View source for Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

{{Short description|World War II era Pan-Asian union under the Empire of Japan}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=May 2020}}
{{Use American English|date = February 2019}}
{{Infobox geopolitical organisation
| name                   = Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
| linking_name           = Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
| native_name            = 大東亜共栄圏
| symbol_type            = 
| image_symbol           = 
| image_map              = [[File:Greater Asian Co-prosperity sphere (orthographic projection).svg|300px]]
| map_caption            = Members of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and territories occupied by the Japanese army at maximum height in 1945. Japan and its [[Axis powers|Axis]] allies [[Thailand in World War II|Thailand]] and [[Azad Hind]] are in dark red; occupied territories/puppet states are in lighter red. [[Korea under Japanese rule|Korea]], [[Taiwan under Japanese rule|Taiwan]], [[Karafuto Prefecture|Karafuto (South Sakhalin)]], and [[Kuril Islands|Chishima (Kuril) Archipelago]] were integral parts of Japan.
| membership_type        = Membership
| membership             = 
 {{flagcountry|Empire of Japan|name=Japan}}<br />{{flagcountry|Thailand}}<br />{{flagcountry|Azad Hind}}<br />
{{collapsible list
  | titlestyle = background: transparent; text-align: left; font-weight: normal;
  | title = Japanese puppet states
  | {{flagcountry|Manchukuo}}
  | {{flagcountry|Mengjiang}}
  | {{flagcountry|Wang Jingwei regime|1943}}
  | {{flagcountry|State of Burma}}
  | {{flagcountry|Second Philippine Republic}}
  | {{flag decoration|Vietnam|1945}} [[Empire of Vietnam|Vietnam]]  
  | {{flag decoration|Cambodia|1863}} [[Kingdom of Kampuchea (1945)|Kampuchea]]
  | {{flag decoration|Kingdom of Laos}} [[Kingdom of Luang Prabang (1945)|Laos]]
 }}
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{{Shōwa Statism|Principles}}
{{Infobox Chinese
| kyujitai = 大東亞共榮圈
| shinjitai = 大東亜共栄圏
| kana = だいとうあきょうえいけん
| revhep = Dai Tōa Kyōeiken
}}
The {{Nihongo|'''Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'''|大東亜共栄圏|Dai Tōa Kyōeiken|lead=yes}}, also known as the '''GEACPS''',<ref>{{cite book|last1=Matthiessen|first1=Sven|title=Japanese Pan-Asianism and the Philippines from the Late Nineteenth Century to the End of World War II: Going to the Philippines Is Like Coming Home?|date=2015|publisher=Brill|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=llPeCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA28|isbn=9789004305724}}</ref> was a [[Pan-Asianism|pan-Asian]] union that the [[Empire of Japan|Empire of Japan]] tried to establish. Initially, it covered Japan (including [[Korea under Japanese rule|annexed Korea]]), [[Manchukuo]], and [[Wang Jingwei regime|China]], but as the [[Pacific War]] progressed, it also included territories in [[Southeast Asia]] and parts of [[Azad Hind|India]].<ref name=":4">William L. O'Neill, ''A Democracy at War: America's Fight at Home and Abroad in World War II''. Free Press, 1993, p. 53. {{ISBN|0-02-923678-9}}</ref> The term was first coined by [[Minister for Foreign Affairs (Japan)|Minister for Foreign Affairs]] [[Hachirō Arita]] on June 29, 1940.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal |last=Colegrove |first=Kenneth |date=1941 |title=The New Order in East Asia |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2049073 |journal=The Far Eastern Quarterly |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=5–24 |doi=10.2307/2049073 |jstor=2049073 |s2cid=162713869 |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

The proposed objectives of this union were to ensure [[Autarky|economic self-sufficiency]] and [[Economic union|cooperation]] among the member states, along with resisting the influence of  [[Western imperialism in Asia|Western imperialism]] and [[Ideology of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Soviet communism]].<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal |last=W. Giles |first=Nathaniel |date=2015 |title=The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: The Failure of Japan's 'Monroe Doctrine' for Asia |url=https://dc.etsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1265&context=honors |journal=Undergraduate Honors Theses |issue=295 |pages=2–34 |via=East Tennessee State University Digital Commons}}</ref> In reality, militarists and nationalists saw it as an effective propaganda tool to enforce Japanese hegemony.<ref name=":5" /> The latter approach was reflected in a document released by Japan's [[Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare|Ministry of Health and Welfare]], ''[[An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus]]'', which promoted racial supremacist theories.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book |last=Dower |first=John W. |title=War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War |publisher=Pantheon Books |year=1986 |isbn=039450030X |edition=1st |location=New York |pages=262–290 |oclc=13064585}}</ref> Japanese spokesmen openly described the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as a device for the "development of the Japanese race."<ref>{{cite web |last= |first= |date=10 August 1945 |title=The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere |url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000710366.pdf |access-date=31 July 2021 |website=United States Central Intelligence Agency}}</ref> When [[World War II]] ended, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere became a source of criticism and scorn for the [[Allies of World War II|Allies]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere |work=A Dictionary of World History |url=https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095905411 |access-date=31 July 2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref>

==Development of the concept==
{{Main|Japanese nationalism|Propaganda in Japan during the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II}}
[[File:Manchukuo011.jpg|thumb|upright=0.9|1935 propaganda poster of [[Manchukuo]] promoting harmony between [[Japanese people|Japanese]], [[Chinese people|Chinese]], and [[Manchu people|Manchu]]. The caption from right to left says: "With the help of Japan, China, and Manchukuo, the world can be in peace." The flags shown are, right to left: the "[[Five Races Under One Union]]" flag of [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|China]], the [[flag of Japan]], and the [[flag of Manchukuo]].]]
The concept of a unified [[Asia]] under Japanese leadership had its roots dating back to the 16th century. For example, [[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]] proposed to make China, Korea, and Japan into "one". Moreover, Hideyoshi had further plans to expand into India, the Philippines, and other islands in the Pacific.{{sfn|Turnbull|2008|p=6}}<ref name=":Ma&Kang">{{Cite book |last1=Ma |first1=Xinru |title=Beyond Power Transitions: The Lessons of East Asian History and the Future of U.S.-China Relations |last2=Kang |first2=David C. |date=2024 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=978-0-231-55597-5 |series=Columbia Studies in International Order and Politics |location=New York}}</ref>{{Rp|page=99-100}} 

