View source for OPEC

{{Short description|International petroleum organization}}
{{Distinguish|Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation}}
{{Good article}}
{{Use American English|date=July 2020}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=January 2023}}
{{Infobox country
| conventional_long_name = Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
| image_flag             = Flag of OPEC.svg
| image_coat             = Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Logo.svg
| symbol_type            = Emblem
| image_map              = OPEC and OPEC+.png
| image_map_caption      = OPEC and OPEC+ members
| org_type               = Organization<ref name=":3">{{Cite web |title=GLOSSARY |url=https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=O#opec |access-date=8 April 2024 |website=U.S. Energy Information Administration}}</ref><ref name=":7">{{Citation |last=Jelley |first=Nick |title=OPEC |date=2017-01-19 |work=A Dictionary of Energy Science |url=https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780191826276.001.0001/acref-9780191826276-e-475 |access-date=2024-04-08 |publisher=Oxford University Press |language=en |doi=10.1093/acref/9780191826276.001.0001 |isbn=978-0-19-182627-6|url-access=subscription }}</ref>
| membership_type        = Membership
| membership             = {{ubli|12 OPEC members|11 OPEC+ members|5 observer states}} See {{section link|#Membership}}
| admin_center_type      = Headquarters
| admin_center           = [[Vienna]], Austria
| official_languages     = English
| leader_title1          = [[List of Secretaries General of OPEC|Secretary General]]
| leader_name1           = [[Haitham al-Ghais]]
| established            = [[Baghdad]], Iraq
| established_event1     = Statute
| established_date1      = {{nowrap|{{Start date and age|September 1960|df=y|p=y}}}}
| established_event2     = In effect
| established_date2      = {{Start date and age|January 1961|df=y|p=y}}<!-- The article needs to explain the concept of currency for OPEC
| currency               = {{nowrap|Indexed as [[USD]] per [[Barrel (unit)|barrel]]}} ([[Price of oil|USD$/bbl]]) -->
| official_website       = {{URL|https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en|opec.org}}
| demonym                = 
| area_km2               = 
| area_rank              = 
| GDP_PPP                = 
| GDP_PPP_year           = 
| HDI                    = 
| HDI_year               = 
| today                  = 
}}

The '''Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries''' ('''OPEC''' {{IPAc-en|ˈ|oʊ|p|ɛ|k}} {{respell|OH|pek}}) is an organization enabling the co-operation of leading oil-producing and oil-dependent countries in order to collectively influence the global oil market and maximize [[Profit (economics)|profit]]. It was founded on 14 September 1960 in [[Baghdad]] by the first five members: [[Iran]], [[Iraq]], [[Kuwait]], [[Saudi Arabia]] and [[Venezuela]]. The organization, which currently comprises 12 member countries, accounted for 38 percent of [[List of countries by oil production|global oil production]], according to a 2022 report.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |title=Where our oil comes from - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) |url=https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/where-our-oil-comes-from.php |access-date=2024-03-26 |website=www.eia.gov}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=2022-05-03 |title=Opec: What is it and what is happening to oil prices? |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/business-61188579}}</ref> Additionally, it is estimated that 79.5 percent of the world's proven oil reserves are located within OPEC nations, with the [[Middle East]] alone accounting for 67.2 percent of OPEC's total reserves.<ref name=":52">Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. (2023). ''OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin'' (58th ed.), 90 pages. Retrieved from https://asb.opec.org/. ISSN: 0475-0608. (See pages 7 and 22).</ref><ref name=":62">{{Cite web |title=OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves |url=https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm}}</ref>

In a series of steps in the 1960s and 1970s, OPEC restructured the global system of oil production in favor of oil-producing states and away from an [[oligopoly]] of dominant Anglo-American oil firms (the "[[Seven Sisters (oil companies)|Seven Sisters]]").{{sfn|Colgan|2021|loc=The Rise of OPEC, pp. 59–93}} In the 1970s, [[1970s energy crisis|restrictions in oil production]] led to a dramatic rise in oil prices with long-lasting and far-reaching consequences for the global economy. Since the 1980s, OPEC has had a limited impact on world oil-supply and oil-price stability, as there is frequent cheating by members on their commitments to one another, and as member commitments reflect what they would do even in the absence of OPEC.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book |last=Colgan |first=Jeff D. |title=Partial Hegemony: Oil Politics and International Order |date=2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-754637-6 |pages=94–118 |chapter=The Stagnation of OPEC |doi=10.1093/oso/9780197546376.001.0001 |chapter-url=https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780197546376.001.0001/oso-9780197546376-chapter-4}}</ref>

The formation of OPEC marked a turning point toward [[Nationalization of oil supplies|national sovereignty over natural resources]]. OPEC decisions have come to play a prominent role in the global oil market and in [[Petroleum politics|international relations]]. Economists have characterized OPEC as a textbook example of a [[cartel]]<ref>
{{cite book |last1=LeClair |first1=Mark S. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hW6lDAAAQBAJ |title=International Commodity Markets and the Role of Cartels |date=8 July 2016 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-315-50088-1 |edition=reprint |publication-place=Abingdon |page=81 |chapter=The History and Evaluation of Significant commodity Cartels |quote=OPEC, the most notorious of the modern cartels, functioned effectively for only thirteen years. |access-date=11 June 2023 |orig-date=2000}} 
</ref> (a group whose members cooperate to reduce [[Competition (economics)|market competition]]) but one whose consultations may be protected by the doctrine of [[state immunity]] under international law.<ref>
{{cite book
 |last1                = Terhechte
 |first1               = Jörg Philipp
 |author-link1         = Jörg Philipp Terhechte
 |editor-last1         = Herrmann
 |editor-first1        = Christoph
 |editor-last2         = Terhechte
 |editor-first2        = Jörg Philipp
 |editor-link2         = Jörg Philipp Terhechte
 |date                 = 1 December 2009
 |chapter              = Applying European Competition Law to International Organizations: The Case of OPEC
 |title                = European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2010 
 |url                  = https://books.google.com/books?id=ugnfC6oFH2YC
 |publication-place    = Heidelberg
 |publisher            = Springer Science & Business Media
 |page                 = 195
 |isbn                 = 978-3-540-78883-6
 |access-date          = 11 June 2023
 |quote                = [...] the question whether OPEC's activities, those of its member states and those of the state-owned enterprises are protected by the principle of State Immunity is to be answered in accordance with the preconditions set by the UN Convention as an expression of common principles of International law. [...] The crucial question [...] in terms of International law is: 'Is OPEC engaged in commercial activities or not?'
}} 
</ref>

