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{{Short description|Famine killing millions (1959–1961)}}
{{About|the famine of 1959–1961|other famines in Chinese history|List of famines in China}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=December 2020}}
{{Infobox famine
| country = [[China]]
| location = Half of the country. Death rates were highest in [[Anhui]] (18% dead), [[Chongqing]] (15%), [[Sichuan]] (13%), [[Guizhou]] (11%), and [[Hunan]] (8%).<ref name="Cao 2005">{{cite book|script-title=zh:大饥荒：1959–1961年的中国人口|last=Cao |first=Shuji |author-mask=Cao Shuji (曹树基)|date=2005|pages=46, 67, 117, 150, 196|url=https://staff.lib.msu.edu/wuxian/GreatFamine/|publisher=Time Publishing|location=Hong Kong|isbn=978-9889828233 |language=zh}} An excerpt, which calculates death rate between 1958 and 1962, is published as: {{cite journal|script-title=zh:1959–1961 年中国的人口死亡及其成因|last=Cao |first=Shuji |author-mask=Cao Shuji (曹树基)|journal=Chinese Journal of Population Science|script-journal=zh:中国人口科学|issue=1|date=2005|page=|url=http://www.yhcw.net/famine/Research/r060628a.html|language=zh}}</ref>
| period = 1959–1961
| total_deaths = 15–60 million
| theory = Result of the [[Great Leap Forward]], [[people's commune]], [[Eliminate Sparrows campaign]], Soviet debts, accelerationist policy and other factors.
| demographics = <!-- Example: population declined by 10% due to mortality or 5% of the people emigrated, etc. -->
| consequences = Termination of the Great Leap Forward campaign
| native_name={{langn|zh-hans|三年大饥荒}}
}}
{{History of the People's Republic of China}}

The '''Great Chinese Famine''' ({{zh|s=三年大饥荒|l=three years of great famine}}) was a [[famine]] that occurred between 1959 and 1961 in the [[People's Republic of China]] (PRC).<ref name=":18">{{Cite web|script-title=zh:关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议|url=http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-06/23/content_1024934_2.htm|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191022175245/http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-06/23/content_1024934_2.htm|archive-date=22 October 2019|access-date=23 April 2020|website=The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China|language=zh}}</ref><ref name=":9">{{Cite web|date=1981-06-27|title=Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China|url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121344.pdf?v=d461ad5001da989b8f96cc1dfb3c8ce7|website=Wilson Center}}</ref><ref name=":0" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":1" /> Some scholars have also included the years 1958 or 1962.<ref name=":14">{{Cite journal|last1=Kung|first1=Kai-sing|last2=Lin|first2=Yifu|year=2003|title=The Causes of China's Great Leap Famine, 1959–1961|journal=Economic Development and Cultural Change|volume=52|issue=1|pages=51–73|doi=10.1086/380584|issn=0013-0079|s2cid=9454493}}</ref><ref name=":11" /><ref name="Tombstone-p126">{{cite book|surname=Yang|given=Jisheng|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nadqrYU10eMC|title=Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958–1962|date=2012|publisher=Farrar, Straus & Giroux|isbn=978-0-374-27793-2|page=126|author-link=Yang Jisheng (journalist)}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.scmp.com/article/723956/revisiting-calamitous-time|title=45 million died in Mao's Great Leap Forward, Hong Kong historian says in new book|website=South China Morning Post|date=5 September 2010 |url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200226140751/https://www.scmp.com/article/723956/revisiting-calamitous-time|archive-date=26 February 2020|access-date=23 April 2020}}</ref> It is widely regarded as the deadliest famine and one of the greatest man-made disasters in human history, with an estimated death toll due to starvation that ranges in the tens of millions (15 to 55 million).{{refn|group="note"|According to various sources.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Smil|first=Vaclav|date=18 December 1999|title=China's great famine: 40 years later|journal=BMJ: British Medical Journal|volume=319|issue=7225|pages=1619–1621|doi=10.1136/bmj.319.7225.1619|issn=0959-8138|pmc=1127087|pmid=10600969}}</ref><ref name=":10">{{Cite journal|last=Gráda|first=Cormac Ó|author-link=Cormac Ó Gráda|year=2007|title=Making Famine History|journal=Journal of Economic Literature|volume=45|issue=1|pages=5–38|doi=10.1257/jel.45.1.5|jstor=27646746|issn=0022-0515|hdl=10197/492|s2cid=54763671 |hdl-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last1=Meng |first1=Xin|last2=Qian |first2=Nancy |last3=Yared |first3=Pierre |year=2015|title=The Institutional Causes of China's Great Famine, 1959–1961|url=https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pyared/papers/famines.pdf|journal=Review of Economic Studies|volume=82|issue=4|pages=1568–1611|doi=10.1093/restud/rdv016|access-date=22 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200305165942/https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pyared/papers/famines.pdf|archive-date=5 March 2020|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Hasell|first1=Joe|last2=Roser|first2=Max|date=10 October 2013|title=Famines|url=https://ourworldindata.org/famines|journal=Our World in Data|access-date=22 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200418002509/https://ourworldindata.org/famines|archive-date=18 April 2020|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.dartmouth.edu/~crossley/HIST5.03/FILES/OHMC_DIkotter.pdf|title=Mao's Great Famine: Ways of Living, Ways of Dying|last=Dikötter|first=Frank|publisher=Dartmouth University|access-date=22 April 2020|archive-date=16 July 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200716231543/http://www.dartmouth.edu/~crossley/HIST5.03/FILES/OHMC_DIkotter.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite news|last=Mirsky|first=Jonathan|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/books/review/tombstone-the-great-chinese-famine-1958-1962-by-yang-jisheng.html|title=Unnatural Disaster|date=7 December 2012|work=The New York Times|access-date=22 April 2020|issn=0362-4331|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170124011617/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/books/review/tombstone-the-great-chinese-famine-1958-1962-by-yang-jisheng.html|archive-date=24 January 2017|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=":6">{{Cite news|last=Branigan|first=Tania|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/01/china-great-famine-book-tombstone|title=China's Great Famine: the true story|date=1 January 2013|work=The Guardian|access-date=22 April 2020|issn=0261-3077|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160110054200/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/01/china-great-famine-book-tombstone|archive-date=10 January 2016|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite news|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/ajeats/2016/01/china-great-famine-mission-expose-truth-160106100552321.html|title=China's Great Famine: A mission to expose the truth|work=Al Jazeera|access-date=22 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200421154859/https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/ajeats/2016/01/china-great-famine-mission-expose-truth-160106100552321.html|archive-date=21 April 2020|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=":7">{{Cite magazine|url=https://qz.com/633457/charted-chinas-great-famine-according-to-yang-jisheng-a-journalist-who-lived-through-it/|title=Charted: China's Great Famine, according to Yang Jisheng, a journalist who lived through it|last=Huang|first=Zheping|magazine=Quartz|date=10 March 2016 |access-date=22 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200525094610/https://qz.com/633457/charted-chinas-great-famine-according-to-yang-jisheng-a-journalist-who-lived-through-it/|archive-date=25 May 2020|url-status=live}}</ref>}} The most stricken provinces were [[Anhui]] (18%&nbsp;dead), [[Chongqing]] (15%), [[Sichuan]] (13%), [[Guizhou]] (11%) and [[Hunan]] (8%).<ref name="Cao 2005"/>

The major contributing factors in the famine were the policies of the [[Great Leap Forward]] (1958 to 1962) and [[people's commune]]s, launched by Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party [[Mao Zedong]], such as inefficient distribution of food within the nation's [[planned economy]]; requiring the use of poor agricultural techniques; the [[Eliminate Sparrows campaign]] that reduced sparrow populations as part of the [[Four Pests campaign]] (which disrupted the [[ecosystem]]); over-reporting of grain production; and ordering millions of farmers to switch to iron and steel production.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" /><ref name=":11" /><ref name=":3" /><ref>{{Cite book|last=Bowman|first=John S.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cYoHOqC7Yx4C&pg=PA72|title=Columbia Chronologies of Asian History and Culture|date=2000|publisher=Columbia University Press|isbn=978-0-231-50004-3}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Kung |first=James Kai-sing |date=2022 |chapter=The Political Economy of China's Great Leap Famine |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-economic-history-of-china/political-economy-of-chinas-great-leap-famine/32E5530258C063FE060C1A8C60A23C05 |url-access=subscription |editor-last=Ma |editor-first=Debin |editor2-last=von Glahn |editor2-first=Richard |title=The Cambridge Economic History of China: 1800 to the Present |publisher=Cambridge University Press |pages=642–684 |doi=10.1017/9781108348485.019 |isbn=978-1-108-42553-7 |s2cid=246670673}}</ref>

During the [[Seven Thousand Cadres Conference]] in early 1962, [[Liu Shaoqi]], then [[President of the People's Republic of China|President of China]], formally attributed 30% of the famine to [[natural disaster]]s and 70% to man-made errors ({{lang|zh|三分天灾，七分人祸}}).<ref name=":11" /><ref name=":4">{{Cite web|last=Sun|first=Zhonghua|script-title=zh:刘少奇"三分天灾，七分人祸"提法的由来|url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64172/85037/85039/5898093.html|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121214040606/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64172/85037/85039/5898093.html|archive-date=2012-12-14|access-date=2021-01-08|website=People's Daily|language=zh}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite web|last=Sun|first=Zhonghua|script-title=zh:刘少奇"三分天灾，七分人祸"提法的由来(2)|url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64172/85037/85039/5898130.html|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190915075439/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64172/85037/85039/5898130.html|archive-date=15 September 2019|access-date=22 April 2020|website=People's Daily|language=zh}}</ref> After the launch of [[Reform and opening up]], the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) officially stated in June 1981 that the famine was mainly due to the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward as well as the [[Anti-Right Deviation Struggle]], in addition to some natural disasters and the [[Sino-Soviet split]].<ref name=":18"/><ref name=":9"/>

== Terminology ==
Aside from the "Three Years of Great Famine" ({{zh|s=三年大饥荒|labels=no}}), there are two names for the famine that have been used by the Chinese government. Initially, the usual name was "Three Years of Natural Disasters" ({{zh|s=三年自然灾害|labels=no}}). In June 1981, this was changed to "Three Years of Difficulty" ({{zh|s=三年困难时期|labels=no}}), thus no longer blaming nature alone for the famine.<ref name=":18" /><ref name=":9" /><ref name="Songster-2004">{{cite book|last=Songster|first=Edith Elena|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MSyIXwAACAAJ|title=A Natural Place for Nationalism: The Wanglang Nature Reserve and the Emergence of the Giant Panda as a National Icon|publisher=University of California, San Diego|year=2004|type=thesis|oclc=607612241|access-date=18 January 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=M.|first1=J.|date=17 February 2015|title=New (approved) assessments The great famine|url=https://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/09/new-approved-assessments|url-status=live|newspaper=The Economist|language=en|location=Beijing|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180120153221/https://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/09/new-approved-assessments|archive-date=20 January 2018|access-date=18 January 2018}} Cites {{cite book|last=Dikötter|first=Frank|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JuvlBQAAQBAJ|title=The Tragedy of Liberation: A History of the Chinese Revolution 1945–1957|date=2015|publisher=Bloomsbury Press|isbn=978-1-62040-349-5|location=London|oclc=881092774}}</ref>

==Causes of the famine==
The Great Chinese Famine was caused by a combination of radical agricultural policies, social pressure, economic mismanagement, and natural disasters such as droughts and floods in farming regions.

