View source for Fatalism

{{Short description|Philosophical doctrine on the subjugation of all events to fate}}
{{Distinguish|Determinism|Predeterminism|Predictability|Theological determinism}}
{{Expand German|Fatalismus|date=July 2021}} 
{{Use dmy dates|date=February 2016}}
[[File:Thomas C. Gotch - Destiny - Google Art Project.jpg|thumb|right|''Destiny'', painting by [[Thomas Cooper Gotch|T. C. Gotch]] (1885–1886), [[Adelaide]], [[Art Gallery of South Australia]]]]

'''Fatalism''' is a [[belief]]<ref name="Iran. J. Public Health">{{cite journal |last1=Durmaz |first1=H. |last2=Çapik |first2=C. |date=March 2023 |title=Are Health Fatalism and Styles of Coping with Stress Affected by Poverty? A Field Study |journal=[[Iranian Journal of Public Health]] |publisher=[[Tehran University of Medical Sciences]] |volume=52 |issue=3 |pages=575–583 |doi=10.18502/ijph.v52i3.12140 |issn=2251-6093 |pmc=10135518 |pmid=37124894 |s2cid=257501917 |quote=Fatalism is the belief that everything an individual may encounter in his life is determined against his will and that this destiny cannot be changed by effort. In a fatalistic attitude, individuals believe that they cannot control their lives and that there is no point in making choices. Fatalism is a response to overwhelming threats that seem uncontrollable.}}</ref> and [[Philosophy|philosophical doctrine]]<ref name="SEP">{{cite encyclopedia |author-last=Rice |author-first=Hugh |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/fatalism/ |title=Fatalism |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |editor-link=Edward N. Zalta |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |date=Winter 2018 |publisher=[[Center for the Study of Language and Information]] |location=[[Stanford University]] |access-date=5 April 2020}}</ref><ref name="Solomon 2003">{{cite journal |title=On Fate and Fatalism |author-last=Solomon |author-first=Robert C. |author-link=Robert C. Solomon |date=October 2003 |journal=[[Philosophy East and West]] |publisher=[[University of Hawaii Press]] |volume=53 |issue=4 |pages=435–454 |doi=10.1353/pew.2003.0047 |jstor=1399977 |s2cid=170753493}}</ref> which considers the entire universe as a [[Deterministic system (philosophy)|deterministic system]] and stresses the subjugation of all events, actions, and behaviors to [[fate]] or [[destiny]], which is commonly associated with the consequent attitude of resignation in the face of future events which are thought to be inevitable and outside of human control.<ref name="Iran. J. Public Health"/><ref name="SEP"/><ref name="Solomon 2003"/><ref name="Stambaugh 1994"/>

