View source for Niger uranium forgeries

{{Short description|Forged documents in the Iraq disarmament crisis}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=May 2016}}
{{Chronological|reason=A number of sections are place out of order by date and it is somewhat confusing when attempting to sort them.  The first 'doubt' section, "Initial doubts", lacks a direct date, but used the words " Days before the Iraq invasion" to place it around 2003.  The second section, "US doubts", lists a date of February 2002 despite being later down the page than the "Initial doubts" section and the section directly before it, "European and French intelligence reports" using the date of 28 June 2004.  The third, "CIA doubts" uses a date of October 2002 despite being after "Initial doubts" and "European and French intelligence reports".  The fourth, "More doubts" is dated January 2006 while the section that follows it, "Statements by Wilson" is dated July 2003".|date=February 2024}}
[[File:Niger w2 locator.svg|thumb|Location of [[Niger]] in Africa]]
The '''Niger uranium forgeries''' were forged documents initially released in 2001 by [[SISMI]] (the former military intelligence agency of Italy), which seem to depict an attempt made by [[Saddam Hussein]] in [[Iraq]] to purchase [[yellowcake uranium]] powder from [[Niger]] during the [[Iraq disarmament crisis]]. On the basis of these documents and other indicators, the governments of the [[Federal government of the United States|United States]] and the [[Government of the United Kingdom|United Kingdom]] asserted that Iraq violated [[United Nations]] [[sanctions against Iraq]] by attempting to procure nuclear material for the purpose of creating [[weapons of mass destruction]].

== Abbreviated timetable ==
The first report of these documents was in a [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA) Senior Executive Intelligence brief dated 18 October 2001, entitled: "Iraq: Nuclear Related Procurement Efforts". This information was not considered to be certain and not much was done to promote this claim right away.{{citation needed|date=November 2023}}

These documents were sent to the CIA office in [[Rome]] by [[SISMI]].

On 10 May 2002, the CIA's Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis (NESA) in the [[Central Intelligence Agency#Directorate of Analysis|Directorate of Intelligence]] (DI) prepared a Principals Committee briefing book updating the status of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. The document noted that a "foreign government service says Iraq was trying to acquire 500 tons of uranium from Niger".

On 22 July 2002, the [[United States Department of Energy]] (DOE) published an intelligence product ("Daily Intelligence Highlight, Nuclear Reconstitution Efforts Underway?") which highlighted the intelligence on the Iraq-Niger uranium deal as one of three indications that Iraq might be reconstituting its nuclear program.<ref name="Intelligence">{{cite book|author=United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence|title=Report on the Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 9, 2004, Ordered Reported on July 7, 2004|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FhxVroTCvuQC&pg=PA48|publisher=Government Printing Office|pages=48–|id=GGKEY:ZQL5FY25BSB}}</ref>

=== Second and third dissemination ===
{{unreferenced section|date=March 2017}}
There was a second and third dissemination of these forged documents to the United States by SISMI in early September 2002. One source was a suspicious "ex-agent" of SISMI who occasionally worked on and off for them, who was selling the documents.

[[File:Yellowcake (03010301).jpg|thumb|[[Yellowcake]] powder]]
Far more officially, [[Nicolò Pollari]], chief of SISMI, brought the Niger yellowcake story directly to the [[Executive Office of the President of the United States|White House]], meeting secretly in Washington on 9 September 2002, with then–[[Deputy National Security Advisor]] [[Stephen Hadley]]. In that month, the claims of Saddam trying to buy yellowcake uranium from Niger became much stronger. In September 2002, the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] (DIA) published an intelligence assessment ("Defense Intelligence Assessment, Iraq's Reemerging Nuclear Program") which outlined Iraq's recent efforts to rebuild its nuclear program including uranium acquisition. On this issue, the assessment said "Iraq has been vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake."

On 11 September 2002, [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]] (NSC) staff contacted the CIA to clear language for possible use by President Bush. The language cleared by the CIA said, "Iraq has made several attempts to buy high strength aluminum tubes used in centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. And we also know this: within the past few years, Iraq has resumed efforts to obtain large quantities of a type of uranium oxide known as yellowcake, which is an essential ingredient of this process."

In October 2002 the Intelligence Community (IC) produced a [[Classified information|classified]], 90-page [[National Intelligence Estimate]] (NIE) on Iraq's WMD programmes which cited reports that Iraq began "vigorously trying to procure" more uranium from Niger, as well as Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Yellowcake and Niger were not specifically mentioned in this speech. There are many reports of a struggle about this, saying the Niger uranium claims were initially in this Cincinnati speech but taken out by the insistence of the [[Director of Central Intelligence|CIA Director]] [[George Tenet]].

== Iraq and WMD ==
In late 2002, the [[Presidency of George W. Bush|Bush administration]]  began soliciting support for war in Iraq using the political slogan "[[coalition of the willing]]" to refer to what later became the [[Multinational Force – Iraq]]. To back up its claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, that administration referred to intelligence from Italy, Britain, and France detailing interactions between [[Saddam Hussein]] and the governments of Niger, [[Somalia]], and the [[Democratic Republic of Congo]]. Specifically, CIA director [[George Tenet]] and [[United States Secretary of State]] [[Colin Powell]] both cited attempts by Hussein to obtain uranium from Niger in their September testimony before the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]]. At that time, using information derived from the same source, the UK government also publicly reported an attempted purchase from an (unnamed) "African country". In December, the [[United States Department of State]] issued a fact sheet listing the alleged Niger yellowcake affair in a report entitled "Illustrative Examples of Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council".<ref>{{cite press release
|publisher=Department of State
|date=19 December 2002
|title=Illustrative Examples of Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council
|url=http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/16118.htm
|access-date=23 April 2009
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090414034303/http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/16118.htm
|archive-date=14 April 2009
|url-status=live
|df=dmy-all
}}</ref>

== Initial doubts ==
The classified documents detailing an Iraqi approach to purchase yellowcake [[uranium]] from Niger were considered dubious by some analysts in US intelligence, according to news accounts.  Days before the Iraq invasion, the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] (IAEA) voiced serious doubt on the authenticity of the documents to the [[UN Security Council]], judging them counterfeit.<ref name="Ensor 2003">{{cite web | last=Ensor | first=David | title=Fake Iraq documents 'embarrassing' for U.S. | website=CNN | date=2003-03-14 | url=http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/14/sprj.irq.documents/ | access-date=2018-02-23 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061028145936/http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/14/sprj.irq.documents/ | archive-date=28 October 2006 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref>