The {{As of|2018|June|alt=current OPEC members are|url=http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm|post=}} Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. The former members are Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, and Qatar.<ref>{{cite web |title=OPEC: Member Countries |url= https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm |website=opec.org |access-date= 22 April 2020}}</ref> '''OPEC+''' is a larger group consisting of OPEC members and other oil-producing countries; it was formed in late 2016 to better control the global crude oil market.<ref name="ope2">{{Cite magazine|last= Cohen |first= Ariel|author-link=Ariel Cohen|title=OPEC Is Dead, Long Live OPEC+ |url= https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2018/06/29/opec-is-dead-long-live-opec/ |url-status=live |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20190802092849/https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2018/06/29/opec-is-dead-long-live-opec/ |archive-date=2 August 2019 |access-date=2 August 2019 |magazine=[[Forbes]] | quote = The deal represents the latest successful policy effort by the 24 member supercartel, informally referred to as the 'Vienna Group' or 'OPEC+,' to put their thumb on the scale of global oil markets. And it's a huge thumb indeed. [...] OPEC's 14 members control 35 percent of global oil supplies and 82 percent of proven reserves. With the addition of the 10 Non-OPEC nations, notable among them Russia, Mexico and Kazakhstan, those shares increase to 55 percent and 90 percent respectively. This affords OPEC+ a level of influence over the world economy never seen before.}}
</ref> Canada, Egypt, Norway, and Oman are observer states.

==Organization and structure==
In a series of steps in the 1960s and 1970s, OPEC restructured the global system of oil production in favor of oil-producing states and away from an oligopoly of dominant Anglo-American oil firms (the Seven Sisters). Coordination among oil-producing states within OPEC made it easier for them to nationalize oil production and structure oil prices in their favor without incurring punishment by Western governments and firms. Prior to the creation of OPEC, individual oil-producing states were punished for taking steps to alter the governing arrangements of oil production within their borders. States were coerced militarily (e.g. in 1953, the US and UK sponsored a [[1953 Iranian coup d'état|coup against Mohammad Mosaddegh]] after his government nationalized Iran's oil production) or economically (e.g. the Seven Sisters slowed down oil production in one non-compliant state and ramped up oil production elsewhere) when they acted contrary to the interests of the Seven Sisters and their governments.{{sfn|Colgan|2021|loc=The Rise of OPEC, pp. 59–93}}

The organisational logic that underpins OPEC is that it is in the collective interest of its members to limit the world oil supply in order to reap higher prices.<ref name=":1" /> However, the main problem within OPEC is that it is individually rational for members to cheat on commitments and produce as much oil as possible.<ref name=":1" />

Political scientist Jeff Colgan has argued that OPEC has since the 1980s largely failed to achieve its goals (limits on world oil supply, stabilized prices, and raising of long-term average revenues).<ref name=":1" /> He finds that members have cheated on 96% of their commitments.<ref name=":1" /> The analysis spans over the period 1982–2009.{{sfn|Colgan|2021|pp=107–109}} To the extent that member states comply with their commitments, it is because the commitments reflect what they would do even if OPEC did not exist. One large reason for the frequent cheating is that OPEC does not punish members for non-compliance with commitments.<ref name=":1" />

In June 2020, all countries participating in the OPEC+ framework collectively agreed to the introduction of a Compensation Mechanism aimed at ensuring full conformity with and adherence to the agreed-upon oil production cuts. This initiative aligns with one of OPEC's stated objectives: to maintain a stable oil market, which, notably, has been relatively more stable than other energy commodities.<ref>{{Cite web |last=OPEC |first=Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries |date=15 July 2020 |orig-date= |title=JMMC sees improving market conditions and conformity levels |url=https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/6060.htm |access-date=4 April 2024 |publisher=OPEC}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=El Gamal |first=Rania |date=July 15, 2020 |editor-last=Edmund |editor-first=Blair |title=OPEC+ panel agrees on easing oil cuts, compensation plan, says OPEC+ source |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/oil-opec-talks-idINS8N28P02L/ |access-date=4 April 2024 |website=Reuters}}</ref>

=== Leadership and decision-making ===
{{See also|List of secretaries general of OPEC}}
[[File:158ava Reunión de países miembros de la OPEP (5251965558).jpg|thumb|alt=refer to caption|OPEC Conference delegates at [[Swissotel]], [[Quito]], [[Ecuador]], December 2010]]
The OPEC Conference is the supreme authority of the organisation, and consists of delegations normally headed by the oil ministers of member countries. The chief executive of the organisation is the [[List of Secretaries General of OPEC|OPEC secretary general]]. The conference ordinarily meets at the Vienna headquarters, at least twice a year and in additional extraordinary sessions when necessary. It generally operates on the principles of unanimity and "one member, one vote", with each country paying an equal membership fee into the annual budget.<ref name="statute">{{cite web |year=2012 |title=Statute |url=http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/OPEC_Statute.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141021084736/http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/OPEC_Statute.pdf |archive-date=21 October 2014 |access-date=12 December 2014 |publisher=OPEC}}</ref> However, since Saudi Arabia is by far the largest and most-profitable oil exporter in the world, with enough capacity to function as the traditional [[swing producer]] to balance the global market, it serves as "OPEC's ''de facto'' leader".<ref name="FT2015" />

=== International cartel ===
At various times, OPEC members have displayed apparent anti-competitive [[cartel]] behavior through the organisation's agreements about oil production and price levels.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Gülen |first=S. Gürcan |year=1996 |title=Is OPEC a Cartel? Evidence from Cointegration and Causality Tests |url=http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/WP318.pdf |url-status=unfit |journal=[[The Energy Journal]]|volume=17 |issue=2 |pages=43–57 |citeseerx=10.1.1.133.9886 |doi=10.5547/issn0195-6574-ej-vol17-no2-3 |bibcode=1996EnerJ..17...43G |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20000916172154/http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/WP318.pdf |archive-date=16 September 2000}}</ref> Economists often cite OPEC as a textbook example of a cartel that cooperates to reduce market competition, as in this definition from [[OECD]]'s ''Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law'':<ref name=cartel>{{cite web |url= http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/2376087.pdf |title= Glossary of Industrial Organization Economics and Competition Law |publisher=[[OECD]] |year=1993 |page=19 |access-date=22 December 2015 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20160304094916/http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/2376087.pdf |archive-date= 4 March 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref>

{{blockquote|International commodity agreements covering products such as coffee, sugar, tin and more recently oil (OPEC: Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) are examples of ''international cartels'' which have publicly entailed agreements between different national governments.}}

While OPEC is at times cited as a textbook example of a cartel, various authoritative and academic sources provide a broader perspective on the organization's role. For instance, the [[US Energy Information Administration]]'s<ref>{{Cite web |title=U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) |url=https://www.eia.gov/ |access-date=8 April 2024}}</ref> glossary explains OPEC as:<ref name=":3" />

