY, MARKING, AND RETURN |url=http://s3.amazonaws.com/ftt-uploads/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/07210015/Final_-Risk_Management_for_Electronic-Ballot_05082020-1.pdf |access-date=23 June 2020 |archive-date=10 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200710215909/http://s3.amazonaws.com/ftt-uploads/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/07210015/Final_-Risk_Management_for_Electronic-Ballot_05082020-1.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> including systems in Australia,<ref name="aust">{{Cite conference |last=Halderman |first=J. Alex, and Vanessa Teague |title=E-Voting and Identity |date=13 August 2015 |chapter=The New South Wales iVote System: Security Failures and Verification Flaws in a Live Online Election |series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science |volume=9269 |pages=35–53 |doi=10.1007/978-3-319-22270-7_3 |conference=International Conference on E-Voting and Identity |arxiv=1504.05646 |isbn=978-3-319-22269-1 }}</ref><ref name="teague">{{Cite web |last=Teague |first=Vanessa |date=28 June 2022 |title=How NOT to Assess an E-voting System |url=https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2022/06/28/how-not-to-assess-an-e-voting-system/ |access-date=1 July 2022 |website=Princeton University |archive-date=8 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220708192401/https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2022/06/28/how-not-to-assess-an-e-voting-system/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Estonia,<ref name="estan">{{citation|last1=Springall|first1=Drew|last2=Finkenauer|first2=Travis|last3=Durumeric|first3=Zakir|last4=Kitcat|first4=Jason|last5=Hursti|first5=Harri|last6=MacAlpine|first6=Margaret|last7=Halderman|first7=Alex|title=Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security|chapter=Security Analysis of the Estonian Internet Voting System|year=2014|pages=703–715|doi=10.1145/2660267.2660315|isbn=9781450329576|s2cid=1985090|access-date=3 December 2017|chapter-url=https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2660315|url=https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/ivoting-ccs14.pdf|archive-date=12 August 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170812232217/https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/ivoting-ccs14.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="osce-est">"The OSCE/ODIHR EAM was made aware of a program that could, if it was running on a voter’s computer, change the vote without the possibility for the voter to detect it. The case was brought to the attention of the project manager who assessed this threat to be theoretically plausible but nearly impossible to implement in reality." {{Cite web |date=6 March 2011 |title=ESTONIA PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report |url=https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/9/77557.pdf |access-date=20 June 2020 |website=OSCE |archive-date=16 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210116153304/https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/9/77557.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> Switzerland,<ref name="appel-switz">{{Cite web |last=Appel |first=Andrew |date=27 June 2022 |title=How to Assess an E-voting System |url=https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2022/06/27/how-to-assess-an-e-voting-system/ |access-date=1 July 2022 |website=Princeton University, Center for Information Technology Policy |archive-date=8 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220708192300/https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2022/06/27/how-to-assess-an-e-voting-system/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="swiss-sctyl">{{Cite web |last=Zetter |first=Kim |date=12 March 2019 |title=Researchers Find Critical Backdoor in Swiss Online Voting System |url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/researchers-find-critical-backdoor-in-swiss-online-voting-system/ |access-date=20 June 2020 |website=Vice |language=en |archive-date=2 September 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200902043649/https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/zmakk3/researchers-find-critical-backdoor-in-swiss-online-voting-system |url-status=live }}</ref> Russia,<ref>{{Cite news|last=Gupta|first=Manhar|title=Russia's Blockchain Voting Turned Into A Fiasco|work=Cryptotrends|url=https://cryptotrends.in/russias-blockchain-voting-turned-into-a-fiasco/|access-date=25 June 2020|archive-date=19 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201019232828/https://cryptotrends.in/russias-blockchain-voting-turned-into-a-fiasco/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="moscow">{{Cite conference |last=Gaudry |first=Pierrick, and Alexander Golovnev |date=10 February 2020 |title=Breaking the Encryption Scheme of the Moscow Internet Voting System |url=http://fc20.ifca.ai/preproceedings/178.pdf |conference=Financial Cryptography 2020 |via=International Financial Cryptography Association}}</ref><ref name="risks-moscow">{{Cite journal |title=Electronic voting systems |last=Anderson |first=Ross |date=21 February 2020 |url=http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/31/59#subj2.1 |journal=The RISKS Digest |volume=31 |issue=59 |language=en |via=Newcastle University |access-date=23 June 2020 |archive-date=19 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201019205036/http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/31/59#subj2.1 |url-status=live }}</ref> and the United States.<ref name="vice-mit">{{Cite news |last=Zetter |first=Kim |date=13 February 2020 |title='Sloppy' Mobile Voting App Used in Four States Has 'Elementary' Security Flaws |language=en |work=VICE |url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/sloppy-mobile-voting-app-used-in-four-states-has-elementary-security-flaws/ |access-date=23 June 2020 |archive-date=20 September 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200920040721/https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/akw7mp/sloppy-mobile-voting-app-used-in-four-states-has-elementary-security-flaws |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="appel-dem"/>

It has been argued political parties that have more support from less-wealthy voters—who tend to have less access to and familiarity with the Internet—may suffer in the elections due to e-voting, which tends to increase participation among wealthier voters.{{Citation needed|date=July 2024}} It is unsure as to whether narrowing the [[digital divide]] would promote equal voting opportunities for people across various social, economic, and ethnic backgrounds.<ref name=":0" />