==Definition==
The term "fatalism" can refer to any of the following ideas:
* Broadly, any view according to which [[human being]]s are powerless to do anything other than what they actually do.<ref name="Iran. J. Public Health"/><ref name="SEP"/><ref name="Solomon 2003"/><ref name="Stambaugh 1994"/> Included in this is the belief that all events are decided by fate and are outside human control, hence humans have no power to influence the future or indeed the outcome of their own thoughts and actions.<ref name="Iran. J. Public Health"/><ref name="Solomon 2003"/><ref name="Stambaugh 1994"/><ref name="Taylor 1962">{{cite journal |title=Fatalism |author-last=Taylor |author-first=Richard |author-link=Richard Clyde Taylor |date=January 1962 |journal=[[The Philosophical Review]] |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] on behalf of the Sage School of Philosophy at [[Cornell University]] |volume=71 |issue=1 |pages=56–66 |doi=10.2307/2183681 |issn=1558-1470 |jstor=2183681}}</ref>
More specifically:
* Theological fatalism, according to which [[free will]] is incompatible with the existence of an [[Omniscience|omniscient]] [[God]] who has foreknowledge of all future events.<ref name="SEP2">{{cite web |last1=Zagzebski |first1=Linda |title=Foreknowledge and Free Will |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/ |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=7 June 2020}}</ref> This is very similar to [[theological determinism]].{{efn|For further informations, see the article on [[predeterminism]].}}
* Logical fatalism, according to which propositions about the future which we take to currently be either [[true or false]] can only be true or false if future events are [[Predeterminism|already determined]].<ref name="SEP"/>
* [[Causal determinism]], which is usually treated as distinct from fatalism, on the grounds that it requires only the determination of each ''successive'' state in a system by that system's prior state, rather than the ''final'' state of a system being [[Predeterminism|predetermined]].<ref name="SEP"/>
* The view that the appropriate reaction to the inevitability of some future event is acceptance or resignation, rather than resistance. For instance, 19th-century German philosopher [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] discusses what he calls "Turkish fatalism" (''Türkenfatalismus'') in his essay ''[[The Wanderer and His Shadow]]'' (1880),<ref name="Stambaugh 1994">{{cite book |author-last=Stambaugh |author-first=Joan |author-link=Joan Stambaugh |year=1994 |chapter=''Amor dei'' and ''Amor fati'': Spinoza and Nietzsche |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qytXzUMTEfQC&pg=PA79 |title=The Other Nietzsche |publisher=[[SUNY Press]] |pages=79–81 |isbn=9781438420929 |quote=Turkish fatalism contains the fundamental error of placing man and fate opposite each other like two separate things: Man, it says, can strive against fate, can try to defeat it, but in the end it always remains the winner, for which reason the smartest thing to do is to give up or live just any way at all. The truth is that every man himself is a piece of fate; when he thinks he is striving against fate in the way described, fate is being realized here, too; the struggle is imaginary, but so is resignation to fate; all these imaginary ideas are included in fate. The fear that most people have of the doctrine of determinism of the will is precisely the fear of this Turkish fatalism. They think man will give up weakly and stand before the future with folded hands because he cannot change anything about it; or else he will give free rein to his total caprice because even this cannot make what is once determined still worse. The follies of man are just as much a part of fate as his cleverness: this fear of the belief in fate is also fate. You yourself, poor frightened man, are the invincible Moira reigning far above the gods; for everything that comes, you are blessing or curse and in any case the bonds in which the strongest man lies. In you the whole future of the human world is predetermined; it will not help you if you are terrified of yourself.}}</ref> where he makes no distinction between the terms "fate" and "fatalism".<ref name="Stambaugh 1994"/> This view is closer to everyday use of the word "fatalism" and parallels [[defeatism]].<ref name="Iran. J. Public Health"/><ref name="Stambaugh 1994"/>

==Religion==
Throughout history, the [[belief]] that the entire [[universe]] is a [[Deterministic system (philosophy)|deterministic system]] subject to the will of [[fate]] or [[destiny]] has been articulated in both [[Eastern religions|Eastern]] and [[Western religions|Western]] religions, philosophy, music, and literature.<ref name="Iran. J. Public Health"/><ref name="SEP"/><ref name="Solomon 2003"/><ref name="Stambaugh 1994"/><ref name="Taylor 1962"/>

The ancient Arabs that inhabited the [[Arabian Peninsula]] [[Pre-Islamic Arabia|before the advent of Islam]] used to profess a widespread belief in fatalism (''ḳadar'') alongside a fearful consideration for [[Astral religion|the sky and the stars as divine beings]], which they held to be ultimately responsible for every phenomenon that occurs on Earth and for the destiny of humankind.<ref name="Al-Abbasi 2020">{{cite journal |last=al-Abbasi |first=Abeer Abdullah |date=August 2020 |title=The Arabsʾ Visions of the Upper Realm |url=https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/ep/0004/article/view/8301/8105 |journal=[[Marburg Journal of Religion]] |publisher=[[University of Marburg]] |volume=22 |issue=2 |pages=1–28 |doi=10.17192/mjr.2020.22.8301 |issn=1612-2941 |access-date=23 May 2022}}</ref> Accordingly, they shaped their entire lives in accordance with their [[Astrology|interpretations of astral configurations and phenomena]].<ref name="Al-Abbasi 2020"/>