=== Great Leap Forward ===
{{Main|Great Leap Forward}}

The Chinese Communist Party introduced drastic changes in farming policy during the Great Leap Forward.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2011-10-23|title=Mao's Great Leap Forward 'killed 45 million in four years'|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/news/mao-s-great-leap-forward-killed-45-million-four-years-2081630.html|access-date=2021-01-04|website=The Independent|language=en}}</ref><ref name=":17e">{{Cite web|title=The Great Leap Forward Period in China, 1958–1960|url=https://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/greatleap.htm|access-date=2021-01-04|website=San Jose State University}}</ref>

==== People's communes ====
{{Main|People's commune}}

[[File:People's commune canteen.jpg|thumb|The public dining hall (canteen) of a people's commune. The slogan on the wall reads "No need to pay to eat, focus on producing".]]
During the Great Leap Forward, farming was organized into people's communes and the cultivation of individual plots was forbidden. Previously farmers cultivated plots of land given to them by the government. The Great Leap Forward led to the agricultural economy being increasingly centrally planned. Regional Party leaders were given production quotas for the communes under their control. Their output was then appropriated by the state and distributed at its discretion. In 2008, former deputy editor of [[Yanhuang Chunqiu]] and author Yang Jisheng would summarize his perspective of the effect of the production targets as an inability for supply to be redirected to where it was most demanded:
{{blockquote|In [[Xinyang]], people starved at the doors of the grain warehouses. As they died, they shouted, "Communist Party, Chairman Mao, save us". If the granaries of [[Henan]] and [[Hebei]] had been opened, no one need have died. As people were dying in large numbers around them, officials did not think to save them. Their only concern was how to fulfill the delivery of grain.<ref name=trans>Translation from [http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18328 "A hunger for the truth: A new book, banned on the mainland, is becoming the definitive account of the Great Famine"]. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120210190821/http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18328 |date=10 February 2012 }}, chinaelections.org, 7 July 2008 of content from Yang Jisheng, ''墓碑 －－中國六十年代大饑荒紀實 (Mu Bei – Zhong Guo Liu Shi Nian Dai Da Ji Huang Ji Shi)'', Hong Kong: Cosmos Books (Tian Di Tu Shu), 2008, {{ISBN|978-9882119093}} {{in lang|zh}}</ref>}}

The degree to which people's communes lessened or worsened the famine is controversial. Each region dealt with the famine differently, and timelines of the famine are not uniform across China. One argument is that excessive eating took place in the mess halls, and that this directly led to a worsening of the famine. If excessive eating had not taken place, one scholar argued, "the worst of the Great Leap Famine could still have been avoided in mid-1959".<ref>{{cite book|author=Dali L. Yang|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VmLuoAkMKrkC|title=Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap Famine|publisher=Stanford University Press|year=1996|isbn=978-0-8047-3470-7|page=55}}</ref> However, dire hunger did not set in to places like Da Fo village until 1960,<ref>{{cite book|author=Ralph Thaxton|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=14A1qPQOgQMC|title=Catastrophe and Contention in Rural China: Mao's Great Leap Forward Famine and the Origins of Righteous Resistance in Da Fo Village|date=2008|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-72230-8|page=125}}</ref> and the public dining hall participation rate was found not to be a meaningful cause of famine in Anhui and [[Jiangxi]].<ref name="discrepancies">{{cite book|author1=Kimberley Ens Manning|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aHPTn2Rq9IUC|title=Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China's Great Leap Forward and Famine|author2=Felix Wemheuer|author3=Chen Yixin|date=2011|publisher=UBC Press|isbn=978-0-7748-5955-4|page=220|chapter=Under the Same Maoist Sky: Accounting for Death Rate Discrepancies in Anhui and Jiangxi}}</ref> In Da Fo village, "food ''output'' did not decline in reality, but there was an astonishing loss of food ''availability'' associated with Maoist state appropriation".<ref name="Thaxton2008">{{cite book|author=Ralph Thaxton|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=14A1qPQOgQMC|title=Catastrophe and Contention in Rural China: Mao's Great Leap Forward Famine and the Origins of Righteous Resistance in Da Fo Village|date=2008|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-72230-8|page=128}}</ref>

==== Agricultural techniques ====
Along with [[collectivization]], the central government decreed several changes in agricultural techniques that would be based on the [[Lysenkoism|ideas]] of later-discredited Soviet agronomist [[Trofim Lysenko]].<ref>{{cite book|title=The People's Republic of China, 1949–76|edition=2nd|first=Michael|last=Lynch|location=London|publisher=Hodder Education|year=2008|page=57}}</ref> One of these ideas was close planting, whereby the density of seedlings was at first tripled and then doubled again. The theory was that plants of the same species would not compete with each other. In natural cycles they did fully compete, which actually stunted growth and resulted in lower yields.

Another policy known as "[[deep plowing]]" was based on the ideas of Lysenko's colleague Terentiy Maltsev, who encouraged peasants across China to eschew normal [[plowing]] depths of 15–20 centimeters and instead plow deeply into the soil (1 to 2 [[Chi (unit)|Chinese feet]] or 33 to 66&nbsp;cm). The deep plowing theory stated that the most fertile soil was deep in the earth, and plowing unusually deeply would allow extra-strong root growth. While deep plowing can increase yields in some contexts, the policy is generally considered to have hindered yields in China.

==== Eliminate Sparrows campaign ====
{{Main|Eliminate Sparrows campaign}}

[[File:Tree-Sparrow-2009-16-02.jpg|thumb|upright=1.1|The [[Eurasian tree sparrow]] was targeted in the [[Eliminate Sparrows campaign]]]]

In the [[Four Pests campaign]], citizens were called upon to destroy mosquitoes, rats, flies, and sparrows. The mass eradication of the sparrows as part of the associated [[Eliminate Sparrows campaign]] resulted in an increase of the population of crop-eating insects, which had no predators without the sparrows.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Summers-Smith |first=J. Denis |title=In search of sparrows |date=1992 |publisher=T & A Poyser |isbn=978-0-85661-073-8 |location=London}}</ref>

==== Illusion of superabundance ====
Beginning in 1957, the Chinese Communist Party began to report excessive production of grain because of pressure from superiors. However, the actual production of grain throughout China was decreasing from 1957 to 1961. For example:
* In [[Sichuan Province]], even though the collected grain was decreasing from 1958 to 1961, the numbers reported to the central government kept increasing.{{sfn|Yang|2012|p=240}}
* In [[Gansu]], the grain yield declined by 4,273,000 [[tonne]]s from 1957 to 1961.<ref name="Tombstone-p126"/>

This series of events resulted in an "illusion of superabundance" (浮夸风), and the Party believed that they had an excess of grain. On the contrary, the crop yields were lower than average. For instance, Beijing believed that "in 1960 state granaries would have 50 billion ''[[Chinese units of measurement|jin]]'' of grain", when they actually contained 12.7 billion ''jin.''<ref>{{cite book|author1=Kimberley Ens Manning|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aHPTn2Rq9IUC|title=Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China's Great Leap Forward and Famine|author2=Felix Wemheuer|author3=Gao Hua|date=2011|publisher=UBC Press|isbn=978-0-7748-5955-4|page=177|chapter=Food Augmentation Methods and Food Substitutes during the Great Famine}}</ref> The effects of the illusion of superabundance were significant, leaving some historians to argue that it was the major cause of much of the starvation throughout China. Yang Dali argued that there were three main consequences from the illusion of superabundance:

{{blockquote|First, it led to planners to shift lands from grain to economic crops, such as cotton, sugarcane, and beets, and divert huge numbers of agricultural laborers into industrial sectors, fueling state demand for procured grain from the countryside. Second, it prompted the Chinese leadership, especially [[Zhou Enlai]], to speed up grain exports to secure more foreign currency to purchase capital goods needed for industrialization. Finally, the illusion of superabundance made the adoption of the commune mess halls seem rational at the time. All these changes, of course, contributed to the rapid exhaustion of grain supplies.<ref name="Yang">{{cite book|author=Dali L. Yang|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VmLuoAkMKrkC|title=Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap Famine|publisher=Stanford University Press|year=1996|isbn=978-0-8047-3470-7|page=65}}</ref>}}

==== Iron and steel production ====
{{see also|Backyard furnace}}
[[File:Backyard furnace4.jpg|thumb|[[Backyard furnace]]s for producing steel]]
Iron and steel production was identified as a key requirement for economic advancement, and millions of peasants were ordered away from agricultural work to join the iron and steel production workforce. Much of the iron produced by the peasant population ended up being too weak to be used commercially, and agricultural laborers and production were lost.