===Monroe Doctrine for Japan===
In Autumn 1872, [[United States]] minister to Japan [[Charles DeLong]] explained to U.S. General [[Charles LeGendre]] that he had been urging the Government of Japan to occupy Taiwan and "civilize" the [[Taiwanese indigenous people]] just as the U.S. had taken over the land of the [[Native Americans in the United States|Native Americans]] and "civilized" them.<ref>James Bradley, "The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of Empire and War" (Little, Brown and Company, 2009), p. 186-188</ref> General LeGendre, the first non-Japanese person hired as a foreign policy expert by the Japanese government, encouraged the Japanese to declare a Japanese "sphere of influence" modeled on the [[Monroe Doctrine]] that the U.S. had declared for the exclusion of other powers from the [[Western Hemisphere]]. Such a Japanese sphere of influence would be the first time a non-White state would adopt such a policy {{citation needed|date=May 2025}}. The stated aim of the sphere of influence would be to civilize the barbarians of Asia. "Pacify and civilize them if possible, and if not...exterminate them or otherwise deal with them as the United States and England have dealt with the barbarians," LeGendre explained to the Japanese.<ref>James Bradley, "The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of Empire and War" (Little, Brown and Company, 2009), p. 188 citing Robert Eskildsen, ed. "Foreign Adventures and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874 (Nankang, Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academic Sinica, 2005), 209.</ref> Japan began [[Taiwan under Japanese rule | invading Taiwan]] in 1874 and fought the [[Russian Empire]] for control of [[Manchuria]] starting [[Russo-Japanese War | in 1904]].

Continuing this American policy, U.S. President [[Theodore Roosevelt]] also secretly reiterated to Japan that, just as the U.S. under the Monroe Doctrine and its [[Roosevelt Corollary]] declared the [[Western Hemisphere]] as part its sphere of influence, Japan should create its own sphere of influence in the Pacific Rim. Teddy Roosevelt was encouraged by Japan embarking on Western ways and developing a modern military in the wake of the forced "Opening of Japan" by the United States that had begun with the [[Perry Expedition]]. Roosevelt envisioned demarcating respective United States and Japanese zones of military and economic dominance in the Pacific Rim. Roosevelt told the Japanese that they are more racially similar to Americans than Russians are, even though Russians are a White race, and that Japan should take its place among the great Western powers to dominate, among other areas, Korea and Manchuria, but that Japan must not encroach on U.S. possession of the [[Philippines]].<ref>James Bradley, "The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of Empire and War" (Little, Brown and Company, 2009), p. 222-226</ref> In much the same way that Europeans used the "backwardness" of African and Asian nations as a reason for why they had to conquer them, for the Japanese elite the "backwardness" of [[China]] and [[Korea]] was proof of the inferiority of those nations, thus giving the Japanese the "right" to conquer them.<ref>{{cite book |last=Storry |first=Richard |year=1979 |title=Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894–1943 |url=https://archive.org/details/japandeclineofwe0000stor |url-access=registration |location=New York City |publisher=St. Martins' Press |isbn=978-033306868-7 | page=17}}</ref> This mutual recognition of the U.S. and the Japanese zones of control in the Pacific would be secretly articulated in the [[Taft–Katsura Agreement]] of July 1905, essentially partitioning the Western [[Pacific Rim]] between the two powers.<ref>James Bradley, "The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of Empire and War" (Little, Brown and Company, 2009), p. 248-251</ref>

In an interview with the [[New York Times]] days later, Katsura explained that Japan's "policy in the [[Far East]] will be in exact accord with that of England and the United States." Japan will soon force "upon Korea and China the same benefits of modern development that have been in the past forced on us.... We intend to begin a campaign of education in [Korea and China] such as we ourselves have experienced [and to develop] Asiatic commercial interests that will benefit us all. China and Korea are both atrociously mis-governed...These conditions we will endeavor to correct at the earliest possible date--by persuasion and education, if possible; by force, if necessary. And in this, as in all things, we expect to act in exact concurrence with the ideas and desires of England and the United States."<ref>James Bradley, "The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of Empire and War" (Little, Brown and Company, 2009), p. 250-251 citing New York Times, 1905 July 30 </ref>

During the proceedings of the [[Lansing–Ishii Agreement]], Japan explained to Western observers that their expansionism in Asia was analogous to the United States' Monroe Doctrine.<ref name=":5" /> This conception was influential in the development of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity concept, with the [[Imperial Japanese Army|Japanese Army]] also comparing it to the [[Roosevelt Corollary]].<ref name=":4" /> One of the reasons why Japan adopted imperialism was to resolve domestic issues such as [[Human overpopulation|overpopulation]] and [[Scarcity|resource scarcity]]. Another reason was to withstand Western imperialism.<ref name=":5" />

On November 3, 1938, [[Prime Minister of Japan|Prime Minister]] [[Fumimaro Konoe]] and Minister for Foreign Affairs [[Hachirō Arita]] proposed the development of the {{nihongo4|'''New Order in East Asia'''|東亜新秩序<ref>{{lang|ja|[[s:ja:第二次近衛声明|第二次近衛声明]]}}</ref>|Tōa Shin Chitsujo}}, which was limited to Japan, China, and the puppet state of Manchukuo.<ref>Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (2006), ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=5P9bgGxfYKUC&dq=%22new+order+of+east+asia%22+%22greater+east+asia+co-prosperity%22&pg=PA63 Asian security reassessed]'', pp. 48–49, 63, {{ISBN|981-230-400-2}}</ref> They believed that the union had 6 purposes:<ref name=":5" />

# Permanent stability of Eastern Asia
# Neighbourly amity and international justice
# Joint defence against communism
# Creation of a new culture
# Economic cohesion and co-operation
# World peace

The vagueness of the above points were effective in making people more agreeable to [[Japanese militarism|militarism]] and [[Collaboration with Imperial Japan|collaborationism]].<ref name=":5" />

On June 29, 1940, Arita renamed the union the '''Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere''', which he announced by radio address. At [[Yōsuke Matsuoka]]'s advice, Arita emphasised on the economic aspects more. On August 1, Konoe, who still used the original name, expanded the scope of the union to include the territories of Southeast Asia.<ref name=":5" /> On November 5, Konoe reaffirmed that a Japan–Manchukuo–China [[Japanese yen|yen]] bloc<ref>James L. McClain, ''Japan: A Modern History'' p. 460 {{ISBN|0-393-04156-5}}</ref> would continue and be "perfected".<ref name=":5" />

==History==
{{Main|Japanese colonial empire|Military history of Japan#Shōwa era and World War II (1926–1945)}}

The outbreak of World War II in Europe gave the Japanese an opportunity to fulfill the objectives of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, without significant pushback from the Western powers or China.<ref>William L. O'Neill, ''A Democracy at War'', p. 62.</ref> This entailed the conquest of Southeast Asian territories to extract their natural resources. If territories were unprofitable, the Japanese would encourage their subjects, including those in mainland Japan, to endure "economic suffering" and prevent outflow of material to the enemy. Nonetheless, they preached the moral superiority of cultivating a "spiritual essence" instead of prioritising material gain like Western powers.<ref name=":3" />