{{Blockquote|text=An intergovernmental organization whose stated objective is to 'coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of member countries'.}}

The ''Oxford Dictionary of Energy Science'' (2017)<ref>{{Citation |last=Jelley |first=Nick |title=A Dictionary of Energy Science |date=2017-01-19 |url=https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780191826276.001.0001/acref-9780191826276 |access-date=2024-04-08 |publisher=Oxford University Press |language=en-US |doi=10.1093/acref/9780191826276.001.0001 |isbn=978-0-19-182627-6|url-access=subscription }}</ref> defines OPEC as:<ref name=":7" />

{{Blockquote|text=An organization set up in 1960 to coordinate petroleum policies among its member countries, initially with the aim of securing a regular supply to consuming countries at a price that gave a fair return on capital investment.|source=}}

OPEC members strongly prefer to describe their organisation as a modest force for market stabilisation, rather than a powerful anti-competitive cartel. In its defense, the organisation was founded as a counterweight against the previous "[[Seven Sisters (oil companies)|Seven Sisters]]" cartel of multinational oil companies, and non-OPEC energy suppliers have maintained enough market share for a substantial degree of worldwide competition.<ref>{{cite journal |date=June–July 2012 |title=The Global Energy Scene |url=http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/OB06_072012.pdf |url-status=live |journal=OPEC Bulletin |volume=43 |pages=24–41 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160909221208/http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/OB06_072012.pdf |archive-date=9 September 2016 |access-date=9 April 2016 |number=5}}</ref> Moreover, because of an economic "[[prisoner's dilemma]]" that encourages each member nation individually to discount its price and exceed its production quota,<ref>{{cite book |last1=Browning |first1=Edgar K. |url=http://www.wiley.com/college/browning/0471389161/pdf/ |title=Microeconomics: Theory & Applications |last2=Zupan |first2=Mark A. |date=2004 |publisher=Wiley |isbn=978-0-471-67871-7 |edition=8th |pages=394–396 |chapter=The Prisoner's Dilemma and Cheating by Cartel Members |access-date=5 September 2016 |chapter-url=http://www.wiley.com/college/browning/0471389161/pdf/ch14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160915032256/http://www.wiley.com/college/browning/0471389161/pdf/ |archive-date=15 September 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref> widespread cheating within OPEC often erodes its ability to influence global oil prices through [[Collective action problem|collective action]].<ref>{{cite news |last=Colgan |first=Jeff |date=16 June 2014 |title=OPEC, the Phantom Menace |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/16/opec-the-phantom-menace/ |url-status=live |access-date=9 November 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161110043953/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/16/opec-the-phantom-menace/ |archive-date=10 November 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Van de Graaf |first=Thijs |year=2016 |title=Is OPEC dead? Oil exporters, the Paris agreement and the transition to a post-carbon world |url=https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8137111/file/8137112.pdf |url-status=live |journal=Energy Research & Social Science |volume=23 |pages=182–188 |doi=10.1016/j.erss.2016.10.005 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190925074356/https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8137111/file/8137112.pdf |archive-date=25 September 2019 |access-date=25 September 2019 |hdl-access=free |hdl=1854/LU-8137111}}</ref> Political scientist Jeff Colgan has challenged the notion that OPEC is a cartel, pointing to endemic cheating in the organization: "A cartel needs to set tough goals and meet them; OPEC sets easy goals and fails to meet even those."<ref name=":1" />

OPEC has not been involved in any disputes related to the competition rules of the [[World Trade Organization]], even though the objectives, actions, and principles of the two organisations diverge considerably.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Farah |first1=Paolo Davide |last2=Cima |first2=Elena |date=September 2013 |title=Energy Trade and the WTO: Implications for Renewable Energy and the OPEC Cartel |journal=Journal of International Economic Law |volume=16 |issue=3 |pages=707–740 |doi=10.1093/jiel/jgt024 |ssrn=2330416}}</ref> A key US District Court decision held that OPEC consultations are protected as "governmental" acts of state by the [[Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act]], and are therefore beyond the legal reach of US [[competition law]] governing "commercial" acts.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Joelson |first1=Mark R. |last2=Griffin |first2=Joseph P. |year=1975 |title=The Legal Status of Nation-State Cartels Under United States Antitrust and Public International Law |journal=The International Lawyer |volume=9 |issue=4 |pages=617–645 |jstor=40704964}}</ref> Despite popular sentiment against OPEC, legislative proposals to limit the organisation's sovereign immunity, such as the [[NOPEC]] Act, have so far been unsuccessful.<ref>{{cite news |last=Learsy |first=Raymond J. |date=10 September 2012 |title=NOPEC ('No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act'): A Presidential Issue and a Test of Political Integrity |work=HuffPost |url=https://www.huffingtonpost.com/raymond-j-learsy/nopec-no-oil-producing-an_b_1869803.html |url-status=live |access-date=6 April 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170603111612/http://www.huffingtonpost.com/raymond-j-learsy/nopec-no-oil-producing-an_b_1869803.html |archive-date=3 June 2017 |quote=Varied forms of a NOPEC bill have been introduced some 16 times since 1999, only to be vehemently resisted by the oil industry.}}</ref>