In the ''[[I Ching]]'' and [[philosophical Taoism]], the ebb and flow of favorable and unfavorable conditions suggests the path of least resistance is effortless (''see'': [[Wu wei]]). In the [[Indian philosophy|philosophical schools of the Indian Subcontinent]], the concept of ''[[karma]]'' deals with similar philosophical issues to the Western concept of determinism. Karma is understood as a spiritual mechanism which causes the [[Saṃsāra|eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth]] (''saṃsāra'').<ref name="Bodewitz 2019">{{cite book |author-last=Bodewitz |author-first=Henk |year=2019 |chapter=Chapter 1 – The Hindu Doctrine of Transmigration: Its Origin and Background |editor1-last=Heilijgers |editor1-first=Dory H. |editor2-last=Houben |editor2-first=Jan E. M. |editor3-last=van Kooij |editor3-first=Karel |title=Vedic Cosmology and Ethics: Selected Studies |location=[[Leiden]] and [[Boston]] |publisher=[[Brill Publishers]] |series=Gonda Indological Studies |volume=19 |doi=10.1163/9789004400139_002 |doi-access=free |pages=3–19 |isbn=978-90-04-40013-9 |issn=1382-3442}}</ref> Karma, either positive or negative, accumulates according to an individual's actions throughout their life, and at their death determines the nature of their next life in the cycle of Saṃsāra.<ref name="Bodewitz 2019"/> Most [[Indian religions|major religions originating in India]] hold this belief to some degree, most notably [[Hinduism]],<ref name="Bodewitz 2019"/> [[Jainism]], [[Sikhism]], and [[Buddhism]].

The views on the interaction of karma and free will are numerous, and diverge from each other greatly. For example, in [[Sikhism#Liberation|Sikhism]], god's grace, gained through worship, can erase one's karmic debts, a belief which reconciles the principle of karma with a monotheistic god one must freely choose to worship.<ref>House, H. Wayne. 1991. "Resurrection, Reincarnation, and Humanness." ''[[Bibliotheca Sacra]]'' 148(590). Retrieved 29 November 2013.</ref> [[Karma in Jainism#Material theory|Jainists]] believe in a sort of [[compatibilism]], in which the cycle of Saṃsara is a completely mechanistic process, occurring without any divine intervention. The Jains hold an atomic view of reality, in which particles of karma form the fundamental microscopic building material of the universe.

