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{{Short description|Multiple states under one central authority, usually created by conquest}}
{{about|political and historical terms}}
{{redirect|Ancient Empires|the game|Ancient Empires (mobile game)}}
{{distinguish|Umpire}}
{{multiple issues|{{POV|date=June 2023}}{{Tone|date=June 2023}}}}
[[File:Roman Empire Trajan 117AD.png|thumb|upright=1.35|{{legend|#b23938| The [[Roman Empire]] at its greatest territorial extent in 117 AD, the time of [[Trajan]]'s death}}  {{legend|#d28989|[[List of Roman client rulers|Roman vassal states]]}}]]

{{Basic forms of government}} {{politics}}

An '''empire''' is a realm controlled by an emperor or an empress and divided between a [[hegemony|dominant]] center and subordinate peripheries.{{sfn|Howe|2002|p=30}} The center of the empire (sometimes referred to as the [[metropole]]) has political control over the peripheries.<ref>{{Cite book |last =Reus-Smit |first =Christian |url =https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/individual-rights-and-the-making-of-the-international-system/A915E13F20DDBD0F5FEE91A59D7C827A |title =Individual Rights and the Making of the International System |date =2013 |publisher =Cambridge University Press |isbn =978-0-521-85777-2 |page =4}}</ref> Within an empire, different populations may have different sets of rights and may be governed differently.{{sfn|Burbank|Cooper|2010|p=8}} The word "empire" derives from the Roman concept of {{lang | la | [[imperium]]}}. Narrowly defined, an empire is a [[sovereign state]] whose [[head of state]] uses the title of "[[emperor]]" or [[Empress-regnant|"empress"]]; but not all states with aggregate territory under the rule of supreme authorities are called "empires" or are ruled by an emperor; nor have all self-described empires been accepted as such by contemporaries and historians (the [[Central African Empire]] of 1976 to 1979, and some [[Anglo-Saxon]] kingdoms in early England being examples).{{efn |
The [[Tsardom of Bulgaria (1908–1946)]] had general recognition as a kingdom, despite its grandiose name.
}}

There have been "ancient and modern, centralized and decentralized, ultra-brutal and relatively benign" empires.{{Sfn|Howe|2002|page=35}} An important distinction has been between [[Tellurocracy|land empires made up solely of contiguous territories]], such as the [[Achaemenid Empire]], [[Roman Empire]], the [[Mongol Empire]], or the [[Russian Empire]]; and those - [[Thalassocracy|based on sea-power]] - which include territories that are remote from the 'home' country of the empire, such as the [[Dutch colonial empire]], the [[Empire of Japan]], the [[Chola Empire]] or the [[British Empire]].{{Sfn|Howe|2002|page=35}}

Aside from the more formal usage, the concept of ''empire'' in popular thought is associated with such concepts as ''[[imperialism]]'', ''[[colonialism]]'', and ''[[globalization]]'', with "imperialism" referring to the creation and maintenance of unequal relationships between nations and not necessarily the policy of a state headed by an emperor or empress. The word "empire" can also refer colloquially to a large-scale [[commerce|business]] enterprise (e.g. a [[transnational corporation]]), to a political organization controlled by a [[Single (music)|single]] individual (a [[political boss]]) or by a group (political bosses).<ref>{{Cite web |title =Empire |url=http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/61337 |url-access =subscription |access-date =21 October 2014 |website =Oxford Dictionary Online}}</ref> "Empire" is often used as a term to describe overpowering situations causing displeasure.{{Sfn|Howe|2002}}

==Definition==
An empire is an aggregate of many separate states or territories under a supreme ruler or oligarchy.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Oxford Dictionary Online |url=https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/61337?rskey=ZzCRVM&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid |access-date=2020-06-30}} "An extensive territory under the control of a supreme ruler (typically an emperor) or an [[oligarchy]], often consisting of an aggregate of many separate states or territories. In later use also: an extensive group of subject territories ultimately under the rule of a single sovereign state."</ref> This is in contrast to a [[federation]], which is an extensive state voluntarily composed of autonomous states and peoples. An empire is a large polity which rules over territories outside of its original borders.

Definitions of what physically and politically constitutes an empire vary. It might be a state affecting [[imperialism|imperial policies]] or a particular [[Structuralism|political structure]]. Empires are typically formed from diverse ethnic, national, cultural, and religious components.{{Sfn|Howe|2002|page=15}} 'Empire' and 'colonialism' are used to refer to relationships between a powerful state or society versus a less powerful one; [[Michael W. Doyle]] has defined empire as "effective control, whether formal or informal, of a subordinated society by an imperial society".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Doyle |first=Michael |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XlluDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA30 |title=Empires |date=5 September 2018 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-1-5017-3413-7 |page=30 |language=en |quote=I favor the behavioral definition of empire as effective control, whether formal or informal, of a subordinated society by an imperial society.}}</ref> [[Imperialism]] for Doyle is simply the process of establishing and maintaining an empire.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Doyle |first=Michael |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XlluDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA30 |title=Empires |date=5 September 2018 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-1-5017-3413-7 |pages=30, 37 |language=en}}</ref> Similarly, for [[Rein Taagepera]] imperialism is a policy of conquest and domination of foreign lands and populations.<ref>Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). ''More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes''. (Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|978-1-009-42782-1}}), p 48.</ref> 

This is not to be confused with the [[Theories of imperialism|Imperialism in the Marxist-Leninst sense]] of the late modern phenomenon following the European colonialism and representing the last stage of capitalism.<ref>Lenin, Vladimir. (1917). ''[[Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism]]''. (Петроград: Жизнь и Знание).</ref> Initially, the term was [[New Imperialism]], where the qualifier "new" differentiated the contemporary imperialism from earlier imperialism, such as the formation of ancient empires and the first wave of European colonization.<ref>Louis, W. Roger (2006). "32: Robinson and Gallagher and their critics". ''Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization''. (London: I.B.Tauris), p. 910.</ref> Eventually, Lenin cancelled all earlier forms and began the history of Imperialism in the 1760s. The Leninist definition of imperialism removed the essence of empire from politics to economics and explicitly denied that modern capitalist imperialism had anything in common with the empires of the past.<ref name="auto2">[[Dominic Lieven|Lieven, Dominic]] (2012). "Empire, history and the contemporary global order," ''Proceedings of the British Academy'', vol 131: p 130, https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/documents/2012/pba131p127.pdf</ref>

Since the beginning, mainstream historians of empire were puzzled: as the highest stage of capitalism, imperialism cannot exist before 1876. Such a concept is not very helpful “if we do not know for certain whether it fits the facts of two millennia or… two generations.”<ref name="auto">[[Keith Hancock (historian)|Hancock, William Keith]] (1940). ''Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs''. (Oxford University Press), p 2, 298, https://archive.org/details/surveyofbritishc0002wkha</ref> [[Kenneth Waltz]] believed that the cause (capitalism) appears much younger than the effect (imperialism). He believed that it is as though Newton explained gravitation by a certain 17th century phenomenon ignoring that gravitation operated earlier.<ref name="auto5">Waltz, Kenneth (1979). ''[[Theory of International Politics]]''. (Boston: McGraw-Hill), p 25, https://archive.org/details/theoryofinternat00walt/page/24/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> Lenin’s work was interpreted as political pamphlet rather than scientific thesis,<ref>{{Cite book |last=Doyle |first=Michael |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XlluDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA30 |title=Empires |date=5 September 2018 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-1-5017-3413-7 |page=12 |language=en}}</ref> suitable for "the half-educated whose power of criticism was not fully developed,"<ref>[[:de:Richard Koebner|Koebner, Richard]] (1964). ''Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political Word, 1840-1960''. (Cambridge University Press), p. 282, https://archive.org/details/imperialismstory0000koeb/page/282/mode/2up?view=theater&q=lenin</ref> and calling them to hunt the “invisible hand” of economic exploitation. According to Michael Doyle, thus imperialism turned into an economic and European phenomenon.<ref name="auto"/> The pamphlet re-defined empire as the original sin of European peoples, who corrupted an 'innocent world', and the belief became wholeheartedly shared all over the non-Western world.<ref>[[John Darwin (historian)|Darwin, John]] (2008). ''After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405''. (New York: Bloomsbury Press), p 22-23.</ref><ref>Adler, Eric (2008). “Post-9/11 views of Rome and the nature of ‘defensive imperialism.’” ''International Journal of the Classical Tradition'', vol 15 (4): p 600-601, 604.</ref> In this world, the word ''imperialist'' became "the 20th-century version of the devil" who has constant designs on their sovereignty and economic growth.<ref>[[:de:Richard Koebner|Koebner, Richard]] (1964). ''Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political Word, 1840-1960''. (Cambridge University Press), pp. XXII-XXIII, https://archive.org/details/imperialismstory0000koeb/page/n27/mode/2up?view=theater</ref>

Few historians{{Weasel inline|date=September 2025}} follow the Marxist approach and most recognize that imperialism predates the European colonialism and capitalism by at least four millenia.<ref>[[John M. MacKenzie|MacKenzie, John M.]] (2016). "Empires in world history: Characteristics, concepts, and consequences." ''The Encyclopedia of Empire''. (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. {{ISBN|978-1-118-44064-3}}), vol I, p 2.</ref><ref name="auto3">[[Dominic Lieven|Lieven, Dominic]] (2012). "Empire, history and the contemporary global order," ''Proceedings of the British Academy'', vol 131: p 132, https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/documents/2012/pba131p127.pdf</ref><ref>[[Kimberly Kagan|Kagan, Kimberly]] et al (2010). ''The Imperial Moment''. (Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), p 8.</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Doyle |first=Michael |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XlluDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA30 |title=Empires |date=5 September 2018 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-1-5017-3413-7 |page=64 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="auto5"/> In the early 21st century, most [[Theories of imperialism|theories of empire]] still were Eurocentric, reflecting the brief period when European empires dominated the world. This perspective, according to the 2021 ''Oxford World History of Empire'', must be widened and the "[[Imperialism#Age of Imperialism|Age of Imperialism]]" situated within a proper world history of empires. Millennia had passed before Europe could claim to dictate the course of world history and a significant time has passed since.<ref>Bang, Peter Fibiger et al (2021). ''The Oxford World History of Empire''. (Oxford University Press). Vol. 1, p. XX.</ref> 

According to historians such as George Steinmetz, involving the cessation of state sovereignty, empires should properly be studied in the domain of politics rather than economics.<ref>[[George Steinmetz (academic)|Steinmetz, George]] (2013). ''Sociology and Empire: The Imperial Entanglements of a Discipline''. (Duke University Press), p 10.</ref><ref>[[Kimberly Kagan|Kagan, Kimberly]] et al (2010). ''The Imperial Moment''. (Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), p 5.</ref> The essential core of the definition is political.<ref name="hnn.us">[[Paul W. Schroeder|Schroeder, Paul W.]] (10 February 2003). "Is the US an empire?" ''History News Network'', https://www.hnn.us/article/is-the-us-an-empire</ref> Lenin’s usage of the term 'empire' primarily deals with imperialism during the 20th century.<ref>Abernethy, David B. (2000). ''The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415-1980''. (New Haven: Yale University Press), p 19.</ref> Mainstream and Marxist historians heavily disagree on the topic of imperialism<ref name="auto3" />

[[Tom Nairn]] and [[Paul James (academic)|Paul James]] define empires as polities that "extend relations of power across territorial spaces over which they have no prior or given legal sovereignty, and where, in one or more of the domains of economics, politics, and culture, they gain some measure of extensive [[hegemony]] over those spaces to extract or accrue value".{{Sfn|James|Nairn|2006|page=xxiii}} [[Rein Taagepera]] has defined an empire as "any relatively large sovereign political entity whose components are not sovereign".<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Taagepera |first=Rein |date=1979 |title=Size and Duration of Empires: Growth-Decline Curves, 600 B.C. to 600 A.D. |journal=Social Science History |volume=3 |issue=3/4 |page=117 |doi=10.2307/1170959 |jstor=1170959}}</ref> Peter Bang characterizes empire as "composite, layered and anything but uniform in their internal organization of power," and comprising "a range of different territories and communities, subjected hierarchically in various ways to a dominant power."<ref>{{Citation |last=Bang |first=Peter Fibiger |title=Empire—A World History |date=2021-03-03 |work=The Oxford World History of Empire |pages=1–88 |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/39128/chapter-abstract/338546613?redirectedFrom=fulltext |access-date=2024-11-30 |publisher=Oxford University Press |doi=10.1093/oso/9780199772360.003.0002 |isbn=978-0-19-977236-0|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

However, sometimes an empire is only a semantic construction, such as when a ruler assumes the title of "emperor".<ref>{{Cite web |title=empire |url=https://www.thefreedictionary.com/empire |access-date=26 October 2018 |website=The Free Dictionary |quote=any monarchy that for reasons of history, prestige, etc, has an emperor rather than a king as head of state}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2018 |title=empire |url=http://www.yourdictionary.com/empire |access-date=26 October 2018 |website=Your Dictionary |publisher=LoveToKnow, Corp. |quote=government by an emperor or empress}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=empire |url=https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/empire |access-date=26 October 2018 |website=Vocabulary.com Dictionary |quote=a monarchy with an emperor as head of state}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2018 |title=empire |url=https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/empire |access-date=26 October 2018 |website=Collins English Dictionary |quote=government by an emperor or empress}}</ref> That polity over which the ruler reigns logically becomes an "empire", despite having no additional territory or hegemony. Examples of this form of empire are the [[Central African Empire]], [[Second Mexican Empire|Mexican Empire]], or the [[Korean Empire]] proclaimed in 1897 when Korea, far from gaining new territory, was on the verge of being annexed by the [[Empire of Japan]], one of the last to use the name officially. Among the last states in the 20th century known as empires in this sense were the Central African Empire, [[Ethiopian Empire|Ethiopia]], [[Empire of Vietnam|Vietnam]], [[Manchukuo]], [[Russian Empire|Russia]], [[German Empire|Germany]], and Korea.

Scholars typically distinguish empires from nation-states.<ref name=":11">{{Cite book |last=Tilly |first=Charles |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uV8KywAACAAJ |title=Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992 |date=1990 |publisher=Blackwell |pages=4, 45–46 |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite encyclopedia |last=Colomer |first=Josep M. |title=Empires Versus States |date=2017 |entry=Empires Versus States |encyclopedia=Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics |language=en |doi=10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.608 |doi-access= |isbn=978-0-19-022863-7}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Hechter |first1=Michael |last2=Brustein |first2=William |date=1980 |title=Regional Modes of Production and Patterns of State Formation in Western Europe |journal=American Journal of Sociology |volume=85 |issue=5 |pages=1061–1094 |doi=10.1086/227125 |issn=0002-9602 |jstor=2778891 |s2cid=143853058}}</ref> In an empire, there is a hierarchy whereby one group of people (usually, the metropole) has command over other groups of people, and there is a hierarchy of rights and prestige for different groups of people.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Stanard |first=Matthew G. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pZlNDwAAQBAJ |title=European Overseas Empire, 1879 - 1999: A Short History |date=2018 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-119-13013-0 |pages=3–4 |language=en}}</ref> [[Josep Colomer]] distinguished between empires and [[State (polity)|states]] in the following way:

# Empires were vastly larger than states
# Empires lacked fixed or permanent boundaries whereas a state had fixed boundaries
# Empires had a "compound of diverse groups and territorial units with asymmetric links with the center" whereas a state had "supreme authority over a territory and population"
# Empires had multi-level, overlapping jurisdictions whereas a state sought monopoly and homogenization<ref name=":0" />

==Characteristics==
{{See also|Thalassocracy}}
Many empires were the result of military conquest, incorporating the vanquished states into a political union, but imperial hegemony can be established in other ways. According to [[Edward Luttwak]], there are two main ways to establish and maintain an imperial [[political structure]]: (i) as a territorial empire of direct conquest and control by force or (ii) as a coercive, [[Hegemony|hegemonic]] empire of indirect control. The former method provides greater tribute and direct political control, yet limits further expansion because it absorbs military forces to fixed garrisons. The latter method provides less tribute and indirect control, but avails military forces for further expansion.<ref>Based on ''The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire'', Ross Hassig, ''Mexico and the Spanish Conquest'' (1994), pp. 23–24, {{ISBN|0-582-06829-0}} (pbk)</ref>

Empires can expand by both land and sea. Territorial empires (e.g. the [[Macedonia (ancient kingdom)|Macedonian Empire]] and [[Byzantine Empire]]) tend to be [[Connected space|contiguous]] areas extending directly outwards from the original frontier. The terrestrial empire's maritime analogue is the [[thalassocracy]], an empire composed of islands and coasts which are accessible to its terrestrial homeland, such as the Athenian-dominated [[Delian League]] and [[British Empire|British empires]]) with looser structures and more scattered territories, often consisting of many islands and other forms of possessions which required the creation and maintenance of a powerful navy.{{Sfnp|Howe|2002|page=15, 66}}

The [[Delian League|Athenian Empire]], the [[Roman Empire]], and the [[British Empire]] developed at least in part under [[Election|elective]] auspices. Empires such as the [[Holy Roman Empire]] also came together by electing the emperor with votes from member realms through the [[Imperial election]]. The [[Empire of Brazil]] declared itself an empire after separating from the [[Portuguese Empire]] in 1822. France has twice transitioned from being called the [[republic|French Republic]] to being called the French Empire while it retained an overseas empire.{{Sfn|Burbank|Cooper|2010}} Europeans began applying the designation of "empire" to non-European monarchies, such as the [[Qing Empire]] and the [[Mughal Empire]], as well as the [[Maratha Confederacy]], eventually leading to the looser denotations applicable to any political structure meeting their criteria of "[[imperium]]". Some monarchies styled themselves as having greater size, scope, and power than the territorial, politico-military, and economic facts support. As a consequence, some monarchs assumed the title of "[[emperor]]" (or its corresponding translation, ''[[tsar]]'', ''empereur'', ''[[kaiser]]'', ''[[shah]]'' etc.) and renamed their states as "The Empire of ..."

Empires were seen as expanding power and administration, and guaranteeing stability, security and legal order for their subjects.{{Sfn|Howe|2002|page=126–127}} They tried to minimize ethnic and religious antagonism inside the empire. Some empires tended to impose their ideas, beliefs and cultural habits on the subject states to strengthen the imperial structure; others opted for [[Multiculturalism|multicultural]] and [[Cosmopolitanism|cosmopolitan]] policies.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www-personal.umich.edu/~geostein/docs/Steinmetz%202014%20Empires%20imperial%20states%20and%20colonies.pdf | title=U-M Web Hosting }}</ref><ref>[[George Steinmetz (academic)|Steinmetz, George]] (2013). ''Sociology and Empire: The Imperial Entanglements of a Discipline''. (Duke University Press), p 9.</ref> [[Anthony Pagden]] estimates that most of the early empires were multicultural and attempted to incorporate various groups into some larger cosmopolitan whole.<ref>Pagden, Anthony (2015). ''The Burdens of Empire: 1539 to the Present''. (Cambridge University Press), p. 5.</ref> The aristocracies that ruled empires were often more cosmopolitan and broad-minded than their nationalistic successors.{{Sfn|Howe|2002|page=126–127}} Cultures generated by empires could have notable effects that outlasted the empire itself.

In the mid-twentieth century, the word "empire" obtained a negative connotation, viewed as inherently immoral or illegitimate.{{Sfn|Howe|2002|page=16–17}} Traditional or overt empire destroyed and discredited itself in the World Wars. The matters are worse in the German language where empire is "reich" and immediately associates with the [[Third Reich]].<ref>[[Dominic Lieven|Lieven, Dominic]] (2012). "Empire, history and the contemporary global order," ''Proceedings of the British Academy'', vol 131: p 132, 149, https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/documents/2012/pba131p127.pdf</ref> For the first time in history, countries which proudly called themselves empires disappeared from the map. The postwar world came under the domination of two superpowers both of which proclaimed themselves to be enemies of empire. The West contained the imperialist East and the East and the [[Global South|South]] resisted the imperialist West. Imperialism became a cosmopolitan, multi-front battle cry wielding many diverse and distant peoples in fighting a common enemy.<ref>[[:de:Richard Koebner|Koebner, Richard]] (1964). ''Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political Word, 1840-1960''. (Cambridge University Press), pp. XXII-XXIII, XXV, https://archive.org/details/imperialismstory0000koeb/page/n29/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> As former colonies came to make up the majority of states in the United Nations, "empire" lost all legitimacy in this major international forum. "Any state stupid enough to call itself an empire became subject automatically to UN resolutions on decolonisation."<ref>[[Dominic Lieven|Lieven, Dominic]] (2012). "Empire, history and the contemporary global order," ''Proceedings of the British Academy'', vol 131: p 131, 149, https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/documents/2012/pba131p127.pdf</ref> Most postwar histories of empires have been hostile, especially if the authors were promoting nationalism.

==History==

{{Multiple image
| header            = Early empires
| header_background = #f8eaba
| image1            = Achaemenid Empire 500 BCE.jpg
| caption1          = [[Achaemenid Empire]] of [[Ancient Persia|Persia]] at its zenith
| image2            = Seleucid-Empire 200bc.jpg
| caption2          = Seleucid Empire and Mauryan Empire in 200 BCE. The Seleucid Empire reached its peaked under Antiochus III.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://usuarios.lycos.es/superjulio/IMPERIOS%20DE%20ORIENTE%20MEDIO%201%20(IRAK,%20SIRIA,%20ISRAEL,%20LIBANO,%20YEMEN,%20ARABIA,%20OMAN)/Mapas%20Imperiales%20Imperio%20Seleucida3.jpg |title=Mapas Imperiales - Imperio Seleucida |website=usuarios.lycos.es |access-date= }}{{Dead link|date=February 2025 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Haywood |first=John |author-link= |title=The Cassell Atlas of World History |publisher=Andromeda Oxford Ltd. | year=1997 |page=2.02 |others=et al. }}</ref>
}}
Stephen Howe writes that with the exception of the Roman, Chinese and "perhaps ancient Egyptian states", early empires seldom survived the death of their founder and were usually limited in scope to conquest and collection of tribute, having little impact on the everyday lives of their subjects.{{sfn|Howe|2002|pp=37, 39}}

With the exception of Rome, the periods of dissolution following imperial falls were equally short. Successor states seldom outlived their founders and disappeared in the next and often larger empire. Only in the wreckage of the Roman Empire, distinguished Robert G. Wesson, a system of full-fledged nation-states evolved and it took a millennium. "It seems almost impossible for a community of free states to reemerge where a universal empire has once stretched across the land and fixed its ways and symbols of authority."<ref>Wesson, Robert G. (1967). ''The Imperial Order''. (Berkeley: University of California Press), p 374.</ref> [[Walter Scheidel]] also finds Europe exceptional among civilizations which experienced imperial unity because for an entire millennium (between Charlemagne and Napoleon) no single power managed to control more than one-fifth of the region’s population.<ref>Scheidel, Walter (2021). "The scale of empire: territory, population, distribution." ''The Oxford World History of Empire''. (Oxford University Press). Vol. 1, p. 106.</ref> Some empires, like the [[Neo-Babylonian Empire|Neo-Babylonian]], [[Median kingdom|Median]] and [[Lydia]]n were outright conquered by a larger empire. The historical pattern was not a simple rise-and-fall cycle; rather it was rise, fall, and greater rise, taking on an increasingly global scale.<ref>[[John M. MacKenzie|MacKenzie, John M.]] (2016). "Empires in world history: Characteristics, concepts, and consequences." ''The Encyclopedia of Empire''. (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. {{ISBN|978-1-118-44064-3}}), vol I, p 1.</ref> [[Raoul Naroll]] called it "expanding pulsation,"<ref>Naroll, Raoul, (1967). "Imperial Cycles and World Order," ''Peace Research Society'', 7: pp 83-101.</ref> [[Christopher Chase-Dunn]] "upward sweeps,"<ref>Chase-Dunn, Chris et al ( 11 August 2006). " (IROWS Working paper 22. University of California), p. 5, https://escholarship.org/content/qt8pp6d9m3/qt8pp6d9m3_noSplash_2b3c6bced34fe2a377213e93569f0ce3.pdf</ref> and [[Ian Morris (historian)|Ian Morris]] "exponential growth."<ref>Morris, Ian (2012). "The evolution of war," ''Cliodynamics'', vol 3 (1): p 23-24.</ref>

[[Peter Turchin]], [[Walter Scheidel]] and [[Rein Taagepera]] demonstrated this millennia-long trend in mathematically calculated graphs. Turchin showed the largest empire in total area for 2800 BC – AD 1800.<ref>Turchin, Peter (2009), "A theory for formation of large empires," ''Journal of Global History'', vol 4: p 201, fig 2, p 205, https://peterturchin.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Turchin_JGH_2009.pdf</ref> Scheidel demonstrated population of the largest empire and three largest empires as a share of world population from 700 BC to AD 2000.<ref>Scheidel, Walter (2021). "The scale of empire: Territory, population, distribution." ''The Oxford World History of Empire''. (Oxford University Press). Vol. 1, p. 102, fig. 2.7.</ref> Taagepera showed the largest empire in total area and share of world population for 3000 BC - AD 2000<ref>Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). ''More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes''. (Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|978-1-009-42782-1}}), fig 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, p 228, 230, 233.</ref> and for the same period five largest empires as share of world land and world population.<ref>Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). ''More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes''. (Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|978-1-009-42782-1}}), fig 4.1, p 51.</ref> The general vector of these graphs, according to Max Ostrovsky, represents a fragment in hyperbola ''[[wikt:arctangent|Y = Arctg X]]'' when the hyperbola takes off.<ref>Ostrovsky, Max (2006). ''Y = Arctg X: The Hyperbola of the World Order''. (Lanham: University Press of America), p 363-364, https://archive.org/details/yarctgxhyperbola0000ostr/page/362/mode/2up?q=arctg&view=theater</ref>

Empires were limited in scope to conquest, as Howe observed, but conquest is a considerable scope. Many fought to the death to avoid it or to be liberated from it. Imperial conquests and attempts of conquest significantly contributed to the [[list of wars by death toll]]. The imperial impact on subjects can be regarded as "little," but only on those subjects who survived the imperial conquest and rule. We cannot ask the inhabitants of [[Carthage]] and [[Masada]], for example, whether empire had little impact on their lives. We seldom hear the voices of subject peoples because history is mostly written by winners,<ref>[[Peter Garnsey|Garnsey, Peter D. A.]] & Whittaker, Charles Richard (1978). ''Imperialism in the Ancient World''. (Cambridge University Press), p 5, https://archive.org/details/p.-d.-a.-garnsey-imperialism-in-the-ancient-world/P.%20D.%20A.%20Garnsey%20-%20Imperialism%20in%20the%20Ancient%20World/page/5/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> that is, by the great empires themselves.<ref>Wesson, Robert G. (1967). ''The Imperial Order''. (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 388.</ref> The imperial sources tend to ignore or reduce the resistance by subdued states.<ref>Brien, Pierre (2002). ''From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire''. (tr. Daniels, Peter T. Indiana: Eisenbrauns)  p 79.</ref> But two rich primary sources of the subject population are the Hebrew [[Prophetic books]] and the ''[[Sibylline Oracles]]''.<ref>[[Erich S. Gruen|Gruen, Erich S]]. (2020). “The Sibylline Oracles and resistance to Rome.” ''The Future of Rome: Roman, Greek, Jewish and Christian Visions''. (Eds. Price, Jonathan J. & Berthelot, Katell, Cambridge University Press), p 195.</ref><ref>[[Moshe Weinfeld|Weinfeld, Moshe]] (1986). "The protest against imperialism in ancient Israelite prophecy." ''The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations''. (Ed. [[Shmuel Eisenstadt|Eisenstadt, Shmuel]]. Albania: New York State University Press), p 169-182, https://archive.org/details/originsdiversity0000unse/page/168/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> The hatred towards the ruling empires expressed in these sources makes impression of an impact more serious than estimated by Howe. A classical writer and adherent of empire, [[Orosius]] explicitly preferred to avoid the views of subject populations.<ref>Orosius. ''History against the Pagans'', IV:23. (tr. Fear, A. T., Liverpool University Press, 2010).</ref> And another classical Roman patriot, [[Lucan]] confessed that "words cannot express how bitterly we are hated" by subject peoples.<ref>Lucan. ''Civil War'', 7:482. (tr. Braund, S. H., Oxford University Press, 1992).</ref> More subject voices were revealed by Historian Timothy H. Parson in his research of seven empires from the perspective of their subjects.<ref>Parsons, Timothy (2010). ''The Rule of Empires: Those Who Built Them, Those Who Endured Them, and Why They Always Fall''. (New York: Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-19-530431-2}}), https://archive.org/details/ruleofempirestho00pars/page/n7/mode/2up</ref>

===Early empires===
The earliest known empire appeared in southern Egypt sometime around 3200 BC. Southern Egypt was divided by three kingdoms each centered on a powerful city. Hierapolis conquered the other two cities over two centuries, and later grew into the country of Egypt.{{Sfn|Stearns|2001}} The [[Akkadian Empire]], established by [[Sargon of Akkad]] (24th century BC), was an early all-Mesopotamian empire which spread into Anatolia, the Levant and Ancient Iran. This imperial achievement was repeated by [[Shamshi-Adad I]] of [[Assyria]] and [[Hammurabi]] of [[Babylon]] in the 19th and 18th centuries BC. In the 15th century BC, the [[New Kingdom of Egypt|New Kingdom]] of [[Ancient Egypt]], ruled by [[Thutmose III]], was [[North Africa during Antiquity|ancient Africa]]'s major force upon incorporating [[Nubia]] and the [[City-state#Ancient city-states|ancient city-states]] of the [[Levant]].