===Conflicts===
OPEC often has difficulty agreeing on policy decisions because its member countries differ widely in their oil export capacities, production costs, reserves, geological features, population, economic development, budgetary situations, and political circumstances.<ref name="MEES" /><ref name="discordant" /> Indeed, over the course of market cycles, oil reserves can themselves become a source of serious conflict, instability and imbalances, in what economists call the "[[Resource curse#Effects|natural resource curse]]".<ref>{{cite journal |last=Palley |first=Thomas I. |date=December 2003 |title=Lifting the Natural Resource Curse |url=https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/198/40112.html |url-status=live |journal=[[Foreign Service Journal]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160520023419/https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/198/40112.html |archive-date=20 May 2016 |access-date=26 April 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Ross |first=Michael L. |date=May 2015 |title=What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse? |url=https://escholarship.org/content/qt8tp5x1hb/qt8tp5x1hb.pdf?t=qay04b |journal=[[Annual Review of Political Science]] |volume=18 |pages=239–259 |doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359 |doi-access=free}}</ref> A further complication is that religion-linked [[List of conflicts in the Middle East|conflicts in the Middle East]] are recurring features of the geopolitical landscape for this oil-rich region.<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Kessler|first=Oren|author-link=Oren Kessler|date=13 February 2016|title=The Middle East's Conflicts Are About Religion|magazine=[[The National Interest]]|url=http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-middle-easts-conflicts-are-about-religion-15205?page=show|url-status=live|access-date=17 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160326124531/http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-middle-easts-conflicts-are-about-religion-15205?page=show|archive-date=26 March 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last=Motadel |first=David |date=24 May 2015 |title='Defending the Faith' in the Middle East |newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/24/opinion/sunday/defending-the-faith-in-the-middle-east.html |url-status=live |access-date=17 March 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150908005002/http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/24/opinion/sunday/defending-the-faith-in-the-middle-east.html |archive-date=8 September 2015}}</ref> Internationally important conflicts in OPEC's history have included the [[Six-Day War]] (1967), [[Yom Kippur War]] (1973), a [[OPEC siege|hostage siege directed by Palestinian militants]] (1975), the [[Iranian Revolution]] (1979), the [[Iran–Iraq War]] (1980–1988), the [[Gulf War|Iraqi occupation of Kuwait]] (1990–1991), the [[September 11 attacks]] (2001), the [[History of Iraq (2003–2011)|American occupation of Iraq]] (2003–2011), the [[conflict in the Niger Delta]] (2004–present), the [[Arab Spring]] (2010–2012), the [[Libyan crisis]] (2011–present), and the international [[Embargo against Iran]] (2012–2016). Although events such as these can temporarily disrupt oil supplies and elevate prices, the frequent disputes and instabilities tend to limit OPEC's long-term cohesion and effectiveness.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |year=2004 |title=Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) |encyclopedia=Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa |publisher=Gale / Macmillan Reference USA |location=Detroit |url=http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/OPEC.aspx |access-date=10 April 2016 |editor-last=Mattar |editor-first=Philip |editor-link=Philip Mattar |edition=2nd |volume=3 |isbn=978-0-02-865769-1 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160409042033/http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/OPEC.aspx |archive-date=9 April 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref>

==History and impact==

===Post-WWII situation===
In 1949, [[United States of Venezuela|Venezuela]] initiated the move towards the establishment of what would become OPEC, by inviting Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to exchange views and explore avenues for more regular and closer communication among petroleum-exporting nations as the world recovered from [[World War&nbsp;II]].<ref name="open">{{Cite web |url=http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/GenInfo.pdf |title=General Information |date=May 2012 |work=OPEC |access-date=13 April 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140413233306/http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/GenInfo.pdf |archive-date=13 April 2014 |url-status=live }}</ref> At the time, some of the world's largest [[List of oil fields|oil fields]] were just entering production in the Middle East. The United States had established the [[Interstate Oil Compact Commission]] to join the [[Texas Railroad Commission]] in limiting overproduction. The US was simultaneously the world's largest producer and consumer of oil; the world market was dominated by a group of [[multinational companies]] known as the "[[Seven Sisters (oil companies)|Seven Sisters]]", five of which were headquartered in the US following the breakup of [[John D. Rockefeller]]'s original [[Standard Oil]] monopoly. Oil-exporting countries were eventually motivated to form OPEC as a counterweight to this concentration of political and [[economic power]].<ref name="prize" />

===1959–1960: Anger from exporting countries===
In February 1959, as new supplies were becoming available, the multinational oil companies (MOCs) unilaterally reduced their posted prices for Venezuelan and Middle Eastern crude oil by 10 percent. Weeks later, the [[Arab League]]'s first [[Arab Petroleum Congress]] convened in Cairo, Egypt, where the influential journalist [[Wanda Jablonski]] introduced Saudi Arabia's [[Abdullah Tariki]] to Venezuela's observer [[Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo]], representing the two then-largest oil-producing nations outside the United States and the Soviet Union. Both oil ministers were angered by the price cuts, and the two led their fellow delegates to establish the Maadi Pact or [[Gentlemen's agreement|Gentlemen's Agreement]], calling for an "Oil Consultation Commission" of exporting countries, to which MOCs should present price-change plans. Jablonski reported a marked hostility toward the West and a growing outcry against "[[absentee landlord]]ism" of the MOCs, which at the time controlled all oil operations within the exporting countries and wielded enormous political influence. In August 1960, ignoring the warnings, and with the US favoring Canadian and Mexican oil for strategic reasons, the MOCs again unilaterally announced significant cuts in their posted prices for Middle Eastern crude oil.<ref name="open"/><ref name="prize">{{cite book |first=Daniel |last=Yergin |author-link=Daniel Yergin |title=The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power |location=New York |publisher=Simon & Schuster |year=1991 |isbn=978-0-671-50248-5 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/prize00dani/page/499 499–503] |title-link=The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Painter |first=David S. |year=2012 |title=Oil and the American Century |journal=[[The Journal of American History]] |volume=99 |issue=1 |pages=24–39 |doi=10.1093/jahist/jas073 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bBvz_YxlB-AC&pg=PA7 |title=Historical Dictionary of the Petroleum Industry |first=M.S. |last=Vassiliou |publisher=Scarecrow Press |year=2009 |isbn=978-0-8108-6288-3 |page=7}}</ref>

===1960–1975: Founding and expansion===
[[File:Wien - OPEC-Zentrale (b).JPG|thumb|alt=refer to caption|OPEC headquarters in Vienna (2009 building)]]
The following month, during 10–14 September 1960, the Baghdad Conference was held at the initiative of Tariki, Pérez Alfonzo, and Iraqi prime minister [[Abd al-Karim Qasim]], whose country had skipped the 1959 congress.<ref name=":0">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8U_sWfvgToQC&pg=PA74 |last=Styan |first=David |title=France and Iraq: Oil, Arms and French Policy Making in the Middle East |publisher=I.B. Tauris |date=2006 |page=74 |isbn=978-1-84511-045-1}}</ref> Government representatives from Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela met in [[Baghdad]] to discuss ways to increase the price of crude oil produced by their countries, and ways to respond to unilateral actions by the MOCs. Despite strong US opposition: "Together with Arab and non-Arab producers, Saudi Arabia formed the Organization of Petroleum Export Countries (OPEC) to secure the best price available from the major oil corporations."<ref>{{cite book |last=Citino |first= Nathan J. |year=2002 |title=From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa'ud, and the Making of US-Saudi Relations |url=https://archive.org/details/fromarabnational00nath |url-access=limited |location=Bloomington |publisher=[[Indiana University Press]] |isbn=978-0-253-34095-5 |page=[https://archive.org/details/fromarabnational00nath/page/n20 4]}}</ref> The Middle Eastern members originally called for OPEC headquarters to be in Baghdad or Beirut, but Venezuela argued for a neutral location, and so the organization chose [[Geneva]], Switzerland. On 1 September 1965, OPEC moved to [[Vienna]], Austria, after Switzerland declined to extend [[diplomatic privileges]].<ref>{{cite book |last=Skeet |first=Ian |title=OPEC: Twenty-Five Years of Prices and Politics |location=Cambridge |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=1988 |page=24 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Jg80AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA24 |isbn=978-0-521-40572-0 |access-date=17 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160617124502/https://books.google.com/books?id=Jg80AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA24 |archive-date=17 June 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> At the time, Switzerland was attempting to reduce their foreign population and the OPEC was the first intergovernmental body to leave the country because of restrictions on foreigners.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2209&dat=19650629&id=zhpbAAAAIBAJ&sjid=404NAAAAIBAJ&pg=7157,5955607|title=Switzerland Reduces Her Foreign Population|language=en|work=The Telegraph|date=1965-06-29}}</ref> Austria was keen to attract international organizations and offered attractive terms to the OPEC.<ref>{{Cite web |title=OPEC: Thank you Austria – thank you Vienna! |url=https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/3157.htm |access-date=2023-06-02 |website=www.opec.org}}</ref>

