View source for Mutual assured destruction

{{short description|Doctrine of military strategy}}
{{redirect2|Mutually assured destruction|Mutual annihilation|the episode of ''The Americans''|Mutually Assured Destruction (The Americans){{!}}Mutually Assured Destruction (''The Americans'')|particle–antiparticle annihilation|Annihilation}}
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| footer            = [[Strategic bomber]]s, [[ICBM]]s, [[SLBM]]s, and [[MIRV]]s all contribute to mutual assured destruction via a large number of [[Nuclear weapons delivery|deliverable]] [[strategic nuclear weapons]].
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{{War}}
{{Nuclear weapons}}

'''Mutual assured destruction''' ('''MAD''') is a [[doctrine]] of [[military strategy]] and [[national security|national security policy]] which posits that a full-scale use of [[nuclear weapon]]s by an attacker on a nuclear-armed defender with [[Second strike|second-strike capabilities]] would result in the [[nuclear holocaust|complete annihilation]] of both the attacker and the defender.<ref>[http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategy-mutual-assured-destruction.htm Mutual Assured Destruction] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180103001128/http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategy-mutual-assured-destruction.htm |date=2018-01-03 }}; Col. Alan J. Parrington, USAF, [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj97/win97/parrin.html Mutually Assured Destruction Revisited, Strategic Doctrine in Question] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150620055606/http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj97/win97/parrin.html |date=2015-06-20 }}, Airpower Journal, Winter 1997.</ref> It is based on the theory of [[Deterrence theory|rational deterrence]], which holds that the threat of using strong weapons against the enemy prevents the enemy's use of those same weapons. The strategy is a form of [[Nash equilibrium]] in which, once armed, neither side has any incentive to initiate a conflict or to disarm.

The result may be a [[nuclear peace]], in which the presence of [[nuclear weapons]] decreases the risk of crisis escalation, since parties will seek to avoid situations that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Proponents of nuclear peace theory therefore believe that controlled [[nuclear proliferation]] may be beneficial for global stability. Critics argue that nuclear proliferation increases the chance of [[nuclear war]] through either deliberate or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons, as well as the likelihood of [[nuclear material]] falling into the hands of [[violent non-state actor]]s.

The term "mutual assured destruction", commonly abbreviated "MAD", was coined by Donald Brennan, a strategist working in [[Herman Kahn]]'s [[Hudson Institute]] in 1962.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Whole earth security : a geopolitics of peace|last=Daniel.|first=Deudney|date=1983|publisher=Worldwatch Institute|isbn=978-0-916468-54-5|location=Washington|pages=80|oclc=9833320}}</ref> Brennan conceived the acronym cynically, spelling out the English word "[[wikt:mad#English|mad]]" to argue that holding weapons capable of destroying society was irrational.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Jervis|first=Robert|date=2002|title=Mutual Assured Destruction|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3183553|journal=Foreign Policy|issue=133|pages=40–42|doi=10.2307/3183553|jstor=3183553|issn=0015-7228|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

==Theory==
{{Conflict resolution sidebar}}
Under MAD, each side has enough nuclear weaponry to destroy the other side. Either side, if attacked for any reason by the other, would retaliate with equal or greater force. The expected result is an immediate, irreversible escalation of hostilities resulting in both combatants' mutual, total, and assured destruction. The doctrine requires that neither side construct shelters on a massive scale.<ref name=":0">{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17026538|title=How did we forget about mutually assured destruction?|last=Castella|first=Tom de|date=2012-02-15|work=BBC News|access-date=2017-09-19|language=en-GB}}</ref> If one side constructed a similar system of shelters, it would violate the MAD doctrine and destabilize the situation, because it would have less to fear from a [[second strike]].<ref>Freeman Dyson, ''Disturbing the Universe'', Chapter 13, ''The Ethics of Defense'', Basic Books, 1981.</ref><ref>''Weapons and Hope'', Freeman Dyson, Harper Collins, 1985</ref> The same principle is invoked against [[missile defense]].

The doctrine further assumes that neither side will dare to launch a [[Pre-emptive nuclear strike|first strike]] because the other side would [[launch on warning]] (also called [[fail-deadly]]) or with surviving forces (a [[second strike]]), resulting in unacceptable losses for both parties. The payoff of the MAD doctrine was and still is expected to be a tense but stable global peace. However, many have argued that mutually assured destruction is unable to deter conventional war that could later escalate. Emerging domains of [[Cyber spying|cyber-espionage]], proxy-state conflict, and [[Prompt Global Strike|high-speed missiles]] threaten to circumvent MAD as a deterrent strategy.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Jones|first1=Seth G.|last2=Hicks|first2=Kathleen H.|last3=Cancian|first3=Mark F.|last4=Friend|first4=Alice Hunt|last5=Harrison|first5=Todd|last6=Hersman|first6=Rebecca K.C.|last7=Hunter|first7=Andrew P.|last8=Karako|first8=Thomas|last9=Schaus|first9=John|last10=Williams|first10=Ian|last11=Daniels|first11=Seamus P.|date=2018|title=The Return of Political Warfare|journal=Defense Outlook 2018|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22448.10|pages=30–32}}</ref>

The primary application of this doctrine started during the [[Cold War]] (1940s to 1991), in which MAD was seen as helping to prevent any direct full-scale conflicts between the United States and the [[Soviet Union]] while they engaged in smaller [[proxy war]]s around the world. MAD was also responsible for the [[arms race]], as both nations struggled to keep nuclear parity, or at least retain [[second-strike capability]]. Although the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the MAD doctrine continues to be applied.

Proponents of MAD as part of the US and USSR strategic doctrine believed that [[Nuclear warfare|nuclear war]] could best be prevented if neither side could expect to survive a full-scale nuclear exchange as a functioning state. Since the credibility of the threat is critical to such assurance, each side had to invest substantial [[capital (economics)|capital]] in their nuclear arsenals even if they were not intended for use. In addition, neither side could be expected or allowed to adequately defend itself against the other's nuclear missiles.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/mutual-assured-destruction |website=[[Encyclopedia Britannica]] |title=mutual assured destruction |access-date=23 March 2024 |date=9 February 2024}}</ref> This led both to the hardening and diversification of nuclear delivery systems (such as nuclear [[missile silo]]s, [[ballistic missile submarine]]s, and nuclear [[bomber]]s kept at [[fail-safe]] points) and to the [[Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty]].

This MAD scenario is often referred to as [[strategic deterrence|rational nuclear deterrence]].

When the possibility of nuclear warfare between the United States and Soviet Union started to become a reality, theorists began to think that mutual assured destruction would be sufficient to deter the other side from launching a nuclear weapon. [[Kenneth Waltz]], an American political scientist, believed that nuclear forces were in fact useful, but even more useful in the fact that they deterred other nuclear threats from using them, based on mutually assured destruction. The theory of mutually assured destruction being a safe way to deter continued even farther with the thought that nuclear weapons intended on being used for the winning of a war, were impractical, and even considered too dangerous and risky.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Danilovic|first=Vesna|url=http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015056796371|title=When the stakes are high :deterrence and conflict among major powers /|publisher=Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press|year=2002|isbn=978-0-472-11287-6|pages=10|hdl=2027/mdp.39015056796371}}</ref> Even with the Cold War ending in 1991, deterrence from mutually assured destruction is still said to be the safest course to avoid nuclear warfare.<ref>{{Citation|last=DELPECH|first=THÉRÈSE|title=Introduction|date=2012|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1103rc.5|work=Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century|pages=1–8|series=Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy|publisher=RAND Corporation|jstor=10.7249/mg1103rc.5|isbn=978-0-8330-5930-7|access-date=2021-04-02}}</ref>

