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{{Short description|Brand of smart and proximity cards}}
{{Advert|date=March 2023}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=April 2024}}
[[File:Mifare logo rgb.svg|thumb|MIFARE Logo]]
'''MIFARE''' is a series of [[Integrated Circuit|integrated circuit (IC)]] chips used in [[contactless smart card]]s and [[proximity card]]s.

The brand includes proprietary solutions based on various levels of the [[ISO/IEC 14443]] Type-A 13.56 [[Megahertz|MHz]] contactless smart card standard. It uses [[Advanced Encryption Standard|AES]] and [[Data Encryption Standard|DES/Triple-DES]] encryption standards, as well as an older proprietary encryption algorithm, [[Crypto-1]]. According to NXP, 10 billion of their smart card chips and over 150 million reader modules have been sold.<ref>{{cite web
 | url = http://www.mifare.net/
 | title = The success of MIFARE
 | author = MIFARE
 | publisher = Mifare.net 
 | date = 1 December 2009}}</ref>

The MIFARE trademark is owned by [[NXP Semiconductors]], which was [[Corporate spin-off|spun off]] from [[Philips Electronics]] in 2006.<ref>{{Cite web |title=MIFARE Trademark of NXP B.V. - Registration Number 4661504 - Serial Number 79142259 :: Justia Trademarks |url=http://trademarks.justia.com/791/42/mifare-79142259.html |access-date=2023-12-16 |website=trademarks.justia.com}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=31 August 2006 |title=Philips Semiconductors to become NXP |url=https://www.eetimes.com/Philips-Semiconductors-to-become-NXP/ |website=EE Times}}</ref>

==Variants==
MIFARE products are embedded in [[Contactless smart card|contactless]] and contact smart cards, smart paper tickets, [[Wearable computer|wearables]] and phones.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2016-08-18 |title=NXP and RioCard Launch New MIFARE® Wearable for Multimodal Transport in Rio {{!}} MIFARE |url=https://www.mifare.net/nxp-and-riocard-launch-new-mifare-wearable-for-multimodal-transportation-in-rio/ |access-date=2023-09-22 |website=MIFARE {{!}} The leading brand of contactless IC products }}{{Dead link|date=July 2025 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=NXP Advances Security for Contactless Single Use Applications with MIFARE Ultralight AES |url=https://www.nxp.com/pages/:NW-NXP-ADVANCES-SECURITY-FOR-CONTACTLESS |access-date=2023-09-22 |website=nxp.com}}</ref>

The MIFARE brand name (derived from the term MIKRON FARE collection and created by the company [[NXP Semiconductors|Mikron]]) covers four families of contactless cards:
; MIFARE Classic: Employs a proprietary protocol compliant with parts 1–3 of [[ISO/IEC 14443 Type A]], with an NXP proprietary security protocol for authentication and ciphering.<ref>
{{cite journal
 | last = Nohl | first = Karsten |author2=David Evans |author3=Starbug Starbug |author4=Henryk Plötz
 | url = http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1496724
 | title =  Reverse-engineering a cryptographic RFID tag
 | journal = SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th Conference on Security Symposium 
 | publisher = USENIX
 | pages =  185–193 
 | date = 2008-07-31 }}
</ref>

Subtypes: MIFARE Classic EV1 (other subtypes are no longer in use).
; MIFARE Plus: Drop-in replacement for MIFARE Classic with certified [[security level]] (AES-128 based) and is fully backwards compatible with MIFARE Classic.{{Citation needed|date=April 2023}}

Subtypes: MIFARE Plus S, MIFARE Plus X, MIFARE Plus SE and MIFARE Plus EV2.
; MIFARE Ultralight: Low-cost ICs that are useful for high volume applications such as public transport, loyalty cards and event ticketing.

Subtypes: MIFARE Ultralight C, MIFARE Ultralight EV1, MIFARE Ultralight Nano and MIFARE Ultralight AES.
; MIFARE DESFire: Contactless ICs that comply with parts 3 and 4 of ISO/IEC 14443-4 Type A with a mask-ROM operating system from NXP. The ''DES'' in the name refers to the use of a DES, two-key [[3DES]], three-key 3DES and AES encryption; while ''Fire'' is an acronym for ''Fast, innovative, reliable, and enhanced''.

Subtypes: MIFARE DESFire EV1, MIFARE DESFire EV2, MIFARE DESFire EV3, MIFARE DESFire EV3C and MIFARE DESFire Light.
; MIFARE DUOX: Contactless ICs that implement an ISO/IEC 14443-4 file system and secure messaging similar to MIFARE DESFire EV2/EV3, but with added support for public-key authentication. Unlike DESFire, DUOX chips no longer support the deprecated DES algorithm. The supported authentication key types are 128-bit AES, 256-bit AES and 256-bit [[elliptic-curve cryptography]] (ECC) with [[X.509]] public-key certificate handling.

There is also the MIFARE SAM AV2 contact smart card. This can be used to handle the encryption in communicating with the contactless cards. The SAM (Secure Access Module) provides the secure storage of [[cryptographic]] keys and cryptographic functions.

===MIFARE Classic family===
The MIFARE Classic IC is a basic memory storage device, where the memory is divided into segments and blocks with simple security mechanisms for [[access control]]. They are [[Application-specific integrated circuit|ASIC]]-based and have limited computational power. Due to their reliability and low cost, those cards are widely used for electronic wallets, access control, corporate ID cards, transportation or stadium ticketing. It uses an NXP proprietary security protocol ([[Crypto-1]]) for authentication and ciphering.{{Citation needed|date=April 2023}}

MIFARE Classic encryption has been compromised; see [[#Security|below]] for details.{{Citation needed|date=April 2023}}

The MIFARE Classic with 1K memory offers 1,024 bytes of data storage, split into 16 ''sectors''; each sector is protected by two different keys, called ''A'' and ''B''. Each key can be programmed to allow operations such as reading, writing, increasing value blocks, etc. MIFARE Classic with 4K memory offers 4,096 bytes split into forty sectors, of which 32 are the same size as in the 1K with eight more that are quadruple size sectors. MIFARE Classic Mini offers 320 bytes split into five sectors. For each of these IC types, 16 bytes per sector are reserved for the keys and access conditions and can not normally be used for user data. Also, the very first 16 bytes contain the serial number of the card and certain other manufacturer data and are read-only. That brings the net storage capacity of these cards down to 752 bytes for MIFARE Classic with 1K memory, 3,440 bytes for MIFARE Classic with 4K memory, and 224 bytes for MIFARE Mini.{{Citation needed|date=April 2023}}

{{Outdated as of|2013|12|31|topic=smartphone types}}
The Samsung [[TecTile]] [[Near field communication|NFC]] tag stickers use MIFARE Classic chips. This means only devices with an NXP NFC controller chip can read or write these tags. At the moment BlackBerry phones, the Nokia Lumia 610 (August 2012<ref>{{cite web|title=nfc tags|url=http://www.nfc-phones.org/nfc-tags/|website=Nfc-phones.org|access-date=5 August 2012|archive-date=5 August 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120805060128/http://www.nfc-phones.org/nfc-tags/|url-status=dead}}</ref>), the Google Nexus 4, Google Nexus 7 LTE and Nexus 10 (October 2013<ref>{{cite web|title=nfc tags|url=http://www.nfcbrief.com/2012/11/nexus-4-and-10-incompatible-with-mifare.html|website=Nfcbrief.com|access-date=11 August 2013|archive-date=21 August 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130821083621/http://www.nfcbrief.com/2012/11/nexus-4-and-10-incompatible-with-mifare.html|url-status=dead}}</ref>) can't read/write TecTile stickers.{{Citation needed|date=April 2023}}

===MIFARE Plus family===

====MIFARE Plus====
MIFARE Plus is a replacement IC solution for the MIFARE Classic.

It is less flexible than a MIFARE DESFire EV1 contactless IC.

MIFARE Plus was publicly announced in March 2008 with first samples in Q1 2009.<ref>
{{cite press release
 | url = http://www.nxp.com/news/content/file_1418.html
 | title = NXP introduces new security and performance benchmark with MIFARE Plus
 | publisher = NXP
 | date = 1 March 2008}}</ref>

MIFARE Plus, when used in older transportation systems that do not yet support AES on the reader side, still leaves an open door to attacks. Though it helps to mitigate threats from attacks that broke the [[Crypto-1]] cipher through the weak random number generator, it does not help against brute force attacks and crypto analytic attacks.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Nohl/BH_US_08_Nohl_Mifare.pdf |title=BlackHat '08 : MIFARE – Little Security, despite Obscurity |website=Blackhat.com |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>

During the transition period from MIFARE Classic to MIFARE Plus where only a few readers might support AES in the first place, it offers an optional AES authentication in Security Level 1 (which is in fact MIFARE Classic operation). This does not prevent the attacks mentioned above but enables a secure mutual authentication between the reader and the card to prove that the card belongs to the system and is not fake.

In its highest security level SL3, using 128-bit AES encryption, MIFARE Plus is secured from attacks.{{citation needed|date=August 2018}}

==== MIFARE Plus EV1 ====
MIFARE Plus EV1 was announced in April 2016.<ref>
{{citation
 | url = https://www.mifare.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MIFARE-Plus-EV1-leaflet_LR.pdf
 | title = NXP MIFARE Plus EV1
 | publisher = NXP
}}</ref>

New features compared to MIFARE Plus X include:

; Sector-wise security-level switching: The choice of crypto algorithm used in the authentication protocol can be set separately for each sector. This makes it possible to use the same card with both readers that can read MIFARE Classic products (with sectors protected by [[Key size|48-bit]] CRYPTO1 keys, "Security Level 1") and readers that can read MIFARE Plus products (with sectors protected by 128-bit [[Advanced Encryption Standard|AES]] keys, "Security Level 3"). This feature is intended to make it easier to gradually migrate existing MIFARE Classic product-based installations to MIFARE Plus, without having to replace all readers at the same time.
; ISO 7816-4 wrapping: The card can now be accessed in either the protocol for MIFARE (which is not compliant with the [[ISO 7816]]-4 [[APDU]] format), or using a new protocol variant that runs on top of ISO 7816-4. This way the cards become compatible with NFC reader APIs that can only exchange messages in ISO 7816-4 APDU format, with a maximum transfer data buffer size of 256 bytes.
; Proximity check: While the protocol for MIFARE Classic tolerated message delays of several seconds, and was therefore vulnerable to relay attacks, MIFARE Plus EV1 now implements a basic "ISO compliant" [[distance-bounding protocol]]. This puts tighter timing constraints on the permitted round-trip delay during authentication, to make it harder to forward messages to far-away cards or readers via computer networks.
; Secure end-2-end channel: Permits AES-protected over-the-air updates even to Crypto1 application sectors (SL1SL3 mix mode).
; Transaction MAC: The card can produce an additional [[message-authentication code]] over a transaction that can be verified by a remote clearing service, independent of the keys used by the local reader during the transaction.

