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{{Short description|Refrainment from using weapons of mass destruction unless attacked with them first}}
{{Nuclear weapons}}
In [[nuclear ethics]] and [[deterrence theory]], '''no first use''' ('''NFU''') refers to a type of pledge or policy wherein a [[List of states with nuclear weapons|nuclear power]] formally refrains from the use of [[nuclear weapons]] or other [[weapons of mass destruction]] (WMD) in [[war]]fare, except for as a [[second strike]] in retaliation to an attack by an enemy power using WMD. Such a pledge would allow for a unique state of affairs in which a given nuclear power can be engaged in a conflict of [[conventional weapons|conventional weaponry]] while it formally forswears any of the strategic advantages of nuclear weapons, provided the enemy power does not possess or utilize any such weapons of their own. The concept is primarily invoked in reference to nuclear [[mutually assured destruction]] but has also been applied to [[Chemical warfare|chemical]] and [[biological warfare]], as is the case of the official WMD policy of [[India and weapons of mass destruction|India]].<ref>{{cite web |title=India's Response to CBW attack |url=https://idsa.in/cbwmagazine/IndiaResponsetoCBWAttack_aahmed_1008 |publisher=Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sundaram |first1=Kumar |last2=Ramana |first2=M.V. |title=India and the Policy of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons |journal=Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament |volume=1 |pages=152–168 |year=2018 |doi=10.1080/25751654.2018.1438737 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

[[China]] and [[India]] are currently the only two nuclear powers to formally maintain a no first use policy, adopting pledges in 1964 and 1998 respectively. Both [[NATO]] and a number of its member states have repeatedly rejected calls for adopting a NFU policy,<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_07-08/jmja99 |title=NATO's Nuclear Weapons: The Rationale for 'No First Use' |publisher=Arms Control Association |date=July–August 1999 |first=Jack |last=Mendelsohn}}</ref> as during the lifetime of the Soviet Union a [[pre-emptive nuclear strike]] was commonly argued as a key option to afford NATO a credible nuclear deterrent, compensating for the overwhelming conventional weapon superiority enjoyed by the [[Soviet Army]] in [[Eurasia]].<ref>{{cite web |last=Chang |first=Gordon |title=Declaring a no-first-use nuclear policy would be exceedingly risky |url=https://thebulletin.org/declaring-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-would-be-exceedingly-risky9689|date=July 27, 2016|website=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160728162546/http://thebulletin.org/declaring-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-would-be-exceedingly-risky9689|archive-date=July 28, 2016 |url-status=dead|access-date=January 24, 2018}}</ref><ref name="Tierney 2016">{{cite news |last=Tierney |first=Dominic |title=Refusing to Nuke First Is for the Powerful|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/09/nuclear-obama-north-korea-pakistan/499676/|work=The Atlantic|access-date=2018-01-24|language=en-US}}</ref> In 1993, [[Russia]] dropped a pledge against first use of nuclear weapons made in 1982 by [[Leonid Brezhnev]],<ref>{{cite news |last=Schmemann |first=Serge |title=Russia Drops Pledge of No First Use of Atom Arms|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/04/world/russia-drops-pledge-of-no-first-use-of-atom-arms.html|access-date=2 January 2012|newspaper=The New York Times|date=November 4, 1993}}</ref> with Russian military doctrine later stating in 2000 that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons "in response to a large-scale conventional aggression".<ref>[http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/federov.htm No First Use of Nuclear Weapons meeting: paper by Yuri Fedorov, 'Russia's Doctrine on the Use of Nuclear Weapons'] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081204145927/http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/federov.htm |date=December 4, 2008}} – Pugwash Meeting no. 279 London, UK, 15–17 November 2002</ref> Pakistan has also made similar statements, largely in reference to intermittent military tensions with India. [[North Korea and weapons of mass destruction|North Korea]] has publicly pledged to refrain from a preemptive nuclear strike, while threatening retaliation up to and including WMD against conventional aggression.
<!--TO DO: big, decently-sourced "Rationale" section covering moral and political arguments for and against, major non-government NFU advocates within nuclear powers and relationships between NFU and other anti-nuclear or pro-N-disarmament ideas and philosophies -->

==Countries pledging no-first-use==
===China===
{{Excerpt|China and weapons of mass destruction#No-first-use }}

===India===
{{main|India and weapons of mass destruction|Nuclear Command Authority (India)}}

India first adopted a "no first use" policy after its second series of nuclear tests, [[Pokhran-II]], in 1998. In August 1999, the Indian government released a draft of the doctrine<ref name=NFU>{{cite web |title=Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine |url=http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html |url-status=dead |publisher=Indianembassy.org |access-date=30 April 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091205231912/http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html |archive-date=December 5, 2009}}</ref> which asserts that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence and that India will pursue a policy of "retaliation only". The document also maintains that India "will not be the first to initiate a nuclear first strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail" and that decisions to authorise the use of nuclear weapons would be made by the prime minister or his "[[Order of succession|designated successor(s)]]".<ref name=NFU/> According to the [[National Research Development Corporation]], despite the [[2001–2002 India–Pakistan standoff|escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan in 2001–2002]], India remained committed to its nuclear no-first-use policy.<ref>[shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in:8080/jspui/bitstream/.../08_chapter%204.pdf A Rani (2013)]</ref>{{fcn|date=August 2023}} India is in the process of developing a nuclear doctrine based on "[[credible minimum deterrence]]".