== "Sixteen Words" controversy in 2003 State of the Union ==
In his [[2003 State of the Union Address|January 2003 State of the Union speech]], U.S. President George W. Bush said, "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."<ref>{{cite press release
|publisher=The White House
|date=28 January 2003
|title=President Delivers 'State of the Union'
|url=https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/print/20030128-19.html
|access-date=6 September 2017
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170711182333/https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/print/20030128-19.html
|archive-date=11 July 2017
|url-status=live
|df=dmy-all
}}</ref> This single sentence is now known as "the ''Sixteen Words''".<ref>{{cite news
|url=http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/07/20/sprj.irq.wmd.investigation/
|work=CNN |title=Bush's 16 Words Still Hotly Debated
|date=25 December 2003
|access-date=7 July 2008
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080726064431/http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/07/20/sprj.irq.wmd.investigation/
|archive-date=26 July 2008
|url-status=live
|df=dmy-all
}}</ref>
The administration later conceded that evidence in support of the claim was inconclusive and stated, "These sixteen words should never have been included." The administration attributed the error to the CIA.<ref name="TenetError">{{cite news
|url=http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/07/11/sprj.irq.wmdspeech/
|first1=Jamie |last1=McIntyre |first2=David |last2=Ensor
|title=Tenet admits error in approving Bush speech
|date=25 December 2003
|access-date=7 July 2008
|work=CNN
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080515194058/http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/07/11/sprj.irq.wmdspeech/
|archive-date=15 May 2008
|url-status=live
|df=dmy-all
}}</ref> In mid-2003, the US government declassified the 2002 [[National Intelligence Estimate]], which contained a dissenting opinion published by the US Department of State stating that the intelligence connecting Niger to Saddam Hussein was "highly suspect", primarily because State Department's intelligence agency analysts did not believe that Niger would be likely to engage in such a transaction due to a French consortium which maintained close control over the Nigerien uranium industry.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/2004_rpt/iraq-wmd-intell_chapter2.htm/ |title=Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080815055753/http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/2004_rpt/iraq-wmd-intell_chapter2.htm |archive-date=15 August 2008 |author=Senate Select Committee on Intelligence |year=2004}}</ref>

According to ''[[The Washington Post]]'', when occupying troops found no evidence of a current nuclear program, the statement and how it came to be in the speech became a focus for critics in Washington and foreign capitals to press the case that the White House manipulated facts to take the United States to war. The ''Post'' reported, "Dozens of interviews with current and former intelligence officials and policymakers in the United States, Britain, France and Italy show that the Bush administration disregarded key information available at the time showing that the Iraq–Niger claim was highly questionable."<ref>{{cite news |last=Eisner |first=Peter |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/02/AR2007040201777_pf.html/ |title=How Bogus Letter Became a Case for War |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171206064656/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/02/AR2007040201777_pf.html |archive-date=6 December 2017 |work=The Washington Post |date=3 April 2007}}</ref> With the release of the 2002 NIE report, the Bush administration was criticized for including the statement in the State of the Union despite CIA and State Department reports questioning its veracity.{{citation needed|date=December 2024}}

== European and French intelligence reports ==
The front page of the 28 June 2004 ''[[Financial Times]]'' carried a report from their national security correspondent, Mark Huband, describing that between 1999 and 2001, three unnamed European intelligence services were aware that Niger was possibly engaged in illicit negotiations over the export of its uranium ore with [[North Korea]], [[Libya]], Iraq, [[Iran]], and [[China]].<ref>{{Citation
|last = Huband
|first = Mark
|title = European Intelligence Suggests Iraq Sought Uranium in Niger
|newspaper = The Financial Times
|date = 28 June 2004
|url = http://search.ft.com/searchArticle?id=040628000877
}} {{dead link|date=May 2010}}</ref> "The same information was passed to the US" but American officials decided not to include it in their assessment, Huband added in a follow-up report.<ref>{{Citation
 |last       = Huband
 |first      = Mark
 |title      = Inquiry will confirm that Iraq sought uranium
 |newspaper  = The Financial Times
 |date       = 7 July 2004
 |url        = https://www.ft.com/content/92d94ba6-24e4-11d8-81c6-08209b00dd01
 |archive-url = https://archive.today/20130123130413/http://www.ft.com/cms/s/92d94ba6-24e4-11d8-81c6-08209b00dd01,id=040707006455,print=yes.html
 |url-status = dead
 |archive-date = 23 January 2013
 }}</ref>

French intelligence informed the United States a year before President Bush's State of the Union address that the allegation could not be supported with hard evidence.<ref>{{Citation
|last = Drogin
|first = Bob
|title = Niger Uranium Rumors Wouldn't Die
|newspaper = The Los Angeles Times
|date = 17 February 2006
|url = https://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/latimes/access/988523441.html?dids=988523441:988523441&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&type=current&date=Feb+17%2C+2006&author=Bob+Drogin+And+Tom+Hamburger&pub=%5BHOME+EDITION%5D%3B+Los+Angeles+Times&edition=&startpage=A.1&desc=The+Nation
|access-date = 7 July 2017
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20121108065911/http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/latimes/access/988523441.html?dids=988523441:988523441&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&type=current&date=Feb+17%2C+2006&author=Bob+Drogin+And+Tom+Hamburger&pub=%5BHOME+EDITION%5D%3B+Los+Angeles+Times&edition=&startpage=A.1&desc=The+Nation
|archive-date = 8 November 2012
|url-status = dead
|df = dmy-all
}}</ref>

''[[The Sunday Times]]'' dated 1 August 2004 contains an interview with an Italian source describing his role in the forgeries. The source said he was sorry to have played a role in passing along false intelligence.<ref name="ItalianFakes">{{Citation
|last = Rufford
|first = Nicholas
|title = Italian spies 'faked documents' on Saddam nuclear purchase
|newspaper = The Sunday Times of London
|date = 1 August 2004
|url = http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,2763-1198188,00.html
|access-date = 22 September 2004
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20051205095043/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,2763-1198188,00.html
|archive-date = 5 December 2005
|url-status = dead
|df = dmy-all
}}</ref>

Although the claims made in the British intelligence report regarding Iraq's interest in yellowcake ore from Niger were never withdrawn, the CIA and Department of State could not verify them and are said to have thought the claims were "highly dubious".<ref>{{Citation
|last = Duffy
|first = Michael
|title = A Question of Trust
|newspaper = Time Magazine
|date = 21 July 2003
|url = http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1005234-3,00.html
|access-date = 28 September 2006
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070930081715/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1005234-3,00.html
|archive-date = 30 September 2007
|url-status = dead
|df = dmy-all
}}</ref>