The effects of internet voting on overall voter turnout are unclear. A 2017 study of online voting in two Swiss cantons found that it had no effect on turnout,<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Germann|first1=Micha|last2=Serdült|first2=Uwe|date=1 June 2017|title=Internet voting and turnout: Evidence from Switzerland|url=https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/136119/1/1-s2.0-S026137941630453X-main.pdf|journal=Electoral Studies|volume=47|pages=1–12|doi=10.1016/j.electstud.2017.03.001|s2cid=157177069|access-date=24 August 2020|archive-date=18 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201018221258/https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/136119/1/1-s2.0-S026137941630453X-main.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> and a 2009 study of Estonia's national election found similar results.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Alvarez|first1=R. Michael|last2=Hall|first2=Thad E.|last3=Trechsel|first3=Alexander H.|date=July 2009|title=Internet Voting in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Estonia|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/abs/internet-voting-in-comparative-perspective-the-case-of-estonia/8A8BCDACE0F361D1623D6F013025E624|journal=PS: Political Science & Politics|language=en|volume=42|issue=3|pages=497–505|doi=10.1017/S1049096509090787|s2cid=155061911|issn=1537-5935|access-date=7 January 2021|archive-date=12 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210312141309/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/abs/internet-voting-in-comparative-perspective-the-case-of-estonia/8A8BCDACE0F361D1623D6F013025E624|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref> To the contrary, however, the introduction of online voting in municipal elections in the Canadian province of [[Ontario]] resulted in an average increase in turnout of around 3.5 percentage points.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Goodman|first1=Nicole|last2=Stokes|first2=Leah C.|date=July 2020|title=Reducing the Cost of Voting: An Evaluation of Internet Voting's Effect on Turnout|journal=British Journal of Political Science|language=en|volume=50|issue=3|pages=1155–1167|doi=10.1017/S0007123417000849|issn=0007-1234|doi-access=free}}</ref> Similarly, a further study of the Swiss case found that while online voting did not increase overall turnout, it did induce some occasional voters to participate who would have abstained were online voting not an option.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=12 November 2020|title=Does E-Voting matter for turnout, and to whom?|journal=Electoral Studies|language=en|article-number=102245|doi=10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102245|issn=0261-3794|doi-access=free|last1=Petitpas|first1=Adrien|last2=Jaquet|first2=Julien M.|last3=Sciarini|first3=Pascal|volume=71}}</ref>

A paper on “remote electronic voting and turnout in the Estonian 2007 parliamentary elections” showed that rather than eliminating inequalities, e-voting might have enhanced the [[digital divide]] between higher and lower socioeconomic classes. People who lived greater distances from polling areas voted at higher levels with this service now available. The 2007 Estonian elections yielded a higher voter turnout from those who lived in higher income regions and who received formal education.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Bochsler|first=Daniel|date=26 May 2010|title=Can Internet voting increase political participation?|url=http://www.eui.eu/Projects/EUDO-PublicOpinion/Documents/bochslere-voteeui2010.pdf|journal=Centre for the Study of Imperfection in Democracies|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160918221247/http://www.eui.eu/Projects/EUDO-PublicOpinion/Documents/bochslere-voteeui2010.pdf|archive-date=18 September 2016}}</ref> Still regarding the Estonian Internet voting system, it was proved to be more cost-efficient than the rest of the voting systems offered in 2017 local elections.<ref>Krimmer R., Duenas-Cid D., Krivonosova I., Vinkel P., Koitmae A. (2018) How Much Does an e-Vote Cost? Cost Comparison per Vote in Multichannel Elections in Estonia. In: Krimmer R. et al. (eds) Electronic Voting. E-Vote-ID 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 11143. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00419-4_8</ref><ref name="Kramer 2020">{{cite journal |first1=Robert |last1=Krimmer |first2=David |last2=Duenas-Cid |first3=Iuliia |last3=Krivonosova |year=2020 |title=New methodology for calculating cost-efficiency of different ways of voting: is internet voting cheaper? |journal=Public Money & Management |volume=41 |issue=1 |pages=17–26 |doi=10.1080/09540962.2020.1732027|doi-access=free }}</ref>
{| class="wikitable sortable"
|+ Cost range per ballot (in euro) for the 2017 local elections<ref name="Kramer 2020"/>
|-
! Voting system !! Minimum !! Maximum
|-
| Advance voting in county centres            ||   5.48 || 5.92
|-
| Advance voting in ordinary polling stations || 16.24 || 17.36
|-
| Early voting in county centres              ||   5.83 || 6.30
|-
| Election day voting in county centres       ||   4.97	|| 5.58
|-
| Election day voting in ordinary polling stations ||   2.83 || 3.01
|-
| Internet voting                             ||   2.17 || 2.26
|}

Electronic voting is perceived to be favored moreover by a certain demographic, namely the younger generation such as Generation X and Y voters. However, in recent elections about a quarter of e-votes were cast by the older demographic, such as individuals over the age of 55. Including this, about 20% of e-votes came from voters between the ages of 45 and 54. This goes to show that e-voting is not supported exclusively by the younger generations, but finding some popularity amongst Gen X and Baby Boomers as well.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2017/06/07/how-estonias-e-voting-system-could-be-the-future/|title=How Estonia's E-Voting System Could Be The Future|last=Leetaru|first=Kalev|website=Forbes|language=en|access-date=25 September 2019|archive-date=19 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201119035242/https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2017/06/07/how-estonias-e-voting-system-could-be-the-future/|url-status=live}}</ref> In terms of electoral results as well, the expectation that online voting would favor younger candidates has not been borne out in the data, with mayors in Ontario, Canada who were elected in online elections actually being slightly older on average than those elected by pencil and paper.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Wigginton |first1=Michael J |last2=Stockemer |first2=Daniel |date=31 December 2021 |title=Does the Introduction of Online Voting Create Diversity in Representation? |journal=Political Studies Review |volume=21 |language=en |pages=172–182 |doi=10.1177/14789299211064450 |s2cid=245625982 |issn=1478-9299|doi-access=free }}</ref>