=== More policies from the central government ===
Economists Xin Meng, [[Nancy Qian]] and Pierre Yared showed that, much as Nobel laureate [[Amartya Sen]] had earlier claimed, aggregate production was sufficient for avoiding famine and that the famine was caused by over-procurement and poor distribution within the country. They show that unlike most other famines, there were surprisingly more deaths in places that produced more food per capita, explaining that the inflexibility in the centrally planned food procurement system explains at least half of the famine mortality.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Meng|first1=Xin|last2=Qian|first2=Nancy|last3=Yared|first3=Pierre|date=1 October 2015|title=The Institutional Causes of China's Great Famine, 1959–1961|url=https://academic.oup.com/restud/article/82/4/1568/2607347|journal=The Review of Economic Studies|volume=82|issue=4|pages=1568–1611|doi=10.1093/restud/rdv016|issn=0034-6527|url-access=subscription}}</ref> Economic historians James Kung and Shuo Chen show that there was more over-procurement in places where politicians faced more competition.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Kung|first1=James Kai-Sing|last2=Chen|first2=Shuo|date=February 2011|title=The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China's Great Leap Famine|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=105|issue=1|pages=27–45|doi=10.1017/S0003055410000626|s2cid=154339088|issn=1537-5943}}</ref>

In addition, policies from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the central government, particularly the [[Three Red Banners]] and the [[Socialist Education Movement]] (SEM), proved to be ideologically detrimental to the worsening famine. The Three Red Banners of the CCP "sparked the fanaticism of 1958". The implementation of the [[Mass line]], one of the three banners which told people to "go all out, aim high, and build socialism with greater, better, and more economical results", is cited in connection to the pressures officials felt to report a superabundance of grain.{{sfn|Yang|2012|p=87}} The SEM, established in 1957, also led to the severity of the famine in various ways, including causing the "illusion of superabundance" (浮夸风). Once the exaggerations of crop yields from the Mass Line were reported, "no one dared to 'dash cold water{{'"}} on further reports.{{sfn|Yang|2012|p=99}} The SEM also led to the establishment of conspiracy theories in which the peasants were believed to be pretending to be hungry in order to sabotage the state grain purchase.<ref name="Discourses of Hunger">{{cite book|author1=Kimberley Ens Manning|author2=Felix Wemheuer|title=Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China's Great Leap Forward and Famine|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aHPTn2Rq9IUC|date= 2011|publisher=UBC Press|isbn=978-0-7748-5955-4|page=127|chapter='The Grain Problem is an Ideological Problem': Discourses of Hunger in the 1957 Socialist Education Campaign}}</ref>

=== Power relations in local governments ===
[[File:1957 Mao Zedong on airplane.jpg|thumb|upright=1.1|left|Mao Zedong on an airplane, 1957]]

Local governments had just as much, if not more, influence on the famine as did higher rungs of government. As the Great Leap Forward progressed, many provincial leaders began aligning themselves with Mao and higher Party leaders.<ref>{{cite book|author=Dali L. Yang|title=Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap Famine|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VmLuoAkMKrkC|year=1996|publisher=Stanford University Press|isbn=978-0-8047-3470-7|page=31}}</ref> Local leaders were forced to choose between doing what was best for their community and guarding their reputation politically. Landlords began "denouncing any opposition as 'conservative rightism{{'"}}, which is defined broadly as anything anti-communist.<ref>{{cite book|author=Frank Dikötter|title=Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5NsMWCHDStQC|date=2010|publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing|isbn=978-0-8027-7928-1|page=2}}</ref> In an environment of conspiracy theories directed against peasants, saving extra grain for a family to eat, espousing the belief that the Great Leap Forward should not be implemented, or merely not working hard enough were all seen as forms of "conservative rightism". Peasants became unable to speak openly on collectivization and state grain purchase. With a culture of fear and recrimination at both a local and official level, speaking and acting against the famine became a seemingly impossible task.<ref name="Discourses of Hunger"/>

The influence of local government in the famine can be seen in the comparison between the provinces of Anhui and Jiangxi. Anhui, having a radical pro-Mao government, was led by [[Zeng Xisheng]] who was "dictatorial", with ties to Mao.<ref>{{cite book|author1=Kimberley Ens Manning|author2=Felix Wemheuer|title=Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China's Great Leap Forward and Famine|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aHPTn2Rq9IUC|date=2011|publisher=UBC Press|isbn=978-0-7748-5955-4|pages=212–213|chapter=Under the Same Maoist Sky : Accounting for Death Rate Discrepancies in Anhui and Jiangxi}}</ref> Zeng firmly believed in the Great Leap Forward and tried to build relationships with higher officials rather than maintain local ties. Zeng proposed agricultural projects without consulting colleagues, which caused Anhui's agriculture to fail terribly. Zhang Kaifan, a party secretary and deputy-governor of the province, heard rumours of a famine breaking out in Anhui and disagreed with many of Zeng's policies. Zeng reported Zhang to Mao for such speculations. As a result, Mao labeled Zhang "a member of the '[[Peng Dehuai]] anti-Party military clique{{'"}} and he was purged from the local party. Zeng was unable to report on the famine when it became an emergency situation, as this would prove his hypocrisy. For this he was described as a "blatant political radical who almost single-handedly damaged Anhui".<ref>{{cite book|author1=Kimberley Ens Manning|author2=Felix Wemheuer|title=Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China's Great Leap Forward and Famine|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aHPTn2Rq9IUC|date=2011|publisher=UBC Press|isbn=978-0-7748-5955-4|pages=213|chapter=Under the Same Maoist Sky: Accounting for Death Rate Discrepancies in Anhui and Jiangxi}}</ref>

Jiangxi encountered a situation almost opposite to that of Anhui. The leaders of Jiangxi publicly opposed some of the Great Leap programs, quietly made themselves unavailable, and even appeared to take a passive attitude towards the Maoist economy. As the leaders worked collaboratively among themselves, they also worked with the local population. By creating an environment in which the Great Leap Forward did not become fully implemented, the Jiangxi government "did their best to minimize damage". From these findings, scholars Manning and Wemheuer concluded that much of the severity of the famine was due to provincial leaders and their responsibility for their regions.<ref>{{cite book|author1=Kimberley Ens Manning|author2=Felix Wemheuer|title=Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China's Great Leap Forward and Famine|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aHPTn2Rq9IUC|date=2011|publisher=UBC Press|isbn=978-0-7748-5955-4|pages=216–218|chapter=Under the Same Maoist Sky: Accounting for Death Rate Discrepancies in Anhui and Jiangxi}}</ref>

=== Natural disasters ===
{{see also|1958 Yellow River flood}}[[File:Luokou yellow river bridge visit zhou enlai 1958.jpg|thumb|Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] (center front) visited Luokou Yellow River Bridge during the 1958 Yellow River flood.<ref name=":16" />]]
In 1958, there was a notable regional [[1958 Yellow River flood|flood of the Yellow River]] which affected part of [[Henan Province]] and [[Shandong Province]].<ref name=":16">{{Cite web|last=Qian|first=Zhengying|author-link=Qian Zhengying|date=1985-06-13|title=关于黄河、长江、淮河、永定河防御特大洪水方案的报告（摘要）|url=http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/26/content_1671.htm|access-date=23 April 2020|website=[[National People's Congress]]|language=zh}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-06/14/content_648957.htm|title=新闻分析：做好黄河防汛工作为何不能掉以轻心？|website=The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China|language=zh|access-date=22 April 2020|archive-date=25 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210225094210/http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-06/14/content_648957.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=中国历史上的水灾有哪些？|url=http://guoqing.china.com.cn/zhuanti/2017-07/13/content_41210848.htm|access-date=22 April 2020|website=[[China Internet Information Center]]|language=zh}}</ref><ref name="dahe1">{{Cite web|title=1958年黄河大水灾纪实|url=http://newpaper.dahe.cn/jrab/html/2009-07/13/content_199329.htm|access-date=22 April 2020|website=Dahe Wang (大河网)|language=zh|archive-date=3 July 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200703071205/http://newpaper.dahe.cn/jrab/html/2009-07/13/content_199329.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name="dahe"/> It was reported as the most severe flood of the [[Yellow River]] since 1933.<ref name="dahe1" /><ref name="dahe">{{Cite web|title=历史上的五次黄河水灾|url=http://newpaper.dahe.cn/jrab/html/2009-07/20/content_201822.htm|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191122192109/http://newpaper.dahe.cn/jrab/html/2009-07/20/content_201822.htm|archive-date=22 November 2019|access-date=22 April 2020|website=Dahe Wang (大河网)|language=zh}}</ref> In July 1958, the Yellow River flood affected 741,000 people in 1708 villages and inundated over 3.04 million [[Mu (unit of area)|mu]] (over half a million [[acre]]s) of cultivated fields.<ref name="dahe1"/> The largest torrent of the flood was smoothly directed into the [[Bohai Sea]] on 27 July, and the government declared a "victory over the flood" after sending a rescue team of over 2 million people.<ref name=":16" /><ref name="dahe1"/><ref>{{Cite web|date=2005-10-11|title=黄河防洪概述|url=http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/54051/54053/3757306.html|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070913195832/http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/54051/54053/3757306.html|archive-date=13 September 2007|access-date=23 April 2020|website=People's Daily|language=zh}}</ref> The spokesperson of the Flood Prevention Center of Chinese government stated on 27 July 1958, that:

{{blockquote|This year we defeated the large flood without division of torrents or breaks on dams, which secures the big harvest of the crops. This is yet another miracle created by the Chinese people.<ref name="dahe1"/>}}

But the government was encouraged to report success and hide failures.<ref name=":11" /> Because the 2 million farm laborers from the two provinces were ordered away from the fields to serve as a rescue team and were repairing the banks of the river instead of tending to their fields, "crops are neglected and much of the harvest is left to rot in the fields".<ref>{{cite book|last=Bowman|first=John S|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cYoHOqC7Yx4C&pg=PA72|title=Columbia Chronologies of Asian History and Culture|publisher=Columbia University Press|year=2000|isbn=0-231-11004-9|page=72|access-date=22 April 2020}}</ref> In contrast, historian [[Frank Dikötter]] has argued that most floods during the famine were not due to unusual weather, but to massive, poorly planned and poorly executed irrigation works which were part of the Great Leap Forward.<ref name="Dikotter333" /> At this time, encouraged by Mao Zedong, people in China were building a large number of dams and thousands of kilometers of new irrigation canals in an attempt to move water from wet areas to areas that were experiencing drought.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ozy.com/true-and-stories/230000-died-in-a-dam-collapse-that-china-kept-secret-for-years/91699/|title=230,000 Died in a Dam Collapse That China Kept Secret for Years|date=17 February 2019|website=OZY|access-date=23 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200502135655/https://www.ozy.com/true-and-stories/230000-died-in-a-dam-collapse-that-china-kept-secret-for-years/91699/|archive-date=2 May 2020|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|title=Massive new dams remind China of human price of 'tofu constructions'|work=[[The Globe and Mail]]|url=https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/asian-pacific-business/massive-new-dams-remind-china-of-human-price-of-tofu-constructions/article13123199/|url-status=live|access-date=23 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140623153116/http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/asian-pacific-business/massive-new-dams-remind-china-of-human-price-of-tofu-constructions/article13123199/|archive-date=23 June 2014}}</ref><ref name=":19">{{Cite web|url=https://www.internationalrivers.org/sites/default/files/attached-files/a_profile_of_dams_in_china.pdf|title=A Profile of Dams in China|last=Fu|first=Shui|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190927010439/https://www.internationalrivers.org/sites/default/files/attached-files/a_profile_of_dams_in_china.pdf|archive-date=27 September 2019}}</ref><ref name=":20">{{Cite journal|last=Zhao|first=Xiaoxia|year=2018|title="水利大跃进"的历史考察 – 以江苏省为例|url=http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/media/articles/c168-201704006.pdf|journal=Twenty-First Century|via=[[Chinese University of Hong Kong]]}}</ref> Some of the works, such as the [[Red Flag Canal]], made positive contributions to irrigation,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Xiang|first=Wei-Ning|date=1 March 2020|title=The Red Flag Canal: a socio-ecological practice miracle from serendipity, through impossibility, to reality|journal=Socio-Ecological Practice Research|language=en|volume=2|issue=1|pages=105–110|doi=10.1007/s42532-019-00037-z|pmid=34778717|pmc=8150154|issn=2524-5287|doi-access=free|bibcode=2020SEPR....2..105X }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=The Red Flag Canal|url=http://www.hqq.org.cn/web/english/Introduction/index.html|access-date=23 April 2020|website=The Red Flag Canal|archive-date=3 August 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200803231806/http://www.hqq.org.cn/web/english/Introduction/index.html|url-status=dead}}</ref> but researchers have pointed out that the massive hydraulic construction project led to many deaths due to starvation, epidemics, and drowning, which contributed to the famine.<ref name=":19" /><ref name=":20" /><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-dams-famine-idUSTRE51Q40E20090227|title=China farmers recall bitter days of famine for dam|date=27 February 2009|work=Reuters|access-date=23 April 2020|language=en}}</ref>