==== MIFARE Plus EV2 ====
The MIFARE Plus EV2 was introduced to the market on 23 June 2020.<ref>
{{citation
 | url = https://www.mifare.net/nxp-delivers-enhanced-security-for-new-and-legacy-smart-city-services-with-mifare-plus-ev2-ic/
 | title = NXP MIFARE Plus EV2
 | date = 23 June 2020
 | publisher = NXP
}}</ref> It comes with an enhanced read performance and transaction speed compared to MIFARE Plus EV1.<ref>
{{citation
 | url = https://www.nxp.com/products/rfid-nfc/mifare-hf/mifare-plus/mifare-plus-ev2-secure-ic-for-contactless-smart-city-services:MFPEV2
 | title = NXP MIFARE Plus EV2
 | publisher = NXP
}}</ref>

New features compared to MIFARE Plus EV1 include:
; Transaction Timer: To help mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks, the Transaction Timer feature, which is also available on NXP's MIFARE DESFire EV3 IC, makes it possible to set a maximum time per transaction, so it's harder for an attacker to interfere with the transaction.

===MIFARE Ultralight family===

====MIFARE Ultralight====
The MIFARE Ultralight has only 512 bits of memory (i.e. 64 bytes), without cryptographic security. The memory is provided in 16 ''pages'' of 4 bytes. Cards based on these chips are so inexpensive that they are often used for disposable tickets for events such as the [[2006 FIFA World Cup]].
It provides only basic security features such as one-time-programmable (OTP) bits and a write-lock feature to prevent re-writing of memory pages but does not include cryptography as applied in other MIFARE product-based cards.

====MIFARE Ultralight EV1====
MIFARE Ultralight EV1<ref>[http://www.mifare.net/files/8413/5167/2490/MIFARE_Ultralight_EV1_.pdf] {{dead link|date=February 2016}}</ref> introduced in November 2012 the next generation of paper ticketing smart card ICs for limited-use applications for ticketing schemes and additional security options.<ref>{{cite web |first=Ken |last=Shirriff |title=Inside the tiny chip that powers Montreal subway tickets |date=June 2024 |url=http://www.righto.com/2024/06/montreal-mifare-ultralight-nfc.html}}</ref> It comes with several enhancements above the original MIFARE Ultralight:
* 384 and 1024 bits user memory product variants
* OTP, lock bits, configurable counters for improved security
* Three independent 24-bit one-way counters to stop reloading
* Protected data access through 32-bit password
* ECC originality check. However, the purpose of it "during (pre-)personalization is to protect customer investments by identifying mass penetration of non-NXP originated MIFARE Ultralight AES ICs into an infrastructure. As individual signatures can still be copied, it does not completely prevent hardware copy or emulation of individual MIFARE Ultralight AES ICs."<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/data-sheet/MF0AES(H)20.pdf |title=MF0AES(H)20 : MIFARE Ultralight AES contactless limited-use IC |date=28 March 2023 |website=Nxp.com |access-date=24 April 2025 }}</ref>

====MIFARE Ultralight C====
Introduced at the Cartes industry trade show in 2008, the MIFARE Ultralight C IC is part of NXP's low-cost MIFARE product offering (disposable ticket). With Triple DES, MIFARE Ultralight C uses a widely adopted standard, enabling easy integration in existing infrastructures. The integrated Triple DES authentication provides an effective countermeasure against cloning.{{citation needed|date=August 2018}}

Key applications for MIFARE Ultralight C are public transportation, event ticketing, loyalty and NFC Forum tag type 2.

====MIFARE Ultralight AES====
It was introduced in 2022.

===MIFARE DESFire family===

====MIFARE DESFire====
The MIFARE DESFire (MF3ICD40) was introduced in 2002 and is based on a core similar to SmartMX, with more hardware and software security features than MIFARE Classic. It comes pre-programmed with the general-purpose MIFARE DESFire operating system which offers a simple directory structure and files. They are sold in four variants: One with Triple-DES only and 4 KiB of storage, and three with AES (2, 4, or 8 kiB; see MIFARE DESFire EV1). The AES variants have additional security features; e.g., [[CMAC]]. MIFARE DESFire uses a protocol compliant with ISO/IEC 14443-4.<ref>Some [[ISO/IEC 7816]]-4 commands are used by MIFARE DESFire EV1, including a proprietary method to wrap native MIFARE DESFire commands into an ISO/IEC 7816 APDU.</ref> The contactless IC is based on an [[Intel MCS-51|8051 processor]] with 3DES/AES cryptographic accelerator, making very fast transactions possible.

The maximal read/write distance between card and reader is {{convert|10|cm|in|1}}, but the actual distance depends on the field power generated by the reader and its antenna size.

In 2010, NXP announced the discontinuation of the MIFARE DESFire (MF3ICD40) after it had introduced its successor MIFARE DESFire EV1 (MF3ICD41) in late 2008. In October 2011 researchers of Ruhr University Bochum<ref>{{cite web
 | url = http://it.slashdot.org/story/11/10/10/1850230/
 | title = German Researchers Crack Mifare RFID Encryption
 | work = [[Slashdot]]
 | date = 10 October 2011
 | access-date=9 February 2016
}}</ref> announced that they had broken the security of MIFARE DESFire (MF3ICD40), which was acknowledged by NXP<ref>{{cite web
 |url=http://mifare.net/technology/security/mifare-desfire-d40/
 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130221220435/http://mifare.net/technology/security/mifare-desfire-d40/
 |url-status=dead
 |archive-date=21 February 2013
 |title=Security of MF3ICD40 
 |website=Mifare.net 
 |access-date=9 February 2016 
}}</ref> (see [[#MIFARE DESFire|MIFARE DESFire security]]).

====MIFARE DESFire EV1====
First evolution of MIFARE DESFire contactless IC, broadly backwards compatible. Available with 2 KiB, 4 KiB, and 8 KiB non-volatile memory. Other features include:<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-identity-and-security/gemalto-website-has-moved-thales|title=Gemalto's web site has moved (May 2020)|website=thalesgroup.com}}</ref>
* Support for random ID
* Support for 128-bit [[Advanced Encryption Standard|AES]]
* Hardware and operating system are [[Common Criteria]] certified at level [[Evaluation Assurance Level|EAL]] 4+

MIFARE DESFire EV1 was publicly announced in November 2006.{{citation needed|date=November 2011}}

====MIFARE DESFire EV2====

The second evolution of the MIFARE DESFire contactless IC family, broadly backwards compatible.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mifare.net/index.php?cID=3119 |title=Mifare |website=Mifare |date=2 June 2014|access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
New features include:
* MI smart App enabling to offer or sell memory space for additional applications of 3rd parties without the need to share secret keys
* Transaction MAC to authenticate transactions by 3rd parties
* Virtual Card Architecture for privacy protection
* Proximity check against relay attacks

MIFARE DESFire EV2 was publicly announced in March 2016 at the IT-TRANS event in Karlsruhe, Germany

====MIFARE DESFire EV3====

The latest evolution of the MIFARE DESFire contactless IC family, broadly backward compatible. New features include:

* ISO/IEC 14443 A 1–4 and ISO/IEC 7816-4 compliant
* Common Criteria EAL5+ certified for IC hardware and software
* NFC Forum Tag Type 4 compliant
* SUN message authentication for advanced data protection within standard NDEF read operation
* Choice of open DES/2K3DES/3K3DES/AES crypto algorithms
* Flexible file structure: hosts as many applications as the memory size supports
* Proof of transaction with card generated [[Message authentication code|MAC]]
* Transaction Timer mitigates risk of man-in-the-middle attacks

MIFARE DESFire EV3 was publicly announced on 2 June 2020.<ref name=":0" />

====MIFARE DESFire EV3C====

The DESFire EV3C card has all the features of the DESFire EV3, plus it can also emulate a MIFARE Classic 1K card. Some DESFire files can be mapped to a MIFARE Classic 1K memory layout, which offers a migration route for existing users on MIFARE Classic that gradually want to move to DESFire.

