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{{Short description|Political, economic or military predominance of one state over other states}}
{{About|the use of the term hegemony in geopolitics and international relations|the Marxist concept|Cultural hegemony}}
{{Redirect|Hegemon}}
{{use dmy dates|date=July 2023}}
[[File:362BCThebanHegemony.png|thumb|[[Ancient Greece]] under the hegemony of [[Thebes, Greece|Thebes]], 371–362 BC]]

'''Hegemony''' ({{IPAc-en|h|ɛ|ˈ|dʒ|ɛ|m|ən|i|audio=En-us-hegemony.ogg}}, {{IPAc-en|ukalso|h|ɪ|ˈ|ɡ|ɛ|m|ən|i}}, {{IPAc-en|usalso|ˈ|h|ɛ|dʒ|ə|m|oʊ|n|i}}) is the political, economic, and military predominance of one [[State (polity)|state]] over other states, either regional or global.<ref>{{cite book|chapter=Hegemony|year=2019|publisher =Oxford University Press and International Studies Association, LLC |doi=10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.509|url=https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-509|title=Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies|last=Schenoni|first=Luis L.|isbn=978-0190846626}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Hegemony|year=2014|work=Oxford Advanced American Dictionary |publisher=Dictionary.com, LLC|url=http://oaadonline.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/dictionary/hegemony|access-date=2014-02-01|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140203070750/http://oaadonline.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/dictionary/hegemony|archive-date=2014-02-03|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite book |last=Mearsheimer |first=John J. |url= |title=The Tragedy of Great Power Politics |date=2001 |publisher=W. W. Norton & Company |isbn=978-0-393-34927-6 |language=en |chapter=Chapter 2}}</ref>

In [[Ancient Greece]] (ca. 8th BC – AD 6th c.), hegemony denoted the politico-military dominance of the ''hegemon'' [[city-state]] over other city-states.<ref name="TheColumbia">{{cite book |title=The Columbia Encyclopedia|edition=5th|year=1994|location=New York |publisher= Columbia University Press |isbn= 0-231-08098-0|editor-first=Barbara A.|editor-last=Chernow|editor2-first= George A.|editor2-last=Vallasi |page=1215}}</ref> In the 19th century, ''hegemony'' denoted the "social or cultural predominance or ascendancy; predominance by one group within a society or milieu" and "a group or regime which exerts undue influence within a society".<ref>{{cite OED|hegemony}} (Definitions 2a and 2b)</ref>

In theories of [[imperialism]], the hegemonic order dictates the internal politics and the societal character of the subordinate states that constitute the hegemonic [[sphere of influence]], either by an internal, [[vassal state|sponsored government]] or by an external, [[puppet state|installed government]].

The term ''hegemonism'' denoted the geopolitical and the cultural predominance of one country over other countries, e.g., the hegemony of the [[Great power|Great Powers]] established with [[European colonialism]] in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.<ref name="Fontana">{{cite book |title=The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought |publisher=HarperCollins |year=1999 |isbn=0-00-255871-8 |editor1-last=Bullock |editor1-first=Alan |edition=3rd |location=London |pages=387–388 |editor2-last=Trombley |editor2-first=Stephen}}</ref>

In [[international relations]] theories, hegemony is distinguished from empire as ruling only external but not internal affairs of other states.<ref>[[Jack Snyder (political scientist)|Snyder, Jack]] (2002) "The myths of empire and strategies of hegemony," ''Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power'', (eds. Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper and Kevin Moore, New York: The New Press), p 270.</ref>

==Etymology==
[[File:Map Macedonia 336 BC-en.svg|thumb|right|upright=1.35|The League of Corinth hegemony: the [[Kingdom of Macedonia]] (362 BC) (red) and the [[Corinthian League]] (yellow)]]
From the post-classical [[Latin]] word {{Wikt-lang|la|hēgemonia}} (1513 or earlier) from the [[Greek language|Greek]] word {{langx|grc|{{Wikt-lang|grc|ἡγεμονία}}|hēgemonía|authority, rule, political supremacy|label=none}}, related to the word {{lang|grc|ἡγεμών}}, {{Transliteration|grc|hēgemṓn}}, {{gloss|leader}}.<ref>''Oxford English Dictionary''.</ref> ''Leadership'', translated into Greek, renders ''hegemony''; an alternative translation is ''archia'' – Greek common word for ''empire''.{{citation needed|date=August 2025}} Many scholars use the term "hegemony" interchangeably or synonymously with "[[Empire#Present|empire]]" or "[[World domination|domination]]"{{citation needed|date=August 2025}} and they are referred in the respective articles.

== Political science ==
{{Main|Cultural hegemony}}
[[File:North Atlantic Treaty Organization (orthographic projection).svg|thumb|[[NATO]] countries account for over 70% of [[List of countries by military expenditures|global military expenditure]],<ref name="sipri1">{{cite web|url=http://milexdata.sipri.org/ |title=The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database |publisher=Milexdata.sipri.org |access-date=2010-08-22 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100328072123/http://milexdata.sipri.org/ |archive-date=March 28, 2010 }}</ref> with the United States alone accounting for 43% of global military expenditure in 2009.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/15majorspenders |title=The 15 countries with the highest military expenditure in 2009 |access-date=2010-08-22 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100328104327/http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/15majorspenders |archive-date=2010-03-28 }}</ref>]]
[[File:Gramsci.png|thumb|upright|left|[[Antonio Gramsci]] (1891–1937), the [[Intellectual|theoretician]] of [[cultural hegemony]]]]

In the historical writing of the 19th century, the denotation of ''hegemony'' extended to describe the predominance of one country upon other countries; and, by extension, ''hegemonism'' denoted the Great Power politics (c. 1880s – 1914) for establishing hegemony (indirect imperial rule), that then leads to a definition of [[imperialism]] (direct foreign rule).

In the early 20th century, the Italian [[Marxist philosophy|Marxist philosopher]] [[Antonio Gramsci]] used the idea of hegemony to talk about politics ''within'' a given society. He developed the theory of [[cultural hegemony]], an analysis of [[economic class]] (including social class) and how the [[ruling class]] uses [[consent]] as well as force to maintain its power. Hence, the philosophic and sociologic theory of cultural hegemony analysed the [[Norm (sociology)|social norms]] that established the [[social structure]]s to impose their ''[[Weltanschauung]]'' (world view)—justifying the social, political, and economic ''status quo''—as natural, inevitable, and beneficial to every social class, rather than as artificial [[Social constructionism|social construct]]s beneficial solely to the ruling class.<ref name="TheColumbia"/><ref name="Fontana"/><ref>{{cite book |first=K. J. |last=Holsti |title=The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory |url=https://archive.org/details/dividingdiscipli0000hols |url-access=registration |year=1985 |location=Boston |publisher=Allen & Unwin |isbn=0-04-327077-8}}</ref>

