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{{Short description|Model of humans as rational, self-interested agents}}
{{Italic title}}
{{about|the economic concept|the journal|Homo Oeconomicus}}

The term '''''Homo economicus''''', or '''economic man''', is the portrayal of humans as [[Agency (philosophy)|agents]] who are consistently [[Rationality|rational]] and narrowly [[Rational egoism|self-interested]], and who pursue their subjectively defined ends [[Optimal decision|optimally]]. It is a wordplay on ''[[Homo sapiens]]'', used in some [[economic theories]] and in [[pedagogy]].<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6QrvmNo2qD4C&pg=PA158|title=Moral Markets: The Critical Role of Values in the Economy|last=Zak|first=Paul J.|date=2010-12-16|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=9781400837366|page=158|access-date=22 June 2018}}</ref>

In [[game theory]], ''Homo economicus'' is often (but not necessarily) modelled through the assumption of '''perfect rationality'''. It assumes that agents always act in a way that [[Utility maximization problem|maximize utility]] as a [[Consumption (economics)|consumer]] and [[economic profit|profit]] as a [[Production (economics)|producer]],<ref>{{cite book|title=Principles of Microeconomics|author=Rittenberg and Tregarthen|page=2|chapter=Chapter 6|access-date=June 20, 2012|chapter-url=http://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/ECON101-3.1.pdf}}</ref> and are capable of arbitrarily complex deductions towards that end. They will always be capable of thinking through all possible outcomes and choosing that course of action which will result in the best possible result.

The rationality implied in ''Homo economicus'' does not restrict what sort of preferences are admissible. Only naive applications of the ''Homo economicus'' model assume that agents know what is best for their long-term physical and mental health. For example, an agent's utility function could be linked to the perceived utility of other agents (such as one's husband or children), making ''Homo economicus'' compatible with other models such as ''[[Homo reciprocans]],'' which emphasizes human [[Cooperation#In humans|cooperation]].

As a theory on human conduct, it contrasts to the concepts of [[behavioral economics]], which examines [[cognitive biases]] and other [[irrationalities]], and to [[bounded rationality]], which assumes that practical elements such as cognitive and time limitations restrict the rationality of agents.

== History of the term ==

The term "economic man" was used for the first time in the late nineteenth century by critics of [[John Stuart Mill]]'s work on political economy.<ref name=persky>Persky, Joseph. "Retrospectives: The Ethology of Homo economicus." ''The Journal of Economic Perspectives'', Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring, 1995), pp. 221–231</ref> Below is a passage from Mill's work that critics referred to:

<blockquote>[Political economy] does not treat the whole of man's nature as modified by the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society. It is concerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end.<ref>Mill, John Stuart. "On the Definition of Political Economy, and on the Method of Investigation Proper to It," London and Westminster Review, October 1836. ''Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy'', 2nd ed. London: Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer, 1874, essay 5, paragraphs 38 and 48.</ref></blockquote>

Later in the same work, Mill stated that he was proposing "an arbitrary definition of man, as a being who inevitably does that by which he may obtain the greatest amount of necessaries, conveniences, and luxuries, with the smallest quantity of labour and physical self-denial with which they can be obtained."

[[Adam Smith]], in ''[[The Theory of Moral Sentiments]]'', had claimed that individuals have sympathy for the well-being of others. On the other hand, in ''[[The Wealth of Nations]]'', Smith wrote:

<blockquote>It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.<ref>Smith, Adam. “On the Division of Labour,” The Wealth of Nations, Books I–III. New York: Penguin Classics, 1986, p. 119.</ref></blockquote>