===MIFARE SAM AV2===
MIFARE SAMs are not contactless smart cards. They are [[secure access module]]s designed to provide the secure storage of [[cryptographic]] keys and cryptographic functions for terminals to access the MIFARE products securely and to enable [[secure communication]] between [[terminal emulator|terminals]] and [[Host (network)|host]] (backend). MIFARE SAMs are available from NXP in the contact-only module (PCM 1.1) as defined in [[ISO/IEC 7816]]-2 and the HVQFN32 format.{{citation needed|date=March 2011}}

Integrating a MIFARE SAM AV2 in a contactless [[smart card]] reader enables a design that integrates high-end cryptography features and the support of cryptographic authentication and data encryption/decryption.{{citation needed|date=March 2011}}  Like any SAM, it offers functionality to store keys securely and perform authentication and encryption of data between the contactless card and the SAM and the SAM towards the backend. Next to a classical SAM architecture, the MIFARE SAM AV2 supports the X-mode which allows a fast and convenient contactless terminal development by connecting the SAM to the microcontroller and reader IC simultaneously.{{citation needed|date=March 2011}}

MIFARE SAM AV2 offers AV1 mode and AV2 mode where in comparison to the SAM AV1 the AV2 version includes [[public key infrastructure]] (PKI), [[hash function]]s like [[SHA-1]], SHA-224, and [[SHA-256]]. It supports MIFARE Plus and secure host communication. Both modes provide the same communication interfaces, cryptographic algorithms (Triple-DES 112-bit and 168-bit key, MIFARE products using Crypto1, AES-128 and AES-192, [[RSA (algorithm)|RSA]] with up to 2048-bit keys), and X-mode functionalities.{{citation needed|date=March 2011}} The MIFARE SAM AV3 is the third generation of NXP's Secure Access Module, and it supports MIFARE ICs as well as NXP's UCODE DNA, ICODE DNA and NTAG DNA ICs.<ref>
{{citation
 | url = https://www.nxp.com/products/rfid-nfc/mifare-hf/mifare-sam/mifare-sam-av3:MIFSAMAV3
 | title = NXP MIFARE SAM AV3
 | publisher = NXP
}}</ref>

=== MIFARE 2GO ===
A cloud-based platform that digitizes MIFARE product-based smart cards and makes them available on NFC-enabled smartphones and wearables. With this, new Smart City use cases such as mobile transit ticketing, mobile access and mobile micropayments are being enabled.<ref>
{{citation
 | url = https://www.nxp.com/products/rfid-nfc/mifare-hf/mifare-2go:MIFARE2GO
 | title = NXP MIFARE 2GO
 | publisher = NXP
}}</ref>

==Byte layout==
[[File:MiFare Byte Layout.png|thumb|none|Byte-level sector and block memory layout used by MIFARE Classic and MIFARE Plus cards.]]

==History==
* 1994 – MIFARE Classic IC with 1K user memory introduced.
* 1996 – First transport scheme in [[Seoul]] using MIFARE Classic with 1K memory.
* 1997 – MIFARE PRO with [[Triple DES]] [[coprocessor]] introduced.
* 1997 – MIFARE LIGHT with 384Bit user memory introduced.
* 1999 – MIFARE PROX with [[public key infrastructure|PKI]] coprocessor introduced.
* 2001 – MIFARE Ultralight introduced.
* 2002 – MIFARE DESFire introduced, [[microprocessor]] based product.
* 2004 – MIFARE SAM introduced, secure infrastructure counterpart of MIFARE DESFire.
* 2006 – MIFARE DESFire EV1 is announced as the first product to support 128-bit AES.
* 2008 – MIFARE4Mobile industry Group is created, consisting of leading players in the Near Field Communication (NFC) ecosystem.
* 2008 – MIFARE Plus is announced as a drop-in replacement for MIFARE Classic based on 128-bit AES.
* 2008 – MIFARE Ultralight C is introduced as a smart paper ticketing IC featuring Triple DES Authentication.
* 2010 – MIFARE SAM AV2 is introduced as secure key storage for readers AES, Triple DES, PKI Authentication.
* 2012 – MIFARE Ultralight EV1 introduced, backward compatible to MIFARE Ultralight but with extra security.
* 2014 – MIFARE SDK was introduced, allowing developers to create and develop their own NFC Android applications. 
* 2014 – NXP Smart MX2 the world's first secure smart card platform supporting MIFARE Plus and MIFARE DESFire EV1 with EAL 50 was released.
* 2015 – MIFARE Plus SE, the entry-level version of NXP's proven and reliable MIFARE Plus product family, was introduced.
* 2016 – MIFARE Plus EV1 was introduced, the proven mainstream smart card product compatible with MIFARE Classic in its backward compatible security level.
* 2016 – MIFARE DESFire EV2 is announced with improved performance, security, privacy and multi-application support.
* 2016 – MIFARE SDK is rebranded to TapLinx, with additional supported products.
* 2018 – MIFARE 2GO cloud service was introduced, allows to manage MIFARE DESFire and MIFARE Plus (in SL3) product-based credentials onto NFC-enabled mobile and wearable devices.
*2020 – MIFARE DESFire EV3 is announced<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|title=NXP Introduces MIFARE DESFire EV3 IC, Ushers in New Era of Security and Connectivity for Contactless Smart City Services {{!}} NXP Semiconductors – Newsroom|url=https://media.nxp.com/news-releases/news-release-details/nxp-introduces-mifare-desfire-ev3-ic-ushers-new-era-security-and/|access-date=3 June 2020|website=media.nxp.com}}</ref>
*2020 – MIFARE Plus EV2 was introduced, adding SL3 to support MIFARE 2GO, EAL5+ certification & Transaction Timer to help mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks.
*2022 – MIFARE Ultralight AES was introduced.
*2023 – MIFARE DESFire EV3C with MIFARE Classic compatibility introduced
*2024 – MIFARE DUOX with public-key cryptography introduced

The MIFARE product portfolio was originally developed by Mikron in Gratkorn, Austria. Mikron was acquired by Philips in 1995.<ref>{{cite web
| url=https://www.telecompaper.com/news/philips-semiconductors-acquires-mikron--59203
| title=Philips Semiconductors Acquires Mikron
| date=2 June 1995| website=Telecompaper.com
| access-date=17 February 2017
}}</ref> Mikron sourced silicon from Atmel in the US, Philips in the Netherlands, and Siemens in Germany.{{citation needed|date=November 2011}}

[[Infineon Technologies]] (then Siemens) licensed MIFARE Classic from Mikron in 1994<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.telecompaper.com/news/siemens-and-mikron-agree-licensing-deal--22439 |title=Siemens And Mikron Agree Licensing Deal |website=Telecompaper.com |date=7 April 1994 |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref> and developed both stand alone and integrated designs with MIFARE product functions. Infineon currently produces various derivatives based on MIFARE Classic including 1K memory (SLE66R35) and various microcontrollers (8 bit (SLE66 series), 16 bit (SLE7x series), and 32 bit (SLE97 series) with MIFARE implementations, including devices for use in USIM with [[Near Field Communication]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.infineon.com/cms/en/corporate/press/news/releases/2007/INFAIM200711-015.html |title=Infineon Adds Security and Convenience to SIM Cards for NFC Applications – Infineon Technologies |website=Infineon.com |date=1 November 2007|access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>

Motorola tried to develop MIFARE product-like chips for the wired-logic version but finally gave up. The project expected one million cards per month for start, but that fell to 100,000 per month just before they gave up the project.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.cnet.com/2100-1001-204306.html |title=Motorola sets smart card targets – CNET |website=News.cnet.com |date=1 October 1997|access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>

In 1998 Philips licensed MIFARE Classic to [[Hitachi]]<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.smartcard.co.uk/members/newsletters/1998/feb98.pdf |title=Smart Card News |date=1 February 1998 |volume=7 |website=Smartcard.co.uk |issue=2 |access-date=9 February 2016 |archive-date=2 November 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131102015139/http://www.smartcard.co.uk/members/newsletters/1998/feb98.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> Hitachi licensed MIFARE products for the development of the contactless smart card solution for [[Nippon Telegraph and Telephone|NTT's]] IC telephone card which started in 1999 and finished in 2006.{{citation needed|date=November 2011}} In the NTT contactless IC telephone card project, three parties joined: Tokin-Tamura-Siemens, [[Hitachi]] (Philips-contract for technical support), and Denso (Motorola-only production).{{citation needed|date=November 2011}} NTT asked for two versions of chip, i.e. wired-logic chip (like MIFARE Classic) with small memory and big memory capacity. Hitachi developed only big memory version and cut part of the memory to fit for the small memory version.

The deal with Hitachi was upgraded in 2008 by NXP (by then no longer part of Philips) to include MIFARE Plus and MIFARE DESFire to the renamed semiconductor division of Hitachi [[Renesas Technology]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nxp.com/news/press-releases/2008/11/renesas-and-nxp-announce-licensing-agreement-on-mifare-contactless-technology.html |title=NXP Semiconductors :: Media Center |website=Nxp.com |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>

In 2010 NXP licensed MIFARE products to [[Gemalto]]. In 2011 NXP licensed [[Oberthur Technologies|Oberthur]] to use MIFARE products on SIM cards. In 2012 NXP signed an agreement with [[Giesecke & Devrient]] to integrate MIFARE product-based applications on their secure SIM products. These licensees are developing [[Near Field Communication]] products<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-identity-and-security/gemalto-website-has-moved-thales|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101206130027/http://www.gemalto.com/press/archives/2010/2010-11-25_NXP_Gemalto_MIFARE_License_en.pdf|url-status=dead|title=Gemalto's web site has moved (May 2020)|archive-date=6 December 2010|website=thalesgroup.com}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nxp.com/news/content/file_1818.html |title=NXP Semiconductors :: Media Center |website=Nxp.com |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>

==Security==

=== MIFARE Classic ===
The encryption used by the MIFARE Classic IC uses a 48-bit key.<ref>{{cite web
 |title=MIFARE Classic 1K specification 
 |url=http://mifare.net/products/smartcardics/mifare_standard1k.asp
 |date=2 February 2009}}{{dead link|date=November 2016 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>

A presentation by Henryk Plötz and [[Karsten Nohl]]<ref>{{cite web |author=Karsten Nohl |url=http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~kn5f/ |title=Karsten Nohl, PhD: University of Virginia, C.S. Dept |website=Cs.virginia.edu |access-date=9 February 2016 |archive-date=4 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200204014629/http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~kn5f/ |url-status=dead }}</ref> at the [[Chaos Communication Congress]] in December 2007 described a partial reverse-engineering of the algorithm used in the MIFARE Classic chip.<ref>{{cite web
 | title = Mifare: Little Security, Despite Obscurity
 | url = https://events.ccc.de/congress/2007/Fahrplan/events/2378.en.html
 | first = Karsten | last = Nohl |author2=Henryk Plötz
 | date = 10 January 2008
 | publisher = Chaos Communication Congress
 }}</ref> A paper that describes the process of reverse engineering this chip was published at the August 2008 [[USENIX]] security conference.<ref>{{cite journal
 | url = http://www.usenix.org/events/sec08/tech/nohl.html
 | title = Reverse-Engineering a Cryptographic RFID Tag
 | first = Karsten | last = Nohl |author2=David Evans
 | journal = Proceedings of the 17th USENIX Security Symposium
 | date= 1 August 2008}}</ref>

In March 2008 the Digital Security<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ru.nl/ds/ |title=Digital security – Digital Security |website=Ru.nl |date=8 July 2015 |access-date=9 February 2016 |archive-date=9 February 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160209220535/http://www.ru.nl/ds/ |url-status=dead }}</ref> research group of the [[Radboud University Nijmegen]] made public that they performed a complete reverse-engineering and were able to clone and manipulate the contents of an [[OV-Chipkaart]] which is using MIFARE Classic chip.<ref>{{cite web
 | url = https://www.cs.ru.nl/~flaviog/publications/Security_Flaw_in_MIFARE_Classic.pdf
 | title = Security Flaw in Mifare Classic
 | author = Digital Security Group
 | publisher = Radboud University Nijmegen
 | date = 1 March 2008
 | access-date = 19 July 2020
 | archive-date = 13 May 2021
 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210513153719/https://www.cs.ru.nl/~flaviog/publications/Security_Flaw_in_MIFARE_Classic.pdf
 | url-status = dead
 }}</ref> For demonstration they used the [[Proxmark3]] device, a 125&nbsp;kHz / 13.56&nbsp;MHz research instrument.<ref>{{cite web | url = http://www.proxmark.org | title = Proxmark | access-date = 25 January 2011}}</ref> The schematics and software are released under the free [[GNU General Public License]] by Jonathan Westhues in 2007. They demonstrate it is even possible to perform card-only attacks using just an ordinary stock-commercial NFC reader in combination with the libnfc library.