From the Gramsci analysis derived the [[political science]] denotation of hegemony as ''leadership''; thus, the historical example of [[Prussia]] as the militarily and culturally predominant province of the [[German Empire]] (1871–1918); and the personal and intellectual predominance of [[Napoleon I|Napoleon Bonaparte]] upon the [[French Consulate]] (1799–1804).<ref>{{cite book |first=Chris |last=Cook |title=Dictionary of Historical Terms |year=1983 |location=London |publisher=MacMillan |page=142 |isbn=0-333-44972-X}}</ref> Contemporarily, in ''[[Hegemony and Socialist Strategy]]'' (1985), [[Ernesto Laclau]] and [[Chantal Mouffe]] defined hegemony as a political relationship of [[power (philosophy)|power]] wherein a sub-ordinate society (collectivity) perform social tasks that are culturally unnatural and not beneficial to them, but that are in exclusive benefit to the [[Imperialism|imperial]] interests of the hegemon, the superior, ordinate power; hegemony is a military, political, and economic relationship that occurs as an [[Articulation (sociology)|articulation]] within political [[discourse]].<ref>{{cite book |first1=Ernest |last1=Laclau |first2=Chantal |last2=Mouffe |title=Hegemony and Socialist Strategy |url=https://archive.org/details/hegemonysocialis00lacl |url-access=limited |edition=2nd |year=2001 |location=London |publisher=Verso |pages=[https://archive.org/details/hegemonysocialis00lacl/page/n57 40]–59, 125–144 |isbn=1-85984-330-1}}</ref> Beyer analysed the contemporary hegemony of the United States at the example of the Global War on Terrorism and presented the mechanisms and processes of American exercise of power in 'hegemonic governance'.<ref name="Beyer">{{cite book |last=Beyer |first=Anna Cornelia |title=Counterterrorism and International Power Relations |year=2010 |location=London |publisher=I.B. Tauris |isbn=978-1-84511-892-1}}</ref>

== International relations ==
In the field of [[international relations]], hegemony generally refers to the ability of an actor to shape the international system. Usually this actor is a state, such as [[British Empire|Britain]] in the 19th century or the United States in the 20th century. A hegemon may shape the international system through coercive and non-coercive means.<ref>Norrloff, Carla (2019). "Hegemony," ''Oxford Bibliographies'', https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0122.xml#</ref> According to Nuno Monteiro, hegemony is distinct from unipolarity.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal |last=Monteiro |first=Nuno P. |date=2012 |title=Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful |url=https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064 |journal=International Security |volume=36 |issue=3 |pages=9–40 |doi=10.1162/ISEC_a_00064 |issn=0162-2889 |s2cid=57558611|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The latter refers to a preponderance of power within an anarchic system, whereas the former refers to a hierarchical system where the most powerful state has the ability to "control the external behavior of all other states."<ref name=":5"/>

The [[English school of international relations theory|English school of international relations]] takes a broader view of history. The research of [[Adam Watson]] was world-historical in scope. For him, hegemony was the most common order in history (historical "optimum") because many provinces of "frank" empires were under hegemonic rather than imperial rule. Watson summarized his life-long research: There was a spectrum of political systems ranging between multiple independent states and universal empire. The further a political system evolved towards one of the extremes, the greater was the gravitational pull towards the hegemonic center of the spectrum.<ref>Watson, Adam (1992). ''The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis'', (London: Routledge), pp. 122–125, 131–132, 324.</ref> [[Paul W. Schroeder]] drew a similar generalization that most empires involve informal, indirect rule.<ref>Schroeder, Paul W. (10 February 2003). "Is the US an empire?" ''History News Network'', https://www.hnn.us/article/is-the-us-an-empire</ref>

Hegemony may take different forms. Benevolent hegemons provide public goods to the countries within their sphere of influence. Coercive hegemons exert their economic or military power to discipline unruly or free-riding countries in their sphere of influence. Exploitative hegemonies extract resources from other countries.<ref>See Snidal, Duncan (1985). "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory." ''International Organization'' 39 (4): pp. 580–614.</ref><ref>Grunberg, Isabelle (1990). "Exploring the ‘Myth' of Hegemonic Stability." ''International Organization'' 44 (4): 431–477.</ref> 
 
A prominent theory in [[International Relations]] focusing on the role of hegemonies is [[hegemonic stability theory]]. Its premise is that a hegemonic power is necessary to develop and uphold a stable international political and economic order. The theory was developed in the 1970s by [[Robert Gilpin]]<ref name="Gilpin, Robert 1975">Gilpin, Robert (1975). ''U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation''. New York: Basic Books.</ref> and [[Stephen D. Krasner]],<ref>Krasner, Stephen D. (1976). "State Power and the Structure of International Trade." ''World Politics'' 28 (3): 317–347.</ref> among others. It has been criticized on both conceptual and empirical grounds. For example, [[Robert Keohane]] has argued that the theory is not a proper theory because it amounts to a series of allegedly redundant claims that apparently could not be used predictively.<ref name="Keohane, Robert O. 1984">Keohane, Robert O. (1984). ''After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy''. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. {{ISBN?}}</ref>

A number of International Relations scholars have examined the decline of hegemons and their orders. For some, such decline tends to be disruptive because the stability that the hegemon provided gives way to a power vacuum.<ref>Kindleberger, Charles P. (1981). "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy." ''International Studies Quarterly'' 25: 242–254.</ref><ref>Gilpin, Robert (1981). ''War and Change in World Politics''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).</ref> Others have maintained that cooperation may persist in the face of hegemonic decline because of institutions<ref name="Keohane, Robert O. 1984"/> or enhanced contributions from non-hegemonic powers.<ref>Snidal, Duncan (1985). "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory." ''International Organization'' 39 (4): 580–614.</ref>

There has been a long debate in the field about whether American hegemony is in decline. As early as in the 1970s, [[Robert Gilpin]] suggested that the global order maintained by the United States would eventually decline as benefits from the public goods provided by Washington would diffuse to other states.<ref name="Gilpin, Robert 1975"/> In the 1980s, some scholars singled out Japan's economic growth and technological sophistication as a threat to U.S. primacy.<ref>Vogel, Ezra (1986). "Pax Nipponica." ''Foreign Affairs'' 64 (4): 752–767.</ref> More recently, analysts have focused on the economic and military rise of China and its challenge to U.S. hegemony.<ref>Schweller, Randall L., and Xiaoyu Pu (2011). "After Unipolarity: China's Vision of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline." ''International Security'' 36 (1): 41–72.</ref>

Scholars differ as to whether [[Polarity (international relations)|bipolarity or unipolarity]] is likely to produce the most stable and peaceful outcomes. Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer are among those who argue that bipolarity tends to generate relatively more stability,<ref name="Waltz 1979 132_133">{{Cite book |last=Waltz |first=Kenneth Neal |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=j6qOAAAAMAAJ |title=Theory of International Politics |date=1979 |publisher=McGraw-Hill |isbn=978-0-07-554852-2 |pages=170–171 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Mearsheimer|first=John|title=The Tragedy of Great Power Politics|publisher=W.W. Norton|year=2001|pages=44–45}}</ref> whereas John Ikenberry and William Wohlforth are among those arguing for the stabilizing impact of unipolarity. Some scholars, such as [[Karl Deutsch]] and [[J. David Singer]] argued that multipolarity was the most stable structure.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Deutsch|first1=Karl W.|last2=Singer|first2=J. David|date=1964|title=Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009578|journal=World Politics|volume=16|issue=3|pages=390–406|doi=10.2307/2009578|issn=0043-8871|jstor=2009578|s2cid=53540403 |url-access=subscription}}</ref>