After Japanese advancements into [[French Indochina]] in 1940, knowing that Japan was completely dependent on other countries for natural resources, [[President of the United States|U.S. President]] [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] ordered a trade embargo on [[steel]] and [[Petroleum|oil]], raw materials that were vital to Japan's war effort.<ref name="Columbia">{{cite web |url= http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1900_power.htm |title= Japan's Quest for Power and World War II in Asia |website= Asia for Educators, Columbia University |access-date=31 July 2021}}</ref> Without steel and oil imports, Japan's military could not fight for long.<ref name="Columbia"/> As a result of the embargo, Japan decided to attack the British and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia from 7 to 19 December 1941, seizing the raw materials needed for the war effort.<ref name="Columbia"/> These efforts were successful, with Japanese politician [[Nobusuke Kishi]] announcing via radio broadcast that vast resources were available for Japanese use in the newly conquered territories.<ref>{{cite web |title=Japan's New Order and Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: Planning for Empire |url=https://apjjf.org/2011/9/49/Janis-Mimura/3657/article.html |access-date=31 July 2021 |website=The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus|date=6 December 2011 }}</ref>

As part of its war drive in the Pacific, [[Propaganda in Japan during the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II|Japanese propaganda]] included phrases like "Asia for the Asiatics" and talked about the need to "liberate" Asian colonies from the control of Western powers.<ref name="rhodes248">Anthony Rhodes, ''Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II'', p. 248, 1976, Chelsea House Publishers, New York {{ISBN?}}</ref> They also planned to change the Chinese hegemony in the agricultural market in Southeast Asia with Japanese immigrants to boost its economic value, with the former being despised by Southeast Asian natives.<ref name=":3" /> The Japanese failure to bring the ongoing [[Second Sino-Japanese War]] to a swift conclusion was blamed in part on the lack of resources; Japanese propaganda claimed this was due to the refusal by Western powers to supply Japan's military.<ref>James L. McClain, ''Japan: A Modern History'' p. 471 {{ISBN|0-393-04156-5}}</ref> Although invading Japanese forces sometimes received rapturous welcomes throughout recently captured Asian territories due to anti-Western and occasionally, anti-Chinese sentiment,<ref name=":3" /> the subsequent brutality of the Japanese military led many of the inhabitants of those regions to regard Japan as being worse than their former colonial rulers.<ref name="rhodes248"/> The Japanese government directed that economies of occupied territories be managed strictly for the production of raw materials for the Japanese war effort; a cabinet member declared, "There are no restrictions. They are enemy possessions. We can take them, do anything we want".<ref>James L. McClain, ''Japan: A Modern History'' p. 495 {{ISBN|0-393-04156-5}}</ref> For example, according to estimates, under Japanese occupation, about 100,000 Burmese and Malay Indian labourers died while constructing the [[Burma Railway|Burma-Siam Railway]].<ref>{{cite thesis |last=Mori |first=Takato |date=2006 |title='Co-Prosperity' or 'Commonwealth'?: Japan, Britain and Burma 1940–1945|type=PhD |page=4 |publisher=ProQuest LLC|url=https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/46518898.pdf |access-date=31 July 2021}}</ref> The Japanese sometimes spared ethnic groups, such as Chinese immigrants, if they supported the war effort, whether sincerely or not.<ref name=":3" />

''An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus'' – a secret document completed in 1943 for high-ranking government use – laid out that Japan, as the originator and strongest military power within the region, would naturally take the superior position within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, with the other nations under Japan's umbrella of protection.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Dower |first=John W. |title=War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War |publisher=Pantheon Books |year=1986 |isbn=039450030X |edition=1st |location=New York |pages=263–264 |oclc=13064585}}</ref><ref name=":1" /> Japanese propaganda was useful in mobilizing Japanese citizens for the war effort, convincing them Japan's expansion was an act of anti-colonial liberation from Western domination.<ref>Chickering, R., & Forster, S. (Eds.). (2003). ''The shadows of total war: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919–1939''. Cambridge University Press, p. 330 {{ISBN?}}</ref>  The booklet ''Read This and the War is Won''—for the Japanese Army—presented colonialism as an oppressive group of colonists living in luxury by burdening Asians. According to Japan, since racial ties of blood connected other Asians to the Japanese, and Asians had been weakened by colonialism, it was Japan's [[Civilizing mission|self-appointed role]] to "make men of them again" and liberate them from their Western oppressors.<ref name=":2">John W. Dower, ''War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War'' pp. 24–25 {{ISBN|0-394-50030-X}}</ref>

According to Foreign Minister [[Shigenori Tōgō]] (in office 1941–1942 and 1945), should Japan be successful in creating this sphere, it would emerge as the leader of Eastern Asia, and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere would be synonymous with the Japanese Empire.<ref name="i6">Iriye, Akira. (1999). ''Pearl Harbor and the coming of the Pacific War: a Brief History with Documents and Essays'', p. 6. {{ISBN?}}</ref>

===Greater East Asia Conference===
{{Main|Greater East Asia Conference}}

[[File:Greater East Asia Conference Map.PNG|upright=1.6|thumb|Attendees of the Greater East Asia Conference<br>{{colour box|#6B0000}}: Japan and colonies<br>{{colour box|#FE2020}}{{colour box|#BC8F8F}}{{colour box|#DEA5A4}}: Japanese allies and occupied territory <br>{{colour box|#F9CCCA}}: Territories disputed and claimed by Japan and its allies]]
[[File:Greater East Asia Conference.JPG|thumb|upright=1.4|The [[Greater East Asia Conference]] in November 1943. Participants left to right: [[Ba Maw]], [[Zhang Jinghui]], [[Wang Jingwei]], [[Hideki Tojo]], [[Wan Waithayakon]], [[Jose P. Laurel|José P. Laurel]], and [[Subhas Chandra Bose]]]]
[[File:Japanese 1943 propaganda booklet 2.JPG|upright=1.4|thumb|Fragment of a Japanese propaganda booklet published by the Tokyo Conference (1943), depicting scenes of situations in Greater East Asia, from the top, left to right: the [[Japanese occupation of Malaya]], [[Thailand in World War II|Thailand under Plaek Phibunsongkram]] gaining the territories of [[Saharat Thai Doem]], the [[Wang Jingwei regime|Republic of China]] under [[Wang Jingwei]] allied with Japan, [[Subhas Chandra Bose]] forming [[Azad Hind|the Provisional Government of Free India]], the [[State of Burma]] gaining independence under [[Ba Maw]], the Declaration of the [[Second Philippine Republic]], and people of [[Manchukuo]]]]
The {{nihongo|Greater East Asia Conference|大東亞會議|Dai Tōa Kaigi}} took place in [[Tokyo]] on 5–6 November 1943: Japan hosted the [[head of state|heads of state]] of various component members of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The conference was also referred to as the ''Tokyo Conference''. The common language used by the delegates during the conference was [[English language|English]].<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Pacific War: Japan Versus the Allies|last=Levine|first=Alan J.|publisher=Praeger|year=1995|isbn=0275951022|location=Westport|page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=MuyizRQAjt4C&q=%22An+Investigation+of+Global+Policy+with+the+Yamato+Race+as+Nucleus%22+australia&pg=PA92 92]|oclc=31516895}}</ref> The conference was mainly used as propaganda.<ref name="Greater East Asia Conference">{{Cite web|url=https://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=70|title=Greater East Asia Conference|website=World War II Database|access-date=2021-07-31}}</ref>