This comment is perfectly in line with the notion of ''Homo economicus'' and the idea, propounded by Smith in ''The Wealth of Nations'' and, in the 20th century, by the likes of Ayn Rand (in ''The Virtue of Selfishness'', for example), that pursuing one's individual self-interest promotes social well-being. In Book V, Chapter I, Smith argues, "The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects are perhaps always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become." This could be seen as prefiguring one part of [[Marx's theory of alienation]] of labor; and also as a pro-worker argument against the division of labor and the restrictions it places upon freedom of occupation. But even so, taken in the context of the work as a whole, Smith clearly intends it in a pro-capitalism, pro-bourgeoisie, way: "removing difficulties", such as reducing the time needed for travel and trade, through "expedients", such as steam-engine ships, here means the typical argument that capitalism brings freedom of entrepreneurship and innovation, which then bring prosperity. Thus, Smith is not unreasonably called "The Father of Capitalism"; early on, he theorized many of today's most widespread and deep-seated pro-capitalism arguments.

The early role of Homo Economicus within neoclassical theory was summarised to include a general objective of discovering laws and principles to accelerate further growth within the national economy and the welfare of ordinary citizens. These laws and principles were determined by two governing factors, natural and social.<ref name=Elahi>{{cite journal |last1=Elahi |first1=Khandakar |title=Behavioural controversy concerning homo economicus: a Humean perspective |journal=The Journal of Philosophical Economics |date=January 2014 |volume=7 |pages=2–29 |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265643563}}</ref> It had been found to be the foundation of neoclassical theory of the firm which assumed that individual agents would act rationally amongst other rational individuals.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kluver |first1=Jesse |last2=Frazier |first2=Rebecca |last3=Haidt |first3=Jonathan |title=Behavioral ethics for Homo economicus, Homo heuristicus, and Homo duplex |journal=Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes |year=2014 |volume=123 |issue=2 |pages=150–158 |doi=10.1016/j.obhdp.2013.12.004}}</ref> In which Adam Smith explains that the actions of those that are rational and self-interested under homo economicus promotes the general good overall which was understood as the efficient allocation of material wealth. However, social scientists had doubted the actual importance of income and wealth to overall happiness in societies.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Konow |first1=James |last2=Earley |first2=Joseph |title=The Hedonistic Paradox: Is homo economicus happier? |journal=Journal of Public Economics |year=2008 |volume=92 |issue=1–2 |pages=1–33 |doi=10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.006|url=https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2728/1/MPRA_paper_2728.pdf }}</ref>  

The term 'Homo economicus' was initially critiqued for its portrayal of the economic agent as a narrowly defined, money-making animal, a characterization heavily influenced by the works of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. Authors from the [[English historical school of economics|English Historical School of Economics]] sought to demote this model from its broad classification under the 'genus homo', arguing that it insufficiently captured the complex ethical and behavioral dimensions of human decision-making. Their critique emphasized the need for a more nuanced understanding of human agency beyond the mere pursuit of economic rationality.<ref>Rodriguez-Sickert, C. (2009). Homo economicus. In Handbook of Economics and Ethics (Edward Elgar).</ref>

Economists in the late 19th century—such as [[Francis Edgeworth]], [[William Stanley Jevons]], [[Léon Walras]], and [[Vilfredo Pareto]]—built mathematical models on these economic assumptions. In the 20th century, the [[rational choice theory]] of [[Lionel Robbins]] came to dominate mainstream economics. The term "economic man" then took on a more specific meaning: a person who acted rationally on complete knowledge out of self-interest and the desire for wealth.

== Model ==

''Homo economicus'' is a term used for an approximation or [[Economic model|model]] of ''[[Homo sapiens]]'' that acts to obtain the highest possible well-being for themself given available information about opportunities and other constraints, both natural and [[institution]]al, on their ability to achieve their predetermined goals. This approach has been formalized in certain [[social sciences]] models, particularly in [[economics]].