The Radboud University published four scientific papers concerning the security of the MIFARE Classic:
* A Practical Attack on the MIFARE Classic<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cs.ru.nl/~flaviog/publications/Attack.MIFARE.pdf|title=A Practical Attack on the MIFARE Classic|website=RU.nl|access-date=6 July 2017|archive-date=22 April 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220422044935/http://www.cs.ru.nl/~flaviog/publications/Attack.MIFARE.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref>
* Dismantling MIFARE Classic<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cs.ru.nl/~flaviog/publications/Dismantling.Mifare.pdf|title=Dismantling MIFARE Classic|website=RU.nl|access-date=6 July 2017|archive-date=8 August 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170808204848/http://www.cs.ru.nl/~flaviog/publications/Dismantling.Mifare.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref>
* Wirelessly Pickpocketing a MIFARE Classic Card<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cs.ru.nl/~flaviog/publications/Pickpocketing.Mifare.pdf|title=Wirelessly Pickpocketing a MIFARE Classic Card|website=RU.nl|access-date=6 July 2017|archive-date=2 January 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220102193453/http://www.cs.ru.nl/~flaviog/publications/Pickpocketing.Mifare.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref>
* Ciphertext-only [[Cryptanalysis]] on Hardened MIFARE Classic Cards<ref>{{cite web|url=http://cs.ru.nl/~rverdult/Ciphertext-only_Cryptanalysis_on_Hardened_Mifare_Classic_Cards-CCS_2015.pdf|title=Ciphertext-only Cryptanalysis on Hardened Mifare Classic Cards|website=RU.nl|access-date=25 September 2017}}</ref>

In response to these attacks, the Dutch [[Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations|Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations]] stated that they would investigate whether the introduction of the Dutch Rijkspas could be brought forward from Q4 of 2008.<ref>{{cite web | url = http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2008/10/31/antwoord-op-kamervragen-over-de-beveiliging-van-de-chip-pas.html | title = Dutch Page | access-date = 24 March 2012 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20131102125151/http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2008/10/31/antwoord-op-kamervragen-over-de-beveiliging-van-de-chip-pas.html | archive-date = 2 November 2013 | url-status = dead }}</ref>

NXP tried to stop the publication of the second article by requesting a preliminary injunction. However, the injunction was denied, with the court noting that, "It should be considered that the publication of scientific studies carries a lot of weight in a democratic society, as does inform society about serious issues in the chip because it allows for mitigating of the risks."<ref>{{cite web
 | url = http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/ResultPage.aspx?snelzoeken=t&searchtype=ljn&ljn=BD7578
 | title = Pronunciation, Primary Claim
 | author = Arnhem Court Judge Services
 | publisher = Rechtbank Arnhem
 | date = 18 July 2008
 | access-date = 13 January 2009
 | archive-date = 15 February 2012
 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20120215225402/http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/ResultPage.aspx?snelzoeken=t&searchtype=ljn&ljn=BD7578
 | url-status = dead
 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.thestandard.com/news/2008/07/18/judge-denies-nxps-injunction-against-security-researchers |title=Judge denies NXP's injunction against security researchers |access-date=13 February 2010 |date=1 July 2008|work=The Standard|url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090105205323/http://www.thestandard.com/news/2008/07/18/judge-denies-nxps-injunction-against-security-researchers |archive-date=5 January 2009 }}</ref>

Both independent research results are confirmed by the manufacturer NXP.<ref name='mifare security'>{{cite web | url = http://www.mifare.net/technology/security/ | title = mifare.net :: Security | access-date = 25 January 2011}}</ref> These attacks on the cards didn't stop the further introduction of the card as the only accepted card for all Dutch public transport the [[OV-chipkaart]] continued as nothing happened<ref>[http://www.id-nee.nl/03-7%20OVchipkaart%20hoofdtekst.htm#voorbereidinggaatgewoondoor] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120608164142/http://www.id-nee.nl/03-7%20OVchipkaart%20hoofdtekst.htm#voorbereidinggaatgewoondoor|date=8 June 2012}}</ref> but in October 2011 the company [[Trans Link Systems|TLS]], responsible for the OV-Chipkaart announced that the new version of the card will be better protected against fraud.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://webwereld.nl/nieuws/108161/nieuwe-ov-chip-gaat-fraude-tegen.html |title=Nieuwe OV-chip gaat fraude tegen – Webwereld |website=Webwereld.nl |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>

The MIFARE Classic encryption [[Crypto-1]] can be broken in about 200 seconds on a laptop from 2008,<ref>{{cite web
 | last = Courtois | first = Nicolas T. |author2=Karsten Nohl |author3=Sean O'Neil
 | url = http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/166| title =  Algebraic Attacks on the Crypto-1 Stream Cipher in MiFare Classic and Oyster Cards
 | publisher = Cryptology ePrint Archive | date = 1 April 2008}}</ref> if approx. 50 bits of known (or chosen) keystream are available. This attack reveals the key from sniffed transactions under certain (common) circumstances and/or allows an attacker to learn the key by challenging the reader device.

Another attack recovers the secret key in about 40&nbsp;ms on a laptop. This attack requires just one (partial) authentication attempt with a legitimate reader.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Garcia |first1=Flavio D. |first2=Gerhard |last2=de Koning Gans |first3=Ruben |last3=Muijrers |first4=Peter |last4=van Rossum |first5=Roel |last5=Verdult |first6=Ronny Wichers |last6=Schreur |first7=Bart |last7=Jacobs |url=https://www.cs.ru.nl/~flaviog/publications/Dismantling.Mifare.pdf |title=Dismantling MIFARE Classic |publisher=13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2008), LNCS, Springer |date=4 October 2008 |access-date=19 July 2020 |archive-date=23 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210223113847/https://www.cs.ru.nl/~flaviog/publications/Dismantling.Mifare.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> 

Additionally, there are a number of attacks that work directly on a card and without the help of a valid reader device.<ref>{{cite web| last = Garcia| first = Flavio D.| author2 = Peter van Rossum| author3 = Roel Verdult| author4 = Ronny Wichers Schreur| url = https://www.cs.ru.nl/~flaviog/publications/Pickpocketing.Mifare.pdf| title = Wirelessly Pickpocketing a Mifare Classic Card| publisher = 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P 2009), IEEE| date = 1 March 2009| access-date = 19 July 2020| archive-date = 2 January 2022| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220102193453/http://www.cs.ru.nl/~flaviog/publications/Pickpocketing.Mifare.pdf| url-status = dead}}</ref> These attacks have been acknowledged by NXP.<ref>[http://mifare.net/security/mifare_classic.asp]{{dead link|date=February 2016}}</ref> 
In April 2009 new and better card-only attack on MIFARE Classic has been found. It was first announced at the rump session of Eurocrypt 2009.<ref>{{cite web
 | last = Courtois| first = Nicolas T. | 
url = http://eurocrypt2009rump.cr.yp.to/7870fc6d38647a661145594ef0c33015.pdf | 
title =  Conditional Multiple Differential Attack on MIFARE Classic | 
publisher = Slides presented at the rump session of Eurocrypt 2009 conference | date = 2 April 2009}}</ref> 
This attack was presented at SECRYPT 2009.<ref>{{cite web
 | last = Courtois| first = Nicolas T. | 
title =  The Dark Side of Security by Obscurity and Cloning MiFare Classic Rail and Building Passes Anywhere, Anytime | 
publisher = In SECRYPT 2009 – International Conference on Security and Cryptography, to appear | url = http://www.secrypt.org/ |
date = 7 July 2009 }}</ref> 
The full description of this latest and fastest attack to date can also be found in the IACR preprint archive.<ref>{{cite web
 | last = Courtois| first = Nicolas T. | 
title =  The Dark Side of Security by Obscurity and Cloning MiFare Classic Rail and Building Passes Anywhere, Anytime | 
url = http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/137 |
publisher = IACR Cryptology Preprint Archive | 
date = 4 May 2009 }}</ref> 
The new attack improves by a factor of more than 10 all previous card-only attacks on MIFARE Classic, has instant running time, and does not require a costly precomputation. The new attack allows recovering the secret key of any sector of the MIFARE Classic card via wireless interaction, within about 300 queries to the card. It can then be combined with the nested authentication attack in the Nijmegen Oakland paper to recover subsequent keys almost instantly. Both attacks combined and with the right hardware equipment such as [[Proxmark3]], one should be able to clone any MIFARE Classic card in 10 seconds or less. This is much faster than previously thought.