At the conference, Tojo greeted them with a speech praising the "spiritual essence" of Asia instead of the "materialistic civilisation" of the West.<ref name="G. Beasley, p 204">W. G. Beasley, ''The Rise of Modern Japan'', p. 204 {{ISBN|0-312-04077-6}}</ref> Their meeting was characterised by the praise of solidarity and condemnation of Western colonialism but without practical plans for either economic development or integration.<ref>[[Andrew Gordon (historian)|Andrew Gordon]], ''A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa to the Present'', p. 211, {{ISBN|0-19-511060-9}}, {{OCLC|49704795}}</ref> Because of a lack of military representatives at the conference, the conference served little military value.<ref name="Greater East Asia Conference"/>

With the simultaneous use of [[Wilsonianism|Wilsonian]] and Pan-Asian rhetoric, the goals of the conference were to solidify the commitment of certain Asian countries to Japan's war effort and to improve Japan's world image; however, the representatives of the other attending countries were in practice neither independent nor treated as equals by Japan.<ref>{{cite book |last=Abel |first=Jessamyn |date=November 2016 |title=The International Minimum: Creativity and Contradiction in Japan's Global Engagement, 1933–1964 |url=https://hawaii.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.21313/hawaii/9780824841072.001.0001/upso-9780824841072-chapter-008|publisher= Hawaii Scholarship Online |doi=10.21313/hawaii/9780824841072.001.0001 |isbn= 9780824841072|s2cid=153084986 }}</ref>

The following dignitaries attended:
* [[Hideki Tojo]], Prime Minister of the [[Empire of Japan]]
* [[Zhang Jinghui]], Prime Minister of the [[Manchukuo|Empire of Manchuria]]
* [[Wang Jingwei]], President of the [[Wang Jingwei regime|Republic of China]]
* [[Ba Maw]], Head of State of the [[State of Burma]]
* [[Subhas Chandra Bose]], Head of State of the [[Azad Hind|Provisional Government of Free India]]
* [[Jose P. Laurel|José P. Laurel]], President of the [[Second Philippine Republic|Republic of the Philippines]]
* Prince [[Wan Waithayakon]], envoy from the [[Thailand|Kingdom of Thailand]]

===Imperial rule===
The ideology of the [[Japanese colonial empire]], as it expanded dramatically during the war, contained two contradictory impulses. On the one hand, it preached the unity of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, a coalition of Asian races directed by Japan against [[Western imperialism in Asia]]. This approach celebrated the spiritual values of the East in opposition to the "crass [[materialism]]" of the West.<ref>Jon Davidann, "Citadels of Civilization: U.S. and Japanese Visions of World Order in the Interwar Period", in Richard Jensen, et al. eds., ''Trans-Pacific Relations: America, Europe, and Asia in the Twentieth Century'' (2003) pp. 21–43 {{ISBN?}}</ref> In practice, however, the Japanese installed organisationally-minded bureaucrats and engineers to run their new empire, and they believed in ideals of efficiency, modernisation, and engineering solutions to social problems.<ref>Aaron Moore, ''Constructing East Asia: Technology, Ideology, and Empire in Japan's Wartime Era, 1931–1945'' (2013) 226–227 {{ISBN?}}</ref> [[Japanese language|Japanese]] was the official language of the bureaucracy in all of the areas and was taught at schools as a national language.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Keong-il |first1=Kim |title=Nationalism and Colonialism in Japan's 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' in World War II |journal=The Review of Korean Studies |date=2005 |volume=8 |issue=2 |pages=65–89}}</ref>

Japan set up puppet regimes in Manchuria and China; they vanished at the war's end. The Imperial Army operated ruthless administrations in most conquered areas but paid more favourable attention to the [[Dutch East Indies]]. The main goal was to obtain oil but the Dutch colonial government destroyed the oil wells. However, the Japanese could repair and reopen them within a few months of their conquest. However, most tankers transporting oil to Japan were sunk by [[United States Navy|U.S. Navy]] submarines, so Japan's oil shortage became increasingly acute. Japan also sponsored an Indonesian nationalist movement under [[Sukarno]].<ref>Laszlo Sluimers, "The Japanese military and Indonesian independence", ''Journal of Southeast Asian Studies'' (1996) 27#1 pp. 19–36</ref> Sukarno finally came to power in the late 1940s after several years of fighting the Dutch.<ref>Bob Hering, ''Soekarno: Founding Father of Indonesia, 1901–1945'' (2003) {{ISBN?}} {{page?|date=December 2024}}</ref>

===Philippines===
To build up the economic base of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Japanese Army envisioned using the Philippine islands as a source of agricultural products needed by its industry. For example, Japan had a surplus of [[sugar]] from [[Taiwan under Japanese rule|Taiwan]], and a severe shortage of [[cotton]], so they tried to grow cotton on sugar lands with disastrous results; they lacked the seeds, pesticides, and technical skills to grow cotton. Jobless farm workers flocked to the cities, where there was minimal relief and few jobs. The Japanese Army also tried using [[Sucrose|cane sugar]] for fuel, [[Ricinus|castor beans]] and [[copra]] for oil, ''[[Derris]]'' for [[quinine]], cotton for uniforms, and [[abacá]] for rope. The plans were difficult to implement due to limited skills, collapsed international markets, bad weather, and transportation shortages. The program failed, giving very little help to Japanese industry and diverting resources needed for food production.<ref>Francis K. Danquah, "Reports on Philippine Industrial Crops in World War II from Japan's English Language Press", ''Agricultural History'' (2005) 79#1 pp. 74–96. {{JSTOR|3744878}}</ref> As Stanley Karnow writes, Filipinos "rapidly learned as well that 'co-prosperity' meant servitude to Japan's economic requirements".<ref>Stanley Karnow, ''In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines'' (1989), pp. 308–309 {{ISBN?}}</ref>