In a speech at the [[National Defence College, India|National Defence College]] by India's [[National Security Advisor (India)|National Security Advisor]], [[Shivshankar Menon]], on October 21, 2010, the wording was changed from "no first use" to "no first use against non-nuclear weapon states",<ref>{{cite web |title=Shivshankar Menon at NDC (Speech) |url=http://indiablooms.com/NewsDetailsPage/2010/newsDetails211010n.php |url-status=dead |access-date=April 30, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130127042637/http://indiablooms.com/NewsDetailsPage/2010/newsDetails211010n.php |archive-date=January 27, 2013}}</ref> but some argued that it was not a substantive change but "an innocent typographical or lexical error in the text of the speech".<ref>{{cite web |title=Did India Change its Nuclear Doctrine?: Much Ado about Nothing |url=https://idsa.in/idsacomments/DidIndiaChangeitsNuclearDoctrine_vnarang_010311 |publisher=Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses |access-date=June 19, 2019}}</ref> In April 2013, [[Shyam Saran]], convener of the [[National Security Advisory Board]], affirmed that regardless of the size of a nuclear attack against India, be it a [[tactical nuclear weapon]] or a [[strategic nuclear weapon]], India would [[Massive retaliation|retaliate massively]].<ref>{{cite news |last=Bagchi |first=Indrani |title=Even a midget nuke strike will lead to massive retaliation, India warns Pak |url=http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/even-a-midget-nuke-strike-will-lead-to-massive-retaliation-india-warns-pak/articleshow/19795988.cms |newspaper=The Economic Times |date=April 30, 2013 |access-date=April 30, 2013}}</ref> That was in response to reports that Pakistan had developed a tactical battlefield nuclear weapon in an attempt to supposedly nullify an Indian "no first use" retaliatory doctrine.<ref>{{cite news |title=Analysis: New Pakistani Tactical Nuclear Weapons&nbsp;— Implications And Ramifications |url=http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Analysis_New_Pakistani_Tactical_Nuclear_Weapons___Implications_And_Ramifications_999.html |newspaper=Space Daily |date=February 16, 2013}}</ref> In April 2014, before the general elections, Prime Minister Modi reiterated commitment to a no-first-use policy.<ref>{{cite news |title=Modi says committed to no first use of nuclear weapons |url=https://in.reuters.com/article/uk-india-election-nuclear-idINKBN0D20QB20140416 |publisher=[[Reuters]] |date=April 16, 2014 |access-date=June 19, 2019 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190619182650/https://in.reuters.com/article/uk-india-election-nuclear-idINKBN0D20QB20140416 |archive-date=June 19, 2019}}</ref> On November 10, 2016, the Indian [[Defence Minister of India|Defence Minister]] [[Manohar Parrikar]] questioned the no-first-use policy of India, and asked why should India "bind" itself when it is a "responsible nuclear power". He clarified that it was his personal opinion.<ref>{{cite news |title=India's defense minister questions its no first-use nuclear policy — then says it's his personal opinion |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/11/10/indias-defense-minister-questions-its-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-then-says-its-his-personal-opinion/ |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |date=November 10, 2016 |access-date=August 16, 2019}}</ref>

Indian defence minister [[Rajnath Singh]], speaking on the anniversary of the death of former [[Prime Minister of India|prime minister]] [[Atal Bihari Vajpayee]] on August 16, 2019, said that India's no-first-use policy might change depending upon the "circumstances". Vajpayee's government conducted the [[Pokhran-II]] nuclear tests in 1998.<ref>{{cite news |title='No First Use' nuclear policy depends on circumstances: Rajnath Singh |url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/no-first-use-nuclear-policy-depends-on-circumstances-rajnath-singh/article29109149.ece |work=The Hindu |date=August 16, 2019 |access-date=August 16, 2019 |language=en-IN |issn=0971-751X}}</ref>

==Countries without a no-first-use policy==
{{See also|Mutual assured destruction}}
[[Pakistan]], [[Russia]], the [[United Kingdom]], the [[United States]],<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/10/26/wnuke26.xml |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20031204104612/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2003%2F10%2F26%2Fwnuke26.xml |url-status=dead |archive-date=4 December 2003 |title=Pentagon wants 'mini-nukes' to fight terrorists |work=The Telegraph |access-date=2007-09-14 |date=<!-- 12:39am BST --> 26 October 2003 |first=Julian |last=Coman |location=London }}</ref> and [[France]]<ref>{{cite book|last=Heuser|first=Beatrice|title=NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG nuclear strategies and forces for Europe, 1949-2000|date=1997|publisher=St. Martin's Press|location=New York|isbn=9780230377622|pages=120–121|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=niaGDAAAQBAJ&q=france+nuclear+strategy|access-date=30 March 2017}}</ref> say that they will use nuclear weapons against either nuclear or non-nuclear states only in the case of invasion or other attack against their territory or against one of their allies. Historically, [[NATO]] military strategy, taking into account the numerical superiority of [[Warsaw Pact]] conventional forces, assumed that [[tactical nuclear weapon]]s would have to be used to defeat a Soviet invasion.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The East-West Strategic Balance |year=1982}}</ref>{{fcn|date=August 2023}}<ref name="LA Times 1987">{{Cite journal|title=Senate Permits Study for New Tactical Nuclear Missile |journal=[[The Los Angeles Times]] |first=Melissa |last=Healy |date=October 3, 1987 |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-10-03-mn-2950-story.html |access-date=2012-08-08}}</ref>

At the [[1999 Washington summit|16th NATO summit]] in April 1999, [[Germany]] proposed that NATO adopt a no-first-use policy, but the proposal was rejected.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_11-12/grnd98 |title=Germany Raises No-First-Use Issue at NATO Meeting |publisher=Arms Control Association |access-date=2013-04-30}}</ref> In 2022, leaders of the five NPT nuclear-weapon states issued a statement on prevention of nuclear war, saying "We affirm that a [[Nuclear warfare|nuclear war]] cannot be won and must never be fought."<ref>{{Cite news |date=2022-01-04 |title=Russia, China, Britain, U.S. and France say no one can win nuclear war |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/russia-china-britain-us-france-say-no-one-can-win-nuclear-war-2022-01-03/ |access-date=2022-03-20}}</ref>