''Homo economicus'' is usually seen as "rational" in the sense that well-being as defined by the [[utility function]] is optimized given perceived opportunities.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Medema |first=Steven G. |title=The Economics Book: From Xenophon to Cryptocurrency, 250 Milestones in the History of Economics |date=2019 |publisher=[[Sterling Publishing]] |isbn=978-1-4549-3008-2 |location=New York |page=146}}</ref> That is, the individual seeks to attain very specific and predetermined goals to the greatest extent with the least possible cost. Note that this kind of "rationality" does not say that the individual's actual goals are "rational" in some larger ethical, social, or human sense, only that they try to attain them at minimal cost. Only naïve applications of the ''Homo economicus'' model assume that this hypothetical individual knows what is best for their long-term physical and mental health and can be relied upon to always make the right decision for themself. See [[rational choice theory]] and [[rational expectations]] for further discussion; the article on [[rationality]] widens the discussion.

As in social science, these assumptions are at best approximations. The term is often used derogatorily in academic literature, perhaps most commonly by [[sociology|sociologists]], many of whom tend to prefer structural explanations to ones based on rational action by individuals.

The use of the Latin form ''Homo economicus'' is certainly long established; Persky<ref name=persky/> traces it back to [[Vilfredo Pareto|Pareto]] (1906)<ref>Pareto, Vilfredo (1906). "Manual of political economy".</ref> but notes that it may be older. The English term ''economic man'' can be found even earlier, in [[John Kells Ingram]]'s ''A History of Political Economy'' (1888).<ref>Zabieglik, Stefan (2002). "The Origins of the Term ''Homo Oeconomicus''", Gdansk, 123–130.</ref>  The ''[[Oxford English Dictionary]] (O.E.D.)'' cites the use of ''Homo oeconomicus'' by [[Charles Stanton Devas|C. S. Devas]] in his 1883 work ''The Groundwork of Economics'' in reference to Mill's writings, as one of a number of phrases that imitate the scientific name for the human species:

{{quote|Mill has only examined the ''Homo oeconomicus'', or dollar-hunting animal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/87988#eid215918154|title=Homo oeconomicus|url-access=subscription |work=Oxford English Dictionary}}</ref>}}

According to the ''[[Oxford English Dictionary|OED]]'', the human genus name ''Homo'' is

{{quote|Used with [[Latin|L.]] or mock-L. adjs. in names imitating ''Homo sapiens,'' ''etc.,'' and intended to personify some aspect of human life or behaviour (indicated by the adj.). ''Homo faber'' ("feIb@(r)) [H. Bergson L'Evolution Créatrice (1907) ii. 151], a term used to designate man as a maker of tools.) Variants are often comic: ''Homo insipiens;'' ''Homo turisticus.''<ref>This is from the CD edition of 2002.</ref>}}

Note that such forms should logically keep the capital for the "genus" name—''i.e.,'' ''<u>H</u>omo economicus'' rather than ''<u>h</u>omo economicus.'' Actual usage is inconsistent.

[[Amartya Sen]] has argued there are grave pitfalls in assuming that rationality is limited to selfish rationality. Economics should build into its assumptions the notion that people can give credible commitments to a course of conduct. He demonstrates the absurdity with the narrowness of the assumptions by some economists with the following example of two strangers meeting on a street.<ref>AK Sen, ‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory’ (1977) 6 Philosophy and Public Affairs 317, 332</ref>

{{Cquote|"Where is the railway station?" he asks me. "There," I say, pointing at the post office, "and would you please post this letter for me on the way?" "Yes," he says, determined to open the envelope and check whether it contains something valuable.}}

== Criticisms ==
{{csection|date=June 2021}}

''Homo economicus'' bases its choices on a consideration of its own personal "utility function".