===Effectiveness of the theory according to empirical studies===

A study published in the ''[[Journal of Conflict Resolution]]'' in 2009 [[quantitative research|quantitatively evaluated]] the nuclear peace [[hypothesis]] and found support for the existence of the [[stability-instability paradox]]. The study determined that nuclear weapons promote [[strategic stability]] and prevent large-scale wars but simultaneously allow for more [[low intensity conflict]]s. If a nuclear monopoly exists between two states, and one state has nuclear weapons and its opponent does not, there is a greater chance of war. In contrast, if there is mutual nuclear weapon ownership with both states possessing nuclear weapons, the odds of war drop precipitously.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Rauchhaus |first=Robert W. |title=Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=53 |issue=2 |pages=258–277 |year=2009 |doi=10.1177/0022002708330387 |s2cid=145065008 |url=http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/53/2/258.short |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

==History==
===Pre-1945===
{{See also|The bomber will always get through}}
The concept of MAD had been discussed in the literature for nearly a century before the invention of nuclear weapons. One of the earliest references comes from the English author [[Wilkie Collins]], writing at the time of the [[Franco-Prussian War]] in 1870: "I begin to believe in only one civilizing influence—the discovery one of these days of a destructive agent so terrible that War shall mean annihilation and men's fears will force them to keep the peace."<ref>{{cite web | url=http://wilkiecollinssociety.org/newsletter-spring-2009/ | title=Wilkie Collins and Mutually Assured Destruction | publisher=The Wilkie Collins Society | date=Spring 2009 | access-date=17 September 2014}}</ref> The concept was also described in 1863 by [[Jules Verne]] in his novel ''[[Paris in the Twentieth Century]]'', though it was not published until 1994. The book is set in 1960 and describes "the engines of war", which have become so efficient that war is inconceivable and all countries are at a perpetual stalemate.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Paris in the twentieth century|author=Verne, Jules|date=1996|publisher=Random House|others=Howard, Richard, 1929-|isbn=978-0-679-44434-3|edition= first US |location=New York|oclc=32854161}}</ref>{{primary source inline|date=February 2019}}

MAD has been invoked by more than one weapons inventor. For example, [[Richard Jordan Gatling]] patented his namesake [[Gatling gun]] in 1862 with the partial intention of illustrating the futility of war.<ref>Paul Wahl and Don Toppel, ''The Gatling Gun'', Arco Publishing, 1971.</ref> Likewise, after his 1867 invention of [[dynamite]], [[Alfred Nobel]] stated that "the day when two army corps can annihilate each other in one second, all civilized nations, it is to be hoped, will recoil from war and discharge their troops."<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://history1900s.about.com/od/medicaladvancesissues/a/nobelhistory.htm|title=Everything You Need to Know About the First Nobel Prizes|access-date=2016-10-04|archive-date=2016-08-01|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160801011956/http://history1900s.about.com/od/medicaladvancesissues/a/nobelhistory.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref> In 1937, [[Nikola Tesla]] published ''The Art of Projecting Concentrated Non-dispersive Energy through the Natural Media'',<ref>Tesla, Nikola, [http://www.teslaradio.com/pages/teleforce.htm ''The New Art of Projecting Concentrated Non-dispersive Energy through the Natural Media, System of Particle Acceleration for Use in National Defense''], circa 16 May 1935.</ref> a treatise concerning [[charged particle beam]] weapons.<ref name="Seifer454">{{cite book |last=Seifer |first=Marc J. |title=Wizard: the life and times of Nikola Tesla: biography of a genius |year=2001 |publisher=Citadel |isbn=978-0-8065-1960-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=h2DTNDFcC14C |page=454}}</ref> Tesla described his device as a "superweapon that would put an end to all war."

The March 1940 [[Frisch–Peierls memorandum]], the earliest technical exposition of a practical nuclear weapon, anticipated deterrence as the principal means of combating an enemy with nuclear weapons.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Brown|first1=Andrew|last2=Arnold|first2=Lorna|date=2010-09-20|title=The Quirks of Nuclear Deterrence|journal=International Relations|language=en|volume=24|issue=3|pages=293–312|doi=10.1177/0047117810377278|s2cid=143594540}}</ref>

===Early Cold War===
[[File:Hiroshima aftermath.jpg|thumb|right|270px|Aftermath of the atomic bomb explosion over [[Hiroshima]] (August 6, 1945), to date one of the only two times a nuclear strike has been performed as an act of war]]
In August 1945, the United States became the first nuclear power after the [[Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki|nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki]]. Four years later, on August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union [[RDS-1|detonated its own nuclear device]]. At the time, both sides lacked the means to effectively use nuclear devices against each other. However, with the development of aircraft like the American [[Convair B-36]] and the Soviet [[Tupolev Tu-95]], both sides were gaining a greater ability to deliver nuclear weapons into the interior of the opposing country. The official policy of the United States became one of "Instant Retaliation", as coined by Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]], which called for massive atomic attack against the Soviet Union if they were to invade Europe, regardless of whether it was a conventional or a nuclear attack.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Abel |first1=Elie |title=DULLES SAYS PACTS GIVE TO PRESIDENT RETALIATION RIGHT; Declares Congress Need Not Be Consulted First if Foe Strikes U. S. or Allies |url=https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1954/03/17/92820904.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0 |access-date=22 September 2022 |agency=The New York TImes Archives |work=The New York TImes |date=March 17, 1954}}</ref>

By the time of the 1962 [[Cuban Missile Crisis]], both the United States and the Soviet Union had developed the capability of launching a nuclear-tipped missile from a submerged submarine, which completed the "third leg" of the [[nuclear triad]] weapons strategy necessary to fully implement the MAD doctrine. Having a three-branched nuclear capability eliminated the possibility that an enemy could destroy all of a nation's nuclear forces in a [[Pre-emptive nuclear strike|first-strike]] attack; this, in turn, ensured the credible threat of a devastating [[second strike|retaliatory strike]] against the aggressor, increasing a nation's [[nuclear deterrence]].<ref name="NW">{{cite magazine |author=John Barry |url=http://www.newsweek.com/id/226494 |title=Do We Still Need a Nuclear 'Triad'? |magazine=[[Newsweek]] |date=2009-12-12 |access-date=2010-10-08}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/USNuclearDeterrence.html |title=Nuclear Stockpile |publisher=US Department of Defense |author=Office for the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters |access-date=2010-10-08 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100510015329/http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/USNuclearDeterrence.html |archive-date=2010-05-10 }}</ref><ref name="Time">{{cite magazine|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,959948,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080307080808/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,959948,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=March 7, 2008 |title=Toning Up the Nuclear Triad |magazine=Time |date=1985-09-23 |access-date=2010-10-08}}</ref>

Campbell Craig and [[Sergey Radchenko]] argue that [[Nikita Khrushchev]] (Soviet leader 1953 to 1964) decided that policies that facilitated nuclear war were too dangerous to the Soviet Union. His approach did not greatly change his foreign policy or military doctrine but is apparent in his determination to choose options that minimized the risk of war.<ref>Campbell Craig and [[Sergey Radchenko]], "MAD, not Marx: Khrushchev and the nuclear revolution." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' (2018) 41#1/2:208-233.</ref>

===Strategic Air Command===
{{More citations needed|subsection|date=July 2019}}
{{see also|Operation Chrome Dome}}
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Beginning in 1955, the United States [[Strategic Air Command]] (SAC) kept one-third of its bombers on alert, with crews ready to take off within fifteen minutes and fly to designated targets inside the [[Soviet Union]] and destroy them with nuclear bombs in the event of a Soviet first-strike attack on the United States. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy increased funding for this program<ref>{{cite web | url=https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal61-1373672# | title=CQ Almanac Online Edition }}</ref> and raised the commitment to 50 percent of SAC aircraft.{{citation needed|date=April 2024}}