However, there have been disagreements on the significance of the drought and floods in causing the Great Famine.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":6" /><ref name=":3" /><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2014/9/cj34n3-2.pdf|title=Lessons from China's Great Famine|last=Mao|first=Yushi|year=2014|publisher=[[Cato Institute]]}}</ref> According to published data from Chinese Academy of Meteorological Sciences ({{lang|zh|中国气象科学研究院}}), the drought in 1960 was not uncommon and its severity was only considered "mild" compared to that in other years—it was less serious than those in 1955, 1963, 1965–1967, and so on.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Gao|first=Suhua|title=1951～1990年全国降水量距平变化图|url=http://www.yhcw.net/famine/Research/ClimatePic/r020904a.htm|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190809165558/http://www.yhcw.net/famine/Research/ClimatePic/r020904a.htm|archive-date=9 August 2019|access-date=22 April 2020|website=[[Yanhuang Chunqiu]]|language=zh}}</ref> Moreover, Yang Jisheng, a senior journalist from [[Xinhua News Agency]], reports that [[Xue Muqiao]], then head of the [[National Bureau of Statistics of China|National Statistics Bureau of China]], said in 1958, "We give whatever figures the upper-level wants" to overstate natural disasters and relieve official responsibility for deaths due to starvation.<ref name=":7" /> Yang claimed that he investigated other sources including a non-government archive of meteorological data from 350 weather stations across China, and the droughts, floods, and temperatures during 1958–1961 were within the typical patterns for China.<ref name=":7" /> According to Basil Ashton:

{{blockquote|Many foreign observers felt that these reports of weather-related crop failures were designed to cover up political factors that had led to poor agricultural performance. They also suspected that local officials tended to exaggerate such reports to obtain more state assistance or tax relief. Clearly, the weather contributed to the appalling drop in output, but it is impossible to assess to what extent.<ref name=":11">{{Cite journal|last1=Ashton|first1=Basil|last2=Hill|first2=Kenneth|last3=Piazza|first3=Alan|last4=Zeitz|first4=Robin|year=1984|title=Famine in China, 1958–61|journal=Population and Development Review|volume=10|issue=4|pages=613–645|doi=10.2307/1973284|jstor=1973284}}</ref>}}Despite these claims, other scholars have provided provincial-level demographic panel data which quantitatively proved that weather was also an important factor, particularly in those provinces which experienced excessively wet conditions.<ref name="Houser">{{Cite journal|last1=Houser|first1=Daniel|last2=Sands|first2=Barbara|last3=Xiao|first3=Erte|date=2009|title=Three parts natural, seven parts man-made: Bayesian analysis of China's Great Leap Forward demographic disaster|url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0167268108001777|journal=Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization|language=en|volume=69|issue=2|pages=148–159|doi=10.1016/j.jebo.2007.09.008}}</ref> According to economist Daniel Houser and others, 69% of the Famine was due to government policies while the rest (31%) was due to natural disasters.<ref name="Houser" />

==Extent of the famine==
=== Production drop ===
Policy changes affecting how farming was organized coincided with droughts and floods. Weather had been relatively mild for much of the 1950s, but became particularly bad by 1959, driving down crop yields. As a result, year-over-year grain production fell dramatically.<ref name=":32">{{Cite book |last=Hammond |first=Ken |title=China's Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future |publisher=1804 Books |year=2023 |isbn=9781736850084 |location=New York |page=49}}</ref> The harvest was down by 15% in 1959 compared to 1958, and by 1960, it was at 70% of its 1958 level.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Lin|first1=Justin Yifu|last2=Yang|first2=Dennis Tao|date=2000|title=Food Availability, Entitlements and the Chinese Famine of 1959-61|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2565651|journal=The Economic Journal|volume=110|issue=460|pages=136–158|doi=10.1111/1468-0297.00494|jstor=2565651|issn=0013-0133|url-access=subscription}}</ref> Specifically, according to China's governmental data, crop production decreased from 200 million [[ton]]s (or 400 billion [[Catty|jin]]) in 1958 to 170 million tons (or 340 billion jin) in 1959, and to 143.5 million tons (or 287 billion jin) in 1960.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Shang|first=Changfeng|date=2009|title=三年经济困难时期的紧急救灾措施|url=https://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=7828|url-status=live|journal=《当代中国史研究》|language=zh|issue=4|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201106112141/http://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=7828|archive-date=2020-11-06|via=[[Chinese University of Hong Kong]]}}</ref>