=== Soviet Union/Russia ===
In its final years, the [[Soviet Union]] adopted a formal no-first-use policy in 1982 when Foreign Minister [[Andrei Gromyko]] read out at the [[United Nations]] a pledge by General Secretary [[Leonid Brezhnev]] not to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Goshko |first=John M. |date=1982-06-16 |title=Soviet Chief Renounces First Use of A-Weapons |language=en-US |newspaper=The Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/06/16/soviet-chief-renounces-first-use-of-a-weapons/69fde24a-b92c-4bba-b253-4693dfbda9f7/ |access-date=2022-03-19 |issn=0190-8286}}</ref> On April 26, 1983, American child actress [[Samantha Smith]] received a mail directly from new leader [[Yuri Andropov|Andropov]], also emphasis that "Soviet Union solemnly declared throughout the entire world that never—never— will it use nuclear weapons first against any country".<ref>{{Cite web |title=Letter |url=https://www.samanthasmith.info/letter |access-date=2025-07-31 |website=SamanthaSmith.info |language=en}}</ref> However, this pledge was not taken very seriously, and later leaked [[Soviet Armed Forces]] documents confirmed that the military had made plans for a pre-emptive nuclear strike and considered launching one during the [[Able Archer 83]] crisis.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title='No First Use' and Nuclear Weapons |url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/no-first-use-and-nuclear-weapons |access-date=2022-03-19 |publisher=Council on Foreign Relations |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |title=Soviet plan for WW3 nuclear attack unearthed |first=Henry |last=Samuel |date=20 September 2007  |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1563692/Soviet-plan-for-WW3-nuclear-attack-unearthed.html |access-date=2022-03-19 |website=The Telegraph}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |first=Taylor |last=Downing |title=Able Archer 83: the Nato war-game that nearly spelled nuclear disaster |date=2021-05-20 |url=https://www.historyextra.com/period/20th-century/able-archer-83-what-happened-nato-war-gamecold-war-nuclear-disaster/ |access-date=2022-03-20 |website=History Extra |language=en}}</ref> After the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]], the [[Russia|Russian Federation]] formally reversed this policy in 1993 due to the weakness of the [[Russian Armed Forces]] in the [[Post-Soviet states|post-Soviet era]].<ref name=":1" /><ref>{{Cite news |last=Efron |first=Sonni |date=1993-11-04 |title=Russia Discards Soviet Legacy of No First Use of A-Weapons |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-11-04-mn-53224-story.html |access-date=2022-03-19 |website=The Los Angeles Times |language=en-US}}</ref> Russia describes its entire military doctrine as defensive [[Military doctrine of Russia#2010 Military Doctrine|military doctrine]].
With regard to nuclear weapons specifically, Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons:

* in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it or its allies, and also
* in case of aggression against Russia with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is threatened.<ref name="Policy2010">{{cite web|orig-year=presidential decree 2010-06-25|date=2010-06-25|script-title=ru:Военная доктрина Российской Федерации|title=Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii|trans-title=Military doctrine of the Russian Federation|language=ru|location=Moscow|publisher=[[Security Council of the Russian Federation]]|url=http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/33.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110504070127/http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/33.html|archive-date=2011-05-04|url-status=dead}} The same URL is used for various revisions with different presidential decree dates.</ref>

The military doctrine of 2014 did not depart from this stance.<ref>[http://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029 Military doctrine of the Russian Federation of 2014], paragraph 27</ref> The 2020 Presidential Executive Order on Nuclear Deterrence in Article 4 uses the following wording: "deterrence of a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies. In the event of a military conflict, this Policy provides for the prevention of an escalation of military actions and their termination on conditions that are acceptable for the Russian Federation and/or its allies."{{cn|date=October 2024}} This has been interpreted as describing non-nuclear scenarios where Russia might use nuclear weapons to achieve its military goals.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2020/russias-nuclear-doctrine-moves-focus-non-western-threats |title=Russia's nuclear doctrine moves the focus from non-Western threats |date=October 1, 2020|first=Petr |last=Topychkanov| publisher=Stockholm International Peace Research Institute}}</ref> During the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]], observers expressed concern that Russia would preemptively use [[tactical nuclear weapon]]s after President [[Vladimir Putin]] announced the mobilization of Russian nuclear forces to "combat-ready" status.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2022-03-16 |title=Ukraine war: Could Russia use tactical nuclear weapons? |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60664169 |access-date=2022-03-19}}</ref> In December 2022, Putin claimed that Russia would not be the first to use nuclear weapons or the second, and that "Russian nuclear doctrine is premised on self-defense."<ref>{{Cite news |date=2022-12-07 |first=Alys |last=Davies |title=Putin: Nuclear risk is rising, but we are not mad |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63893316 |access-date=2022-12-07}}</ref><ref name= isw7Dec2022 >{{cite web|first1=Karolina |last1=Hird |first2=Riley |last2=Bailey |first3=George |last3=Barros |first4=Madison |last4=Williams |first5=Yekaterina |last5=Klepanchuk |first6=Frederick W. |last6=Kagan |publisher=Institute for the Study of War |url=https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7 |date=7 December 2022 |title=Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 7}}</ref><ref name="videoconference">{{cite web |first=Vladimir |last=Putin |url=http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70046 |date=7 December 2022 |script-title=ru:Заседание Совета по развитию гражданского общества и правам человека|trans-title=Meeting of the Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights |format=video conference}}</ref>

Russia and China maintain a mutual agreement to have a no first use policy which was developed under the [[2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship|Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation]] in 2001. Under the second paragraph of article two, China and Russia agreed that "The contracting parties reaffirm their commitment that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other nor target strategic nuclear missiles against each other."<ref>{{cite web |url=http://pg.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t47618.htm |title=Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation |at=Article 2, second paragraph}}</ref>

===United Kingdom===
In March 2002, the [[Secretary of State for Defence]] [[Geoff Hoon]] stated that the UK was prepared to use [[Nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom|nuclear weapons]] against "[[rogue state]]s" such as [[Ba'athist Iraq]] if they ever used "weapons of mass destruction" against [[British Armed Forces]] troops in the field.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1883258.stm |work=BBC News |title=UK 'prepared to use nuclear weapons' |access-date=2007-09-14 |date= 20 March 2002<!--, 14:49 GMT--> |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20021020052015/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1883258.stm |archive-date = 2002-10-20}}</ref> This policy was restated in February 2003 and again under the [[Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom)|Ministry of Defence]]'s [[Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010]].<ref name=":1" /><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2717939.stm |date= 2 February 2003<!--, 19:25 GMT -->|work=BBC News |title=UK restates nuclear threat |access-date=2007-09-14}}</ref> In April 2017 Defence Secretary [[Michael Fallon]] confirmed that the UK would use nuclear weapons in a "[[Pre-emptive nuclear strike|pre-emptive initial strike]]" in "the most extreme circumstances".<ref name=independent-20170424>{{cite news |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-nuclear-weapons-first-strike-michael-fallon-general-election-jeremy-corbyn-trident-a7698621.html |title=Theresa May would fire UK's nuclear weapons as a 'first strike', says Defence Secretary Michael Fallon |first=Rob |last=Merrick |newspaper=The Independent |date=24 April 2017 |access-date=24 April 2017 |archive-date=25 April 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170425031826/http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-nuclear-weapons-first-strike-michael-fallon-general-election-jeremy-corbyn-trident-a7698621.html |url-status=dead }}</ref> Fallon stated in a parliamentary answer that the UK has neither a 'first use' or 'no first use' in its nuclear weapon policy so that its adversaries would not know when the UK would launch nuclear strikes.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2017-09-05/8502/ |title=Nuclear Weapons:Written question – 8502  |first=Michael |last=Fallon |publisher=UK Parliament |date=5 September 2017 |access-date=18 November 2018}}</ref>