The system established by the concept of the homo economicus has become the basis for the concepts used in economics.<ref>Falk, A. (2003). Homo Economicus versus Homo Reciprocans: Studies on a New Social Political Model of Change? Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik : PWP : eine Zeitschrift des Vereins für Socialpolitik, 4(1), 141–172.</ref> "Self-interest is the main motivation of human beings in their transactions" is a theoretical structure in the concept of homo economicus. Over the years, economists have studied and discussed institutional economics, behavioural economics, political economy, economic anthropology and [[ecological economics]]. The economic man solution is considered to be inadequate and flawed.<ref>Urbina, D. A., & Ruiz-Villaverde, A. (2019). A Critical Review of Homo Economicus from Five Approaches. The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 78(1), 63–93. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajes.12258</ref>

===Economists===
Economists [[Thorstein Veblen]], [[John Maynard Keynes]], [[Herbert A. Simon]], and many of the [[Austrian School]] criticise ''Homo economicus'' as an actor with too great an understanding of macroeconomics and economic forecasting in his decision making. They stress [[uncertainty]] and [[bounded rationality]] in the making of economic decisions, rather than relying on the rational man who is fully informed of all circumstances impinging on his decisions. They argue that perfect knowledge never exists, which means that all economic activity implies risk. Austrian economists rather prefer to use as a model tool the ''[[Homo agens]]''.

Empirical studies by [[Amos Tversky]] questioned the assumption that [[investor]]s are rational. In 1995, Tversky demonstrated the tendency of investors to make risk-averse choices in gains, and risk-seeking choices in losses. The investors appeared as very risk-averse for small losses but indifferent for a small chance of a very large loss. This violates economic rationality as usually understood. Further research on this subject, showing other deviations from conventionally defined economic rationality, is being done in the growing field of experimental or [[behavioral economics]]. Some of the broader issues involved in this criticism are studied in [[decision theory]], of which [[rational choice theory]] is only a subset.

Behavioral economists [[Richard Thaler]] and [[Daniel Kahneman]] have criticized the notion of [[economic agent]]s possessing stable and well-defined preferences that they consistently act upon in a self-interested manner. Using insights from psychological experiments found explanations for anomalies in economic decision-making that seemed to violate rational choice theory. Writing a column in the Journal of Economic Perspectives under the title ''Anomalies'', Thaler wrote features on the many ways observed economic behavior in markets deviated from theory. One such anomaly was the endowment effect by which individual preferences are framed based on reference positions (Kahneman et al., 1990). In an experiment in which one group was given a mug and the other was asked how much they were [[willingness to pay|willing to pay]] (WTP) for the mug, it was found that the price that those endowed with the mug where willingness to accept (WTA) greatly exceeded that of the WTP. This was seen as falsifying the [[Coase theorem]] in which for every person the WTA equals the WTP that is the basis of the [[efficient-market hypothesis]]. From this they argued the endowment effect acts on us by making it painful for us to give up the endowment. Kahneman also argued against the rational-agent model in which agents make decisions with all of the relevant context including weighing all possible future opportunities and risks. Evidence supports the claim that decisions are often made by "narrow framing" with investors making portfolio decisions in isolation from their entire portfolio (Nicholas Barberis et al., 2003). [[Shlomo Benartzi]] and Thaler found that investors also tended to use unreasonable time periods in evaluating their investments.<ref>{{Cite journal |doi=10.2307/2118511 |jstor=2118511 |title= Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle |last1=Benartzi |first1=Shlomo |last2=Thaler |first2=Richard H. |journal=The Quarterly Journal of Economics |year=1995 |volume=110 |issue=1 |pages=73–92 |s2cid=55030273|url=http://www.nber.org/papers/w4369.pdf }}</ref> 