Online voting is widely used privately for shareholder votes,<ref name="penobscot">{{Cite news |last=Weil |first=Gordon |date=4 July 2020 |title=Maine system combined with shareholder-style voting could overcome false fraud fears, boost turnout |language=en |work=Penobscot Bay Pilot |url=https://www.penbaypilot.com/node/135568 |access-date=29 July 2020 |archive-date=31 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201031023134/https://www.penbaypilot.com/node/135568 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="fisch">{{Cite web |last=Fisch |first=Jill |date=2017 |title=Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor |url=https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2759&context=faculty_scholarship |access-date=29 July 2020 |website=Minnesota Law Review |archive-date=18 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201018192753/https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2759&context=faculty_scholarship |url-status=live }}</ref> 
and other private organizations.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Election Management Software Market Impressive Gains |url=https://www.designerwomen.co.uk/election-management-software-market-impressive-gains-including-key-players-eballot-election-runner-avante-election-management-system-ems/ |access-date=25 June 2022 |website=Designer Women |language=en-US |archive-date=29 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220629142532/https://www.designerwomen.co.uk/election-management-software-market-impressive-gains-including-key-players-eballot-election-runner-avante-election-management-system-ems/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=17 December 2021 |title=NAACP Statement on the NAACP NC State Conference Election |url=https://naacp.org/articles/naacp-statement-naacp-nc-state-conference-election |access-date=25 June 2022 |website=naacp.org |language=en |archive-date=29 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220129135433/https://naacp.org/articles/naacp-statement-naacp-nc-state-conference-election |url-status=live }}</ref>
The election management companies do not promise accuracy or privacy.<ref name="esc">Election Services Co. {{Cite web |title=Terms of Use & Privacy Policy |url=http://www.electionservicesco.com/pages/terms-privacy.php |access-date=29 July 2020 |website=www.electionservicesco.com |archive-date=15 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200615040858/http://www.electionservicesco.com/pages/terms-privacy.php |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="broad-terms">ProxyVote {{Cite web |title=Terms of Use & Linking Policy |url=https://www.broadridge.com/legal/terms-of-use |access-date=29 July 2020 |website=www.broadridge.com |language=en |archive-date=9 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210309150624/https://www.broadridge.com/legal/terms-of-use |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="cshare">Proxydirect {{Cite web |title=Online Service Terms & Conditions |url=https://www.computershare.com/us/online-service-terms-conditions |access-date=29 July 2020 |website=www.computershare.com |archive-date=18 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201018053213/https://www.computershare.com/us/online-service-terms-conditions |url-status=live }}</ref>
In fact one company uses an individual's past votes for research,<ref name="brav">{{Cite web |last=Brav |first=Alon, Matthew D. Cain, Jonathon Zytnick |date=November 2019 |title=Retail Shareholder Participation in the Proxy Process: Monitoring, Engagement, and Voting |url=http://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/GOVERNANCEPROFESSIONALS/a8892c7c-6297-4149-b9fc-378577d0b150/UploadedImages/Retail.pdf |access-date=29 July 2020 |website=European Corporate Governance Institute |archive-date=18 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201018042104/http://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/GOVERNANCEPROFESSIONALS/a8892c7c-6297-4149-b9fc-378577d0b150/UploadedImages/Retail.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> and to target ads.<ref name="broad-target">{{Cite web |title=Proxy Services for Mutual Funds and ETF Providers |url=https://www.broadridge.com/financial-services/asset-management/mutual-funds-etf/drive-a-successful-proxy-outcome/proxy-services |access-date=29 July 2020 |website=www.broadridge.com |language=en |archive-date=31 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210131141900/https://www.broadridge.com/financial-services/asset-management/mutual-funds-etf/drive-a-successful-proxy-outcome/proxy-services |url-status=live }}</ref>

Corporations and organizations routinely use Internet voting to elect officers and board members and for other proxy elections. Internet voting systems have been used privately in many modern nations and publicly in the United States, the UK, Switzerland and Estonia. In Switzerland, where it is already an established part of local referendums, voters get their passwords to access the ballot through the postal service. Most voters in Estonia can cast their vote in local and parliamentary elections, if they want to, via the Internet, as most of those on the electoral roll have access to an e-voting system, the largest run by any [[European Union]] country. It has been made possible because most Estonians carry a national identity card equipped with a computer-readable microchip and it is these cards which they use to get access to the online ballot. All a voter needs is a computer, an electronic card reader, their ID card and its PIN, and they can vote from anywhere in the world. [[Electronic voting in Estonia|Estonian e-votes]] can only be cast during the days of [[Advance poll|advance voting]]. On election day itself people have to go to polling stations and fill in a paper ballot.

==== Sybil attacks ====
{{Main|Sybil attack}}
One of the biggest weaknesses of online voting is the difficulty of dealing with fake identities, especially when voting is implemented using software without the cooperation of some kind of government agency.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Nebulas |date=2018-09-21 |title=Liberal Radicalism: Can Quadratic Voting Be the Perfect Voting System? |url=https://medium.com/nebulasio/liberal-radicalism-can-quadratic-voting-be-the-perfect-voting-system-e958408567b2 |access-date=2020-11-03 |website=Medium |language=en |archive-date=15 September 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240915080450/https://medium.com/nebulasio/liberal-radicalism-can-quadratic-voting-be-the-perfect-voting-system-e958408567b2 |url-status=dead }}</ref> These attacks use sybils—fake or duplicate identities—to influence community decisions. Since a single vote has the potential to tilt a group decision, prevention of sybil attacks is an important priority in ensuring the security of voting.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Shahaf |first1=Gal |title=Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence |last2=Shapiro |first2=Ehud |last3=Talmon |first3=Nimrod |date=August 2019 |publisher=International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization |isbn=978-0-9992411-4-1 |location=California |pages=572–579 |chapter=Sybil-Resilient Reality-Aware Social Choice |doi=10.24963/ijcai.2019/81 |doi-access=free}}</ref> Sybil attacks are a common issue with implementations on open, peer-to-peer networks, as the system must have a way to prevent fake identities to prevent gaming of the vote.<ref name="Lalley2017-1">{{Cite SSRN |title=Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy |last1=Lalley |first1=Steven |last2=Weyl |first2=E. Glen |date=24 December 2017 |language=en |ssrn=2003531}}</ref>