Living conditions were poor throughout the Philippines during the war. Transportation between the islands was difficult because of a lack of fuel. Food was in short supply, with sporadic famines and epidemic diseases that killed hundreds of thousands of people.<ref>Satoshi Ara, "Food supply problem in Leyte, Philippines, during the Japanese Occupation (1942–44)", ''Journal of Southeast Asian Studies'' (2008) 39#1 pp. 59–82.</ref><ref>Francis K. Danquah, "Japan's Food Farming Policies in Wartime Southeast Asia: The Philippine Example, 1942–1944", ''Agricultural History'' (1990) 64#3, pp. 60–80. {{JSTOR|3743634}}</ref> In October 1943, Japan declared the Philippines an independent republic. The Japanese-sponsored [[Second Philippine Republic]], headed by President [[Jose P. Laurel|José P. Laurel]], proved to be ineffective and unpopular as Japan maintained very tight control.<ref>[http://countrystudies.us/philippines/21.htm "World War II"], in Ronald E. Dolan, ed. ''Philippines: A Country Study'' (1991)</ref>

===Failure===
The Co-Prosperity Sphere collapsed with [[Surrender of Japan|Japan's surrender]] to the [[Allies of World War II|Allies]] in September 1945. [[Ba Maw]], wartime President of Burma under the Japanese, blamed the Japanese military for the failure of the Co-Prosperity Sphere:

{{quote|The militarists saw everything only from a Japanese perspective and, even worse, they insisted that all others dealing with them should do the same. For them, there was only one way to do a thing, the Japanese way; only one goal and interest, the Japanese interest; only one destiny for the East Asian countries, to become so many Manchukuos or Koreas tied forever to Japan. This racial impositions&nbsp;... made any real understanding between the Japanese militarists and the people of our region virtually impossible.<ref>Lebra, Joyce C. (1975). ''Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents'', p. 157. {{ISBN?}}</ref>}}

In other words, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere operated not for the betterment of all the Asian countries but for Japan's interests, and thus the Japanese failed to gather support in other Asian countries. Nationalist movements did appear in these Asian countries during this period, and these nationalists cooperated with the Japanese to some extent. However, Willard Elsbree, professor emeritus of [[political science]] at [[Ohio University]], claims that the Japanese government and these nationalist leaders never developed "a real unity of interests between the two parties, [and] there was no overwhelming despair on the part of the Asians at Japan's defeat".<ref>Lebra, p. 160.</ref>

[[File:Japanese Empire - 1942.svg|thumb|upright=1.4|The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere at its greatest extent]]

The failure of Japan to understand the goals and interests of the other countries involved in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere led to a weak association of countries bound to Japan only in theory and not in spirit. Ba Maw argued that Japan should've acted according to the declared aims of "Asia for the Asiatics". He claimed that if Japan had proclaimed this maxim at the beginning of the war and acted on that idea, they could have engineered a very different outcome.

{{quote|No military defeat could then have robbed her of the trust and gratitude of half of Asia or even more, and that would have mattered a great deal in finding for her a new, great, and abiding place in a postwar world in which Asia was coming into her own.<ref>Lebra, p. 158.</ref>}}

==Propaganda efforts==
Pamphlets were dropped by airplane on the Philippines, Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore, and Indonesia, urging them to join the movement.<ref>Anthony Rhodes, ''Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II'', p. 253 1976, Chelsea House Publishers, New York</ref> Mutual cultural societies were founded in all conquered lands to ingratiate with the natives and try to supplant English with Japanese as the commonly used language.<ref>Anthony Rhodes, ''Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II'', p. 254, 1976, Chelsea House Publishers, New York {{ISBN?}}</ref> Multi-lingual pamphlets depicted many Asians marching or working together in happy unity, with the flags of all the states and a map depicting the intended sphere.<ref>"[http://2bangkok.com/wwiipropaganda.shtml Japanese Propaganda Booklet from World War II] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101025220021/http://2bangkok.com/wwiipropaganda.shtml |date=25 October 2010 }}"</ref> Others proclaimed that they had given independent governments to the countries they occupied, a claim undermined by the lack of power given to these puppet governments.<ref name="psyop">"[http://www.psywarrior.com/JapanPSYOPWW2.html Japanese  PSYOP During  WWII]"</ref>

In Thailand, a street was built to demonstrate it, to be filled with modern buildings and shops, but {{frac|9|10}} of it consisted of [[Potemkin village|false fronts]].<ref>[[Edwin P. Hoyt]], ''Japan's War'', p. 326 {{ISBN|0-07-030612-5}}</ref> A network of Japanese-sponsored film production, distribution, and exhibition companies extended across the Japanese Empire and was collectively referred to as the Greater East Asian Film Sphere. These film centers mass-produced shorts, newsreels, and feature films to encourage Japanese language acquisition as well as cooperation with Japanese colonial authorities.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Attractive Empire: Transnational Film Culture in Imperial Japan|last=Baskett|first=Michael|publisher=University of Hawai'i Press|year=2008|isbn=9781441619709|location=Honolulu|oclc=436157559}}</ref>

==Projected territorial extent==
[[File:DaitouaKyoueiken.JPG|thumb|A Japanese [[10 sen coin|10 sen]] stamp from 1942 depicting the approximate extension of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere]]
Prior to the escalation of World War II to the Pacific and East Asia, Japanese planners regarded it as self-evident that the conquests secured in Japan's earlier wars with [[Russian Empire|Russia]] ([[Karafuto Prefecture|South Sakhalin]] and [[Kwantung Leased Territory|Kwantung]]), [[German Empire|Germany]] ([[South Seas Mandate]]), and China ([[Manchuria]]) would be retained, as well as Korea (''Chōsen''), Taiwan (''Formosa''), the recently seized additional portions of China, and occupied French Indochina.<ref name="Weinberg">Weinberg, L. Gerhard. (2005). ''Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leaders'' pp. 62–65.{{ISBN?}}</ref>

===Land Disposal Plan===
A reasonably accurate indication as to the geographic dimensions of the Co-Prosperity Sphere are elaborated on in a Japanese wartime document prepared in December 1941 by the Research Department of the [[Army Ministry|Ministry of War]].<ref name="Weinberg"/> Known as the "Land Disposal Plan in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" ({{nihongo2|大東亜共栄圏における土地処分案}})<ref>{{lang|ja|検察側文書 1987 号、法廷証 679 号(1946 年 10 月 9 日付速記録)}}</ref> it was put together with the consent of and according to the directions of the Minister of War (later Prime Minister) [[Hideki Tojo|Hideki Tōjō]]. It assumed that the already established puppet governments of Manchukuo, [[Mengjiang]], and the Wang Jingwei regime in Japanese-occupied China would continue to function in these areas.<ref name="Weinberg"/> Beyond these contemporary parts of Japan's [[sphere of influence]] it also envisaged the conquest of a vast range of territories covering virtually all of East Asia, the [[Pacific Ocean]], and even sizable portions of the [[Western Hemisphere]], including in locations as far removed from Japan as [[South America]] and the eastern [[Caribbean]].<ref name="Weinberg"/>