In Kahneman-Tversky’s criticism of the Homo Economicus model, many mainstream economists had utilised deductive logic to further progress the Homo Economicus idea as opposed to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in which they had applied inductive logic.  Further findings of their experiments that opposed Homo Economicus had found that individuals will constantly adjust their choices according to changes in their income and market prices.  Furthermore, Kahneman and Tversky had conducted experiments exploring prospect theory where results from several experiments concluded that individuals will generally put higher importance on avoiding loss over making a gain.<ref name=Elahi/>
''Homo economicus'' assumptions have been criticized not only by economists on the basis of logical arguments, but also on empirical grounds by cross-cultural comparison. Economic anthropologists such as [[Marshall Sahlins]],<ref>Marshall Sahlins: ''[http://www.eco-action.org/dt/affluent.html The Original Affluent Society] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190724130948/http://www.eco-action.org/dt/affluent.html |date=2019-07-24 }},'' in: Marshall Sahlins (1972''): Stone Age Economics.'' London: Routledge 2003</ref> [[Karl Polanyi]],<ref>Karl Polanyi (1944): ''[[The Great Transformation (book)|The Great Transformation]].'' Beacon Press 2001</ref> [[Marcel Mauss]]<ref>Marcel Mauss (1924): ''[[The Gift (Mauss book)|The Gift]]. The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies.'' London: Routledge 2006</ref> and [[Maurice Godelier]]<ref>Maurice Godelier: ''The Enigma of the Gift.'' University Of Chicago Press 1999</ref> have demonstrated that in traditional societies, choices people make regarding production and exchange of goods follow patterns of [[reciprocity (cultural anthropology)|reciprocity]] which differ sharply from what the ''Homo economicus'' model postulates. Such systems have been termed [[gift economy]] rather than market economy. Criticisms of the ''Homo economicus'' model put forward from the standpoint of ethics usually refer to this traditional ethic of kinship-based reciprocity that held together traditional societies. Philosophers [[Amartya Sen]] and [[Axel Honneth]] are noted for their criticisms of the [[The Idea of Justice|normative assumptions]] made by the self-interested utility function.<ref>Archived at [https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211205/4aLjJ2AsEk8 Ghostarchive]{{cbignore}} and the [https://web.archive.org/web/20161212235920/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4aLjJ2AsEk8 Wayback Machine]{{cbignore}}: {{cite web| url = https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4aLjJ2AsEk8| title = Social Freedom, Morality and Markets {{!}} Axel Honneth (2016) | website=[[YouTube]] | date = 9 June 2016 }}{{cbignore}}</ref>

Swiss economist [[Bruno Frey]], points to the excessive emphasis on [[extrinsic motivation]] (rewards and punishments from the social environment) as opposed to [[intrinsic motivation]]. For example, it is difficult if not impossible to understand how ''Homo economicus'' would be a hero in war or would get inherent pleasure from [[artisan|craftsmanship]]. Frey and others argue that too much emphasis on rewards and punishments can "crowd out" (discourage) intrinsic motivation: paying a boy for doing household tasks may push him from doing those tasks "to help the family" to doing them simply for the reward.

===Sociologists===

Another weakness is highlighted by economic sociologists, who argue that ''Homo economicus'' ignores an extremely important question, i.e. the origins of tastes and the parameters of the utility function by social influences, training, education, and the like. The exogeneity of tastes (preferences) in this model is the major distinction from ''[[Homo sociologicus]],'' in which tastes are taken as partially or even totally determined by the societal environment. Comparisons between economics and sociology have resulted in a corresponding term ''Homo sociologicus'', introduced by German sociologist [[Ralf Dahrendorf]] in 1958, to parody the image of human nature given in some sociological models that attempt to limit the social forces that determine individual tastes and social values.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Dahrendorf |first1=Ralf |title=Homo Sociologicus: ein Versuch zur Geschichte, Bedeutung und Kritik der Kategorie der sozialen Rolle. |date=1965 |publisher=Westdeutscher Verlag |location=Köln/Opladen}}</ref> (The alternative or additional source of these would be biology.) Hirsch ''et al.'' say that ''Homo sociologicus'' is largely a ''[[tabula rasa]]'' upon which societies and cultures write values and goals; unlike ''economicus'', ''sociologicus'' acts not to pursue selfish interests but to fulfill social roles<ref>Hirsch, Paul, Stuart Michaels and Ray Friedman. 1990. "Clean Models vs. Dirty Hands: Why Economics Is Different from Sociology." In Sharon Zukin and Paul DiMaggio, eds. ''Structures of Capital: The Social Organization of the Economy'': 39–56. Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1990 ({{ISBN|0-521-37523-1}})</ref> (though the fulfillment of social roles may have a selfish rationale—e.g. politicians or [[socialite]]s). This "individual" may appear to be all society and no individual.