Some future possible avenues of inquiries include to investigate more intersectional [[proof of personhood]] systems that aren't directly blockchain-based.<ref name=":6">{{cite arXiv |eprint=2008.05300 |class=cs.CR |first1=Divya |last1=Siddarth |first2=Sergey |last2=Ivliev |title=Who Watches the Watchmen? A Review of Subjective Approaches for Sybil-resistance in Proof of Personhood Protocols |date=2020-10-13 |last3=Siri |first3=Santiago |last4=Berman |first4=Paula}}</ref> For example, extending the [[web of trust]] by having a protocol that verifies proof of identities using social interactions would allow a community of users to assign corresponding levels of trusts to different candidates in relation with others. However, this would require a fully decentralized system.<ref name=":6" /> This web-of-trust protocol could even expand to allowing candidates to provide proof of personhood by physical attendance, which could lead to trusted clusters that grow into communities.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Howitt |first=Aleeza |date=2019-03-05 |title=Proposal for a Decentralized Unique Identity Seeding Protocol |url=https://ubiresearch.org/proposal-for-a-decentralized-unique-identity-seeding-protocol |access-date=2020-11-10 |website=UBI Research |language=en-US}}</ref>

===Hybrid systems===
There are also hybrid systems that include an electronic ballot marking device (usually a touch screen system similar to a DRE) or other [[assistive technology]] to print a [[voter verified paper audit trail]], then use a separate machine for electronic tabulation. Hybrid voting often includes both e-voting and mail-in paper ballots.<ref>Poulos, John, et al. "System, method and computer program for vote tabulation with an electronic audit trail." U.S. Patent No. 8,195,505. 5 June 2012. https://patents.google.com/patent/US8195505B2/en {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191008174418/https://patents.google.com/patent/US8195505B2/en |date=8 October 2019 }}</ref>

Internet voting can use remote locations (voting from any Internet capable computer) or can use traditional polling locations with voting booths consisting of Internet connected voting systems.

===Spreadsheets===
Data from different tally sheets or machines are often summed in spreadsheets. This step can introduce errors.  Austria,<ref name="aus">{{Cite news |last=Oltermann |first=Philip |date=June 5, 2023 |title=Austrian Social Democrats announce wrong leader after ‘technical error’ |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/05/austrian-social-democrats-announce-wrong-leader-after-technical-error |access-date=2025-10-03 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref> 
Scotland,<ref name="org-scot">{{Cite web |date=2007-06-01 |title=May 2007 Election Report, Open Rights Group Election Observation Mission in Scotland and England, pp.51-52 |url=http://www.openrightsgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/org_election_report.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100621134954/http://www.openrightsgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/org_election_report.pdf |archive-date=2010-06-21 |access-date=2025-10-03 |website=www.openrightsgroup.org}}</ref> 
and Anne Arundel County, MD,<ref name="cbs-aa">{{Cite web |last=Olaniran |first=Christian  |date=September 25, 2025 |title=Annapolis Board of Elections affirms 2025 primary election results after hand count |url=https://www.cbsnews.com/baltimore/news/annapolis-primary-elections-error-hand-count/ |access-date=2025-10-03 |website=www.cbsnews.com |language=en-US}}</ref> 
have made mistakes in summing tallies in spreadsheets. Arapahoe County, CO, made mistakes in releasing its spreadsheet for public use.<ref name="arap">{{Cite web |date=2025-06-16 |title=Statement Regarding the 2020 General Election Cast Vote Record (CVR) |url=https://www.arapahoeco.gov/news_detail_votes_T90_R1078.php |access-date=2025-10-03 |website=www.arapahoeco.gov |language=en}}</ref>

==Analysis==
[[Image:topvoter2.jpg|thumb|ISG TopVoter, a machine designed specifically to be used by voters with disabilities]]
Electronic voting systems may offer advantages compared to other voting techniques. An electronic voting system can be involved in any one of a number of steps in the setup, distributing, voting, collecting, and counting of ballots, and thus may or may not introduce advantages into any of these steps. Potential disadvantages exist as well including the potential for flaws or weakness in any electronic component.

Charles Stewart of the [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology]] estimates that 1 million more ballots were counted in the 2004 US presidential election than in 2000 because electronic voting machines detected votes that paper-based machines would have missed.<ref>Friel, Brian (November 2006)[http://nationaljournal.com/njcover.htm Let The Recounts Begin], [[National Journal]] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050619003932/http://nationaljournal.com/njcover.htm |date=19 June 2005 }}</ref>

In May 2004 the U.S. [[Government Accountability Office]] released a report titled "Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents Challenges",<ref>Government Accountability Office (May 2004) "[http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04766t.pdf Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents Challenges] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303172057/http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04766t.pdf |date=2016-03-03 }}"</ref> analyzing both the benefits and concerns created by electronic voting. A second report was released in September 2005 detailing some of the concerns with electronic voting, and ongoing improvements, titled "Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed".<ref>Government Accountability Office (September 2005) "[http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05956.pdf Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160209072826/http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05956.pdf |date=2016-02-09 }}"</ref>

===Electronic ballots===
Electronic voting systems may use ''electronic ballot'' to store votes in [[computer memory]]. Systems which use them exclusively are called DRE voting systems. When electronic ballots are used there is no risk of exhausting the supply of ballots.  Additionally, these electronic ballots remove the need for printing of paper ballots, a significant cost.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://electronicsewa.com/ |title=Home |access-date=2 June 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151120222242/http://electronicsewa.com/ |archive-date=20 November 2015 }}</ref> When administering elections in which ballots are offered in multiple languages (in some areas of the United States, public elections are required by the [[Voting Rights Act|National Voting Rights Act of 1965]]), electronic ballots can be programmed to provide ballots in multiple languages for a single machine.  The advantage with respect to ballots in different languages appears to be unique to electronic voting. For example, [[King County, Washington]]'s demographics require them under U.S. federal election law to provide ballot access in Chinese (Mandarin?). With any type of paper ballot, the county has to decide how many Chinese-language ballots to print, how many to make available at each polling place, etc.  Any strategy that can assure that Chinese-language ballots will be available at all polling places is certain, at the very least, to result in a significant number of wasted ballots.{{Citation needed|date=August 2009}} (The situation with lever machines would be even worse than with paper: the only apparent way to reliably meet the need would be to set up a Chinese-language lever machine at each polling place, few of which would be used at all.)