During periods of increased tension in the early 1960s, SAC kept part of its B-52 fleet airborne at all times, to allow an extremely fast retaliatory strike against the Soviet Union in the event of a surprise attack on the United States. This program continued until 1969. Between 1954 and 1992, bomber wings had approximately one-third to one-half of their assigned aircraft on quick reaction ground alert and were able to take off within a few minutes.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/annual-budget-message-the-congress-fiscal-year-1961 | title=Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1961. &#124; the American Presidency Project }}</ref> SAC also maintained the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP, pronounced "kneecap"), also known as "Looking Glass", which consisted of several EC-135s, one of which was airborne at all times from 1961 through 1990.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.stratcom.mil/About/History/ | title=History }}</ref> During the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] the bombers were dispersed to several different airfields, and sixty-five B-52s were airborne at all times.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/20815-08-us-strategic-air-command-history-and-research-division-historical-study-no-90-vol | title=U.S. Strategic Air Command, History and Research Division, Historical Study No. 90, Vol. I, Strategic Air Command Operations during the Cuban Crisis of 1962, circa 1963, Top Secret, Excised Copy &#124; National Security Archive }}</ref>

During the height of the tensions between the US and the USSR in the 1960s, two popular films were made dealing with what could go terribly wrong with the policy of keeping nuclear-bomb-carrying airplanes at the ready: ''[[Dr. Strangelove]]'' (1964)<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.tvovermind.com/movies/50-years-later-2001-a-space-odyssey-is-still-an-unparalleled-marvel-on-the-big-screen |title=50 Years Later, '2001: A Space Odyssey' Is Still an Unparalleled Marvel on the Big Screen |date=2018-08-31 |work=TVOvermind |access-date=2018-09-15 |language=en-US}}</ref> and ''[[Fail-Safe (1964 film)|Fail Safe]]'' (1964).<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/gerald-hirschfeld-dead-young-frankenstein-fail-safe-cinematographer-was-95-977763 |title=Gerald Hirschfeld, Cinematographer on 'Young Frankenstein' and 'Fail-Safe,' Dies at 95 |work=The Hollywood Reporter |access-date=2018-09-15 |language=en}}</ref>
{{clear right}}

===Retaliation capability (second strike)===
{{see also|Second strike}}
[[File:Robert McNamara official portrait.jpg|thumb|120px|left|[[Robert McNamara]]]]
The strategy of MAD was fully declared in the early 1960s, primarily by [[United States Secretary of Defense]] [[Robert McNamara]]. In McNamara's formulation, there was the very real danger that a nation with nuclear weapons could attempt to eliminate another nation's retaliatory forces with a surprise, devastating first strike and theoretically "win" a nuclear war relatively unharmed. The true second-strike capability could be achieved only when a nation had a ''guaranteed'' ability to fully retaliate after a first-strike attack.<ref name=":0" />

The United States had achieved an early form of second-strike capability by fielding continual patrols of strategic nuclear bombers, with a large number of planes always in the air, on their way to or from fail-safe points close to the borders of the Soviet Union. This meant the United States could still retaliate, even after a devastating first-strike attack. The tactic was expensive and problematic because of the high cost of keeping enough planes in the air at all times and the possibility they would be shot down by Soviet [[Surface-to-air missile|anti-aircraft missile]]s before reaching their targets. In addition, as the idea of a [[missile gap]] existing between the US and the Soviet Union developed, there was increasing priority being given to [[ICBM]]s over bombers.

[[File:USS George Washington (SSBN-598) underway at sea, circa in the 1970s.jpg|thumb|210px|right|The [[USS George Washington (SSBN-598)|USS ''George Washington'' (SSBN-598)]], the lead ship of the [[US Navy]]'s first class of [[Ballistic missile|Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines, Nuclear (SSBN)]]]]
It was only with the advent of [[nuclear submarine|nuclear-powered]] [[ballistic missile submarine]]s, starting with the [[George Washington class submarine|'' George Washington'' class]] in 1959, that a genuine [[Survivability|survivable]] nuclear force became possible and a retaliatory second strike capability guaranteed.

The deployment of fleets of ballistic missile submarines established a guaranteed second-strike capability because of their stealth and by the number fielded by each Cold War adversary—it was highly unlikely that all of them could be targeted and preemptively destroyed (in contrast to, for example, a missile silo with a fixed location that could be targeted during a first strike). Given their long-range, high [[survivability]] and ability to carry many medium- and long-range nuclear missiles, submarines were credible and effective means for full-scale retaliation even after a massive first strike.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB2020rev/chapters/chapter3.html | title=NMHB 2020 &#91;Revised&#93; }}</ref>

This deterrence strategy and the program have continued into the 21st century, with nuclear submarines carrying [[Trident II]] ballistic missiles as one leg of the US [[strategic deterrence|strategic nuclear deterrent]] and as the sole deterrent of the United Kingdom. The other elements of the US deterrent are intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on alert in the continental United States, and nuclear-capable bombers. Ballistic missile submarines are also operated by the navies of China, France, India, and Russia.

The [[United States Department of Defense|US Department of Defense]] anticipates a continued need for a [[Nuclear triad|sea-based strategic nuclear force]].{{citation needed|date=April 2024}} The first of the current [[Ohio-class submarine|''Ohio''-class SSBNs]] are expected to be retired by 2029,{{citation needed|date=April 2024}} meaning that a replacement platform must already be seaworthy by that time. A replacement may cost over $4 billion per unit compared to the USS ''Ohio''{{'}}s $2 billion.<ref name="Frost">
 {{cite news
 |url = http://www.dailypress.com/news/dp-local_subs_0424apr24,0,5810806.story
 |title = Newport News contract awarded
 |newspaper = [[Daily Press (Virginia)|Daily Press]]
 |last = Frost
 |first = Peter
 |access-date = 2011-09-27
 |url-access=subscription 
 |url-status = dead
 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20090426041620/http://www.dailypress.com/news/dp-local_subs_0424apr24,0,5810806.story
 |archive-date = 2009-04-26
}}</ref> The USN's follow-on class of SSBN will be the [[Columbia-class submarine|Columbia]] class, which began construction in 2021 and enter service in 2031.<ref>{{cite web |title=Navy Columbia(SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, Updated June 24, 2019 |url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110504225457/http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf |archive-date=2011-05-04 |url-status=live |website=fas.org |publisher=Congressional Research Service |access-date=July 17, 2019}}</ref>

=== ABMs threaten MAD ===
{{main|Anti-ballistic missile}}
{{See also|Strategic Defense Initiative}}
In the 1960s both the Soviet Union ([[A-35 anti-ballistic missile system]]) and the United States ([[LIM-49 Nike Zeus]]) developed anti-ballistic missile systems. Had such systems been able to effectively defend against a retaliatory [[second strike]], MAD would have been undermined. However, multiple scientific studies showed technological and logistical problems in these systems, including the inability to distinguish between real and decoy weapons.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=HSIN|first=HONOR|date=2003|title=Episode II: US Ballistic Missile Defense|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43648994|journal=Harvard International Review|volume=25|issue=3|pages=15–16|jstor=43648994|issn=0739-1854}}</ref>

===MIRVs===
{{main|Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle}}
{{Unreferenced section|date=August 2013}}
[[File:Peacekeeper RV vehicles.jpg|thumb|right|175px|A time exposure of seven [[multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle|MIRVs]] from [[Peacekeeper missile]] passing through clouds]]

==== MIRVs as counter against ABM ====
The [[multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle]] (MIRV) was another weapons system designed specifically to aid with the MAD nuclear deterrence doctrine. With a MIRV payload, one [[ICBM]] could hold many separate warheads. MIRVs were first created by the United States in order to counterbalance the Soviet [[A-35 anti-ballistic missile system]]s around Moscow. Since each defensive missile could be counted on to destroy only one offensive missile, making each offensive missile have, for example, three warheads (as with early MIRV systems) meant that three times as many defensive missiles were needed for each offensive missile. This made defending against missile attacks more costly and difficult. One of the largest US MIRVed missiles, the [[LGM-118A Peacekeeper]], could hold up to 10 warheads, each with a yield of around {{convert|300|ktonTNT|PJ|lk=in}}—all together, an explosive payload equivalent to 230 [[Little Boy|Hiroshima-type]] bombs. The multiple warheads made defense untenable with the available technology, leaving the threat of retaliatory attack as the only viable defensive option. MIRVed land-based ICBMs tend to put a premium on striking first.<!--For example, assume that each side has 100 missiles, with 5 warheads each, and further that each side has a 95 percent chance of neutralizing the opponent's missiles in their silos by firing 2 warheads at each silo. In this case, the side that strikes first can reduce the enemy ICBM force from 100 missiles to about 5 by firing 40 missiles with 200 warheads, and keeping the rest of 60 missiles in reserve. --> The [[START II]] agreement was proposed to ban this type of weapon, but never entered into force.