== US doubts ==
Previously, in February 2002, three different American officials had made efforts to verify the reports.  The deputy commander of US Armed Forces Europe, Marine General [[Carlton W. Fulford, Jr.]], went to Niger and met with the country's president, [[Tandja Mamadou]].  He concluded that, given the controls on Niger's uranium supply, there was little chance any of it could have been diverted to Iraq.  His report was sent to the Chairman of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], Gen. [[Richard Myers]].  The US Ambassador to Niger, [[Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick]], was also present at the meeting and sent similar conclusions to the State Department.<ref name="globalsecurity.org">[http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/2004_rpt/iraq-wmd-intell_chapter2-b.htm "Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110319070127/http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/2004_rpt/iraq-wmd-intell_chapter2-b.htm |date=19 March 2011 }}, Chapter 2-B, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2004.</ref> CNN reported on 14 March 2003 (before invasion) that the International Atomic Energy Agency found the documents to be forged.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/14/sprj.irq.documents/index.html|title=CNN.com – Fake Iraq documents 'embarrassing' for U.S. - Mar. 14, 2003|first=David Ensor CNN Washington|last=Bureau|website=[[CNN]]|access-date=16 November 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090927013535/http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/14/sprj.irq.documents/index.html|archive-date=27 September 2009|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

== Wilson and Niger ==
[[File:니제르 우라늄광산 (1451).jpeg|thumb|Aerial view of a [[uranium]] mine in Niger]]
In late February 2002, the CIA sent Ambassador [[Joseph C. Wilson|Joseph Wilson]] to investigate the claims himself.  Wilson had been posted to Niger 14 years earlier, and throughout a diplomatic career in Africa he had built up a large network of contacts in Niger.  Wilson interviewed former prime minister of Niger, [[Ibrahim Assane Mayaki]], who reported that he knew of no attempted sales to Iraq. Mayaki did however recall that in June 1999 an Iraqi delegation had expressed interest in "expanding commercial relations", which he had interpreted to mean yellowcake sales.<ref>{{cite news
|last = Schmidt
|first = Susan
|title = Plame's Input Is Cited on Niger Mission
|newspaper = [[The Washington Post]]
|date = 10 July 2004
|url = https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39834-2004Jul9.html?
|access-date = 6 September 2017
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20171006115044/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39834-2004Jul9.html
|archive-date = 6 October 2017
|url-status = live
|df = dmy-all
}}</ref>
Ultimately, Wilson concluded that there was no way that production at the uranium mines could be ramped up or that the excess uranium could have been exported without it being immediately obvious to many people both in the private sector and in the government of Niger. He returned home and told the CIA that the reports were "unequivocally wrong".<ref>{{cite news
|last = Kristof
|first = Nicholas D.
|title = Missing in Action: Truth
|newspaper = [[The New York Times]]
|date = 6 May 2003
|url = https://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/06/opinion/06KRIS.html?pagewanted=print
|access-date = 19 February 2017
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160723183354/http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/06/opinion/06KRIS.html?pagewanted=print
|archive-date = 23 July 2016
|url-status = live
|df = dmy-all
}}</ref> The CIA retained this information in its Counter Proliferation Department and it was not passed up to the CIA Director, according to the unanimous findings of the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee's July 2004 report.

=== Criticism ===
Former Ambassador Wilson had claimed that he found no evidence of Saddam Hussein ever attempting or buying yellowcake uranium from Niger on his trip to Niger.<ref name="WilsonAfrica">{{cite news
|last = Wilson
|first = Joseph
|title = What I Didn't Find in Africa
|newspaper = The New York Times
|date = 6 July 2003
|url = https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/06/opinion/what-i-didn-t-find-in-africa.html?pagewanted=all
|access-date = 19 February 2017
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20161202204325/http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/06/opinion/what-i-didn-t-find-in-africa.html?pagewanted=all
|archive-date = 2 December 2016
|url-status = live
|df = dmy-all
}}</ref>

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence suggested that the evidence Wilson found could be interpreted differently:

{{blockquote|[Wilson's] intelligence report indicated that former Nigerien Prime Minister Ibrahim Mayaki was unaware of any contracts that had been signed between Niger and any rogue states for the sale of yellowcake while he was Prime Minister (1997–1999) or Foreign Minister (1996–1997). Mayaki said that if there had been any such contract during his tenure, he would have been aware of it. Mayaki said, however, that in June 1999, (REDACTED) businessman, approached him and insisted that Mayaki meet with an Iraqi delegation to discuss "expanding commercial relations" between Niger and Iraq. The intelligence report said that Mayaki interpreted 'expanding commercial relations' to mean that the delegation wanted to discuss uranium yellowcake sales. The intelligence report also said that "although the meeting took place, Mayaki let the matter drop due to the UN sanctions on Iraq".<ref name="globalsecurity.org" />}}

Wilson has responded to criticism by observing that uranium was not actually discussed at the 1999 meeting.  On ''Meet the Press'', for example, Wilson stated:

{{blockquote|At that meeting, uranium was not discussed. It would be a tragedy to think that we went to war over a conversation in which uranium was not discussed because the Niger official was sufficiently sophisticated to think that perhaps he might have wanted to discuss uranium at some later date.<ref>{{cite news
|last = Wilson
|first = Joseph
|title = Tim Russert interview with former Ambassador Wilson
|newspaper = Meet the Press Transcript
|publisher = NBC News
|date = May 2, 2004
|url = https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna4880116
|access-date = 3 February 2007
|df = dmy-all
}}</ref>}}

==Panorama article==
[[:it:Carlo Rossella|Carlo Rossella]], the editor of ''[[Panorama (magazine)|Panorama]]'', published the documents during the third week of September 2002 and passed them to the American embassy in Rome in October 2002.<ref>{{cite news |last=Luttazzi |first=Daniele |author-link=Daniele Luttazzi |url=http://www.danieleluttazzi.it/?q=node%2F221 |title=Interviste random 2 |trans-title=Random Interviews 2 |language=it |work=[[:it:Rolling Stone|Rolling Stone]] |via=danieleluttazzi.it |date=November 2004 |access-date=September 7, 2021 |archive-date=October 12, 2006 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061012014206/http://www.danieleluttazzi.it/?q=node%2F221 |quote=See ''Intervista a Rolling Stone (novembre 2004)'' or Rolling Stone interview (November 2004).}}</ref>

== CIA doubts ==
In early October 2002, [[George Tenet]] called Deputy National Security Adviser [[Stephen Hadley]] to ask  him to remove reference to the Niger uranium from a speech Bush was to give in [[Cincinnati]] on 7 October. This was followed up by a memo asking Hadley to remove another, similar line. Another memo was sent to the White House expressing the CIA's view that the Niger claims were false; this memo was given to both Hadley and National Security Adviser [[Condoleezza Rice]].<ref>{{Citation
|last = Noah
|first = Timothy
|title = Cheney Wraps His Glutes in the Flag
|publisher = Slate.com
|date = 24 July 2003
|url = http://www.slate.com/id/2086029/
|access-date = 27 June 2011
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110124213451/http://www.slate.com/id/2086029/
|archive-date = 24 January 2011
|url-status = live
|df = dmy-all
}}</ref><ref>{{Citation
 |last        = Waxman
 |first       = Henry A.
 |title       = Memorandum to Members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Re: The President's Claim that Iraq Sought Uranium from Niger
 |publisher   = US Government
 |date        = 18 December 2008
 |url         = http://oversight-archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/20081218120632.pdf
 |url-status     = dead
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20110506024239/http://oversight-archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/20081218120632.pdf
 |archive-date = 6 May 2011
 |df          = dmy-all
}}</ref><ref>{{Citation
|last = The Public Record Staff
|title = Gonzales, Rice Lied to Congress About Niger Intelligence
|publisher = The Public Record
|date = 18 December 2008
|url = http://pubrecord.org/politics/1000/gonzales-rice-lied-to-congress-about-niger-intelligence/
|access-date = 13 July 2011
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20111008205432/http://pubrecord.org/politics/1000/gonzales-rice-lied-to-congress-about-niger-intelligence/
|archive-date = 8 October 2011
|url-status = live
|df = dmy-all
}}</ref>