Although the projected extension of the Co-Prosperity Sphere was extremely ambitious, the Japanese goal during the "Greater East Asia War" was not to acquire all the territory designated in the plan at once, but to prepare for a future decisive war some 20 years later by conquering the Asian colonies of the defeated European powers, as well as the Philippines from the United States.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The double patriots; a study of Japanese nationalism|author1-link=Richard Storry|last=Storry|first=Richard|publisher=Greenwood Press|year=1973|isbn=0837166438|location=Westport|pages=317–319|oclc=516227}}</ref> When Tōjō spoke on the plan to the [[House of Peers (Japan)|House of Peers]] he was vague about the long-term prospects, but insinuated that the Philippines and Burma might be allowed independence, although vital territories such as [[Japanese occupation of Hong Kong|Hong Kong]] would remain under Japanese rule.<ref name="G. Beasley, p 204" />

The [[Micronesia]]n islands that had been seized from Germany in [[World War I]] and which were assigned to Japan as [[League of Nations mandate|C-Class Mandates]], namely the [[Mariana Islands|Marianas]], [[Caroline Islands|Carolines]], [[Marshall Islands]], and several others do not figure in this project.<ref name="Weinberg"/> They were the subject of earlier negotiations with the Germans and were expected to be officially ceded to Japan in return for economic and monetary compensations.<ref name="Weinberg"/>

The plan divided Japan's future empire into two different groups.<ref name="Weinberg"/> The first group of territories were expected to become either part of Japan or otherwise be under its direct administration. Second were those territories that would fall under the control of a number of tightly controlled pro-Japanese [[vassal state]]s based on the model of Manchukuo, as nominally "independent" members of the Greater East Asian alliance.

[[File:German and Japanese spheres of influence at greatest extent World War II 1942.jpg|thumb|German and Japanese direct spheres of influence at their greatest extents in fall 1942. Arrows show planned movements to the proposed demarcation line at 70° E, which was, however, never even approximated.]]

Parts of the plan depended on successful negotiations with [[Nazi Germany]] and a global victory by the [[Axis powers]]. After Germany and [[Fascist Italy|Italy]] [[Results of the attack on Pearl Harbor#Germany and Italy declare war|declared war on the United States]] on 11 December 1941, Japan presented the Germans with [[Axis powers negotiations on the division of Asia|a drafted military convention]] that would specifically delimit the Asian continent by a dividing line along the [[70th meridian east]] [[longitude]]. This line, running southwards through the [[Ob (river)|Ob River]]'s Arctic estuary, southwards to just east of [[Khost]] in [[Kingdom of Afghanistan|Afghanistan]] and heading into the [[Indian Ocean]] just west of [[Rajkot]] in [[British Raj|India]], would have split Germany's ''[[Lebensraum]]'' and Italy's ''[[spazio vitale]]'' territories to the west of it, and Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and its other areas to the east of it.<ref name="Rich">{{cite book | first=Rich | last= Norman | year=1973 | title=Hitler's War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion | publisher=W.W. Norton & Company Inc. | pages=235}}</ref> The plan of the Third Reich for fortifying its own ''Lebensraum'' territory's eastern limits, beyond which the Co-Prosperity Sphere's northwestern frontier areas would exist in East Asia, involved the creation of [[Ural Mountains in Nazi planning#"Living wall"|a "living wall"]] of ''[[Wehrbauer]]'' "soldier-peasant" communities defending it. However, it is unknown if the Axis powers ever formally negotiated a possible, complementary ''second'' demarcation line that would have divided the Western Hemisphere.

====Japanese-governed====
* ''Government-General of Formosa''
:Hong Kong, the Philippines, [[Portuguese Macau]] (to be purchased from [[Estado Novo (Portugal)|Portugal]] or taken by force), the [[Paracel Islands]], and [[Hainan|Hainan Island]] (to be purchased from the Chinese puppet regime). Contrary to its name it was not intended to include the island of Formosa (Taiwan)<ref name="Weinberg"/>
* ''South Seas Government Office''
:[[Guam]], [[Nauru]], [[Banaba|Ocean Island]], the [[Gilbert Islands]], and [[Wake Island]]<ref name="Weinberg"/>
* ''Melanesian Region Government-General'' or ''South Pacific Government-General''
:[[Territory of Papua|British New Guinea]], [[Territory of New Guinea|Australian New Guinea]], the [[British Solomon Islands|Solomon Islands]], the [[Ellice Islands]], [[Colony of Fiji|Fiji]], the [[New Hebrides]], [[New Caledonia]], the [[Loyalty Islands Province|Loyalty Islands]], and the [[Chesterfield Islands]]<ref name="Weinberg"/>
* ''Eastern Pacific Government-General''
:[[Territory of Hawaii|Hawaii Territory]], [[Howland Island]], [[Baker Island]], the [[Phoenix Islands]], the [[Marquesas Islands|Marquesas]] and [[Tuamotus|Tuamotu Islands]], the [[Society Islands]], the [[Cook Islands|Cook]] and [[Austral Islands]], all of the [[Samoan Islands]], and [[Kingdom of Tonga (1900–1970)|Tonga]].<ref name="Weinberg"/> The possibility of re-establishing the defunct [[Hawaiian Kingdom|Kingdom of Hawaii]] was also considered, based on the model of Manchukuo.<ref name="levine92">Levine (1995), p. 92</ref> Those favouring annexation of Hawaii (on the model of [[Karafuto Prefecture|Karafuto]]) intended to use the [[Japanese in Hawaii|local Japanese community]], which had constituted 43% (c. 160,000) of Hawaii's population in the 1920s, as a leverage.<ref name="levine92"/> Hawaii was to become self-sufficient in food production, while the [[Big Five (Hawaii)|Big Five]] corporations of sugar and [[pineapple]] processing were to be broken up.<ref>Stephan, J.J. (2002), [https://books.google.com/books?id=PbA7zURbxd8C&dq=%22Land+Disposal+Plan%22+japan&pg=PA150 ''Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor''], p. 159, {{ISBN|0-8248-2550-0}}</ref> No decision was ever reached regarding whether Hawaii would be annexed to Japan, become a puppet state, or be used as a bargaining chip for leverage against the U.S.<ref name="levine92"/>
* ''Australian Government-General''
:All of [[Australia]] including [[Tasmania]].<ref name="Weinberg"/> Australia and [[New Zealand]] were to accommodate up to two million Japanese settlers.<ref name="levine92"/> However, there are indications that the Japanese were also looking for a separate peace with Australia, and a satellite state rather than colony status similar to that of Burma and the Philippines.<ref name="levine92"/>
* ''New Zealand Government-General''
:The New Zealand [[North Island|North]] and [[South Island]]s, [[Macquarie Island]], as well as the rest of the Southwest Pacific<ref name="Weinberg"/>
* ''Ceylon Government-General''
:Ceylon and all of India below a line running approximately from [[Portuguese Empire|Portuguese]] [[Portuguese India|Goa]] to the coastline of the [[Bay of Bengal]]<ref name="Weinberg"/>
* ''Alaska Government-General''
:The [[Territory of Alaska|Alaska Territory]], the [[Yukon|Yukon Territory]], the western portion of the [[Northwest Territories]], [[Alberta]], [[British Columbia]], and [[Washington (state)|Washington]].<ref name="Weinberg"/> There were also plans to make the [[West Coast of the United States|American West Coast]] (comprising [[California]] and [[Oregon]]) a semi-autonomous satellite state. This latter plan was not seriously considered as it depended upon a global victory of Axis forces.<ref name="levine92"/>
* ''Government-General of Central America''
:[[Guatemala]], [[El Salvador]], [[Honduras]], [[British Honduras]], [[Nicaragua]], [[Costa Rica]], [[Panama]], [[Colombia]], the [[Maracaibo]] (western) portion of [[United States of Venezuela|Venezuela]], [[Ecuador]], [[Republic of Cuba (1902–1959)|Cuba]], [[Republic of Haiti (1859–1957)|Haiti]], the [[Dominican Republic]], [[Colony of Jamaica|Jamaica]], and [[The Bahamas]]. In addition, if either [[Mexico]], [[Peru]], or [[Presidential Republic (1925–73)|Chile]] were to enter the war against Japan, substantial parts of these states would also be ceded to Japan.<ref name="Weinberg"/> Events that transpired between May 22, 1942, when Mexico declared war on the Axis, through [[History of Peru#The alternation between democracy and militarism (1930–1979)|Peru]]'s declaration of war on February 12, 1944, and concluding with Chile only declaring war on Japan by April 11, 1945 (as Nazi Germany was nearly defeated at that time), brought all three of these southeast [[Pacific Rim]] nations of the Western Hemisphere's Pacific coast into conflict with Japan by the war's end. The future of [[Trinidad]], [[British Guiana|British]] and [[Surinam (Dutch colony)|Dutch Guiana]], and the [[British West Indies|British]] and [[French West Indies|French]] possessions in the [[Leeward Islands]] at the hands of Imperial Japan were meant to be left open for negotiations with Nazi Germany had the Axis forces been victorious.<ref name="Weinberg"/>