In the event of a Soviet conventional attack on [[Western Europe]], [[NATO]] planned to use [[tactical nuclear weapons]]. The Soviet Union countered this threat by issuing a statement that any use of nuclear weapons (tactical or otherwise) against Soviet forces would be grounds for a full-scale Soviet retaliatory strike ([[massive retaliation]]). Thus it was generally assumed that any combat in Europe would end with [[apocalypse|apocalyptic]] conclusions.

==== Land-based MIRVed ICBMs threaten MAD ====
[[Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle|MIRVed]] land-based ICBMs are generally considered suitable for a first strike (inherently [[counterforce]]) or a counterforce [[second strike]], due to:
# Their high accuracy (low [[circular error probable]]), compared to submarine-launched ballistic missiles which used to be less accurate, and more prone to defects;
# Their fast response time, compared to bombers which are considered too slow;
# Their ability to carry multiple MIRV warheads at once, useful for destroying a whole missile field or several cities with one missile.

Unlike a [[decapitation strike]] or a [[countervalue strike]], a [[counterforce strike]] might result in a potentially more constrained retaliation. Though the Minuteman III of the mid-1960s was MIRVed with three warheads, heavily MIRVed vehicles threatened to upset the balance; these included the [[SS-18 Satan]] which was deployed in 1976, and was considered to threaten [[Minuteman III]] silos, which led [[Team B|some]] [[neoconservatives]] to conclude a [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] first strike was being prepared for.{{citation needed|date=August 2021}} This led to the development of the aforementioned [[Pershing II]], the [[Trident I]] and [[Trident II]], as well as the [[MX missile]], and the [[B-1 Lancer]].

MIRVed land-based [[ICBM]]s are considered destabilizing because they tend to put a premium on striking first. When a missile is MIRVed, it is able to carry many [[warhead]]s (up to eight in existing US missiles, limited by [[New START]], though Trident II is capable of carrying up to 12<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://missilethreat.com/missiles/ugm-133-trident-d-5/ |title=UGM-133 Trident D-5 - Missile ThreatTrident 2 &#124; Missile Threat |access-date=2015-02-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151027084659/http://missilethreat.com/missiles/ugm-133-trident-d-5/ |archive-date=2015-10-27 |url-status=dead }}</ref>) and deliver them to separate targets. If it is assumed that each side has 100 missiles, with five warheads each, and further that each side has a 95 percent chance of neutralizing the opponent's missiles in their silos by firing two warheads at each silo, then the attacking side can reduce the enemy ICBM force from 100 missiles to about five by firing 40 missiles with 200 warheads, and keeping the rest of 60 missiles in reserve. As such, this type of weapon was intended to be banned under the [[START II]] agreement; however, the START II agreement was never brought into force, and neither Russia nor the United States ratified the agreement.

===Late Cold War===
The original US MAD doctrine was modified on July 25, 1980, with US President [[Jimmy Carter]]'s adoption of ''countervailing strategy'' with [[Presidential Directive 59]]. According to its architect, Secretary of Defense [[Harold Brown (Secretary of Defense)|Harold Brown]], "countervailing strategy" stressed that the planned response to a Soviet attack was no longer to bomb Soviet population centers and cities primarily, but first to kill the Soviet leadership, then attack military targets, in the hope of a Soviet surrender before total destruction of the Soviet Union (and the United States). This modified version of MAD was seen as a winnable nuclear war, while still maintaining the possibility of assured destruction for at least one party. This policy was further developed by the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan administration]] with the announcement of the [[Strategic Defense Initiative]] (SDI, nicknamed "Star Wars"), the goal of which was to develop space-based technology to destroy Soviet missiles before they reached the United States.

SDI was criticized by both the Soviets and many of America's allies (including Prime Minister of the United Kingdom [[Margaret Thatcher]]) because, were it ever operational and effective, it would have undermined the "assured destruction" required for MAD. If the United States had a guarantee against Soviet nuclear attacks, its critics argued, it would have first-strike capability, which would have been a politically and militarily destabilizing position. Critics further argued that it could trigger a new arms race, this time to develop countermeasures for SDI. Despite its promise of nuclear safety, SDI was described by many of its critics (including Soviet nuclear physicist and later peace activist [[Andrei Sakharov]]) as being even more dangerous than MAD because of these political implications. Supporters also argued that SDI could trigger a new arms race, forcing the USSR to spend an increasing proportion of GDP on defense—something which has been claimed to have been an indirect cause of the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. [[Mikhail Gorbachev|Gorbachev]] himself in 1983 announced that “the continuation of the S.D.I. program will sweep the world into a new stage of the arms race and would destabilize the strategic situation.”<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Webb|first1=Rachel|last2=Connolly|first2=Erin|last3=Gott|first3=Jessica|last4=Hadfield|first4=Zach|last5=Hamel|first5=Michael|last6=Heimer|first6=Brandon W.|last7=Kattan|first7=Ari|last8=Kirkegaard|first8=Marie C.|last9=Kuhns|first9=Ryan|last10=Maloney|first10=Jillian|last11=Mascaro|first11=Anthony D.|date=2019|title=Defensive Satellites:: Who Will Shoot First?|chapter=Defensive Satellites |journal=On the Horizon|chapter-url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22545.20|pages=190–199}}</ref>

Proponents of [[ballistic missile defense]] (BMD) argue that MAD is exceptionally dangerous in that it essentially offers a single course of action in the event of a nuclear attack: full retaliatory response. The fact that [[nuclear proliferation]] has led to an increase in the number of nations in the "[[nuclear club]]", including nations of questionable stability (e.g. [[North Korea]]), and that a nuclear nation might be hijacked by a [[Despotism|despot]] or other person or persons who might use nuclear weapons without a sane regard for the consequences, presents a strong case for proponents of BMD who seek a policy which both protect against attack, but also does not require an escalation into what might become [[World War III|global nuclear war]]. Russia continues to have a strong public distaste for Western BMD initiatives, presumably because proprietary operative BMD systems could exceed their technical and financial resources and therefore degrade their larger military standing and sense of security in a post-MAD environment. Russian refusal to accept invitations {{Citation needed|reason=who and when invited Russia to join BMD?|date=January 2021}} to participate in NATO BMD may be indicative of the lack of an alternative to MAD in current Russian war-fighting strategy due to the dilapidation of conventional forces after the breakup of the [[Soviet Union]].