During the early years of OPEC, the oil-producing countries had a 50/50 profit agreement with the oil companies.{{sfn|Colgan|2021|loc=The Rise of OPEC, pp. 73–78}} OPEC bargained with the dominant oil companies (the Seven Sisters), but OPEC faced coordination problems among its members.{{sfn|Colgan|2021|loc=The Rise of OPEC, pp. 73–78}} If one OPEC member demanded too much from the oil companies, then the oil companies could slow down production in that country and ramp up production elsewhere.{{sfn|Colgan|2021|loc=The Rise of OPEC, pp. 73–78}} The 50/50 agreements were still in place until 1970 when Libya negotiated a 58/42 agreement with the oil company [[Occidental Petroleum|Occidental]], which prompted other OPEC members to request better agreements with oil companies.{{sfn|Colgan|2021|loc=The Rise of OPEC, pp. 73–78}}> In 1971, an accord was signed between major oil companies and members of OPEC doing business in the [[Mediterranean Sea]] region, called the ''Tripoli Agreement''. The agreement, signed on 2 April 1971, raised oil prices and increased producing countries' profit shares.<ref name="OPEC_1971_Tripoli_Agreement">[[Marius Vassiliou]] (2009). Historical Dictionary of the Petroleum Industry. Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press. {{ISBN|0-8108-5993-9}}.</ref>

During 1961–1975, the five founding nations were joined by [[Qatar]] (1961), [[Indonesia]] (1962–2008, rejoined 2014–2016), [[Kingdom of Libya|Libya]] (1962), [[United Arab Emirates]] (originally just the [[Emirate of Abu Dhabi]], 1967), [[Algeria]] (1969), [[Nigeria]] (1971), [[Ecuador]] (1973–1992, 2007–2020), and [[Gabon]] (1975–1994, rejoined 2016).<ref name="OPEC Member">{{cite web |url=http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm |title=Member Countries |access-date=7 January 2020 |work=OPEC |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200107050155/https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm |archive-date=7 January 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref> By the early 1970s, OPEC's membership accounted for more than half of worldwide oil production.<ref name=MarketShare/> Indicating that OPEC is not averse to further expansion, [[Mohammed Barkindo]], OPEC's acting secretary general in 2006, urged his African neighbors Angola and Sudan to join,<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/energy/4374140.html |title=Angola, Sudan to ask for OPEC membership |agency=Associated Press |date=3 December 2006 |access-date=4 December 2006 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110604205524/http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/energy/4374140.html |archive-date=4 June 2011 |url-status=live }}</ref> and [[Angola]] did in 2007, followed by [[Equatorial Guinea]] in 2017.<ref name=May2017Vienna>{{cite press release |url=http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/4305.htm |title=OPEC 172nd Meeting concludes |publisher=OPEC |date=11 March 2019 |access-date=26 May 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170527214657/http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/4305.htm |archive-date=27 May 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref> Since the 1980s, representatives from Canada, Egypt, Mexico, Norway, Oman, Russia, and other oil-exporting nations have attended many OPEC meetings as observers, as an informal mechanism for coordinating policies.<ref name=observers>{{cite news |url=http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/09/opec-fifty-years-regulating-oil-market-roller-coaster/ |title=OPEC: Fifty Years Regulating Oil Market Roller Coaster |agency=Inter Press Service |date=14 September 2010 |access-date=23 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151224104031/http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/09/opec-fifty-years-regulating-oil-market-roller-coaster/ |archive-date=24 December 2015 |url-status=live }}</ref>

===1973–1974: Oil embargo===
{{Main|1973 oil crisis}}
[[File:GASOLINE SHORTAGE HIT THE STATE OF OREGON IN THE FALL OF 1973 BY MIDDAY GASOLINE WAS BECOMING UNAVAILABLE ALONG... - NARA - 555405.jpg|thumb|alt=refer to caption|An undersupplied US gasoline station, closed during the oil embargo in 1973]]
The oil market was tight in the early 1970s, which reduced the risks for OPEC members in nationalising their oil production. One of the major fears for OPEC members was that nationalisation would cause a steep decline in the price of oil. This prompted a wave of nationalisations in countries such as Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. With greater control over oil production decisions and amid high oil prices, OPEC members unilaterally raised oil prices in 1973, prompting the 1973 oil crisis.{{sfn|Colgan|2021|loc=The Rise of OPEC, pp. 79–85}}