===Ājīvika===
In [[ancient India]], the [[Ājīvika]] school of philosophy founded by [[Makkhali Gosala|Makkhali Gosāla]] (around 500 BCE), otherwise referred to as "Ājīvikism" in [[Indology|Western scholarship]],<ref name="Balcerowicz">{{cite book |last=Balcerowicz |first=Piotr |year=2016 |chapter=Determinism, Ājīvikas, and Jainism |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nfOPCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA136 |title=Early Asceticism in India: Ājīvikism and Jainism |location=[[London]] and [[New York City|New York]] |publisher=[[Routledge]] |edition=1st |series=Routledge Advances in Jaina Studies |pages=136–174 |isbn=9781317538530 |quote=The Ājīvikas' doctrinal signature was indubitably the idea of [[determinism]] and [[fate]], which traditionally incorporated four elements: the doctrine of destiny (''niyati-vāda''), the doctrine of predetermined concurrence of factors (''saṅgati-vāda''), the doctrine of intrinsic nature (''svabhāva-vāda''), occasionally also linked to [[Charvaka|materialists]], and the doctrine of fate (''daiva-vāda''), or simply fatalism. The Ājīvikas' emphasis on fate and determinism was so profound that later sources would consistently refer to them as ''niyati-vādins'', or ‘the propounders of the doctrine of destiny’.}}</ref> upheld the ''Niyati'' ("[[Fate]]") doctrine of absolute fatalism or [[determinism]],<ref name="Balcerowicz"/><ref name="Leaman 1999">{{cite book |editor-last=Leaman |editor-first=Oliver |editor-link=Oliver Leaman |year=1999 |chapter=Fatalism |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_4crBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA80 |title=Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy |location=[[London]] and [[New York City|New York]] |publisher=[[Routledge]] |edition=1st |series=Routledge Key Guides |pages=80–81 |isbn=9780415173636 |quote='''Fatalism.''' Some of the teachings of [[Indian philosophy]] are fatalistic. For example, the Ajivika school argued that fate (''nyati'') governs both the [[Saṃsāra|cycle of birth and rebirth]], and also individual lives. Suffering is not attributed to past actions, but just takes place without any cause or rationale, as does relief from suffering. There is nothing we can do to achieve '''''[[moksha]]''''', we just have to hope that all will go well with us. [...] But the Ajivikas were committed to '''[[asceticism]]''', and they justified this in terms of its practice being just as determined by fate as anything else.}}</ref><ref name="Basham 1981">{{cite book |author-last=Basham |author-first=Arthur L. |author-link=Arthur Llewellyn Basham |year=1981 |orig-date=1951 |chapter=Chapter XII: Niyati |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BiGQzc5lRGYC&pg=PA224 |title=History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas, a Vanished Indian Religion |location=[[Delhi]] |publisher=[[Motilal Banarsidass]] |edition=1st |series=Lala L. S. Jain Series |pages=224–238 |isbn=9788120812048 |oclc=633493794 |quote=The fundamental principle of Ājīvika philosophy was Fate, usually called ''Niyati''. [[Buddhist texts|Buddhist]] and [[Jain literature|Jaina]] sources agree that [[Makkhali Gosala|Gosāla]] was a rigid determinist, who exalted ''Niyati'' to the status of the motive factor of the universe and the sole agent of all phenomenal change. This is quite clear in our ''locus classicus'', the ''[[Samaññaphala Sutta]]''. Sin and suffering, attributed by [[Āstika and nāstika|other sects]] to the laws of ''[[karma]]'', the result of evil committed in the previous lives or in the present one, were declared by Gosāla to be without cause or basis, other, presumably, than the force of destiny. Similarly, the escape from evil, the working off of accumulated evil ''karma'', was likewise without cause or basis.}}</ref> which negates the existence of [[free will]] and ''[[karma]]'', and is therefore considered one of the [[Āstika and nāstika|''nāstika'']] or "heterodox" schools of [[Indian philosophy]].<ref name="Balcerowicz"/><ref name="Leaman 1999"/><ref name="Basham 1981"/> The oldest descriptions of the Ājīvika fatalists and their founder Gosāla can be found both in the [[Buddhist texts|Buddhist]] and [[Jain literature|Jaina]] scriptures of ancient India.<ref name="Balcerowicz"/><ref name="Basham 1981"/> The predetermined fate of all sentient beings and the impossibility to achieve [[Moksha|liberation]] (''mokṣa'') from the [[Saṃsāra|eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth]] (''saṃsāra'') was the major distinctive philosophical and [[Metaphysics|metaphysical doctrine]] of this heterodox school of Indian philosophy,<ref name="Balcerowicz"/><ref name="Leaman 1999"/><ref name="Basham 1981"/> annoverated among the other ''[[Śramaṇa]]'' movements that emerged in India during the [[History of India#Second urbanisation (c. 600 – 200 BCE)|Second urbanization]] (600–200 BCE).<ref name="Balcerowicz"/>

===Buddhism===
{{Buddhist Philosophy sidebar}}
{{Main|Enlightenment in Buddhism|Two truths doctrine}}
{{Further|Four stages of enlightenment|Sotāpanna|Three marks of existence}}

[[Buddhist philosophy]] contains several concepts which some scholars describe as deterministic to various levels. However, the direct analysis of Buddhist metaphysics through the lens of determinism is difficult, due to the differences between European and Buddhist traditions of thought.<ref name="Garfield 2014">{{cite book |author-last=Garfield |author-first=Jay L. |year=2014 |editor2-first=Edwin F. |chapter=Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency, and Ethics for Mādhyamikas |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ru0VDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA172 |editor1-last=Dasti |editor1-first=Matthew R. |editor2-last=Bryant |title=Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy |location=Oxford and New York |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |pages=172–185 |doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199922734.003.0008 |isbn=9780199395675 |lccn=2013017925}}</ref>