In the [[Amarna Period]] (15th-13th centuries BC), Egypt, the [[Middle Assyrian Empire]], [[Hittite Empire]], and those of the [[Mitanni]] and [[Elamites]] formed [[club of great powers]]. Egypt and the Hittites emerged as two dominant Empires of the club and in 1274 BC clashed in the [[Battle of Kadesh]]. The confrontation was not decisive and soon the Amarna international system was dissolved during the [[late Bronze Age collapse]]. All its empires declined. The first empire to recover from the collapse was the [[Neo-Assyrian Empire]] (916–612 BC). By 673 BC, Assyria conquered the entire [[Fertile Crescent]] including Cyprus and [[Assyrian conquest of Egypt|Egypt]].

The Assyrian achievement, however, was short lived. In the 6th century BC, the [[Median Empire]], [[Neo-Babylonian empire|Babylonians]], Scythians and Cimmerians allied and [[Medo-Babylonian conquest of the Assyrian Empire|defeated the Assyrian Empire]]. The Assyrian capital, [[Nineveh]], was razed by their combined armies in 612 BC. Never again a world leading empire would be centered in a great River Valley. The fall of Nineveh marks the end of the [[Bronze Age|River Valleys age]] and the beginning of the [[Axial Age]],<ref>[[Karl Jaspers|Jaspers, Karl]] (1953). ''The Origin and Goal of History''. (New Haven: Yale University Press), p 6-7.</ref> when the center of power shifted away from the [[River valley civilization|great River Valleys]], and empires suddenly became significantly larger.<ref>Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). ''More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes''. (Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|978-1-009-42782-1}}), p 121.</ref> The Median Empire became the first leading empire, the largest of its day, centered beyond River Valleys. This Empire lasted for about sixty years and was conquered by the Persian Empire.{{Sfn|Stearns|2001}}

From 1500 BC in China rose the [[Shang Empire]] which was succeeded by the [[Zhou dynasty|Zhou]] Empire around 1100 BC. Chronologically, the collapse of Shang also coincides with the late Bronze Age collapse. Both Shang and Zhou equalled or surpassed in territory their contemporary Near Eastern empires. The Zhou Empire dissolved in 770 BC into feudal multi-state system which lasted for five and a half centuries until the [[Qin's wars of unification|universal conquest of Qin]] in 221 BC.
{{Clear}}

===Classical period===
{{See also|Sino-Roman relations}}{{Multiple image
| header            = Empires of the Classical period
| header_background = #f8eaba
| image1            = Roman Empire-117AD.png
| caption1          = [[Roman Empire]] under [[Trajan]] (98–117). This would be the peak of the empire's territorial extent.
| image2            = Map of the Han dynasty.svg
| caption2          = [[Han Empire]] of [[Imperial China|China]] in 2 AD
}}

The [[Axial Age]] (mid-First Millennium BC) witnessed unprecedented imperial expansion in the [[Indo-Mediterranean|Indo-Mediterranean region]] and China,<ref>Samuel N. Eisenstadt, ''Axial Age Civilizations'', (New York: New York State University Press, 1986)</ref> distinguished as the most "dramatic" surge in premodern history.<ref>[[Peter Turchin|Turchin, Peter]] (2009), "A theory for formation of large empires," ''Journal of Global History'', vol 4: p 201, fig 2 on p 205, https://peterturchin.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Turchin_JGH_2009.pdf</ref> The array of successive and parallel empires of the Age makes "bewildering" impression on imperiometric experts.<ref>Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). ''More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes''. (Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|978-1-009-42782-1}}), p 126.</ref> The Axial threshold is remarkable in world history. From 600 BC, the area of the largest empire would never fell below {{convert|2.0|e6km2|e6sqmi|abbr=unit}} – a size never reached before 600 BC. The [[Colonialism|Colonial]] surge was less exponential.<ref>Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). ''More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes''. (Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|978-1-009-42782-1}}), p 229.</ref> The Axial surge culminated with the Roman, Kushan and Han Empires ruling over as many as two-thirds of all people on Earth, the most extreme ever degree of imperial consolidation. The relative demographic size of the three largest empires in the world was not as massive before and ever since.<ref>[[Walter Scheidel|Scheidel, Walter]] (2021). "The scale of empire: territory, population, distribution." ''The Oxford World History of Empire''. (Oxford University Press). Vol. 1, p. 102.</ref>

The successful and extensive [[Achaemenid Empire]] (550–330 BC), also known as the first Persian Empire, covered [[Mesopotamia]], [[Egypt]], parts of [[Greece]], [[Thrace]], the [[Middle East]], much of [[Central Asia]], and North-Western [[India]]. It is considered the first great empire in history or the first "world empire".<ref>[[Friedrich Ratzel]], "Territorial Growth of States", ''Human Geography: An Essential Anthology'', (eds. Agnew, John, & Livingstone, David & Rogers, Alisdair, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p 527; and "The Laws of the Spatial Growth of States", The ''Structure of Political Geography'', (eds. Kasperson, Roger E., & Minghi, Julian V., Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), p 18.</ref> It was overthrown and replaced by the short-lived empire of [[Alexander the Great]]. His Empire was succeeded by three Empires ruled by the [[Diadochi]]—the [[Seleucid]], [[Ptolemaic dynasty|Ptolemaic]], and [[Antigonid dynasty|Antigonid]], which, despite being independent, are called the "[[Hellenistic]] Empire" by virtue of their similarities in culture and administration.

Meanwhile, in the western Mediterranean the Empires of [[Carthage]] and [[Rome]] began their rise. Having decisively defeated Carthage in 202 BC, Rome defeated Macedonia in 200 BC and the Seleucids in 190–189 BC to establish an all-Mediterranean Empire. The Seleucid Empire broke apart and its former eastern part was absorbed by the [[Parthian Empire]]. In 30 BC Rome annexed Ptolemaic Egypt.

In India during the [[Axial Age]] appeared the [[Maurya Empire]]—a geographically extensive and powerful empire, ruled by the Mauryan dynasty from 321 to 185 BC. The empire was founded in 322 BC by [[Chandragupta Maurya]] through the help of [[Chanakya]],<ref name="Namita2008">{{Cite book |last=Namita Sanjay Sugandhi |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8bdULPF4gNYC&pg=PA88 |title=Between the Patterns of History: Rethinking Mauryan Imperial Interaction in the Southern Deccan |year=2008 |isbn=978-0-549-74441-2 |pages=88–89 |access-date=2012-06-06 }}{{Dead link|date=January 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref> who rapidly expanded his power westward across central and western India, taking advantage of the disruptions of local powers following the withdrawal by Alexander the Great. By 320 BC, the Maurya Empire had fully occupied [[northwestern India]] as well as defeating and conquering the [[satrap]]s left by Alexander. Under Emperor [[Ashoka the Great]], the Maurya Empire became the first Indian empire to conquer the whole Indian Peninsula — an achievement repeated only twice, by the [[Gupta Empire|Gupta]] and [[Mughal Empire|Mughal]] Empires. In the reign of Ashoka [[Buddhism]] spread to become the dominant religion in many parts of the ancient India.{{Sfn|Stearns|2001}}

In 221 BC, China became an empire when the [[Qin (state)|State of Qin]] ended the chaotic [[Warring States period]] through its [[Qin's wars of unification|conquest]] of the [[Seven Warring States|other six states]], starting the [[Qin dynasty|Qin Empire]] (221–207 BC). Its sovereign adopted the new title of ''[[Emperor of China|Huangdi]]'' (皇帝), which is translated in English as "Emperor". The Qin Empire is known for the construction of the [[Great Wall of China]] and the [[Terracotta Army]], as well as the standardization of currency, weights, measures and writing system. It laid the foundation for China's first golden age, the [[Han dynasty]] (202 BC–AD 9, AD 25–220). The Han Empire [[Protectorate of the Western Regions|expanded into Central Asia]] and established trade through the [[Silk Road]]. [[Confucianism]] was, for the first time, adopted as an official state ideology. During the reign of the [[Emperor Wu of Han]] (156–87 BC), the [[Xiongnu]] were pacified. In the first two centuries of the Common Era, only four empires stretched between the [[Pacific Ocean|Pacific]] and the [[Atlantic Ocean|Atlantic]]: the Han Empire of China, the [[Kushan Empire]], the [[Parthian Empire]] of Persia, and the [[Roman Empire]].<ref>[[Craig Benjamin|Benjamin, Craig]] (2018). ''Empires of Ancient Eurasia: The First Silk Roads Era, 100 BCE – 250 CE''. (Michigan: Cambridge University Press), p. 2.</ref> The [[end of the Han dynasty|collapse of the Han Empire]] in AD 220 saw China fragmented into the [[Three Kingdoms]], only to be unified once again by the [[Jin dynasty (266–420)|Jin Empire]] (AD 266–420). The relative weakness of the Jin Empire plunged China into political disunity that would last from AD 304 to AD 589 when the [[Sui dynasty|Sui Empire]] (AD 581–618) reunited China.{{Sfn|Stearns|2001}}

The Romans were the first people to invent and embody the concept of "empire" in their two mandates: to wage war and to make and execute laws.{{Sfn|Howe|2002}} They were the most extensive Western empire until the [[early modern period]], and left a lasting impact on European society. Many languages, cultural values, religious institutions, political divisions, urban centers, and legal systems can trace their origins to the Roman Empire. The Roman Empire governed and rested on exploitative actions. They took slaves and money from the peripheries to support the imperial center.{{Sfn|Howe|2002}} However, the absolute reliance on conquered peoples to carry out the empire's fortune, sustain wealth, and fight wars would ultimately lead to the collapse of the Roman Empire.{{Sfn|Howe|2002}} The Romans were strong believers in what a later imperial age called their "civilizing mission". This term was legitimized and justified by writers like Cicero who wrote that only under Roman rule could the world flourish and prosper.{{Sfn|Howe|2002}} This ideology, that was envisioned to bring a new world order, was eventually spread across the Mediterranean world and beyond. People started to build houses like Romans, eat the same food, wear the same clothes and engage in the same games.{{Sfn|Howe|2002}} Even rights of citizenship and authority to rule were granted to people not born within Roman territory.{{Sfn|Howe|2002}}

The Latin word ''[[imperium]]'' derives from ''imperare'', meaning "to command", and originally referred to a magistrate's authority (usually in a military sense). As the Roman state expanded overseas, the term began to be used to describe Rome's authority over its [[colony|colonies]] and [[client state]]s. Successful generals were often given the title ''[[imperator]]'', an honorific roughly meaning "commander". Although historians use the terms "Republic" and "Empire" to identify the periods of Roman history before and after absolute power was assumed by [[Augustus]], the Romans themselves continued to refer to their government as the ''[[Res publica]]'', meaning "public affair". On the other hand, the concept of ''imperium Romanum'', as in, the authority of the Romans, is attested since the 2nd century BC. The modern concepts of "Empire" and "Emperor" did not appear until several centuries later, long after the fall of Rome in the West. Augustus established a new ''[[de facto]]'' monarchy, but sought to maintain the appearance of a republican government. He and his early successors used the informal titles of ''[[Augustus (title)|augustus]]'' and ''[[princeps]]'', but over time the title of ''imperator'' came to denote the office of (what is now referred to as) "[[Roman emperor|emperor]]".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Burger |first=Michael |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MQUs2QnC2F4C&pg=PA115 |title=The Shaping of Western Civilization: From Antiquity to the Enlightenment |publisher=University of Toronto Press |year=2008 |isbn=978-1-55111-432-3 |page=115}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last1=Hornblower |first1=Simon |url= |title=The Oxford Classical Dictionary |last2=Spawforth |first2=Antony |last3=Eidinow |first3=Esther |date=2012 |publisher= OUP Oxford|isbn=978-0-19-954556-8 |pages=730 |language= |chapter=Imperium |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bVWcAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA730}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last1=Hornblower |first1=Simon |title=The Oxford Classical Dictionary |last2=Spawforth |first2=Antony |last3=Eidinow |first3=Esther |date=2012 |isbn=978-0-1995-4556-8 |pages=728 |chapter=Imperator |publisher=OUP Oxford |doi= |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bVWcAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA728}}</ref>

The [[Roman Catholic Church]], founded in the early Imperial Period, spread across Europe, first by the activities of Christian evangelists, and later by official imperial promulgation. The legal systems of [[France]] and its former colonies are strongly influenced by Roman law.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ken Pennington |title=France – Legal History |url=http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/Law508/FranceLegalHistory.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130929015635/http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/Law508/FranceLegalHistory.htm |archive-date=September 29, 2013 |access-date=September 23, 2013 |publisher=Columbus School of Law and School of Canon Law, The Catholic University of America}}</ref> Similarly, the United States was founded on a model inspired by the [[Roman Republic]], with upper and lower legislative assemblies, and executive power vested in a single individual, the president. The president, as "commander-in-chief" of the armed forces, reflects the ancient Roman titles ''imperator princeps''.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Haven |first=Cynthia |author-link=Cynthia Haven |date=February 19, 2010 |title=Stanford scholar links Rome and America in Philadelphia exhibition |url=http://news.stanford.edu/news/2010/february15/caroline-winterer-qanda-021910.html |publisher=Stanford Report}}</ref> Since 2002, all the world is divided between [[Unified combatant command#List of combatant commands|US "commands"]] literally reflecting Roman ''imperia''.

===Post-classical period===
{{Multiple image
| perrow            = 2
| header            = Empires of the Post-classical period
| header_background = #f8eaba
| image1            = Justinian555AD.png
| caption1          = [[Eastern Roman Empire]] in 555
| image2            = The Sasanian Empire at its apex under Khosrow II.svg
| caption2          = The [[Sasanian Empire]] at its greatest extent in c. 620 under Khosrow II
| image3            = Caliphate 740-en.svg
| caption3          = The extent of the [[Umayyad Caliphate]] in 740
| image4            = Tang Dynasty circa 700 CE.png
| caption4          = The territory directly held by the [[Tang dynasty|Tang Empire]] of China in 700 AD
| image5            = Chola Empire map2.png
| caption5          = [[Chola Empire]] c.1030
| image6            = Expansion of the Mongol Empire.svg
| caption6          = [[Mongol Empire]] in the 13th century
| image7            = Map of the Delhi Sultanate.png
| caption7          = The [[Delhi Sultanate]] in the [[Indian subcontinent]] at its greatest extent in 1335
| image8            = Bulgaria under rule of Boris I.png
| caption8          = [[First Bulgarian Empire|Bulgarian Empire]] in 850
}}

The fall of Rome looms large in the [[Eurocentrism|Eurocentric]] view of history but it did not alter the general imperial trend and the rest of Eurasia does not fit the "Middle Ages" of the Eurocentric periodization. Far from a graveyard of empires, the new age is marked by vibrant imperial formations continuing the earlier imperial impulse undimmed.<ref>[[Peter Fibiger Bang|Bang, Peter Fibiger]] (2021). "Empire—a world history: Anatomy and concept, theory and synthesis." ''The Oxford World History of Empire''. (Oxford University Press). Vol. 1, p 59.</ref> Empires continued to establish new records, albeit with longer intervals, and some experienced [[Golden age (metaphor)|Golden Ages]].<ref>[[Mark Edward Lewis|Lewis, Mark Edward]] (2012), ''China's Cosmopolitan Empire: The Tang Dynasty''. (Harvard University Press, {{ISBN|978-0-674-03306-1}}), p 1.</ref><ref>S. George, Linda (1998). ''The Golden Age of Islam''. (Benchmark Books. {{ISBN|978-0-7614-0273-2}}).</ref> China reunified by the 6th century and under the [[Tang dynasty]] pushed into Central Asia. In the 8th century, the [[Caliphate]] became the largest so far empire in area. The Caliphate and China crossed the whole Old World from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In the 9th century, China under the [[Song dynasty]] established the all-time record in the share of world population (38%). And in the 13th century, the Mongols created the largest ever contigous empire. The two last records still hold.<ref name="Taagepera, Rein 2024">Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). ''More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes''. (Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|978-1-009-42782-1}}), p 177.</ref>

In [[Western Asia]], the term "[[History of Iran|Persian Empire]]" came to denote the [[Iranian peoples|Iranian]] imperial states established in the pre–[[Islam]]ic and, beginning with the [[Safavid dynasty|Safavid Empire]], modern [[Persia]].{{Sfn|Stearns|2001}} In the 7th century, the [[Caliphate|Arab Empire]] was established by Muhammad, the founder of Islam.<ref>Hoyland, Robert G. (2014). ''In God's Path: The Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire''. (Oxford University Press). {{ISBN|978-0-19-991636-8}}</ref> Over the next century, in one of the fastest and vastest expansions in history,<ref>Buchan, James (21 July 2007). "Children of empire". ''The Guardian''.</ref> his Empire conquered Persia and expanded on three continents (Asia, Africa, and Europe). At their height, under the [[Umayyad Caliphate]], the territory that was conquered by the Arab Empire stretched from Iberia (at the Pyrenees) in the west to India (at Sind) in the east. In 751 AD, the Arab and [[Tang dynasty|Chinese]] Empires clashed in the [[Battle of Talas]].

In [[East Asia]], various [[Chinese Empire|Chinese empires]] (or [[Dynasties of China|dynasties]]) dominated the political, economic and cultural landscapes during this era, the most powerful of which was probably the [[Tang dynasty|Tang Empire]] (618–690, 705–907). Other influential Chinese empires during the post-classical period include the [[Sui dynasty|Sui Empire]] (581–618), the [[Liao dynasty|Great Liao Empire]], the [[Song dynasty|Song Empire]], the [[Western Xia|Western Xia Empire]] (1038–1227), the [[Jin dynasty (1115–1234)|Great Jin Empire]] (1115–1234), the [[Qara Khitai|Western Liao Empire]] (1124–1218), the [[Yuan dynasty|Great Yuan Empire]] (1271–1368), and the [[Ming dynasty|Great Ming Empire]] (1368–1644). During this period, Japan and Korea underwent voluntary [[Sinicization]].<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia |title=Ancient Japan |encyclopedia=[[World History Encyclopedia]] |url=https://www.worldhistory.org/japan/ |access-date=2018-07-31}}</ref><ref>{{Cite encyclopedia |last1=Cartwright |first1=Mark |title=Ancient Japanese & Chinese Relations |encyclopedia=[[World History Encyclopedia]] |date=27 June 2017 |url=https://www.worldhistory.org/article/1085/ancient-japanese--chinese-relations/ |access-date=2018-07-31}}</ref><ref>{{Cite encyclopedia |last1=Cartwright |first1=Mark |title=Ancient Korean & Chinese Relations |encyclopedia=[[World History Encyclopedia]] |date=30 November 2016 |url=https://www.worldhistory.org/article/984/ancient-korean--chinese-relations/ |access-date=2018-07-31}}</ref> The Sui, Tang and Song empires had the world's largest economy and were the most technologically advanced during their time.<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=8kfAAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA264 Bulliet & Crossley & Headrick & Hirsch & Johnson 2014], p. 264.</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Lockard |first=Craig |date=1999 |title=Tang Civilization and the Chinese Centuries |url=http://www.columbia.edu/itc/ealac/moerman/fall2000/edit/pdfs/wk5/tangci.pdf |journal=Encarta Historical Essays}}</ref> The Song population reached 125 million in 1125, representing 38% of a world population – the largest percentage any empire has ever reached.<ref name="Taagepera, Rein 2024"/> The Great Yuan Empire was the world's [[List of largest empires#Empires at their greatest extent|ninth largest empire]] by total land area; while the Great Ming Empire is famous for the [[Ming treasure voyages|seven maritime expeditions]] led by [[Zheng He]].{{Sfn|Stearns|2001}}

Around the 6th century, the [[Yamato Kingship|Yamato clan]] set up Japan's first empire and [[Imperial House of Japan|first and only dynasty]].<ref>Henshall, Kenneth (2012). ''A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower''. (London: Palgrave Macmillan), p 16, https://books.google.co.il/books?id=vD76fF5hqf8C&redir_esc=y</ref> During the next two centuries, Japan's kingdoms and tribes came to be unified under this dynasty. The [[Japanese emperor]] adopted the Chinese title [[Son of Heaven]]. [[Emperor Kinmei]] (509–571) is considered the first historically verifiable Japanese emperor.<ref>Hoye, Timothy (1999). ''Japanese Politics: Fixed and Floating Worlds''. (New Jersey: Texas Women's University), p 78, https://archive.org/details/japanesepolitics0000hoye/page/78/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> The Japanese imperial dynasty continues to this day, albeit in an almost entirely ceremonial role, and represents the [[List of oldest monarchies in the world|oldest continuous hereditary monarchy in the world]].

The [[Ajuran Sultanate]] was a [[Somalis|Somali]] empire in the medieval times that dominated the [[Indian Ocean]] trade. It was a [[Somali people|Somali]] [[Muslim]] [[sultanate]]<ref>{{Cite book |last=Luling |first=Virginia |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=s0Y_AQAAIAAJ&pg=PA17 |title=Somali Sultanate: the Geledi city-state over 150 years |publisher=Transaction Publishers |year=2002 |isbn=978-1-874209-98-0 |page=17}}</ref><ref>Luc Cambrézy, Populations réfugiées: de l'exil au retour, p.316</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mukhtar |first=Mohamed Haji |year=1989 |title=The Emergence and Role of Political Parties in the Inter-River Region of Somalia from 1947–1960 |url=http://escholarship.org/uc/item/7h11k656 |journal=[[Ufahamu]] |volume=17 |issue=2 |page=98|doi=10.5070/F7172016882 |doi-access=free }}</ref> that ruled over large parts of the [[Horn of Africa]] in the [[Medieval|Middle Ages]]. Through a strong centralized administration and an aggressive military stance towards invaders, the Ajuran Sultanate successfully resisted an [[Oromo people|Oromo]] [[Ajuran Sultanate#Ajuran-Oromo battles|invasion]] from the west and a [[Portuguese Empire|Portuguese]] incursion from the east during the Gaal Madow and the [[Ajuran Sultanate#Ajuran-Portuguese battles|Ajuran-Portuguese wars]]. Trading routes dating from the ancient and early medieval periods of [[Maritime history of Somalia|Somali maritime enterprise]] were strengthened or re-established, and foreign trade and commerce in the coastal provinces flourished with ships sailing to and coming from many kingdoms and empires in [[East Asia]], [[South Asia]], [[Southeast Asia]], [[Europe]], [[Middle East]], [[North Africa]] and [[East Africa]].<ref name="Shapes">{{Cite book |last=Shelley |first=Fred M. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5qlXatHRJtMC&pg=PA358 |title=Nation Shapes: The Story behind the World's Borders |publisher=ABC-CLIO |year=2013 |isbn=978-1-61069-106-2 |page=358}}</ref>

In the 7th century, [[Maritime Southeast Asia]] witnessed the rise of a [[Buddhist]] thallasocracy, the [[Srivijaya Empire]], which thrived for 600 years and was succeeded by the Hindu-Buddhist [[Majapahit Empire]] that ruled from the 13th to 15th centuries. In the Southeast Asian mainland, the Hindu-Buddhist [[Khmer Empire]] was centered in the city of [[Angkor]] and flourished from the 9th to 13th centuries. Following the demise of the Khmer Empire, the Siamese Empire flourished alongside the Burmese and Lan Chang Empires from the 13th through the 18th centuries.