===United States===
The United States has refused to adopt a no first use policy and says that it "reserves the right to use" nuclear weapons first in the case of conflict. This was partially to provide a [[nuclear umbrella]] over its allies in [[NATO]] as a deterrent against a conventional [[Warsaw Pact]] attack during the [[Cold War]], and NATO continues to oppose a no-first-use policy.<ref name=":1" /><ref>{{Cite web |title=NATO's Nuclear Weapons: The Rationale for 'No First Use' |publisher=Arms Control Association |url=https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999-07/features/natos-nuclear-weapons-rationale-first-use |access-date=2022-03-19}}</ref> Not only did the United States and NATO refuse to adopt a no first use policy, but until 1967 they maintained a nuclear doctrine of "[[massive retaliation]]" in which nuclear weapons would explicitly be used to defend North America or Western Europe against a conventional attack. Although this strategy was revised, they both reserved the right to use nuclear weapons first under the new doctrine of "[[flexible response]]".<ref>{{Cite web |title=NATO's Nuclear Weapons: The Rationale for 'No First Use' |publisher=Arms Control Association |url=https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999-07/features/natos-nuclear-weapons-rationale-first-use |access-date=2022-03-20}}</ref>

Released on April 6, 2010, the 2010 [[Nuclear Posture Review]] reduces the role of [[Nuclear weapons of the United States|U.S. nuclear weapons]]: "The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners." The U.S. doctrine also includes the following assurance to other states: "The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty|NPT]] and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations."<ref name="nuclposreview">{{cite web |url=http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-04-06_NPR%20201%20Briefing%20-%201032.pdf |title=Nuclear Posture Review Report |publisher=[[U.S. Department of Defense]] |date=April 2010 |access-date=2019-07-08 |archive-date=2012-12-27 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121227050836/http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-04-06_NPR%20201%20Briefing%20-%201032.pdf |url-status=bot: unknown }}</ref>

For states eligible for the assurance, the United States would not use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological attack but states that those responsible for such an attack would be held accountable and would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response. Even for states that are not eligible for the assurance, the United States would consider the use of nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners. The Nuclear Posture Review also notes, "It is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 65-year record of nuclear non-use be extended forever."<ref name="nuclposreview"/>

This supersedes the doctrine of the [[George W. Bush administration]] set forth in "[[Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations]]" and written under the direction of Air Force General [[Richard Myers]], chairman of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]]. That now superseded doctrine envisioned commanders requesting presidential approval to use nuclear weapons to preempt an attack by a nation or a terrorist group using weapons of mass destruction.{{cn|date=October 2024}} The now superseded doctrine also included the option of using nuclear weapons to destroy known enemy stockpiles of [[nuclear weapon|nuclear]], [[biological weapon|biological]], or [[chemical weapon]]s.{{cn|date=October 2024}}

In August 2016, President [[Barack Obama]] reportedly considered adopting a no first use policy.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/nuclear-weapons-no-first-use-debate-214300/|title=The Flimsy Case Against No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons|first=Bruce|last=Blair|website=Politico |date=28 September 2016 |access-date=19 June 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://thebulletin.org/2016/08/the-dangers-of-no-first-use/|title=The dangers of no-first-use|first1=Franklin C. |last1=Miller |first2=Keith B. |last2=Payne |work=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists|date=22 August 2016|access-date=19 June 2019}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite news|last1=Sonne|first1=Paul|last2=Lubold|first2=Gordon|last3=Lee|first3=Carol E.|date=12 August 2016|title='No First Use' Nuclear Policy Proposal Assailed by U.S. Cabinet Officials, Allies|language=en-US|work=[[The Wall Street Journal]]|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/no-first-use-nuclear-policyproposal-assailed-by-u-s-cabinet-officials-allies-1471042014|issn=0099-9660}}</ref> Obama was persuaded by several Cabinet officials such as Secretary of State [[John Kerry]], Secretary of Defense [[Ash Carter]], and Secretary of Energy [[Ernest Moniz]] that 'no first use' would rattle U.S. allies and decided not to take up the policy.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/science/obama-unlikely-to-vow-no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons.html|title=Obama Unlikely to Vow No First Use of Nuclear Weapons|first1=David E.|last1=Sanger|first2=William J.|last2=Broad|date=5 September 2016|access-date=19 June 2019|newspaper=The New York Times}}</ref><ref name="Tierney 2016" />