In an attempt to counter these card-only attacks, new "hardened" cards have been released in and around 2011, such as the MIFARE Classic EV1.<ref>{{cite web | url = https://www.mifare.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/MIFARE_Classic_EV1.pdf | title = MIFARE Classic EV1 | access-date = 25 September 2017 }}{{Dead link|date=July 2025 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref> These variants are insusceptible for all card-only attacks publicly known until then, while remaining backward compatible with the original MIFARE Classic. In 2015, a new card-only attack was discovered that is also able to recover the secret keys from such hardened variants.<ref>{{cite web
 | author=Carlo Meijer |author2=Roel Verdult
 | url = http://cs.ru.nl/~rverdult/Ciphertext-only_Cryptanalysis_on_Hardened_Mifare_Classic_Cards-CCS_2015.pdf | title = Ciphertext-only Cryptanalysis on Hardened Mifare Classic Cards | publisher = 22nd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2015), ACM| date = 1 October 2015}}</ref>
Since the discovery of this attack, NXP is officially recommending to migrate from MIFARE Classic product-based systems to higher security products.<ref>{{cite web | url = https://www.mifare.net/en/products/chip-card-ics/mifare-classic/security-statement-on-crypto1-implementations/ | title = Security Statement on Crypto1 Implementations | date = 12 October 2015 | access-date = 25 September 2017 | archive-date = 6 September 2023 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20230906215654/https://www.mifare.net/en/products/chip-card-ics/ | url-status = dead }}</ref>

===MIFARE DESFire===
In November 2010, security researchers from the Ruhr University released a paper detailing a [[side-channel attack]] against MIFARE product-based cards.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.proxmark.org/files/Documents/13.56%20MHz%20-%20MIFARE%20DESFire/Cloning_Cryptographic_RFID_Cards_for_25USD-WISSEC_2010.pdf |title=Cloning Cryptographic RFID Cards for 25$ ? |author1=Timo Kasper |author2=Ingo von Maurich |author3=David Oswald |author4=Christof Paar |website=Proxmark.org |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref> The paper demonstrated that MIFARE DESFire product-based cards could be easily emulated at a cost of approximately $25 in [[Commodity hardware|"off the shelf" hardware]]. The authors asserted that this side-channel attack allowed cards to be cloned in approximately 100 ms. Furthermore, the paper's authors included hardware schematics for their original cloning device, and have since made corresponding software, firmware and improved hardware schematics publicly available on GitHub.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://github.com/emsec/ChameleonMini |title=emsec/ChameleonMini: The ChameleonMini is a versatile contactless smartcard emulator compliant to NFC, ISO 14443 and ISO 15693. It has been designed and maintained by the Chair for Embedded Security of the Ruhr-University in Bochum. The freely programmable platform can be used to emulate and virtualize cards (perfect clones including the UID), for practical penetration tests in RFID environments, or serve as a passively operated NFC device, e.g., as an NFC door lock |publisher=GitHub |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>

In October 2011 David Oswald and Christof Paar of Ruhr-University in Bochum, Germany, detailed how they were able to conduct a successful "side-channel" attack against the card using equipment that can be built for nearly $3,000. Called "Breaking MIFARE DESFire MF3ICD40: Power Analysis and Templates in the Real World",<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.iacr.org/workshops/ches/ches2011/presentations/Session%205/CHES2011_Session5_1.pdf |title=Breaking Mifare DESFire MF3ICD40: Power Analysis and Templates in the Real World |website=Iacr.org |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref> they stated that system integrators should be aware of the new security risks that arise from the presented attacks and can no longer rely on the mathematical security of the used 3DES cipher. Hence, to avoid, e.g. manipulation or cloning of smart cards used in payment or access control solutions, proper actions have to be taken: on the one hand, multi-level countermeasures in the back end allow to minimize the threat even if the underlying RFID platform is insecure," In a statement<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.mifare.net/en/login/?msg=2&al=/developer/news/|archive-url=https://archive.today/20130221194445/http://www.mifare.net/overview/news/|archive-date=21 February 2013|url-status=dead|title=Login &#124; MIFARE|website=mifare.net|access-date=22 January 2022}}</ref> NXP said that the attack would be difficult to replicate and that they had already planned to discontinue the product at the end of 2011. NXP also stated "Also, the impact of a successful attack depends on the end-to-end system security design of each individual infrastructure and whether diversified keys – recommended by NXP – are being used. If this is the case, a stolen or lost card can be disabled simply by the operator detecting the fraud and blacklisting the card, however, this operation assumes that the operator has those mechanisms implemented. This will make it even harder to replicate the attack with a commercial purpose."

===MIFARE Ultralight===
In September 2012 a security consultancy Intrepidus<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://intrepidusgroup.com/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121206021831/http://intrepidusgroup.com/|url-status=dead|title=Site not found · DreamHost|archive-date=6 December 2012|website=intrepidusgroup.com}}</ref> demonstrated at the EU SecWest event in Amsterdam,<ref>{{cite web |url=http://eusecwest.com/agenda.html |title=EUSecWest Applied Security Conference: Amsterdam, NL |website=Eusecwest.com |access-date=9 February 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160305144652/https://eusecwest.com/agenda.html |archive-date=5 March 2016 |url-status=dead }}</ref> that MIFARE Ultralight product-based fare cards in the New Jersey and San Francisco transit systems can be manipulated using an Android application, enabling travelers to reset their card balance and travel for free in a talk entitled "NFC For Free Rides and Rooms (on your phone)".<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-uvvVMHnC3c |title=NFC subway hack |via=YouTube |date=2 September 2012|access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref> Although not a direct attack on the chip but rather the reloading of an unprotected register on the device, it allows hackers to replace value and show that the card is valid for use. This can be overcome by having a copy of the register online so that values can be analyzed and suspect cards hot-listed. NXP has responded by pointing out that they had introduced the MIFARE Ultralight C in 2008 with 3DES protection and in November 2012 introduced the MIFARE Ultralight EV1<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mifare.net/products/mifare-smartticket-ics/mifare-ultralight-ev1/|archive-url=https://archive.today/20130221235449/http://www.mifare.net/products/mifare-smartticket-ics/mifare-ultralight-ev1/|url-status=dead|title=mifare.net :: MIFARE Ultralight EV1|date=21 February 2013|archive-date=21 February 2013|website=MIFARE.net|access-date=6 July 2017}}</ref> with three decrement only counters to foil such reloading attacks.

==Considerations for systems integration==
For systems based on contactless smartcards (e.g. public transportation), security against fraud relies on many components, of which the card is just one. Typically, to minimize costs, [[systems integrator]]s will choose a relatively cheap card such as a MIFARE Classic and concentrate security efforts in the [[back office]]. Additional [[encryption]] on the card, transaction counters, and other methods known in [[cryptography]] are then employed to make cloned cards useless, or at least to enable the back office to detect a fraudulent card, and put it on a blacklist. Systems that work with online readers only (i.e., readers with a permanent link to the back office) are easier to protect than systems that have offline readers as well, for which real-time checks are not possible and blacklists cannot be updated as frequently.

==Certification==
Another aspect of fraud prevention and compatibility guarantee is to obtain certification called to live in 1998 ensuring the compatibility of several certified MIFARE product-based cards with multiple readers. With this [[certification]], the main focus was placed on the [[Near field communication|contactless]] communication of the wireless interface, as well as to ensure proper implementation of all the commands of MIFARE product-based cards. The certification process was developed and carried out by the Austrian laboratory called Arsenal Research. Today, independent test houses such as Arsenal Testhouse, UL and LSI-TEC, perform the certification tests and provide the certified products in an online database.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://arsenal-testhouse.com/certified-mifare-products/|title=Certified Mifare Products – Arsenal Testhouse|website=Arsenal-Testhouse.com|access-date=6 July 2017}}</ref>