== Wilson and Plame ==
{{Main|Plame affair}}

Retired ambassador [[Joseph C. Wilson]] wrote a critical [[op-ed]] in ''[[The New York Times]]'' in which he explained the nature of the documents and the government's prior knowledge of their unreliability for use in a case for war.  Shortly after Wilson's op-ed, in a column by [[Robert Novak]], in pondering why a State Department employee was dispatched rather than a trained CIA agent, the identity of Wilson's wife, CIA analyst [[Valerie Plame]], was revealed.  The [[Senate Intelligence Committee]] report and other sources confirm that Plame "offered his name up" to her superiors.

== IAEA analysis ==
Further, in March 2003, the Director General of the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] (IAEA) released results of his analysis of the documents. Reportedly, it took IAEA officials only a matter of hours to determine that these documents were fake. IAEA experts discovered indications of a crude forgery, such as the use of incorrect names of Nigerien officials. As a result, the IAEA reported to the U.N. Security Council that the documents were "in fact not authentic". The UN spokesman wrote:

{{blockquote|The I.A.E.A. was able to review correspondence coming from various bodies of the government of Niger and to compare the form, format, contents and signature of that correspondence with those of the alleged procurement-related documentation. Based on thorough analysis, the I.A.E.A. has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents, which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transaction between Iraq and Niger, are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded.<ref>[http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/07/sprj.irq.un.transcript.elbaradei/ Transcript of IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei's presentation to the U.N. Security Council] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060420060144/http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/07/sprj.irq.un.transcript.elbaradei/ |date=20 April 2006 }}, March 7, 2003, CNN.com</ref>}}

== British inquiries ==

=== Foreign Affairs Committee ===
The first British investigation into this matter was conducted by the [[House of Commons of the United Kingdom|House of Commons]] [[Foreign Affairs Select Committee]] (FAC).<ref>Announcement of New Inquiry. [http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/foreign_affairs_committee/fac_pn_23__02_03_.cfm The Decision to go to War in Iraq] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061018080456/http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/foreign_affairs_committee/fac_pn_23__02_03_.cfm |date=18 October 2006 }} FAC. 3 June 2003.</ref> The committee comprises fourteen [[Members of Parliament]] from government and opposition parties, and has permanent cross-party support.<ref>[http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/foreign_affairs_committee/fac_remit.cfm About the Foreign Affairs Committee] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090805205509/http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/foreign_affairs_committee/fac_remit.cfm |date=5 August 2009 }} parliament.uk</ref> They examined and tested several key claims in the [[September Dossier]], ''Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government'', including the topic of uranium acquisition.

In June and July, British [[Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs|Foreign Secretary]] [[Jack Straw]] testified that the claim in the dossier rested on separate evidence to the fraudulent documents, and that this specific intelligence, obtained from a foreign government, was still under review and had not been shared with the CIA.<ref>[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3061665.stm Iraq uranium claim sows confusion] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040604174446/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3061665.stm |date=4 June 2004 }} BBC. 12 July 2003.</ref> In written evidence to the same committee, Straw further disclosed that the separate intelligence information upon which the British Government had based its conclusion, was also briefed to the IAEA by a foreign intelligence service that owned the reporting, shortly before IAEA Director General Dr. [[Mohamed ElBaradei]]'s statement to the UN Security Council on 7 March 2003.<ref>[https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/813/813we35.htm Iraqi Attempts To Procure Uranium] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131102041250/http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/813/813we35.htm |date=2 November 2013 }} FAC. July 2003.</ref><ref>Statements of the Director General to the United Nations Security Council. [http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n006.shtml The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060903185204/http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n006.shtml |date=3 September 2006 }} IAEA. 7 March 2003.</ref> This was further confirmed in a parliamentary answer to [[Lynne Jones]] MP.<ref>[https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040130/text/40130w14.htm#40130w14.html_wqn3 Foreign And Commonwealth Affairs] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131102060132/http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040130/text/40130w14.htm#40130w14.html_wqn3 |date=2 November 2013 }} 30 January 2004</ref> Lynne Jones subsequently contacted the IAEA to question whether a third party had discussed or shared separate intelligence with them and, if so, what assessment they made of it. IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky responded to Jones in May 2004:

<blockquote>I can confirm to you that we have received information from a number of member states regarding the allegation that Iraq sought to acquire uranium from Niger. However, we have learned nothing which would cause us to change the conclusion we reported to the United Nations Security Council on March 7, 2003 with regards to the documents assessed to be forgeries and have not received any information that would appear to be based on anything other than those documents.<ref>[http://www.lynnejones.org.uk/uranium.htm The 'uranium from Africa' claim] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080821102550/http://www.lynnejones.org.uk/uranium.htm |date=21 August 2008 }} Lynnejones.org.uk</ref></blockquote>

After talking with numerous witnesses and considering much evidence, the committee judged the evidence that Iraq was trying to procure uranium was not sufficiently strong enough to justify absolute terms.