During the [[2017–2018 North Korea crisis]], there were efforts to either require congressional approval for a pre-emptive nuclear strike<ref>{{cite news 
| last = Mitchell | first = Ellen | date = 2017-05-03
| title = Lawmakers back push to curtail Trump's nuclear strike ability
| work = The Hill 
| url = https://thehill.com/policy/defense/331798-lawmakers-back-push-to-curtail-trumps-nuclear-strike-ability/
| access-date = 2018-01-07}}</ref> or to ban it altogether and impose an NFU policy.<ref>{{cite news
| last = Lillis | first = Mike | date = 2017-10-12
| title = Pelosi urges new law to limit president's use of nuclear weapons
| work = The Hill 
| url = https://thehill.com/policy/defense/355186-pelosi-urges-new-law-to-limit-presidents-use-of-nuclear-weapons/
| access-date = 2018-01-07}}</ref> The [[United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations|Senate Foreign Relations Committee]] chaired by [[Bob Corker]] held its first meeting on the President's authority to use nuclear weapons in 41 years.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2017-11-14 |title=Senate committee questions Trump's nuclear authority |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-usa-senate-idUSKBN1DE2ON |access-date=2022-03-19}}</ref> Since 2017, [[Ted Lieu]], [[Ed Markey]], [[Elizabeth Warren]], and [[Adam Smith (Washington politician)|Adam Smith]] all introduced bills to limit the President's ability to order a pre-emptive nuclear strike.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Senator Warren, Chairman Smith Unveil Legislation to Establish 'No-First-Use' Nuclear Weapons Policy |first=Elizabeth |last=Warren |author-link=Elizabeth Warren|url=https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senator-warren-chairman-smith-unveil-legislation-to-establish-no-first-use-nuclear-weapons-policy |access-date=2022-03-20 |publisher=United States Senate |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-01-24 |title=Congressman Lieu, Senator Markey Introduce the Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of 2017 |url=https://lieu.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congressman-lieu-senator-markey-introduce-restricting-first-use-0 |access-date=2022-03-19 |author-link=Ted Lieu |first=Ted |last=Lieu |publisher=United States House of Representatives |language=en}}</ref> Calls to limit the [[President of the United States]]' ability to unilaterally launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike increased after the [[January 6 United States Capitol attack]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Invasion of Ukraine proves the U.S. must Trump-proof the nuclear codes – fast |date=March 12, 2022 |first=Jordan |last=Gans-Morse |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/u-s-must-trump-proof-nuclear-codes-2024-ncna1291705 |access-date=2022-03-19 |website=NBC News |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Trump-inspired insurrection prompts concern over control of nuclear weapons |first=Rachel |last=Oswald |date=January 8, 2021 |url=https://www.rollcall.com/2021/01/08/trump-nuclear-strike-codes-capitol-riot/ |access-date=2022-03-19 |website=Roll Call |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |first1=Elizabeth |last1=Warren |last2=Perry |first2=William J. |title=No president should have unilateral power to use nuclear weapons: Sen. Warren and Sec. Perry |url=https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/01/25/after-trump-end-nuclear-launch-authority-for-presidents-column/4235023001/ |access-date=2022-03-19 |website=USA Today |language=en-US}}</ref> During the [[2020 United States presidential election]] the eventual victor [[Joe Biden]] expressed support for a "sole purpose" declaration confirming that the only use of U.S. nuclear weapons would be as a deterrent, although this is distinct from a "no first use" declaration identifying that the United States would not unilaterally use them.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Woolf |first=Amy F. |url=https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/IN10553.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210916133326/https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/IN10553.pdf |archive-date=2021-09-16 |url-status=live |title=U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Considering 'No First Use' |publisher=[[Congressional Research Service]] |year=2021 |location=Washington DC |oclc=1097538161}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Sole Purpose Is Not No First Use: Nuclear Weapons and Declaratory Policy |first1=Ankit |last1=Panda |first2=Vipin |last2=Narang |date=February 22, 2021 |url=http://warontherocks.com/2021/02/sole-purpose-is-not-no-first-use-nuclear-weapons-and-declaratory-policy/ |access-date=2022-03-20 |website=War on the Rocks |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite magazine |last1=Biden |first1=Joseph R. Jr. |author-link=Joe Biden |date=2022-03-10 |title=Why America Must Lead Again |magazine=Foreign Affairs|language=en-US |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again |access-date=2022-03-20 |issn=0015-7120}}</ref>

===Pakistan===
{{see also|N-deterrence}}
Pakistan's Foreign Minister [[Shamshad Ahmad]] warned that if Pakistan is ever invaded or attacked, it will use "any weapon in its arsenal" to defend itself.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mdWCAgAAQBAJ&q=pakistan+will+use+any+weapon+in+its+arsenal&pg=PA343|title=India-Pakistan in War and Peace |via=Google Books|date=2003-09-02|publisher=Routledge|isbn=9781134407583|last1=Dixit|first1=J. N. |page=343}}</ref>

Pakistan refuses to adopt a no first use doctrine and indicates that it would launch nuclear weapons even if the other side did not use such weapons first. Pakistan's asymmetric nuclear posture has significant influence on India's ability to retaliate, as shown in [[2001 India Pakistan standoff|2001]] and [[2008 India Pakistan standoff|2008 crises]], when [[non-state actor]]s carried out deadly terrorist attacks on India, only to be met with a relatively subdued response from India. A military spokesperson stated that "Pakistan's threat of nuclear first-use deterred India from seriously considering conventional military strikes."<ref name="Narang Policy Brief">{{cite news|last=Narang|first=Vipin|title=Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Implications for South Asian Stability|url=http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Pakistans_Nuclear_Posture_policy_brief.pdf|access-date=4 January 2013|newspaper=Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Policy Brief|date=January 2010|archive-date=3 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303183022/http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Pakistans_Nuclear_Posture_policy_brief.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref>

Pakistan's [[Pakistan National Security Council|National Security Advisor]] [[Sartaj Aziz]] defended the [[Pakistan and its Nuclear Deterrent Program|policy of first use]].<ref name="Council of Foreign Relations"/> Aziz stated that Pakistan's first use doctrine is entirely deterrent in nature. He explained that it was effective after the [[2001 Indian Parliament attack]] and argued that if Pakistan had a no first use policy, there would have been a major war between the two countries.<ref name="Council of Foreign Relations">{{cite web|last1=Boies|first1=Mary McInnis|title=Promoting U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Future Challenges and Opportunities|url=http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/promoting-us-pakistan-relations-future-challenges-opportunities/p33514|publisher=Council on Foreign Relations|access-date=6 October 2014}}</ref>

===North Korea===
{{main|North Korea and weapons of mass destruction}}
North Korea's stated policy position is that nuclear weapons "will never be abused or used as a means for preemptive strike", but if there is an "attempt to have recourse to military force against us" North Korea may use their "most powerful offensive strength in advance to punish them".<ref name=38north-20201013>{{cite news |url=https://www.38north.org/2020/10/kjuspeech101320/ |title=Kim Jong Un's October 10 Speech: More Than Missiles |publisher=The Henry L. Stimson Center |work=38 North |date=13 October 2020 |access-date=15 October 2020}}</ref>

==Israel==
Although Israel [[policy of deliberate ambiguity|does not officially confirm or deny]] having nuclear weapons, [[Nuclear weapons and Israel|the country is widely believed to be in possession of them]]. Its continued ambiguous stance puts it in a difficult position since to issue a statement pledging 'no first use' would confirm their possession of nuclear weapons.