==Places that use MIFARE products==

=== Transportation ===

{| class="wikitable sortable"
|-
! Card name
! Locality
! Type 
! class="unsortable" | Details
|-
| [[SUBE card]]
| [[Argentina]] (Buenos Aires)
| MIFARE Plus X 2K<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nacionservicios.com.ar/documentos/Com-Ext-Nro-104-2014-LPub-18-2014-Adjudicacion.pdf |title=Comunicación Externa # 104 - Aviso de Adjudicación |website=NacionServicios.com.ar |access-date=7 July 2025}}</ref>
| Used for public transport, such as Metro, trains and buses<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.sube.gob.ar/ |title=SUBE |website=Sube.gob.ar |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
|-
| [[Tarjeta Sin Contacto MOVI]]
| [[Argentina]] ([[Rosario]])
| [[#MIFARE DESFire|MIFARE DESFire]] EV1 SAM V2<ref name="PTUBA-SBP-Rosario">
{{cite web
 |url=http://www.ptuba.gov.ar/licitaciones/pliego_lpn012013_bicicletas.pdf 
 |title=Adquisición de un Sistema de Bicicletas Públicas para Rosario 
 |year=2013 
 |work=Proyecto de Transporte Sostenible y Calidad del Aire – Secretaría de Transporte del Ministerio del Interior y Transporte a través de la Unidad Ejecutora de Proyecto (UEP) 
 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131102035816/http://www.ptuba.gov.ar/licitaciones/pliego_lpn012013_bicicletas.pdf 
 |archive-date=2 November 2013 
 |url-status=dead 
}}</ref>
| Means of payment for urban transport and as of 2015 payment for public bicycles and parking meters.
|-
| [[Metrocard (Adelaide)|Adelaide Metro metroCard]]
| Australia ([[Adelaide]])
| [[#MIFARE DESFire EV1|MIFARE DESFire EV1]], [[MIFARE#MIFARE DESFire EV3|MIFARE DESFire EV3]]
| Adelaide Metro network (Bus, Train and Tram)<ref>[http://www.adelaidemetro.com.au/ticketing/metrocard] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120704235802/http://www.adelaidemetro.com.au/ticketing/metrocard|date=4 July 2012}}</ref>
|-
| Baku metrocard
| [[Azerbaijan]] (Baku)
| MIFARE Classic 1K, MIFARE Plus S 1K<ref>{{cite web
 | url = http://lotgate.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9&Itemid=30&lang=en
 | title = Integrator's web site (subway solutions)
 | author = LOT ltd
 | website = Lotgate.com
 |access-date=9 February 2016
}}</ref>
| For use on the subway rides on the Baku Metro.
|-
| M-Card
| Canada ([[St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador|St. John's]])
| MIFARE Classic 1K
| Used on the [[Metrobus Transit]] system.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.metrobus.com/mcard.asp|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120306144707/http://www.metrobus.com/mcard.asp|title=Metrobus |url-status=dead|archive-date=6 March 2012|website=metrobus.com}}</ref>
|-
|| [[Compass Card (TransLink)|Compass Card]]
| Canada ([[Metro Vancouver]])
| MIFARE DESFire EV1 4K, MIFARE Ultralight (single use)<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nxp.com/news/press-releases/2013/01/nxps-mifare-deafire-selected-to-support-vancouvers-green-city-plan.html |title=NXP Semiconductors :: Media Center |website=NXP.com |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
| Used for public transit ([[TransLink (British Columbia)|TransLink]]). $6 refundable deposit.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.translink.ca/en/Fares-and-Passes/Compass-Card.aspx |title=TransLink : If you like FareSavers, you'll love Compass Card |website=TransLink.ca |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref> 
|-
| Tarjeta Metroval<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.metro-valparaiso.cl/viaje-en-metro/medios-de-pago |title=Metro Valparaiso Medios de pago |website=Metro-Valparaiso.cl |date=2 June 2014|access-date=9 February 2016 |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131102114608/http://www.metro-valparaiso.cl/viaje-en-metro/medios-de-pago |archive-date=2 November 2013 }}</ref>
| Chile ([[Valparaíso]])
| MIFARE Classic 1K
| [[Valparaíso Metro]] uses this card as a unique payment method
|-
| [[Tarjeta bip!]]
| Chile ([[Santiago de Chile]])
| MIFARE Classic 1K and 4K (if bank bip or university bip are used)
| Metro de Santiago, Transantiago<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tarjetabip.cl |title=Tarjeta bip! |website=TarjetaBip.cl |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
|-
| [[In Karta]]
| [[Czech Republic]] (nationwide)
| MIFARE DESFire, MIFARE DESFire EV1
|,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cd.cz/ |title=České dráhy, a.s. &#124; Úvodní stránka |website=Cd.cz |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref> Used for transport on trains, aimed at regular train users. Using the card enables 25% discount on fares.
|-
|Hradecká karta
|[[Czech Republic]] (Hradec Králové)
|MIFARE Classic 4K
|Card is issued by DPMHK a.s. (Transport company of Hradec Králové), no longer compatible with Pardubická karta.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Používání Městské karty v Pardubicích {{!}} Dopravní podnik města Hradce Králové|url=https://www.dpmhk.cz/146/Pouzivani_Mestske_karty_v_Pardubicich/|access-date=2020-07-13|website=dpmhk.cz}}</ref>
|-
| [[Matkakortti]]
| [[Finland]] ([[Helsinki]])
| MIFARE DESFire
| Can be used with all forms of public transport systems within Helsinki Metropolitan Area.<ref>[http://www.hsl.fi/EN/ticketsandfares/ticketsontravelcard/Pages/default.aspx] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111229063900/http://www.hsl.fi/EN/ticketsandfares/ticketsontravelcard/Pages/default.aspx|date=29 December 2011}}</ref>
|-
|[[Metromoney]]
|[[Georgia (country)|Georgia]] ([[Tbilisi]])
| MIFARE Classic 1K
|Used in municipal transport (metro, bus) and while traveling by [[Rike-Narikala ropeway]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://ttc.com.ge/?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=155 |title=Metromoney card – Tbilisi Transport Company |website=Ttc.com.ge |date=3 June 2012|access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
|-
|[[Delhi Metro Rail Corporation]]
|[[India]]
|[[#MIFARE Ultralight family|MIFARE Ultralight]]
|Used in Metro transit system and for paying fares in DTC and cluster buses.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.dnaindia.com/delhi/report-now-delhi-metro-card-valid-for-travel-in-dtc-buses-2654321|title=Now, Delhi Metro card valid for travel in DTC buses|date=2 August 2018|website=dna|access-date=28 December 2018}}</ref>
|-
| Namma Metro Smart Card
| India (Bengaluru)
| MIFARE DESFire EV1
| Can be used to travel in [[Namma Metro]] in Bengaluru<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.mifare.net/bengaluru-metro-system-adopts-nxps-mifare-technology/|title=Bengaluru Metro System Adopts NXP's MIFARE Technology &#124; MIFARE|website=mifare.net|date=22 January 2012}}{{Dead link|date=July 2025 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>
|-
| [[TFI Leap Card]]
| Ireland ([[Dublin]])
| [[#MIFARE DESFire EV1|MIFARE DESFire EV1]]<ref name="cardinfo">{{cite web|url=https://docs.google.com/document/pub?id=1b4kr7Z8N2jQ6xqSWUVBtDDsOVpSyj8o7fyL2vuLKYtQ |title=Triple RFID cardscan |website=Docs.Google.com |date=1 September 2012|access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
| replaces the individual Luas, Dart and Dublin Bus smartcards
|-
| AltoAdige/Südtirol Pass
| Italy ([[Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol]])
| MIFARE DESFire EV1
| Southern Tirol network (Bus, Train and Cable-cars)<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.sii.bz.it |title=Südtirol Mobil &#124; Mobilità Alto Adige |language=it|website=Sii.bz.it |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
|-
|[[Tallinja Card]]
|[[Malta]]
|MIFARE Plus X 2K
|Used by [[Malta Public Transport]] (buses); https://www.publictransport.com.mt/en/tallinja-card
|-
| [[AT HOP card]]
| New Zealand ([[Auckland]])
| MIFARE DESFire EV1
| Introduced as the regional [[integrated ticketing]] card. The previous branded [[HOP card]] aka "Snapper/HOP" uses the [[JCOP]] standard and was phased out of use in Auckland in 2013.<ref name="Snapper AT Hop transition">[https://www.snapper.co.nz/newsroom/2013/11/20/snapper-continues-to-focus-on-the-customer-during-at-hop-transition] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140221084837/https://www.snapper.co.nz/newsroom/2013/11/20/snapper-continues-to-focus-on-the-customer-during-at-hop-transition|date=21 February 2014}}</ref>
|-
|[[SmartTech Production]]
|Hong Kong
| MIFARE Golden Partner<ref>{{cite web
 | url = http://www.smarttech.com.hk/
 | title = Card Manufacturer – NXP Mifare Golden Partner
 | author = SmartTech Production
}}</ref>
|
|-
| [[TransCard]]
| [[Slovakia]]
| MIFARE DESFire EV1
| Used by almost every public transport system in Slovakia. In most cases only referred to as BČK – Bezkontaktná čipová karta (contactless smart card). Managed by [[Zväz autobusovej dopravy]] (Association of bus transport) as [[Slovenský dopravný pas]] (Slovak transport pass).<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.dopravnypas.sk/ |title=Slovenský dopravný pas |website=dopravnypas.sk |access-date=29 March 2022}}</ref>
|-
| [[Urbana (payment card)|Urbana]]
| [[Slovenia]] ([[Ljubljana]])
| MIFARE DESFire EV1
| Used by buses, parking spaces, libraries, museums, the [[Ljubljana Castle funicular]], sports institutes and cultural events.<ref>[http://www.jhl.si/holding/urbana] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120628213622/http://www.jhl.si/holding/urbana|date=28 June 2012}}</ref>
|-
| [[T-mobilitat]]
| Spain (Barcelona)
| MIFARE DESFire<ref>{{cite web 
 |url=https://www.mifare.net/nxps-mifare-desfire-drives-smart-mobility-in-barcelona/ 
 |title=NXP´s MIFARE DESFire drives smart mobility in Barcelona 
 |author=MIFARE 
 |website=Mifare.net 
 |date=4 March 2015 
 |access-date=12 April 2018 
 }}{{Dead link|date=July 2025 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>
| Metro, trains and buses, with compatibility with Bicing bike rentals, car parks.
|-
| [[Resekortet]]
| Sweden
| MIFARE Classic 1K<ref>{{cite web
 |url=http://www.svenskkollektivtrafik.se/Resekortet/Puffar/Annonser-langst-ned-pa-startsida/Kontakt/RKF-specifikationen/ 
 |title=RKF-specifikationen – Svensk Kollektivtrafik 
 |author=Resekortet i Sverige AB 
 |website=Sevenskkollektivtrafik.se 
 |access-date=9 February 2016 
 |url-status=dead 
 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150529235805/http://www.svenskkollektivtrafik.se/Resekortet/Puffar/Annonser-langst-ned-pa-startsida/Kontakt/RKF-specifikationen/ 
 |archive-date=29 May 2015 
}}</ref>
| Travel ticket for buses and trains. 
|-
| [[EasyCard]]
| [[Taiwan]]
| MIFARE Classic, MIFARE Plus<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.iis.sinica.edu.tw/page/aboutus/FILE/2012iisupdate-E2-project.pdf |title=Contactless Smartcard Technology Needs More Security |website=Iis.sinica.edu.tw |access-date=9 February 2016 |archive-date=24 September 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924033428/http://www.iis.sinica.edu.tw/page/aboutus/FILE/2012iisupdate-E2-project.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref>
| 
|-
|[[Nol Card]]
|United Arab Emirates (Dubai)
|MIFARE DESFire EV1 4K
|Migrated from [[FeliCa]]
|- 
| [[Oyster card]]
| United Kingdom (London)
| MIFARE DESFire EV1
| Migrated from MIFARE Classic to MIFARE DESFire EV1 in 2011<ref>{{cite web|author=Dan Balaban |url=http://www.nfctimes.com/news/transport-london-discard-mifare-classic-seeks-desfire-sims |title=Transport for London to Discard Mifare Classic &#124; NFC Times – Near Field Communication and all contactless technology |website=NFCtimes.com |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
|-
| [[TAP card]]
| United States (Los Angeles, California)
| MIFARE Classic 1K / MIFARE Plus<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1276540 |title=L.A. Metro Taps NXP's MIFARE Plus for Contactless TAP Ticketing |work=EE Times|access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
| Used as electronic ticketing for most public transport within Los Angeles County. 
|-
| [[Hop Fastpass]]
| United States ([[Portland, Oregon|Portland]], Oregon)
| MIFARE DESFire EV1 256B<ref>{{cite press release
  | url = https://www.mifare.net/nxp-helps-the-portland-vancouver-metro-region-move-intelligence-to-the-cloud-with-the-new-hop-fastpass-transit-card-used-on-buses-the-light-rail-and-streetcars/
  | title = NXP helps the Portland-Vancouver Metro region move intelligence to the cloud with the new Hop Fastpass™ Transit Card used on Buses, the Light Rail and Streetcars
  | publisher = MIFARE
  | date = 9 October 2017
  | access-date = 16 June 2018
  }}{{Dead link|date=July 2025 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>
|-
| [[Breeze Card]]
| United States ([[Atlanta Metropolitan Area]], Georgia)
| MIFARE DESFire EV1, MIFARE Ultralight (Breeze Ticket) 
| Used on transport in the Greater Atlanta area on systems such as [[MARTA]], [[CobbLinc]], [[Ride Gwinnett]], and [[GRTA Xpress]] regional busses.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.breezecard.com/ |title=Page Redirection |website=breezecard.com |access-date=11 April 2024}}</ref>
|-
| [[Clipper card|Clipper Card]]
| United States ([[San Francisco Bay Area]], California)
| MIFARE DESFire EV1 4K
| Replacing TransLink, which used a Motorola Card.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://clippercard.com/ |title=Page Redirection |website=Clippercard.com |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
|-
| [[Kennesaw State University|Talon Card]]
| United States (Kennesaw State University)
| MIFARE Classic 4K
| Used for door access and on campus payments
|-
| [[SmarTrip]]
| United States ([[Washington Metropolitan Area]], Washington, D.C.)
| MIFARE Plus X 2K
| Used on the [[Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority]] and neighbouring transit systems; accepted on systems in Baltimore, Maryland
|-
|[[Metrorrey]]
|[[Mexico|México]] ([[Monterrey]])
|MIFARE Classic 1K
|Used in public transport like, metro, metrobus, and the new generation of metropolitan bus [[Muevo leon|Muevo Leon]]
|-
|[[Beep (smart card)]]
|[[Philippines]] ([[Metro Manila]])
|MIFARE Classic, MIFARE DESFire EV1<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-01-09 |title=Faq's – beep™ |url=https://beep.com.ph/faqs/ |access-date=2024-01-09 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240109174212/https://beep.com.ph/faqs/ |archive-date=9 January 2024 }}</ref>
|Used on the [[LRT Line 1 (Metro Manila)|LRT Line 1]], [[LRT Line 2]], [[MRT Line 3 (Metro Manila)|MRT Line 3]],<ref>{{Cite web |date=2015-10-07 |title=Beep cards can now be used on MRT 3, LRT 1, 2 {{!}} Inquirer News |url=https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/727979/beep-cards-can-now-be-used-on-mrt-3-lrt-12 |access-date=2024-01-09 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151007201229/https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/727979/beep-cards-can-now-be-used-on-mrt-3-lrt-12 |archive-date=7 October 2015 }}</ref> and [[BGC Bus]]<ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-07-14 |title=Tap-and-go beep cards now accepted on BGC buses |url=https://www.rappler.com/business/industries/136587-beep-cards-bgc-bus/ |access-date=2024-01-09 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220714163707/https://www.rappler.com/business/industries/136587-beep-cards-bgc-bus/ |archive-date=14 July 2022 }}</ref>
|-
|[[Freedom Card]]
|United States ([[Philadelphia]])
|MIFARE DESFire EV1 4K
|Used for fare collection at [[PATCO Speedline|PATCO]] stations
|}