Scholars disagree about the sources and stability of U.S. unipolarity. Realist international relations scholars argue that unipolarity is rooted in the superiority of U.S. material power since the end of the Cold War.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Wohlforth|first=William C.|date=1999|title=The Stability of a Unipolar World|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539346|journal=International Security|volume=24|issue=1|pages=5–41|doi=10.1162/016228899560031|jstor=2539346|s2cid=57568539|issn=0162-2889|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Norrlof|first=Carla|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lMfuht7crW4C|title=America's Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation|date=2010|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-139-48680-4|language=en}}</ref> Liberal international relations scholar [[John Ikenberry]] attributes U.S. hegemony in part to what he says are commitments and self-restraint that the United States established through the creation of international institutions (such as the United Nations, [[International Monetary Fund]], World Bank, and World Trade Organization).<ref name="Ikenberry">{{cite journal|last=Ikenberry|first=G. John|date=Winter 1998–1999|title=Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order|journal=International Security|volume=23|issue=3|pages=43–78|doi=10.1162/isec.23.3.43|jstor=2539338|s2cid=57566810}}</ref> Constructivist scholar [[Martha Finnemore]] argues that legitimation and institutionalization are key components of unipolarity.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Martha Finnemore|date=2009|title=Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be|journal=World Politics|volume=61|issue=1|pages=58–85|doi=10.1353/wp.0.0027|issn=1086-3338|doi-access=free}}</ref>

== Media and communications studies ==
Adopted from the work of Gramsci and [[Stuart Hall (cultural theorist)|Stuart Hall]], in [[media studies]] and [[cultural studies]] hegemony refers to individuals or concepts that become most dominant in a culture. Building on Gramsci's ideas, Hall stated that the media is a critical institution for furthering or inhibiting hegemony.<ref name="Ouellette2017">{{Cite book|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1gk08zz|title=Keywords for Media Studies|year=2017|publisher=NYU Press|doi=10.2307/j.ctt1gk08zz|isbn=978-1-4798-1747-4|editor-last=Ouellette|editor-first=Laurie|editor-last2=Gray|editor-first2=Jonathan}}</ref>

[[Communications studies]] scholars have argued that in the [[Praxis (process)|praxis]] of hegemony, imperial dominance is established by means of [[cultural imperialism]], whereby the leader state (hegemon) dictates the internal politics and the societal character of the subordinate states that constitute the hegemonic [[sphere of influence]], either by an internal, sponsored government or by an external, installed government. The imposition of the hegemon's way of life—an imperial ''[[lingua franca]]'' and [[Bureaucracy|bureaucracies]] (social, economic, educational, governing)—transforms the concrete imperialism of direct military domination into the abstract [[Political power|power]] of the ''status quo'', indirect imperial domination.<ref>Bush, B., [https://books.google.com/books?id=kG2hAwAAQBAJ&q=%22power+imposing%22 ''Imperialism and Postcolonialism''], Routledge, 2014, p. 123.</ref> J. Brutt-Griffler, a critic of this view, has described it as "deeply condescending" and "treats people&nbsp;... as blank slates on which global capitalism's moving finger writes its message, leaving behind another cultural automaton as it moves on."<ref>Brutt-Griffler, J., in Karlfried Knapp, Barbara Seidlhofer, H. G. Widdowson, [https://books.google.com/books?id=3klgGNmjVpEC&dq=impose+cultural+imperialism&pg=PA264 ''Handbook of Foreign Language Communication and Learning''], Walter de Gruyter, 2009, p. 264.</ref>

Culturally, hegemony also is established by means of [[language]], specifically the imposed ''lingua franca'' of the hegemon (leader state), which then is the official source of information for the people of the society of the sub-ordinate state. Writing on language and power, Andrea Mayr says, "As a practice of power, hegemony operates largely through language."<ref>Mayr, A., [https://books.google.com/books?id=nIjpTHCNYsUC&dq=language+hegemony&pg=PA14 ''Language and Power: An Introduction to Institutional Discourse''], A&C Black, 2008, p. 14.</ref> In contemporary society, an example of the use of language in this way is in the way Western countries set up educational systems in African countries mediated by Western languages.<ref>Clayton, T., [https://books.google.com/books?id=fKQ4csjlktIC&q=hegemony+language ''Rethinking Hegemony''], James Nicholas Publishers, 2006, pp. 202–03.</ref>

=={{anchor|Hegemonies in history}}Historical examples==
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=== 30th–27th centuries BC ===
The political pattern of [[Sumer]] was hegemony shifting from city to city and called [[Kish (Sumer)|King of Kish]]. According to the ''[[Sumerian King List]]'', Kish established the hegemony yet before the [[Flood myth|Flood]]. One of the earliest literary legacies of humankind, the ''[[Epic of Gilgamesh]]'', is a case of [[Gilgamesh and Aga|anti-hegemonic resistance]]. [[Gilgamesh]] fights and overthrows the hegemon of his world.<ref>[[Samuel Noah Kramer]], ''History Begins in Sumer'', University of Pennsylvania Press, 1956, p 32.</ref>

=== 8th–3rd centuries BC ===

In the [[Ancient Greece|Greek]] world of [[5th century BC]], the [[city-state]] of [[Sparta]] was the ''hegemon'' of the [[Peloponnesian League]] (6th to 4th centuries BC) and King [[Philip II of Macedon]] was the hegemon of the [[League of Corinth]] in 337 BC (a kingship he willed to his son, [[Alexander the Great]]). Likewise, the role of [[Athens]] within the short-lived [[Delian League]] (478–404 BC) was that of a "hegemon".<ref>''Encyclopædia Britannica'', [https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-Europe/Greeks-Romans-and-barbarians#ref58255 "Greeks, Romans, and barbarians (from Europe, history of)"]: "Fusions of power occurred in the shape of leagues of cities, such as the Peloponnesian League, the Delian League, and the Boeotian League. The efficacy of these leagues depended chiefly upon the hegemony of a leading city (Sparta, Athens, or Thebes)"</ref> The super-regional Persian [[Achaemenid Empire]] of 550 BC–330 BC dominated these sub-regional hegemonies prior to its collapse. Ancient historians such as [[Herodotus]] ({{circa | 484 BC}} – {{circa | 425 BC}}). [[Xenophon]] ({{circa | 431 BC}} – 354 BC) and [[Ephorus]] ({{circa | 400 BC}} – 330 BC) pioneered the use of the term ''hēgemonía'' in the modern sense of ''hegemony''.<ref>Wickersham, JM., [https://books.google.com/books?id=X9_7b1J19i0C&dq=hegemony+history&pg=PR10 ''Hegemony and Greek Historians'', Rowman & Littlefield, 1994, p. 1 – "The ''hēgemonia'' of greatest interest in Herodotus is the supreme command of the Greek coalition against Xerxes."]</ref>