Critics argue{{who|date=July 2016}} the need for extra ballots in any language can be mitigated by providing a process to print ballots at voting locations.  They argue further, the cost of software validation, compiler trust validation, installation validation, delivery validation and validation of other steps related to electronic voting is complex and expensive, thus electronic ballots are not guaranteed to be less costly than printed ballots.{{citation needed|date=July 2016}}

===Accessibility===
[[Image:Jellybuttons.jpg|thumb|A Hart eSlate DRE voting machine with jelly buttons for people with manual dexterity disabilities]]
Electronic voting machines can be made fully accessible for persons with disabilities. Punched card and optical scan machines are not fully accessible for the blind or visually impaired, and lever machines can be difficult for voters with limited mobility and strength.<ref>"[http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=14581 Protecting the Integrity and Accessibility of Voting in 2004 and Beyond]". ''[[People for the American Way]]'' {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20041212172330/http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=14581 |date=12 December 2004 }}</ref> Electronic machines can use headphones, [[Sip-and-puff|sip and puff]], foot pedals, joy sticks and other [[adaptive technology]] to provide the necessary [[accessibility]].

Organizations such as the [[Verified Voting Foundation]] have criticized the accessibility of electronic voting machines<ref>[http://verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=1875] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070810071352/http://verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=1875|date=10 August 2007}}</ref> and advocate alternatives. Some disabled voters (including the visually impaired) could use a [[tactile ballot]], a ballot system using physical markers to indicate where a mark should be made, to vote a secret paper ballot. These ballots can be designed identically to those used by other voters.<ref>[http://www.electionaccess.org/Bp/Ballot_Templates.htm "Ballot Templates."] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120829073345/http://www.electionaccess.org/Bp/Ballot_Templates.htm |date=29 August 2012 }} (tactile ballots) ''[[International Foundation for Election Systems]]''</ref> However, other disabled voters (including voters with dexterity disabilities) could be unable to use these ballots.

===Cryptographic verification===
The concept of election verifiability through cryptographic solutions has emerged in the academic literature to introduce transparency and trust in electronic voting systems.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Juels|first=Ari|author2=Dario Catalano|author3=Markus Jakobsson|title=Coercion-Resistant Electronic Elections|journal=Cryptology ePrint Archive|date=November 2002|issue=165|pages=61–70 |url=http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/165|access-date=2 May 2012|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140407075829/http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/165|archive-date=7 April 2014|citeseerx=10.1.1.11.8779}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Chaum|first=David |author2=Peter Y. A. Ryan |author3=Steve Schneider|title=A Practical Voter-Verifiable Election Scheme|journal=ESORICS'05: 10th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security|year=2005|volume=3679|series=LNCS|pages=118–139|citeseerx=10.1.1.456.7748}}</ref> It allows voters and election observers to verify that votes have been recorded, tallied and declared correctly, in a manner independent from the hardware and software running the election. Three aspects of verifiability are considered:<ref>{{cite journal|last=Kremer|first=Steve |author2=Mark Ryan |author3=Ben Smyth|title=Election verifiability in electronic voting protocols|journal=ESORICS'10: 15th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security|year=2010|volume=6345|pages=389–404}}</ref> individual, universal, and eligibility. Individual verifiability allows a voter to check that her own vote is included in the election outcome, universal verifiability allows voters or election observers to check that the election outcome corresponds to the votes cast, and eligibility verifiability allows voters and observers to check that each vote in the election outcome was cast by a uniquely registered voter.

===Voter intent===
Electronic voting machines are able to provide immediate feedback to the voter detecting such possible problems as [[undervote|undervoting]] and [[overvote|overvoting]] which may result in a [[spoiled ballot]]. This immediate feedback can be helpful in successfully determining [[voter intent]].

===Transparency===
It has been alleged by groups such as the UK-based [[Open Rights Group]]<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.openrightsgroup.org/2007/06/20/org-election-report-highlights-problems-with-voting-technology-used/ |title=ORG Election Report highlights problems with voting technology used |publisher=Openrightsgroup.org |access-date=24 May 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090224024126/http://www.openrightsgroup.org/2007/06/20/org-election-report-highlights-problems-with-voting-technology-used/ |archive-date=24 February 2009 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.openrightsgroup.org/2008/07/02/org-verdict-on-london-elections-insufficient-evidence-to-declare-confidence-in-results/|title=Open Rights Group - ORG verdict on London Elections: "Insufficient evidence" to declare confidence in results|work=Open Rights Group|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090422003623/http://www.openrightsgroup.org/2008/07/02/org-verdict-on-london-elections-insufficient-evidence-to-declare-confidence-in-results/|archive-date=22 April 2009|access-date=2 July 2008}}</ref> that a lack of testing, inadequate audit procedures, and insufficient attention given to system or process design with electronic voting leaves "elections open to error and [[electoral fraud|fraud]]".