Israel has said that it "would not be the first country in the [[Middle East]] to formally introduce nuclear weapons into the region".<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.cfr.org/publication/9822/israels_nuclear_program_and_middle_east_peace.html |publisher=Lionel Beehner |date=February 10, 2006 |access-date=2007-11-03 |title=Israel's Nuclear Program and Middle East Peace |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080209064933/http://www.cfr.org/publication/9822/israels_nuclear_program_and_middle_east_peace.html |archive-date=February 9, 2008 }}</ref>

If Israel's very existence is threatened, some speculate that Israel would use a "[[Samson Option]]", a "last resort" deterrence strategy of [[massive retaliation]] with nuclear weapons, should the State of Israel be substantially damaged and/or near destruction.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Hersh|first=Seymour M.|title=The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy|date=1991|publisher=Random House|isbn=0-394-57006-5|edition=1st|location=New York|pages=42, 136–137, 288–289|oclc=24609770}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Cohen|first=Avner|title=Israel and the bomb|date=1998|publisher=Columbia University Press|isbn=0-585-04150-4|location=New York|pages=2, 7, 341|oclc=42330721}}</ref><ref>Avner Cohen, "Israel's Nuclear Opacity: a Political Genealogy", ''The Dynamics of Middle East Nuclear Proliferation'', pp. 187–212, edited by Steven L. Spiegel, Jennifer D. Kibbe and Elizabeth G. Matthews. Symposium Series, Volume 66, The Edwin Mellen Press, 2001.</ref> According to Israeli historian [[Avner Cohen]], Israel's policy on nuclear weapons, which was set down in 1966, revolves around four "red lines" which could lead to an Israeli nuclear response:

* A successful military penetration into populated areas within Israel's borders.
* The destruction of the [[Israeli Air Force]].
* Israeli cities being subjected to massive and devastating [[Aerial bombing of cities|aerial bombardment]], [[Chemical warfare|chemical attacks]], or [[Biological warfare|biological attacks]].
* The use of nuclear weapons against Israel.<ref name=":0" />

==Rationale==
<!--TO DO: big, decently-sourced "Rationale" section covering moral and political arguments for and against, major non-government NFU advocates within nuclear powers and relationships between NFU and other anti-nuclear or pro-N-disarmament ideas and philosophies -->
Debates in the [[international community]] on strategic no-first-use of nuclear weapons include legal, [[nuclear ethics|ethical]], moral and political arguments from [[international organization|intergovernmental organizations]], regional blocs, [[non-governmental organization]]s and [[civil society]] actors as well as countries.<ref name=":1" /><ref name="SIPRI 1984">{{cite book |date=1984 |editor1=Stockholm International Peace Research Institute |editor-link1=Stockholm International Peace Research Institute |editor-last2=Blackaby |editor-first2=Frank Thomas |editor-last3=Goldblat |editor-first3=Jozef |editor-last4=Lodgaard |editor-first4=Sverre |editor-link4=Sverre Lodgaard |title=No-first-use |location=London and Philadelphia |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=0850662605 |ol=OL2840610M}}</ref>{{rp|3–26}} In 2023, former [[International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War|IPPNW]] program director John Loretz wrote: "With the risk of nuclear war greater than at any time since the [[Cold War#New Cold War (1979–1985)|Cold War of the 1980s]] ([[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] 2023)—exacerbated even further by the [[Russian Invasion of Ukraine|prolonged war in Ukraine]]—it comes as no surprise that academics, diplomats, and nuclear strategists are focusing anew on risk reduction proposals. One idea that has been in circulation for some time is a global-no-first-use agreement (GNFU), with unilateral or bilateral NFUs as another option."<ref>{{cite journal |last=Loretz |first=John |date=March 6, 2023 |title=Book Review: The Sheathed Sword: From Nuclear Brink to No First Use |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13623699.2023.2186769?journalCode=fmcs20 |journal=Medicine, Conflict and Survival |volume=38 |doi=10.1080/13623699.2023.2186769 |access-date=May 18, 2023|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

According to [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute|SIPRI]]'s 1984 analysis, first use of nuclear weapons as a right of self-defense in warfare is the "most controversial" under international law—a right, in their view, not unlimited. Highlighted also were the views of "religious, political and military authorities" who questioned a first-use doctrine. SIPRI concluded that a meaningful no-first-use declaration "would have to be accompanied—or preferably preceded—by changes in the deployment of both nuclear and conventional forces".<ref name="SIPRI 1984" />{{rp|6, 23–24}}

Sparking debate with their 1982 ''[[Foreign Affairs]]'' article, former [[National Security Advisor (United States)|US national security advisor]] [[McGeorge Bundy]], US [[diplomat]] [[George F. Kennan]], former [[United States Secretary of Defense|US Secretary of Defense]] [[Robert McNamara]] and US lead negotiator for the [[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]] [[Gerard C. Smith]] challenged the US and the [[NATO|Atlantic Alliance]] "to consider the possibilities, the requirements, the difficulties, and the advantages of a policy of no-first-use" and urged that citizens, too, consider these policy questions. The authors believed that fully exploring NFU as a strategy and policy would reveal greater advantages than costs and "help the peoples and governments of the [[NATO|Alliance]] to find the political will to move in this direction". They called "both fear and mistrust&nbsp;... the most immediate enemies", arguing that: "The Soviet government has repeatedly offered to join the West in declaring such a policy, and while such declarations may have only limited reliability, it would be wrong to disregard the real value to both sides of a jointly declared adherence to this policy." They also maintained that an NFU posture and policy "could help to open the path toward serious reduction of nuclear armaments on both sides", cautioning that "[a]s long as the weapons themselves exist, the possibility of use will remain."<ref name="Bundy et al ForAff1982">{{cite book |last1=Bundy |first1=McGeorge |author-link1=McGeorge Bundy |last2=Kennan |first2=George F|author-link2=George F. Kennan |last3=McNamara |first3=Robert S |author-link3=Robert McNamara |last4=Smith |first4=Gerard C |author-link4=Gerard C. Smith |date=1984 |editor1=Stockholm International Peace Research Institute |editor-link1=Stockholm International Peace Research Institute |editor-last2=Blackaby |editor-first2=Frank Thomas |editor-last3=Goldblat |editor-first3=Jozef |editor-last4=Lodgaard |editor-first4=Sverre |editor-link4=Sverre Lodgaard |title=No-first-use |location=London and Philadelphia |publisher=Taylor & Francis |pages=29–41 |chapter=Nuclear weapons and the Atlantic Alliance (rept) |isbn=0850662605 |ol=OL2840610M}}</ref>{{rp|32, 35, 37, 39–40}}