The as of 2015 emerging science of "[[neuroeconomics]]" suggests that there are serious shortcomings in the conventional theories of economic rationality.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Schmitz | first1 = Sigrid | last2 = Köeszegi | first2 = Sabine T. | last3 = Enzenhofer | first3 = Bettina | last4 = Harrer | first4 = Christine | author-link1 = Sigrid Schmitz | title = Quo vadis Homo economicus? References to rationality/emotionality in neuroeconomic discourses | journal = Recent Notes on Labor Science and Organization | publisher = University of Vienna (Universität Wien) | url = http://repositum.tuwien.ac.at/obvutwoa/content/titleinfo/1006477 | date = 2015 | volume = 2015,2 }} [http://repositum.tuwien.ac.at/obvutwoa/download/pdf/1006477 Pdf.]</ref> Rational economic decision making has been shown to produce high levels of [[cortisol]], [[epinephrine]] and [[corticosteroid]]s, associated with elevated levels of stress.  It seems that the dopaminic system is only activated upon achieving the reward, and otherwise the "pain" receptors, particularly in the [[prefrontal cortex]] of the left hemisphere of the brain show a high level of activation.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Rilling | first1 = J.K. | last2 = Sanfey | first2 = A.G. | last3 = Aronson | first3 = J.A. | last4 = Nystrom | first4 = L.E. | last5 = Cohen | first5 = J.D. | year = 2004 | title = Opposing BOLD responses to reciprocated and unreciprocated altruism in putative reward pathways | journal = NeuroReport | volume = 15 | issue = 16| pages = 2539–2543 | doi = 10.1097/00001756-200411150-00022 | pmid = 15538191 | s2cid = 13127406 }}</ref>  [[Serotonin]] and [[oxytocin]] levels are minimised, and the general immune system shows a level of suppression.  Such a pattern is associated with a generalised reduction in the levels of trust.  Unsolicited "gift giving", considered irrational from the point of view of ''Homo economicus'', by comparison, shows an elevated stimulation of the pleasure circuits of the whole brain, reduction in the levels of stress, optimal functioning of the immune system, reduction in cortico-steroids and epinephrine and cortisol, activation of the [[substantia nigra]], the [[striatum]] and the [[nucleus accumbens]] (associated with the [[placebo effect]]), all associated with the building of social trust.  [[Mirror neuron]]s result in a [[win-win]] [[positive sum game]] in which the person giving the gift receives a pleasure equivalent to the person receiving it.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Kosfeld | first1 = M. | last2 = Heinrichs | first2 = M | last3 = Zak | first3 = P.J. | last4 = Fischbacher | first4 = U. | last5 = Fehr | first5 = E. | year = 2005 | title = Oxytocin increases trust in humans | url = https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:101739| journal = Nature | volume = 435 | issue = 7042| pages = 673–676 | doi = 10.1038/nature03701 | pmid = 15931222 | bibcode = 2005Natur.435..673K | s2cid = 1234727 }}</ref> This confirms the findings of anthropology which suggest that a "[[gift economy]]" preceded the more recent market systems where win-lose or risk-avoidance lose-lose calculations apply.<ref>Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis "A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and its Evolution" (Princeton University Press; Reprint edition)</ref>