In October 1973, the [[Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries|Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries]] (OAPEC, consisting of the Arab majority of OPEC plus Egypt and Syria) declared significant production cuts and an oil [[embargo]] against the United States and other industrialized nations that supported Israel in the [[Yom Kippur War]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kumins|first=Lawrence|date=1975|title=Oil and the Economy|journal=Energy Shock|page=189}}</ref><ref name="Maugeri2006" /> A [[1967 Oil Embargo|previous embargo attempt]] was largely ineffective in response to the [[Six-Day War]] in 1967.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v34/d266 |publisher=US Department of State |title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. XXXIV: Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues, Document 266 |date=1999 |access-date=28 April 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160604103018/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v34/d266 |archive-date=4 June 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> However, in 1973, the result was a sharp rise in oil prices and OPEC revenues, from US$3/bbl to US$12/bbl, and an emergency period of energy [[rationing]], intensified by panic reactions, a declining trend in US oil production, currency devaluations,<ref name="Maugeri2006">{{cite book |first=Leonardo |last=Maugeri |title=The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World's Most Controversial Resource |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JWmx5uKA6gIC |date=2006 |publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group |isbn=978-0-275-99008-4 |pages=112–116 |access-date=20 June 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160501230353/https://books.google.com/books?id=JWmx5uKA6gIC&printsec=frontcover |archive-date=1 May 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> and a lengthy UK coal-miners dispute. For a time, the UK imposed an emergency [[Three-Day Week|three-day workweek]].<ref>{{cite web |title=British Economics and Trade Union politics 1973–1974 |url=http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/releases/2005/nyo/politics.htm |publisher=The National Archives (UK) |date=January 2005 |access-date=29 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070609060809/http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/releases/2005/nyo/politics.htm |archive-date=9 June 2007 |url-status=live }}</ref> Seven European nations banned non-essential Sunday driving.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1973/11/26/page/7/article/europe-car-ban-becoming-a-real-traffic-stopper |title=Europe car ban becoming a real traffic stopper |newspaper=Chicago Tribune |date=26 November 1973 |access-date=6 January 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160219093149/http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1973/11/26/page/7/article/europe-car-ban-becoming-a-real-traffic-stopper/ |archive-date=19 February 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> US gas stations limited the amount of petrol that could be dispensed, closed on Sundays, and restricted the days when petrol could be purchased, based on number plate numbers.<ref>{{cite book |title=How We Got Here: The '70s |last=Frum |first=David |author-link=David Frum |year=2000 |publisher=[[Basic Books]] |isbn=978-0-465-04195-4 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/howwegothere70sd00frum/page/313 313–318] |url=https://archive.org/details/howwegothere70sd00frum/page/313 }}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine |url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,942763,00.html |title=Gas Fever: Happiness Is a Full Tank |magazine=Time |date=18 February 1974 |access-date=30 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100922191457/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,942763,00.html |archive-date=22 September 2010 }}</ref> Even after the embargo ended in March 1974, following intense diplomatic activity, prices continued to rise. The world experienced a [[1973–1975 recession|global economic recession]], with [[stagflation|unemployment and inflation surging simultaneously]], steep declines in stock and bond prices, major shifts in [[trade balance]]s and [[petrodollar recycling|petrodollar flows]], and a dramatic end to the [[Post–World War II economic expansion|post-WWII economic boom]].<ref>{{cite book |first=Robert |last=Skidelsky |title=Keynes: The Return of the Master |year=2009 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/keynesreturnofma0000skid/page/116 116–126] |isbn=978-1-84614-258-1 |publisher=Allen Lane |title-link=Keynes: The Return of the Master }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Masouros |first=Pavlos E. |title=Corporate Law and Economic Stagnation: How Shareholder Value and Short-Termism Contribute to the Decline of the Western Economies |publisher=Eleven International Publishing |year=2013 |pages=60–62}}</ref>

[[File:Women Uses Her Home Fireplace for Heat. A Newspaper Headline before Her Tells of the Community's Lack of Heating Oil 10-1973 (4271701391).jpg|thumb|alt=refer to caption|A woman uses wood in a fireplace for heat. A newspaper headline in the foreground shows a story regarding a lack of heating oil in the community.]]
The 1973–1974 oil embargo had lasting effects on the United States and other industrialized nations, which established the [[International Energy Agency]] in response, as well as national [[Global strategic petroleum reserves|emergency stockpiles]] designed to withstand months of future supply disruptions. Oil [[Energy conservation|conservation]] efforts included lower speed limits on highways, smaller and more [[Efficient energy use|energy-efficient]] cars and appliances, year-round [[daylight saving time]], reduced usage of [[HVAC|heating and air-conditioning]], better [[building insulation]], increased support of [[mass transit]], and greater emphasis on [[coal]], [[natural gas]], [[ethanol fuel|ethanol]], [[nuclear power|nuclear]] and other [[alternative energy]] sources. These long-term efforts became effective enough that US oil consumption rose only 11 percent during 1980–2014, while [[real GDP]] rose 150 percent. But in the 1970s, OPEC nations demonstrated convincingly that their oil could be used as both a political and economic weapon against other nations, at least in the short term.<ref name="Maugeri2006"/><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.history.com/topics/energy-crisis |title=Energy Crisis (1970s) |publisher=[[The History Channel]] |year=2010 |access-date=25 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160624152753/http://www.history.com/topics/energy-crisis |archive-date=24 June 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.envirothonpa.org/documents/The1973OilCrisis.pdf |title=The 1973 Oil Crisis |publisher=Pennsylvania Envirothon |first=Sarah |last=Horton |date=October 2000 |access-date=16 February 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120711030710/http://www.envirothonpa.org/documents/The1973OilCrisis.pdf |archive-date=11 July 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |url=http://www.socialismtoday.org/51/opec.html |title=Oil Shock: The role of OPEC |journal=Socialism Today |issue=51 |date=October 2000 |access-date=30 November 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150216024014/http://www.socialismtoday.org/51/opec.html |archive-date=16 February 2015 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://nationalinterest.org/feature/twilight-the-petrostate-16235?page=show |title=Twilight of the Petrostate |first1=Petr |last1=Aven |first2=Vladimir |last2=Nazarov |first3=Samvel |last3=Lazaryan |journal=The National Interest |date=17 May 2016 |access-date=2 June 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160522201053/http://nationalinterest.org/feature/twilight-the-petrostate-16235?page=show |archive-date=22 May 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref>

The embargo also meant that a section of the [[Non-Aligned Movement]] saw power as a source of hope for their [[developing countries]]. The Algerian president [[Houari Boumédiène]] expressed this hope in a speech at the UN's sixth Special Session, in April 1974:

{{blockquote|The OPEC action is really the first illustration and at the same time the most concrete and most spectacular illustration of the importance of raw material prices for our countries, the vital need for the producing countries to operate the levers of price control, and lastly, the great possibilities of a union of raw material producing countries. This action should be viewed by the developing countries as an example and a source of hope.<ref>Tony Smith, Configurations of Power in North-South Relations since 1945. ''Industrial Organisation'' 31:1 (Winter 1977) p. 4</ref>}}

===1975–1980: Special Fund, now the OPEC Fund for International Development===
{{Main|OPEC Fund for International Development}}
OPEC's [[international aid]] activities date from well before the 1973–1974 oil price surge. For example, the [[Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development]] has operated since 1961.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.kuwait-fund.org/timeLine/?lang=en |title=Timeline |publisher=Kuwait Fund |access-date=23 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151224104007/https://www.kuwait-fund.org/timeLine/?lang=en |archive-date=24 December 2015 |url-status=live }}</ref>