<blockquote>We conclude that it is very odd indeed that the Government asserts that it was not relying on the evidence which has since been shown to have been forged, but that eight months later it is still reviewing the other evidence. The assertion "... that Iraq sought the supply of significant amounts of uranium from Africa ..." should have been qualified to reflect the uncertainty.<ref>Ninth Report of Session 2002-03. "[https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/813/813.pdf The Decision to go to War in Iraq] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080807165529/http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/813/813.pdf |date=7 August 2008 }}", FAC. 3 July 2003</ref></blockquote>

=== Butler Committee ===

The [[Butler Review|Butler Committee]], appointed by then Prime Minister [[Tony Blair]], concluded that the report Saddam's government was seeking uranium in Africa appeared "well-founded":

{{blockquote|{{ordered list|type=lower-alpha
| It is accepted by all parties that Iraqi officials visited Niger in 1999.

| The British government had intelligence from several different sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium. Since uranium constitutes almost three-quarters of Niger's exports, the intelligence was credible.

| The evidence was not conclusive that Iraq actually purchased, as opposed to having sought, uranium, and the British government did not claim this.

| The forged documents were not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery does not undermine it.<ref>{{cite report |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_07_04_butler.pdf |title=Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110218180454/http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_07_04_butler.pdf |archive-date=18 February 2011 |id=HC 898 |location=London |publisher=The Stationery Office |date=14 July 2004 |via=the BBC |at=Section 499, p. 137 for "well-founded"; section 503, p. 139 for points a–d |access-date=2011-09-03}}</ref>}}}}

The review however was itself mired in controversy leading both opposition parties to end their participation and leaving Tony Blair's [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]] as the only party involved with the review.<ref>{{cite news |title=WMD committee vows to press on |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3524385.stm |publisher=[[British Broadcasting Corporation]] |date=2 March 2004 |access-date=29 May 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121112051437/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3524385.stm |archive-date=12 November 2012 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref>

== More doubts ==
In January 2006, ''[[The New York Times]]'' revealed the existence of a memo which stated that the suggestion of uranium being sold was "unlikely" because of a host of economic, diplomatic and logistical obstacles. The memo, dated 4 March 2002, was distributed at senior levels by the office of former [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[Colin Powell|Colin L. Powell]] and by the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]].<ref>{{Citation
|last = Lichtblau
|first = Eric
|title = 2002 Memo Doubted Uranium Sale Claim
|newspaper = [[The New York Times]]
|date = 18 January 2006
|url = https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/18/politics/18niger.html?&oref=login&pagewanted=print
|access-date = 19 February 2017
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20130513063159/http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/18/politics/18niger.html?&oref=login&pagewanted=print
|archive-date = 13 May 2013
|url-status = live
|df = dmy-all
}}</ref>

== Statements by Wilson ==
In a July 2003 [[op-ed]], Ambassador Wilson recounted his experiences and stated "I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat".<ref name="WilsonAfrica" />

Wilson told ''[[The Washington Post]]'' anonymously in June 2003 that he had concluded that the intelligence about the Niger uranium was based on the forged documents because "the dates were wrong and the names were wrong." However, the relevant papers were not in CIA hands until eight months after Wilson made his trip. Wilson had to backtrack and said he may have "misspoken" on this.<ref name="WilsonMisspoke">{{Citation
|last = Milbank
|first = Dana
|title = Husband (Wilson) Is Conspicuous in Leak Case
|newspaper = The Washington Post
|date = 25 October 2005
|url = https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/24/AR2005102401690_pf.html
|access-date = 6 September 2017
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170512023943/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/24/AR2005102401690_pf.html
|archive-date = 12 May 2017
|url-status = live
|df = dmy-all
}}</ref>
<ref name="SenateReport">{{Citation
|last = Schmidt
|first = Susan
|title = Plame's Input Is Cited on Niger Mission
|newspaper = The Washington Post
|date = 10 July 2004
|url = https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39834-2004Jul9.html
|access-date = 6 September 2017
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20171006115044/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39834-2004Jul9.html
|archive-date = 6 October 2017
|url-status = live
|df = dmy-all
}}</ref>  The Senate intelligence committee, which examined pre-Iraq war intelligence, reported that Wilson "had never seen the CIA reports and had no knowledge of what names and dates were in the reports."<ref name="WilsonMisspoke" /><ref name="SenateReport" />

== Origin of forged documents ==
No one has been convicted of forging the documents.  Various theories have been reported on how they were produced, distributed, and where pressure was applied to keep their fraudulent nature a secret.

=== Funneled through former Italian intelligence agent ===
By late 2003, the trail of the documents had been partially uncovered. They were obtained by a "security consultant" (and former agent of the precursor agency to [[SISMI]], the SID), [[Rocco Martino]], from [[Italy|Italian]] military intelligence (SISMI).<ref>{{cite web
|title = Don't Blame the Italians
|author = Justin Raimondo
|date = 15 November 2005
|url = http://original.antiwar.com/justin/2005/11/14/dont-blame-the-italians/
|access-date = 11 November 2010
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20101104221814/http://original.antiwar.com/justin/2005/11/14/dont-blame-the-italians/
|archive-date = 4 November 2010
|url-status = live
|df = dmy-all
|author-link = Justin Raimondo
}}</ref>
An article in ''[[The Times]]'' ([[London]]) quoted Martino as having received the documents from a woman on the staff of the Niger embassy (located in a tiny apartment in [[Rome]]), after a meeting was arranged by a serving SISMI agent.<ref name="ItalianFakes" /> Martino later recanted and said he had been misquoted, and that SISMI had not facilitated the meeting where he obtained the documents. It was later revealed that Martino had been invited to serve as the conduit for the documents by Col. Antonio Nucera of SISMI, the head of the counterintelligence and WMD proliferations sections of SISMI's Rome operations center.<ref>{{cite web
 |title       = The Italian Connection, Part II
 |author      = Talking Points Memo
 |date        = 1 November 2005
 |url         = http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/006908.php
 |url-status     = dead
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20051105031122/http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/006908.php
 |archive-date = 5 November 2005
 |df          = dmy-all
}}</ref>

Martino, in turn, offered them to Italian journalist [[Elisabetta Burba]]. On instructions from her editor at ''[[Panorama (Italian magazine)|Panorama]]'', Burba offered them to the [[Embassy of the United States, Rome|U.S. Embassy in Rome]] in October 2002.<ref name="ItalianFakes" /> Burba was dissuaded by the editors of the [[Silvio Berlusconi|Berlusconi]]-owned Panorama from investigating the source of the forgeries.

An August 2004 ''[[Financial Times]]'' article indicated French officials may have had a role in the forged documents coming to light. The article states:

{{blockquote|According to senior European officials, in 1999 [Rocco Martino] provided French officials with genuine documents which revealed Iraq may have been planning to expand 'trade' with Niger. This trade was assumed to be in uranium, which is Niger's main export. It was then that Mr Martino first became aware of the value of documents relating to Niger's uranium exports. He was then asked by French officials to provide more information, which led to a flourishing 'market' in documents. He subsequently provided France with more documents, which turned out to have been forged when they were handed to the International Atomic Energy Agency by U.S. diplomats.}}

The ''Times'' article also stated that "French officials have not said whether they know Mr Martino, and are unlikely to either confirm or deny that he is a source".<ref name="FrenchProbe">{{Citation
 |last       = Huband
 |first      = Mark
 |title      = French probe led to 'fake Niger uranium papers'
 |newspaper  = The Financial Times
 |date       = 2 August 2004
 |url        = https://www.ft.com/content/a724ed04-e41f-11d8-9f08-00000e2511c8
 }}{{dead link|date=September 2018 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>

=== Current or former United States Executive Branch employees ===
It is as yet unknown how Italian intelligence came by the documents and why they were not given directly to the US.
According to a 2003 article in ''[[The New Yorker]]'' by [[Seymour Hersh]], the forgery may have been a deliberate entrapment by current and former CIA officers to settle a score against Cheney and other [[neoconservative]]s.  Hersh recounts how a former officer told him that "somebody deliberately let something false get in there."  Hersh continues:

{{blockquote|
He became more forthcoming in subsequent months, eventually saying that a small group of disgruntled retired C.I.A. clandestine operators had banded together in the late summer of last year and drafted the fraudulent documents themselves.