===Psychologists and  anthropologists===
Critics,{{Citation needed|reason=Who?|date=March 2019}} learning from the broadly defined [[psychoanalysis|psychoanalytic]] tradition, criticize the ''Homo economicus'' model as ignoring the inner conflicts that real-world individuals suffer, as between short-term and long-term goals (''e.g.,'' eating chocolate cake and losing weight) or between individual goals and societal values. Such conflicts may lead to "irrational" behavior involving inconsistency, psychological paralysis, neurosis, and psychic pain. Further irrational human behaviour can occur as a result of habit, laziness, mimicry and simple obedience.{{cn|date=May 2024}}
According to Sergio Caruso, one should distinguish between the purely "methodological" version of ''Homo economicus'', aimed at practical use in the economic sphere (e.g. economic calculus), and the" anthropological" version, aimed at depicting a certain type of man, or even human nature in general. The former has proved unrealistic, liable to be corrected resorting to [[economic psychology]]. Depicting different types of "economic man" (each depending on the social context) is possible with the help of [[cultural anthropology]], and [[social psychology]]  if only those types are contrived as socially and/or historically determined abstractions (such as [[Max Weber|Weber's]], [[Karl Korsch|Korsch's]], and [[Erich Fromm|Fromm's]] concepts of ''Idealtypus'', "historical specification", and "social character"). Marxist theoretician [[Antonio Gramsci|Gramsci]] admitted of the ''Homo economicus'' as a useful abstraction on the ground of economic theory, provided that we grant there be as many ''homines oeconomici'' as the modes of production. However the concept of ''Homo economicus'' puts aside all other aspects of human nature (such as ''Homo faber'', ''Homo loquens'', ''Homo ludens'', ''Homo reciprocans'', and so on).<ref>Caruso, Sergio: ''Homo oeconomicus. Paradigma, critiche, revisioni'', Florence (Italy): Firenze University Press, 2012 {{ISBN|978-88-6655-105-8}}
</ref>{{page needed|date=May 2018}}

== Response to criticism ==
In advanced-level theoretical economics, scholars have  modified models enough to more realistically depict real-life decision-making. For example, models of individual behavior under [[bounded rationality]] and of people suffering from [[envy]] can be found in the literature.<ref>Geoffrey Brennan: "[http://search.barnesandnoble.com/Culture-Social-Norms-and-Economics/Mark-Casson/e/9781858986173 Pareto Desirable Redistribution: The case of Malice and Envy]" in: ''Culture, Social Norms and Economics'' (1997)</ref>

== See also ==
{{columns-list|colwidth=15em|
* [[Agent (economics)]]
* [[Consumer confusion]]
* ''[[Homo duplex]]''
* ''[[Homo Sovieticus]]''
* [[Post-autistic economics]]
* [[Rational agent]]
* [[Rational choice theory]]
* [[Rational pricing]]
* [[Superrationality]]
* [[Bounded rationality]]
* [[Rationality and power]]
* [[List of alternative names for the human species]]
}}

== Notes ==

{{reflist}}

== References ==

{{refbegin}}
* [[J.S. Mill]], 'On the Definition of Political Economy, and on the Method of Investigation Proper to It' (1836) London and Westminster Review
* J.S. Mill, ''Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy'' (2nd ed. Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer 1874) ([http://www.efm.bris.ac.uk/het/mill/question.pdf read online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171208180333/http://www.efm.bris.ac.uk/het/mill/question.pdf |date=2017-12-08 }})
* [[Amartya Sen|A.K. Sen]], ‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory’ (1977) 6 Philosophy and Public Affairs 317
{{refend}}

== External links ==
{{wikiquote}}

*[https://web.archive.org/web/20061016235749/http://globalwebpost.com/farooqm/writings/islamic/i_econ_fin/Homo-islamicus.doc Self-Interest, Homo Islamicus and Some Behavioral Assumptions in Islamic Economics and Finance] (DOC) by Dr. Mohammad Omar Farooq
* [https://www.mayoresearch.org/files/REQUIEMmri.pdf Requiem for Homo Economicus] Edward J. O'Boyle, Mayo Research Institute, a refutation of reductionism in [[free will]] using tenets of [[natural law]]

{{Consumer behaviour}}
{{game theory}}

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[[Category:Behavioral economics]]
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[[Category:Latin philosophical phrases]]
[[Category:Rational choice theory]]
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