In 2009, the [[Federal Constitutional Court of Germany]] found that when using voting machines the "verification of the result must be possible by the citizen reliably and without any specialist knowledge of the subject." The [[DRE voting machine|DRE]] Nedap-computers used till then did not fulfill that requirement. The decision did not ban electronic voting as such, but requires all essential steps in elections to be subject to public examinability.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20090303_2bvc000307en.html |title=Ruling of the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 3 March 2009 |publisher=Bundesverfassungsgericht.de |access-date=24 May 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110711062054/http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20090303_2bvc000307en.html |archive-date=11 July 2011 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-019en.html |title=German Federal Constitutional Court, Press release no. 19/2009 of 3 March 2009 |publisher=Bundesverfassungsgericht.de |access-date=24 May 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090404111620/http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-019en.html |archive-date=4 April 2009 }}</ref>

In 2013, The [[California Association of Voting Officials]] was formed to maintain efforts toward publicly owned General Public License open source voting systems

===Coercion evidence===
In 2013, researchers from Europe proposed that the electronic voting systems should be coercion evident.<ref name=":1">Gurchetan S Grewal, Mark D Ryan, Sergiu Bursuc, Peter Y A Ryan. Caveat Coercitor: coercion-evidence in electronic voting. 34th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2013</ref> There should be a public evidence of the amount of coercion that took place in a particular elections. An internet voting system called "[[Caveat Coercitor]]"<ref>[http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a367.pdf Caveat Coercitor: coercion-evidence in electronic voting] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303233122/http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a367.pdf |date=3 March 2016 }}, 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy</ref> shows how coercion evidence in voting systems can be achieved.<ref name=":1" />

===Audit trails===
{{Further|Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail|End-to-end auditable voting systems}}

A fundamental challenge with any [[voting machine]] is to produce evidence that the votes were recorded as cast and tabulated as recorded. Election results produced by voting systems that rely on voter-marked paper ballots can be verified with manual hand counts (either valid sampling or full recounts). [[Voting machine#Direct-recording electronic (DRE)|Paperless]] ballot voting systems must support auditability in different ways. An independently auditable system, sometimes called an Independent Verification, can be used in recounts or audits. These systems can include the ability for voters to verify how their votes were cast or enable officials to verify that votes were tabulated correctly.

A discussion draft argued by researchers at the [[National Institute of Standards and Technology]] (NIST) states, "Simply put, the DRE architecture’s inability to provide for independent audits of its electronic records makes it a poor choice for an environment in which detecting errors and fraud is important."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf |title=Draft white paper on VVPR |access-date=24 May 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091128025506/http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf |archive-date=28 November 2009 }}</ref> The report does not represent the official position of NIST, and misinterpretations of the report has led NIST to explain that "Some statements in the report have been misinterpreted. The draft report includes statements from election officials, voting system vendors, computer scientists and other experts in the field about what is potentially possible in terms of attacks on DREs. However, these statements are not report conclusions."<ref>[https://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/factsheet/draftvotingreport.htm] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070202222414/https://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/factsheet/draftvotingreport.htm|date=2 February 2007}}</ref>

[[Image:Desi accuvote-tsx vvpat.jpg|thumb|A Diebold Election Systems, Inc. model AccuVote-TSx DRE voting machine with VVPAT attachment]]

Various technologies can be used to assure DRE voters that their votes were cast correctly, and allow officials to detect possible fraud or malfunction, and to provide a means to audit the tabulated results. Some systems include technologies such as cryptography (visual or mathematical), paper (kept by the voter or verified and left with election officials), audio verification, and dual recording or witness systems (other than with paper).

Dr. [[Rebecca Mercuri]], the creator of the [[Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail]] (VVPAT) concept (as described in her Ph.D. dissertation in October 2000 on the basic voter verifiable ballot system), proposes to answer the auditability question by having the voting machine print a paper ballot or other paper facsimile that can be visually verified by the voter before being entered into a secure location. Subsequently, this is sometimes referred to as the "[[Mercuri method]]." To be truly ''voter''-verified, the record itself must be verified by the voter and able to be done without assistance, such as visually or audibly.  If the voter must use a bar-code scanner or other electronic device to verify, then the record is not truly voter-verifiable, since it is actually the electronic device that is verifying the record for the voter. VVPAT is the form of Independent Verification most commonly found in [[elections in the United States]] and other countries such as Venezuela.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/examples/e-voting-audits-venezuela|title=E-voting Audits in Venezuela|last=apleasant|date=25 November 2013|website=www.ndi.org|language=en|access-date=13 February 2017|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170214003900/https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/examples/e-voting-audits-venezuela|archive-date=14 February 2017}}</ref>

[[End-to-end auditable voting systems]] can provide the voter with a receipt that can be taken home. This receipt does not allow voters to prove to others how they voted, but it does allow them to verify that the system detected their vote correctly. End-to-end (E2E) systems include [[Punchscan]], [[ThreeBallot]] and [[Prêt à Voter]]. [[Scantegrity]] is an add-on that extends current optical scan voting systems with an E2E layer. The city of [[Takoma Park, Maryland]] used [[Scantegrity II]] for its November 2009 election.<ref>{{cite web|title=Pilot Study of the Scantegrity II Voting System Planned for the 2009 Takoma Park City Election |url=http://www.takomaparkmd.gov/committees/boe/documents/flyer_workshop_I_(02-19-09).pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110719064407/http://www.takomaparkmd.gov/committees/boe/documents/flyer_workshop_I_%2802-19-09%29.pdf |archive-date=19 July 2011 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web
 |last        = Hardesty
 |first       = Larry
 |title       = Cryptographic voting debuts
 |work        = MIT news
 |date = 13 November 2009
 |access-date  = 30 November 2009
 |url         = http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2009/rivest-voting.html
 |url-status     = live
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20110719064407/http://www.takomaparkmd.gov/committees/boe/documents/flyer_workshop_I_(02-19-09).pdf
 |archive-date = 19 July 2011
}}</ref>

Systems that allow the voter to prove how they voted are never used in U.S. public elections, and are outlawed by most state constitutions. The primary concerns with this solution are [[voter intimidation]] and [[vote selling]].

An audit system can be used in measured random recounts to detect possible malfunction or fraud. With the VVPAT method, the paper ballot is often treated as the official ballot of record. In this scenario, the ballot is primary and the electronic records are used only for an initial count. In any subsequent recounts or challenges, the paper, not the electronic ballot, would be used for tabulation. Whenever a paper record serves as the legal ballot, that system will be subject to the same benefits and concerns as any paper ballot system.