One concept which is argued to support a hard determinism is the doctrine of [[Pratītyasamutpāda|dependent origination]] (''pratītyasamutpāda'') in the [[early Buddhist texts]], which states that all [[Dharma|phenomena]] (''dharma'') are necessarily caused by some other phenomenon, which it can be said to be ''dependent'' on, like links in a massive, never-ending chain; the basic principle is that all things (dharmas, phenomena, principles) arise in dependence upon other things, which means that they are [[Śūnyatā|fundamentally "empty" or devoid of any intrinsic, eternal essence]] and therefore [[Impermanence (Buddhism)|are impermanent]].<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Stanford 2022">{{cite encyclopedia |last=Thakchoe |first=Sonam |date=Summer 2022 |title=The Theory of Two Truths in Tibet |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-tibet/ |url-status=live |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |editor-link=Edward N. Zalta |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=The Metaphysics Research Lab, [[Center for the Study of Language and Information]], [[Stanford University]] |issn=1095-5054 |oclc=643092515 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220528014845/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-tibet/ |archive-date=28 May 2022 |access-date=5 July 2022}}</ref> In traditional Buddhist philosophy, this concept is used to explain the functioning of the [[Saṃsāra|eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth]] (''saṃsāra''); all thoughts and actions exert a [[Karma|karmic force]] that attaches to the individual's [[consciousness]], which will manifest through [[Rebirth (Buddhism)|reincarnation]] and results in future lives.<ref name="Garfield 2014"/> In other words, righteous or unrighteous actions in one life will necessarily cause good or bad responses in another future life or more lives.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tricycle.org/magazine/dependent-origination/|title=Dependent Origination: The Twelve Links Explained|last=Goldstein|first=Joseph|website=Tricycle: The Buddhist Review|language=en|access-date=2020-01-26}}</ref> The early Buddhist texts and later [[Tibetan Buddhist canon|Tibetan Buddhist scriptures]] associate dependent arising with the fundamental Buddhist doctrines of [[Śūnyatā|emptiness]] (''śūnyatā'') and [[Anatta|non-self]] (''anattā'').<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Stanford 2022"/>

Another Buddhist concept which many scholars perceive to be deterministic is the doctrine of [[Anatta|non-self]] (''anattā'').<ref name="Garfield 2014"/> In Buddhism, [[Enlightenment in Buddhism|attaining enlightenment]] involves one realizing that neither in [[humans]] nor any other [[Sentient beings (Buddhism)|sentient beings]] is there a fundamental core of permanent being, identity, or personality which can be called the "soul", and that all sentient beings (including humans) are instead made of [[Skandha|several, constantly changing factors]] which bind them to the [[Saṃsāra|eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth]] (''saṃsāra'').<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Stanford 2022"/> Sentient beings are composed of the [[Skandha|five aggregates of existence]] (''skandha''): matter, sensation, perception, [[Mental factors (Buddhism)|mental formations]], and consciousness.<ref name="Garfield 2014"/> In the ''[[Saṃyutta Nikāya]]'' of the [[Pali Canon|Pāli Canon]], the [[Gautama Buddha|historical Buddha]] is recorded as saying that "just as the word 'chariot' exists on the basis of the aggregation of parts, even so the concept of 'being' exists when the five aggregates are available."<ref>David Kalupahana, ''Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.'' The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, page 78.</ref> The early Buddhist texts outline different ways in which dependent origination is a middle way between different sets of "extreme" views (such as "[[Monism|monist]]" and "[[Pluralism (philosophy)|pluralist]]" ontologies or [[Materialism|materialist]] and [[Mind–body dualism|dualist]] views of mind-body relation).<ref>Choong, Mun-keat (2000). ''The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism: A Comparative Study Based on the Sutranga Portion of the Pali Samyutta-Nikaya and the Chinese Samyuktagama'', pp. 192-197. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag.</ref> In the ''[[Kaccānagotta Sutta]]'' of the [[Pali Canon|Pāli Canon]] ([[Saṃyutta Nikāya|SN]] 12.15, parallel at [[Āgama (Buddhism)#Saṃyukta Āgama|SA]] 301), the [[Gautama Buddha|historical Buddha]] stated that "this world mostly relies on the dual notions of existence and non-existence" and then explains the right view as follows:<ref name=":34">Choong, Mun-keat (2000). ''The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism: A Comparative Study Based on the Sutranga Portion of the Pali Samyutta-Nikaya and the Chinese Samyuktagama,'' p. 192. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag.</ref>
{{Blockquote|But when you truly see the origin of the world with right understanding, you won't have the notion of non-existence regarding the world. And when you truly see the cessation of the world with right understanding, you won't have the notion of existence regarding the world.<ref name=":35">Kaccānagottasutta SN 12.15 SN ii 16, translated by Bhikkhu Sujato https://suttacentral.net/sn12.15/en/sujato</ref>}}