In [[Southeastern Europe|Southeastern]] and [[Eastern Europe]], during 917, the [[Eastern Roman Empire]], sometimes called the Byzantine Empire, was forced to recognize the Imperial title of [[Bulgaria]]n ruler [[Simeon I of Bulgaria|Simeon the Great]], who were then called [[Tsar]], the first ruler to hold that precise imperial title. The [[First Bulgarian Empire|Bulgarian Empire]], established in the region in 680–681, remained a major power in [[Southeast Europe]] until its fall in the late 14th century. Bulgaria gradually reached its cultural and territorial apogee in the 9th century and early 10th century under [[Boris I of Bulgaria|Prince Boris I]] and Simeon I, when it became one of the largest states in Europe. This period is considered the [[Golden Age of medieval Bulgarian culture]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Dvornik |first=Francis |title=The Slavs: Their Early History and Civilization |publisher=American Academy of Arts and Sciences |year=1956 |location=Boston |page=179 |quote=The Psalter and the Book of Prophets were adapted or "modernized" with special regard to their use in Bulgarian churches, and it was in this school that [[Glagolitic script|glagolitic writing]] was replaced by the so-called [[Cyrillic script|Cyrillic writing]], which was more akin to the Greek [[uncial]], which simplified matters considerably and is still used by the Orthodox Slavs.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Florin Curta |url=https://archive.org/details/southeasterneuro0000curt |title=Southeastern Europe in the Middle Ages, 500–1250 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2006 |isbn=978-0-521-81539-0 |series=Cambridge Medieval Textbooks |pages=[https://archive.org/details/southeasterneuro0000curt/page/221 221]–222 |quote=Cyrillic preslav. |url-access=registration}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=J. M. Hussey, Andrew Louth |title=Oxford History of the Christian Church |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2010 |isbn=978-0-19-161488-0 |page=100 |chapter=The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=J-H9BTVHKRMC&q=The+Orthodox+Church+in+the+Byzantine+Empire+Cyrillic+preslav+eastern&pg=PR3-IA34}}</ref>

At the time, in the [[Medieval period|Medieval West]], the title "empire" had a specific technical meaning that was exclusively applied to states that considered themselves the heirs and successors of the Roman Empire. Among these were the "Byzantine Empire", which was the actual continuation of the [[Byzantine Empire|Eastern portion of the Roman Empire]], the [[Carolingian Empire]], the largely Germanic [[Holy Roman Empire]], and the [[Russian Empire]]. Yet, these states did not always fit the geographic, political, or military profiles of empires in the modern sense of the word. To legitimise their ''imperium'', these states directly claimed the title of ''Empire'' from Rome. Both German ''Kaiser'' and Russian ''Tsar'' derive from Caesar. In its peak under [[Charlemagne]] (748-814), the Carolingian Empire remained modest compared to the contemporary Caliphate or [[Song dynasty|Song]] – "lots of Charles but little of magnum."<ref>Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). ''More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes''. (Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|978-1-009-42782-1}}), p 163.</ref>
The ''sacrum Romanum imperium'' (Holy Roman Empire), which lasted from 800 to 1806, claimed to have exclusively comprehended Christian principalities, and was only nominally a discrete imperial state. The Holy Roman Empire was not always centrally-governed, as it had neither core nor peripheral territories, and was not governed by a central, politico-military elite. Hence, [[Voltaire]]'s remark that the Holy Roman Empire "was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire" is accurate to the degree that it ignores<ref>{{Citation |title=Voltaire |url=http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Voltaire |publisher=[[Wikiquote]], citing Essai sur l'histoire generale et sur les moeurs et l'espirit des nations, Chapter 70 (1756) |access-date=2008-01-06}}</ref> German rule over Italian, French, Provençal, Polish, Flemish, Dutch, and Bohemian populations, and the efforts of the ninth-century [[Holy Roman Emperor]]s (i.e., the [[Ottonians]]) to establish central control. Voltaire's "nor an empire" observation applies to its late period.

In the thirteenth century, [[Genghis Khan]] expanded the [[Mongol Empire]] to be the largest contiguous empire in the world history. It traversed nine modern time zones.<ref>[[Walter Scheidel|Scheidel, Walter]] (2021). "The scale of empire: Territory, population, distribution." ''The Oxford World History of Empire''. (Oxford University Press). Vol. 1, p. 97.</ref> For the first time, all of the major regional powers of Eurasia were integrated into a single geopolitical space. [[Nikolay Kradin]] calls the phenomenon "medieval globalization."<ref>Kradin, Nikolay N. (2021). "The Mongol Empire and the unification of Eurasia." ''The Oxford World History of Empire''. (Oxford University Press). Vol. 2, p 531.</ref> However, within two generations, the empire was separated into four discrete khanates under Genghis Khan's grandsons. One of them, [[Kublai Khan]], conquered China and established the [[Yuan dynasty]] with the imperial capital at [[Beijing]]. One family ruled the whole Eurasian land mass from the Pacific to the Adriatic and Baltic Seas. The emergence of the [[Pax Mongolica]] had significantly eased [[trade]] and [[commerce]] across Asia.<ref>Gregory G. Guzman, "Were the barbarians a negative or positive factor in ancient and medieval history?", ''The Historian'' 50 (1988), 568–570</ref><ref>[[Thomas T. Allsen]], ''Culture and conquest in Mongol Eurasia'', 211</ref>

In 1204, after the [[Fourth Crusade]] conquered [[Constantinople]], the [[Crusades|crusaders]] established a [[Latin Empire]] (1204–1261) in that city, while the defeated Byzantine Empire's descendants established two smaller, short-lived empires in [[Asia Minor]]: the [[Empire of Nicaea]] (1204–1261) and the [[Empire of Trebizond]] (1204–1461). Constantinople was retaken in 1261 by the Byzantine successor state centered in [[Nicaea]], re-establishing the [[Byzantine Empire]] until 1453, by which time the [[Turkic peoples|Turkish]]-[[Muslim]] [[Ottoman Empire]] (ca. 1300–1918), had conquered most of the region. The Ottoman Empire was a successor of the Abbasid Empire and one of the most powerful empires in the world.{{Sfn|Howe|2002|page=46}} Centered on modern day Turkey, the Ottoman Empire overthrew the Byzantine Empire and dominated the eastern Mediterranean, battering at Austria and Malta, key geographical locations to central and south-west Europe respectively.{{Sfn|Howe|2002|page=46}}

This was not just a rivalry of East and West but a rivalry between Christians and Muslims.{{Sfn|Howe|2002|page=46}} Both the Christians and Muslims had alliances with other countries.{{Sfn|Howe|2002|page=46}} The flows of trade and of cultural influences across the supposed great divide never ceased, so the countries never stopped bartering with each other.{{Sfn|Howe|2002}} These epochal clashes between civilizations profoundly shaped many people's thinking back then, and continues to do so in the present day.{{Sfn|Howe|2002|page=30}} Modern hatred against Muslim communities in South-Eastern Europe, mainly in Bosnia and Kosovo, has often been articulated in terms of seeing them as unwelcome residues of this imperialism: in short, as Turks.{{Sfn|Howe|2002|page=47}}

===Early Modern period===
{{Multiple image
| perrow            = 2
| header            = Early Modern Empires
| header_background = #f8eaba
| image1            = Islamic_Gunpowder_Empires.jpg
| caption1          = The three Muslim [[Gunpowder empires]]: [[Mughals]], [[Safavids]], and [[Ottoman Empire|Ottomans]] in 18th century
| image2            = Ming Empire cca 1580 (en).svg
| caption2          = The [[Ming Empire]] of China in 1550
}}

In 1547, [[Ivan the Terrible]] was coronated as [[Tsar|Emperor of Russia]]. He transformed Russia from a medieval state to a fledgling empire and began the [[Russian conquest of Siberia|conquest of Siberia]]. With this conquest completed by 1778, the Russian Empire became the second contiguous empire in size after the Mongol Empire.
  
The Islamic [[gunpowder empires]] started to develop from the 15th century.{{Sfn|Khan|2005|page=54}} In the [[Indian subcontinent]], the [[Delhi Sultanate]] conquered most of the Indian peninsula and spread [[Islam]] across it. It later disintegrated with the establishment of the [[Bengal Sultanate|Bengal]], [[Gujarat Sultanate|Gujarat]], and [[Bahmani Sultanate]]. In the 16th century, the [[Mughal Empire]] was founded by [[Timur]] and [[Genghis Khan]]'s direct descendant [[Babur]]. His successors such [[Humayun]], [[Akbar]], [[Jahangir]] and [[Shah Jahan]] extended the empire. In the 17th century, [[Aurangzeb]] expanded the [[Mughal Empire]] over most of the [[South Asia]] and imposed [[Sharia]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Jackson |first=Roy |title=Mawlana Mawdudi and Political Islam: Authority and the Islamic State |date=2010 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-136-95036-0}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Chapra |first=Muhammad Umer |title=Morality and Justice in Islamic Economics and Finance |date=2014 |publisher=Edward Elgar Publishing |isbn=978-1-78347-572-8 |pages=62–63 |language=en}}</ref> The Mughal Empire became the world's largest economy and leading manufacturing power with a nominal GDP that valued a quarter of world GDP, superior than the combination of [[Europe]]'s GDP.<ref name="Parthasarathi38">{{Citation |title=Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not: Global Economic Divergence, 1600–1850 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1_YEcvo-jqcC&pg=PA38 |pages=39–45 |year=2011 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-139-49889-0 |given=Prasannan |surname=Parthasarathi}}</ref><ref name="books.google.com">[[Angus Maddison|Maddison, Angus]] (2003): ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=rHJGz3HiJbcC&pg=PA259 Development Centre Studies The World Economy Historical Statistics: Historical Statistics]'', [[OECD Publishing]], {{ISBN|92-64-10414-3}}, pages 259–261</ref> It has been estimated that the Mughal emperors controlled an unprecedented one-fourth of the world's entire economy and was home to one-fourth of the world's population at the time.<ref name="harrison">{{Cite book |last=[[Lawrence Harrison (academic)|Lawrence E. Harrison]], [[Peter L. Berger]] |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RB0oAQAAIAAJ |title=Developing cultures: case studies |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2006 |isbn=978-0-415-95279-8 |page=158}}</ref> After the death of Aurangzeb, which marks the end of the medieval India and the beginning of European invasion in India, the empire was weakened by [[Nader Shah]]'s invasion.<ref name="Browne">{{Cite web |title=An Outline of the History of Persia During the Last Two Centuries (A.D. 1722–1922) |url=http://persian.packhum.org/persian/pf?file=90001014&ct=33 |access-date=2010-09-24 |website=Edward G. Browne |publisher=Packard Humanities Institute |location=London |page=33 |archive-date=2016-03-04 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304052417/http://persian.packhum.org/persian/pf?file=90001014&ct=33 }}</ref> The [[Kingdom of Mysore|Mysore Empire]] was established by [[Hyder Ali]] and [[Tipu Sultan]], who allied with [[Napoleon Bonaparte]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Goldfarb |first=Michael |date=18 March 2007 |title=Napoleon, the Jews and French Muslims |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/18/opinion/18iht-edgoldfarb.4943373.html}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=25 June 2015|title=Voltaire, Rousseau and Napoleon on Prophet Muhammad|url=http://www.ihistory.co/enlightened-french-disbelievers-on-prophet-muhammad/|access-date=31 May 2019|archive-date=28 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190328230931/http://www.ihistory.co/enlightened-french-disbelievers-on-prophet-muhammad/|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Bonaparte and Islam · Liberty, Equality, Fraternity |url=http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/exhibits/show/liberty--equality--fraternity/item/2938 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190528112838/http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/exhibits/show/liberty--equality--fraternity/item/2938 |archive-date=2019-05-28 |access-date=2019-05-31}}</ref> Other independent empires were also established, such as those ruled by the [[Nawabs of Bengal and Murshidabad|Nawabs of Bengal]]<ref name="hassanalimirza2">{{Cite web |last=Murshidabad.net |date=8 May 2012 |title=Hassan Ali Mirza's succession |url=http://murshidabad.net/history/history-topic-hassan-ali.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120802033722/http://murshidabad.net/history/history-topic-hassan-ali.htm |archive-date=2 August 2012 |access-date=10 August 2012 |df=dmy-all}}</ref> and [[Nizam of Hyderabad]].<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Ian Copland |title=A History of State and Religion in India |last2=Ian Mabbett |last3=Asim Roy |last4=Kate Brittlebank |last5=Adam Bowles |publisher=Routledge |year=2012 |page=161 |display-authors=3}}</ref>

The [[Qing dynasty|Great Qing Empire]] of China (1644–1912) was the [[List of largest empires#Empires at their greatest extent|fourth largest empire]] in world history by total land area, and [[Legacy of the Qing dynasty|laid the foundation for the modern territorial claims]] of both the [[China|People's Republic of China]] and the [[Taiwan|Republic of China]]. Apart from having direct control over much of East Asia, the empire also exerted domination over [[List of tributaries of China#Qing|other states]] through the [[Tributary system of China|Chinese tributary system]]. The multiethnic and multicultural nature of the Great Qing Empire was crucial to the subsequent birth of the nationalistic concept of ''[[zhonghua minzu]]''. The empire reached its peak during the reign of the [[Qianlong Emperor]], after which the empire entered a period of prolonged decline, culminating in its collapse as a result of the [[Xinhai Revolution]].

The [[Ashanti Empire]] (or Confederacy), also Asanteman (1701–1896), was a [[West African]] state of the [[Ashanti people|Ashanti]], the [[Akan people]] of the [[Ashanti Region]], Akanland in modern-day Ghana. The Ashanti (or Asante) were a powerful, militaristic and highly disciplined people in West Africa. Their military power, which came from effective strategy and an early adoption of European [[firearm]]s, created an empire that stretched from central Akanland (in modern-day Ghana) to present day [[Benin]] and [[Ivory Coast]], bordered by the [[Dagomba people|Dagomba]] kingdom to the north and [[Dahomey]] to the east. Due to the empire's military prowess, sophisticated hierarchy, social stratification and culture, the Ashanti empire had one of the largest [[historiographies]] of any indigenous [[Sub-Saharan Africa]]n political entity.

In the pre-Columbian Americas, two Empires were prominent—the [[Aztec]]a in Mesoamerica and [[Inca]] in Peru. Both existed for several generations before the arrival of the Europeans. Inca had gradually conquered the whole of the settled Andean world as far south as today Santiago in Chile. In [[Oceania]], the [[Tu'i Tonga Empire|Tonga Empire]] was a lonely empire that existed from the [[Late Middle Ages]] to the Modern period.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Thomson |first=Basil |date=January 1901 |title=Note Upon the Natives of Savage Island, or Niue |url=https://zenodo.org/record/1840765 |journal=The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland |volume=31 |pages=137–145 |doi=10.2307/2842790 |jstor=2842790}}</ref>

===Colonial empires===
{{main|Colonial empire}}
[[File:Portugal Império total.png|thumb|upright=1.25|All areas of the world that were once part of the [[Portuguese Empire]]. The Portuguese established in the early 16th century together with the [[Spanish Empire]] the first global empire and trade network.<ref>[https://www.amazon.com/Conquerors-Portugal-Forged-Global-Empire/dp/0812994000] ''Conquerors: How Portugal Forged the First Global Empire'', Author: Roger Crowley, Publisher: Random House; 1st edition, year: 2015</ref>]]
Beginning in the 15th century, a number of west European countries reached and colonized overseas regions across the globe. Ushering the [[Age of Discovery]], the imperial expansion advanced to a new global scale. The extensive overseas expansion, particularly in the South Asia and Americas by the Portuguese and Spanish, later joined by the English, French and Dutch, created empires on which the [[Sun never sets]]. The global scale is one of main distinctions between the colonial and traditional land empires.<ref>Adas, Michael (1998). "Imperialism and Colonialism in Comparative Perspective,"  ''International History Review'', vol 20 (2), p 371,  https://www.jstor.org/stable/40108227</ref><ref>Blakemore, Erin (August 16, 2024). "What is Colonialism," ''National Geographic'', https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/colonialism</ref> Colonial empires were a transformative period in world history when previously isolated parts of the world became connected to form one [[world system]].<ref>[[John M. MacKenzie|MacKenzie, John M.]] (2016). "Empires in world history: Characteristics, concepts, and consequences." ''The Encyclopedia of Empire''. (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. {{ISBN|978-1-118-44064-3}}), vol I, p 24.</ref> They laid the groundwork for globalization,<ref>[[Anthony Pagden|Pagden, Anthony]] (2015). ''The Burdens of Empire: 1539 to the Present''. (Cambridge University Press), p. 36.</ref><ref>[[John Darwin (historian)|Darwin, John]] (2008). ''After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405''. (New York: Bloomsbury Press), p 15.</ref> and set human history on the global common course. For this reason, [[Adam Smith]] in 1776 named the voyages of Columbus and Vasco da Gama "the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind."<ref>''[[s:The Wealth of Nations/Book IV/Chapter 7|An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations]]''. Vol. II: book IV: chapter VII: part III:395.</ref>

The [[Portuguese Empire]] colonized vast portions of the Americas, Africa, Asia and Oceania to become one of the most powerful empires of the period, the longest-lived [[colonial empire]] in European history,<ref>Page, Melvin E. & Sonnenburg, Penny M. (2003). ''Colonialism: An International, Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia'', vol 2, p 481.</ref><ref>Brockey, Liam Matthew (2008). ''Portuguese Colonial Cities in the Early Modern World''. (Ashgate Publishing), p XV.</ref> and one of the [[List of largest empires|largest empires]] in history. The [[Spanish Empire]] expanded over the same continents as well as in Europe,<ref>Thomas, Hugh (2015). ''World Without End: The Global Empire of Philip II'' (Penguin).</ref> exceeding the Portuguese rival in size and, among colonial empires, remaining second only to Britain.<ref name="Taagepera1997">{{cite journal|author=Taagepera|first=Rein|author-link=Rein Taagepera|date=September 1997|title=Expansion and Contraction Patterns of Large Polities: Context for Russia|url=https://escholarship.org/content/qt3cn68807/qt3cn68807.pdf|url-status=live|journal=[[International Studies Quarterly]]|volume=41|issue=3|pages=492–502|doi=10.1111/0020-8833.00053|jstor=2600793|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200707203055/https://escholarship.org/content/qt3cn68807/qt3cn68807.pdf|archive-date=2020-07-07|access-date=2020-07-07}}</ref>
{{Clear}}

[[File:Modern Empires - en.svg|thumb|upright=1.25|Diachronic map of the main empires of the modern era (1492–1945)]]
{{Multiple image
| perrow            = 2
| header            = Empires of the Modern period
| header_background = #f8eaba
| image1            = Map of territorial growth 1775.jpg
| caption1          = Red shows self-governing North American British colonies and pink shows claimed and largely indirectly controlled territories in 1775.
| image2            = 
| caption2          = 
| image3            = Ottoman empire.svg
| caption3          = [[Ottoman Empire]] at its greatest extent
| image4            = Spanish Empire Anachronous en.svg
| caption4          = [[Spanish empire|Spanish]]–[[Portuguese empire|Portuguese]] Empire of the [[Iberian Union]] (1580–1640) was the first global imperial entity. The map includes all Spanish territories, but only territories Portugal had during the Iberian Union.
| image5            = French Empire on World 1812.png
| caption5          = The map includes Napoleon's [[First French empire]] with its colonial ownership in 1812. [[Napoleon]]'s rule over Europe led to massive changes not only in Europe but across the world.
| image6            = The Russian Empire-en.svg
| caption6          = [[Russian Empire]] in 1866 became the second largest contiguous empire to have ever existed. [[Russia|The Russian Federation]] is currently the largest state on the planet.
| image7            = BritishEmpire1919.png
| caption7          = In 1920, the [[British Empire]] was [[List of largest empires|the largest empire in history]].
| image8            = EmpireFrench.png
| caption8          = Evolution of the [[French colonial empire|French Empire]] in the 16th to the 20th century. In 1920, the [[French colonial empire]] was [[List of largest empires|the second largest empire in the world]].
| image9            = Italian Empire.png
| caption9          = [[Italian colonial empire|Italian Empire]] in 1942
| image10           = Qing dynasty in 1760.svg
| caption10         = China's [[Qing dynasty|Qing Empire]] in 1760
| image11           = Japanese Empire (orthographic projection).svg
| caption11         = 19th to 20th century [[Empire of Japan]] at its maximum extent, 1942
}}

The [[British Empire]] established an [[List of largest empires|absolute imperial record in size]] and, for a century, was the foremost global power.<ref>[[Niall Ferguson|Ferguson, Niall]] (2002). ''Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power''. (Basic Books).</ref> The British established their [[First British Empire|first empire]] (1583–1783) in North America by colonising lands that made up [[British America]], including parts of [[History of Canada#Canada under British rule (1763–1867)|Canada]], the [[Caribbean]] and the [[Thirteen Colonies]]. In 1776, the [[Continental Congress]] of the Thirteen Colonies declared itself independent from the British Empire, thus beginning the [[American Revolution]]. Britain turned towards Asia, the Pacific, and later Africa, with subsequent exploration and conquests leading to the rise of the [[Second British Empire]] (1783–1815), which was followed by the [[Industrial Revolution]] and [[Britain's Imperial Century]] (1815–1914). It became the [[World's largest empires|largest empire]] in world history, encompassing one quarter of the world's land area and one fifth of its population.<ref>Johnston, Steve, [https://books.google.com/books?id=FXkN1SF6NgsC&dq=%22By+1922%2C+the+British+Empire+presided%22&pg=PA90 Tea Party Culture War: A Clash of Worldviews]{{Dead link|date=February 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}, p90, "By 1922, the British Empire presided over 458 million people—one-quarter of the world's population—and comprised more than 13 million square miles."</ref> The impacts of this period are still prominent in the current age "including widespread use of the English language, belief in Protestant religion, economic globalization, modern precepts of law and order, and representative democracy."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Watts |first=Carl P |title=Pax Britannica |url=https://www.academia.edu/2013776 |page=3 |quote=it left many legacies, including widespread use of the English language, belief in Protestant religion, economic globalization, modern precepts of law and order, and representative democracy.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Winks |first=Robin W. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mY7McxJl7jYC&pg=PA406 |title=World civilization: a brief history |date=1993 |publisher=Collegiate Press |isbn=978-0-939693-28-3 |edition=2nd |location=San Diego, CA |page=406 |quote=By 1914 common law, trail by jury, the King James Authorized Version of the Bible, the English language, and the British navy had been spread around the globe.}}</ref>

In India, Britain confronted the [[Sikh Empire]] (1799–1849) in the Punjab region. Weakened by the death of its founder, [[Ranjit Singh]], in 1839, the empire fell to the British after the [[Second Anglo-Sikh war|Second Anglo-Sikh War]] in 1849. During the same period, the [[Maratha Empire]] (also known as the Maratha Confederacy) was a Hindu state located in present-day India. It existed from 1674 to 1818, and at its peak, the empire's territories covered much of Southern Asia. The empire was founded and consolidated by Shivaji. After the death of [[Mughal Empire|Mughal]] Emperor Aurangzeb, it expanded greatly under the rule of the Peshwas. In 1761, the Maratha army lost the Third Battle of Panipat, which halted the expansion of the empire. Later, the empire was divided into a confederacy of states which, in 1818, were lost to the British during the [[Anglo-Maratha Wars (disambiguation)|Anglo-Maratha wars]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Pagadi |first=Setumadhavarao R. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UVFuAAAAMAAJ |title=Shivaji |publisher=National Book Trust, India |year=1983 |isbn=978-81-237-0647-4 |page=21}}</ref>

France was a dominant empire possessing many [[colonies]] in various locations around the world. During [[Louis XIV]]'s long reign, from 1643 to 1715, France was Europe's most populous, richest and powerful country. From the 16th to the 17th centuries, the First [[French colonial empire]]’s total area at its peak in 1680 was over {{convert|10|e6km2|e6sqmi|abbr=unit}}, the second largest empire in the world at the time behind only the [[Spanish Empire]].<ref>Robert Aldrich, ''Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion'' (1996) p 304</ref> It had many possessions around the world, mainly in the [[Americas]], [[Asia]] and [[Africa]]. At its peak in 1750, French India had an area of 1.5 million km<sup>2</sup> and a total population of 100 million people and was the most populous colony under [[French India|French rule]]. The [[Napoleonic Empire]] (1804–1814) conquered much of the continental Europe. It ruled over 90 million people and was the leading world power of the time. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the colonial empire of France was the second largest in the world behind the British Empire. The French colonial empire extended over {{convert|13.5|e6km2|e6sqmi|abbr=unit}} of land at its height in the 1920s and 1930s with a totaled population of 150 million people. Including metropolitan France, the total amount of land under French sovereignty reached {{convert|13.5|e6km2|e6sqmi|abbr=unit}} at the time, which is 10.0% of the Earth's total land area. The total area of the French colonial empire, with the first (mainly in the Americas and Asia) and second (mainly in Africa and Asia), the French colonial empires combined, reached {{convert|24|e6km2|e6sqmi|abbr=unit}}, the second largest in the world (the first being the British Empire).<ref>{{cite book |editor=Melvin E. Page |title=Colonialism: An International Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qFTHBoRvQbsC&pg=PA218 |year=2003 |publisher=ABC-CLIO |page=218 |isbn=978-1-57607-335-3 |access-date=23 December 2021 |archive-date=19 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211119170748/https://books.google.com/books?id=qFTHBoRvQbsC&pg=PA218 |url-status=live }}</ref>

The [[Empire of Brazil]] (1822–1889) was the only South American modern monarchy, established by the heir of the [[Portuguese Empire]] as an independent nation eventually became an emerging international power. The new country was huge but sparsely populated and ethnically diverse. In 1889 the monarchy was overthrown in a sudden [[coup d'état]] led by a clique of military leaders whose goal was the formation of a republic.

===Late modern period===
Beginning around 1760, the [[New Imperialism]] or [[The Age of Empire: 1875–1914|Age of Imperialism]] characterizes a period of colonial expansion by European powers, the United States and Japan. Though the [[American Revolutionary War]] (1775–1783) and the collapse of the [[Spanish Empire]] in [[Latin America]] in the 1820s ended the first era of European colonialism, the period featured an unprecedented pursuit of overseas territorial acquisitions. At the time, states focused on building their empires with new technological advances and developments. During the era of New Imperialism, the European powers and Japan conquered almost all of Africa and most of Asia. The new wave of imperialism reflected ongoing imperial rivalries, their imperial ambitions, and a "[[civilizing mission]]".

With the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 during the [[Napoleonic Wars]] (1803–1815), the [[Austrian Empire]] (1804–1867) emerged reconstituted as the Empire of [[Austria-Hungary]] (1867–1918) and claimed to "inherite" the imperium of Central and Western Europe. Another "heir to the Holy Roman Empire", was the [[German Empire]] (1871–1918).