====Asian puppet states====
* ''East Indies Kingdom (Indonesia)''
:[[Dutch East Indies]], [[British Borneo]], [[Christmas Island]]s, [[Cocos (Keeling) Islands|Cocos Islands]], [[Andaman Islands|Andaman]], [[Nicobar Islands]], and [[Portuguese Timor]] (to be purchased from Portugal)<ref name="Weinberg"/>
* ''Kingdom of Burma''
:Burma proper, [[Assam Province|Assam]] (a province of the British Raj), and a large part of [[Bengal Presidency|Bengal]].<ref name="Weinberg"/>
* ''Kingdom of Malaya''
:[[British Malaya]] (excluding the Cocos and Christmas Islands)<ref name="Weinberg"/>
* ''Kingdom of Annam (Vietnam)'' 
:[[Annam (French protectorate)|Annam]], [[French protectorate of Laos|Laos]], and [[Tonkin (French protectorate)|Tonkin]]<ref name="Weinberg"/>
* ''Kingdom of Cambodia''
:[[French protectorate of Cambodia|Cambodia]] and [[French Cochinchina]]<ref name="Weinberg"/>

Puppet states which already existed at the time, the Land Disposal Plan has been drafted, were:
* ''[[Manchukuo|Empire of Manchuria]]''
:Chinese Manchuria
* ''[[Wang Jingwei regime|Republic of China]]''
:Other parts of China occupied by Japan
* ''[[Mengjiang]]''
:[[Inner Mongolia]] territories west of Manchuria, since 1940 officially a part of the Republic of China. It was meant as a starting point for a regime which would cover all of Mongolia.

Contrary to the plan Japan installed a puppet state on the Philippines instead of exerting direct control. In the former French Indochina, the [[Empire of Vietnam]], the [[Kingdom of Kampuchea (1945)|Kingdom of Kampuchea]], and the [[Kingdom of Luang Prabang (Japanese puppet state)|Kingdom of Luang Prabang]] were founded. Vietnam attempted to work for independence and made progressive reforms.<ref>{{cite book |title=Vietnam-Indochina-Japan Relations during the Second World War |last=Furuta|first=Motoo |chapter=Some Issues Surrounding the Evaluation of the Trần Trọng Kim Cabinet |chapter-url= https://waseda.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_uri&item_id=39280&file_id=98&file_no=1 |publisher=Waseda University Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies|year=2017|pages=124–129}}</ref> The State of Burma did not become a kingdom.

==Political parties and movements with Japanese support==
* [[Azad Hind]] ([[Indian nationalism|Indian nationalist]] movement in South Asia)
* [[Indian Independence League]] (Indian nationalist movement in Southeast Asia)
* [[Indonesian National Party]] (Indonesian nationalist movement)
* [[KALIBAPI|Kapisanan ng Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas]] (Philippine nationalist ruling party of the Second Philippine Republic)
* [[Kesatuan Melayu Muda]] (Malayan nationalist movement)
* [[Freedom Bloc]] (Dobama-Sinyetha Asiayone) (Burmese nationalist association)
* [[Đại Việt National Socialist Party]] ([[Vietnamese nationalism|Vietnamese nationalist]] movement)
* [[Concordia Association|Concordia Association of Manchukuo]] ([[Manchurian nationalism|Manchurian nationalist]] movement)

==See also==
===Administration===
* [[Collaboration with Imperial Japan]]
* [[East Asia Development Board]]
* [[Imperial Rule Assistance Association]]
* [[List of East Asian leaders in the Japanese sphere of influence (1931–1945)]]
* [[Ministry of Greater East Asia]]

===People===
* [[Hachirō Arita]]: an army thinker who thought up the Greater East Asian concept
* [[Ikki Kita]]: a Japanese nationalist who developed a similar pan-Asian concept
* [[Satō Nobuhiro]]: the alleged developer of the Greater East Asia concept