In the years after 1973, as an example of so-called "[[checkbook diplomacy]]", certain Arab nations have been among the world's largest providers of foreign aid,<ref>{{cite book |chapter-url=http://faculty.georgetown.edu/imo3/petrod/petro2.htm |chapter=Economics of Petrodollars |title=The Economic Dimensions of Middle Eastern History |pages=179–199 |author-link=Ibrahim Oweiss |first=Ibrahim M. |last=Oweiss |editor-first1=Haleh |editor-last1=Esfandiari |editor-first2=A.L. |editor-last2=Udovitch |publisher=Darwin Press |date=1990 |access-date=19 October 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/world/middleeast/cables-released-by-wikileaks-reveal-saudis-checkbook-diplomacy.html |title=Cables Released by WikiLeaks Reveal Saudis' Checkbook Diplomacy |first=Ben |last=Hubbard |newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|date=21 June 2015 |access-date=19 October 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161221173312/http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/world/middleeast/cables-released-by-wikileaks-reveal-saudis-checkbook-diplomacy.html |archive-date=21 December 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> and OPEC added to its goals the selling of oil for the socio-economic growth of poorer nations. The OPEC Special Fund was conceived in [[Algiers, Algeria]], in March 1975, and was formally established the following January. "A Solemn Declaration 'reaffirmed the natural solidarity which unites OPEC countries with other developing countries in their struggle to overcome underdevelopment,' and called for measures to strengthen cooperation between these countries... [The OPEC Special Fund's] resources are additional to those already made available by OPEC states through a number of bilateral and multilateral channels."<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ofid.org/ABOUT-US |title=About Us |work=OFID |access-date=13 January 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160103213950/http://www.ofid.org/ABOUT-US |archive-date=3 January 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> The Fund became an official international development agency in May 1980 and was renamed the [[OPEC Fund for International Development]],<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ofid.org/Portals/0/Publications/Special%20Publications/AE-engl.pdf |title=The Agreement Establishing the OPEC Fund for International Development |work=OPEC |date=27 May 1980 |access-date=12 January 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170424183934/http://www.ofid.org/Portals/0/Publications/Special%20Publications/AE-engl.pdf |archive-date=24 April 2017 }}</ref> with Permanent Observer status at the United Nations.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/intergovernmental-organizations/ |title=Intergovernmental Organizations |newspaper=United Nations |access-date=28 April 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170806153518/http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/intergovernmental-organizations/ |archive-date=6 August 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2020, the institution ceased using the abbreviation OFID.

===1975: Hostage siege===

{{Main|OPEC siege}}
On 21 December 1975, Saudi Arabia's [[Ahmed Zaki Yamani]], Iran's [[Jamshid Amuzegar]], and the other OPEC oil ministers were taken hostage at their semi-annual conference in [[Vienna, Austria]]. The attack, which killed three non-ministers, was orchestrated by a six-person team led by Venezuelan terrorist "[[Carlos the Jackal]]", and which included [[Gabriele Kröcher-Tiedemann]] and [[Hans-Joachim Klein]]. The self-named "Arm of the Arab Revolution" group declared its goal to be the liberation of [[Palestine (region)|Palestine]]. Carlos planned to take over the conference by force and hold for ransom all eleven attending oil ministers, except for Yamani and Amuzegar who were to be executed.<ref name=jackal/>

Carlos arranged bus and plane travel for his team and 42 of the original 63 hostages, with stops in [[Algiers]] and [[Tripoli, Libya|Tripoli]], planning to fly eventually to [[Baghdad]], where Yamani and Amuzegar were to be killed. All 30 non-Arab hostages were released in Algiers, excluding Amuzegar. Additional hostages were released at another stop in Tripoli before returning to Algiers. With only 10 hostages remaining, Carlos held a phone conversation with Algerian president [[Houari Boumédienne|Houari Boumédiène]], who informed Carlos that the oil ministers' deaths would result in an attack on the plane. Boumédienne must also have offered Carlos asylum at this time and possibly financial compensation for failing to complete his assignment. Carlos expressed his regret at not being able to murder Yamani and Amuzegar, then he and his comrades left the plane. All the hostages and terrorists walked away from the situation, two days after it began.<ref name=jackal/>

Sometime after the attack, Carlos's accomplices revealed that the operation was commanded by [[Wadie Haddad]], a founder of the [[Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine]]. They also claimed that the idea and funding came from an Arab president, widely thought to be [[Muammar Gaddafi]] of Libya, itself an OPEC member. Fellow militants [[Bassam Abu Sharif]] and Klein claimed that Carlos received and kept a ransom between $20&nbsp;million and US$50&nbsp;million from "an Arab president". Carlos claimed that Saudi Arabia paid ransom on behalf of Iran, but that the money was "diverted en route and lost by the Revolution".<ref name=jackal>{{cite web |url=http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/terrorists_spies/terrorists/jackal/12.html |title=Carlos the Jackal: Trail of Terror |publisher=truTV |first=Patrick |last=Bellamy |url-status=unfit |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120107125703/http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/terrorists_spies/terrorists/jackal/12.html |archive-date=7 January 2012 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3t5jtM2faD8C&pg=PA102 |title=Jackal: The Complete Story of the Legendary Terrorist, Carlos the Jackal |first=John |last=Follain |publisher=Arcade Publishing |year=1998 |isbn=978-1-55970-466-3 |page=102 |access-date=13 January 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160503194550/https://books.google.com/books?id=3t5jtM2faD8C&pg=PA102 |archive-date=3 May 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> He was finally captured in 1994 and is serving life sentences for at least 16 other murders.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://news.sky.com/story/carlos-the-jackal-jailed-over-1974-paris-grenade-attack-10816476 |title='Carlos the Jackal' jailed over 1974 Paris grenade attack |first=Gary |last=Anderson |publisher=Sky News |date=28 March 2017 |access-date=22 April 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170328141244/http://news.sky.com/story/carlos-the-jackal-jailed-over-1974-paris-grenade-attack-10816476 |archive-date=28 March 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref>