In the course of the [[Scramble for Africa]] (1870-1914), European empires separated between themselves almost all the continent. Symbolized by the [[Pink Map]], the Portuguese claimed sovereignty over a wide land corridor stretching between the Atlantic shore of Angola and [[Indian Ocean|Indian]] shore of Mozambique. This led to the [[1890 British Ultimatum]] as Britain aimed to establish their own and longer corridor from Egypt to South Africa. In the clash of the corridors, the British prevailed.<ref>Newitt, M. (1995). ''A History of Mozambique''.  (London, Hurst & Co), p. 347.</ref>

The [[Spanish–American War]] of 1898 and the [[Russo-Japanese War]] of 1904–05 signaled the advent of new extra-European empires, the United States and Japan respectively. The two events marked the closure of the "imperial belt"—belt of great empires stretching from west to east. Originally formed in the Old World during the [[Axial Age]] along the [[Silk Road]], this belt shifted northward during the medieval period due to climatic change, penetrated to North America in the colonial period, and "closed" in the Far East c.1900.<ref>Ostrovsky, Max (2006). ''The Hyperbola of the World Order'', (Lanham: University Press of America), p 93-126, https://books.google.co.il/books?redir_esc=y&hl=ru&id=9b0gn89Ep0gC&q=imperial+belt#v=snippet&q=imperial%20belt&f=false</ref> The history of empires ceased being eurocentric. The [[Pearl Harbor attack]] symbolized the fact that two non-European empires clashed on the opposite to Europe place of the globe.

Though seldom viewed through an imperial lens, the World Wars were imperial wars.<ref>[[Jane Burbank|Burbank, Jane]] & [[Frederick Cooper (historian)|Cooper, Frederick]]  (2021). "Empires and the politics of difference: Pathways of incorporation and exclusion." ''The Oxford World History of Empire''. (Oxford University Press). Vol. I: p. 406.</ref><ref name="Overy, Richard 2021">Overy, Richard (2021). ''Blood and Ruins: The Great Imperial War, 1931-1945''. (Dublin: Penguin. {{ISBN|978-0-713-99562-6}}, p X, 3, 11.</ref><ref name="auto4">[[Richard H. Immerman|Immerman, Richard H]]. (2010). ''Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz''. (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p 2, https://books.google.co.il/books?id=gTgEl8PN5PEC&printsec=frontcover&hl=ru&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false</ref><ref>[[Akira Iriye|Iriye, Akira]] (Spring 2005). [https://www.amacad.org/publication/daedalus/beyond-imperialism-new-internationalism "Beyond imperialism: The new internationalism."] ''Daedalus'', vol 134 (2): p 110 {{JSTOR|20027982}}</ref> All great powers which waged both World Wars were empires fighting for their survival or expansion.<ref>Mulvey, Paul (2016). "World War I and empire." ''The Encyclopedia of Empire''. (Ed. MacKenzie, John M. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. {{ISBN|978-1-118-44064-3}}), p 1.</ref><ref>Jackson, Ashley (2016). "World War II and empire." ''The Encyclopedia of Empire''. (Ed. MacKenzie, John M. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. {{ISBN|978-1-118-44064-3}}), p 1.</ref><ref>Gerwarth, Robert & Manela, Erez (2014). ''Empires at War, 1911-1923''. (New York: Oxford University Press), p 14-15.</ref><ref>Jackson, Ashley (2000). "History of empires and conflicts: World War II and empire," ''Global Security and International Poliitcal Economy''. (ed. Colas, Alejandro, UNESCO-EOLSS), vol 1: p 1-2.</ref> The alliances and  rivalries that brought about World War I were inter-imperial. The empires that came to an end after this War did not die a natural death as an intrinsically anachronistic organizations; their demise was the consequence of the "clash of empires" in which stronger empires won, added colonies and introduced "[[League of Nations mandate|mandate]]." No victorious empire dissolved.<ref>[[Frederick Cooper (historian)|Cooper, Frederick]] (2021). "Epilogue: Beyond empire?" ''The Oxford World History of Empire''. (Oxford University Press). Vol. II: p. 1257.</ref><ref>[[Jane Burbank|Burbank, Jane]] & [[Frederick Cooper (historian)|Cooper, Frederick]] (January 2019). "Empires after 1919." ''International Affairs''. Vol. 95 (1): pp. 81, 85.</ref> Colonial expansion reached its zenith during the interwar period, when, including the sphere under the Monroe Doctrine, 85% of the earth dry land came under an imperial system.<ref>[[Grover Clark|Clark, Grover]] (1936). ''The Balance Sheets of Imperialism''. (New York: Russell & Russell), p. 6, table II on p. 29, https://archive.org/details/balancesheetsofi0000unse/page/6/mode/2up?view=theater</ref><ref>[[Tony Ballantyne (historian)|Ballantyne, Tony]] & [[Antoinette Burton|Burton, Antoinette]]  (2012). ''Empires and the Reach of the Global, 1870–1945''. (London: Harvard University Press), p. 1, https://books.google.co.il/books?id=FCWfAwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=ru&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false</ref> Imperial continuity, transformation and invention characterize the two decades after the [[Fourteen Points|enunciation of the doctrine of self-determination]]. The world order of this time remained an imperial one.<ref>[[Jane Burbank|Burbank, Jane]] & [[Frederick Cooper (historian)|Cooper, Frederick]] (January 2019). "Empires after 1919." ''International Affairs''. Vol. 95 (1): pp. 81-82.</ref> In his magnum opus ''Sources of Social Power'', [[Michael Mann (sociologist)|Michael Mann]] titled the chapter on World War II "The last interimperial war," where he concluded that European and Japanese imperialism was the deeper cause of the War.<ref name="Mann, Michael 2012 p. 456">Mann, Michael (2012). ''Sources of Social Power''. (Cambridge University Press). Vol. III: p. 456.</ref> On January 18, 1942, the Axis powers [[Axis powers negotiations on the division of Asia|agreed]] to divide up Eurasia along the 70th meridian east envisioning "two large imperial blocs."<ref>Hedinger, Daniel & Brescius, Moritz von  (2021). "The German and Japanese Empires: Great Power competition and the World Wars in trans-imperial perspective." ''The Oxford World History of Empire''. (Oxford University Press). Vol. II: pp. 1123, 1138.</ref> The Axis lost and instead of the 70 meridian the frontier between the two remaining imperial blocs was fixed on the [[Fulda Gap]].

In view of [[Richard Overy]], the origins of both World Wars can only be understood through the prism of the [[New Imperialism|fresh drive to empire]] since the 1870s. He regards both Wars as one Thirty Year War caused by that imperial surge.<ref name="Overy, Richard 2021"/> The concept of [[Second Thirty Years' War]] is notable and was shared by Churchill and de Gaulle. According to them, paraphrasing [[Carl von Clausewitz]], World War II was continuation of World War I with the same means. This concept was suppressed in both Western and Soviet historiography because it heavily shares the Axis "guilt of war" between all contemporary empires.<ref>Bell, Philip M.H. (1988). ''The Origins of the Second World War in Europe''. (Harlow: Longman. {{ISBN|978-0-582-49112-0}}), chapter 3: "The case against a Thirty Years War."</ref>

The world political map was completed c.1900 leaving no sovereign void and with empires ruling over four-fifth of the world. A contemporary observer, [[Max Weber]], generalized that great empires claim spheres of interest over a wide orbit and in the 1900s "such orbits encompass the whole surface of the planet."<ref name="auto6">Weeber, Max (1910). ''From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology''. (tr. Mills, C. Wright, London: Routeledge), p 161.</ref> Many scholars suppose that the end of the overseas space for imperial expansion contributed to the intensity of the World Wars if not was their main factor (chapter "Circumscription theory" below). According to one thesis, the overseas world provided European empires with an enormous outlet and thus prevented Europe from unifying into a single European empire. The European powers turned their exceeding energies outward and the internal European [[Balance of power (international relations)|power was balanced]].<ref>Ostrovsky, Max, (2007). ''The Hyperbola of the World Order'', (Lanham: University Press of America), p 50, https://books.google.co.il/books?redir_esc=y&hl=ru&id=9b0gn89Ep0gC&q=imperial+belt#v=snippet&q=balanced&f=false</ref> Correspondingly, the thesis continues,<ref>Ostrovsky, Max, (2007). ''The Hyperbola of the World Order'', (Lanham: University Press of America), p 129-140, https://books.google.co.il/books?redir_esc=y&hl=ru&id=9b0gn89Ep0gC&q=imperial+belt#v=onepage&q=ratzel&f=false</ref>  when the space for expansion ended, the empires became destined for head-on collisions, as reflected in the anxious,<ref>Bell, Duncan (2007). ''The Idea of Great Britain: Empire and the Future of World order, 1860-1900''. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p 37-39, https://books.google.co.il/books?id=qFX7QB7bLVsC&printsec=frontcover&hl=ru&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false</ref><ref>[[Gavin Plumley|Plumley, Gavin]] (27 September 2013). "Anxiety attack: Faces from the fin-de-siècle. An exhibition of turn-of-the-century portraits reveals troubled times," ''Independent'', https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/features/anxiety-attack-faces-from-the-findesiecle-8844684.html</ref> [[Claustrophobia|claustrophobic]]<ref>[[Christopher John Bartlett|Bartlett, Christopher John]] (2000). ''The Global Conflict: The International Rivalry of the Great Powers, 1880-1990''. (London & New York: Longman), p 22, https://archive.org/details/globalconflictin0000bart/page/22/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> mood of the [[Fin de siècle]]. This was the time when the theory of [[lebensraum]] developed and the term [[geopolitics]] was coined to designate a new science, accompanied by an avalanche of literature envisaging war.<ref>[[I. F. Clarke|Clarke, Ignatius Frederick]] (1995). ''The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871-1914: Fictions of Future Warfare and of Battles Still to Come''. (Liverpool University Press), p 15-16, 21, 25, https://archive.org/details/taleofnextgreatw00ifcl/page/14/mode/2up?view=theater</ref><ref>Clarke, Ignatius Frederick (1992). ''Voices Prophesying War: Future Wars, 1763-3749''. (New York: Oxford University Press), https://archive.org/details/voicesprophesyin0000clar/page/n7/mode/2up</ref> ''[[Volk ohne Raum]]'' (''A People without Space'') by the former colonist [[Hans Grimm]] (1926) sold nearly 700,000 copies.<ref name="Wistrich85">{{cite book |last= Wistrich|first=Robert Solomon|title=Who's who in Nazi Germany|publisher=[[Routledge]]|page=85|year=2002|isbn=0-415-26038-8}}</ref> “Raving maniacs, described [[Halford Mackinder]] the opponents of his Empire, suffering from global claustrophobia.”<ref>[[John Gilbert Winant|Winant, John G]]., & Mackinder, Halford (1944). “The Monthly Record: Presentation of the Medals Awarded by the American Geographical Society to Two British Geographers,” ''Geographical Journal''. Vol 103: p 133.</ref>

Furthermore, the global closure coincided with unprecedented technological advances in weapons now produced on the industrial scale. The same year (1904), Mackinder outlined the [[Geographical Pivot of History|global closure]] and [[Henry Brooks Adams]] the [[Accelerating change#Early observations|law of acceleration]] in technological progress and production. These factors caused a "clash of empires"<ref name="auto4"/> of epic proportions, as vividly described by its famous participant:
{{blockquote|
And the first gust of wind swept across Europe grown nervous. The time that now followed lay in the chests of men like a heavy nightmare... And then the first mighty lightening flash struck the earth ... and with the thunder of heaven there mingled the roar of World War batteries... The fight for freedom has began mightier than the Earth has ever seen.<ref>Hitler, Adolf (1925) ''[[Mein Kampf]]'' (tr, Manheim, Ralph, London: Pimlico, 1992), p 145, 148.</ref>}}
The Ottoman, Austrian, German and Russian Empires were defeated in the First World War, though the two latter Empires soon reappeared in their Nazi and [[Soviet Empire|Soviet]] forms.<ref>[[Jane Burbank|Burbank, Jane]] & [[Frederick Cooper (historian)|Cooper, Frederick]] (January 2019). "Empires after 1919." ''International Affairs''. Vol. 95 (1): pp. 81.</ref> The German (once again), Italian and Japanese Empires were defeated in the Second World War. Weakened by the same War,<ref>[[Jane Burbank|Burbank, Jane]] & [[Frederick Cooper (historian)|Cooper, Frederick]] (January 2019). "Empires after 1919." ''International Affairs''. Vol. 95 (1), p. 98.</ref><ref>Mann, Michael (2012). ''Sources of Social Power''. (Cambridge University Press). Vol. IV: p. 13.</ref> the rest of the European Empires underwent [[decolonization]]. The Soviet Empire collapsed in 1989-1991. The United States remained the only superpower, but whether its foreign policy qualifies as imperial is debatable (chapters "Contemporary usage" and 'Present" below).

Egyptologist [[Barry Kemp (Egyptologist)|Barry Kemp]] developed a "basic model" of imperial evolution. At the start, according to the model, we have a number of roughly equal players. The game inexorably follows a trajectory toward a critical point when one player accumulated sufficient power to outweigh other players and becomes unstoppable. Imagining an imperial game of this kind outlines the "essence of the basic process at work in history."<ref>Kemp, Barry J. (1989). ''Ancient Egypt: Anatomy of Civilization''. (London & New York: Kentledge), p 32.</ref> Kemp specialized on the Bronze Age and by accident published his game theory in 1989, the moment before modern empires completed his "basic process."

An Historian specializing on the world history explicitly applied Kemp's game analogy to modern empires. The global closure c.1900 marks the point when empires ended their "regular season" and entered "play-offs." The knock-out tournament began with "[[Wild card (sports)|wild card playoff]]" (First World War), proceeded with "breath-stopping series of quarterfinals and semifinals" (Second World War), and "culminated with a deadly boring final that went into triple overtime until the Soviets scored a golden own goal."<ref>Ostrovsky, Max, (2007). ''The Hyperbola of the World Order'', (Lanham: University Press of America), p 359-360, https://books.google.co.il/books?redir_esc=y&hl=ru&id=9b0gn89Ep0gC&q=imperial+belt#v=snippet&q=play&f=false</ref>

== Fall of empires ==
The fall of an empire is typically associated with a change in the [[new world order (politics)|world order]], with a new [[hegemon]] replacing the former empire. There is typically a decline in [[soft power]] and [[hard power]]. During the fall, the empire typically retreats its expanded operations. [[Trade]] shrinks as the former empire shifts its priorities towards [[domestic policy]]. Living conditions may deteriorate as the economy shrinks. [[Balkanization]] or territorial divisions may occur. However, this process is not universal. Some empires are more resilient and fall gracefully while others experience complete chaos.

=== Roman Empire ===
{{Further|Fall of the Western Roman Empire}}
The fall of the [[Fall of the Western Roman Empire|western half of the Roman Empire]] is seen as one of the most pivotal points in all of human history. This event traditionally marks the transition from classical civilization to the birth of Europe. The Roman Empire started to decline at the end of the reign of the last of the [[Five Good Emperors]], Marcus Aurelius in 161–180 A.D. There is still a debate over the cause of the fall of one of the largest empires in history. Historian [[André Piganiol]] argues that the Roman Empire under its authority can be described as "a period of terror",<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Piganiol |first=André |year=1950 |title=The Causes of the Fall of the Roman Empire |journal=The Journal of General Education |volume=5 |issue=1 |pages=62–69 |jstor=27795332}}</ref> holding its imperial system accountable for its failure. Another theory blames the rise of Christianity as the cause, arguing that the spread of certain Christian ideals caused internal weakness of the military and state.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Bury |first=John |title=History of the Later Roman Empire |publisher=Dover Publications |year=2011 |isbn=978-0-486-20398-0 |location=New York}}</ref> In his book ''The Fall of the Roman Empire'', historian [[Peter Heather]] contends that there were many factors, including issues of money and manpower, which produced military limitations and culminated in the Roman army's inability to effectively repel invading barbarians at the frontier.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Heather |first=Peter |title=The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-19-532541-6 |location=New York, Oxford}}</ref> The Western Roman economy was already stretched to its limit in the 4th and 5th centuries C.E. due to continual conflict and loss of territory which, in turn, generated loss of revenue from the tax base. There was also the looming presence of the Persians which, at any time, took a large percentage of the fighting force's attention. At the same time the Huns, a nomadic warrior people from the steppes of Asia, are also putting extreme pressure on the German tribes outside of the Roman frontier, which gave the German tribes no other choice, geographically, but to move into Roman territory. At this point, without increased funding, the Roman army could no longer effectively defend its borders against major waves of Germanic tribes. This inability is illustrated by the crushing [[Battle of Adrianople|defeat at Adrianople]] in 378 C.E. and, later, the [[Crossing of the Rhine]] in 406 C.E.

An empire can [[Historiography of the fall of the Western Roman Empire|fall for many reasons]]. However, why the fall of the Roman Empire was fatal, and why the post-classical Europe never repeated its ancient unity, is a completely different question. [[Eurocentrism]] in the Roman case led to the theory of inevitable imperial fall and Western [[declinism]] in imperiology, which remains the only widely believed case of [[Historical determinism|historical inevitability]]. To describe any [[polity]] as an empire is usually to damn it as doomed to disappear,<ref name="auto2"/> usually due to [[imperial overstretch]]. [[Comparative history]], however, alters the Eurocentric theory. The Chinese Empire rose synchronously with Rome and never fell. More precisely, China underwent several disintegrations but each time reunified and each time faster.<ref>[[Walter Pohl|Pohl, Walter]] & Wieser, Veronika (2023). ''Emerging Powers in Eurasian Comparison, 200-1100''. (Brill), p. 8.</ref> Asking why post-Roman Europe, contrary to China, never reunified reveals factors which the [[case study]] of the [[Fall of the Western Roman Empire|fall of Rome]] cannot reveal. The latter question was addressed in [[Comparative studies of the Roman and Han empires#Political pattern|this comparative analysis]].

===Decolonization===
{{Main|Decolonization}}
After 1945 the [[Empire of Japan]] retained its Emperor but lost its colonial possessions and became the State of [[Japan]]. Despite the semantic reference to imperial power, [[Japan]] is a ''[[de jure]]'' [[constitutional monarchy]], with a homogeneous population of 127 million people that is 98.5 percent ethnic Japanese, making it one of the largest nation-states.<ref>George Hicks, ''Japan's hidden apartheid: the Korean Minority and the Japanese'', (Aldershot, England; Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1998), 3.</ref> The deconstruction of European colonial empires also quickened and became commonly known as [[decolonisation]]. The British Empire evolved into a loose, multinational [[Commonwealth of Nations]], while the [[French colonial empire]] metamorphosed to a [[Organisation internationale de la Francophonie|Francophone commonwealth]]. The same process happened to the [[Portuguese Empire]], which evolved into a [[Community of Portuguese Language Countries|Lusophone commonwealth]], and to the former territories of the extinct [[Spanish Empire]], which alongside the Lusophone countries of [[Portugal]] and [[Brazil]], created an [[Organization of Ibero-American States|Ibero-American commonwealth]]. France returned the French territory of [[Kwang-Chou-Wan]] to China in 1946. The British gave [[Hong Kong]] back to China in 1997 after 150 years of rule. The Portuguese territory of [[Macau]] reverted to China in 1999. Macau and Hong Kong did not become part of the provincial structure of China; they have autonomous systems of government as [[Special Administrative Regions of the People's Republic of China]].

France still governs [[Overseas France|overseas territories]] ([[French Guiana]], [[Martinique]], [[Réunion]], [[French Polynesia]], [[New Caledonia]], [[Collectivity of Saint Martin|Saint Martin]], [[Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon]], [[Guadeloupe]], [[French Southern and Antarctic Lands]] (TAAF), [[Wallis and Futuna]], [[Saint Barthélemy]], and [[Mayotte]]), and exerts hegemony in [[Francafrique]] ("French Africa"; 29 francophone countries such as [[Chad]], [[Rwanda]], etc.). Fourteen [[British Overseas Territories]] remain under British sovereignty. Fifteen countries of the [[Commonwealth of Nations]] share their head of state, King [[Charles III]], as [[Commonwealth realms]].

==Transition from empire==
In time, an empire may change from one political entity to another. For example, the [[Holy Roman Empire]], a German re-constitution of the [[Roman Empire]], metamorphosed into various political structures (i.e., federalism), and eventually, under [[Habsburg]] rule, re-constituted itself in 1804 as the [[Austrian Empire]], an empire much different politics and scope, which in turn became the [[Austro-Hungarian Empire]] in 1867. The Roman Empire, perennially reborn, also lived on as the [[Byzantine Empire]] (Eastern Roman Empire) – temporarily splitting into the [[Latin Empire]], the [[Empire of Nicaea]] and the [[Empire of Trebizond]] before its remaining territory and centre became part of the [[Ottoman Empire]]. A similarly persistent concept of empire saw the [[Mongol Empire]] become the Khanate of the [[Golden Horde]], the [[Yuan dynasty|Yuan]] [[Empire of China]], and the [[Ilkhanate]] before resurrection as the [[Timurid Empire]] and as the [[Mughal Empire]].

An autocratic empire can become a republic with its imperial dominions reduced to a core territory (e.g., [[Weimar Republic|Weimar Germany]] shorn of the German colonial empire im 1918–1919, the Ottoman Empire in 1918–1923, the Austro-Hungarian Empire after 1918, or the [[Russian Empire]] after 1918 and again in 1989–91). Or it can become a [[republic]] within the same borders (e.g., the Central African Empire in 1979).

Alternatively, an empire can integrate the ruling metropole with the ruled periphery to become state. Originally imperial cores, [[Wessex]], the [[Capetian dynasty|Capetian Île-de-France]],<ref>For the Capetians, Aragon & Castile, and Sardinia, [[Krishan Kumar (sociologist)|Kumar, Krishan]] (March 2010). "Nation-states as empires, empires as nation-states: Two principles, one practice?" ''Theory and Society''. Vol. 39 (2): pp. 127-128.</ref> [[Kingdom of Aragon|Aragon]] and [[Kingdom of Castile|Castile]],<ref>[[Xosé Manoel Núñez Seixas|Nunez, Xose-Manoel]] (2014). "Nation-building and regional integration: The case of the Spanish Empire, 1700-1914." ''Nationalizing Empires''. (Budapest:  Central European University Press),  pp. 195-196.</ref> [[Kingdom of Sardinia (1720–1861)|Sardinia]],<ref>For the Capetians, Aragon & Castile, and Sardinia, [[Charles S. Maier|Maier, Charles]]  (2006). ''Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors''. (Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), pp. 28-29.</ref> [[Prussia]]<ref>[[Stefan Berger (historian)|Berger, Stefan]] (2014). "Building the nation among visions of the German Empire." ''Nationalizing Empires''. (Budapest:  Central European University Press), p. 251.</ref> and [[Grand Principality of Moscow|Muscovy]]<ref>[[Alexei I. Miller|Miller, Alexei]] (2014). "The Romanov Empire and the Russian nation." ''Nationalizing Empires''. (Budapest:  Central European University Press), pp. 311-312.</ref> merged with their imperial peripheries to form the states of England, France, Spain, Italy, Germany and Russia respectively. Many "nation-states" of today, including "the most talked-about model of the nation-state" (France), were originally formed as empires.<ref>[[Krishan Kumar (sociologist)|Kumar, Krishan]] (March 2010). "Nation-states as empires, empires as nation-states: Two principles, one practice?" ''Theory and Society''. Vol. 39 (2): pp. 119, 128.</ref><ref>[[Charles S. Maier|Maier, Charles]]  (2006). ''Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors''. (Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), p. 29.</ref> "The later ideology of nationalism of course disguises this unpalatable fact, just as it exhibits amnesia about many other aspects of the violent origins of nations."<ref>[[Krishan Kumar (sociologist)|Kumar, Krishan]] (March 2010). "Nation-states as empires, empires as nation-states: Two principles, one practice?" ''Theory and Society''. Vol. 39 (2): p. 125.</ref>

Earlier, [[Narmer]], [[Yamato Kingship|Yamato]], and [[Qin (state)|Qin]] established empires which evolved into states of Egypt, China and Japan. These states count millennia. Sociologists of empires, noted [[Krishan Kumar (sociologist)|Krishan Kumar]], have tended to ignore China because it does not fit neatly into their concept of imperial duration and ethnic composition.<ref name="Kumar, Krishan 2025 p. 119">Kumar, Krishan (2025). "History, sociology and the study of empires: Reflections of a Historical Sociologist." ''European Journal of Social Theory''. Vol. 28 (1): p. 119.</ref> "If there is a successful imposition of the dominant system, the resultant elimination of differences produces a unified 'national' state rather than empire."<ref>[[Mason Hammond|Hammond, Mason]] (1948). ''Ancient Imperialism: Contemporary Justifications''. ''Harvard Studies in Classical Philology'', vol 58/59: p 106.</ref> All empires were temporary organizations but not all empires fell. The [[paradigm]] "all empires fall" is politically correct and historically wrong.<ref>[[Yuri Pines|Pines, Yuri]] (2012). ''The Everlasting Empire: The Political Culture of Ancient China and Its Imperial Legacy''. (Princeton: Princeton University Press).</ref> However, according to [[Robert Conquest]], deep historical analysis in the case is overshadowed by the popular wish of the [[American decline#Comparisons with earlier states|US decline]]. Breaking the law of imperial fall means giving the United States a chance.<ref>Conquest, Robert (2000). ''Reflections on a Ravaged Century''. (New York: Norton), p. 241, https://archive.org/details/reflectionsonra00conq/page/240/mode/2up</ref>

==Contemporary usage==
{{Further|Imperialism}}
In "Prolegomena" to the 2021 two-volumes ''Oxford World History of Empire'', editor [[Peter Fibiger Bang]] stated that humanity has moved beyond the postcolonial moment and imperialism has resurfaced as a global force. Although anti-imperialist in rhetoric, the leading military powers of today—the United States, China, and Russia—pursue imperial policies.<ref>Bang, Peter Fibiger et al (2021). ''The Oxford World History of Empire''. (Oxford University Press). Vol. 1, p. XIX.</ref> In the "Epilogue" of this compilation [[Frederick Cooper (historian)|Frederick Cooper]] added that the United States developed and maintains a form of imperial reach, now in competition with another imperial power of China, while the Russian Empire has reappeared in yet another transmutation on its Eurasian space.<ref>Cooper, Frederick (2021). "Epilogue: Beyond empire?" ''The Oxford World History of Empire''. (Oxford University Press). Vol. II: pp. 1251, 1272.</ref> One year after the volumes went into press, Russia [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine|boldly confirmed]] these statements for itself. Having listed the United States, [[Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China|China]], [[Russian imperialism#Contemporary Russian imperialism|Russia]], [[Zionism as settler colonialism|Israel]] and [[Ideology of the Islamic State|ISIS]] as his examples of the contemporary imperial phenomena, [[John M. MacKenzie]] concludes: "What is incontrovertible is that empires are vital to an understanding not only of human history, but also of the world we live in now."<ref>MacKenzie, John M. (2016). "Empires in world history: Characteristics, concepts, and consequences." ''The Encyclopedia of Empire''. (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. {{ISBN|978-1-118-44064-3}}), vol I, p 24.</ref> Sandra Halperin and [[Ronen Palan]] claim a significant imperial dimension in the contemporary political landscape and challenge the common assumption that nation states have displaced empires.<ref>Halperin, Sandra & Palan, Ronen (2015). ''Legacies of Empire: Imperial Roots of the Contemporary Global Order''. (Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|9781316271674}}, pp. 1-2, 8.</ref> Despite the official definition of empire as illegitimate, Cooper drews his conclusion, it is premature to tell whether we have mastered the skills of turning empire into new forms of political organization.<ref>Cooper, Frederick (2021). "Epilogue: Beyond empire?" ''The Oxford World History of Empire''. (Oxford University Press). Vol. II: p. 1274.</ref> [[Krishan Kumar (sociologist)|Krishan Kumar]] explained what in his view means the end of empire. What disappeared in the 20th century is the name "empire," no state calls itself "empire." Meanwhile the phenomenon of empire continues under other names and produces a world significantly different from a theoretical world of equal states.<ref>Kumar, Krishan (March 2010). "Nation-states as empires, empires as nation-states: Two principles, one practice?" ''Theory and Society''. Vol. 39 (2): p. 137.</ref> Paraphrasing Mark Twain and [[William Faulkner]], he suggested that rumours of empires' death are greatly exaggerated and their "past is never dead; it is not even past."<ref name="Kumar, Krishan 2025 p. 119"/>

===United States===
{{Further|American imperialism}}
Contemporaneously, the concept of ''empire'' is politically valid, yet is not always used in the traditional sense. One of the most widely discussed cases is the United States. Characterizing aspects of the US in regards to its [[Territorial evolution of the United States|territorial expansion]], foreign policy, and its international behavior as "American Empire" is common. The term "American Empire" refers to the United States' [[Manifest destiny|cultural ideologies]] and [[History of U.S. foreign policy|foreign policy]] strategies. The term is most commonly used to describe the U.S.'s status since the 20th century, but it can also be applied to the United States' world standing before the rise of nationalism in the 20th century.{{Sfn|Lens|Zinn|2003}} The US itself was at one point a colony in the British Empire. [[Thomas Jefferson]] used the term "[[Empire of Liberty]]" and argued that "no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire & self government".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Jefferson |first=Thomas |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pl6wDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA194 |title=The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume 44: 1 July to 10 November 1804 |date=2019 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-19437-0 |pages=194 |language=}}</ref> Jefferson in the 1780s while awaiting the fall of the Spanish empire, said: "till our population can be sufficiently advanced to gain it from them piece by piece".{{Sfn|Lens|Zinn|2003|pages=63-64}}<ref>LaFeber, Walter, ''Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America'' (1993) 2nd edition, p. 19</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Boot |first=Max |author-link=Max Boot |date=May 6, 2003 |title=American Imperialism? No Need to Run Away from Label |url=http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=5934 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090123000358/http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=5934 |archive-date=January 23, 2009 |access-date=2008-01-06 |publisher=Council on Foreign Relations op-ed, quoting USA Today}}</ref>

Even so, the ideology that the US was founded on anti-imperialist principles has prevented many from acknowledging America's status as an empire. This active rejection of imperialist status is not limited to high-ranking government officials, as it has been ingrained in American society throughout its entire history. As David Ludden explains, "journalists, scholars, teachers, students, analysts, and politicians prefer to depict the U.S. as a nation pursuing its own interests and ideals".<ref name="Ludden2004">{{Cite journal |date=30 October 2004 |title=America's Invisible Empire |url=http://www.epw.in/journal/2004/44/commentary/americas-invisible-empire.html |journal=Economic and Political Weekly |volume=39 |issue=44}} Text available [http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article18738.htm here] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170127021121/http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article18738.htm |date=2017-01-27 }}, author link [http://history.fas.nyu.edu/object/davidludden here] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161118042321/http://history.fas.nyu.edu/object/davidludden |date=2016-11-18 }}.</ref> This often results in imperialist endeavors being presented as measures taken to enhance state security. Ludden explains this phenomenon with the concept of "ideological blinders", which he says prevent American citizens from realizing the true nature of America's current systems and strategies. These "ideological blinders" that people wear have resulted in an "invisible" American empire of which most American citizens are unaware.<ref name=Ludden2004/> Besides its anti-imperialist principles, the United States is not traditionally recognized as an empire, because the U.S. adopted a different political system from those that previous empires had used.