Some Western scholars argue that the concept of non-self necessarily disproves the ideas of [[free will]] and [[moral responsibility]].<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Repetti 2012"/> If there is no autonomous self, in this view, and all events are necessarily and unchangeably caused by others, then no type of autonomy can be said to exist, moral or otherwise.<ref name="Repetti 2012"/> However, other scholars disagree, claiming that the [[Buddhist cosmology|Buddhist conception of the universe]] allows for a form of [[compatibilism]].<ref name="Garfield 2014"/> Buddhism perceives reality occurring on [[Two truths doctrine|two different levels]]: the [[Nirvana|ultimate reality]], which can only be truly understood by the [[Enlightenment in Buddhism|enlightened ones]], and the [[Maya (religion)#Buddhism|illusory or false reality of the material world]], which is considered to be "real" or "true" by those who are [[Avidyā (Buddhism)|ignorant about the nature of metaphysical reality]]; i.e., those who still haven't achieved enlightenment.<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Stanford 2022"/> Therefore, Buddhism perceives free will as a notion belonging to the [[Three marks of existence|illusory belief in the unchanging self or personhood]] that pertains to the false reality of the material world, while concepts like non-self and dependent origination belong to the ultimate reality; the transition between the two can be truly understood, Buddhists claim, by one who has attained enlightenment.<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Stanford 2022"/><ref name="Repetti 2012">{{cite journal |last=Repetti |first=Ricardo |date=2012 |title=Buddhist Hard Determinism: No Self, No Free Will, No Responsibility |url=http://enlight.lib.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-MAG/mag388415.pdf |journal=Journal of Buddhist Ethics |volume=19 |pages=136–137, 143–145}}</ref>

==Determinism and predeterminism==
While the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, fatalism, [[determinism]], and [[predeterminism]] are distinct, as each emphasizes a different aspect of the futility of human will or the foreordination of destiny. However, all these doctrines share common ground.

''Determinists'' generally agree that human actions affect the future but that human action is itself determined by a causal chain of prior events. Their view does not accentuate a "submission" to fate or destiny, whereas ''fatalists'' stress an acceptance of future events as inevitable. Determinists believe the future is fixed specifically due to [[causality]]; fatalists and predeterminists believe that some or all aspects of the future are inescapable but, for fatalists, not necessarily due to causality.<ref>Hoefer, Carl, "[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/determinism-causal Causal Determinism]", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)</ref>

Fatalism is a looser term than determinism. The presence of historical "indeterminisms" or chances, i.e. events that could not be predicted by sole knowledge of other events, is an idea still compatible with fatalism. Necessity (such as a law of nature) will happen just as inevitably as a chance—both can be imagined as sovereign.<ref name="SEP"/> This idea has roots in Aristotle's work, "De interpretatione".<ref>Barnes, E. J. (1984). The complete works of Aristotle, de interpretatione IX. princeton: Princeton University press.</ref>