In Ancient East Asia, Chinese hegemony existed during the [[Spring and Autumn period]] (c. 770–480 BC), when the weakened rule of the [[Eastern Zhou]] dynasty led to the relative autonomy of the [[Five Hegemons (Spring and Autumn period)|Five Hegemons]] (''Ba'' in Chinese [{{lang|zh|霸}}]). The term is translated as ''lord protector'', or ''lord of the covenants'', or ''chief of the feudal lords'' and is described as intermediate between king of independent state and ''Emperor of All under Heaven''.<ref>''[[Guanzi (text)|Guanzi]]: Economic Dialogues in Ancient China'', ed. Adam K. W. Wen, Connecticut: New Heaven, 1954, p. 60.</ref> The hegemons were appointed by [[Feudalism|feudal]] lord conferences and were nominally obliged to support the King of Zhou,<ref>''Encyclopædia Britannica'', [https://www.britannica.com/place/Qi-ancient-state-China-771-221-BC "Ch'i"]: "As a result, Ch'i began to dominate most of China proper; in 651 BC it formed the little states of the area into a league, which was successful in staving off invasions from the semi-barbarian regimes to the north and south. Although Ch'i thus gained hegemony over China, its rule was short-lived; after Duke Huan's death, internal disorders caused it to lose the leadership of the new confederation."</ref> whose status parallel to that of the Roman Pope in the medieval Europe.{{citation needed|date=June 2025}}

In 364 BC, [[Qin (state)|Qin]] emerged victorious from war and its [[Duke Xian of Qin (424–362 BC)|Duke Xian]] (424–362 BC) was named hegemon by the King of Zhou.<ref>[[Sima Qian]], 4:160. [[Records of the Grand Historian]], ed. [[Burton Watson]], Hong Kong: Columbia University Press, 1962.</ref> Qin rulers did not preserve the official title of hegemon but in fact kept the hegemony over their world: "For more than one hundred years [before 221 BC] Qin commanded eight lands and brought the lord of equal rank to its court."<ref>Sima Qian, 6:282.</ref> One of the six other great powers, [[Wey (state)|Wei]], was annexed as early as 324 BC. From the reign of Duke Xian on, "Qin gradually swallowed up the six [other] states until, after hundred years or so, the [[Qin Shi Huang|First Emperor]] was able to bring all kings under his power."<ref>Sima Qian, 1:87–88.</ref>

The century preceding the [[Qin's wars of unification]] in 221 BC was dominated by confrontation between the hegemonic ''horizontal'' alliance led by Qin and the anti-hegemonic alliance called ''perpendicular'' or ''vertical''.<ref>Sima Qian, 6:279.</ref> "The political world appears as a chaos of ever-changing coalitions, but in which each new combination could ultimately be defined by its relation to Qin".<ref>''Cambridge Ancient History of China'', 1999, p. 633.</ref>

The first anti-hegemonic or ''perpendicular'' alliance was formed in 322 BC. Qin was supported by one state, [[Wey (state)|Wei]], which it had annexed two years previously. The remaining five great warring states of China joined in the anti-hegemonic coalition and attacked Qin in 318 BC.<ref>Sima Qian, 5:208.</ref> "Qin, supported by one annexed state, overwhelmed the world coalition."<ref>Ostrovsky, p. 257.</ref> The same scenario repeated itself several times.<ref>Sima Qian, 4:167, 5:208–224.</ref><ref>[[Han Fei]],1:5–12. ''Complete Works'', tr. W. K. Liao, London: Columbia University Press, 1959.</ref>) until Qin decisively moved from hegemony to [[Qin's wars of unification|conquests and annexations]] in 221 BC.

=== 2nd century BC–15th century AD ===
[[File:Roman Empire Trajan 117AD.png|thumb|upright=1.1|{{legend|#b23938|[[Roman Empire]] at its greatest extent, 117 AD}}]]
Rome established its hegemony over the entire Mediterranean after its victory over the [[Seleucid Empire]] in 189 BC. Officially, Rome's client states were outside the whole Roman imperium, and preserved their entire sovereignty and international rights and privileges.<ref>Perry Cooper Sands, ''The Client Princes under the Republic'', New York: Arno Press, 1975, pp. 114, 160.</ref> [[Edward Luttwak]], in ''The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire'',<ref>''The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century AD to the Third'', (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).</ref> outlined three stages, with hegemonic being the first, followed by imperial. In his view the transformation proved to be fatal and eventually led to the fall of the Roman Empire.{{citation needed|date=August 2025}}

With few exceptions, the Roman treaties with client states (''foedera'') were formulized on equal terms without any expression of clientship and the Romans almost never used the word "client." The term "client king" is an invention of the post-Renaissance scholarship.<ref>[[Andrew Lintott]], ''Imperium Romanum: Politics and Administration'', London: Routledge, 1993, p. 32.</ref> Those who are conventionally called by modern historians of Rome "client kings" were referred to as "allies and friends" of the Roman people. "Alliance" and "friendship," not any kind of subordination, bound them to Rome.<ref>[[Cassius Dio]], [[Roman History (Cassius Dio)|''Roman History'']], (tr. Earnest Lary, London: Loeb, 1961), 20:68:3; 28:53; 33:34; 36:21; 37:14; 38:33–34; 39:33; 41:11, 13; 43:27.</ref><ref>[[Diodorus Siculus]], ''[[Bibliotheca historica]]'', (tr. C. H. Oldfather, London: Loeb, 1946), 33:16; 34/5:31.</ref><ref>[[Vergil]], ''[[Aeneid]]'', in ''Cosmos and Imperium'', (Oxford University Press, 1986), 7:543.</ref><ref>[[Sallust]], ''[[Jugurtha|Jogurthine War]]'', (London: Loeb, 1961), 14:2; 83.</ref><ref>[[Sallust]], ''Histories'', (London: Loeb, 1961), 1:11.</ref><ref>[[Julius Caesar]], ''[[Gallic Wars]]'', (trs. V. O. Gorenstein, & M. M. Pokrovsky, Moscow: Ladomir, 1981), 1:3, 11, 35.</ref><ref>Lintott, 1993, p 32.</ref><ref>Sands, 1975, pp. 10–11, 46, 49, 54.</ref>

No regular or formal tribute was extracted from client states. The land of a client state could not officially be a basis for taxation.<ref>Sands, 1975, pp. 127–128, 152–155.</ref> The overall fact is that, despite extensive conquests, the Romans did not settle down nor extracted revenues in any subdued territories between 200 and 148 BC.<ref>[[John North (historian)|John North]], "The development of Roman imperialism," ''Journal of Roman Studies'', 71: (1981), p. 2.</ref> The first good evidence for regular taxation of another kingdom comes from Judea as late as 64 BC.<ref>Lintott, 1993, p. 35.</ref>

The Roman hegemony of the late Republic left to the Mediterranean kings internal autonomy and obliged them not to enter alliances hostile to Rome and not to wage offensive wars without consent of the Senate. Annexations usually followed when client kings broke this order ([[Macedonia (ancient kingdom)|Macedonia]] in 148 BC and [[Kingdom of Pontus|Pontus in 64 BC]]). In the course of these and other annexations, Rome gradually evolved from hegemony into empire. The last major client state of the Mediterranean—the [[Ptolemaic Kingdom]]—was annexed by [[Augustus]] in the very beginning of his reign in 30 BC.