To successfully audit any voting machine, a strict [[chain of custody]] is required.

The solution was first demonstrated (New York City, March 2001) and used (Sacramento, California 2002) by AVANTE International Technology, Inc.. In 2004 Nevada was the first state to successfully implement a DRE voting system that printed an electronic record. The $9.3 million voting system provided by [[Sequoia Voting Systems]] included more than 2,600 [[AVC EDGE]] touchscreen DREs equipped with the [[VeriVote VVPAT]] component.
<ref>[https://www.nbcnews.com/id/5937115 ‘Paper trail’ voting system used in Nevada] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201022031805/http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5937115 |date=22 October 2020 }}, [[Associated Press]] 7 September 2004</ref> The new systems, implemented under the direction of then Secretary of State [[Dean Heller]] replaced largely punched card voting systems and were chosen after feedback was solicited from the community through town hall meetings and input solicited from the [[Nevada Gaming Control Board]].<ref>[http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/10/28/nevada.evote/index.html Nevada improves odds with e-vote] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303172108/http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/10/28/nevada.evote/index.html |date=3 March 2016 }}, [[CNN]] 29 October 2004</ref>

===Hardware===
[[File:Urnaeleições2006.jpg|thumb|right|Brazilian [[DRE voting machine]]]]
Inadequately secured hardware can be subject to [[Electoral fraud#Tampering with electronic voting systems|physical tampering]]. Some critics, such as the group "[[Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet]]" ("We do not trust voting machines"), charge that, for instance, foreign hardware could be inserted into the machine, or between the user and the central mechanism of the machine itself, using a [[man in the middle attack]] technique, and thus even sealing DRE machines may not be sufficient protection.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/images/9/91/Es3b-en.pdf |title=Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B voting computer a security analysis (chapter 7.1) |access-date=24 May 2010 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100107134107/http://wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/images/9/91/Es3b-en.pdf |archive-date=7 January 2010 }}</ref> This claim is countered by the position that review and testing procedures can detect fraudulent code or hardware, if such things are present, and that a thorough, verifiable [[chain of custody]] would prevent the insertion of such hardware or software.{{Citation needed|date=August 2010}}  [[Security seal]]s are commonly employed in an attempt to detect tampering, but testing by [[Argonne National Laboratory]] and others demonstrates that existing seals can usually be quickly defeated by a trained person using low-tech methods.<ref>{{cite web|title=Defeating Existing Tamper-Indicating Seals |publisher=[[Argonne National Laboratory]] |url=http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/defeat.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081007232536/http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/defeat.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=7 October 2008 }}</ref>

===Software===
Security experts, such as [[Bruce Schneier]], have demanded that voting machine [[source code]] should be publicly available for inspection.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2004/11/the_problem_wit.html |title=The Problem with Electronic Voting Machines |date=10 November 2004 |publisher=Schneier.com |access-date=24 May 2010 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100208093414/http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2004/11/the_problem_wit.html |archive-date=8 February 2010 }}</ref> Others have also suggested publishing voting machine software under a [[free software license]] as is done in Australia.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections/electronicvoting.html |title=The electronic voting and counting system |publisher=Elections.act.gov.au |access-date=24 May 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110218212750/http://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections/electronicvoting.html |archive-date=18 February 2011 }}</ref>

===Testing and certification===
{{See also|Certification of voting machines}}

One method to detect errors with voting machines is [[parallel testing]], which are conducted on the Election Day with randomly picked machines. The [[Association for Computing Machinery|ACM]] published a study showing that, to change the outcome of the 2000 U.S. presidential election, only 2 votes in each precinct would have needed to be changed.<ref>Di Franco, A., Petro, A., Shear, E., and Vladimirov, V. 2004. Small vote manipulations can swing elections. Commun. ACM 47, 10 (Oct. 2004), 43–45. DOI= http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1022594.1022621</ref>

===Cost===
Cost of having electronic machines receive the voter's choices, print a ballot and scan the ballots to tally results is higher than the cost of printing blank ballots, having voters mark them directly (with machine-marking only when voters want it) and scanning ballots to tally results, according to studies in Georgia,<ref name="oset-reality">{{Cite web |url=https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5766827-OSET.html |title=Georgia State Election Technology Acquisition, A Reality Check |last=Perez |first=Edward, and Gregory Miller |date=March 2019 |website=OSET Institute |language=en |access-date=6 March 2020 |archive-date=30 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200730231209/https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5766827-OSET.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="bmd-ga">{{Cite news |last=Fowler |first=Stephen |url=https://www.gpbnews.org/post/here-s-what-vendors-say-it-would-cost-replace-georgia-s-voting-system |title=Here's What Vendors Say It Would Cost To Replace Georgia's Voting System |work=Georgia Public Broadcasting |access-date=28 February 2020 |language=en |archive-date=28 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200228224101/https://www.gpbnews.org/post/here-s-what-vendors-say-it-would-cost-replace-georgia-s-voting-system |url-status=live }}</ref> New York<ref name="bmdny">{{Cite web |url=https://www.nyvv.org/paperballotCostsMain.shtml |title=NYVV - Paper Ballots Costs |website=www.nyvv.org |access-date=28 February 2020 |archive-date=28 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200228224035/https://www.nyvv.org/paperballotCostsMain.shtml |url-status=dead }}</ref> and Pennsylvania.<ref name="pitt cost">{{Cite web |url=https://www.cyber.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/PDFs/voting-system-selection-one-pager%20%282%29.pdf |title=Pennsylvania Counties' New Voting Systems Selections: An Analysis |last=Deluzio |first=Christopher, Kevin Skoglund |date=28 February 2020 |website=University of Pittsburgh |access-date=28 February 2020 |archive-date=26 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200626032838/https://www.cyber.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/PDFs/voting-system-selection-one-pager%20(2).pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref>

==Adoption worldwide==
{{excerpt|Electronic voting by country|templates=-electiontech, Cleanup bare URLs}}

==In popular culture==
In the 2006 film [[Man of the Year (2006 film)|''Man of the Year'']] starring [[Robin Williams]], the character played by Williams—a comedic host of political talk show—wins the election for President of the United States when a software error in the electronic voting machines produced by the fictional manufacturer Delacroy causes votes to be tallied inaccurately.