=== Death toll ===
The [[excess mortality]] associated with the famine has been estimated by former CCP officials and international experts, with most giving a number in the range of 15–55 million deaths. The [[Maoist]] author [[Gao Mobo]] claims that [[anti-communist]] writers prefer to stretch the death toll number as high as possible while those sympathetic to the [[Chinese Communist Revolution]] prefer to see the number as low as possible.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Gao|first=Mobo|title=Constructing China: Clashing Views of the People's Republic|year=2018|publisher=Pluto|isbn=978-1-786-80242-2|page=11|doi=10.2307/j.ctv3mt8z4 |jstor=j.ctv3mt8z4|s2cid=158528294}}</ref> [[Mao Zedong]] himself suggested, in a discussion with [[Field Marshal Montgomery]] in Autumn 1961, that "unnatural deaths" exceeded 5 million in 1960–1961, according to a declassified [[CIA]] report.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Central Intelligence Agency |author-link=Central Intelligence Agency |date=1964-07-31 |title=Communist China's Domestic Crisis: the Road to 1964 |url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/polo-10.pdf |journal=Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room |pages=82}}</ref> 
{| class="wikitable sortable"
|+ Estimates of mortality during the Great Chinese Famine
! scope="col" | Deaths (in&nbsp;millions) !! scope="col" | Researchers !! scope="col" | Year !! scope="col" | Comments
|-
|55
|scope=row | Yu Xiguang {{nwr|({{zhi|余习广}})}}
|2015
|Yu is an independent Chinese historian and a former instructor at the [[Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party]], estimated that 55 million people died due to the famine.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Chen |first=Yixin |date=January 2015 |title=The Study of China's Great Leap Forward Famine in the West |url=http://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/webmanager/wkfiles/2012/201503_38_paper.pdf |url-status=dead |journal=Journal of Jiangsu University (Social Science Edition) |language=zh |volume=17 |issue=1 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210517052743/http://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/webmanager/wkfiles/2012/201503_38_paper.pdf |archive-date=17 May 2021 |access-date=29 July 2020 |via=[[Chinese University of Hong Kong]]}}</ref><ref name=":22">{{Cite journal |last=Dikötter |first=Frank |author-link=Frank Dikötter |year=2011 |editor-last= |editor-first= |title=Response [Sites of Horror: Mao's Great Famine] |journal=[[The China Journal]] |volume= |issue=66 |pages=163 |doi=10.1086/tcj.66.41262812 |issn=1324-9347 |jstor=41262812 |s2cid=141874259 |quote=It is fine to query my figures, but one also has to explain why every historian who has spent a long time in the archives has reached a very high figure, from 38 million by Yang Jisheng to{{spaces}}... Yu Xiguang, who after two decades of archival research puts it at 55 million.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Yu |first=Xiguang |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PSdBAAAACAAJ |title=大躍進・苦日子上書集 |publisher=Shidai chaoliu chubanshe |year=2005 |isbn=978-9-889-85499-7 |language=zh |trans-title=Great Leap Forward: A Collection of Letters about the Tough Days}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Yu |first=Xiguang |date=6 May 2008 |title=大跃进 |trans-title=Great Leap Forward |url=https://boxun.com/news/gb/pubvp/2008/05/200805072050.shtml |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221116081150/https://news.boxun.com/news/gb/pubvp/2008/05/200805072050.shtml |archive-date=2022-11-16 |access-date=29 July 2020 |website=[[Boxun]] |language=zh}}</ref> His conclusion was based on two decades of archival research.<ref name=":22" />
|-
|data-sort-value="45" |30–60
|scope=row | [[Jasper Becker]]
|1996
|Becker, a British journalist and author of ''[[Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine]]'',{{refn|group="note"|The title of [[Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine|Becker's book]] is a reference to [[hungry ghost]]s in Buddhism and [[Chinese traditional religion]].}} wrote that most estimates of the famine death toll range from 30 to 60 million.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Becker |first=Jasper |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3VeLKJyRzuQC |title=Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine |year=1996 |publisher=The Free Press |isbn=978-0-6848-3457-3 |author-link=Jasper Becker}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Autocratic Ghosts and Chinese Hunger |url=https://econfaculty.gmu.edu/bcaplan/museum/chinhung.htm |publisher=George Mason University}}</ref>
|-
|43
|scope=row | [[Frank Dikötter]]
|2010
|Dikötter, Chair Professor of Humanities at the [[University of Hong Kong]] and the author of ''[[Mao's Great Famine]]'', estimated that at least 45 million people died from starvation, overwork and state violence during the Great Leap Forward, claiming his findings to be based on access to recently opened local and provincial party archives.<ref name="Dikotter333">Dikötter, Frank. ''Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–62.'' Walker & Company, 2010. p. 333. {{ISBN|0-8027-7768-6}}</ref><ref name="indepedent">{{cite news |last=Akbar |first=Arifa |date=17 September 2010 |title=Mao's Great Leap Forward 'killed 45 million in four years' |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/news/maos-great-leap-forward-killed-45-million-in-four-years-2081630.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101029150409/http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/news/maos-great-leap-forward-killed-45-million-in-four-years-2081630.html |archive-date=29 October 2010 |access-date=20 September 2010 |work=The Independent |location=London}}</ref> His study also stressed that state violence exacerbated the death toll. Dikötter claimed that at least 2.5 million of the victims were beaten or tortured to death.<ref>Dikötter, Frank. ''[[Mao's Great Famine]]: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–62.'' Walker & Company, 2010. p. 298. {{ISBN|0-8027-7768-6}}</ref> His approach to the documents, as well as his claim to be the first author to use them, however, have been questioned by some other scholars.<ref>Dillon, Michael. "Collective Responsibility". ''The Times Literary Supplement'' 7 January (2011), p. 13.</ref> Reviewing ''Mao's Great Famine'', historian [[Cormac Ó Gráda]] wrote that "MGF is full of numbers but there are few tables and no graphs. [....] On page after page of MGF, numbers [...] are produced with no discussion of their reliability or provenance: all that seems to matter is that they are 'big'."<ref name="ograda2011">{{Cite journal |last=Ó Gráda |first=Cormac |author-link=Cormac Ó Gráda |year=2011 |editor-last=Dikötter |editor-first=Frank |title=Great Leap into Famine: A Review Essay |journal=Population and Development Review |volume=37 |issue=1 |pages=191–202 |doi=10.1111/j.1728-4457.2011.00398.x |issn=0098-7921 |doi-access=free}}</ref> Dikötter's high death toll estimate has also been criticized by sociologist [[Andrew G. Walder]] as unsupported by age-specific population data<ref>{{Cite book |last=Meyskens |first=Covell F. |title=Mao's Third Front: The Militarization of Cold War China |year=2020 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-108-78478-8 |page=6}}</ref> and by historian Anthony Garnaut who writes that Dikötter's sampling techniques fall short of academic best practices.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Garnaut |first1=Anthony |year=2013 |title=Hard facts and half-truths: The new archival history of China's Great Famine |journal=China Information |volume=27 |issue=2 |pages=223–246 |doi=10.1177/0920203X13485390 |s2cid=143503403}}</ref>
|-
|43
|scope=row | [[Chen Yizi]]
|1994
|Chen, a former senior Chinese official and a top advisor to former CCP General Secretary [[Zhao Ziyang]], stated that 43 million people died due to the famine.<ref name=":15">{{Cite news |last1=Strauss |first1=Valerie |last2=Southerl |first2=Daniel |date=17 July 1994 |title=How many died? New evidence suggests far higher numbers for the victims of Mao Zedong's era |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/07/17/how-many-died-new-evidence-suggests-far-higher-numbers-for-the-victims-of-mao-zedongs-era/01044df5-03dd-49f4-a453-a033c5287bce/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190925173059/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/07/17/how-many-died-new-evidence-suggests-far-higher-numbers-for-the-victims-of-mao-zedongs-era/01044df5-03dd-49f4-a453-a033c5287bce/ |archive-date=2019-09-25 |access-date=18 July 2020 |newspaper=The Washington Post |issn=0190-8286}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=25 April 2014 |title=Chen Yizi, a Top Adviser Forced to Flee China, Dies at 73 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/26/world/asia/chen-yizi-a-top-adviser-forced-to-flee-china-dies-at-73.html |access-date=18 July 2020 |work=The New York Times |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> While Chen conducted a county-by-county review of deaths in five provinces and performed extrapolation,<ref name=":15" /> economist [[Carl Riskin]] wrote that "Chen Yizi's methods of estimation are unknown" because they are unpublished.<ref name="riskin1998">{{Cite journal |last=Riskin |first=Carl |author-link=Carl Riskin |year=1998 |title=Seven questions about the Chinese famine of 1959–1961 |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1043951X99800091 |journal=China Economic Review |volume=9 |issue=2 |pages=111–124 |doi=10.1016/S1043-951X(99)80009-1|url-access=subscription }}</ref>
|-
|40
|scope=row | Liao Gailong {{nwr|({{zhi|廖盖隆}})}}
|2019
|Liao, former Vice Director of the History Research Unit of the CCP, reported 40 million "unnatural" deaths due to the famine.<ref name=":21">{{Cite web |last=Hong |first=Zhenkuai |script-title=zh:有关大饥荒的新谬说（二） |url=http://www.yhcqw.com/32/9660.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201103065942/http://www.yhcqw.com/32/9660.html |archive-date=2020-11-03 |access-date=18 July 2020 |website=[[Yanhuang Chunqiu]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Veg |first=Sebastian |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GGCbDwAAQBAJ&q=Liao+Gailong+40+million&pg=PA45 |title=Popular Memories of the Mao Era: From Critical Debate to Reassessing History |year=2019 |publisher=Hong Kong University Press |isbn=978-9-888-39076-2}}</ref>
|-
|36
|scope=row | [[Mao Yushi]]
|2014
|Mao, a Chinese economist and winner of the 2012 [[Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty]], put the death toll at 36 million.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mao |first1=Yushi |date=Fall 2014 |title=Lessons from China's Great Famine |url=https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2014/9/cj34n3-2.pdf |journal=Cato Journal |volume=34 |issue=3}}</ref>
|-
|36
|scope=row | [[Yang Jisheng (journalist)|Yang Jisheng]]
|2012
|Yang, [[Xinhua News Agency]] senior journalist and author of ''Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958–1962'', concluded there were 36 million deaths due to starvation, while another 40 million others failed to be born, so that "China's total population loss during the Great Famine then comes to 76 million."<ref name=":2" /><ref name="hunger">[http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18328 "A hunger for the truth: A new book, banned on the mainland, is becoming the definitive account of the Great Famine"], chinaelections.org, 7 July 2008 {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120210190821/http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18328|date=10 February 2012}}</ref> In response, historian [[Cormac Ó Gráda]] wrote that the results of a retrospective fertility survey "make the case for a total [death toll] much lower—perhaps ten million lower—than that proposed by Yang".<ref name="ograda2013">{{Cite journal |last=Gráda |first=Cormac Ó |author-link=Cormac Ó Gráda |year=2013 |editor-last=Jisheng |editor-first=Yang |editor2-last=Xun |editor2-first=Zhou |title=Great Leap, Great Famine: A Review Essay |journal=Population and Development Review |volume=39 |issue=2 |pages=333–346 |doi=10.1111/j.1728-4457.2013.00595.x |issn=0098-7921 |jstor=41857599 |s2cid=154275320}}</ref>
|-
|32.5
|scope=row | Cao Shuji {{nwr|({{zhi|曹树基}})}}
|2005
|Cao, Distinguished Professor at [[Shanghai Jiao Tong University]], estimated the death toll at 32.5 million.<ref name=":17">{{Cite web |last=Yang |first=Jishen |script-title=zh:关于大饥荒年代人口损失的讨论 |url=http://www.yhcqw.com/71/9611.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180513014719/http://www.yhcqw.com/71/9611.html |archive-date=13 May 2018 |access-date=22 April 2020 |website=[[Yanhuang Chunqiu]]|language=zh}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Shanghai Jiaotong University Institute of Humanities |url=https://shss.sjtu.edu.cn/En/FacultyDetail/77?f=1&t=2 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191101152830/http://shss.sjtu.edu.cn/En/FacultyDetail/77?f=1&t=2 |archive-date=1 November 2019 |access-date=22 April 2020 |website=shss.sjtu.edu.cn}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Gráda |first=Cormac Ó |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FICSBQAAQBAJ&q=cao+shuji+32.5+million&pg=PA159 |title=Eating People Is Wrong, and Other Essays on Famine, Its Past, and Its Future |year=2015 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-1-400-86581-9 |author-link=Cormac Ó Gráda}}</ref><ref name="ograda2011" />
|-
|30
|scope=row | [[Vaclav Smil]]
|1999
|Smil, a Czech-Canadian scientist and policy analyst, estimated 30 million deaths.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Smil |first=Vaclav |year=1999 |title=China's great famine: 40 years later |journal=[[The BMJ]] |volume=319 |issue=7225 |pages=1619–1621 |doi=10.1136/bmj.319.7225.1619 |pmc=1127087 |pmid=10600969 |authorlink=Vaclav Smil}}</ref>
|-
|30
|scope=row | Judith Banister
|1987
|Banister, Director of Global Demographics at [[the Conference Board]],<ref>{{Cite web |title=Judith Banister |url=https://www.conference-board.org/bio/index.cfm?bioid=427 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131023161746/https://www.conference-board.org/bio/index.cfm?bioid=427 |archive-date=23 October 2013 |access-date=22 April 2020 |website=conference-board.org}}</ref> estimated 30 million excess deaths from 1958 to 1961.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Banister |first=Judith |url=https://archive.org/details/chinaschangingpo0000bani |title=China's Changing Population |year=1987 |publisher=Stanford University Press |isbn=978-0-804-71887-5}}</ref>
|-
|23
|scope=row | Peng Xizhe {{nwr|({{zhi|彭希哲}})}}
|1987
|Peng, Professor of Population and Development at [[Fudan University]], estimated 23 million excess deaths during the famine.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Peng |first=Xizhe |year=1987 |title=Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces |journal=[[Population and Development Review]] |volume=13 |issue=4 |pages=639–670 |doi=10.2307/1973026 |issn=0098-7921 |jstor=1973026}}</ref>
|-
|22
|scope=row | Li Chengrui {{nwr|({{zhi|李成瑞}})}}
|1998
|Li, former Minister of the [[National Bureau of Statistics of China]], estimated 22 million deaths.<ref name=":17" /><ref>{{Cite book |last=Paine |first=Sarah C. M. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cJ9sBgAAQBAJ&q=Li+Chengrui+22+million&pg=PA130 |title=Nation Building, State Building, and Economic Development: Case Studies and Comparisons: Case Studies and Comparisons |year=2015 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-46409-9}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last1=Jinglian |first1=Wu |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oS_cCwAAQBAJ&q=Li+Chengrui+22+million&pg=PT69 |title=Whither China?: Restarting the Reform Agenda |last2=Guochuan |first2=Ma |year=2016 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-190-22317-5}}</ref> His estimate was based on the 27 million deaths<ref name=":11" /><ref>{{Cite news |last=Hilts |first=Philip J. |date=11 July 1984 |title=Chinese Statistics Indicate Killing of Baby Girls Persists |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/07/11/chinese-statistics-indicate-killing-of-baby-girls-persists/144803ec-0513-4170-b7eb-972246895c38/ |access-date=24 July 2020 |newspaper=The Washington Post |issn=0190-8286}}</ref> estimated by [[Ansley J. Coale]], and the 17 million deaths estimated by Jiang Zhenghua ({{zhi|蒋正华}}).<ref name="jiang">{{cite journal |last=Jiang |first=Zhenghua |year=1986 |script-title=zh:中国人口动态估计的方法和结果 |url=http://www.yhcw.net/famine/Research/10052.pdf |script-journal=zh:西安交通大学学报 |issue=3 |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20120703082638/http://www.yhcw.net/famine/Research/10052.pdf |archivedate=2012-07-03 |language=zh}}</ref><ref name="ograda2013" />
|-
|18
|scope=row | Shujie Yao {{nwr|({{zhi|姚书杰}})}}
|1999
|Yao, the Chair of Economics at the Business School of [[Middlesex University]], concluded that 18 million people died due to the famine.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Yao |first=Shujie |year=1999 |title=A Note on the Causal Factors of China's Famine in 1959–1961 |journal=Journal of Political Economy |volume=107 |issue=6 |pages=1365–1369 |doi=10.1086/250100 |s2cid=17546168}}</ref>
|-
|15
|scope=row | [[Chinese Academy of Sciences]]
|1989
|A research team at the [[Chinese Academy of Sciences]] concluded that at least 15 million people died of [[malnutrition]].<ref name=":21" />
|-
|15.4
|scope=row | Daniel Houser, Barbara Sands, and Erte Xiao
|2009
|Houser, Sands, and Xiao, writing in the ''[[Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization]]'', estimated that China suffered 15.4 million excess deaths during the famine, of which 69% (or 10.6 million) were attributable to effects stemming from national policies.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Houser |first1=Daniel |last2=Sands |first2=Barbara |last3=Xiao |first3=Erte |date=2009-02-01 |title=Three parts natural, seven parts man-made: Bayesian analysis of China's Great Leap Forward demographic disaster |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167268108001777 |journal=Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |volume=69 |issue=2 |pages=148–159 |doi=10.1016/j.jebo.2007.09.008 |issn=0167-2681}}</ref>
|}
[[File:Birth rate in China.svg|thumb|Birth and death rates in China]]
Due to the lack of food and incentive to marry at that time, according to China's official statistics, China's population in 1961 was about 658,590,000, some 14,580,000 lower than in 1959.<ref name=":8">{{Cite web|last=Chen|first=Tingwei|date=2010-08-01|script-title=zh:三年困难时期"代食品运动"出台记|url=http://www.people.com.cn/GB/198221/198819/198858/12308312.html|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011141905/http://www.people.com.cn/GB/198221/198819/198858/12308312.html|archive-date=11 October 2017|access-date=22 April 2020|website=People's Daily|language=zh}}</ref> The birth rate decreased from 2.922% (1958) to 2.086% (1960) and the death rate increased from 1.198% (1958) to 2.543% (1960), while the average numbers for 1962–1965 are about 4% and 1%, respectively.<ref name=":8" /> The mortality in the birth and death rates both peaked in 1961 and began recovering rapidly after that, as shown on the chart of census data displayed here<!-- not "left" – incorrect on mobile -->.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Lin|first1=Justin Yifu|last2=Yang|first2=Dennis Tao|year=2000|title=Food Availability, Entitlements and the Chinese Famine of 1959–61|journal=[[The Economic Journal]]|publisher=[[Royal Economic Society]]|volume=110|issue=460|page=143|doi=10.1111/1468-0297.00494}}</ref><ref>Holmes, Leslie. ''Communism: A Very Short Introduction'' ([[Oxford University Press]] 2009). {{ISBN|978-0-199-55154-5}}. p. 32 "Most estimates of the number of Chinese dead are in the range of 15 to 40 million."</ref> Lu Baoguo, a [[Xinhua]] reporter based in [[Xinyang]], explained to Yang Jisheng why he never reported on his experience:

{{blockquote|In the second half of 1959, I took a long-distance bus from Xinyang to [[Luoshan]] and [[Gushi County|Gushi]]. Out of the window, I saw one corpse after another in the ditches. On the bus, no one dared to mention the dead. In one county, [[Guangshan]], one-third of the people had died. Although there were dead people everywhere, the local leaders enjoyed good meals and fine liquor.&nbsp;... I had seen people who had told the truth being destroyed. Did I dare to write it?<ref name="trans" />}}

Yu Dehong, the secretary of a party official in Xinyang in 1959 and 1960, stated:
{{blockquote|I went to one village and saw 100 corpses, then another village and another 100 corpses. No one paid attention to them. People said that dogs were eating the bodies. Not true, I said. The dogs had long ago been eaten by the people.<ref name="trans" />}}

=== Cannibalism ===
There are widespread oral reports, though little official documentation, of [[human cannibalism]] being practiced in various forms as a result of the famine.<ref name="bern97">{{cite news|last=Bernstein|first=Richard|url=https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0CE3D71E3DF936A35751C0A961958260 |title=Horror of a Hidden Chinese Famine|date=5 February 1997|work=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=8 February 2017|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090305072906/http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0CE3D71E3DF936A35751C0A961958260 |archive-date=5 March 2009}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Becker|first=Jasper|url=https://archive.org/details/hungryghostsmaos00beck|title=Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine|publisher=Free Press|year=1997|isbn=978-0-68483457-3|url-access=registration|page=352}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Dikötter|first=Frank|title=Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962|year=2010|isbn=978-0-80277768-3|pages=320–323|chapter=36. Cannibalism |publisher=Walker }}</ref> To survive, people had to resort to every possible means, from eating soil and poisons to stealing and killing and even to eating human flesh.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1nq1qr |title=The Great Famine in China, 1958–1962: A Documentary History |date=2012 |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=978-0-300-17518-9 |pages=59–71 |language=en |chapter=Chapter Four Cannibalism (Late 1959–Early 1961)|jstor=j.ctt1nq1qr }}</ref>{{sfn|Yang|2012|loc=passim}} Yang Jisheng, a retired Chinese reporter, said "Parents ate their own kids. Kids ate their own parents. And we couldn't have imagined there was still grain in the warehouses. At the worst time, the government was still exporting grain."<ref name="npr.org">{{cite web|last1=Lim |first1=Louisa |title=A Grim Chronicle of China's Great Famine |work=NPR |date=10 November 2012 |url=https://www.npr.org/2012/11/10/164732497/a-grim-chronicle-of-chinas-great-famine}}</ref> Due to the scale of the famine, some have speculated that the resulting cannibalism could be described as "on a scale unprecedented in the history of the 20th century".<ref name="bern97" />{{sfn|Becker|1997|loc=passim}}

== Aftermath ==
=== Initial reactions and cover-ups ===
[[File:1961_Mao_Zedong_reading_People's_Daily_in_Hangzhou_(2).jpg|alt=|thumb|Mao Zedong reading ''[[People's Daily]]'' (1961).]]

Provincial and local party leaders, for their part, conspired to cover up shortfalls and reassign blame in order to protect their own lives and positions.<ref name=":17e" /><ref>{{Cite web|title=Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958–1962|url=https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/tombstone-the-great-chinese-famine-1958-1962/|access-date=2021-01-08|website=Association for Asian Studies|language=en-US}}</ref> Mao was kept unaware of some of the starvation of villagers in the rural areas who were suffering, as the birth rate began to plummet and deaths increased in 1958 and 1959.<ref name="Yang" /> In 1960, as gestures of solidarity, Mao ate no meat for seven months and [[Zhou Enlai]] cut his monthly grain consumption.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Ó Gráda|first=Cormac|author-link=Cormac Ó Gráda|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LoN2XkjJio4C&pg=PA242|title=Famine: A Short History|date=2009|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-0-691-12237-3|pages=242|language=en}}</ref>

In visits to [[Henan province]] in 1958, Mao observed what local officials claimed was increases in crop yield of one thousand to three thousand percent achieved, supposedly, in massive 24-hour pushes organized by the officials which they called "sputnik launches". But the numbers were faked, and so were the fields that Mao observed, which had been carefully prepared in advance of Mao's visit by local officials, who removed shoots of grain from various fields and carefully transplanted them into a field prepared especially for Mao, to appear to be a bumper crop.{{sfn|Becker|1997|p=122}}

The local officials became trapped by these sham demonstrations to Mao, and exhorted the peasants to reach unattainable goals, by "deep ploughing and close planting", among other techniques. This ended up making things much worse; the crop failed completely, leaving barren fields. No one was in a position to challenge Mao's ideas as incorrect, so peasants went to extreme lengths to keep up the charade; some grew seedlings in their bedding and coats and, after the seedlings quickly sprouted, "planted" them in fields—the bedding made the plants look high and healthy.{{sfn|Becker|1997|p=122}}

The post office in Xinyang confiscated 1,200 outgoing letters begging for help.<ref name="npr.org"/> Yang Jisheng, a retired Chinese reporter, said:

{{blockquote|When the Guangshan County post office discovered an anonymous letter to Beijing disclosing starvation deaths, the public security bureau began hunting down the writer. One of the post office's counter staff recalled that a pockmarked woman had mailed the letter. The local public security bureau rounded up and interrogated every pockmarked woman without identifying the culprit. It was subsequently determined that the writer worked in Zhengzhou and had written the letter upon returning to her home village and seeing people starving to death.<ref name="npr.org"/>}}

Like in the massive Soviet-created famine in Ukraine (the [[Holodomor]]), doctors were prohibited from listing "starvation" as a cause of death on death certificates.{{sfn|Becker|1997|at=ch.&nbsp;3}}<ref>{{Cite book|last=Yang|first=Jishen|url=https://library.hnjhj.com/book/gravestone.pdf|title=Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962 (Chinese Version)|year=2008|access-date=8 January 2021|archive-date=3 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201203200123/https://library.hnjhj.com/book/gravestone.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> This kind of deception was far from uncommon; a famous [[propaganda]] picture from the famine shows Chinese children from [[Shandong]] province ostensibly standing atop a field of wheat, so densely grown that it could apparently support their weight. In reality, they were standing on a bench concealed beneath the plants, and the "field" was again entirely composed of individually transplanted stalks.<ref name=":17e" />