===Related topics===
* [[Flying geese paradigm]]
* [[Japanese war crimes]]
* ''[[Kantokuen]]''
* [[Political extremism in Japan]]
* [[Tanaka Memorial]] (''Tanaka Jōsōbun'') – an alleged Japanese strategic planning document from 1927 in which Prime Minister Baron [[Tanaka Giichi]], who laid out a strategy to take over the world for [[Emperor of Japan|Emperor]] [[Hirohito]]

====Others====
{{Div col}}
* [[Balkan Federation]]
* [[Civilizing mission]]
* [[Eurasianism]]
* [[Greater Germanic Reich]]
* [[Greater Serbia]]
* [[Latin Bloc (proposed alliance)]]
* [[Intermarium|''Międzymorze'']]
* [[Monroe Doctrine]]
* [[New Order (Nazism)]]
* [[Pan-Slavism]]
* [[Russian world|''Russkiy mir'']]
* [[Scramble for Africa]]
* [[White man's burden]]
{{Div col end}}

==References==
===Citations===
{{Reflist|30em}}

===Further reading===
* {{cite book |last = Baskett |first = Michael |year = 2008 |title = The Attractive Empire: Transnational Film Culture in Imperial Japan |publisher = [[University of Hawai'i Press]] |location = Honolulu |isbn = 978-0-8248-3223-0 |url = https://books.google.com/books?id=lx4QfrTyvWEC}}
* [[John W. Dower|Dower, John W.]] (1986). [https://books.google.com/books?id=X-Th04d7jj0C&q=War+Without+Mercy:+Race+and+Power+in+the+Pacific+War ''War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War.''] New York: [[Pantheon Books]]. {{ISBN|978-0-394-50030-0}}; {{OCLC|13064585}}
* Fisher, Charles A. (1950) [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1790152 "The Expansion of Japan: A Study in Oriental Geopolitics: Part II. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." ''The Geographical Journal'' (1950): 179–193.]
* {{cite book |last1=Huff |first1=Gregg |title=World War II and Southeast Asia: Economy and Society under Japanese Occupation |date=2020 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=9781316162934 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/world-war-ii-and-southeast-asia/5EE13B3424DE481C5AD6E1B82D0058D2}}
* Iriye, Akira. (1999). [https://books.google.com/books?id=sIIZIgAACAAJ&q=Pearl+Harbor+and+the+coming+of+the+Pacific+War+:a+Brief+History+with+Documents+and+Essays ''Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War: A Brief History with Documents and Essays.'']{{Dead link|date=June 2024 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }} Boston: [[St. Martin's Press]]. {{ISBN|978-0-312-21818-8}}; {{OCLC|40985780}}
* [[Joyce Lebra|Lebra, Joyce C.]] (ed.) (1975). [https://books.google.com/books?id=TnVuAAAAMAAJ&q=Japan%27s+Greater+East+Asia+Co-Prosperity+Sphere+in+World+War+II:+Selected+Readings+and+Documents ''Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents.''] Oxford: [[Oxford University Press]]. {{ISBN|978-0-19-638265-4}}; {{OCLC|1551953}}
* Levine, Alan J. (1995). [https://www.questia.com/library/2007523/the-pacific-war-japan-versus-the-allies ''The Pacific War: Japan versus the Allies''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190705120137/https://www.questia.com/library/2007523/the-pacific-war-japan-versus-the-allies |date=5 July 2019 }} (Santa Barbara: Greenwood, {{ISBN|0-275-95102-2}})
* Myers, Ramon Hawley and Mark R. Peattie. (1984) [https://books.google.com/books?id=KqNiaX7b4bgC&q=The+Japanese+Colonial+Empire,+1895-1945 ''The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945.''] Princeton: [[Princeton University Press]]. {{ISBN|978-0-691-10222-1}}
* [[Mark Peattie|Peattie, Mark R.]] (1988). [https://books.google.com/books?id=RpDDxDAxHjEC&dq=Mark+R.+Peattie&pg=RA1-PA217 "The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945,"] in [https://books.google.com/books?id=RpDDxDAxHjEC ''The Cambridge History of Japan: The Twentieth Century''] (editor, Peter Duus). Cambridge: [[Cambridge University Press]]. {{ISBN|978-0-521-22357-7}}
* Swan, William L. (1996) {{JSTOR|20071764}}  "Japan's Intentions for Its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as Indicated in Its Policy Plans for Thailand" ''Journal of Southeast Asian Studies'' 27#1 (1996) pp.&nbsp;139–149
* {{cite book |last=Toll |first=Ian W. |author-link=Ian W. Toll |title=[[Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941–1942]] |location=New York |publisher=W.W. Norton |date=2011}}
* {{cite book |last=Toll |first=Ian W. |author-mask=3 |title=[[The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942–1944]] |location=New York |publisher=W.W. Norton |date=2015}}
* {{cite book |last=Toll |first=Ian W. |author-mask=3 |title=[[Twilight of the Gods: War in the Western Pacific, 1944–1945]] |location=New York |publisher=W.W. Norton |date=2020}}
* {{citation|last=Turnbull|first=Stephen|year=2008|title=The Samurai Invasion of Korea 1592–98|publisher=Osprey Publishing Ltd |isbn=9781846032547|oclc=244583893}}
* [[Matome Ugaki|Ugaki, Matome]]. (1991). [https://books.google.com/books?id=hAZnAAAAMAAJ&q=Fading+Victory:+The+Diary+of+Ugaki+Matome,+1941-1945 ''Fading Victory: The Diary of Ugaki Matome, 1941–1945.''] Pittsburgh: [[University of Pittsburgh Press]]. {{ISBN|978-0-8229-3665-7}}
* [[Willy Vande Walle|Vande Walle, Willy]] ''et al.'' [https://web.archive.org/web/20101228021446/http://www.researchportal.be/en/project/the-money-doctors-from-japan-finance-imperialism-and-the-building-of-the-yen-bloc-1894-1937--(KUL_3H070265)/ ''The 'Money Doctors' from Japan: Finance, Imperialism, and the Building of the Yen Bloc, 1894–1937''] (abstract). FRIS/Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2007–2010.
* Yellen, Jeremy A. (2019). [https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501735561/the-greater-east-asia-co-prosperity-sphere/#bookTabs=1 The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War.] Ithaca: [[Cornell University Press]]. {{ISBN|978-1501735547}}

==External links==
{{Commons category}}
* [https://www.britannica.com/topic/Greater-East-Asia-Co-prosperity-Sphere Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere] at Britannica
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20080829194844/http://www.adam-matthew-publications.co.uk/digital_guides/fo_japan_series1_prt1to2/japanese_minister_officals.aspx#sixth Foreign Office Files for Japan and the Far East]
* [http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=70 WW2DB: Greater East Asia Conference]

{{JapanEmpireNavbox}}
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{{Foreign relations of Japan}}
{{Authority control}}

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