In the context of Japan's reliance on US extended [[Deterrence theory|deterrence]], former Japanese diplomat, director of [[Japan Institute of International Affairs|JIIA]]'s Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation (2008–2014) and commissioner of the [[Japanese Atomic Energy Commission]] (2014–2017) Nobuyasu Abe in 2018 called for re-examining the role of nuclear weapons alongside the non-nuclear military situation in the regional security environment to bridge the "great divide between idealists and realists" on adopting a no-first-use policy. He described the political divide in Japan as the skepticism of the [[Government of Japan|Japanese government]], the ruling [[Liberal Democratic Party of Japan|LDP]], and "center/right conservatives" on the one hand, and the support of the ruling coalition's junior partner [[Komeito]], opposition parties, and "left/center anti-nuclear idealists" on the other.<ref>{{cite journal | last=Abe |first=Nobuyasu |date=2018 |title=No First Use: How to Overcome Japan's Great Divide |journal=Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=137–151 |doi=10.1080/25751654.2018.1456042|doi-access=free }}</ref>{{rp|138, 144, 148}} In its analysis of [[Nuclear umbrella#South Korea|South Korea]]'s reliance on US extended deterrence, the [[Asan Institute for Policy Studies]] in January 2022 wrote that, were the US  to adopt an NFU position, the credibility of its extended deterrence would be diminished.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://en.asaninst.org/contents/the-troubled-rok-u-s-alliance/ |title=Issue Briefs: The Troubled ROK–US Alliance |date=January 21, 2022 |publisher=The [[Asan Institute for Policy Studies]] |access-date=June 2, 2023}}</ref> The institute's public attitudes survey findings, published in May 2023, include naming North Korea as the most pressing security concern, followed by China.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://theasanforum.org/country-report-south-korea-april-2023/ |title=Country Report: South Korea (April 2023) |date=May 2, 2023 |publisher=The [[Asan Institute for Policy Studies]] |access-date=June 5, 2023}}</ref> In its November 2017 policy brief, the [[European Council on Foreign Relations]] concluded that North Korea's posture is one of "nuclear pre-emption" and its government "concerned that a [[preemptive war|first strike]] could destroy it"; in contrast, China pursues "what Beijing calls 'nuclear counterstrike campaigns{{'"}}, having declared its NFU doctrine out of the belief "that neither its government nor its nuclear arsenal could be eliminated in a first strike by a hostile power".<ref>{{cite web |url= https://ecfr.eu/publication/pre_empting_defeat_in_search_of_north_koreas_nuclear_doctrine/ |last1=Allard |first1=Léonie |last2=Duchâtel |first2=Mathieu |last3=Godement |first3=François |title=Policy Brief. Pre-empting defeat: In search of North Korean's nuclear doctrine |date=November 22, 2017 |publisher=[[European Council on Foreign Relations]] |access-date=June 9, 2023}}</ref> And in the foreground of strained relations between South Korea and Japan, stemming from [[Korea under Japanese rule|Japan's 1910–1945 occupation of Korea]], the June 2023 trilateral meeting of the countries' military chiefs signaled closer nuclear strategy consultation at the urging of their US counterpart.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/us-japan-skorea-hold-rare-military-meeting-nkorea-launches-missile-2023-07-12/ |last=Ali |first=Idrees |date=July 12, 2023 |title=US, Japan, South Korea hold rare military meeting as North Korea launches missile |website=Reuters |access-date=July 12, 2023}}</ref>

Nonresident Senior Fellows in [[Brookings Institution|Brookings]]'s Center for East Asia Policy Studies [[Richard C. Bush]] and Jonathan D. Pollack in 2016 noted that "non-nuclear states living in the shadow of nuclear-armed adversaries" are willing to forego developing their own nuclear arms because of US security guarantees, and that adopting an NFU doctrine "would represent a profound shift" in those guarantees.<ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/07/20/before-moving-to-no-first-use-think-about-northeast-asia/ |last1=Bush |first1=Richard C. |author-link1= Richard C. Bush |last2=Pollack |first2=Jonathan D. |title=Order from Chaos series. Before moving to 'no first use,' think about Northeast Asia |date=July 20, 2016 |publisher=[[Brookings Institution]] |access-date=June 12, 2023}}</ref> Co-founder Keith B. Payne and Research Scholar Michaela Dodge of the National Institute for Public Policy in 2023 noted that for decades "US allies" have continued to oppose such a shift, citing a reported survey by the [[Presidency of Joe Biden|Biden]] Administration as the most recent indicator, and called for, among other things, "a more informed public discourse" by strengthening and expanding participation in strategic deterrence dialogues.<ref name="NIPP 2023">{{cite web| url=https://nipp.org/information_series/keith-b-payne-and-michaela-dodge-emerging-challenges-to-extended-deterrence-assurance-and-the-future-of-u-s-alliances-no-555-june-6-2023/ |last1=Payne |first1=Keith B. |last2=Dodge |first2=Michaela |title= Information Series, Issue No. 555. Emerging Challenges to Extended Deterrence, Assurance and the Future of US Alliances |date=June 6, 2023 |publisher=National Institute for Public Policy |access-date=June 6, 2023}}</ref> The authors also noted that further enlargement of "underlying 'anti-nuclear' sentiment among some allied governments and/or their publics&nbsp;... would essentially eliminate the existing US extended nuclear deterrence policy, particularly (but not only) undercutting NATO allied participation in NATO's nuclear deterrence policy."<ref name="NIPP 2023" /> Former chair of the [[Bundestag]] Subcommittee on Disarmament and Arms Control [[Uta Zapf]] in 2021 characterized NFU policy adoption as "a first step and a door-opener for an urgently needed dialog on the role of [[nuclear weapon|NW]] in military doctrines and strategies".<ref>{{cite web |url=https://gsinstitute.org/uta-zapf-is-it-time-for-no-first-use-policies/ |last=Zapf |first=Uta |author-link=Uta Zapf |title=Nuclear Risk Reduction and Disarmament: Is it time for no-first-use policies in the USA and globally? |date=April 29, 2021 |website=[[Global Security Institute]] |access-date=June 14, 2023}}</ref> Dominic Tierney, political science professor at [[Swarthmore College]] and author of ''The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts'', in 2016 wrote: "Champions and critics of no-first-use often cast it as a principled policy and a revolutionary step, for good or for ill. But the idealistic symbolism of no-first-use betrays an underlying reality. Disavowing a first strike is a luxury afforded to the strong.&nbsp;... No-first-use is the policy of [[Goliath]], not [[Mahatma Gandhi|Gandhi]]."<ref name="Tierney 2016" />