Despite the anti-imperial ideology and systematic differences, the political objectives and strategies of the United States government have been quite similar to those of previous empires<ref>{{Cite book |last=Malesevic |first=Sinisa |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LjSDSfD0L3QC |title=Nation-states and nationalisms organization, ideology and solidarity |date=2013 |publisher=Polity Press |isbn=978-0-7456-7206-9}}</ref> and so similar to Rome that the [[Pax Americana#Comparison with Pax Romana|comparison between the two]] turned into cliché.<ref>[[Thomas F. Madden|Madden, Thomas F]]. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p. 9.</ref><ref>[[Niall Ferguson|Ferguson, Niall]] (2005). ''Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire''. (New York: Penguin Books), p. 14</ref> In fact, the "unipolar moment" was followed by a so-called "imperial turn"<ref>M. van Berkel and J. Duindam (2018) ''Prince, Pen and Sword: Eurasian Perspectives''. (Leiden: Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-31571-6), p. 20, https://archive.org/details/oapen-20.500.12657-38043</ref> in the academic research meaning increased interest in the study of empires.<ref>[[Eric W. Robinson|Robinson, Eric W.]] (Autumn 2005). "American Empire? Ancient Reflections on Modern American Power." ''The Classical World'', vol 99 (1): p 35.</ref><ref>[[David Mattingly (archaeologist)|Mattingly, David J.]] (2011). ''Imperialism, Power, and Identity: Experiencing the Roman Empire''. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p XX.</ref> During the [[war on terror]], the number of publications related to empire has increased exponentially, with reviewers complaining that they cannot keep the pace.<ref>Vasunia, Phiroze (2011). "Review: The comparative study of empires," ''Journal of Roman Studies'', vol 101: p 235.</ref> In 2005, two notable Journals, ''[[History and Theory]]'' and ''[[Daedalus]]'', devoted a special issue to empires. Reflecting the popularity of the theme, Sinologist [[Yuri Pines]] coined the term "comparative imperiology."<ref>Pines, Yuri & Biran, Michal & Rüpke, Jörg (2011) ''The Limits of Universal Rule: Eurasian Empires Compared'', (New York: Cambridge University Press), p 2-3, https://books.google.com/books?id=eyoNEAAAQBAJ</ref>

Throughout the 19th century, the United States government attempted to [[United States territorial acquisitions|expand its territory]] by any means necessary. Regardless of the supposed motivation for this constant expansion, all of these land acquisitions were carried out by [[American imperialism|imperialistic means]]. This was done by financial means in some cases, and by military force in others. Most notably, the Louisiana Purchase (1803), the Texas Annexation (1845), and the Mexican Cession (1848) highlight the imperialistic goals of the United States during this "modern period" of imperialism. The U.S. government has stopped adding additional territories, where they permanently and politically take over since the early 20th century, and instead have established 800 military bases as their outposts.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Immerwahr |first=Daniel |title=How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States |date=2019 |publisher=Farrar, Straus and Giroux}}</ref> With this overt but subtle military control of other countries, scholars consider [[Foreign policy of the United States|U.S. foreign policy strategies]] to be imperialistic.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kb6mw3glvZMC&pg=PA129 |title=The Geopolitics of American Insecurity: Terror, Power and Foreign Policy |date=2009 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-134-04540-2 |editor-last=Debrix |editor-first=Francois |pages=129–141 |editor-last2=Lacy |editor-first2=Mark}}</ref> Academic Krishna Kumar argues that the distinct principles of nationalism and imperialism may result in common practice; that is, the pursuit of nationalism can often coincide with the pursuit of imperialism in terms of strategy and decision making.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Kumar |first=Krishan |date=2010 |title=Nation-states as empires, empires as nation-states: two principles, one practice? |url=http://philpapers.org/rec/KUMNAE-2 |journal=Theory and Society |volume=39 |issue=2 |pages=119–143 |doi=10.1007/s11186-009-9102-8 |s2cid=144559989|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Stuart Creighton Miller posits that the public's sense of innocence about Realpolitik (politics based on practical considerations, rather than ideals) impacts popular recognition of US imperial conduct since it governed other countries via surrogates. These surrogates were domestically weak, right-wing governments that would collapse without US support.<ref>Johnson, Chalmers, ''Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire'' (2000), pp. 72–79</ref><!--Try https://books.google.com/books ei=JzuaSMaYGIKgswPl2pT2CQ&q=%22sense+of+innocence%22+power+empire+stuart+miller&btnG=Search+Books{{Ndash}} I haven't access to a copy, to confirm how its results might satisfy this matter.{{Citation needed|date=November 2008}} tag-->

Former President George W. Bush's Secretary of Defense, [[Donald Rumsfeld]], said: "We don't seek empires. We're not imperialistic; we never have been."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Niall Ferguson |title=Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire |url=http://booksellers.penguingroup.com/nf/Book/BookDisplay/0,,9780143034797,00.html |access-date=2010-07-11 |archive-date=2011-07-15 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110715062644/http://booksellers.penguingroup.com/nf/Book/BookDisplay/0,,9780143034797,00.html }}</ref> This was said in the context of the international opposition to the [[Iraq War]] led by the United States in manner widely regarded as imperial.  With the [[2003 invasion of Iraq]] underway, historian Sidney Lens argued that, from its inception, the US has used every means available to dominate foreign peoples and states.{{Sfn|Lens|Zinn|2003|p=Back cover}} Another Historian, [[John Darwin (historian)|John Darwin]], emphasized that, synchronously with decolonization, proceeded the bipolar empire-building. Two great imperial systems, the United States and the Soviet Union, struggled to contain each other’s expansion. After 1990, the United States became "the only world empire."<ref>Darwin, John (2008). ''After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405''. (New York: Bloomsbury Press), p 479, 482.</ref> The Second World War, according to [[Michael Mann (sociologist)|Michael Mann]], hastened on the end of Eurasian empires as well as a triumph of the "American global empire."<ref name="Mann, Michael 2012 p. 456"/> While defeating and containing Eurasian empires and encouraging the liquidation of Colonial empires, the United States built another one—"and not just any empire, but a globe-spanning leviathan."<ref>[[Andrew Preston (historian)|Preston, Andrew]] (2021). "America’s global imperium". ''The Oxford World History of Empire''. (Eds. Peter Fibiger Bang et al. Oxford University Press), p 1218.</ref> Finding the phenomenon ethically disappointing, Ethicist [[Gary Dorrien]] stated that the United States since 1989 has wielded a "new kind of world empire" that overshadows all former colonial empires. The decolonized zones were not left with imperial vacuum. The United States appeared operating in areas that derive from the Spanish, Ottoman, British, French, and Soviet Empires.<ref>Dorrien, Gary J. (2004). ''Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana''. (New York : Routledge. ISBN 0415949807), p. 224.</ref> [[Eliot A. Cohen]] suggested: "The Age of Empire may indeed have ended, but then an age of American hegemony has begun, regardless of what one calls it."{{Sfn|Cohen|2004|page=56}} Some scholars did not bother how to call it: "When it walks like a duck, talks like a duck, it's a duck."<ref>Sebastian Huhnholz, "Do All Roads Lead to Rome? Ancient Implications and Modern Transformations in the Recent US Discourse on an American Empire", ''Mediterraneo Antico'', 13/1-2, (2010): p. 55.</ref><ref>[[Dimitri K. Simes]], "America's Imperial Dilemma", ''Foreign Affairs'', 82/6, (2003): p 93.</ref><ref>In [[Clyde V. Prestowitz Jr.|Clyde V. Prestowitz]]'s version it also "quacks" like a duck. ''Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions'', (New York: Basic Books, 2004: p 25).</ref>

===European Union===
Since the [[European Union]] was formed as a polity in 1993, it has established its own currency, its own [[Citizenship of the European Union|citizenship]], established discrete [[Common Security and Defence Policy|military forces]], and exercises its limited hegemony in the Mediterranean, eastern parts of Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia. The big size and high development index of the [[Economy of the European Union|EU economy]] often has the [[Brussels effect|ability to influence]] global trade regulations in its favor. The political scientist Jan Zielonka suggests that this behavior is imperial because it coerces its neighbouring countries into adopting its ''European'' economic, legal, and political structures.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Ian Black |date=December 20, 2002 |title=Living in a euro wonderland |work=Guardian |url=https://www.theguardian.com/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,,863888,00.html |access-date=2008-01-06}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=December 13, 2002 |title=EU gets its military fist |work=BBC News |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2574625.stm |access-date=2008-01-06}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Nikolaos Tzifakis |date=April 2007 |title=EU's region-building and boundary-drawing policies: the European approach to the Southern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans 1 |journal=Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans |publisher=informaworld |volume=9 |issue=1 |pages=47–64 |doi=10.1080/14613190701217001 |s2cid=154857668}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Stephen R. Hurt |year=2003 |title=Co-operation and coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and acp states and the end of the Lomé Convention |url=http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/HNG8A7X4G9BWAM84.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207173102/http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/HNG8A7X4G9BWAM84.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=February 7, 2023 |journal=Third World Quarterly |publisher=informaworld |volume=24 |pages=161–176 |doi=10.1080/713701373 |access-date=2007-01-06 |s2cid=153354532 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |author=Bruno Coppieters |author2=Michael Emerson |author3=Michel Huysseune |author4=Tamara Kovziridze |author5=[[Nathalie Tocci]] |author6=Gergana Noutcheva |author7=Marius Vahl |title=Europeanisation and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from the European Periphery |url=http://www.belspo.be/belspo/home/publ/pub_ostc/WM/rS10303_en.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071202121945/http://www.belspo.be/belspo/home/publ/pub_ostc/WM/rS10303_en.pdf |archive-date=2007-12-02 |access-date=2008-01-06 |publisher=Belgian Science Policy}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Jan Zielonka |url=http://users.ox.ac.uk/~polf0040/IAReview.pdf |title=Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2006 |isbn=978-0-19-929221-9 |location=Oxford |access-date=2008-01-06 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071202121945/http://users.ox.ac.uk/~polf0040/IAReview.pdf |archive-date=2007-12-02 }}</ref> [[Tony Benn]], a left-wing [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]] MP of the United Kingdom, opposed the [[European integration]] policies of the European Union by saying, "I think they're (the European Union) building an empire there, they want us (the United Kingdom) to be a part of their empire and I don't want that."<ref>{{cite AV media|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f0wFii8klNg| archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211104/f0wFii8klNg| archive-date=2021-11-04 | url-status=live|author=Tony Benn|work=[[Oxford Union]]|title=European Union|date=25 March 2013}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

=== Russia ===
In the aftermath of the [[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|annexation of Crimea]], political scientist [[Agnia Grigas]] argued that Moscow pursues the policy of "reimperialization."<ref>Agnia Grigas, ''Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire'', Yale University Press, 2015, pp 16, 22.</ref> Two days after the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]], historian specializing on empires, [[Niall Ferguson]], interpreted the policy of Putin as an attempt to bring back the tsarist Russian Empire.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/vlad-the-invader-putin-is-trying-to-recreate-the-tsarist-russian-empire/|title=Vlad the Invader: Putin is looking to rebuild Russia's empire|first=Niall|last=Ferguson|date=February 24, 2022|website=The Spectator}}</ref> By this time, the "neo-imperialism," or "neo-imperial ambitions" of Russia became widely claimed.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://nationalinterest.org/feature/contending-new-russian-empire-200765|title=Contending With the New Russian Empire|first=David L.|last=Phillips|date=February 25, 2022|website=The National Interest}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/russia-third-empire/|title=Russia's attempt to build a Third Empire|first=Lea|last=Berriault|date=May 6, 2022}}</ref> When Vladimir Putin denies the reality of the Ukrainian state, says another historian of empires [[Timothy Snyder]], he is speaking the familiar language of empire. For five hundred years, European conquerors saw themselves as actors with purpose, and the colonized as instruments to realize the imperial vision.<ref>{{Cite magazine|url=https://www.newyorker.com/news/essay/the-war-in-ukraine-is-a-colonial-war|title=The War in Ukraine Is a Colonial War|first=Timothy|last=Snyder|magazine=The New Yorker |date=April 28, 2022|via=www.newyorker.com}}</ref>

[[Vladimir Putin]] himself used to state: "For Russia to survive, it must remain an empire."<ref>{{cite news|first=Nathan |last=Hodge |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2022/06/10/europe/russia-putin-empire-restoration-endgame-intl-cmd |title=Restoration of empire is the endgame for Russia's Vladimir Putin|work=CNN|date= June 11, 2022|access-date=2024-06-05}}</ref> In June 2022, on the 350 anniversary of the birth of the 18th-century Russian tsar Peter the Great, Putin has compared himself to him associating their twin historic quests to win back Russian lands. For critics this association implied that Putin's "complaints about historical injustice, eastward NATO expansion, and other grievances with the west were all a façade for a traditional war of conquest" and imperialism. "After months of denials that Russia is driven by imperial ambitions in Ukraine, Putin appeared to embrace that mission."<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/10/putin-compares-himself-to-peter-the-great-in-quest-to-take-back-russian-lands|title=Putin compares himself to Peter the Great in quest to take back Russian lands|first=Andrew|last=Roth|date=June 10, 2022|newspaper=The Guardian}}</ref> On the same occasion, [[Mykhailo Podolyak]], an adviser to the Ukrainian government, suggested Russia's "de-imperialization," instead of Russia's official war aim of "de-Nazification" of Ukraine.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Tharoor |first=Ishaan |date=2022-06-13 |title=Analysis {{!}} Putin makes his imperial pretensions clear |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/13/putin-imperial-russia-empire-ukraine/ |access-date=2025-06-05 |newspaper=The Washington Post |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref>

Later that year, [[Anne Applebaum]] approached the new Russian Empire as a fact and opined that this Empire must be defeated.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/12/putin-russia-must-lose-ukraine-war-imperial-future/671891/|title=The Russian Empire Must Die|first=Anne|last=Applebaum|date=November 14, 2022|website=The Atlantic}}</ref> Other pundits described the new Russian Empire as a failed attempt because Russia failed to annex the whole of Ukraine.<ref>{{Cite news|work=Foreign Affairs|date=2 December 2022|title=Putin's Last Stand: The Promise and Peril of Russian Defeat|url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/putin-last-stand-russia-defeat|author1-first=Liana |author1-last=Fix |author2-first=Michael |author2-last=Kimmage}}</ref>

==Timeline of empires==
The chart below shows a timeline of polities that have been called empires. Dynastic changes are marked with a white line.{{Sfn|Stearns|2001}}
* The [[Roman Empire]]'s timeline listed below includes the [[Western Roman Empire|Western]] and [[Byzantine Empire|Eastern portion]].
* The Empires of [[Empire of Nicaea|Nicaea]] and [[Empire of Trebizond|Trebizond]] were Byzantine successor states.
* The Empire of Bronze Age Egypt is not included in the graph. Established by Narmer circa 3000 BC, it lasted as long as China until it was conquered by Achaemenid Persia in 525 BC.
* Japan is presented for the period of its overseas Empire (1895–1945). The original Japanese Empire of "the Eight Islands" would be third persistent after Egypt and China.
* Many Indian empires are also included, though only [[Mauryan dynasty|Mauryans]], [[Gupta Empire|Guptas]], [[Delhi Sultanate|Delhi Sultans]], [[Mughal dynasty|Mughals]], [[Chola Empire]]  and [[Maratha Empire|Marathas]] ruled for large periods in India.

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==Theoretical research==

===Empire versus nation state===
Empires can be traced as far back as the recorded history goes<ref name="citation.allacademic.com">[http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/9/0/5/pages99056/p99056-9.php Yale H. Ferguson & Richard W. Mansbach, "Superpower, Hegemony, Empire," San Diego: Annual Meeting paper, The International Studies Association, March 22–26, (2006: 9)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161124093803/http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/9/0/5/pages99056/p99056-9.php |date=2016-11-24 }}</ref><ref>Niall Ferguson, "The Unconscious Colossus: Limits of (Alternatives to) American Empire", ''Daedalus'', 134/2, (2005): p 24.</ref> and have been the dominant international organization in [[Human history|world history]] until the 20th century to the least.{{Sfn|Burbank|Cooper|2010|pages=2–3}}<ref>[[John Darwin (historian)|Darwin, John]] (2008). ''After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405''. (New York: Bloomsbury Press), p 491.</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |first=Anthony |last=Pagden |title=Imperialism, Liberalism & the Quest for Perpetual Peace |journal=Daedalus |volume=134 |issue=2 |date=2005 |page=47|doi=10.1162/0011526053887301 |s2cid=57564158 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>[[Hedley Bull|Bull, Hedley]] ''The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics'', London: Macmillan, 1977, p. 21).</ref> Yet a century ago, most of the world was ruled by persons who proudly proclaimed themselves Emperors and were proud of their Empires. Of the great powers, only the United States and France were republics.<ref>Pines, Yuri & Biran, Michal & Rüpke, Jörg (2011) ''The Limits of Universal Rule: Eurasian Empires Compared'', (New York: Cambridge University Press), p 2, https://books.google.com/books?id=eyoNEAAAQBAJ</ref> In his textbook on empires, Michael Doyle observed:
{{Blockquote|
Empires have been the key actors in world politics for millennia. They helped create the interdependent civilizations of all the continents ... Imperial control stretches through history, many say, to the present day. Empires are as old as history itself ... They have held the leading role ever since.<ref>''Empires'', (London: Cornell University Press, 1986, pp. 12, 51, 137).</ref>}}
Many empires endured for centuries, while the age of the ancient Egyptian, Chinese and Japanese Empires is counted in millennia. Most people throughout history have lived under imperial rule.{{Sfn|Cohen|2004|page=50}} Despite "efforts in words and wars to put national unity at the center of political imagination, imperial politics, imperial practices, and imperial cultures have shaped the world we live in."{{Sfn|Burbank|Cooper|2010|pages=2–3}}

Looking at a time frame of several millennia prior to the emergence of a global system, [[Robert Gilpin]], [[Daniel Deudney]] and [[John Ikenberry]] observed that all pre-modern regional systems were initially anarchic and marked by high levels of military competition. But almost universally, they tended to consolidate into universal empires. For millennia, this propensity was the principal feature of pre-modern politics.<ref>Gilpin ''War and Change in World Politics'', (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 110–116)</ref><ref name="gji3.scholar.princeton.edu">Deudney, Daniel & G. Ikenberry, John (2015). "America's impact: The end of empire and the globalization of the Westphalian system." (Working paper. Princeton University), pp. 7–8, https://gji3.scholar.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf2666/files/gji3/files/am-impact-dd-gji-final-1-august-2015.pdf</ref> pointing to a fundamental political dynamic.{{Sfn|Burbank|Cooper|2010|page=8}}

This dynamic, according to [[Niall Ferguson]], Ikenberry and Deudney, is obscured by our fixation on the Westphalian state.<ref name="citation.allacademic.com"/> Within the macrohistoric trend, however, European political order was distinctly anomalous because it persisted so long as an anarchy.<ref name="gji3.scholar.princeton.edu"/> By comparisons of [[Jane Burbank]], [[Frederick Cooper (historian)|Frederick Cooper]] and Ferguson, nation-state appears as a "historical novelty" or a "blip on the historical horizon," that "emerged recently from under imperial skies" and whose hold may well prove "ephemeral."{{Sfn|Burbank|Cooper|2010|pages=2–3}}<ref>[[Niall Ferguson]], "The Unconscious Colossus: Limits of (Alternatives to) American Empire", ''Daedalus'', 134/2, (2005): p 24.</ref> Moreover, the consolidations of European states proceeded synchronously with their imperial expansions worldwide. "Ironically, it was the European empires that carried the idea of the sovereign territorial state to the rest of the world..."<ref name="citation.allacademic.com"/>

Puzzled why there is no non-Western [[International relations|IR theory]],<ref>Acharya, Amitav & Buzan, Barry (2007). "Why is there no non-Western international relations theory?" ''International Relations of the Asia-Pacific'', vol 7 (3): 287–312.</ref> [[Amitav Acharya]] and [[Barry Buzan]] sought to apply the discipline to other Asian civilizations. They found the discipline, created in modern Europe, hardly applicabe for the civilizations they selected. Instead of anarchy, international relations appeared usually fixed by the imperial center.<ref>Barry Buzan, & Amitav Acharya (2021). ''Re-imagining International Relations: World Orders in the Thought and Practice of Indian, Chinese, and Islamic Civilizations''. (Washington DC: Cambridge University Press), p 117.</ref> A later attempt of ''Bridging Two Worlds'' aimed to introduce insights from early China and India into their present dialogue for deeper mutual understanding, appreciation and friendship.<ref>Acharya, Amitav et al (2023). ''Bridging Two Worlds: Comparing Classical Political Thought and Statecraft in India and China''. (Berkeley: University of California Press''. {{ISBN|978-0-520-39098-0}}).</ref> The project’s goals are laudable, reviewed the book Sinologist [[Yuri Pines]]. However, the use of those classics for modern IR woule rather be "detrimental" as the outcome invariably was IR "fiasco" and "quagmire." Diplomatic failures led to total wars and ultimately to universal empire.<ref>Pines, Yuri (2023). "Ancient China and India: The story of IR fiasco?" ''The China Review'', vol 23 (3): p 275, 280-282, 289, https://yuri-pines-sinology.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Review-of-Bell-Acharya-China-Review_23.3-final-official.pdf</ref>

The author of ''[[The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background]]'', [[Hans Kohn]], acknowledged that it was the opposite idea—of imperialism—that was, perhaps, the most influential single idea for two millennia, the ordering of human society through unified dominion and common civilization.<ref>[https://archive.org/details/worldorderinhist0000kohn/page/n5/mode/2up?view=theater Kohn, Hans, (1942). ''World Order in Historical Perspective'', (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), p 113]</ref> Empire is something like the "darling of [[World history (field)|global historians]]," usually not because they like it, but because empire was the way history shifted to transnational and global stages.<ref>Conrad, Sebastian (2016). ''What is Global History?'' (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), pp. 162-163, https://ia903404.us.archive.org/22/items/sino-western-20century/20%E4%B8%96%E7%BA%AA%E5%88%9D%E4%B8%AD%E8%A5%BF%E9%9F%B3%E4%B9%90%E6%AF%94%E8%BE%83/What%20Is%20Global%20History_%20-%20Conrad%2C%20Sebastian%3B.pdf</ref>

The prevalence of empire in history was partly due to peace which it establishes for both the conquerors and the conquered, and the by-product of peace, prosperity. The attitude towards the [[Universal monarchy#Universal peace|imperial peace]] since the mid-20th century has been overwhelmingly negative. Within the field of [[International relations]] all central concepts have been formulated against a world empire.<ref>[[Peter Fibiger Bang|Bang, Peter Fibiger]] (2021). "Empire—a world history: Anatomy and concept, theory and synthesis." ''The Oxford World History of Empire''. (Oxford University Press). Vol. 1, p 43.</ref> [[John Kennedy]] called the idea of [[Pax Americana]] "the peace of grave" and the association has been popular ever since.<ref>Kennedy, John F. (10 June 1963). American University Commencement Address. (Washington, D.C.), https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkamericanuniversityaddress.html</ref> History, however, shows that humans eventually "prefer the peace of graveyard over the very graveyard."<ref>Ostrovsky, Max (2007). ''The Hyperbola of the World Order''. (Lanham: University Press of America), p 347.</ref>