"The agency guys were so pissed at Cheney", the former officer said.  "They said, 'O.K, we're going to put the bite on these guys.{{'"}} My source said that he was first told of the fabrication late last year, at one of the many holiday gatherings in the Washington area of past and present C.I.A. officials. "Everyone was bragging about it—'Here's what we did. It was cool, cool, cool.{{'"}} These retirees, he said, had superb contacts among current officers in the agency and were informed in detail of the sismi intelligence.<ref>{{cite magazine
|last = Hersh
|first = Seymour
|title = Annals of National Security: The Stovepipe
|magazine = The New Yorker
|date = 27 October 2003
|url = http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/10/27/031027fa_fact?printable=true
|access-date = 24 April 2009
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20081022180246/http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/10/27/031027fa_fact?printable=true
|archive-date = 22 October 2008
|url-status = live
|df = dmy-all
}}</ref>}}

In an interview published 7 April 2005, Cannistraro was asked by [[Ian Masters (journalist)|Ian Masters]] what he would say if it were asserted that the source of the forgery was former National Security Council and State Department consultant [[Michael Ledeen]]. (Ledeen had also allegedly been a liaison between the [[United States Intelligence Community]] and SISMI two decades earlier.) Cannistraro answered by saying: "you'd be very close".<ref name="WhoForged">{{cite web
|first=Ian |last=Masters
|title = Who Forged the Niger Documents?
|website = AlterNet
|date = 7 April 2005
|url = http://www.alternet.org/story/21704
|access-date = 8 April 2005
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20050409144556/http://www.alternet.org/story/21704/
|archive-date = 9 April 2005
|url-status = live
|df = dmy-all
}}</ref> Ledeen has denied this in an article which mentions, though, that he has worked for the aforementioned ''Panorama'' magazine.<ref name="LedeenPanorama">{{cite web
|first=Larisa |last=Alexandrovna
|title = American who advised Pentagon says he wrote for magazine that found forged Niger documents
|website = The Raw Story
|date = 17 January 2006
|url = http://rawstory.com/news/2005/American_who_consulted_for_Pentagon_says_0117.html
|access-date = 5 July 2006
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20060805201021/http://rawstory.com/news/2005/American_who_consulted_for_Pentagon_says_0117.html
|archive-date = 5 August 2006
|url-status = dead
|df = dmy-all
}}</ref>

In an interview on 26 July 2005, Cannistraro's business partner and columnist for the ''American Conservative'' magazine, former CIA counter terrorism officer [[Philip Giraldi]], confirmed to [[Scott Horton (radio host)|Scott Horton]] that the forgeries were produced by "a couple of former CIA officers who are familiar with that part of the world who are associated with a certain well-known [[neoconservative]] who has close connections with Italy". When Horton said that must be Ledeen, he confirmed it, and added that the ex-CIA officers "also had some equity interests, shall we say, with the operation. A lot of these people are in consulting positions, and they get various, shall we say, emoluments in overseas accounts, and that kind of thing".<ref>{{cite web
 |title       = Philip Giraldi's Interview
 |website      = The Weekend Interview Show
 |date        = 26 July 2005
 |url         = http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/InterviewDisplay.aspx?i=118
 |url-status     = dead
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20051025235203/http://weekendinterviewshow.com/InterviewDisplay.aspx?i=118
 |archive-date = 25 October 2005
 |df          = dmy-all
}}</ref>

In a second interview with Horton, Giraldi elaborated to say that Ledeen and his former CIA friends worked with [[Ahmad Chalabi]] and the [[Iraqi National Congress]]. "These people did it probably for a couple of reasons, but one of the reasons was that these people were involved, through the neoconservatives, with the Iraqi National Congress and Chalabi and had a financial interest in cranking up the pressure against Saddam Hussein and potentially going to war with him."<ref>{{cite web
 |title       = Philip Giraldi explains why the neocons lied us into war
 |website      = The Weekend Interview Show
 |date        = 3 September 2005
 |url         = http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/InterviewDisplay.aspx?i=128
 |url-status     = dead
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20051025235606/http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/InterviewDisplay.aspx?i=128
 |archive-date = 25 October 2005
 |df          = dmy-all
}}</ref>

=== Current and former Italian intelligence employees ===
The suggestion of a plot by CIA officers is countered by a series of articles<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.repubblica.it/2005/j/sezioni/esteri/iraq69/sismicia/sismicia.html|work=La Repubblica |title=Doppiogiochisti e dilettanti tutti gli italiani del Nigergate|trans-title=Double-crossers and amateurs all the Italians of Nigergate|language=it|access-date=16 November 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170315053405/http://www.repubblica.it/2005/j/sezioni/esteri/iraq69/sismicia/sismicia.html|archive-date=15 March 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> in the Italian newspaper {{lang|it|[[La Repubblica]]}}.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nuralcubicle.blogspot.com/2005/10/berlusconi-behind-fake-yellowcake.html|website=Nur al-Cubicle |title=Berlusconi Behind Fake Yellowcake Dossier|access-date=16 November 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161012130712/http://nuralcubicle.blogspot.com/2005/10/berlusconi-behind-fake-yellowcake.html|archive-date=12 October 2016|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://nuralcubicle.blogspot.com/2005/10/yellowcake-dossier-not-work-of-cia.html|website=Nur al-Cubicle |title=Yellowcake Dossier Not the Work of the CIA|access-date=16 November 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161012130152/http://nuralcubicle.blogspot.com/2005/10/yellowcake-dossier-not-work-of-cia.html|archive-date=12 October 2016|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://nuralcubicle.blogspot.com/2005/10/nigergate-great-nuclear-centrifuge.html|website=Nur al-Cubicle |title=Nigergate: The Great Nuclear Centrifuge Scam|access-date=16 November 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161012130139/http://nuralcubicle.blogspot.com/2005/10/nigergate-great-nuclear-centrifuge.html|archive-date=12 October 2016|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>{{unreliable source?|reason=all these three are an unattributed blog with no authorship information|date=December 2024}} Investigative reporters Carlo Bonini and Giuseppe d'Avanzo report that [[Nicolò Pollari]], chief of Italy's military intelligence service, SISMI, brought the Niger yellowcake story directly to the [[White House]] after his insistent overtures had been rejected by the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] in 2001 and 2002. SISMI had reported to the CIA on 15 October 2001, that Iraq had sought yellowcake in Niger, a report it also plied on British intelligence, creating an echo that the Niger forgeries themselves purported to amplify before they were exposed as a hoax.