From the perspective of [[Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons|TPNW]] supporters, ambassador and director for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation at the [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Austria)|Austrian Foreign Ministry]] Alexander Kmentt in 2020 explained that nuclear risk reduction measures, including de-alerting and de-targeting as well as no-first-use declarations, are "assessed as having a negative impact on the credibility of nuclear deterrence" and "considered only insofar, as they do not impact the nuclear deterrence calculus, which in itself is the origin of nuclear risk".<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/nuclear-deterrence-perpetuates-nuclear-risks-the-risk-reduction-perspective-of-tpnw-supporters/ |last=Kmentt |first=Alexander |title=Commentary. Nuclear deterrence perpetuates nuclear risks: the risk reduction perspective of TPNW supporters |publisher=[[European Leadership Network]] |date=December 4, 2020 |access-date=June 12, 2023}}</ref> In her 2018 view of narratives surrounding the TPNW, Heather Williams of [[King's College London]] acknowledged the importance of deterrence as a security tool to many states and proposed a "bridge-building framework" involving supporters and opponents finding common ground and working together, for example, on nuclear risk reduction.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Williams |first=Heather |date=2018 |title=A nuclear babel: narratives around the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons |url=https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/98357442/A_nuclear_babel_Williams_Publishedonline5July2018_GREEN_AAM.pdf |journal=Nonproliferation Review |volume=25 |issue=1–2 |pages=51–63 |doi=10.1080/10736700.2018.1477453 |access-date=July 12, 2023}}</ref>

By 2020 new NFU commitments and ideas had stalled, according to Wilfred Wan, [[United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research|UNIDIR]] researcher on the global nonproliferation regime, because of the deep divide over whether they reduce risk or, for example, increase risk by undermining [[strategic stability]], while John Borrie, lead for UNIDIR's research program on [[weapon of mass destruction|WMD]]s, noted that even the definition of strategic stability was evolving due to the unpredictability of and increasing strategic concerns. In the same publication, Manpreet Sethi, lead researcher for the [[Centre for Air Power Studies (India)|Centre for Air Power Studies]], recommended that China's and India's unilateral NFU declarations be turned into a bilateral statement as a step towards nuclear risk reduction in South Asia, "since the risk of not taking any would be quite risky indeed".<ref>{{cite report |author1=John Borrie |author2=Hassan Elbahtimy |author3=Ulrich Kühn |author4=Tanya Ogilvie-White  |author5= Ankit Panda |author6=Manpreet Sethi |author7=Wilfred Wan |editor-last=Wan |editor-first=Wilfred |date=April 2020 |title=Nuclear Risk Reduction: Closing Pathways to Use |url=https://www.unidir.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/19%20Aug%202020%20%E2%80%94%20Nuclear%20Risk%20Reduction%20-%20Closing%20Pathways%20to%20Use.pdf |publisher=UNIDIR |access-date=July 13, 2023}}</ref>{{rp|10, 74, 154}} The following year, the India-based [[Observer Research Foundation]] co-authored an opinion piece with Manpreet Sethi, mentioning the reintroduction of the No First Use Act in both chambers of the US Congress as "hope rekindled" and noting that, given the reality of countries unwilling to give up their nuclear weapons, an NFU "allows nations to maintain a notional sense of security from their nuclear weapons, but significantly reduces possibilities of use".<ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.eurasiareview.com/17052021-acceptance-of-no-first-use-nfu-by-usa-hope-redux-oped/ |title=Acceptance Of No First Use (NFU) By USA: Hope Redux? – OpEd |author1=Observer Research Foundation |author-link1=Observer Research Foundation |last2=Sethi |first2=Manpreet |date=May 17, 2021 |website=Eurasia Review |access-date=August 3, 2023}}</ref> And in its effort to shape proposals and ideas on nuclear risk reduction "into a pathway to achieve the treaty-mandated disarmament end state of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," the Council on Strategic Risks places the universal adoption of NFU at "the starting gate for any process towards full nuclear disarmament."<ref>{{cite web |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/A-Practical-Strategy-for-Nuclear-Risk-Reduction-and-Disarmament_Fulfilling-the-Code-of-Nuclear-Responsibility_Briefer-17_2021_4_19.pdf |author1=Rear Admiral John Gower, CB OBE |author2=Christine Parthemore |title= Briefer No. 17. A Practical Strategy for Nuclear Risk Reduction and Disarmament: Fulfilling the Code of Nuclear Responsibility |date=April 19, 2021 |website=The Council on Strategic Risks |access-date=November 16, 2023}}</ref>{{rp|1, 10}}

==See also==
{{portal|Politics}}
* [[Nuclear disarmament]]
* [[Nuclear taboo]]

==References==
{{reflist}}

==Further reading==
* Feiveson, Harold A.; Hogendoorn, Ernst Jan: "No First Use of Nuclear Weapons", in: ''The Nonproliferation Review''. 10(2)/2003. The Center for Nonproliferation Studies, {{ISSN|1073-6700}}
* MacDonald, Rhona: "Nuclear Weapons 60 Years On: Still a Global Public Health Threat", in: ''PLoS Medicine''. 2(11)/2005. Public Library of Science, e301, {{ISSN|1549-1277}}
* Caitlin Talmadge, Lisa Michelini, Vipin Narang. "[https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/48/4/7/121305/When-Actions-Speak-Louder-Than-Words-Adversary When Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Adversary Perceptions of Nuclear No-First-Use Pledges]." ''International Security'' 2024; 48 (4): 7–46. 

{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:No First Use}}
[[Category:Foreign policy doctrines of India]]
[[Category:International law]]
[[Category:Military doctrines]]
[[Category:Nuclear strategy]]
[[Category:Chinese foreign policy]]