==== Proud Prophet ====
[[Proud Prophet]] was a series of war games played out by various American military officials. The simulation revealed MAD made the use of nuclear weapons virtually impossible without total nuclear annihilation, regardless of how nuclear weapons were implemented in war plans. These results essentially ruled out the possibility of a limited nuclear strike, as every time this was attempted, it resulted in a complete expenditure of nuclear weapons by both the United States and USSR. Proud Prophet marked a shift in American strategy; following Proud Prophet, American rhetoric of strategies that involved the use of nuclear weapons dissipated and American war plans were changed to emphasize the use of conventional forces.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Bracken|first=Paul|title=The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics|pages=81–90}}</ref>

==== TTAPS Study ====
In 1983, a group of researchers including [[Carl Sagan]] released the TTAPS study (named for the respective initials of the authors), which predicted that the large scale use of nuclear weapons would cause a “[[nuclear winter]]”. The study predicted that the debris burned in nuclear bombings would be lifted into the atmosphere and diminish sunlight worldwide, thus reducing world temperatures by “-15° to -25°C”.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Turco|first1=R. P.|last2=Toon|first2=O. B.|last3=Ackerman|first3=T. P.|last4=Pollack|first4=J. B.|last5=Sagan|first5=Carl|date=1983-12-23|title=Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions|url=https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.222.4630.1283|journal=Science|language=en|volume=222|issue=4630|pages=1283–1292|doi=10.1126/science.222.4630.1283|issn=0036-8075|pmid=17773320|bibcode=1983Sci...222.1283T|s2cid=45515251|url-access=subscription}}</ref> These findings led to theory that MAD would still occur with many fewer weapons than were possessed by either the United States or USSR at the height of the Cold War. As such, nuclear winter was used as an argument for significant reduction of nuclear weapons since MAD would occur anyway.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Plous|first=Scott|date=1984|title=Will Deterrence Survive a Nuclear Winter?|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1693566|journal=Science|volume=225|issue=4659|pages=268|doi=10.1126/science.225.4659.268-a|jstor=1693566|pmid=17749541|issn=0036-8075|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

===Post-Cold War===
{{more citations needed section|date=May 2018}}
[[File:EKV prototype launch.jpg|thumb|200px|A payload launch vehicle carrying a prototype [[Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle|exoatmospheric kill vehicle]] is launched from [[Meck Island]] at the [[Kwajalein Missile Range]] on December 3, 2001, for an intercept of a ballistic missile target over the central Pacific Ocean.]]

After the [[fall of the Soviet Union]], the [[Russian Federation]] emerged as a sovereign entity encompassing most of the territory of the former USSR. Relations between the United States and Russia were, at least for a time, less tense than they had been with the Soviet Union.{{citation needed|date=March 2025}}

While MAD has become less applicable for the US and Russia, it has been argued as a factor behind [[Nuclear weapons and Israel|Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons]]. Similarly, diplomats have warned that Japan may be pressured to nuclearize by the presence of North Korean nuclear weapons. The ability to launch a nuclear attack against an enemy city is a relevant deterrent strategy for these powers.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=SOKOLSKI|first=HENRY D.|date=2004|title=PREFACE|journal=Getting Mad|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12035.3|pages=v–viii}}</ref>

The administration of US President [[George W. Bush]] withdrew from the [[Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty]] in June 2002, claiming that the limited national missile defense system which they proposed to build was designed only to prevent [[nuclear blackmail]] by a state with limited nuclear capability and was not planned to alter the nuclear posture between Russia and the United States.

While relations have improved and an intentional nuclear exchange is more unlikely, the decay in Russian nuclear capability in the [[post–Cold War era]] may have had an effect on the continued viability of the MAD doctrine. A 2006 article by Keir Lieber and Daryl Press stated that the United States could carry out a nuclear first strike on Russia and would "have a good chance of destroying every Russian bomber base, submarine, and ICBM." This was attributed to reductions in Russian nuclear stockpiles and the increasing inefficiency and age of that which remains. Lieber and Press argued that the MAD era is coming to an end and that the United States is on the cusp of global nuclear primacy.<ref>Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," ''[[Foreign Affairs]]'', March/April 2006, pp 42–55.</ref>

However, in a follow-up article in the same publication, others criticized the analysis, including [[Peter C. W. Flory|Peter Flory]], the US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, who began by writing "The essay by Keir Lieber and Daryl Press contains so many errors, on a topic of such gravity, that a Department of Defense response is required to correct the record."<ref name="PCWF">Peter C. W. Flory ''Nuclear Exchange: Does Washington Really Have (or Want) Nuclear Primacy?'' [http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faresponse85514/peter-c-w-flory-keith-payne-pavel-podvig-alexei-arbatov-keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/nuclear-exchange.html Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060925140832/http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faresponse85514/peter-c-w-flory-keith-payne-pavel-podvig-alexei-arbatov-keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/nuclear-exchange.html |date=2006-09-25 }}</ref> Regarding reductions in Russian stockpiles, another response stated that "a similarly one-sided examination of [reductions in] U.S. forces would have painted a similarly dire portrait".

A situation in which the United States might actually be expected to carry out a "successful" attack is perceived as a disadvantage for both countries. The strategic balance between the United States and Russia is becoming less stable, and the objective, the technical possibility of a first strike by the United States is increasing. At a time of crisis, this instability could lead to an accidental nuclear war. For example, if Russia feared a US nuclear attack, Moscow might make rash moves (such as putting its forces on alert) that would provoke a US preemptive strike.<ref name="PCWF" />

An outline of current US nuclear strategy toward both Russia and other nations was published as the document "[[Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence]]" in 1995.

In November 2020, the US successfully destroyed a dummy ICBM outside the atmosphere with another missile. [[Bloomberg Opinion]] writes that this defense ability "ends the era of nuclear stability".<ref>{{Cite news|last=Kluth|first=Andreas|date=2020-11-29|title=A Successful U.S. Missile Intercept Ends the Era of Nuclear Stability|language=en|work=Bloomberg.com|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-11-30/a-successful-u-s-missile-intercept-ends-the-era-of-nuclear-stability|access-date=2020-11-30}}</ref>

==== India and Pakistan ====
MAD does not entirely apply to all nuclear-armed rivals. [[Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts|India and Pakistan]] are an example of this; because of the superiority of conventional Indian armed forces to their Pakistani counterparts, Pakistan may be forced to use their nuclear weapons on invading Indian forces out of desperation regardless of an Indian retaliatory strike. As such, any large-scale attack on Pakistan by India could precipitate the use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan, thus rendering MAD inapplicable. However, MAD is applicable in that it may deter Pakistan from making a “suicidal” nuclear attack rather than a defensive nuclear strike.<ref name=":1"/>

==== North Korea ====
Since the emergence of [[North Korea and weapons of mass destruction|North Korea as a nuclear state]], military action has not been an option in handling the instability surrounding North Korea because of their option of nuclear retaliation in response to any conventional attack on them, thus rendering non-nuclear neighboring states such as South Korea and Japan incapable of resolving the destabilizing effect of North Korea via military force.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Baranwal|first=Sanjay|title="Nuclear Nihilism of North Korea: Perils and Path Ahead"|date=2011|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/42761440|journal=The Indian Journal of Political Science|volume=72|issue=2|pages=547–554|jstor=42761440|issn=0019-5510}}</ref> MAD may not apply to the situation in North Korea because the theory relies on rational consideration of the use and consequences of nuclear weapons, which may not be the case for potential North Korean deployment.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=2017|title=Time to re-assess mutually assured destruction|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26951722|journal=BMJ: British Medical Journal|volume=359|jstor=26951722|issn=0959-8138}}</ref>