===Universal empire===
{{See also|Universal monarchy}}
Expert on warfare [[Quincy Wright]] generalized on what he called "universal empire"—empire unifying all the contemporary system:
{{Blockquote|
Balance of power systems have in the past tended, through the process of conquest of lesser states by greater states, towards reduction in the number of states involved, and towards less frequent but more devastating wars, until eventually a universal empire has been established through the conquest by one of all those remaining.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Wright |first=Quincy |date=August 1, 1948 |title=On the Application of Intelligence to World Affairs |journal=[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] |volume=4 |issue=8 |page=250 |bibcode=1948BuAtS...4h.249W |doi=10.1080/00963402.1948.11460234}}</ref>}}
German Sociologist Friedrich Tenbruck finds that the macro-historic process of imperial expansion gave rise to [[World history (field)|global history]] in which the formations of universal empires were most significant stages.<ref>{{Cite journal |first=Friedrich |last=Tenbruck |title=Internal History of Society or Universal History? |translator=J. Bleicher |journal=Theory, Culture & Society |issue=11 |date=1994 |page=87}}</ref> A later group of political scientists, working on the phenomenon of the current [[unipolarity]], in 2007 edited research on several pre-modern civilizations by experts in respective fields. The overall conclusion was that the [[balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]] was inherently unstable order and usually soon broke in favor of imperial order.<ref>[[William Wohlforth]], & Stuart J. Kaufman, & Richard Little, ''Balance of Power in World History'', (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).</ref> Yet before the advent of the unipolarity, world historian [[Arnold J. Toynbee|Arnold Toynbee]] and political scientist [[Martin Wight]] had drawn the same conclusion with an unambiguous implication for the modern world:
{{Blockquote|
When this [imperial] pattern of political history is found in the New World as well as in the Old World, it looks as if the pattern must be intrinsic to the political history of societies of the species we call civilizations, in whatever part of the world the specimens of this species occur. If this conclusion is warranted, it illuminates our understanding of civilization itself.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Garcilaso de la Vega |title=Royal Commentaries of the Incas and General History of Peru |date=1966 |isbn=978-0-292-73358-9 |pages=X–XI |chapter=Foreword |publisher=University of Texas Press |author-link=Inca Garcilaso de la Vega}}</ref>}}
{{Blockquote|
Most states systems have ended in universal empire, which has swallowed all the states of the system. The examples are so abundant that we must ask two questions: Is there any states system which has not led fairly directly to the establishment of a world empire? Does the evidence rather suggest that we should expect any states system to culminate in this way? ... It might be argued that every state system can only maintain its existence on the [[balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]], that the latter is inherently unstable, and that sooner or later its tensions and conflicts will be resolved into a monopoly of power.<ref>''System of States'', (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977, pp. 43–44).</ref>}}
The earliest thinker to approach the phenomenon of universal empire from a theoretical point of view was [[Polybius]] (2:3):
{{Blockquote|
In previous times events in the world occurred without impinging on one another ... [Then] history became a whole, as if a single body; events in Italy and Libya came to be enmeshed with those in Asia and Greece, and everything gets directed towards one single goal.}}
[[Johann Gottlieb Fichte]], having witnessed the battle at Jena in 1806 when Napoleon overwhelmed Prussia, described what he perceived as a deep historical trend:
{{Blockquote|
There is necessary tendency in every cultivated State to extend itself generally ... Such is the case in Ancient History ... As the States become stronger in themselves and cast off that [Papal] foreign power, the tendency towards a Universal Monarchy over the whole Christian World necessarily comes to light ... This tendency ... has shown itself successively in several States which could make pretensions to such a dominion, and since the fall of the Papacy, it has become the sole animating principle of our History ... Whether clearly or not—it may be obscurely—yet has this tendency lain at the root of the undertakings of many States in Modern Times ... Although no individual Epoch may have contemplated this purpose, yet is this the spirit which runs through all these individual Epochs, and invisibly urges them onward.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Fichte |first=Johann Gottlieb |chapter=Characteristics of the Present Age |date=1975 |title=Theory and Practice of the Balance of Power, 1486–1914: Selected European Writings |isbn=978-0-460-10196-7 |editor-last=Wright |editor-first=Moorhead |pages=87–89 |author-link=Johann Gottlieb Fichte |orig-date=1806}}</ref>}}
Fichte's later compatriot, Geographer [[Alexander von Humboldt]], in the mid-Nineteenth century observed a macro-historic trend of imperial growth in both Hemispheres: "Men of great and strong minds, as well as whole nations, acted under influence of one idea, the purity of which was utterly unknown to them."<ref>{{Cite book |title=Cosmos: a sketch of a physical description of the universe by Alexander von Humboldt; translated from German by E. C. Otté |year=1866 |url=https://www.biodiversitylibrary.org/bibliography/32462 |page=359 |volume=I}}</ref>

In 1870, Argentine diplomat, jurist and political theorist [[Juan Bautista Alberdi]] described imperial consolidation. As von Humboldt, he found this trend unplanned and irrational but evident beyond doubt in the "unwritten history of events." He linked this trend to the recent [[Evolution theory]]: Nations gravitate towards the formation of a single universal society. The laws that lead the nations in that direction are the same natural laws that has formed societies and are part of evolution. These evolutionary laws exist disregarding whether men recognize them.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.hacer.org/pdf/Guerra.pdf|title=In Spanish. Alberdi, Juan Bautista, (1870). Chapter VIII, "Analogia biologica," ''El crimen de la guerra''}}</ref>

[[The Grand Inquisitor]] of [[Fyodor Dostoevski|Dostoevski]] (1880) envisaged a distant future of universal empire ruled by Caesar. The overall unity (human "anthill") has always been one of the main aims of men. The greater was the nation, the more they recognized the need for universal unity. History's great conquerors, such as [[Genghis Khan]] and [[Tamerlan]], irrationally expressed this greatest necessity of humanity. The world unification entails long suffering but it will be the last suffering of mankind before the universal Caesar stops it and imposes world peace.<ref>Достоевский, Ф.М. (1880). ''Собрание сочинений в 15 томах''. Том 9, Братья Карамазовы, Часть 2, Книга 5, https://rvb.ru/dostoevski/01text/vol9/35_1-36.htm</ref> The Inquisitor reminds Jesus that Satan from the beginning proposed him the sword of Caesar over all kingdoms of the world. The allusion is to [[Matthew 4:8]] where universal empire and absolute Caesarism are the ultimate temptation.<ref>[[Nikolai Berdyaev|Бердяев, Николай А]]. (1907). ''[[s:ru:Великий Инквизитор (Бердяев)|Великий Инквизитор]]''. (Санкт Петербург: М. В. Пирожков).</ref> This would have stopped all suffering caused by the lack of unity. But Jesus declined the proposal opting instead to grant humans freedom of choice. Due to human nature, however, humans screwed up to choose unity and instead slaughter each other.<ref>[[Vasily Rozanov|Розанов, Василий В]]. (1901). ''Легенда о Великом Инквизиторе Ф. М. Достоевского''. (Санкт Петербург: М. В. Пирожков), https://www.vehi.net/rozanov/legenda.html</ref><ref>Подосокорский, Николай (2024). "Лакей Смердяков как почитатель Наполеона в романе Ф. М. Достоевского 'Братья Карамазовы,'" ''Новый Мир'', Номер 1, https://nm1925.ru/articles/2024/1-2024/lakey-smerdyakov-kak-pochitatel-napoleona-v-romane-f-m-dostoevskogo-bratya-karamazovy/</ref> Stressing that freedom plunged humanity into unbearbale suffering, the Inquisitor blames Jesus for his rejection of Devil's imperial gift. Moreover, people took his freedom to science which, in the absence of unity, will lead to such "marvels" that the survivors will crawl to the future Caesar begging him to "save them from themselves." The image of Caesar as Savior from wars is common in Rome and other universal empires.<ref>Pines, Yuri (2016). "Qin dynasty, 221–207 BCE." ''The Encyclopedia of Empire''. ((Ed. MacKenzie, John M. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. {{ISBN|978-1-118-44064-3}}), p 4.</ref> People, adds the Inquisitor, will be free only when they reject freedom and recognize the Caesar. As Jesus failed in his primary mission, earthly rulers took the sword of Caesar. By sword they will wield the world into universal empire and thus fulfill mankind's ancient dream of universal unity as initially proposed to Jesus by Antichrist on the mountain.<ref>Беспалов, Алексей (26.December 2013). "Легенда о великом инквизиторе," (Санкт Петербург: Духовная Академия), https://spbda.ru/publications/aleksey-bespalov-legenda-o-velikom-inkvizitore/</ref>

Under the literary style of Dostoevski appears a deep historical insight. In 1946, with the "marvels" of science accomplished, [[Federation of American Scientists|Atomic Scientists]] repeated the concept of the Grand Inquisitor in their ''[[One World or None#One World or None (book)|One World or None]]''. In 1967, Robert Wesson published a 500-page comparative research on universal empires searching how these organizations, horrible in his view, repeatedly occurred in history and the next he expected for the same reason on the global scale before the year 2000. His outline of the prime cause seems in agreement with the implication of the Grand Inquisitor: "Always... we need a higher power to prevent us from abusing our little powers and hurting one another... Let someone save us from ourselves. We long to have peace and security... Yet we cannot have all this with freedom, for freedom means the ability to be disorderly..."<ref>Wesson, Robert G. (1967). ''The Imperial Order''. (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 512.</ref>

In 1886, [[Beyond Good and Evil|Nietzsche]] perceived the new warlike age which the Europeans have entered in the "long spun-out comedy of its petty-statism" and, above all, under "parliamentary imbecility." Blaming the shattering of the European empire into small states when the time for petty politics is past, he stressed the threatening attitude of the immense Russia Empire and warned that the next (20th) century "will bring the struggle for the dominion of the world—the compulsion to great politics."<ref>''Beyond Good and Evil'', chapter VI:208-209.</ref>

The imperial expansion filled the world {{Circa|1900}}.<ref name="youtube.com">{{cite web| url = https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dp0tqdu7fH4| title = "50 Centuries in 10 Minutes", (2014)| website = [[YouTube]]}}</ref><ref name="World 2015">{{cite web| url = https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ymI5Uv5cGU4| title = "History of the World: Every Year", (2015)| website = [[YouTube]]| date = 16 December 2015}}</ref> Three famous contemporary observers—[[Frederick Jackson Turner|Frederick Turner]], [[Halford Mackinder]] and [[Max Weber]]<ref name="auto6"/>—emphasized the significance of the event. Turner drew his [[Frontier Thesis]], predicting American overseas expansion,<ref>{{Cite book |last=Turner |first=Frederick Jackson |url=https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/22994 |title=The Frontier in American History |date=1920 |author-link=Frederick Jackson Turner}}</ref> and Mackinder proclaimed that the world empire is now in sight.<ref>[[Halford J. Mackinder]], ''The [[Geographical Pivot of History]]'', J. Murray, London, 1904.</ref>

[[Friedrich Ratzel]] observed that the "drive toward the building of continually larger states continues throughout the entirety of history" and is active in the present.<ref>Fridriech Ratzel, "The Laws of the Spatial Growth of States", ''The Structure of Political Geography'', (eds. Kasperson, Roger E., & Minghi, Julian V., Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), p 28.</ref> He drew "Seven Laws of Expansionism". His seventh law stated: "The general trend toward amalgamation transmits the tendency of territorial growth from state to state and increases the tendency in the process of transmission." He commented on this law to make its meaning clear: "There is on this small planet sufficient space for only one great state."<ref>Cited in [[Robert Strausz-Hupé]], ''Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power'', (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942), p 30-31.</ref>

Three other contemporaries—[[Kang Youwei#Datong Shu|Kang Youwei]], [[Josiah Strong]] and George [[Vacher de Lapouge#Future|Vacher de Lapouge]]—stressed that imperial expansion cannot indefinitely proceed on the definite surface of the globe and therefore world empire is imminent. Kang Youwei in 1885 believed that the imperial trend will culminate in the contest between Washington and Berlin.<ref>[[K'ang Yu-wei]], ''The One World Philosophy'', (tr. Thompson, Lawrence G., London, 1958), pp. 79–80, 85.</ref> The same year, Josiah Strong bet on the Anglo-Saxons to establish a world empire centered on the United States.<ref>Strong, Josuah (1885). ''Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis''. (New York: The baker & Taylor Co), p 174-175, https://archive.org/details/cu31924020347534/page/n189/mode/2up?view=theater</ref><ref>[[I. F. Clarke|Clarke, Ignatius Frederick]] (1995). ''The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871-1914: Fictions of Future Warfare and of Battles Still to Come''. (Liverpool University Press), p 19, https://archive.org/details/taleofnextgreatw00ifcl/page/18/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> Vacher de Lapouge in 1899 estimated that the final contest will be between Russia and America in which America is likely to triumph.<ref>George [[Vacher de Lapouge]], ''L'Aryen: Son Rôle Social'', (Nantes: 1899), chapter "L'Avenir des Aryens".</ref> Writing the same year, [[Charles Oman]] stressed the technological [[Time–space compression|annihilation of time-space]] and estimated that a federal union of the Anglo-Saxon race would submit the whole world.<ref>Oman, Charles (1899). ''England in the Nineteenth Century''. (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co), p. 260-261, https://archive.org/details/englandinninetee00omanrich/page/260/mode/2up?view=theate</ref>

[[Gabriel de Tarde]], also writing in 1899, supposed a "law of evolution" forming universal empires which, in his comparison, have nothing else in common. Peoples on all inhabited continents inevitably, it seems, end in gigantic social "baobabs" unifying all within each's own sphere. As long as these spheres remain isolated from each other, they are destined for universal pacification by universal conquest. Thus we have had various ''[[pax imperia]]''. Unless the French wake up, the future universal pacification will be either Russian or English. Just as all financial competition tends towards a monopoly and the division of parties towards a one party rule, the division of states, all separately eager for domination, runs towards either the "triumph or accepted preponderance" of one state.<ref>In French: Tarde, Gabriel de (1899). ''Les transformations du pouvoir''. (F. Alcan), p 206-208, https://archive.org/details/lestransformati00tardgoog/page/n223/mode/2up?view=theater</ref>

The above envisaged contests indeed took place, known to us as World War I and II. Writing during the First, [[Oswald Spengler]] in ''[[The Decline of the West]]'' compared two emergences of universal empires and implied for the modern world: The Chinese League of States failed as well as the Taoist idea of intellectual self-disarmament. The Chinese states defended their last independence with bitterness but in vain. Also in vain Rome attempted to avoid conquest of the Hellenistic east. Imperialism is so necessary a product of any civilization that when a strongest people refuse to assume the role of master, it is pushed into it. It is the same with us. The [[Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907|Hague Conference of 1907]] was the prelude of World War, the [[Washington Naval Conference|Washington Conference]] of 1921 will have been that of other wars. Napoleon introduced the idea of military world empire different from the preceding European maritime empires. The contest "for the heritage of the whole world" will culminate "within two generations" (from 1922). The destinies of small states are "without importance to the great march of things." The strongest race will win and seize the management of the world.<ref>Spengler, Oswald (1922). ''The Decline of the West: Perspectives on World-History'', (tr. Atkinson, Charles Francis, (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD), vol II, p 422, 428-432, https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.264078/mode/2up?view=theater</ref>

Writing during the next World War, political scientists Derwent Whittlesey, [[Robert Strausz-Hupé]] and [[John H. Herz]] concluded: "Now that the earth is at last parceled out, consolidation has commenced."<ref>Derwent Whittlesey, ''German Strategy of World Conquest'', (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1942), p 74.</ref> In "this world of fighting superstates there could be no end to war until one state had subjected all others, until world empire had been achieved by the strongest. This undoubtedly is the logical final stage in the geopolitical theory of evolution."<ref>Robert Strausz-Hupé, ''Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power'', (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942), p XI.</ref>
{{Blockquote|
The world is no longer large enough to harbor several self-contained powers ... The trend toward world domination or hegemony of a single power is but the ultimate consummation of a power-system engrafted upon an otherwise integrated world.<ref>John H. Herz, "Power Politics and World Organization,"' ''The American Political Science Review'', 36/6, (1942): p 1041.</ref>}}
Writing in the last year of the War, American theologian Parley Paul Wormer, German historian [[Ludwig Dehio]], and Hungarian-born writer [[Emery Reves]] drew similar conclusions. Fluctuating but persistent movement occurred through the centuries toward ever greater unity. The forward movement toward ever larger unities continues and there is no reason to conclude that it has come to an end. More likely, the greatest convergence of all time is at hand. "Possibly this is the deeper meaning of the savage world conflicts" of the 20th century.<ref>Wormer, Parley Paul, (1945). ''Citizenship and the New Day'', (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press), p 206.</ref>
{{Blockquote|
[T]he old European tendency toward division is now being thrust aside by the new global trend toward unification. And the onrush of this trend may not come to rest until it has asserted itself throughout our planet ... The global order still seems to be going through its birth pangs ... With the last tempest barely over, a new one is gathering.<ref>Ludwig Dehio, ''The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle, 1945'', (tr. Fullman, Charles, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), pp. 266–267.</ref>}}
The famous ''[[The Anatomy of Peace|Anatomy of Peace]]'' by Reves, written and published in 1945, supposed that without the industrial power of the United States, Hitler already might have established world empire. Proposing [[world federalism]], the book warned: Every dynamic force, every economic and technological reality, every "law of history" and logic "indicates that we are on the verge of a period of empire building," which is "the last phase of the struggle for the conquest of the world." As an elimination contest, one of the three remaining powers or a combination "will achieve by force that unified control made mandatory by the times we live in… Anyone of three, by defeating the other two, would conquer and rule the world." If we fail to institute a unified control over the world in democratic way, the "iron law of history" would compel us to wage wars until world empire is finally attained through conquest. Since the former way is improbable due human blindness, we should precipitate the unification by conquest as quickly as possible and start the restoration of human liberties within the world empire.<ref>Reves, Emery (1945). ''The Anatomy of Peace'', (1 ed. New York & London: Harper & Brothers Publishers), pp 265-266, 268-270.</ref>

=== Atomic bomb and empire ===
Reves added "Postscript" to the ''Anatomy'', opening: "A few weeks after the publication of this book, the first atomic bomb exploded over the city of Hiroshima…" This new physical fact however has changed nothing in the political situation. The world empire remains inevitable and nothing else in the book would have been said differently had it been written after August 6, 1945. Not much chance we have to establish [[world government]] before the next horrible war between the two superpowers and whoever is victorious would establish the world empire.<ref>Reves 1945: pp 277-278, 287.</ref> The book sold an exceptional 800,000 copies in thirty languages, was endorsed by [[Albert Einstein]] and numerous other prominent figures, and in 1950 Reves was nominated for the [[Nobel Peace Prize]].

The year after the War and in the first year of the nuclear age, Einstein and British philosopher [[Bertrand Russell]], known as prominent pacifists, outlined for the near future a perspective of world empire (world government established by force). Einstein believed that, unless world government is established by agreement, an imperial world government would come by war or wars.<ref>{{cite book| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=6NoFIRmg3J4C| title = Atomic War or Peace", 1945, ''Albert Einstein Collection: Essays in Humanism'', (New York: Philosophical Library/Open Road), 2016| isbn = 978-1-4532-0459-7| last1 = Einstein| first1 = Albert| date = 27 September 2011| publisher = Open Road Media}}</ref> Russell expected a [[third World War]] to result in a world government under the empire of the United States<ref>{{cite web| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=WwwAAAAAMBAJ| title = "Atomic Weapon and the Prevention of War", ''Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists'', 2/7-8, October 1: p. 20| date = October 1946}}</ref> and regretted that the United States is not enough “imperialistic” to launch a [[Preventive war#Case for preventive nuclear war|preventive nuclear war]] for this cause.<ref>Russell, Bertrand (18 August 1945). “Civilization and the bomb,” The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, vol 24, part VI (58). (Hamilton: McMaster University), https://russell.humanities.mcmaster.ca/our-work/collected-papers/volumes-12-34-of-the-collected-papers/the-atomic-bomb/#the%20atomic%20bomb</ref> Three years later, another prominent pacifist, theologian [[Reinhold Niebuhr]], generalized on the ancient Empires of Egypt, Babylon, Persia and Greece to imply for the modern world: "The analogy in present global terms would be the final unification of the world through the preponderant power of either America or Russia, whichever proved herself victorious in the final struggle."<ref>{{cite web| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=mA0AAAAAMBAJ| title = "The Illusion of World Government", ''Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists'', 5/10: (October 1, 1949): p. 291| date = October 1949}}</ref>

Russian colleague of Russell and Niebuhr, [[Georgy Fedotov]], wrote in 1945: All empires are but stages on the way to the sole empire which must swallow all others. The only question is who will build it and on which foundations. Universal unity is the only alternative to annihilation. Unity by conference is utopian but unity by conquest by the strongest power is not and probably the uncompleted in this War will be completed in the next. "Pax Atlantica" is the best of possible outcomes.<ref>Георгий П. Федотов, (1945). "Новое Отечество," ''Новый Град'', Нью Йорк: Издательство Чехова, 1952, p 98, 102, 107.</ref>

Originally drafted as a secret study for the [[Office of Strategic Services]] (the precursor of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]) in 1944<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://monthlyreview.org/2006/01/01/the-new-geopolitics-of-empire/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180929233206/https://monthlyreview.org/2006/01/01/the-new-geopolitics-of-empire|title=Monthly Review &#124; The New Geopolitics of Empire|first=John Bellamy FosterTopics: Imperialism Political Economy|last=Stagnation|date=January 1, 2006|archive-date=September 29, 2018}}</ref> and published as a book three years later, ''The Struggle for the World...'' by [[James Burnham]] concludes: If either of the two Superpowers wins, the result would be a universal empire which in our case would also be a world empire. The historical stage for a world empire had already been set prior to and independently of the discovery of atomic weapons but these weapons make a world empire inevitable and imminent. "The atomic weapons ... will not permit the world to wait." Only a world empire can establish monopoly on atomic weapons and thus guarantee the survival of civilization. A world empire "is in fact the objective of the Third World War which, in its preliminary stages, has already began". The issue of a world empire "will be decided, and in our day. In the course of the decision, both of the present antagonists may, it is true, be destroyed, but one of them must be."<ref>James Burnham, ''Struggle for the World'', (New York: The John Day Company, 1947), pp. 33, 50, 53, 55; 134–135, 143.</ref>

The next year, world historian [[Crane Brinton]] similarly supposed that the bomb may in the hands of a very skillful and lucky nation prove to be the weapon that permits that nation to unify the world by imperial conquest, to do what Napoleon and Hitler failed to do. Combined with other "wonders of science," it would permit a quick and easy conquest of the world.<ref>Brinton, Crane, (1948). ''From Many, One: The Process of Political Integration, the Problem of World Government'', (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1971), pp 88-89, 94.</ref> In 1951, [[Hans Morgenthau]] concluded that the "best" outcome of World War III would be world empire:
{{Blockquote|
Today war has become an instrument of universal destruction, an instrument that destroys the victor and the vanquished ... At worst, victor and loser would be undistinguishable under the leveling impact of such a catastrophe ... At best, the destruction on one side would not be quite as great as on the other; the victor would be somewhat better off than the loser and would establish, with the aid of modern technology, his domination over the world.<ref>''In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy'', (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p 58.</ref>}}
Expert on earlier civilizations, Toynbee, further developed the subject of World War III leading to world empire:
{{Blockquote|
The outcome of the Third World War ... seemed likely to be the imposition of an ecumenical peace of the Roman kind by the victor whose victory would leave him with a monopoly on the control of atomic energy in his grasp ... This denouement was foreshadowed, not only by present facts, but by historical precedents, since, in the histories of other civilizations, the time of troubles had been apt to culminate in the delivery of a knock-out blow resulting in the establishment of a universal state ...<ref>''[[A Study of History]]'', (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), vol. IX, p. 524.</ref><ref>In his 1962 chapter, titled "Peace through empire," [[Raymond Aron]] repeated the same theory of "universal empire" referring to Toynbee but preferred "not to speculate on the chances of imperial unification." ''Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations''. ({{ISBN|978-0-7658-0504-1}}), p. 737, https://archive.org/details/raymondarondanielj.mahoneybrianc.andersonpeaceandwaratheoryofinternationalrelati/page/n763/mode/2up</ref>}}
The year this volume of ''[[A Study of History]]'' was published, US Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]] announced "[[Massive retaliation|a knock-out blow]]" as an official doctrine, a detailed [[Single Integrated Operational Plan|Plan]] was elaborated and ''[[Fortune (magazine)|Fortune]]'' magazine mapped the design.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.fulltable.com/vts/f/fortune/xf/34.jpg|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170312072919/https://www.fulltable.com/vts/f/fortune/xf/34.jpg|title=Max Gschwind, "Massive Retaliatory Power", map, ''Fortune'', 51, May 1954: p. 105|archive-date=March 12, 2017}}</ref> Section VIII, "Atomic Armaments", of the famous National Security Council Report 68 ([[NSC 68]]), approved by President Harry Truman in 1951, uses the term "blow" 17 times, mostly preceded by such adjectives as "powerful", "overwhelming", or "crippling". Another term applied by the strategists was "Sunday punch".<ref>[[Michio Kaku]], & Daniel Axelrod,<!--- not the redirect to the botanist ---> ''To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon Secret War Plans'', (Boston: South End Press, 1987), p. 195.</ref>

Having modeled the rise of the world empire on the cases of previous empires, Toynbee noted that, by contrast, the modern ultimate "blow" would be atomic. But he remains optimistic: No doubt, the modern world has far greater capacity to reconstruct than the earlier civilizations had.<ref name="archive.org">Toynbee, Arnold, (1948). ''Civilization on Trial'', (New York: Oxford University Press), p 133-134, https://archive.org/details/civilizationontr00toyn/page/126/mode/2up?view=theater</ref>

A pupil of Toynbee, [[William H. McNeill (historian)|William McNeill]], associated with the case of ancient China, which "put a quietus upon the disorders of the [[warring states]] by erecting an imperial bureaucratic structure ... The warring states of the Twentieth century seem headed for a similar resolution of their conflicts."<ref>''[[The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community]]'', (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 807.</ref> The ancient "resolution" McNeill evoked was one of the most sweeping universal conquests in world history, performed by [[Qin's wars of unification|Qin]] in 230–221 BC. Chinese classic [[Sima Qian]] (d. 86 BC) described the event (6:234): "Qin raised troops on a grand scale" and "the whole world celebrated a great bacchanal". [[Herman Kahn]] of the [[RAND Corporation]] criticized an assembled group of [[Strategic Air Command|SAC]] officers for their war plan ([[Single Integrated Operational Plan|SIOP]]-62). He did not use the term [[bacchanalia|bacchanal]] but he coined on the occasion an associating word: "Gentlemen, you do not have a war plan. You have a ''war orgasm''!"<ref>Emphasis added, cited in [[Fred Kaplan (journalist)|Fred Kaplan]], ''The Wizards of Armageddon''. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991, pp. 223, https://books.google.fr/books?id=RSwVBgAAQBAJ&printsec=copyright&redir_esc=y#v=snippet&q=gentlemen&f=false.</ref> History did not completely repeat itself but it passed close.