=== Response from Taiwan ===
In response to the famine on [[Mainland China]], the [[Government of the Republic of China]] and the [[Free China Relief Agency]] launched a large scale donation campaign throughout Taiwan and the Chinese diaspora communist to collect and to deliver aid to the victims of the famine. Initially, the plan was to collect the aid and funds via the Free China Relief Agency and then pass it onto the [[Red Cross]] in order to deliver it to mainland. The Red Cross complied with the request from the Free China Relief Agency and contacted the [[Prc government|PRC government]] for permission to deliver the aid. But, the PRC government refused the aid, claiming that “Although our rural areas suffered serious natural calamities in the past two years, there has never been a famine” and asserting that “ the nation was fully capable of overcoming temporary difficulties caused by natural calamities.” Upon receiving the negative reply, the Free China Relief Agency contacted the [[Republic of China Air Force]] to airdrop the aid onto the mainland. In the ensuing airdrop campaign, the ROC Air Force was able to deliver tons of humanitarian aid to famine-stricken civilians on the mainland through airdrops during the night.<ref>{{Citation |title=Formosa Food Air Drop On Chinese Mainland (1961) | date=13 April 2014 |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7zOw1O74m_E |access-date=2023-07-14 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=June 28, 1961 |title=Taiwan Drops Food on China |url=https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1961/06/28/101468969.html?pageNumber=41 |access-date=2023-07-14 |work=The New York Times |page=41 |language=en |via=TimesMachine |volume=CX |issue=37776}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Taiwan Today |url=https://taiwantoday.tw/print/Society/Taiwan-Review/7357/Famine-on-the-Chinese-Mainland |access-date=2025-08-21 |website=taiwantoday.tw}}</ref>

=== Cultural Revolution ===
{{Main|Cultural Revolution|Socialist Education Movement}}

[[File:1963-11 1963 刘少奇访问朝鲜 崔庸健陪同.jpg|left|thumb|Liu Shaoqi visiting [[North Korea]] (1963).]]
In April and May 1961, [[Liu Shaoqi]], then [[President of the People's Republic of China]], concluded after 44 days of field research in villages of [[Hunan]] that the causes of the famine were 30% natural disaster and 70% human error (三分天灾, 七分人祸).<ref name=":4" /><ref name=":5" />

In January and February 1962, the "[[Seven Thousand Cadres Conference|7000 Cadres Conference]]" took place in [[Beijing]], which was attended by more than 7,000 CCP officials nationwide.<ref name=":17ee">{{Cite web|title=七千人大会|url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/33837/2534794.html|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190919051557/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/33837/2534794.html|archive-date=19 September 2019|access-date=23 April 2020|website=People's Daily}}</ref><ref name=":21" /><ref name=":22" /> During the conference, Liu formally announced his conclusion on the causes of the great famine, while the Great Leap Forward was declared "over" by the Chinese Communist Party.<ref name=":17ee" /><ref name=":21e">{{Cite web|url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/theme/chinese-foreign-policy-database/timeline?year=1962|title=Chinese Foreign Policy Database|website=Wilson Center Digital Archive|access-date=23 April 2020|archive-date=22 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200622102243/https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/theme/chinese-foreign-policy-database/timeline?year=1962|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name=":22e">{{Cite book|last=MacFarquhar|first=Roderick|url=https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780192149978.001.0001/acprof-9780192149978-chapter-8|title=The Seven Thousand Cadres Conference|year=1997|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-167008-4|language=en-US|doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780192149978.001.0001|access-date=23 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200523211114/https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780192149978.001.0001/acprof-9780192149978-chapter-8|archive-date=23 May 2020|url-status=live}}</ref> The policies of Mao Zedong were criticized.<ref name=":21e" /><ref name=":22e" />

The failure of the Great Leap Forward as well as the famine forced Mao Zedong to withdraw from active decision-making within the CCP and the central government, and turn various future responsibilities over to Liu Shaoqi and [[Deng Xiaoping]].<ref name=":12">{{Cite web|title=Three Chinese Leaders: Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping|url=http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_leaders.htm|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131211053051/http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_leaders.htm|archive-date=11 December 2013|access-date=22 April 2020|website=Columbia University}}</ref> A series of economic reforms were carried out by Liu and Deng and others, including policies such as ''sanzi yibao'' (三自一包) which allowed [[free market]] and household responsibility for agricultural production.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Denhardt|first1=Janet Vinzant|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=O6ac30QVU-4C&q=sanzi+yibao&pg=PA376|title=The New Public Service: Serving, Not Steering|last2=Denhardt|first2=Robert B.|date=2007|publisher=M.E. Sharpe|isbn=978-0-7656-2181-8|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Liu Shaoqi (1898-1969) {{!}} CUHK Digital Repository|url=https://repository.lib.cuhk.edu.hk/en/collection/crposter/liushaoqi|access-date=2020-07-02|website=[[Chinese University of Hong Kong]]}}</ref>

However, the disagreement between Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping over economic and social policy grew larger. In 1963, Mao launched the [[Socialist Education Movement]] and in 1966, he launched the [[Cultural Revolution]], during which Liu was accused of being a traitor and enemy agent for attributing only 30% to natural calamities.<ref name=":11" /><ref name=":12" /><ref name=":13">{{Cite journal|last=Dittmer|first=Lowell|year=1981|title=Death and Transfiguration: Liu Shaoqi's Rehabilitation and Contemporary Chinese Politics|journal=The Journal of Asian Studies|volume=40|issue=3|pages=455–479|doi=10.2307/2054551|jstor=2054551|s2cid=153995268 }}</ref> Liu was beaten and denied medicine for [[diabetes]] and [[pneumonia]]; he died in 1969.<ref name=":13" /> Deng was accused of being a "[[capitalist roader]]" during the Cultural Revolution and was purged twice.<ref>{{Cite web|title=The Man Who Re-Invented China {{!}} Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective|url=https://origins.osu.edu/review/man-who-re-invented-china|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190725131635/https://origins.osu.edu/review/man-who-re-invented-china|archive-date=25 July 2019|access-date=22 April 2020|website=Ohio State University|date=17 September 2012 }}</ref>

=== Reforms and reflections ===
{{see also|Boluan Fanzheng|Chinese economic reform}}
[[File:Deng Xiaoping 1976.jpg|thumb|[[Deng Xiaoping]]]]
In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping became the new [[Paramount Leader of China]] and launched the historic [[Reform and opening up]] program which fundamentally changed the agricultural and industrial system in China.<ref>{{Cite web|title=邓小平纪念网|url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/69113/index.html|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200505182417/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/69113/index.html|archive-date=5 May 2020|access-date=22 April 2020|website=People's Daily|language=zh}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-01/40-years-of-reform-that-transformed-china-into-a-superpower/10573468|title=40 years on from the 'experiments' that transformed China into an economic superpower|last1=Zhou|first1=Christina|last2=Xiao|first2=Bang|date=1 December 2018|website=ABC News|language=en-AU|access-date=22 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200424005843/https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-01/40-years-of-reform-that-transformed-china-into-a-superpower/10573468|archive-date=24 April 2020|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://slate.com/technology/2014/04/why-does-china-not-have-famines-anymore-capitalist-and-socialist-reforms.html|title=How China Went From Famine After Famine to Feast|last=Palmer|first=Brian|date=2 April 2014|website=Slate|language=en|access-date=22 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200521021209/https://slate.com/technology/2014/04/why-does-china-not-have-famines-anymore-capitalist-and-socialist-reforms.html|archive-date=21 May 2020|url-status=live}}</ref> Until the early 1980s, the Chinese government's stance was that the famine was largely a result of a series of natural disasters compounded by several planning errors, reflected by the name "Three Years of Natural Disasters". During the "[[Boluan Fanzheng]]" period in June 1981, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officially changed the name to "Three Years of Difficulty", and stated that the famine was mainly due to the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward as well as the [[Anti-Right Deviation Struggle]], in addition to some natural disasters and the [[Sino-Soviet split]].<ref name=":18" /><ref name=":9" /> Academic studies on the Great Chinese Famine also became more active in mainland China after 1980, when the government started to release some demographic data to the public.<ref>{{Cite news|title=一段不容忽视的历史：大饥荒|language=zh|work=[[BBC]]|url=https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/indepth/2009/09/090924_china60_yangjisheng|access-date=22 April 2020}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Chang|first1=Gene Hsin|last2=Wen|first2=Guanzhong James|year=1997|title=Communal Dining and the Chinese Famine of 1958–1961|journal=Economic Development and Cultural Change|volume=46|issue=1|pages=1–34|doi=10.1086/452319|jstor=10.1086/452319|s2cid=154835645|issn=0013-0079}}</ref> A number of high-ranking Chinese officials had expressed their views on the famine:
* [[Zhao Ziyang]], former [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party]], once said that "our Party never admitted mistakes. If things got really bad, we just found some scapegoats and blamed them, like [[Lin Biao]] and the [[Gang of Four]]. If scapegoats were hard to find, we simply blamed natural disasters, such as for the great famine in the late 1950s and early 1960s when tens of millions of people died, which was simply due to political errors of the Party."<ref>{{Cite web|last1=Zhao|first1=Ziyang|last2=Du|first2=Daozheng|author-link2=Du Daozheng|date=2015-03-21|title=《杜导正日记》出版： 道出许多赵紫阳不为人知的秘密|url=https://www.chinesepen.org/blog/archives/23634|access-date=2021-01-08|website=Independent Chinese PEN Center|language=zh}}</ref>
* [[Bo Yibo]], one of the [[Eight Elders]] and former [[Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China]], once said, "During the three difficult years, people across the country went into [[malnutrition]] due to lack of food, and [[edema]] was prevalent, resulting in an increasing number of deaths due to starvation among many rural areas. It is estimated that in 1960 alone, more than 10 million people died. With such thing happening during a time of peace, we as members of the Communist Party feel truly guilty in front of the people, and we must never forget this heavy lesson! "<ref>{{Cite web|last=Lin|first=Yunhui|title=三年大饥荒中的人口非正常变动|url=http://www.yhcqw.com/30/5261.html|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190905042257/http://www.yhcqw.com/30/5261.html|archive-date=2019-09-05|website=[[Yanhuang Chunqiu]]|language=zh}}</ref>
* [[Wan Li]], former President of the [[National People's Congress of China]], stated that "during the three difficult years after the People's Commune movement, people everywhere had [[edema]] and even starved to death. In Anhui alone, according to reports, there were 3-4 million people died 'abnormally' ...... We had been ' [[Far-left politics|left]] ' for too long, and farmers were no longer motivated to work."<ref>{{Cite web|last=Tian|first=Jiyun|author-link=Tian Jiyun|date=2013-03-26|title=万里谈困难时期的安徽：非正常死亡人口三四百万|url=http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguoxiandaishi/detail_2013_03/26/23542832_0.shtml|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150207182835/http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguoxiandaishi/detail_2013_03/26/23542832_0.shtml|archive-date=2015-02-07|website=[[Phoenix Television|Phoenix New Media]]|language=zh}}</ref>
*[[Tian Jiyun]], former [[Vice Premier of China]] and former Vice President of the National People's Congress of China, stated that "looking back at the Three Years of Difficulty, people everywhere had [[edema]] and died of starvation, and tens of millions of people died abnormally, more than the total death toll during the entire Democratic Revolution. What was the reason for that? Liu Shaoqi said it was '30% natural disasters and 70% human error.' But it is now clear that the famine was mainly due to human error, which was the erroneous command, the '[[Utopian socialism|Utopian Socialism]]', and the '[[Far-left politics|Left]] [[opportunism]]'."<ref>{{Cite web|last=Gao|first=Hua|date=2004|title=从《七律·有所思》看毛泽东发动文革的运思|url=https://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=4557|access-date=2021-01-08|website=[[Chinese University of Hong Kong]]|publisher=[[Yanhuang Chunqiu]]|language=zh|archive-date=28 July 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200728222345/https://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=4557|url-status=dead}}</ref>