==== China ====
Since 2020, China has undertaken an ambitious expansion and modernization of its nuclear arsenal. As of March 2025, it is estimated to possess approximately 600 nuclear warheads.<ref name="thebulletin.org">The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. "Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2025." *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 2025. [https://thebulletin.org/premium/2025-03/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2025/](https://thebulletin.org/premium/2025-03/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2025/)</ref> It has developed new variants of intercontinental ballistic missiles and is capable of delivering nuclear warheads via land-based ballistic missiles, sea-based ballistic missiles, and bombers.<ref name="thebulletin.org"/> A 2023 Pentagon report estimated that China could possess 1,000 operational warheads by 2030.<ref name="thebulletin.org"/> China also has the world’s second-largest economy and a highly capable military force.<ref>Council on Foreign Relations. "China and Global Governance." *Council on Foreign Relations*, 2024. [https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/](https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/)</ref> China’s intense development of its nuclear program complicates mutual assured destruction with other countries, including the United States. As its nuclear program expands, the prospect of a credible MAD relationship with the US is likely to increase.{{citation needed|date=October 2025}} China seeks to develop second-strike capabilities to counter other nations, following years of adhering to a declared no-first-use policy. Several analysts have cited China’s nuclear developments as a means of leveraging power to bolster China’s demands due to an increased threat.{{citation needed|date=October 2025}} However, others have claimed that China is simply seeking to boost its deterrence to fortify its own security in a rapidly developing world.<ref>Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. "What Chinese Nuclear Modernization Means for U.S. Deterrence Strategy." *Stanford University*, 2024. [https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/what-chinese-nuclear-modernization-means-us-deterrence-strategy](https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/what-chinese-nuclear-modernization-means-us-deterrence-strategy)</ref>
China’s nuclear arsenal is currently smaller than the arsenals of Russia and the United States. Historically, the United States has possessed a strong nuclear advantage over China. Despite the various different analyses by defense experts and academics of China’s nuclear buildup, its exact intentions remain largely up to speculation.{{citation needed|date=October 2025}}
There does not exist an official consensus on whether or not the United States and China have full mutual assured destruction. However, China’s ambitious nuclear policy signals that the country is potentially seeking to establish a MAD relationship with the United States.<ref>Hudson Institute. "China–U.S. Rivalry Rests on MAD Theory." *Hudson Institute*, 2024. [https://www.hudson.org/node/44313](https://www.hudson.org/node/44313)</ref>{{dubious|not in cited source|date=October 2025}} China’s nuclear buildup also plays a role in regional nuclear dynamics. In a conflict involving Taiwan, for example, the presence of nuclear forces could lead to a rapid escalation in the situation. When the stakes of a conflict become existential, urgency on all sides increases rapidly and intensely. This similarly complicates security guarantees and other forms of alliances with countries across the world, potentially involving allies and/or strategic partners across the world.{{citation needed|date=October 2025}}

==Official policy==
Whether MAD was the officially accepted doctrine of the United States military during the Cold War is largely a matter of interpretation. The [[United States Air Force]], for example, has retrospectively contended that it never advocated MAD as a sole strategy, and that this form of deterrence was seen as one of numerous options in US nuclear policy.<ref>National Archives and Records Administration, RG 200, Defense Programs and Operations, LeMay's Memo to President and JCS Views, Box 83. Secret.</ref> Former officers have emphasized that they never felt as limited by the logic of MAD (and were prepared to use nuclear weapons in smaller-scale situations than "assured destruction" allowed), and did not deliberately target civilian cities (though they acknowledge that the result of a "purely military" attack would certainly devastate the cities as well). However, according to a declassified 1959 [[Strategic Air Command]] study, US nuclear weapons plans specifically targeted the populations of Beijing, Moscow, Leningrad, East Berlin, and Warsaw for systematic destruction.<ref>{{Cite web|title = Strategic Air Command Declassifies Nuclear Target List from 1950s|url = http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb538-Cold-War-Nuclear-Target-List-Declassified-First-Ever/|website = nsarchive.gwu.edu|access-date = 2016-01-06}}</ref> MAD was implied in several US policies and used in the political rhetoric of leaders in both the United States and the USSR during many periods of the Cold War:

{{blockquote|To continue to deter in an era of strategic nuclear equivalence, it is necessary to have nuclear (as well as conventional) forces such that in considering aggression against our interests any adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome would represent a victory or any plausible definition of victory. To this end and so as to preserve the possibility of bargaining effectively to terminate the war on acceptable terms that are as favorable as practical, if deterrence fails initially, we must be capable of fighting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable, or in any event greater than his gains, from having initiated an attack.|President Jimmy Carter in 1980|[[s:Page:Carter Presidential Directive 59, Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy.djvu/2|Presidential Directive 59, Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy]]}}

The doctrine of MAD was officially at odds with that of the [[USSR]], which had, contrary to MAD, insisted survival was possible.<ref name="Richard Pipes 1977">{{cite web |url=http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-422-2012-S1_NP/Syllabus/EReadings/05.2/05.2.Pipes1977Why-the-Soviet-Union.pdf |title=Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War |author=Richard Pipes |publisher=[[Reed College]] |year=1977 |access-date=September 4, 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131214024826/http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-422-2012-S1_NP/Syllabus/EReadings/05.2/05.2.Pipes1977Why-the-Soviet-Union.pdf |archive-date=December 14, 2013 }}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine|url=https://www.scribd.com/doc/63015546/Why-Russia-Thinks-It-Could-Fight-and-Win-a-Nuclear-War |title=Why the Soviet Union thinks it can fight and win a Nuclear War |author=Richard Pipes |magazine=Commentary |year=1977 |access-date=April 21, 2013}}</ref><ref name="gwu.edu">{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv//nukevault/ebb285 |title=Previously Classified Interviews with Former Soviet Officials Reveal U.S. Strategic Intelligence Failure Over Decades |editor1-last=Burr |editor1-first=William |editor2-last=Savranskaya |editor2-first=Svetlana |date=September 11, 2009 |location=[[Washington, DC]] |access-date=April 21, 2013}}</ref> The Soviets believed they could win not only a strategic nuclear war, which they planned to absorb with their extensive [[civil defense]] planning,<ref name="Richard Pipes 1977"/><ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1977/mar-apr/dorough.html |title= Soviet Civil Defense U.S.S.R. preparations for industrial-base war survival. | author= Captain John W. Dorough Jr. |publisher= Air University Review, March–April 1977. |access-date= 2013-09-04 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20131217102003/http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1977/mar-apr/dorough.html |archive-date= 2013-12-17 |url-status= dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|url= http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/30948/john-c-campbell/war-survival-in-soviet-strategy-ussr-civil-defense |title=War Survival in Soviet Strategy: USSR Civil Defense |journal=Foreign Affairs |publisher=[[Foreign Affairs magazine]] |author=Leon Gouré Reviewed by John C. Campbell |year=1977|volume=55 |issue=January 1977 }}</ref> but also the conventional war that they predicted would follow after their strategic nuclear arsenal had been depleted.<ref>{{cite journal|title=Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict During the Cold War: An Oral History Roundtable, Stockholm, 24–25 April 2006 |journal=Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik |date=November 2007 |issue=79 |url=http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/ZB-79.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130523195804/http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/ZB-79.pdf |archive-date=2013-05-23 |url-status=live|access-date=April 21, 2013 |editor1-first=Jan |editor1-last=Hoffenaar |editor2-first=Christopher |editor2-last=Findlay |editor3-first=Andreas (series) |editor3-last=Wenger |editor4-first=Victor (series) |display-editors = 3 |editor4-last=Mauer}}</ref> Official Soviet policy, though, may have had internal critics towards the end of the Cold War, including some in the USSR's own leadership:<ref name="gwu.edu"/>

{{blockquote|Nuclear use would be catastrophic.|1981, the Soviet General Staff<ref name="gwu.edu"/>
}}Other evidence of this comes from the Soviet minister of defense, [[Dmitry Ustinov|Dmitriy Ustinov]], who wrote that "A clear appreciation by the Soviet leadership of what a war under contemporary conditions would mean for mankind determines the active position of the USSR."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Simes|first=Dimitri K.|date=1980|title=Deterrence and Coercion in Soviet Policy|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2538421|journal=International Security|volume=5|issue=3|pages=80–103|doi=10.2307/2538421|jstor=2538421|s2cid=154442754|issn=0162-2889|url-access=subscription}}</ref> The Soviet doctrine, although being seen as primarily offensive by Western analysts, fully rejected the possibility of a "limited" nuclear war by 1975.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Sokolski|first=Henry|title=GETTING MAD : nuclear mutual assured destruction, its origins and practice.|date=2014|publisher=LULU COM|isbn=978-1-312-32984-3|oclc=986955494}}</ref>