===Circumscription theory===
{{Main|Circumscription theory}}
According to the circumscription theory of [[Robert Carneiro]], "the more sharply circumscribed area, the more rapidly it will become politically unified."<ref>Robert Carneiro, "The Circumscription Theory: Challenge and Response", ''American Behavioral Scientist'', 31/4, (1988): p 499.</ref> The Empires of Egypt,<ref>O'Connor, D. B. & Silverman, D. P., ''Ancient Egyptian Kingship'', (Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1995), p XXI.</ref><ref>Amelie Kuhrt, ''The Ancient Near East circa 3000–330 BC'', (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), vol. I, pp. 123–124.</ref> China<ref>[[Yuri Pines]] & Moreno Garcia, Juan Carlos, "Maat and Tianxia: Building world orders in ancient Egypt and China," ''Journal of Egyptian History'', vol 13 (2020): p 227, http://yuri-pines-sinology.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Moreno-Pines-Maat-and-Tianxia-final.pdf</ref><ref>Yuri Pines, ''Envisioning Eternal Empire: Chinese Political Thought of the Warring States Era'', (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009), pp. 8–9.</ref> and [[Yamato Dynasty|Japan]]<ref>Since 1979, the only country preserving its Emperor as head of state. Pines, Yuri & Biran, Michal & Rüpke, Jörg (2011). ''The Limits of Universal Rule: Eurasian Empires Compared'', (New York: Cambridge University Press), p 2, https://books.google.com/books?id=eyoNEAAAQBAJ</ref> are named the most durable political structures in human history. Correspondingly, these are the three most circumscribed civilizations in human history. The Empires of Egypt (established by [[Narmer]] c. 3000 BC) and China (established by [[Qin Shi Huang|Cheng]] in 221 BC) endured for over two millennia. Expert on comparative imperiology, Robert G. Wesson, emphasized the unique in world history "repetition of universal empires" in Egypt and China.<ref>Wesson, Robert G. (1967). ''The Imperial Order''. (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 379.</ref> German Sociologist Friedrich Tenbruck, criticizing the Western idea of progress, emphasized that China and Egypt remained at one particular stage of development for millennia. This stage was universal empire. The development of Egypt and China came to a halt once their empires "reached the limits of their natural habitat".{{Sfn|Tenbruck|1994|pages=84, 86–87}} [[Sinology]] does not recognize the Eurocentric view of the "inevitable" imperial fall;<ref>Yuri Pines, ''Envisioning Eternal Empire: Chinese Political Thought of the Warring States Era'', (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009).</ref><ref>Yuri Pines, The ''Everlasting Empire: The Political Culture of Ancient China and Its Imperial Legacy'', (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2012).</ref> Egyptology<ref>D. B. O'Connor & D. P. Silverman, ''Ancient Egyptian Kingship'', (Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1995).</ref><ref>Aidan Dodson, ''Monarchs of the Nile'', (London: The Rubicon Press, 1995).</ref> and [[Yamato Dynasty|Japanology]] pose equal challenges.

Carneiro explored the Bronze Age civilizations. Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little and [[William Wohlforth]] researched the next three millennia, comparing eight civilizations. They conclude: The "rigidity of the borders" contributed importantly to hegemony in every concerned case.<ref>Kaufman & Little & Wohlforth, ''The Balance of Power in World History'', (London: Palgrave, 2007), p. 237.</ref> Hence, "when the system's borders are rigid, the probability of hegemony is high".<ref>Kaufman & Little & Wohlforth, "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History", ''European Journal of International Relations'', 13/2, (2007): p. 178.</ref>

The circumscription theory was stressed in the [[Comparative studies of the Roman and Han empires|comparative studies of the Roman and Chinese Empires]]. The circumscribed Chinese Empire recovered from all falls, while the fall of Rome, by contrast, was fatal. "What counteracted this [imperial] tendency in Europe ... was a countervailing tendency for the geographical boundaries of the system to expand." If "Europe had been a closed system, some great power would eventually have succeeded in establishing absolute supremacy over the other states in the region".<ref>Stuart J. Kaufman & William C. Wohlforth & Richard Little, ''The Balance of Power in World History'', (London: Palgrave, 2007), pp. 45–46.</ref>
{{Blockquote|
The ancient Chinese system was relatively enclosed, whereas the European system began to expand its reach to the rest of the world from the onset of system formation... In addition, overseas provided outlet for territorial competition, thereby allowing international competition on the European continent to ... trump the ongoing pressure toward convergence.<ref>Victoria Tin-bor Hui, ''War and State Formation in China and Early Modern Europe'', Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 141.</ref>}}
In the 1945 book, ''The Precarious Balance'', on four centuries of the European power struggle, [[Ludwig Dehio]] explained the durability of the European states system by its overseas expansion: "Overseas expansion and the system of states were born at the same time; the vitality that burst the bounds of the Western world also destroyed its unity."<ref>(tr. Fullman, Charles, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), pp. 50, 90, 279.</ref> In a [[The Anatomy of Peace|more famous 1945 book]], Reves similarly argued that the era of outward expansion is forever closed and the historic trend of expansion will result in direct collision between the remaining powers.<ref name="auto1">Reves 1945: pp 267-268.</ref> [[E. H. Carr|Edward Carr]] causally linked the end of the overseas outlet for imperial expansion and World Wars. In the nineteenth century, he wrote during the Second World War, imperialist wars were waged against "primitive" peoples. "It was silly for European countries to fight against one another when they could still ... maintain social cohesion by continuous expansion in Asia and Africa. Since 1900, however, this has no longer been possible: "the situation has radically changed". Now wars are between "imperial powers."<ref>''Conditions of Peace'', (London: Macmillan, 1943), p 113-114.</ref>

[[Hans Morgenthau]] wrote that the very imperial expansion into relatively empty geographical spaces in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, in Africa, Eurasia, and western North America, deflected great power politics into the periphery of the earth, thereby reducing conflict. For example, the more attention Russia, France and the United States paid to expanding into far-flung territories in imperial fashion, the less attention they paid to one another, and the more peaceful, in a sense, the world was. But by the late nineteenth century, the consolidation of the great nation-states and empires of the West was consummated, and territorial gains could only be made at the expense of one another.<ref>''Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace'', 1948, (New York: McGraw Hill, revised 2006 edition), p 354–357.</ref> [[John H. Herz]] outlined one "chief function" of the overseas expansion and the impact of its end:
{{Blockquote|
[A] European balance of power could be maintained or adjusted because it was relatively easy to divert European conflicts into overseas directions and adjust them there. Thus the openness of the world contributed to the consolidation of the territorial system. The end of the 'world frontier' and the resulting closedness of an interdependent world inevitably affected the system's effectiveness.<ref>[[John H. Herz]], "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State", ''World Politics'', 9, (1957): p. 482.</ref>}}
Some later commentators{{Who|date=January 2019}} drew similar conclusions:
{{Blockquote|
For some commentators, the passing of the Nineteenth century seemed destined to mark the end of this long era of European empire building. The unexplored and unclaimed "blank" spaces on the world map were rapidly diminishing ... and the sense of "global closure" prompted an anxious [[Fin de siècle|fin-de-siècle]] debate about the future of the great empires ... The "closure" of the global imperial system implied ... the beginning of a new era of intensifying inter-imperial struggle along borders that now straddled the globe.<ref>Michael Heffernan, "The Politics of the Map in the Early Twentieth Century", ''Cartography and Geographic Information Science'', 29/3, (2002): p. 207.</ref>}}
The opportunity for any system to expand in size seems almost a necessary condition for it to remain balanced, at least over the long haul. Far from being impossible or exceedingly improbable, systemic hegemony is likely under two conditions: "when the boundaries of the international system remain stable and no new major powers emerge from outside the system."<ref>Kaufman & Little & Wohlforth, ''The Balance of Power in World History'', (London: Palgrave, 2007), p 229, 237; Idem., "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History", ''European Journal of International Relations'', 13/2, (2007): p 159.</ref> With the system becoming global, further expansion is precluded. The geopolitical condition of "global closure"<ref>Gerry Kearns, "''Fin de Siècle Geopolitics'': Mackinder, Hobson and Theories of Global Closure", ''Political Geography of the Twentieth Century: A Global Analysis'', (ed. Peter J. Taylor, London: Belhaven Press, 1993).</ref> will remain to the end of history. Since "the contemporary international system is global, we can rule out the possibility that geographic expansion of the system will contribute to the emergence of a new balance of power, as it did so many times in the past."<ref>Kaufman & Little & Wohlforth, ''The Balance of Power in World History'', p 21.</ref> As [[Quincy Wright]] had put it, "this process can no longer continue without interplanetary wars."<ref>Quincy Wright, ''A Study of War'', (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p 92-93.</ref>

Sociologist, [[Michael Mann]], developed the cage metaphor to explain the persistent unity of Egypt. The River Valley was a cage. The whole population was "trapped within the domain of the conqueror," unable to turn backs on emerging authority. A veritable unitary society resulted. Comparing Egypt with other civilizations, Mann concludes: "The social cage was as total as has ever been seen. In this respect it has not been the dominant model of social organization.”<ref>Mann, Michael (1987). ''The Sources of Social Power''. (Cambridge University Press), vol I, pp. 111, 114-115, 124.</ref> Max Ostrovsky remarked that Mann omitted one system which is even more caged—our own. Egypt could be the most caged of historic civilizations but it was not a “total cage’. Modern world system, being global, is a total cage, and this "model of social organization" will remain until the end of history.<ref>Ostrovsky, Max (2006). ''Y = Arctg X: The Hyperbola of the World Order''. (Lanham: University Press of America), pp. 131-132.</ref> One of the leading experts on [[world-systems theory]], [[Christopher Chase-Dunn]], also noted that circumscription theory is applicable to the global system, since the global system is circumscribed.<ref>{{cite web| url = http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows1.txt| title = "World State Formation: Historical Processes and Emergent Necessity", ''Political Geography Quarterly'', 9/2, (1990) |pages=108–130}}</ref><ref>{{cite web| url = https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=osoLn_xoBvQ| title = Robert Carneiro, "Are We Circumscribed Now?" 2012| website = [[YouTube]]| date = 5 October 2012}}</ref> In fact, within less than a century of circumscribed existence, the global system overcame the centuries-old [[balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]] and reached the state of [[unipolarity]]. Given "constant spatial parameters" of the global system, its unipolar structure is neither historically unusual nor theoretically surprising.<ref>Kaufman & Little & Wohlforth, "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History", ''European Journal of International Relations'', 13/2, (2007): p. 179.</ref>

[[Randall Schweller]] theorized that a "closed international system", such as the global system became a century ago, would reach "[[entropy]]" in a kind of [[Second law of thermodynamics|thermodynamic law]]. Once the state of entropy is reached, there is no going back. The initial conditions are lost forever. Stressing the curiosity of this fact, Schweller writes that since the moment the modern world became a closed system, the process has worked in only one direction: from many poles to two poles to one pole. Thus, unipolarity might represent entropy—stable and permanent loss of variation—in the global system.<ref>Randall L. Schweller, "Entropy and the Trajectory of World Politics: Why Polarity Has Become Less Meaningful", ''Cambridge Review of International Affairs'', 23/1, (2010): pp. 149–151.</ref>

[[File:Combined Air Operations Center 151007-F-MS415-019.jpg|thumb|[[Al Udeid Air Base]] in [[Qatar]]]]

===Present===
{{Main|American imperialism}}
{{See also|Pax Americana}}

For [[Dominic Lieven]], empire is all about unequal distribution of power and consequent domination. Thus the 2000s world order is more imperial than the 19th-century one because instead of several empire of roughly equal power there is one imperial superpower. ‘Empire’ has therefore replaced "[[Anarchy (international relations)|anarchy]]."<ref>[[Dominic Lieven|Lieven, Dominic]] (2012). "Empire, history and the contemporary global order," ''Proceedings of the British Academy'', vol 131: p 140, https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/documents/2012/pba131p127.pdf</ref> [[Chalmers Johnson]] argues that the US global network of hundreds of military bases already represents a global empire in its initial form:
{{Blockquote|
For a major power, prosecution of any war that is not a defense of the homeland usually requires overseas military bases for strategic reasons. After the war is over, it is tempting for the victor to retain such bases and easy to find reasons to do so. Commonly, preparedness for a possible resumption of hostilities will be invoked. Over time, if a nation's aims become imperial, the bases form the skeleton of an empire.<ref>''The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic'', New York: Henry Hobt and Company, (2004), p 187.</ref>}}
[[Simon Dalby (academic)|Simon Dalby]] associates the network of bases with the Roman imperial system:
{{Blockquote|
Looking at these impressive facilities which reproduce substantial parts of American suburbia complete with movie theatres and restaurant chains, the parallels with Roman garrison towns built on the Rhine, or on Hadrian's wall in England, where the remains are strikingly visible on the landscape, are obvious ... Less visible is the sheer scale of the logistics to keep garrison troops in residence in the far-flung reaches of empire ... That [military] presence literally builds the cultural logic of the garrison troops into the landscape, a permanent reminder of imperial control.<ref>Simon Dalby, "Imperialism, Domination, Culture: The Continued Relevance of Critical Geopolitics," ''Geopolitics'', 13/3, (2008): p 425.</ref>}}
[[Kenneth Pomeranz]] and Harvard Historian [[Niall Ferguson]] share the above-cited views: "With American military bases in over 120 countries, we have hardly seen the end of empire." This "vast archipelago of US military bases … far exceeds 19th-century British ambitions. Britain's imperium consisted of specific, albeit numerous, colonies and clients; the American imperial vision is much more global…"<ref>Kenneth Pomeranz, [https://www.amacad.org/publication/daedalus/empire-civilizing-missions-past-present "Empire & 'Civilizing' Missions, Past & Present"], ''Daedalus'', 134/2, (2005): p 43, 45. {{JSTOR|20027976}}</ref> The greatest conquerors who have ever lived only dreamed of a military presence as expansive as the United States has already achieved.<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p 164.</ref>
{{Blockquote|
Conventional maps of US military deployments understate the extent of America's military reach. A [[United States Department of Defense|Defense Department]] map of the world, which shows the areas of responsibility of the [[Unified Combatant Command|five major regional commands]], suggests that America's sphere of military influence is now literally global ... The regional combatant commanders—[[Pax Americana|the 'pro-consuls' of this imperium]]—have responsibility for swaths of territory beyond the wildest imaginings of their Roman predecessors.<ref>Niall Ferguson, ''Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire'', (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), p 17.</ref>}}
Another Harvard historian [[Charles S. Maier]] opens his ''Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors'' with these words: "What a substratum for empire! Compared with which, the foundation of the Macedonian, the Roman and the British, sink into insignificance."<ref>(Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press, 2006), p 1.</ref> On almost any criterion, the American Empire in the 2000s transcends the limits of empire that [[John Darwin (historian)|John Darwin]] has observed since 1400 AD. Those writers who compare America to Victorian Britain "betray a staggering ignorance of the history of both."<ref>Darwin, John (2008). ''After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405''. (New York: Bloomsbury Press), p 485.</ref>

One of the most accepted distinctions between earlier empires and the American Empire is the latter's unprecedented "global" or "planetary" scope.<ref>[[Manfred Berg|Berg, Manfred]] (2016). "America, United States of: 20th century to the present." ''The Encyclopedia of Empire''. (Ed. MacKenzie, John M. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. {{ISBN|978-1-118-44064-3}}), p 3.</ref><ref>[[George Steinmetz (academic)|Steinmetz, George]] (December 2005). "Return to empire: The new U.S. imperialism in comparative historical perspective." ''Sociological Theory'', vol 23 (4): p 340, https://websites.umich.edu/~geostein/docs/SteinmetzReturn.pdf</ref><ref>[[Neil Smith (geographer)|Neil Smith]], ''American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization'', (Berkeley & Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 2003), p XIII.</ref> French former Foreign Minister [[Hubert Vedrine]] wondered: "The situation is unprecedented: What previous empire subjugated the entire world...?"<ref>Hubert Vedrine & [[Dominique Moisi]], ''France in an Age of Globalization'', (tr. Gordon, Philip H., Washington: Brookings Institutions Press, 2001), p 2.</ref> The quests for universal empire are old but the present quest outdoes the previous in "the notable respect of being the first to actually be global in its reach."<ref>{{cite web| url = http://bev.berkeley.edu/ipe/readings/American%20hegemony%202005.pdf| title = David C. Hendrickson, "The Curious Case of American Hegemony: Imperial Aspirations and National Decline," ''World Policy Journal'', 22/2, (2005): p 5}}</ref> [[James Kurth]] found that there was "only one empire--the global empire of the United States."<ref>Kurth, James (Spring 2003). "Migration and the dynamics of empire." ''The National Interest''. Vol. 71, p. 5.</ref> Another historian [[Paul Kennedy]], who in 1986 [[The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers|predicted]] the imminent US "[[imperial overstretch]]," in 2002 acknowledged about the present world system:
{{Blockquote|
Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power. The Pax Britannica was run on the cheap. Napoleon's France and Philip II's Spain had powerful foes and were part of a multipolar system. Charlemagne's empire was merely western European in stretch. The Roman Empire stretched further afield, but there was another great empire in Persia and a larger one in China. There is ... no comparison.<ref>{{cite web| url = http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2002_spring/kennedy.html| title = "The Greatest Superpower Ever," ''New Perspectives Quarterly'', 19/2, (2002)| access-date = 2016-12-16| archive-date = 2016-04-14| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160414030710/http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2002_spring/kennedy.html| url-status = dead}}</ref>}}
[[Walter Russell Mead]] observes that the United States attempts to recreate "globally" what the ancient empires of Egypt, China and Rome had each accomplished on a regional basis.<ref>"America's Sticky Power," ''Foreign Policy'', 141, (March – April 2004): p 48.</ref> Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Leeds, [[Zygmunt Bauman]], concludes:
{{Blockquote|
The new 'empire' is not an entity that could be drawn on a map... Drawing a map of the empire would also be a pointless exercise because the most conspicuously 'imperial' trait of the new empire's mode of being consists in viewing and treating the whole of the planet ... as a potential grazing ground...<ref>''Europe: An Unfinished Adventure'', (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p 55-56.</ref>}}
''Times Atlas of Empires'' numbers 70 empires in the world history. Niall Ferguson lists numerous parallels between them and the United States. He concludes: "To those who would still insist on American exceptionalism, the historian of empires can only retort: as exceptional as all the other 69 empires."<ref>"The Unconscious Colossus: Limits of (Alternatives to) American Empire," ''Daedalus'', 134/2, (2005): p 20-21.</ref><ref name="paulkrameronline.com">Kramer, Paul A. (2011). "Power and connection: Imperial histories of the United States in the world." ''The American Historical Review''. Vol. 116 (5), p. 1362, https://paulkrameronline.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/power-and-connection.pdf</ref> [[Fareed Zakaria]] stressed one element not exceptional for the American Empire—the concept of [[American exceptionalism|exceptionalism]]. All dominant empires thought they were special.<ref>{{cite web| url = http://www.newsweek.com/arrogant-empire-132751| title = "The Arrogant Empire," ''Newsweek''. (March 24, 2003)| website = [[Newsweek]]| date = 23 March 2003}}</ref> "Each empire is unique, each regards itself as holding the truth of the world, each sees its mission as realizing that truth throughout the whole world."<ref>Kumar, Krishan (2025). "History, sociology and the study of empires: Reflections of a Historical Sociologist." ''European Journal of Social Theory''. Vol. 28 (1): p. 116.</ref> Historian Paul A. Kramer suggested  a comparative history of imperial exceptionalisms themselves.<ref name="paulkrameronline.com"/>

A team of Historians of empire supposed that we witness genesis of the American Empire. Hence, it should not be compared to empires in their height, such as Rome under [[Hadrian]], but rather with emerging empires undergoing their “imperial moment.” In their hypothesis, at a certain moment a powerful state turns into empire. Their research developed into book, titled ''The Imperial Moment'', where each scholar attempted to identify a parallel imperial moment in the empire of his specialization. The six cases of the book are devoted to five historical Empires and the American Empire. Their comparative analysis aims to show how, why and when empires come into being and the American Empire is expected to come.<ref>[[Kimberly Kagan|Kagan, Kimberly]] et al (2010). ''The Imperial Moment''. (Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), p 6, 174.</ref>

The five past cases under concern demonstrate that very few policy makers were aware that their state was on the brink of empire when the key transformation occurred. Later authors, knowing the outcome (empire), write either teleological or tautological histories. [[Thucydides]] and [[Polybius]] teleologically described empire as the natural culmination of an impersonal process. Others describe pre-imperial events as rational planning of empire, though the participants of those events had no such idea and acted out of different considerations.<ref>[[Kimberly Kagan|Kagan, Kimberly]] et al (2010). ''The Imperial Moment''. (Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), p 164, 172.</ref>

One of the contributors to ''The Imperial Moment'', Roman Historian [[Arthur Eckstein]], in his earlier research had already asked the same question, "At what point does a state begin to have an empire?" and found that this point pre-dates the collective recognition of the imperial situation. The Mediterranean unipolarity was established in 189 BC, but to many intelligent and experienced Greek politicians, according to Polybius (''[[Histories (Polybius)|Histories]]'' 1:1–4; 29:21, 27), this did not actually become clear until after 168 BC.<ref>Eckstein, Arthur M. (2008). ''Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230–170 B.C.'' (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 340-342.</ref>

Empires evolve from a long series of events in which empire has not been an intended outcome.<ref>[[John M. MacKenzie|MacKenzie, John M.]] (2016). "Empires in world history: Characteristics, concepts, and consequences." ''The Encyclopedia of Empire''. (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. {{ISBN|978-1-118-44064-3}}), vol I, p 7.</ref> Having criticized Thucydides and Polybius for their "teleological" approach, the Authors of ''The Imperial Moment'' drew the same teleological conclusion of empire as the natural culmination of an impersonal process. Empires often seem inevitable after the fact, but inconceivable beforehand. The fact of empire precedes the understanding of the existence of empire. Ideological recognition comes rather late in the game.<ref>[[Kimberly Kagan|Kagan, Kimberly]] et al (2010). ''The Imperial Moment''. (Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), pp. 164, 172.</ref> Views of empire as impersonal process are most prominent in theses related to [[Defensive imperialism#Related terms|defensive imperialism]].