===Application references===
{| class="wikitable sortable"
|-
! Application
! Application category
! Project
! NXP partner
! Locality
! Product used
! class="unsortable" | Usecase 
|-
| Automatic fare collection
| Smart mobility
| [[Moscow Metro]]
| Smart Technologies Group
| Moscow
| MIFARE Ultralight
| Contactless smartcards for payment in the AFC System of the Moscow Metro<ref name="smartek.ru">{{cite web |url=http://www.smartek.ru/en/solutions/afcs/afcsprojets/mosmetroafcs.aspx |title=SMART TECHNOLOGIES GROUP – Moscow Metro, AFC, contactless smart cards |website=Smartek.ru |access-date=9 February 2016 |archive-date=4 March 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304001610/http://www.smartek.ru/en/solutions/afcs/afcsprojets/mosmetroafcs.aspx |url-status=dead }}</ref>
|-
| Parking
| Smart mobility
| Pay on Foot system
| Skidata
| Ireland
| 
| Used for cashless vending applications for parking<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.apsparking.com/project-specific.aspx?title=cork-university-hospital |title=Cork University Hospital |website=Apsparking.com |access-date=9 February 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303230129/http://www.apsparking.com/project-specific.aspx?title=cork-university-hospital |archive-date=3 March 2016 }}</ref>
|-
|Parking
|Smart mobility
|[[Metrocard (Adelaide)|Adelaide Metro metroCard]]
|
|Adelaide
|MIFARE DESFire EV1, MIFARE DESFire EV3
|Used at TTP Park N Ride for discounted parking<ref>{{Cite web |last=Metro |first=Adelaide |date=2025-07-15 |title=Park 'n' Ride |url=https://www.adelaidemetro.com.au/how-to-use-public-transport/park-n-ride |access-date=2025-11-09 |website=Adelaide Metro |language=en}}</ref>
|-
| Mobile ticketing
| Access
| MIFARE4Mobile
| Gemalto, Giesecke & Devrient, Oberthur Technologies, STMicroelectronics
| 
| MIFARE on SmartMX
| Access to buildings through smartphone<ref>{{cite web|url=http://nxp-rfid.com/nxp-enables-mobile-ticketing-for-smart-mobile-devices/ |title=NXP Enables Mobile Ticketing for Smart Mobile Devices |website=Nxp-rfid.com |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
|-
| Tourist card
| Smart mobility
| Mobilis Card
| Agencia Valenciana de Mobilidad (aVM)
| Valencia
| MIFARE on SmartMX
| Tourist card, bike rental, electric car rental, transport ticketing, taxi card, access management and payment function<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.avmm.es/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=ec899839-1020-4680-955d-cb7d9d1c1e46&groupId=16203 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150923180840/http://www.avmm.es/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=ec899839-1020-4680-955d-cb7d9d1c1e46&groupId=16203 |url-status=dead |archive-date=23 September 2015 |title=The secret of Valencia's cutting edge contactless ticketing system |website=Avmm.es |access-date=9 February 2016 }}</ref>
|-
| Tourist card
| Smart mobility
| [[Oyster card]]
|  
| London
| MIFARE Classic 1K
| Used for public transport<ref name="smartek.ru"/>
|-
| Fuel card
| Smart mobility
| [[Royal Dutch Shell|Shell]]
| Plastkart
| Turkey
| MIFARE Classic 1K
| Loyalty programs at petrol stations<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.shellsmart.com/smart/index.html?site=en-en |title=Petrol Loyalty Card – Fuel Rewards – Shell Drivers' Club UK |website=Shellsmart.com |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
|-
| Fuel card
| Smart mobility
| Petrol Ofisi
| Plastkart
| Turkey
| MIFARE Classic 1K
| Loyalty programs at petrol stations<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.positivecard.com.tr/ |title=Positive Card |website=PositiveCard.com.tr |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
|-
| Taxi card
| Smart mobility
| Touch Travel Card
| Dialog Axiata, Silverleap Technology
| Sri Lanka
| MIFARE DESFire EV1
| Payment solution in taxis<ref name="orik.lk">{{cite web |url=http://www.orik.lk/news_and_press.php |title=Orik : News and Press releases |website=Orik.lk |access-date=9 February 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140527220050/http://www.orik.lk/news_and_press.php |archive-date=27 May 2014 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
|-
| Ferry card
| Smart mobility
| [[Opal card]]
| 
| Sydney
| MIFARE DESFire EV1
| Card for transport and ferry services<ref name="smartek.ru"/>
|-
| Car sharing
| Smart mobility
| [[Car2Go]]
| Daimler
| 
| MIFARE DESFire EV1
| Used for car sharing<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.nfc.cc/tag/car2go/ |title=Car2Go &#124; NFC Development & Consulting |website=Nfc.cc |access-date=9 February 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140724055736/http://www.nfc.cc/tag/car2go/ |archive-date=24 July 2014 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
|-
| Bike rental
| Smart mobility
|  
| Callock
|  
|  
| Bike rental<ref name="calllock.com">[http://calllock.com/en/menu1/Solutions/] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140528010042/http://calllock.com/en/menu1/Solutions/|date=28 May 2014}}</ref>
|-
| Corporate access
| Access
| [[Nestlé]]
| KABA
|  
| MIFARE DESFire EV1
| Access Security Solution<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.techpro.vn/en/news/news/476-nestle-completes-electronic-security-installation.html |title=Techpro – Nestlé Completes Electronic Security Installation |website=Techpro.vn |date=1 September 2013|access-date=9 February 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304172535/http://techpro.vn/en/news/news/476-nestle-completes-electronic-security-installation.html |archive-date=4 March 2016 }}</ref>
|-
| Bike rental
| Smart mobility
|  
| Callock
|  
|  
| Bike rental<ref name="calllock.com"/>
|-
| Home access
| Access
|  AirKey
| EVVA
|  
|  MIFARE on SmartMX
| Mobile access<ref name="calllock.com"/>
|-
| Home access
| Access
|  Immobilienfirma Top-Invest sárl
| Salto
|  Luxemburg
|  MIFARE DESFire EV1
| Smart lock for home access<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://saltosystems.de/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=365|title=SALTO Networked Locking System - SALTO Systems stattet Premium-Appartements in Luxemburg mit elektronischem Schließsystem aus|date=28 May 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140528005811/http://saltosystems.de/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=365|archive-date=28 May 2014}}</ref>
|-
| Hotel access
| Access
| Marriott Hotel Card
| KABA
|  
|  
| Hotel access card<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?10036/2 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140527230057/http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?10036/2 |url-status=dead |archive-date=27 May 2014 |title=RFID News Roundup |publisher=RFID Journal |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
|-
| [[Campus card]]
| Access
| Campus Card University of Cambridge 
| Salto
| Cambridge, UK
| MIFARE DESFire EV1
| Multiapplication campus card<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.godrejlocks.com/godrej/godrejlocks/Pdf/cambridge.pdf |title=SALTO secures the University of Cambridge |website=Godrejlocks.com |access-date=9 February 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130901132125/http://www.godrejlocks.com/godrej/godrejlocks/Pdf/cambridge.pdf |archive-date=1 September 2013 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
|-
| [[Campus Card]]
| Access
| Campus Card University of Oxford
| 
| Oxford, UK
| MIFARE DESFire EV2 8K
| Multiapplication campus card<ref>[http://www.ox.ac.uk/enewsletters/aad_news_alert/student_administration_and_services/25_06_12_new.html] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140528010049/http://www.ox.ac.uk/enewsletters/aad_news_alert/student_administration_and_services/25_06_12_new.html|date=28 May 2014}}</ref>
|-
| Event ticketing
| Access
| FC Köln
| Payment Solutions
| Köln, Germany
| MIFARE DESFire EV1
| Event ticketing application for soccer games<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.rfidsolutionsonline.com/doc/1-fc-kln-implements-philips-chip-technology-f-0001 |title=1. FC Köln Implements Philips Chip Technology For Contactless Ticketing |website=Rfidsolutionsonline.com |date=1 January 2005|access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
|-
| Event ticketing
| Access
| Ticket FIFA 2014
|  
| Brazil 
|  
| Event ticketing for soccer WM<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.siemens.com/innovation/apps/pof_microsite/_pof-spring-2014/_html_en/sports-facilities.html |title=Archive – Pictures of the Future – Innovation – Home – Siemens Global Website |website=Siemens.com |access-date=9 February 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140527220415/http://www.siemens.com/innovation/apps/pof_microsite/_pof-spring-2014/_html_en/sports-facilities.html |archive-date=27 May 2014 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
|-
| Museum card
| Access
| Müze Kart 
| Mapikart, Türsab
| Istanbul, Turkey 
| MIFARE Classic 1K 
| Access to museum<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.muzekart.com/tr/muzekart |title=Müzekart |website=Muzekart.com |access-date=9 February 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160221214341/http://www.muzekart.com/tr/muzekart |archive-date=21 February 2016 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
|-
| Membership card
| Loyalty
| Manchester City Football Club – Stadium Membership Card 
| Gemalto
| Manchester 
|  
| Access, loyalty, membership, payment function<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?3985 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140326074856/http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?3985 |url-status=dead |archive-date=26 March 2014 |title=Soccer Fans Use RFID Cards to Gain Admission and Buy Food |publisher=RFID Journal |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
|-
| Loyalty card
| Loyalty
| Rabbit Card – Carrot Rewards 
| 
| Bangkok, Thailand
| MIFARE DESFire EV1 
| Used for transport, shops, restaurants, identification, access control, security and Carrot Reward<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.carrotrewards.co.th/ |title=แครอท รีวอร์ดส |website=Carrotrewards.co.th |access-date=9 February 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160206011432/http://www.carrotrewards.co.th/ |archive-date=6 February 2016 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.free-press-release.com/news-new-rabbit-card-brings-e-money-system-to-bangkok-1339744796.html |title=Culture shock News: New œRabbit Card Brings e-Money System to Bangkok |website=Free-press-release.com |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
|-
| Loyalty card
| Loyalty
| Trans Studio Amusement Park
| Bank Mega
| Indonesia
| MIFARE DESFire EV1 
| Trans Studio Amusement Park<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nxp.com/news/press-releases/2011/12/nxp-and-bank-mega-enhance-customer-experience-with-multi-application-smart-card-solution-for-in-door-theme-parks.html |title=NXP Semiconductors :: Media Center |website=Nxp.com |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
|-
| NFC tags
| NFC
| NFC tag 
| SMARTRAC
|  
|   
| NFC enabled smartphones<ref>[http://www.nfctags.com/nfc-applications-which-tag]  {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140330235143/http://www.nfctags.com/nfc-applications-which-tag|date=30 March 2014}}</ref>
|-
| Health card
| Identification
| Sesam-Vitale card
| 
| France
| MIFARE on SmartMX 
| Health and identification card<ref>[http://www.cn.nxp.com/documents/literature/75015874.pdf] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140527214740/http://www.cn.nxp.com/documents/literature/75015874.pdf|date=27 May 2014}}</ref>
|-
| Digital signature
| Identification
| Vingcard
| Assa Abloy
|  
|   
| Digital signature used for access<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.vingcardelsafe.com/en/vce/VingCardElsafe/Products/?productId=604980 |title=VingCard Signature RFID – ASSA ABLOY Hospitality (VingCard Elsafe) – Electronic hotel locks |publisher=VingCard Elsafe |access-date=9 February 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150525030528/http://www.vingcardelsafe.com/en/vce/VingCardElsafe/Products/?productId=604980 |archive-date=25 May 2015 }}</ref>
|-
| [[Micropayment]]
| Micropayment
| Yeldi
| [[Identiv]]
| India
| MIFARE DESFire EV1 
| Cashless payments via mobile phones<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.microwavejournal.com/articles/print/18429-yeldi-selects-identive-and-nxp-for-nfc-cashless-payment-solution-in-india |title=Yeldi selects Identive and NXP for NFC cashless payment solution in India &#124; 2012-10-15 |publisher=Microwave Journal |date=1 October 2012|access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
|-
| Multiapplication card
| Multiapplication
| [[Nol Card]]
|
| Dubai
| MIFARE DESFire EV1 4K
| Public transport, taxis, ferry, retail, parking<ref>{{cite web|url=http://secureidnews.com/news-item/dubai-ask-renews-agreement-for-citys-multimodal-ticketing-system/ |title=Dubai, ASK renews agreement for city's multimodal ticketing system |website=SecureIDNews |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
|-
| Multiapplication card
| Multiapplication
| Touch travel card
| Dialog Axiata, Silverleap Technology
| Sri Lanka
| MIFARE DESFire EV1; MIFARE SAM AV2 
| Transport, micropayments, payment for shops or taxis, NFC mobile ticketing<ref name="orik.lk"/>
|-
| Multiapplication card
| Multiapplication
| Passolig (TFF)
| E-Kart, E-Kent, Aktifbank
| Turkey
| MIFARE DESFire EV1; JCOP
| Stadium access – ticketing, micropayments, payments, transport<ref>{{cite web |author=E-Bilet Süresini Uzat |url=http://www.passolig.com.tr/ |title=Spor ve Eğlence Dünyasının Anahtarı |website=Passolig.com.tr |access-date=9 February 2016 |archive-date=20 April 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140420041708/http://www.passolig.com.tr/ |url-status=dead }}</ref>
|-
| Smart paper ticket
|  
| Moscow Metropolitan Card
| Smart Technologies Group
| Moscow, Russia
| MIFARE Ultralight 
| Used for electronic smart paper ticketing in public transport<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nxp.com/news/press-releases/2009/01/moscow-metro-the-world-s-first-major-transport-system-to-operate-fully-contactless-with-nxp-s-mifare-technology.html |title=NXP Semiconductors :: Media Center |website=Nxp.com |access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
|}