==Criticism==
{{more citations needed section|date=March 2008}}
[[File:Redwing Apache.jpg|thumb|280px|Nuclear weapon test Apache (yield {{convert|1.85|Mt(TNT)|disp=or|abbr=on}})]]Deterrence theory has been criticized by numerous scholars for various reasons. A prominent strain of criticism argues that rational deterrence theory is contradicted by frequent deterrence failures, which may be attributed to misperceptions.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Jervis |first=Robert |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3QlsDQAAQBAJ |title=Perception and Misperception in International Politics: New Edition |date=1976 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-1-4008-8511-4 |language=en}}</ref> Critics have also argued that leaders do not behave in ways that are consistent with the predictions of nuclear deterrence theory.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Green |first=Brendan Rittenhouse |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wFTMDwAAQBAJ |title=The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War |date=2020 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-48986-7 |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Citation |last=Jervis |first=Robert |title=The Nuclear Age |date=2021 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/before-and-after-the-fall/nuclear-age/3F9C601E9D5B0283487BEFCE73913C60 |work=Before and After the Fall: World Politics and the End of the Cold War |pages=115–131 |editor-last=Bartel |editor-first=Fritz |publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/9781108910194.008 |isbn=978-1-108-90677-7 |editor2-last=Monteiro |editor2-first=Nuno P. |s2cid=244858515|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Sagan |first=Scott D. |date=1994 |title=The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539178 |journal=International Security |volume=18 |issue=4 |pages=66–107 |doi=10.2307/2539178 |issn=0162-2889 |jstor=2539178 |s2cid=153925234|url-access=subscription }}</ref> For example, it has been argued that it is inconsistent with the logic of rational deterrence theory that states continue to build nuclear arsenals once they have reached the second-strike threshold.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3" /> For a more inconsistent example, [[Mao Zedong]] urged the socialist camp not to fear [[nuclear war]] with the United States since, even if "half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist."<ref>{{cite news |title= Instant Wisdom: Beyond the Little Red Book |url= http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946612,00.html |date= 20 September 1976 |magazine= [[Time (magazine)|Time]] |access-date= 14 April 2013 |archive-date= 29 September 2013 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20130929083531/http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946612,00.html |url-status= live }}</ref>

Additionally, many scholars have advanced philosophical objections against the principles of deterrence theory on purely [[ethical]] grounds. Included in this group is [[Robert L. Holmes]] who uses a [[reductio ad absurdum]] argument to observe that mankind's reliance upon a system of preventing war which is based exclusively upon the threat of waging war is inherently irrational and must be considered immoral according to fundamental [[deontological]] principles. In addition, he questions whether it can be conclusively demonstrated that such a system has in fact served to prevent warfare in the past and may actually serve to increase the probability of waging war in the future due to its reliance upon the continuous development of new generations of technologically advanced nuclear weapons.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Meyers |first=Diana T. |date=1992 |title=Reviewed work: On War and Morality, Robert L. Holmes |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2185583.pdf |journal=The Philosophical Review |volume=101 |issue=2 |pages=481–484 |doi=10.2307/2185583 |jstor=2185583}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rock |first=Stephen R. |date=1989 |title=Reviewed work: On War and Morality, Robert L. Holmes; Paths to Peace: Exploring the Feasibility of Sustainable Peace, Richard Smoke, Willis Harman |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1961738.pdf |journal=The American Political Science Review |volume=83 |issue=4 |pages=1447–1448 |doi=10.2307/1961738 |jstor=1961738}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Lee |first=Steven |date=1992 |title=Reviewed work: On War and Morality., Robert L. Holmes |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2216042.pdf |journal=Noûs |volume=26 |issue=4 |pages=559–562 |doi=10.2307/2216042 |jstor=2216042}}</ref>

===Challengeable assumptions===
==== Second-strike capability ====
{{main|Second strike}}
* A first strike must not be capable of preventing a retaliatory second strike or else mutual destruction is not assured. In this case, a state would have nothing to lose with a first strike or might try to preempt the development of an opponent's second-strike capability with a first strike. To avoid this, countries may design their nuclear forces to make decapitation strike almost impossible, by dispersing launchers over wide areas and using a combination of [[submarine-launched ballistic missile|sea-based]], [[strategic bombers|air-based]], underground, and [[Missile vehicle|mobile land-based launchers]].
*Another method of ensuring second strike capability is through the use of [[dead man's switch]] or "[[fail-deadly]]:" in the absence of ongoing action from a functional command structure—such as would occur after suffering a successful [[decapitation strike]]—an automatic system defaults to launching a nuclear strike upon some target. A particular example is the Soviet (now Russian) [[Dead Hand]] system, which has been described as a semi-automatic "version of [[Dr. Strangelove|Dr. Strangelove's Doomsday Machine]]" which, once activated, can launch a second strike without human intervention. The purpose of the Dead Hand system is to ensure a second strike even if Russia were to suffer a decapitation attack, thus maintaining MAD.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ross|first=Douglas Alan|date=1998|title=Canada's Functional Isolationism: And the Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40203359|journal=International Journal|volume=54|issue=1|pages=120–142|doi=10.2307/40203359|jstor=40203359|issn=0020-7020|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

==== Perfect detection ====
* No false positives (errors) in the equipment and/or procedures that must identify a launch by the other side. The implication of this is that an accident could lead to a full nuclear exchange. During the Cold War there were several instances of false positives, as in the case of [[Stanislav Petrov]].
* Perfect attribution. If there is a launch from the Sino-Russian border, it could be difficult to distinguish which nation is responsible—both Russia and China have the capability—and, hence, against which nation retaliation should occur. A launch from a nuclear-armed submarine could also be difficult to attribute.

==== Perfect rationality ====
* No rogue commanders will have the ability to corrupt the launch decision process. Such an incident very nearly occurred during the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] when an argument broke out aboard a nuclear-armed submarine cut off from radio communication. The second-in-command, [[Vasily Arkhipov (vice admiral)|Vasili Arkhipov]], refused to launch despite an order from Captain Savitsky to do so.<ref name="Globe">{{Cite news|url= http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cold-war/sovietsbomb.htm | date=13 October 2002 |first=Marion |last=Lloyd | journal=[[Boston Globe]] |title=Soviets Close to Using A-Bomb in 1962 Crisis, Forum is Told |access-date=7 August 2012 |pages=A20}}</ref>
* All leaders with launch capability seem to care about the survival of their citizens. [[Winston Churchill]] is quoted as saying that any strategy will not "cover the case of lunatics or dictators in the mood of [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] when he found himself in his final dugout."<ref>Cited in Wolfgang Panofsky, "The Mutual-Hostage Relations between America and Russia," ''Foreign Affairs'', 52/1, (October 1973): p 118.</ref>

==== Inability to defend ====
* No [[fallout shelter]] networks of sufficient capacity to protect large segments of the population and/or industry.
* No development of anti-missile technology or deployment of remedial protective gear.

==== Inherent instability ====
Another reason is that deterrence has an inherent instability. As Kenneth Boulding said: "If deterrence were really stable... it would cease to deter." If decision-makers were perfectly rational, they would never order the largescale use of nuclear weapons, and the credibility of the nuclear threat would be low.