Pollari met secretly in Washington on 9 September 2002, with then–Deputy [[National Security Advisor (United States)|National Security Advisor]] [[Stephen Hadley]]. Their secret meeting came at a critical moment in the [[White House]] campaign to convince Congress and the American public that war in Iraq was necessary to prevent [[Saddam Hussein]] from developing nuclear weapons. What may be most significant to American observers, however, is ''La Repubblica'''s allegation that the Italians sent the bogus intelligence about Niger and Iraq not only through traditional allied channels such as the CIA, but seemingly directly into the White House. That direct White House channel amplifies questions about the 16-word reference to the uranium from Africa in President Bush's 2003 State of the Union address—which remained in the speech despite warnings from the CIA and the [[State Department]] that the allegation was not substantiated.<ref name="Ariel2005">{{cite news
 |last=David
 |first=Ariel
 |title=Italian Faces Pre-War Intelligence Probe
 |agency=[[Associated Press]]
 |newspaper=[[The Guardian]]
 |publisher=Guardian News and Media
 |location=London
 |date=25 October 2005
 |access-date=7 June 2013
 |url=https://www.theguardian.com/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-5369408,00.html
 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051028051302/http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0%2C1280%2C-5369408%2C00.html
 |archive-date=28 October 2005
 |url-status=dead
}}</ref><ref>{{Citation
|last = Rozen
|first = Laura
|title = La Repubblica's Scoop, Confirmed
|newspaper = [[The American Prospect]]
|date = 25 October 2005
|url = http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=10506
|access-date = 28 October 2005
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20051027201402/http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=10506
|archive-date = 27 October 2005
|url-status = dead
|df = dmy-all
}}</ref>

== Aftermath ==
In March 2003, [[United States Senate|Senator]] [[Jay Rockefeller]], vice-chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, agreed not to open a congressional investigation of the matter, but rather asked the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] (FBI) to conduct the investigation.<ref name="The New Yorker 2003">{{cite magazine | title=Who Lied to Whom? | magazine=The New Yorker | date=2003-03-24 | url=https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/03/31/who-lied-to-whom | access-date=2018-02-23 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180224113118/https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/03/31/who-lied-to-whom | archive-date=24 February 2018 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref>

In 2003, unidentified "senior officials" in the administration leaked word to columnist [[Robert Novak]] that Wilson's wife, [[Valerie Plame]], was a [[CIA]] operative. The CIA requested an investigation into whether this public disclosure was illegal, thus the Niger uranium controversy spawned an ongoing legal investigation and political scandal.

In September 2004, the [[CBS News]] program ''[[60 Minutes]]'' decided to delay a major story on the forgeries because such a broadcast might influence the [[2004 United States presidential election|2004 U.S. presidential election]]. A [[CBS]] spokesman stated, "We now believe it would be inappropriate to air the report so close to the presidential election." This decision closely followed the [[Killian documents controversy]].<ref>{{Citation
|last = Zernike
|first = Kate
|title = '60 Minutes' Delays Report Questioning Reasons for Iraq War
|newspaper = [[The New York Times]]
|date = 25 September 2004
|url = https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/25/politics/campaign/25cbs.html
|access-date = 19 February 2017
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20150528065644/http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/25/politics/campaign/25cbs.html
|archive-date = 28 May 2015
|url-status = live
|df = dmy-all
}}</ref>

Nicolò Pollari, director of the SISMI intelligence agency,<ref name="Ariel2005" /> told an Italian parliamentary intelligence committee that the dossier came from [[Rocco Martino]], a former Italian spy.

The ''[[Los Angeles Times]]'' reported on 3 December 2005, that the FBI reopened the inquiry into "how the Bush administration came to rely on forged documents linking Iraq to nuclear weapons materials as part of its justification for the invasion." According to the Times, "a senior FBI official said the bureau's initial investigation found no evidence of foreign government involvement in the forgeries, but the FBI did not interview Martino, a central figure in a parallel drama unfolding in Rome."

=== Removal of known yellowcake ===
In 2008, the United States facilitated shipping [[yellowcake]] (refined uranium ore) out of Iraq. This yellowcake had been stockpiled prior to the first Gulf War, and was declared to the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] and under IAEA safeguards.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna25546334|title=Secret U.S. mission hauls uranium from Iraq|website=[[NBC News]]|date=5 July 2008|access-date=16 November 2016|df=dmy-all}}</ref>  More than 550 tons of yellowcake was removed from Iraq and eventually shipped to Canada.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.snopes.com/politics/war/yellowcake.asp|title=Yellowcake Uranium Removed from Iraq|first=David|last=Mikkelson|date=12 December 2014 |access-date=16 November 2016}}</ref>

== See also ==
* [[2003 invasion of Iraq]]
* [[Bush–Aznar memo]]
* [[Casus belli]]
* [[Curveball (informant)]]
* [[Downing Street memo]]
* [[Fair Game (2010 film)]]
* [[Fog of war]]
* [[Hussein Kamel al-Majid]]
* [[Iraqi aluminum tubes]]
* [[Iraq disarmament crisis]]
* [[2004 Iraq document leak]]
* [[List of uranium projects]]
* [[Allegations of Iraqi mobile weapons laboratories]]
* [[Plame affair]]
* [[Operation Rockingham]]
* [[Scott Ritter]]
* [[September Dossier]]

== Notes ==
{{Reflist}}

== Further reading ==
* Eisner, Peter (2007). ''The Italian Letter: How the Bush Administration Used a Fake Letter to Build the Case for War in Iraq''. Rodale Books. {{ISBN|1-59486-573-6}}. {{ISBN|978-1-59486-573-2}}.
*{{cite book |last1=Bonini |first1=Carlo |last2=D'Avanzo |first2=Giuseppe |author1-link=:it:Carlo Bonini |author2-link=:it:Giuseppe D'Avanzo |title=Collusion: International Espionage and the War on Terror |publisher=[[Melville House Publishing]] |date=April 11, 2007 |isbn=9781933633275}}

== External links ==
'''Background'''
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20131029183703/http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq&general_topic_areas=africaUraniumClaim Detailed timeline of Africa-uranium allegation] – Center for Cooperative Research
* [http://newyorker.com/fact/content/?030331fa_fact1 "Who Lied to Whom?"] by Seymour M. Hersh, ''The New Yorker'', 31 March 2003.
*  Bonini, Carlo and Giuseppe D'avanzo; translated by  James Marcus. ''Collusion: International Espionage and the War on Terror'' (2007) Melville House Publishing (Hoboken, New Jersey. USA) {{ISBN|978-1-933633-27-5}}.