Augustus initiated an unprecedented era of peace, shortly after his reign called ''[[Pax Romana]]''. This peace however was imperial rather than hegemonic. Classic and modern scholars<ref>Parchami, A., [https://books.google.com/books?id=Pwt6AgAAQBAJ&q=hegemony+rome&pg=PA41 ''Hegemonic Peace and Empire: The Pax Romana, Britannica and Americana''], [[Routledge]], 2009, p. 32, referring to [[Dionysius of Halicarnassus]].</ref> who call ''Pax Romana'' "hegemonic peace," use the term "hegemony" in its broader sense which includes both hegemony and empire.

From the 7th century to the 12th century, the [[Umayyad Caliphate]] and later [[Abbasid Caliphate]] dominated the vast territories they governed, with other states like the [[Byzantine Empire]] paying tribute.<ref>al-Tabari, [https://books.google.com/books?id=1Oe16n-tfBEC&dq=al-tabari+umayyad&pg=PR11 ''The History of al-Tabari'']</ref>

In 7th-century India, [[Harsha]], ruler of a large empire in northern India from AD&nbsp;606 to 647, brought most of the north under his hegemony. He preferred not to rule as a central government, but left "conquered kings on their thrones and contenting himself with tribute and homage."<ref>''Encyclopædia Britannica'', [https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/256065/Harsha "Harsha"]</ref>

From the late 9th to the early 11th century, the empire developed by [[Charlemagne]] achieved hegemony in Europe, with dominance over France, most of Northern and Central Italy, [[Burgundy]] and Germany.<ref>Story, J. [https://books.google.com/books?id=vTbvq_8HFPUC&dq=Charlemagne++hegemony&pg=PA193 ''Charlemagne: Empire and Society'', Manchester University Press, 2005, p. 193.]</ref>

From the 11th to the late 15th century the [[Italian peninsula|Italian]] [[maritime republics]], in particular [[Republic of Venice|Venice]] and [[Republic of Genoa|Genoa]] held hegemony in the Mediterranean, dominating trade between Europe and the Orient for centuries, and having naval supremacy.<ref>{{cite web|title=Italian Trade Cities {{!}} Western Civilization|url=https://courses.lumenlearning.com/atd-herkimer-westerncivilization/chapter/italian-trade-cities/|access-date=2021-09-29|website=courses.lumenlearning.com}}</ref> However, with the arrival of the [[Age of Discovery]] and the [[early modern period]], they began to gradually lose their hegemony to other European powers.<ref>{{Cite book|last=F. Dewitt Platt|first=Roy T. Matthews|title=Western Humanities: Beginnings Through the Renaissance|year=1998 |publisher=Mayfield Pub Co|isbn=1559349441|pages=}}</ref>

=== 16th–19th centuries ===
[[File: Philip II's realms in 1598.png|thumb|upright=1.2|The [[Iberian Union]] in 1598, under [[Philip II of Spain|Philip II]], King of Spain and Portugal]]
European powers dominated global economic system from as early as the 15th century. Some of the powers attempted to shape world order in their own images. A succession of hegemonic contenders emerged during this period, with dominance based on pre-eminence in specific areas, and often with a district primary rival contesting their dominance, or two rivals allied to resist their dominance.<ref name="v1182">{{cite book |last=Jayman |first=Jayantha |url=https://books.google.ca/books?id=xCBHBAAAQBAJ&dq=hegemony+15th+century&pg=PA119 |title=The Politics of International Political Economy |date=2014-08-13 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-136-50740-3 |editor-last=Fouskas |editor-first=Vassilis |pages=119-120 |chapter=The Rise of the Qi Ye Ji Tuan and the Emergence of Chinese Hegemony |access-date=2025-11-17}}</ref><blockquote>
* [[History of Portugal (1415–1578)|Portugal 1494 to 1580]] (From the end of the [[Italian Wars]] to [[Iberian Union|Spanish–Portuguese Union]]) 
** Based on [[Portuguese maritime exploration|Portugal's dominance in navigation]]. 
** Primary rival: [[Habsburg Spain]]
*[[Habsburg Spain|Spain 1516 to 1659]] (From the accession of [[Charles I of Spain]] to the [[Treaty of the Pyrenees]])
**Based on the [[Tercio|Spanish dominance of the European battlefields]] and the global exploration and colonization of the [[New World]]. 
**Primary rival: France under [[Louis XIV]]
* [[Dutch Golden Age|The Netherlands 1580 to 1688]] (From the [[Union of Utrecht|1579 Treaty of Utrecht]], which marks the foundation of the [[Dutch Republic]], to the [[Glorious Revolution]], [[William III of England|William of Orange]]'s arrival in England). 
** Based on [[Economic history of the Netherlands (1500–1815)|Dutch control of credit and money]]. 
** Primary rival: France under f [[Louis XIV]]
* [[Louis XIV|France 1667 to 1688]] (Reign of Louis XIV from the [[War of Devolution]] to  [[Nine Years' War]]). 
** Based on military might and economic dominance in Continental Europe. 
** Primary rival: Britain
* [[Early modern Britain|Britain 1688 to 1792]] (From the Glorious Revolution to the start of the [[French Revolutionary Wars]]). 
** Based on British textiles and command of the high seas. 
** Primary rival: France
* [[Napoleonic era|France 1789 to 1815]] (Napoleonic France). 
** Based on military conquests, diplomatic alliances and propagation of [[Napoleonic Code|modernized civil law]]. 
** Primary rivals: Britain, Prussia
* [[History of the British Isles#19th century|Britain 1815 to 1914]] (From the [[Congress of Vienna]] to the start of the [[Great War]]). 
** Based on British industrial supremacy and railroads.  
** Primary rival: Prussia/Germany
</blockquote>

[[Philip IV of Spain|Phillip IV]] tried to restore the Habsburg dominance but, by the middle of the 17th century "Spain's pretensions to hegemony (in Europe) had definitely and irremediably failed."<ref>''Encyclopædia Britannica'', [https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/456194/Philip-IV "Phillip IV"].</ref><ref>''Encyclopædia Britannica'', [https://www.britannica.com/place/Spain/Spain-under-the-Habsburgs "Spain under the Habsburgs"].</ref>
 
In late 16th- and 17th-century Holland, the Dutch Republic's [[mercantilist]] dominion was an early instance of commercial hegemony, made feasible by the development of wind power for the efficient production and delivery of goods and services. This, in turn, made possible the Amsterdam [[stock market]] and concomitant dominance of world trade.<ref>''Encyclopædia Britannica'', [https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jean-Baptiste-Colbert#ref1401 "Colbert, Jean-Baptiste §&nbsp;Financial and economic affairs"].</ref>