Theological fatalism is the thesis that infallible foreknowledge of a human act makes the act necessary and hence unfree. If there is a being who knows the entire future infallibly, then no human act is free.<ref>Zagzebski, Linda, "Foreknowledge and Free Will", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/>.</ref> The [[early Islamic philosopher]], [[Al Farabi]], makes the case that if God does in fact know all human actions and choices, then Aristotle's original solution to this dilemma stands.<ref>Al-Farabi. (1981). Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione. Translated by F.W.Zimmerman,. Oxford: Oxford university press.</ref>

==Idle argument==
One famous ancient argument regarding fatalism was the so-called [[Lazy argument|''Idle Argument'']]. It argues that if something is fated, then it would be pointless or futile to make any effort to bring it about. The Idle Argument was described by [[Origen]] and [[Cicero]] and it went like this:

*If it is [[destiny|fate]]d for you to recover from this illness, then you will recover whether you call a doctor or not.
*Likewise, if you are fated not to recover, you will not do so whether you call a doctor or not.
*But either it is fated that you will recover from this illness, or it is fated that you will not recover.
*Therefore, it is futile to consult a doctor.<ref>Origen ''Contra Celsum'' II 20</ref><ref>Cicero ''De Fato'' 28-9</ref>

The Idle Argument was anticipated by [[Aristotle]] in his ''[[De Interpretatione]]'' chapter 9. The [[Stoics]] considered it to be a [[sophism]] and the Stoic [[Chrysippus]] attempted to refute it by pointing out that consulting the doctor would be as much fated as recovering. He seems to have introduced the idea that in cases like that at issue two events can be ''co-fated'', so that one cannot occur without the other.<ref>[[Susanne Bobzien]], ''Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy'', Oxford 1998, chapter 5</ref>

==Logical fatalism and the argument from bivalence==
Arguments for logical fatalism go back to antiquity. The argument from bivalence depends not on causation or physical circumstances but rather is based on [[logical truth]]s and [[metaphysical necessity]]. There are numerous versions of this argument, including those by [[Aristotle]]<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball0888/salamis/interpretatione.html |title=Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 9 |access-date=17 February 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070331024000/http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball0888/salamis/interpretatione.html |archive-date=31 March 2007 |url-status=dead }}</ref> and [[Richard Clyde Taylor]].<ref name="Taylor 1962"/>

The key idea of logical fatalism is that there exists necessarily [[Truth value|true or false]] future describing [[Proposition|propositions]], or statements about what is going to happen in the future, and that there is something [[Metaphysical necessity|metaphysically necessary]] about the truth value of these statements.<ref name="SEP" /> So, for example, if it is true today that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then there cannot fail to be a sea battle tomorrow, since otherwise it would not be true today that such a battle will take place tomorrow.

There are two main forms of responses to logical fatalism.<ref name=":1">Mackie, Penelope. “Fatalism, Incompatibilism, and the Power To Do Otherwise” Noûs, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 672-689, December 2003</ref> The first response is concerned with logical fatalism's reliance on the [[principle of bivalence]], which says that a proposition is necessarily either true or false. If one wants to reject logical fatalism, one move to take is to reject that this principle applies to future describing propositions. Aristotle is famously attributed as making this move, though there are views that he does not.<ref name="SEP" /><ref>{{Cite book |last=Whitaker |first=C. W. |title=Aristotle's De interpretatione: contradiction and dialectic |last2=Whitaker |first2=C. W. A. |date=2002 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-925419-4 |series=Oxford Aristotle studies |location=New York}}</ref> This response works well with an A-theory of time, which says that time is fundamentally tensed, and events can be classified as past, present, and perhaps, future.<ref>{{Citation |last=Emery |first=Nina |title=Time |date=2024 |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entriesime/ |access-date=2025-08-01 |edition=Fall 2024 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |last2=Markosian |first2=Ned |last3=Sullivan |first3=Meghan |editor2-last=Nodelman |editor2-first=Uri}}</ref> A-theory supports views of time that say that the future does not yet exist, like [[Presentism (philosophy of time)|presentism]]. Relating to logical fatalism, If the future is considered to be undetermined, meaning that the truth value of a statement can only be determined once the event occurs, then the [[principle of bivalence]] can be rejected.<ref>{{Cite SEP|url-id= future-contingents|title= Future Contingents|author-first=Peter|author-last=Øhrstrøm|author-first2=Per|author-last2=Hasle|date=June 2, 2020}}</ref> However, the [[B-theory of time]] sees the past and future as being just as real as the present. On a [[B-theory of time]], future facts do exist, and therefore the solution to reject the [[principle of bivalence]] on the grounds of undetermined future propositions does not work.<ref name="SEP" />