Researchers outside China have argued that the massive institutional and policy changes which accompanied the [[Great Leap Forward]] were the key factors in the famine, or at least worsened nature-induced disasters.<ref>{{cite video|title=China: A Century of Revolution|year=1997|people=Sue Williams (director), Howard Sharp (editor), [[Will Lyman]] (narrator)|publisher=WinStar Home Entertainment}}</ref><ref>{{citation|title=Encyclopedia of Population|volume=1|pages=388–390|year=2003|editor-last=Demeny|editor-first=Paul|contribution=Famine in China|place=New York|publisher=Macmillan Reference|editor2-last=McNicoll|editor2-first=Geoffrey}}</ref> In particular, Nobel laureate [[Amartya Sen]] puts this famine in a global context, arguing that lack of [[democracy]] is the major culprit: "Indeed, no substantial famine has ever occurred in a democratic country—no matter how poor." He adds that it is "hard to imagine that anything like this could have happened in a country that goes to the polls regularly and that has an independent press. During that terrible calamity the government faced no pressure from newspapers, which were controlled, and none from opposition parties, which were absent."<ref name="Sen1999">{{cite book|author=Amartya Kumar Sen|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Qm8HtpFHYecC|title=Development as freedom|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=1999|isbn=978-0-19-289330-7|access-date=14 April 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140103042841/http://books.google.com/books?id=Qm8HtpFHYecC|archive-date=3 January 2014|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>Wiener, Jon. [https://books.google.com/books?id=1KiD069CPsUC&pg=PA38 "How We Forgot the Cold War. A Historical Journey across America"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190226022039/https://books.google.com/books?id=1KiD069CPsUC&pg=PA38 |date=26 February 2019 }} University of California Press, 2012, p. 38.</ref> Sen though also argues: "Despite the gigantic size of excess mortality in the Chinese famine, the extra mortality in India from regular deprivation in normal times vastly overshadows the former. [...] India seems to manage to fill its cupboard with more skeletons every eight years than China put there in its years of shame."<ref>{{cite book|last=Škof|first=Lenart|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UEGSBgAAQBAJ|title=Breath of Proximity: Intersubjectivity, Ethics and Peace|year=2015|publisher=Springer|page=161|isbn=978-94-017-9738-2}}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|1950s|1960s|China}}
* [[Criticism of communist party rule]]
* [[History of the Chinese Communist Party]]
* [[History of the People's Republic of China]]
* [[List of campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party]]
** [[Four Pests campaign]]
** [[Eliminate Sparrows campaign]]
* [[List of famines]]
* [[List of famines in China]]
** [[Northern Chinese Famine of 1876–1879]]
** [[Chinese famine of 1906–1907]]
** [[Chinese famine of 1928–1930]]
** [[Chinese famine of 1942–1943]]
* [[List of incidents of cannibalism]]
* [[Maoism]]

== Notes ==
{{Notelist}}
{{reflist| group="note"|refs=
<ref name="PATNAIK">She wrote in an essay that "[t]he figure of 30 million has passed into popular folklore&nbsp;... The fact that 19 million of them never existed because they were never born in the first place is not conveyed by the formulation." She criticized the equating of China's "missing millions" with famine deaths, rather than people who were never born due to declining birth rates. Also she claimed that "Because the internal political developments in China after 1978 were in the direction of attacking Maoist egalitarianism and the commune system, no repudiation from Chinese sources of the US estimates are to be seen". Patnaik concluded that the figures were ideologically derived in attempts to discredit communism, while similar excessive deaths in 1990s Russia, following the collapse of the USSR, were routinely ignored.</ref>
}}

== References ==
{{Reflist}}

== Further reading ==
{{refbegin|2}}
* Ashton, Basil, Kenneth Hill, Alan Piazza, Robin Zeitz, "Famine in China, 1958–61", ''Population and Development Review,'' Vol. 10, No. 4. (Dec. 1984), pp.&nbsp;613–645.
* Banister, J. "Analysis of Recent Data on the Population of China", ''Population and Development,'' Vol. 10, No. 2, 1984.
* {{cite book |last1=Becker |first1=Jasper |author-link1=Jasper Becker |year=1998 |title=Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine |publisher=[[Henry Holt and Company|Holt]] |series=A Holt paperback : history |isbn=0-8050-5668-8 |oclc=985077206 }}
* {{cite journal|last=Bernstein|first=Thomas P.|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20192620|title=Mao Zedong and the Famine of 1959-1960: A Study in Wilfulness |journal=[[The China Quarterly]]|date=June 2006|volume=186|issue=186|pages=421–425|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|doi=10.1017/S0305741006000221|jstor=20192620|s2cid=153728069|url-access=subscription}}
* Cao Shuji, "The Deaths of China's Population and Its Contributing Factors during 1959–1961". ''China's Population Science'' (Jan. 2005) (In Chinese).
* ''China Statistical Yearbook'' (1984), edited by State Statistical Bureau. China Statistical Publishing House, 1984. pp.&nbsp;83, 141, 190.
* ''China Statistical Yearbook'' (1991), edited by State Statistical Bureau. China Statistical Publishing House, 1991.
* ''China Population Statistical Yearbook'' (1985), edited by State Statistical Bureau. China Statistical Bureau Publishing House, 1985.
* [[Ansley J. Coale|Coale, Ansley J.]], ''Rapid Population Change in China, 1952–1982'', [[National Academy Press]], Washington, D.C., 1984.
* [[Frank Dikötter|Dikötter, Frank]]. ''[[Mao's Great Famine|Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–62]]''. [[Walker & Company]], 2010. {{ISBN|0-8027-7768-6}}.
* Gao. Mobo (2007). ''Gao Village: Rural Life in Modern China''. [[University of Hawaii Press]]. {{ISBN|978-0-8248-3192-9}}.
* Gao. Mobo (2008). ''The Battle for China's Past''. [[Pluto Press]]. {{ISBN|978-0-7453-2780-8}}.
* Jiang Zhenghua ({{lang|zh|蔣正華}}), "Method and Result of China Population Dynamic Estimation", Academic Report of Xi'a university, 1986(3). pp.&nbsp;46, 84.
* Li Chengrui({{lang|zh|李成瑞}}): Population Change Caused by The Great Leap Movement, Demographic Study, No.1, 1998 pp.&nbsp;97–111
* Li. Minqi (2008). ''The Rise of China and the Demise of the Capitalist World Economy''. [[Monthly Review Press]]. {{ISBN|978-1-58367-182-5}}
* Peng Xizhe, "Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces", ''Population and Development Review,'' Vol. 13, No. 4. (Dec. 1987), pp.&nbsp;639–670
* Thaxton. Ralph A. Jr. (2008). ''Catastrophe and Contention in Rural China: Mao's Great Leap Forward Famine and the Origins of Righteous Resistance in Da Fo Village''. [[Cambridge University Press]]. {{ISBN|0-521-72230-6}}
* {{cite journal|last=Wemheuer|first=Felix|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20749353|title=Dealing with Responsibility for the Great Leap Famine in the People's Republic of China |journal=[[The China Quarterly]]|date=March 2010|volume=201|issue=201|pages=176–194|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|doi=10.1017/S0305741009991123|jstor=20749353|s2cid=154460757|url-access=subscription}}
* Yang, Dali. ''Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society and Institutional Change since the Great Leap Famine''. Stanford University Press, 1996.
* [[Yang Jisheng (journalist)|Yang Jisheng]]. 墓碑 － 中國六十年代大饑荒紀實 (Mubei – Zhongguo Liushi Niandai Da Jihuang Jishi – "Tombstone: An Account of the Chinese Famine in the 1960s"), Hong Kong: Cosmos Books (Tiandi Tushu), 2008, {{ISBN|978-988-211-909-3}} {{in lang|zh}}. By 2010, the title had been changed to 墓碑: 一九五八-一九六二年中國大饑荒紀實 (Mubei: Yi Jiu Wu Ba – Yi Jiu Liu Er Nian Zhongguo Da Jihuang Shiji – "Tombstone: An Account of the Chinese Famine of 1958–1962").
* Yang Jisheng, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=nadqrYU10eMC Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958–1962]'', Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012, {{ISBN|978-0-374-27793-2}}. (Abridged English translation of the above work).
* Official Chinese statistics, shown as a graph. {{citation|url=http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/ChinaFood/data/pop/pop_10.htm |work=Land Use Systems Group (LUC)|publisher=[[International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis]] (IIASA) |location=Austria |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050904001002/http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/ChinaFood/data/pop/pop_10.htm |archive-date=4 September 2005|title=Data – Population Growth}}
{{refend}}

{{Mao Zedong}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:1958 disasters in China]]
[[Category:1959 disasters in China]]
[[Category:1960 disasters in China]]
[[Category:1961 disasters in China]]
[[Category:1962 disasters in China]]
[[Category:1950s famines]]
[[Category:1960s famines]]
[[Category:Famines in China]]
[[Category:Incidents of cannibalism]]
[[Category:Man-made disasters in China]]
[[Category:Great Leap Forward]]