In France, King [[Louis XIV]] and [[Emperor of the French|Emperor]] [[Napoleon]] I (1799–1815) attempted true French hegemony via economic, cultural and military domination of most of [[Continental Europe]]. However, Jeremy Black writes that, because of Britain, France "was unable to enjoy the benefits" of this hegemony.<ref>Black, J., [https://books.google.com/books?id=3qV8GPUJkyEC&dq=hegemony+napoleon&pg=PA76 ''Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony: The World Order Since 1500''], Routledge, 2007, p. 76.</ref>
[[File:Arthur Mees Flags of A Free Empire 1910 Cornell CUL PJM 1167 01 (Reddit source).jpg|thumb|upright=1.1|Map of the [[British Empire]] (as of 1910). At its height, it was the [[List of largest empires|largest empire]] in history.]]
After the defeat and exile of Napoleon, hegemony largely passed to the [[British Empire]], which became the largest empire in history, with [[Queen Victoria]] (1837–1901) ruling over one-quarter of the world's land and population at its zenith. Like the Dutch, the British Empire was primarily seaborne; many [[British possessions]] were located around the rim of the Indian Ocean, as well as numerous islands in the Pacific Ocean and the [[Caribbean Sea]]. Britain also controlled the [[Indian subcontinent]] and large portions of Africa.<ref>Porter, A., [https://books.google.com/books?id=CTkb4yIR8pIC&q=hegemony+british+emp+iii ''The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III: The Nineteenth Century''], Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 258.</ref>

In Europe, Germany, rather than Britain, may have been the strongest power after 1871, but Samuel Newland writes:<blockquote>Bismarck defined the road ahead as … no expansion, no push for hegemony in Europe. Germany was to be the strongest power in Europe but without being a hegemon. … His basic axioms were first, no conflict among major powers in Central Europe; and second, German security without German hegemony."<ref>{{cite book |last=Newland |first=Samuel J |title=Victories Are Not Enough: Limitations of the German Way of War |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9ehS8Dg8sdQC&pg=PA30 |publisher=Diane Publishing |year=2005 |page=30 |isbn=978-1428916487 |access-date=2016-02-24}}</ref></blockquote>

These fluctuations form the basis for cyclical theories by [[George Modelski]] and [[Joshua S. Goldstein]], both of whom allege that naval power is vital for hegemony.

=== 20th century ===
[[File:NATO vs. Warsaw Pact (1949-1990).svg|thumb|The Soviet Union and the United States dominated world affairs during the [[Cold War]].]]
The early 20th century, like the late 19th century, was characterized by multiple [[Great Powers]] but no global hegemon. World War I strengthened the United States and, to a lesser extent, Japan. Both of these states' governments pursued policies to expand their regional [[spheres of influence]], the U.S. in [[Banana Wars|Latin America]] and Japan in [[Empire of Japan|East Asia]]. France, the UK, Italy, the Soviet Union and later [[Nazi Germany]] (1933–1945) all either maintained imperialist policies based on spheres of influence or attempted to conquer territory but none achieved the status of a global hegemonic power.<ref>{{cite book |first=Christopher |last=Hitchens |title=Why Orwell Matters |year=2002 |location=New York |publisher=Basic Books |pages=[https://archive.org/details/whyorwellmatters00hitc/page/86 86–87] |isbn=0-465-03049-1 |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/whyorwellmatters00hitc/page/86 }}</ref>

After the [[Second World War]], the United Nations was established and the five strongest [[global power]]s (China, France, the UK, the U.S., and the USSR) were given permanent seats on the [[UN Security Council]], the organization's most powerful decision-making body.

Following the war, the U.S. and the USSR were the two strongest global powers and this created a bi-polar power dynamic in international affairs, commonly referred to as the [[Cold War]]. American hegemony during this time has been described as [[US imperialism#1947–1952: Cold War in Western Europe|"Empire by invitation"]]. The hegemonic conflict was [[ideological]], between [[communism]] and [[capitalism]], as well as geopolitical, between the [[Warsaw Pact]] countries (1955–1991) and [[NATO]]/[[SEATO]]/[[CENTO]] countries (1949–present/1954–1977/1955–1979). During the Cold War both hegemons competed against each other directly (during the [[arms race]]) and indirectly (via [[proxy war]]s). The result was that many countries, no matter how remote, were drawn into the conflict when it was suspected that their government's policies might destabilize the [[balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]]. Reinhard Hildebrandt calls this a period of "dual-hegemony", where "two dominant states have been stabilizing their European spheres of influence ''against and alongside each other''."<ref>Hilderbrandt, R., [https://books.google.com/books?id=FavTTdW2YqEC&q=%22cold+war%22+hegemony ''US Hegemony: Global Ambitions and Decline : Emergence of the Interregional Asian Triangle and the Relegation of the US as a Hegemonic Power, the Reorientation of Europe''], Peter Lang, 2009, p. 14. (Author's italics).</ref>
Proxy wars became battle grounds between forces supported either directly or indirectly by the hegemonic powers and included the [[Korean War]], the [[Laotian Civil War]], the [[Arab–Israeli conflict]], the [[Vietnam War]], the [[War in Afghanistan (1978–present)|Afghan War]], the [[Angolan Civil War]], and the [[Central American crisis|Central American Civil Wars]].<ref>Mumford, A., [https://books.google.com/books?id=3UgSAAAAQBAJ&q=proxy+wars ''Proxy Warfare''], John Wiley & Sons, 2013, pp. 46–51.</ref>

Following the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]] in 1991, the United States was the world's sole hegemonic power.<ref>Hildebrandt, R., [https://books.google.com/books?id=FavTTdW2YqEC&q=hegemony+USA ''US Hegemony: Global Ambitions and Decline : Emergence of the Interregional Asian Triangle and the Relegation of the US as a Hegemonic Power, the Reorientation of Europe''], Peter Lang, 2009, pp. 9–11.</ref>

=== 21st century ===
{{Original research section|date=August 2025}}
Various perspectives on whether the U.S. was or continues to be a hegemon have been presented since the end of the [[Cold War]]. American political scientists [[John Mearsheimer]] and [[Joseph Nye]] have argued that the U.S. is not a genuine global hegemon because it has neither the financial nor the military resources to impose a proper, formal, global hegemony<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Mearsheimer|first=John|title=The Tragedy of Great Power Politics|publisher=W.W. Norton|year=2001|pages=40, 138}}</ref> and cannot achieve many security, political and economic goals alone.<ref>{{cite book |first=Joseph S. Sr. |last=Nye |title=Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History |year=1993 |location=New York |publisher=HarperCollins |pages=251–252 |isbn=0-06-500720-4}}</ref> This theory is contested in academic discussions of international relations{{by whom|date=August 2025}}.<ref>{{Cite web|author= Henrik B.L. Larsen|url=https://www.routledge.com/NATOs-Democratic-Retrenchment-Hegemony-After-the-Return-of-History/Larsen/p/book/9781032240800|title=NATO's Democratic Retrenchment: Hegemony After the Return of History|website=Routledge & CRC Press}}</ref>{{failed verification|date=August 2025}}