In ''Runoff'', a 2007 novel by [[Mark Coggins]], a surprising showing by the [[Green Party (United States)|Green Party]] candidate in a [[San Francisco Mayor|San Francisco Mayoral election]] forces a [[Two-round system|runoff]] between him and the highly favored establishment candidate—a plot line that closely parallels the actual results of the 2003 election. When the private-eye protagonist of the book investigates at the behest of a powerful Chinatown businesswoman, he determines that the outcome was rigged by someone who defeated the security on the city's newly installed e-voting system.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.januarymagazine.com/crfiction/runoff.html |title=January Magazine, "The Fix Is In" |publisher=Januarymagazine.com |access-date=24 May 2010 |archive-date=29 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201129163222/http://www.januarymagazine.com/crfiction/runoff.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

"[[Hacking Democracy]]" is a 2006 documentary film shown on [[HBO]]. Filmed over three years, it documents American citizens investigating anomalies and irregularities with electronic voting systems that occurred during America's 2000 and 2004 elections, especially in [[Volusia County, Florida]]. The film investigates the flawed integrity of electronic voting machines, particularly those made by [[Diebold Election Systems]] and culminates in the hacking of a [[Diebold]] election system in [[Leon County, Florida]].

The central conflict in the [[Massively multiplayer online game|MMO]] video game [[Infantry (video game)|Infantry]] resulted from the global institution of [[direct democracy]] through the use of personal voting devices sometime in the 22nd century AD. The practice gave rise to a 'voting class' of citizens composed mostly of homemakers and retirees who tended to be at home all day. Because they had the most free time to participate in voting, their opinions ultimately came to dominate politics.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.freeinfantry.com/history1/infantry/ |title=Infantry Archive, 'The Collective Era' |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no-byline.--> |website=freeinfantry.com |access-date=21 September 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170103154939/http://www.freeinfantry.com/history1/infantry/ |archive-date=3 January 2017 }}</ref>

==See also==
<!--alphabetical order-->
{{colbegin}}
* [[Certification of voting machines]]
* [[E-democracy]]
* [[Electoral fraud]]
* [[Electronic referendum]]
* [[Soft error]]
* [[Vote counting system]]
* [[Voting machine]]
{{colend}}

;Electronic voting manufacturers
* [[AccuPoll]]
* [[Bharat Electronics Limited]] (India)
* [[Dominion Voting Systems]] (Canada)
* [[Electronics Corporation of India Limited|Electronics Corporation of India Ltd]]
* [[ES&S]] (United States)
* [[Hart InterCivic]] (United States)
* [[Nedap]] ([[Netherlands]])
* [[Premier Election Solutions]] (formerly Diebold Election Systems) (United States)
* [[Safevote]]
* [[Sequoia Voting Systems]] (United States)
* [[Scytl]] (Spain)
* [[Smartmatic]]

;Academic efforts
* [[Bingo Voting]]
* DRE-i and [[DRE-i with enhanced privacy|DRE-ip]]
* [[Prêt à Voter]]
* [[Punchscan]]

==References==
{{Reflist|30em}}

==External links==
{{external links|date=November 2022}}
* [http://e-lected.blogspot.com/search?q=Smartmatic&max-results=20&by-date=true/ Electronic Vote around the World – Smartmatic]
* [http://www.eac.gov/ Election Assistance Commission]
* [http://vote.nist.gov/ Vote.NIST.gov]{{snd}} the [[National Institute of Standards and Technology]] [[Help America Vote Act]] page
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20120503232608/http://ezine.pk/?e-voting-success-story&id=41543 An Electronic Voting Case Study in KCA University, Kenya]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20070930000436/http://www.electiontechnology.com/research.php The Election Technology Library research list]{{snd}} a comprehensive list of research relating to technology use in elections
* [http://www.aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/e-voting/ E-Voting information] from [http://www.aceproject.org/ ACE Project]
* [http://brainstorms.in/?p=309 How do we vote in India with Electronic Voting machine]
* [https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90727541 NPR] summary of current technology status in the states of the U.S., as of May 2008
* [https://www.valimised.ee/en/internet-voting/internet-voting-estonia Internet Voting in Estonia] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201119035243/https://www.valimised.ee/en/internet-voting/internet-voting-estonia |date=19 November 2020 }}
* [http://www.salentoevoting.it/ Progetto Salento eVoting]{{snd}} a project for an e-voting test in Melpignano e Martignano (Lecce&nbsp;– Italy) designed by Marco Mancarella{{snd}} University of Salento
* {{cite journal | doi = 10.1016/j.cose.2012.08.001 | title = Study on Poll-Site Voting and Verification Systems | volume=31 | issue = 8 | year=2012 | journal=Computers & Security | pages=989–1010 | last1 = Jardí-Cedó | first1 = Roger | last2 = Pujol-Ahulló | first2 = Jordi | last3 = Castellà-Roca | first3 = Jordi | last4 = Viejo | first4 = Alexandre}}{{snd}} a review of existing electronic voting systems and its verification systems in supervised environments
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20070729052927/http://vocomp.org/papers/opencounting.pdf Open Counting]
* [http://people.howstuffworks.com/e-voting4.htm Systems Behind E-Voting]
* [http://www.votebox.co.uk/index.htm VoteBox(tm) UK Online Voting] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171025022833/http://www.votebox.co.uk/index.htm |date=25 October 2017 }}

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