===Institutions===
* Northwest University, South Africa – Student/staff ID, access control, library, student meals, sport applications, payments<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nwu.ac.za/ |title=North-West University |publisher=NWU |date=2 January 2016|access-date=9 February 2016}}</ref>
* [[Cambridge University]]<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/local/wgb/securityaccess.html |title=Computer Laboratory: Access and security |website=Cl.cam.ac.uk |access-date=9 February 2016 |archive-date=3 March 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303232336/http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/local/wgb/securityaccess.html |url-status=dead }}</ref> – Student/Staff ID and access card, library card, canteen payments in some colleges<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.clare.cam.ac.uk/academic/handbook/food-drink.html |title=Welcome to Clare College – Clare College Cambridge |website=Clare.cam.ac.uk |access-date=9 February 2016 |archive-date=17 March 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110317025217/http://www.clare.cam.ac.uk/academic/handbook/food-drink.html |url-status=dead }}</ref>
* [[University of Queensland|The University of Queensland]] – Staff and student ID, access control, library, copy/print, building access (MIFARE DESFire EV1)<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.pf.uq.edu.au/idcards/index.html|title=** UQ ID Cards are the responsibility of Property and Facilities Division|website=pf.uq.edu.au|access-date=3 June 2018}}</ref>

==See also==
* [[RFID]]
* [[Campus card]]
* [[Physical security]]
* [[Near Field Communication|NFC]]
* [[Smart card]]

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==Further reading==
* Dayal, Geeta, [http://www.computerworld.com/article/2537817/security0/how-they-hacked-it--the-mifare-rfid-crack-explained.html "How they hacked it: The MiFare RFID crack explained; A look at the research behind the chip compromise], [[Computerworld]], 19 March 2008.

==External links==
* {{official website|http://www.mifare.net/}}
*[https://www.nxp.com/products/rfid-nfc/mifare-hf/mifare-desfire/mifare-desfire-ev3-high-security-ic-for-contactless-smart-city-services:MF3DHx3 Comparison Table] MIFARE DESFire EV1 / EV2 / EV3
*[http://www.nxp.com/smartgovernance NXP in eGovernment]
* [http://dewy.fem.tu-ilmenau.de/CCC/24C3/matroska/24c3-2378-en-mifare_security.mkv 24C3 Talk about MIFARE Classic] Video of the 24C3 Talk presenting the results of reverse engineering the MIFARE Classic family, raising serious security concerns
* [http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=4252367680974396650&hl=en Presentation of 24th Chaos Computer Congress in Berlin] Claiming that the MIFARE classic chip is possibly not safe
* [http://www.ru.nl/ds/research/rfid/ Demonstration of an actual attack on MIFARE Classic] (a building access control system) by the Radboud University Nijmegen.[[actual|https://www.mersinliakaryakit.com/]]

{{NXP Semiconductors}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Contactless smart cards]]
[[Category:Near-field communication]]
[[Category:NXP Semiconductors]]