Nye opened his 2022 book,  ''The Paradox of American Power'' with: "Not since Rome has one nation loomed so large above the others."<ref>Nye, Joseph (2002) ''The Paradox of American Power''. (New York: Oxford University Press).</ref> Among his other titles were "The New Rome Meets the New Barbarians,"<ref>{{Cite magazine |title=The new Rome meets the new barbarians |url=https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2002/03/21/the-new-rome-meets-the-new-barbarians |magazine=The Economist |issn=0013-0613|last=Nye|first= Joseph|date= March 21, 2002|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190915234602/https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2002/03/21/the-new-rome-meets-the-new-barbarians|archive-date=September 15, 2019 }}</ref> where "New Rome" means the United States, and ''Bound to Lead'',<ref>Nye, Joseph (1991). ''Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature Of American Power''. (Basic Books).</ref> where the bound-to-lead entity is the United States.

According to Mearsheimer, global hegemony is unlikely due to the difficulties in projecting power over large bodies of water.<ref name=":0"/> IR author [[Max Ostrovsky]] wrote:
{{blockquote|Disregarding recent (since 1492 AD) events, the hypothesis makes sense. In 1281, water and the "good wind" (kamikaze) indeed stopped the Mongols on the way to Japan. Later, however, even with all sorts of kamikaze, water ceased to stop. In 1945, the citizens of Hamburg and Dresden, Berlin and Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki (those who survived), would not describe water power as stopping; certainly not the double habakusha—those who survived in Hiroshima on August 6 and within next two days managed to reach Nagasaki. Had Mearsheimer arranged a poll of double habakushas on August 10, "Does, in your opinion, water power stop?" he would have collected unanimous negative, not necessarily literal, replies. Just the day before the anniversary of the original kamikaze (August 15), the Japanese announced the unconditional surrender. They knew: water will not stop. Not this time.<ref>Max Ostrovsky, (2018). ''Military Globalization: Geography, Strategy, Weaponry'', (New York: Edwin Mellen Press), p 275-276, https://archive.org/details/military-globalization/page/275/mode/1up?view=theater&q=Kamikaze</ref>}}

The [[Socialist Party (France)|French Socialist]] politician [[Hubert Védrine]] in 1999 described the U.S. as a hegemonic hyperpower, because of its unilateral military actions worldwide.<ref>Reid, JIM., [https://books.google.com/books?id=p6LwocQyz44C&pg=PA82 ''Religion and Global Culture: New Terrain in the Study of Religion and the Work of Charles H. Long''], Lexington Books, 2004, p. 82.</ref>{{undue weight inline|date=August 2025}} The US role is often described as hegemonic in NATO and other [[US imperialism#US military alliances|US-led military alliances]].{{citation needed|date=August 2025}}

{{Military spending top 25 countries}}

In 2006, author [[Zhu Zhiqun]] claimed that China is already on the way to becoming the world hegemon and that the focus should be on how a [[peaceful transition of power|peaceful transfer of power]] can be achieved between the U.S. and China,<ref>{{Cite book|title=US–China relations in the 21st century : power transition and peace|last=Zhiqun|first=Zhu|publisher=Routledge|year=2006|isbn=0-415-70208-9|location=London; New York}}</ref>{{undue weight inline|date=August 2025}} but has faced opposition{{by whom|date=August 2025}} to this claim.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/yanzhonghuang/2017/08/29/chinas-superpower-status-not-enough-to-replace-u-s-as-global-leader-yet/|title=Forbes Yanz Hong Huang|website=forbes.com}}</ref>{{failed verification|not mentioned in cited source|date=August 2025}} In an article published in 2019, two academics from [[Green School of International and Public Affairs]] argued that a "third‐way hegemony" or Dutch‐style hegemony apart from a peaceful or violent hegemonic rise may be the most feasible option to describe [[Chinese Century|China]] in its global hegemony in the future.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Danner|first1=Lukas K.|last2=Martín|first2=Félix E.|date=2019|title=China's hegemonic intentions and trajectory: Will it opt for benevolent, coercive, or Dutch-style hegemony?|journal=Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies|language=en|volume=6|issue=2|pages=186–207|doi=10.1002/app5.273|issn=2050-2680|doi-access=free}}</ref>

The [[Russo-Georgian War]] was interpreted as an anti-hegemonic resistance by the Russian geopolitical thinker, [[Alexander Dugin]] (the theorist of Russian [[neo-Eurasianism]] and influential on Russian ruler [[Vladimir Putin]]): "Here is the border in the battle of civilizations. I think Americans are great. But we want to put an end to America's hegemony."<ref>Spiegel staff, (August 25, 2008). "The Chronicle of a Caucasian Tragedy," ''Spiegel'', https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/road-to-war-in-georgia-the-chronicle-of-a-caucasian-tragedy-a-574812.html</ref> For [[Fabrizio Vielmini]], writing for the Italian think tank [[Institute for International Political Studies]], the war marked a turning point from the hegemonic order the US tried to enforce for the first two post-Cold War decades.<ref>Vielmini, Fabrizio (2008). "The Systemic Impact of the Five-Day War in Georgia," [[Institute for International Political Studies|ISPI]], https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/systemic-impact-five-day-war-georgia-21100</ref> The Russo-Georgian War was seen by some analysts as a landmark event, with the Wests muted response inviting Russia to acts of ever bolder aggression.<ref>Dickinson, Peter (August 7, 2021). "The 2008 Russo-Georgian War: Putin’s green light," Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-2008-russo-georgian-war-putins-green-light/</ref><ref>Kagan, Robert (May/June 2022). "The price of Hegemony: Can America learn to use its power?" ''Foreign Affairs'', vol 101 (3), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-06/russia-ukraine-war-price-hegemony</ref> In 2014, Russia [[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|conquered and annexed Crimea]], and in 2022 launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine and [[Russian annexation of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts|annexed four more Ukrainian regions]]. Pro-Putin analyst [[Glenn Diesen]] saw the Russian invasion as the "graveyard of liberal hegemony."<ref>Diesen, Glenn (2024). ''The Ukraine War & the Eurasian World Order''. (Clarity Press), p 273.</ref>{{undue weight inline| fringe view|date=August 2025}}