The second response can be attributed to [[William of Ockham]], and is often called the ''Ockhamist Response''.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2">{{Cite web |title=Ockhamism - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/ockhamism/v-1/sections/the-ockhamist-response-hard-and-soft-facts |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20230326095728/https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/ockhamism/v-1/sections/the-ockhamist-response-hard-and-soft-facts |archive-date=2023-03-26 |access-date=2025-08-01 |website=www.rep.routledge.com |language=en}}</ref> This response, essentially, challenges the idea that we cannot affect the past truth of future describing propositions.<ref name=":1" /> The truth value of propositions describing the future, then, may not be as metaphysically necessary as we think.<ref name="SEP" /><ref name=":2" />

The argument for logical fatalism and its responses relate closely to the [[problem of future contingents]]. There are responses to this problem that allow one to also overcome logical fatalism. The third truth value view says that future contingents can have a third value which is beyond truth or falsity.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=Andreoletti |first=Giacomo |date=2019 |title=Fatalism and Future Contingents |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phib.12157 |journal=Analytic Philosophy |language=en |volume=60 |issue=3 |pages=245–258 |doi=10.1111/phib.12157 |issn=2153-9596}}</ref> The all-false view says that all future contingents are false.<ref name=":0" />

==Criticism==
===Semantic equivocation===
One criticism comes from the novelist [[David Foster Wallace]], who in a 1985 paper "Richard Taylor's ''Fatalism'' and the Semantics of Physical Modality" suggests that [[Richard Clyde Taylor|Richard Taylor]] reached his conclusion of fatalism only because his argument involved two different and inconsistent notions of impossibility.<ref name="nyt">{{Cite news|title=Consider the Philosopher|first=James|last=Ryerson|date=December 12, 2008|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/14/magazine/14wwln-Wallace-t.html|work=The New York Times}}</ref> Wallace did not reject fatalism ''per se'', as he wrote in his closing passage, "if Taylor and the fatalists want to force upon us a metaphysical conclusion, they must do metaphysics, not semantics. And this seems entirely appropriate."<ref name="nyt"/> [[Willem de Vries|Willem deVries]] and [[Jay L. Garfield|Jay Garfield]], both of whom were advisers on Wallace's thesis, expressed regret that Wallace never published his argument.<ref name="nyt"/> In 2010, the thesis was, however, published posthumously as ''Time, Fate, and Language: An Essay on Free Will''.

==See also==
{{Portal|Philosophy}}
{{cols|colwidth=26em}}
* [[Accidental necessity]]
* [[Acquiescence]]
* ''[[Amor fati]]''
* [[Calvinism]]
* [[Divine providence]]
* [[Inshallah]]
* [[Jansenism]]
* [[Libertarianism (metaphysics)]]
* [[Problem of future contingents]]
* [[Probability theory]]
* ''[[Shikata ga nai]]''
* [[Superstition]] 
* [[Theological determinism]]
* [[Theological fatalism]]
{{colend}}

==Notes==
{{notelist}}

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==External links==
{{Wikiquote|Fate}}
{{Wiktionary|fatalism}}

*[http://www.projectworldview.org/wvtheme11.htm Fatalism vs. Free Will] from Project Worldview
{{Time travel}}
{{Philosophy topics}}
{{Determinism}}

{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Determinism]]
[[Category:Teleology]]
[[Category:Destiny]]