'''Documents and those who relied on them'''
* [http://newsquake.netscape.com/2007/04/20/yellowcake-follies-an-interview-with-carlo-bonini "Yellowcake Follies: An Interview with Carlo Bonini"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100429165751/http://newsquake.netscape.com/2007/04/20/yellowcake-follies-an-interview-with-carlo-bonini/ |date=29 April 2010 }} at Propeller.com
* [http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/21704/ "Who Forged the Niger Documents?"] interview of Vincent Cannistraro by Ian Masters, ''Alternet'', 7 April 2005.
* [http://cryptome.org/niger-docs.htm Niger-Iraq Yellowcake documents]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20051027201402/http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=10506 Italy's intelligence chief met with Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley just a month before the Niger forgeries first surfaced] by Laura Rozen, [[American Prospect]] Online, 25 October 2005
* [http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/14/sprj.irq.documents/index.html "Fake Iraq documents 'embarrassing' for U.S."] ''CNN'', 14 March 2003.
* [https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/29/AR2005102901478_2.html "A Leak, Then a Deluge"] By Barton Gellman "Washington Post" Sunday, 30 October 2005; Page A01
* {{cite news |last1=Bonini |first1=Carlo |last2=D'Avanzo |first2=Giuseppe |author1-link=:it:Carlo Bonini |author2-link=:it:Giuseppe D'Avanzo |url=https://www.repubblica.it/2005/j/sezioni/esteri/nigergate/francia007/francia007.html |title=Alain Chouet, ex numero 2 dei servizi segreti transalpini racconta il ruolo di Parigi nell'affare del falso traffico di uranio: Nigergate, lo 007 francese che smonta la tesi del Sismi |trans-title=Alain Chouet, former number 2 of the transalpine secret services, talks about the role of Paris in the affair of the false uranium trafficking: Nigergate, the French 007 that dismantles the thesis of the SISMI |language=it |work=[[la Repubblica]] |date=December 1, 2005 |access-date=September 7, 2021 |archive-date=December 3, 2005 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051203061244/https://www.repubblica.it/2005/j/sezioni/esteri/nigergate/francia007/francia007.html}}
* {{cite news |last1=Bonini |first1=Carlo |last2=D'Avanzo |first2=Giuseppe |author1-link=:it:Carlo Bonini |author2-link=:it:Giuseppe D'Avanzo |url=http://www.repubblica.it/2005/j/sezioni/esteri/iraq69/sismicia/sismicia.html |title=Doppiogiochisti e dilettanti, tutti gli italiani del Nigergate |trans-title=Double agents and amateurs all the Italians of the Nigergate |language=it |work=[[la Repubblica]] |date=October 24, 2005 |access-date=September 7, 2021 |archive-date=October 27, 2005 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051027045942/http://www.repubblica.it/2005/j/sezioni/esteri/iraq69/sismicia/sismicia.html}}
* {{cite news |last=Gellman |first=Barton |author-link=Barton Gellman |url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/29/AR2005102901478.html |title=A Leak, Then a Deluge (page 1) |newspaper=[[Washington Post]] |date=October 30, 2005 |access-date=September 7, 2021 |archive-date=October 8, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121008171546/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/29/AR2005102901478.html}}
* {{cite news |last=Gellman |first=Barton |author-link=Barton Gellman |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/29/AR2005102901478_2.html |title=A Leak, Then a Deluge (page 2) |newspaper=[[Washington Post]] |date=October 30, 2005 |access-date=September 7, 2021 |archive-date=October 25, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121025131257/https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/29/AR2005102901478_2.html}}
* {{cite news |last=Gellman |first=Barton |author-link=Barton Gellman |url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/29/AR2005102901478_3.html |title=A Leak, Then a Deluge (page 3) |newspaper=[[Washington Post]] |date=October 30, 2005 |access-date=September 7, 2021 |archive-date=March 24, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160324113703/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/29/AR2005102901478_3.html}}
* {{cite news |last=Gellman |first=Barton |author-link=Barton Gellman |url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/29/AR2005102901478_4.html |title=A Leak, Then a Deluge (page 4) |newspaper=[[Washington Post]] |date=October 30, 2005 |access-date=September 7, 2021 |archive-date=March 24, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160324162522/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/29/AR2005102901478_4.html}}
* {{cite news |last=Gellman |first=Barton |author-link=Barton Gellman |url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/29/AR2005102901478_5.html |title=A Leak, Then a Deluge (page 5) |newspaper=[[Washington Post]] |date=October 30, 2005 |access-date=September 7, 2021 |archive-date=March 24, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160324114841/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/29/AR2005102901478_5.html}}

'''Joseph Wilson and Valarie Plame'''
* [http://www.slate.com/id/2103795 Plame's Lame Game: What Ambassador Joseph Wilson and his wife forgot to tell us about the yellow-cake scandal], from ''[[Slate (magazine)|Slate]]''
* [https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2305-2005Jan11.html The Plame Game: Was This a Crime?] By Victoria Toensing and Bruce W. Sanford. Wednesday, 12 January 2005; Page A21
* Joseph Wilson. [https://web.archive.org/web/20070622165449/http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0706-02.htm What I Didn't Find in Africa], ''New York Times'', 6 July 2003.

'''United States Administration statements, speeches, plans'''
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20050714004539/http://www.factcheck.org/article222.html "Bush's "16 Words" on Iraq & Uranium: He May Have Been Wrong But He Wasn't Lying"] – [[FactCheck]]
* [http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript/ "Transcript of UN speech by Colin Powell"] – ''CNN'', 6 February 2003
* [http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/07/11/sprj.irq.wmdspeech/ "Tenet admits error in approving Bush speech"] ''CNN'', 25 December 2003
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20051025235203/http://weekendinterviewshow.com/InterviewDisplay.aspx?i=118 "Cheney's Plan to Nuke Iran"] interview of Philip Giraldi by Scott Horton, ''WeekendInterviewShow.com'', 26 July 2005

'''Legislative investigations'''
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20050805032317/http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf "Report on Intelligence of Weapons of Mass Destruction"] – Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors chaired by Lord Butler of Brockwell
* [https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/813/813.pdf "The Decision to go to War in Iraq"] UK Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2002-03

{{Iraq War}}
{{Disinformation}}

[[Category:2001 documents]]
[[Category:Political forgery]]
[[Category:Political scandals in the United States]]
[[Category:Iraq and weapons of mass destruction]]
[[Category:2001 in Niger]]
[[Category:Plame affair]]
[[Category:Classified documents]]
[[Category:Propaganda in the United States]]
[[Category:Propaganda legends]]
[[Category:Causes and prelude of the Iraq War]]
[[Category:George W. Bush administration controversies]]
[[Category:Saddam Hussein]]
[[Category:Uranium politics]]
[[Category:Italy in the Iraq War]]
[[Category:Propaganda in the Iraq War]]
[[Category:Iraq War documents]]