Following the annexations, Putin stated that the breakdown of the Western hegemony passed the point of no return, and that the post-Cold War hegemonic world order will not be back.<ref>Мошкин, Михаил & Отрокова, Олеся (30 September 2022). “Путин объявил о начале слома гегемонии Запада.” ''Взгляд'', https://vz.ru/politics/2022/9/30/1177906.html</ref> He often justifies the ongoing war with Ukraine as an “anti-hegemonic” struggle and calls a wider international community to join this struggle.<ref>''Meduza'' (2024). "Путин хочет возглавить борьбу против ‘глобального гегемона,’" https://meduza.io/episodes/2023/03/28/putin-hochet-vozglavit-borbu-protiv-globalnogo-gegemona-a-chto-za-gegemon-i-kto-esche-s-nim-boretsya</ref><ref>Ye Hee Lee, Michelle & Dixon, Robyn (19 June 2024). "North Korea’s Kim declares ‘full support’ for Russian war in Ukraine." ''The Washington Post'', https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/18/russia-vladimir-putin-north-korea-kim-jong-un/</ref> Two days after [[Donald Trump]] was reelected US president, Putin celebrated the "crumbling hegemonic world”, saying the stream of history runs counter to the strivings of the West: "No hegemony can be a consideration in the new international environment."<ref>Putin, Vladimir (7 November 2024). “Путин выступил на заседании дискуссионного клуба "Валдай". Полный текст.” 21st annual Valdai session, [[TASS]], https://tass.ru/politika/22345579</ref>{{primary source inline|date=August 2025}} Following the [[2025 Trump–Zelenskyy Oval Office meeting]] and the turmoil caused by Trump's [[Tariffs in the second Trump administration|tariffs policy]] and [[American expansionism under Donald Trump|expansionist proposals]], Russian official agencies celebrated victory over the hegemony. "Putin quietly finished the Hegemon off," was one newspaper title. This geopolitical victory, it says, is underestimated as Putin has attained what earlier had seemed fantastic, when Russia launched this process to defend its sovereignty from the hegemony.<ref>Editorial (9 April 2025). “Путин добил «гегемона» в тишине: тайный триумф Кремля, который Запад еще не понял.” ''Московский Комсомолец'', https://news.rambler.ua/politics/54484858-putin-dobil-gegemona-v-tishine-taynyy-triumf-kremlya-kotoryy-zapad-esche-ne-ponyal/</ref>

A pamphlet published by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2023 states the US hegemony as existing since the end of the Cold War, and claims that the US consistent abuse of its hegemony imperils the world. The Ministry referred to a composition of US military interventions by country.{{vague|date=August 2025}} This composition, the Ministry said, omits three countries (of 194 UN member states) where the United States was not militarily involved: [[Andorra]], [[Liechtenstein]] and [[Bhutan]]. The Ministry supposed that they were "spared because the United States did not find them on the map.”<ref name="mfa.gov.cn">China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (20 February 2023). “US hegemony and its perils,” https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367483.html</ref>{{primary source inline|date=August 2025}}{{undue weight inline|date=August 2025}} Chinese official agencies frequently publish such pamphlets claiming to be against “hegemony”.<ref>Bloomberg News (20 February 2023). “China blasts US for military, cultural ‘hegemony’ as ties sour.” ''Bloomberg.com'', https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-20/china-blasts-us-for-military-cultural-hegemony-as-ties-sour</ref>

According to [[Michael Ignatieff]] in 2024, both China and Russia may believe that there will never be a more opportune moment to overthrow American hegemony.<ref>Ignatieff, Michael (March 5, 2024). "The threat to American Hegemony is real," Project Syndicate, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-western-hegemony-vulnerable-to-russian-chinese-coordinated-challenge-by-michael-ignatieff-2024-03</ref> By 2025, this possibility became more relevant as Donald Trump came to power, adopted a more pro-Russian line, halted aid to Ukraine and Taiwan, and took a more [[American expansionism under Donald Trump|aggressive attitude towards other allies]] including Canada. With “uneasy feeling” of facing “[[Anschluss]],” Ignatieff found the moment opportune for designing an anti-hegemonic “common front” with Europe and Latin America.<ref>Ignatieff, Michael & Rachman, Gideon (16 January 2025). “Transcript: Does the Trump administration pose an existential threat to Canada?” ''Financial Times'', https://www.ft.com/content/ec972fb6-0c66-4fbe-bbaa-e79df0ea2d3c</ref>

== See also ==
{{Portal|Politics}}
{{col div|colwidth=20em}}
* [[Colonialism]]
* [[Cultural hegemony]]
* [[Dominant ideology]]
* [[Hegemonic masculinity]]
* [[Hegemonic stability theory]]
* ''[[Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism]]''
* ''[[Manufacturing Consent]]''
* [[Media hegemony]]
* [[Monetary hegemony]]
* [[Post-hegemony]]
* [[Regional hegemony]]
* [[Soft power]]
* [[State collapse]]
* [[Superpower]]
* [[Supremacism]]
{{colend}}

== References ==
{{Reflist|30em}}

== Further reading ==
{{refbegin|30em}} 
* Anderson, Perry (2017). ''The H-Word: The Peripeteia of Hegemony.'' London: Verso. {{ISBN?}}
* {{cite book |last=Beyer |first=Anna Cornelia |year=2010 |title=Counterterrorism and International Power Relations: The EU, ASEAN and Hegemonic Global Governance |location=London |publisher=IB Tauris}}{{ISBN?}}
* {{cite journal |last=DuBois |first=T. D. |year=2005 |title=Hegemony, Imperialism and the Construction of Religion in East and Southeast Asia |journal=History and Theory |volume=44 |issue=4 |pages=113–131 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-2303.2005.00345.x}}
* {{cite book |last=Hopper |first=P. |year=2007 |title=Understanding Cultural Globalization |edition= |location=Malden, MA |publisher=Polity Press |isbn=978-0-7456-3557-6}}
* {{cite book |editor-last=Howson |editor-first=Richard|title=Hegemony: Studies in Consensus and Coercion|publisher=Psychology Press|year=2008|isbn=978-0-415-95544-7|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Nhq3fV6tWfwC|access-date=2016-02-24}}
* {{cite book |last=Joseph |first=Jonathan |title=Hegemony: A Realist Analysis |publisher=Routledge |year=2002 |isbn=0-415-26836-2}}
* {{cite book |last=Larsen|first=Henrik Boesen Lindbo |title=NATO's Democratic Retrenchment: Hegemony After the Return of History |publisher=Routledge |year=2019 |isbn=978-1138585287}}
* {{cite book |last=Slack |first=Jennifer Daryl |chapter=The Theory and Method of Articulation in Cultural Studies |title=Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies |url=https://archive.org/details/stuarthallcritic00morl |url-access=limited |editor1-last=Morley |editor1-first=David |editor2-last=Chen |editor2-first=Kuan-Hsing |publisher=Routledge |year=1996 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/stuarthallcritic00morl/page/n123 112]–27}}
* {{cite book |last=Schenoni |first=Luis |chapter=Hegemony |title=Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2019}}{{ISBN?}}
{{refend}}

== External links ==
{{Wikiquote}}
{{Wiktionary}}
{{Commons}}
* {{Britannica|1922977}}
* {{cite EB1911|wstitle=Hegemony |volume=13 |page=208 |short=x}}

{{Use Oxford spelling|date=June 2018}}
{{Political philosophy}}
{{International relations}}
{{Autonomous types of first-tier administration}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Hegemony| ]]
[[Category:International relations theory]]
[[Category:Marxist theory]]
[[Category:Empires]]