However, that apparent perfect rationality criticism is countered and so is consistent with current deterrence policy. In ''[[Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence]]'', the authors detail an explicit advocation of ambiguity regarding "what is permitted" for other nations and its endorsement of "irrationality" or, more precisely, the perception thereof as an important tool in deterrence and foreign policy. The document claims that the capacity of the United States, in exercising deterrence, would be hurt by portraying US leaders as fully rational and cool-headed:

{{blockquote|The fact that some elements may appear to be potentially 'out of control' can be beneficial to creating and reinforcing fears and doubts in the minds of an adversary's decision makers. This essential sense of fear is the working force of deterrence. That the U.S. may become irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be part of the national persona we project to all adversaries.}}

==== Terrorism ====
*The threat of [[Nuclear terrorism|foreign and domestic nuclear terrorism]] has been a criticism of MAD as a defensive strategy. Deterrent strategies are ineffective against those who attack without regard for their life.<ref name=":1" /> Furthermore, the doctrine of MAD has been critiqued in regard to terrorism and asymmetrical warfare. Critics contend that a retaliatory strike would not be possible in this case because of the decentralization of terrorist organizations, which may be operating in several countries and dispersed among civilian populations. A misguided retaliatory strike made by the targeted nation could even advance terrorist goals in that a contentious retaliatory strike could drive support for the terrorist cause that instigated the nuclear exchange.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Fischhoff|first1=Baruch|last2=Atran|first2=Scott|last3=Sageman|first3=Marc|date=2008|title=Mutually Assured Support: A Security Doctrine for Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Threats|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40375782|journal=The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|volume=618|pages=160–167|doi=10.1177/0002716208317247|jstor=40375782|s2cid=146145387|issn=0002-7162|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

However [[Robert Gallucci]], the president of the [[John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation]], argues that although traditional deterrence is not an effective approach toward terrorist groups bent on causing a nuclear catastrophe, "the United States should instead consider a policy of expanded deterrence, which focuses not solely on the would-be nuclear terrorists but on those states that may deliberately transfer or inadvertently lead nuclear weapons and materials to them. By threatening retaliation against those states, the United States may be able to deter that which it cannot physically prevent."<ref>{{cite journal|last=Gallucci|first=Robert|title=Averting Nuclear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme Responses to U.S. Vulnerability|journal=Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|date=September 2006|volume= 607|pages=51–58|doi=10.1177/0002716206290457|s2cid=68857650}}</ref>

[[Graham Allison]] makes a similar case and argues that the key to expanded deterrence is coming up with ways of tracing nuclear material to the country that forged the fissile material: "After a nuclear bomb detonates, [[nuclear forensics|nuclear forensic]] cops would collect debris samples and send them to a laboratory for radiological analysis. By identifying unique attributes of the fissile material, including its impurities and contaminants, one could trace the path back to its origin."<ref name=":0a">{{cite news|last=Allison|first=Graham|title=How to Keep the Bomb From Terrorists|url=http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/03/13/how-to-keep-the-bomb-from-terrorists.html|accessdate=28 January 2013|newspaper=Newsweek|date=13 March 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130513111324/http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/03/13/how-to-keep-the-bomb-from-terrorists.html|archive-date=13 May 2013|url-status=dead}}</ref> The process is analogous to identifying a criminal by fingerprints: "The goal would be twofold: first, to deter leaders of nuclear states from selling weapons to terrorists by holding them accountable for any use of their own weapons; second, to give leaders every incentive to tightly secure their nuclear weapons and materials."<ref name=":0a" />

==== Space weapons ====
* Strategic analysts have criticized the doctrine of MAD for its inability to respond to the proliferation of space weaponry. First, military space systems have unequal dependence across countries. This means that less-dependent countries may find it beneficial to attack a more-dependent country's space weapons, which complicates deterrence. This is especially true for countries like North Korea which have extensive ballistic missiles that could strike space-based systems.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Finch|first1=James P.|last2=Steene|first2=Shawn|date=2011|title=Finding Space in Deterrence: Toward a General Framework for "Space Deterrence"|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26270535|journal=Strategic Studies Quarterly|volume=5|issue=4|pages=10–17|doi=|jstor=26270535|issn=1936-1815}}</ref>  Even across countries with similar dependence, anti-satellite weapons ([[Anti-satellite weapon|ASATs]]) have the ability to remove the command and control of nuclear weapons.{{Citation needed|date=January 2023}} This encourages crisis-instability and pre-emptive nuclear-disabling strikes. Third, there is a risk of asymmetrical challengers.  Countries that fall behind in space weapon advancement may turn to using chemical or biological weapons. This may heighten the risk of escalation, bypassing any deterrent effects of nuclear weapons.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Dorn|first=Bryan|date=2005|title=THE WEAPONISATION OF SPACE: justification and consequences|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/45235390|journal=New Zealand International Review|volume=30|issue=3|pages=2–5|jstor=45235390|issn=0110-0262}}</ref>

==== Entanglements ====
* Cold-war bipolarity no longer is applicable to the global power balance. The complex modern alliance system makes allies and enemies tied to one another. Thus, action by one country to deter another could threaten the safety of a third country. "Security trilemmas" could increase tension during mundane acts of cooperation, complicating MAD.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Talbot|first=Brent J.|date=2020|title=Getting Deterrence Right: The Case for Stratified Deterrence|journal=Journal of Strategic Security|volume=13|issue=1|pages=26–40|doi=10.5038/1944-0472.13.1.1748|jstor=26907411|s2cid=216198899|issn=1944-0464|doi-access=free}}</ref>

==== Emerging hypersonic weapons ====
* Hypersonic ballistic or cruise missiles threaten the retaliatory backbone of mutual assured destruction. The high precision and speed of these weapons may allow for the development of "decapitory" strikes that remove the ability of another nation to have a nuclear response. In addition, the secretive nature of these weapons' development can make deterrence more asymmetrical.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ekmektsioglou|first=Eleni|date=2015|title=Hypersonic Weapons and Escalation Control in East Asia|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26271074|journal=Strategic Studies Quarterly|volume=9|issue=2|pages=43–68|jstor=26271074|issn=1936-1815}}</ref>

==== Failure to retaliate ====
* If it was known that a country's leader would not resort to nuclear retaliation, adversaries may be emboldened. [[Edward Teller]], a member of the Manhattan Project, echoed these concerns as early as 1985 when he said that "The MAD policy as a deterrent is totally ineffective if it becomes known that in case of attack, we would not retaliate against the aggressor."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Teller|first=Edward|date=1985|title=Defense as a Deterrent of War|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/42762238|journal=Harvard International Review|volume=7|issue=4|pages=11–13|jstor=42762238|issn=0739-1854}}</ref>

==See also==
{{div col|colwidth=20em}}
* {{annotated link|Balance of terror}}
* {{annotated link|Counterforce}}
* {{annotated link|Crab mentality}}
* {{annotated link|Deterrence theory}}
* {{annotated link|Game theory}}
* {{annotated link|Lam chau (doctrine)}}
* {{annotated link|Letters of last resort}}
* {{annotated link|Minimum deterrence}}
** {{annotated link|Minimum Credible Deterrence}}
* {{annotated link|Nuclear holocaust}}
* {{annotated link|Nuclear strategy}}
* {{annotated link|Nuclear taboo}}
* {{annotated link|Nuclear weapons debate}}
* {{annotated link|Pax Atomica}}
* {{annotated link|Peace through strength}}
* {{annotated link|Pyrrhic victory}}
* {{annotated link|Rational choice theory}}
* {{annotated link|Samson Option}}
* {{annotated link|Stability–instability paradox}}
* {{annotated link|Second strike}}
{{div col end}}

==References==
{{reflist}}

==External links==
{{commons category|Nuclear Deterrence}}
{{Wikiquote}}
{{Library resources box}}
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20070405120649/http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85204-p0/keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/the-rise-of-u-s-nuclear-primacy.html "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy" from Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20130515020745/http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/552552 First Strike and Mutual Deterrence] from the [http://www.library.georgetown.edu/digital/krogh Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20040902085658/http://trace.ntu.ac.uk/frame2/articles/borg/kahn.html Herman Kahn's Doomsday Machine]
*[http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Deterrence.shtml Robert McNamara's "Mutual Deterrence" speech from 1967]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20080527074314/http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=585 Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction]
*[http://www.armscontrolcenter.org Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20070711015743/http://www.clw.org/ Council for a Livable World]
*[http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategy-mutual-assured-destruction.htm Nuclear Files.org] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180103001128/http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategy-mutual-assured-destruction.htm |date=2018-01-03 }} Mutual Assured Destruction
*John G. Hines et al. ''[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv//nukevault/ebb285/ Soviet Intentions 1965–1985]''. [[Braddock Dunn & McDonald|BDM]], 1995.

{{Cold War}}
{{Doomsday}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Mutual Assured Destruction}}
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