In the case of the United States, the sixth case in ''The Imperial Moment'', the attitude is similar. The imperial situation is new but well known in history and commonly called “empire.” To avoid the word, many alternative terms were tried, such as liberal hegemony, hyperpower, unipolarity, and others. The very panoply of terms suggests that Americans find themselves in a new imperial situation, “largely of their own making, which they do not fully understand.” Eventually, some “unusually perceptive individuals” will grasp the imperial reality and announce the final destination of a “torturous” centuries-long journey: “Last stop, ‘empire.’ Everybody off.”<ref>[[Kimberly Kagan|Kagan, Kimberly]] et al (2010). ''The Imperial Moment''. (Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), p 163-172.</ref>

===Future===
In 1945, Historian [[Ludwig Dehio]] predicted global unification due to the circumscription of the global system, although he did not use this term. Being global, the system can neither expand nor be subject to external intrusion as the European states system had been for centuries:
{{Blockquote|
In all previous struggles for supremacy, attempts to unite the European peninsula in a single state have been condemned to failure primarily through the intrusion of new forces from outside the old Occident. The Occident was an open area. But the globe was not, and, for that very reason, ultimately destined to be unified... And this very process [of unification] was clearly reflected in both World Wars.<ref>Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle, 1945, (tr. Fullman, Charles, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p 234.</ref>}}
Fifteen years later, Dehio confirmed his hypothesis: The European system owed its durability to its overseas outlet. "But how can a multiple grouping of world states conceivably be supported from outside in the framework of a finite globe?"<ref>Ludwig Dehio, "Epilogue," The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle, 1960, (tr. Fullman, Charles, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p 279.</ref>

During the same time, [[Quincy Wright]] developed a similar concept. Balance-of-power politics has aimed less at preserving peace than at preserving the independence of states and preventing the development of world empire. In the course of history, the balance of power repeatedly re-emerged, but on ever-wider scale. Eventually, the scale became global. Unless we proceed to "interplanetary wars," this pattern can no longer continue. In spite of significant reversals, the "trend towards world unity" can "scarcely be denied." World unity appears to be "the limit toward which the process of world history seems to tend."<ref>Quincy Wright, ''A Study of War'', (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p 92-93, 228, 234.</ref>

The same "interplanetary" motif is present also in the [[The Anatomy of Peace|Anatomy of Peace]]: The era of outward expansion is forever closed. "Until and unless we are able to communicate with another planet, the theater of human history will be limited to geographically determined, constant and known dimensions." The historic trend of expansion will result in direct collision between the remaining powers. Multiplied by modern technology, the centripetal forces will accomplish what the greatest empires of the past failed. "For the first time in human history, one power can conquer and rule the world."<ref name="auto1"/>

The "Father of American Anthropology," [[Franz Boas]], known for his [[historical particularism]] and [[cultural relativism]], outlined the "inexorable laws of history" by which political units grow larger in size and smaller in number. The process began in the earliest times and has continued almost always in the same direction. In the long run, the tendency to unification has been more powerful than of disintegration. "Thus the history of mankind shows us the grand spectacle of the grouping of man in units of ever increasing size." The progress in the direction of unification has been so regular and so marked that we must needs conclude that the same tendencies will govern our history in the future. Today the unity of the world is not less conceivable than the modern nations were in the early history. The practical difficulties that stand in the way of the formation of still larger units count for nothing before the "inexorable laws of history."<ref>Boas, Franz, (posthumous publication). ''Race and Democratic Society'', (New York: Biblo ad Tannen, 1969), pp 99-100.</ref>

Seven later scholars—[[Hornell Hart]],<ref>"The Logistic Growth of Political Areas," ''Social Forces'', 26, (1948): p 396-408.</ref> [[Raoul Naroll]],<ref>"Imperial Cycles and World Order," ''Peace Research Society'', 7, (1967): p 83-101.</ref> Louis Morano,<ref>"A Macrohistoric Trend towards World Government", ''Behavior Science Notes'', 8, (1973): p 35-40.</ref> [[Rein Taagepera]],<ref>Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). ''More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes''. (Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|978-1-009-42782-1}}).</ref><ref>"Expansion and Contraction Patterns of Large Polities: Context for Russia." ''International Studies Quarterly'', 41/3, (1997): 475–504.</ref> the author of the circumscription theory [[Robert Carneiro]]<ref>"Political Expansion as an Expression of the Principle of Competitive Exclusion", ''Studying War: Anthropological Perspective'', (eds. Reyna, Stephen P. & Dawns, Richard Erskine, Gordon and Breach, New Hampshire, 1994).</ref><ref>"The Political Unification of the World", ''Cross Cultural Survey'', 38/2, (2004), p 162-177.</ref> and [[Jesse H. Ausubel]] & Cesare Marchetti<ref>Marchetti, Cesare, & Ausubel, Jesse H. (2013). "Quantitative dynamics of human empires," p 2, 49, https://phe.rockefeller.edu/docs/empires_booklet.pdf
Adapted from idem (2012). ''International Journal of Anthropology'', vol 27 (1–2): p 1–62</ref>—[[Quantitative research|quantitatively researched]] expanding imperial cycles. Initially, the imperiometric scholars worked with historical atlases<ref name="ReferenceA">Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). ''More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes''. (Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|978-1-009-42782-1}}), p 65.</ref> but the advent of YouTube created a more dynamic visualization.<ref>Bye, Ollie (2017). "The history of the world: Every year," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-6Wu0Q7x5D0</ref><ref>Brilliant Maps (2025). "The entire history of the world every year in just 60 seconds," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l7ouIIRdaak</ref> Later spot-checks with ''Wikipedia'' showed few disagreements.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> All seven scholars concluded that imperial cycles represent an historical trend leading to world empire. Naroll and Carneiro found this outcome "close at hand," c. 2200 and 2300 respectively. In 2013, Marchetti and Ausubel estimated that the global empire is to rise within "a couple more generations."<ref>Marchetti, Cesare & Ausubel, Jesse H. (2013). "Quantitative dynamics of human empires," p 2, https://phe.rockefeller.edu/docs/empires_booklet.pdf Adapted from idem (2012). ''International Journal of Anthropology'', vol 27 (1–2): p 1–62.</ref> These predictions surprised their many contemporaries, as the 20th century has seen falls of empires, decolonization, and increase in the number of independent states. Nevertheless, the authors explained, when viewed within the millennial context, this recent reversal appears akin to random fluctuation. Since the dawn of history, the total number of separate polities has been reduced from thousands of tribes and states to about 200 and the number was even less in recent history.<ref>Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). ''More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes''. (Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|978-1-009-42782-1}}), p 227.</ref> None of the authors is [[Historical determinism|determinist]]: "The future is not obliged to continue past trends; it just often does..."<ref>Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). ''More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes''. (Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|978-1-009-42782-1}}), p 2, 67.</ref>

The reversal of the trend in 20th century those scholars stated, according to Max Ostrovsky, does not exist. Instead, the 20th century is the point when the historical atlases they worked with reverse their approach and begin painting every nominal sovereignty in different color. They had not done so for the earlier history. Most imperial provinces in history were nominally independent<ref>[[Adam Watson|Watson, Adam]] (1992). ''The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis''. (London: Routledge), pp. 122–125, 131–132, 324.</ref><ref name="hnn.us"/> but historical atlases paint them all in the color of their metropole. Since the 20th century, however, political maps begin painting every Vatican, Monaco and Tuvalu in different color. None of the seven mentioned imperiometric scholars counted the sphere under the Monroe Doctrine, for example, or the sphere after the Monroe Doctrine was extended to Eurasia, named Truman Doctrine, and "globalized."<ref>Whitaker, Arthur P. (1954). ''The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline''. (New York: Cornell University Press), pp. 175-176.</ref><ref>[[Anatol Lieven|Lieven, Anatol]] (2004). "America right or wrong: An anatomy of American nationalism." ''The Geopolitics Reader''. (Eds. O’Tauthail, Gearoid, & Dalby, Simon. London & New York: Routledge), pp. 171-172.</ref> To preserve the consistent approach, Ostrovsky says, in the 20th century we should switch from historical atlases to the [[Unified Combatant Command#List of combatant commands|map of the Unified Combatant Command]].<ref>Ostrovsky, Max (2006). ''The Hyperbola of the World Order''. (Lanham: University Press of America), p. 205.</ref><ref>Ostrovsky, Max (2018). ''Military Globalization: Geography, Strategy, Weaponry''. (New York: Edwin Mellen Press), pp. 241-252. https://archive.org/details/military-globalization/page/241/mode/2up?view=theater</ref>

Though unnoted by contemporary imperiometric scholars, the phenomenon reflected in the latter map was envisaged by the founder of the [[Paneuropean Union]], [[Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi]] yet in 1943, when he drew a specific and immediate future imperial project: After the War America is bound "to take over the command of the skies." The danger of "the utter annihilation of all enemy towns and lands" can "only be prevented by the air superiority of a single power ... America's air role is the only alternative to intercontinental wars." Despite his outstanding anti-imperialism, Coudenhove-Kalergi detailed:
{{Blockquote|
No imperialism, but technical and strategic problems of security urge America to rule the skies of the globe, just as Britain during the last century ruled the seas of the world... Pacifists and anti-imperialists will be shocked by this logic. They will try to find an escape. But they will try in vain... At the end of the war the crushing superiority of American plane production will be an established fact... The solution of the problem ... is by no means ideal, nor even satisfactory. But it is the minor evil...<ref>{{Cite book |author-link=Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi |first=Richard |last=von Coudenhove-Kalergi | title=Crusade for Pan-Europe |publisher=G. P. Putnam's Sons |date=1943 |pages=297–298}}</ref>}}
Coudenhove-Kalergi envisaged a kind of [[Pax Americana]] modeled on "Pax Romana":
{{Blockquote|
During the third century BC the Mediterranean world was divided on five great powers—Roma and Carthage, Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt. The balance of power led to a series of wars until Rome emerged the queen of the Mediterranean and established an incomparable era of two centuries of peace and progress, the 'Pax Romana'...&nbsp;It may be that America's air power could again assure our world, now much smaller than the Mediterranean at that period, two hundred years of peace...{{Sfn|von Coudenhove-Kalergi|1943|page=299}}}}
This period would be necessary transitory stage before [[World State]] is eventually established, though he did not specify how the last transformation is expected to occur. Coudenhove-Kalergi's follower in the teleological theory of World State, Toynbee, specified two ways. One is by wars going on to a bitter end at which one surviving great power "knocks out" its last remaining competitor and establishes world empire, like the earlier empires used to on the regional scale. The other alternative is the United Nations. Having devoted his life to the study of history and international affairs, Toynbee did not bet on the United Nations. Instead, he identified symptoms of the traditional power politics leading to the world empire by a universal conquest.<ref name="archive.org"/>

Toynbee emphasized that the world is ripe for conquest: "...Hitler's eventual failure to impose peace on the world by the force of arms was due, not to any flaw in his thesis that the world was ripe for conquest, but to an accidental combination of incidental errors in his measures..." But "in falling by so narrow a margin to win the prize of world-dominion for himself, Hitler had left the prize dangling within the reach of any successor capable of pursuing the same aims of world-conquest with a little more patience, prudence, and tact." With his "revolution of destruction," Hitler has performed the "yeoman service" for "some future architect of a ''Pax Ecumenica''...&nbsp;For a post-Hitlerian empire-builder, Hitler's derelict legacy was a gift of the Gods."<ref>{{Cite book |author-link=Arnold J. Toynbee |first=Arnold J. |last=Toynbee |title=[[A Study of History]] |location=London |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |date=1954 |volume=IX: Contacts between Civilizations in Time (Renaissances); Law and Freedom in History; The Prospects of the Western Civilization |page=502}}</ref>

The next "architect of a Pax Ecumenica," known more commonly as [[Pax Americana]], demonstrated "more patience, prudence, and tact." Consequently, as President [[Dwight Eisenhower]] put it, the NATO allies became "almost psychopathic" whenever anyone talked about a US withdrawal, and the reception of his successor [[John F. Kennedy]] in Berlin was "almost hysterical," as Chancellor [[Konrad Adenauer]] characterized it.<ref>{{Cite book |first=Marc |last=Trachtenberg |author-link=Marc Trachtenberg |title=A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 |location=Princeton, New Jersey |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |date=1999 |pages=152–153, 394}}</ref> [[John Ikenberry]] finds that the Europeans wanted a stronger, more formal and more imperial system than the United States was initially willing to provide. In the end the United States settled for this "form of empire—a Pax Americana with formal commitments to Europe."<ref>{{Cite journal |first=John G. |last=Ikenberry |author-link=John Ikenberry |title=Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony |journal=[[Political Science Quarterly]] |volume=104 |issue=3 |date=1989 |page=399|doi=10.2307/2151270 |jstor=2151270 }}</ref> According to a much debated thesis, the United States became "empire by invitation."<ref>{{Cite journal |first=Geir |last=Lundestad |author-link=Geir Lundestad |title=Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952 |journal=[[Journal of Peace Research]] |volume=23 |issue=3 |date=1986 |pages=263–267|doi=10.1177/002234338602300305 |s2cid=73345898 }}</ref> The period discussed in the thesis (1945–1952) ended precisely the year Toynbee theorized on "some future architect of a Pax Ecumenica."

Dissociating America from Rome, Eisenhower gave a pessimistic forecast. In 1951, before he became president, he had written on West Europe: "We cannot be a modern Rome guarding the far frontiers with our legions if for no other reason than that these are not, politically, our frontiers. What we must do is to assist these [West European] peoples." Two years later, he wrote: When it was decided to deploy US divisions to Europe, no one had "for an instant" thought that they would remain there for "several decades"—that the United States could "build a sort of Roman Wall with its own troops and so protect the world."{{Sfn|Trachtenberg|1999|pages=147-148}}

Eisenhower assured [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Soviet first secretary]] [[Nikita Khrushchev]] on Berlin in 1959: "Clearly we did not contemplate 50 years in occupation there." It lasted, remarks [[Marc Trachtenberg]], from July 1945 to September 1994, 10 months short of 50 years.{{Sfn|Trachtenberg|1999|page=401}} Notably, when the US troops eventually left, they left eastward. Confirming the theory of the "empire by invitation," with their first opportunity East European states extended the "invitation."<ref>{{Cite book |first=Geir |last=Lundestad |author-link=Geir Lundestad |title=The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From 'Empire' by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |date=2005 |page=3}}</ref>

[[Oswald Spengler]] envisaged the "Imperial Age" for the world in both senses of "empire," spatial (as a world-wide unit ruled by one center) and governmental (as ruled by Emperor). Published in 1922, ''[[The Decline of the West]]'' predicts the triumph of the strongest race in the fight for the whole world within "two generations" and of "Caesarism" over democracy "within a century."<ref>Spengler, Oswald (1922). ''The Decline of the West: Perspectives on World-History'', (tr. Atkinson, Charles Francis, (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD), vol II, p 416, 428-432, 464-465, 506-507, https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.264078/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> In 2022, the Spenglerian century ended short of global "Caesarism," albeit two years before its end [[Donald Trump]] had been advised to [[Crossing the Rubicon|cross the Rubicon]].<ref>Lemon, Jason, (December 20, 2020). "Arizona GOP Chair calls for Trump to 'cross the Rubicon' in tweet shared by Michael Flynn," ''Newsweek'', https://www.newsweek.com/arizona-gop-chair-calls-trump-cross-rubicon-tweet-shared-michael-flynn-1556232</ref>

Chalmers Johnson regards the global military reach of the United States as empire in its "initial" form.<ref>''The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic'', (New York: Henry Hobt and Company, 2004), p 187.</ref> For Charles H. Fairbanks, it is an empire "in formation"<ref>Eakin, Emily (31 March 2002). “All roads led to D. C.” ''New York Times'', https://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/31/weekinreview/ideas-trends-all-roads-lead-to-dc.html</ref> and for [[Kimberly Kagan]] an "emerging" empire.<ref>Kagan, Kimberly et al (2010). ''The Imperial Moment''. (Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), p 6, 174.</ref> [[Dimitri Simes]] finds that most of the world sees the United States as a "nascent" imperial power.<ref>{{Cite journal |first=Dimitri |last=Simes |author-link=Dimitri Simes |title=America's Imperial Dilemma |journal=[[Foreign Affairs]] |volume=82 |issue=6 |date=2003 |pages=91–102 |doi=10.2307/20033759 |jstor=20033759 }}</ref> Some scholars concerned how this empire would look in its ultimate form. The ultimate form of empire was described by Michael Doyle in his ''Empires''. It is empire in which its two main components—the ruling core and the ruled periphery—merged to form one integrated whole. At this stage the ''empire'' as defined ceases to exist and becomes ''world state''. Doyle exemplifies the transformation on the case of the Roman Emperor [[Caracalla]] whose [[Constitutio Antoniniana|edict in AD 212]] extended the Roman citizenship to all inhabitants of the Mediterranean world.<ref>{{Cite book |first=Michael |last=Doyle |title=Empires |location=London |publisher=[[Cornell University Press]] |date=1986 |page=12}}</ref>

Doyle's case of the Roman Empire had also been evoked by [[Susan Strange]] in her 1988 article, "The Future of the American Empire." Strange emphasized that the most persistent empires were those which best managed to integrate the ruling core and the peripheral allies. The article is partly a reply on the published a year earlier bestseller ''[[The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers]]'' which predicted imminent US "imperial overstretch." Strange found this outcome unlikely, stressing the fact that the peripheral allies have been successfully recruited into the American Empire.<ref>{{Cite journal |first=Susan |last=Strange |title=The Future of the American Empire |journal=[[Journal of International Affairs]] |volume=42 |issue=1 |date=1988 |pages=9, 11}}</ref>

Envisaging a world empire of either the United States or the Soviet Union (whoever is victorious in World War III), [[Bertrand Russell]] projected the Roman scenario too: "Like the Romans, they will, in the course of time, extend citizenship to the vanquished. There will then be a true world state, and it will be possible to forget that it will have owed its origin to conquest."<ref>{{Cite magazine |first=Bertrand |last=Russell |author-link=Bertrand Russell |title=The Future of Man |magazine=[[Atlantic Monthly]] |date=April 1951 |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1951/03/the-future-of-man/305193}}</ref> International Relations scholar [[Alexander Wendt]] supposes world empire by universal conquest and subsequent consolidation, provided the conquering power recognizes all conquered members. For his example he also invokes the Roman Empire.<ref>Wendt, Alexander, (2003). "Why the World State is Inevitable: Teleology and the Logic of Anarchy," ''European Journal of International Relations''. 9 (4): pp 54–56, https://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/03wendt.pdf</ref><ref>Wendt, Alexander (2005). "Agency, Teleology and the World State: A Reply to Shannon". ''European Journal of International Relations''. 11 (4): p 595.</ref> In satirical criticism of the European pro-American stance in the wake of September 11, French Philosopher [[Régis Debray]] warned that the logical culmination of the motto "We are all Americans" would be a modernized Edict of Caracalla extending US citizenship to all the West and thus establishing the [[United States of the West]].<ref>In French, Debray, Régis (2002). ''L'édit de Caracalla ou plaidoyer pour des Etats-Unis d'occident'', (Paris: Fayard), p 40, 64, https://archive.org/details/leditdecaracalla0000xavi/page/40/mode/2up?view=theater</ref>

In the above views, the [[Constitutio Antoniniana|Edict of Caracalla]] is an advanced form of empire. [[Emmanuel Todd]] and [[Magdi Allam]] disregarded this nuance and compared the Edict with the US citizenship policy in the early 21st century. Todd found the US policy of this time lagging far behind the Roman under Caracalla while Allam stressed that the United States is also a nation forged by immigrants and already the most successful contemporary expression of multiculturalism the world has seen.<ref>Burton, Paul J. (2013). "Pax Romana/Pax Americana: Views of the "New Rome" from "Old Europe", 2000–2010". ''International Journal of the Classical Tradition''. Vol. 20 (1–2): pp. 31-32.</ref>

To the case of Caracalla, Toynbee added the [[Abbasid Revolution|Abbasid cosmopolitan reformation]] of 750 AD. Both "were good auguries for the prospect that, in a post-Modern chapter of Western history, a supranational commonwealth originally based on the hegemony of a paramount power over its satellites might eventually be put on the sounder basis of a constitutional partnership in which all the people of all the partner states would have their fare share in the conduct of common affairs."{{Sfn|Toynbee|1954|page=554-555}} To the cases of Caracalla and the Abbasid revolution, Max Ostrovsky added the [[Han dynasty|Han]] overthrow of [[Qin dynasty|Qin]] in 206 BC and more gradual cosmopolitan reformations he finds characteristic to all persistent empires and expects in the future global empire. The tragedy of empire is that it is disastrous for the conquered in the beginning and eventually for the conquerors, as they lose their privileges and often the very identity, becoming assimilated within the conquered population. [[Rein Taagepera]] called it imperial "self-ethnocide."<ref>Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). ''More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes''. (Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|978-1-009-42782-1}}), p 86.</ref> When this distant stage comes to the American Empire, according to Ostrovsky, the [[green card]] is abolished since all Earth inhabitants have it by birth.<ref>Ostrovsky, Max (2007). ''The Hyperbola of the World Order''. (Lanham: University Press of America), p 350, https://archive.org/details/yarctgxhyperbola0000ostr/page/350/mode/2up?view=theater</ref>

[[Crane Brinton]] expected that the world empire would not be built instantly but not as slowly as Rome, for much in the modern world has been speeded up.<ref>Brinton, Crane, (1948). ''From Many, One: The Process of Political Integration, the Problem of World Government'', (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1971), p 95.</ref> [[Charles Galton Darwin]], a grandson of the [[Charles Darwin|father of Evolution Theory]], suggested that China, as an isolated and enduring civilization, seems to provide the most relevant model for the global future. As the Chinese Empire, the regions of the world, periodically albeit more rarely, will be united by force into an uneasy world-empire, which will endure for a period until it falls.<ref>Darwin, Charles Galton, (1950). "The Next Million Years," [https://archive.org/download/fateofman00brin/fateofman00brin.pdf ''The Fate of Man'']. (New York: G. Braziller, 1961), pp 499, 501.</ref> Along China, Ostrovsky mentions Egypt as a model for the future but, by contrast, estimates that the intermediate periods of the global empire will be shorter and rarer.<ref>Ostrovsky 2007: pp 352, 362, 367.</ref>

==See also==
* [[Colonial empire]]
* [[Hegemony]]
* [[Linguistic imperialism]]
* [[Military globalization]]
* [[Nomadic empire]]
* [[World domination]]

=== Lists ===
{{Div col}}
* [[List of empires]]
* [[List of largest empires]]
* [[List of medieval great powers]]
* [[List of former sovereign states]]
* [[List of transcontinental countries]]
* [[List of Hindu empires and dynasties]]
{{Div col end}}

==Notes==
{{notelist}}

== References ==
; Citations
{{Reflist}}

==Cited sources and further reading==
{{refbegin|30em}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Brown |first=Peter |author-link=Peter Brown (historian) |date=24 September 2020 |title=No Barbarians Needed |journal=[[The New York Review of Books]] |volume=LXVII |issue=14 |pages=61–62 |quote=Warlordism, not any great movement of peoples, was the political virus that brought down the [[Western Roman Empire|Roman empire in the West]]. [...] 'In less than a generation, provinces [became] kingdoms.' [Due to Europe's] state of perpetual war [amid] the persistent polycentrism made possible by the disappearance of Rome, [b]y the time of the Reformation the 'competitive fragmentation of power' ensured that Europe was studded with safety zones that protected beleaguered dissidents. [...] The best thing that Rome ever did for Europe was to die and not return.}}, review of {{Cite book |last=Kulikowski |first=Michael |title=The Tragedy of Empire: From Constantine to the Destruction of Roman Italy |author-link=Michael Kulikowski}}; {{Cite book |last=Scheidel |first=Walter |title=Escape from Rome: The Failure of Empire and the Road to Prosperity |author-link=Walter Scheidel}}; {{Cite book |last=Nelson |first=Janet L. |title=King and Emperor: A New Life of Charlemagne |author-link=Janet L. Nelson}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Burbank |first1=Jane |title=Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference |last2=Cooper |first2=Frederick |date=2010 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-12708-8 |location=Princeton |author-link2=Frederick Cooper (historian)}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Cohen |first=Eliot A. |author-link=Eliot A. Cohen |date=July–August 2004 |title=History and the Hyperpower |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2004-07-01/history-and-hyperpower |journal=[[Foreign Affairs]] |volume=83 |issue=4 |pages=49–63 |doi=10.2307/20034046 |jstor=20034046 |access-date=26 December 2017|url-access=subscription }}
* {{Cite book |last=Colomer |first=Josep |title=The European Empire |date=2016 |publisher=Createspace Independent Publishing Platform |isbn=978-1-5233-1890-2 |author-link=Josep Colomer}}
* {{Cite book |last=Colomer |first=Josep |url=http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415437752 |title=Great Empires, Small Nations. The uncertain future of the sovereign state |date=2007 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |location=London |author-link=Josep Colomer}}
* {{Cite book |title=Empires and bureaucracy in world history: from late antiquity to the twentieth century |date=2016 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |editor-last=Crooks |editor-first=Peter |editor-last2=Parsons |editor-first2=Timothy H.}}
* {{Cite book |last=Darwin |first=John |title=After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405 |date=2008 |publisher=Bloomsbury Press |location=London}}
* [[Wendy Doniger|Doniger, Wendy]], "The Rise and Fall of Warhorses" (review of [[David Chaffetz]], ''Raiders, Rulers, and Traders: The Horse and the Rise of Empires'', Norton, 2024, 424 pp.), ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', vol. LXXII, no. 6 (10 April 2025), pp.&nbsp;17–19. "Unlike cows, [[horse]]s, whose teeth are quite dull, pull up grass by the roots rather than biting off the blades, or they nibble it right down to the ground, thus quickly destroying the land, which may require some years to recover.... [H]orses in the wild... range constantly to find new territory... [T]he horse came to symbolize [[conquest]] through its own natural [[imperialism]]. The [[steppe]]s bred [[nomad]]ic horses and nomadic [[Eurasian nomads|horde]]s.... Men waged [[war]] to get other people's horses so that they could wage war. [[Horsepower]]... remained the basic unit of power for centuries.... But the [[horse-breeding]] people of the steppes never succeeded in conquering the part of the world west of the [[Carpathians]] and the [[Alps]], nor [[civilization]]s.... where [[sea power]]... was decisive." (p.&nbsp;17.)  
* {{Cite book |last=Elliott |first=J.H. |title=Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830 |date=2006 |publisher=Yale University Press |location=New Haven}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Findlay |first1=Ronald |title=Power and Plenty: Trade, Power, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium |last2=O'Rourke |first2=Kevin H. |date=2007 |publisher=Princeton University Press |location=Princeton}}
* {{Cite web |last=Galtung |first=Johan |date=January 1996 |title=The Decline and Fall of Empires: A Theory of De-Development |url=http://www.transcend.org/galt.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071013085302/http://transcend.org/galt.htm <!-- Bot retrieved archive --> |archive-date=2007-10-13 |access-date=2008-01-06 |location=Honolulu}} Written for the United Nations Research Institute on Development, UNRISD, Geneva.
* {{Cite book |last=Geiss |first=Imanuel |title=War and Empire in the Twentieth Century |date=1983 |publisher=Aberdeen University Press |isbn=978-0-08-030387-1}}
* {{Cite book |last=Gilpin |first=Robert |title=War and Change in World Politics |year=1981 |isbn=978-0-521-27376-3 |pages=110–116 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |author-link=Robert Gilpin}}
* {{Cite book |last=Howe |first=Stephen |title=Empire: A Very Short Introduction |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2002 |isbn=978-0-19-280223-1}}
* {{Cite book |last=Innis |first=Harold |title=Empire and Communications |date=1950 |publisher=University of Toronto Press |edition=1972 revision |location=[[Toronto, Ontario]]}}, Rev. by Mary Q. Innis; foreword by Marshall McLuhan.
* {{Cite book |last1=James |first1=Paul |url=https://www.academia.edu/3587722 |title=Globalization and Violence |last2=Nairn |first2=Tom |publisher=Sage Publications |year=2006 |volume=1: Globalizing Empires, Old and New |location=London |author-link=Paul James (academic)}}
* {{cite journal |last=Khan |first= Iqtidar Alam |title=Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case |journal=Social Scientist |volume=33 |number=3/4 |date=March–April 2005 |pages=54–65 |jstor=3518112}}
* {{Cite book |last=Kamen |first=Henry |title=Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492–1763 |date=2003 |publisher=HarperCollins |location=New York}}
* {{Cite book |last=Kennedy |first=Paul |title=The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 |publisher=Random House 1987 |location=New York}}
* {{Cite book |last=Kumar |first=Krishan |title=Visions of empire: How five imperial regimes shaped the world |date=2019 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-19280-2}}, examines the Roman, Ottoman, Habsburg, Russian, British and French empires.
* {{Cite book |last1=Lens |first1=Sidney |title=The Forging of the American Empire: From the Revolution to Vietnam: A History of American Imperialism |last2=Zinn |first2=Howard |publisher=[[Pluto Press]] |year=2003 |isbn=978-0-7453-2100-4 |page=464}}
* {{Cite book |last=Pagden |first=Anthony |title=Peoples and Empires: A Short History of European Migration, Exploration, and Conquest from Greece to the Present |date=2001 |publisher=Modern Library |location=New York}}
* {{Cite encyclopedia |editor-first=Peter |editor-last=Stearns |title=The Encyclopedia of World History: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern, Chronologically Arranged |edition=6th |date=2001 |isbn=978-0-395-65237-4 |page=passim|publisher=Houghton Mifflin }}
* {{Cite book |last=Subrahmanyam |first=Sanjay |title=The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500–1700 |date=1993 |publisher=Longman |location=London}}
* {{Cite book |title=The Rise of Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade, 1350–1750 |date=1990 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |editor-last=Tracy |editor-first=James D. |location=New York}}
{{refend}}

== External links ==
{{Sister project links|d=Q48349|n=no|b=no|voy=no|v=no|s=yes|species=no|m=no|mw=no|wikt=empire}}
* {{cite EB9 |wstitle= Empire |volume= VIII |last= Bryce |first= James |author-link= James Bryce, 1st Viscount Bryce |pages=181-182 |short=1}}
* [http://www.worldstatesmen.org/COLONIES.html Index of Colonies and Possessions]

{{Empires|state=expanded}}
{{Autonomous types of first-tier administration|state=collapsed}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Empires| ]]
[[Category:Articles which contain graphical timelines]]
[[Category:Constitutional state types]]
[[Category:Monarchy]]