===1979–1980: Oil crisis and 1980s oil glut===
{{Main|1979 oil crisis|1980s oil glut}}
[[File:Opecrev.gif|thumb|alt=refer to caption|Fluctuations of OPEC net oil export revenues since 1972<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/OPEC_Revenues/OPEC.html |title=OPEC Revenues Fact Sheet |publisher=US Energy Information Administration |date=10 January 2006 |url-status=unfit |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080107014809/http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/OPEC_Revenues/OPEC.html |archive-date=7 January 2008 }}</ref><ref name=EIA2015/>]]
In response to a wave of [[oil nationalization]]s and the high prices of the 1970s, industrial nations took steps to reduce their dependence on OPEC oil, especially after prices reached new peaks approaching US$40/bbl in 1979–1980<ref>{{cite news |title=Oil Prices Pass Record Set in '80s, but Then Recede |date=3 March 2008 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/03/business/worldbusiness/03cnd-oil.html |newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|first=Jad |last=Mouawad |access-date=11 February 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170307021046/http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/03/business/worldbusiness/03cnd-oil.html |archive-date=7 March 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-05-18/saudi-aramco-ipo-big-oil-s-world-is-changing |title=It's Saudi Arabia's World. Big Oil Just Lives in It |first=Liam |last=Denning |publisher=Bloomberg News |date=18 May 2016 |access-date=10 March 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170203211205/https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-05-18/saudi-aramco-ipo-big-oil-s-world-is-changing |archive-date=3 February 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref> when the [[Iranian Revolution]] and [[Iran–Iraq War]] disrupted regional stability and oil supplies. Electric utilities worldwide switched from oil to coal, natural gas, or nuclear power;<ref>{{cite journal |title=Oil and nuclear power: Past, present, and future |first1=Ferenc L. |last1=Toth |first2=Hans-Holger |last2=Rogner |journal=Energy Economics |volume=28 |issue=1 |date=January 2006 |pages=1–25 |url=http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/Pess/assets/oil+np_toth+rogner0106.pdf |doi=10.1016/j.eneco.2005.03.004 |bibcode=2006EneEc..28....1T |access-date=30 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071203152254/http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/Pess/assets/oil%2Bnp_toth%2Brogner0106.pdf |archive-date=3 December 2007 |url-status=live }}</ref> national governments initiated multibillion-dollar research programs to develop alternatives to oil;<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/renewable_factsheet.pdf |title=Renewables in Global Energy Supply: An IEA Fact Sheet |publisher=International Energy Agency |date=January 2007 |access-date=30 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303220128/https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/renewable_factsheet.pdf |archive-date=3 March 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite press release |url=http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=2718&ArticleID=9542 |title=Renewable Energy: World Invests $244 billion in 2012, Geographic Shift to Developing Countries |publisher=United Nations Environment Programme |date=12 June 2013 |access-date=30 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304110442/http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=2718&ArticleID=9542 |archive-date=4 March 2016 |url-status=dead }}{{cbignore}}</ref> and commercial exploration developed major non-OPEC oilfields in Siberia, Alaska, the North Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1cJhK-Sd8QgC&pg=PT95 |title=American Power and the Prospects for International Order |first=Simon |last=Bromley |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |year=2013 |isbn=978-0-7456-5841-4 |page=95 |access-date=30 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160617111649/https://books.google.com/books?id=1cJhK-Sd8QgC&pg=PT95 |archive-date=17 June 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> By 1986, daily worldwide demand for oil dropped by 5&nbsp;million barrels, non-OPEC production rose by an even-larger amount,<ref name=Robert/> and OPEC's market share sank from approximately 50 percent in 1979 to less than 30 percent in 1985.<ref name=MarketShare>{{cite news |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/interactives/2016-how-opec-won-the-battle-and-lost-the-war/ |title=How OPEC Won the Battle and Lost the War |first=Liam |last=Denning |publisher=Bloomberg News |date=1 June 2016 |access-date=22 February 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170222193958/https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/interactives/2016-how-opec-won-the-battle-and-lost-the-war/ |archive-date=22 February 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref> Illustrating the volatile multi-year timeframes of typical market cycles for natural resources, the result was a six-year decline in the price of oil, which culminated by plunging more than half in 1986 alone.<ref>{{cite news |title=Worrying Anew Over Oil Imports |newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|date=30 December 1989 |first=Robert D. Jr. |last=Hershey |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/30/business/worrying-anew-over-oil-imports.html?pagewanted=all |access-date=11 February 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170612035248/http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/30/business/worrying-anew-over-oil-imports.html?pagewanted=all |archive-date=12 June 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref> As one oil analyst summarized succinctly: "When the price of something as essential as oil spikes, humanity does two things: finds more of it and finds ways to use less of it."<ref name=MarketShare/>

To combat falling revenue from oil sales, in 1982 Saudi Arabia pressed OPEC for audited national [[production quota]]s in an attempt to limit output and boost prices. When other OPEC nations failed to comply, Saudi Arabia first slashed its own production from 10&nbsp;million barrels daily in 1979–1981 to just one-third of that level in 1985. When even this proved ineffective, Saudi Arabia reversed course and flooded the market with cheap oil, causing prices to fall below US$10/bbl and higher-cost producers to become unprofitable.<ref name=Robert/><ref name=Ali/>{{rp|127–128,136–137}}

These strategic measures by Saudi Arabia to regulate oil prices had profound economic repercussions. As the swing producer in that period, the Kingdom faced significant economic strain. Its revenues dramatically decreased from $119 billion in 1981 to $26 billion by 1985, leading to substantial [[Deficit spending|budget deficits]] and a doubling of its debt, reaching 100% of the Gross Domestic Product.<ref name="Ali2">{{cite book |last1=Al-Naimi |first1=Ali |title=Out of the Desert |date=2016 |publisher=Portfolio Penguin |isbn=978-0-241-27925-0 |location=Great Britain |pages=136–137}}</ref>{{rp|136–137}}

Faced with increasing economic hardship (which ultimately contributed to the collapse of the [[Soviet bloc]] in 1989),<ref>{{cite web |title=The Soviet Collapse: Grain and Oil |author-link=Yegor Gaidar |first=Yegor |last=Gaidar |publisher=[[American Enterprise Institute]] |date=April 2007 |access-date=12 January 2016 |url=https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/20070419_Gaidar.pdf |quote=Oil production in Saudi Arabia increased fourfold, while oil prices collapsed by approximately the same amount in real terms. As a result, the Soviet Union lost approximately $20 billion per year, money without which the country simply could not survive. |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304021426/https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/20070419_Gaidar.pdf |archive-date=4 March 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=The Economics Behind the Fall of the Berlin Wall |first=Ryan |last=McMaken |publisher=[[Mises Institute]] |date=7 November 2014 |access-date=12 January 2016 |url=https://mises.org/library/economics-behind-fall-berlin-wall |quote=High oil prices in the 1970s propped up the regime so well, that had it not been for Soviet oil sales, it's quite possible the regime would have collapsed a decade earlier. |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160306150734/https://mises.org/library/economics-behind-fall-berlin-wall |archive-date=6 March 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> the "[[Free rider problem|free-riding]]" oil exporters that had previously failed to comply with OPEC agreements finally began to limit production to shore up prices, based on painstakingly negotiated national quotas that sought to balance oil-related and economic criteria since 1986.<ref name="Robert">{{cite book |last=Robert |first=Paul |year=2004 |title=The End of Oil: The Decline of the Petroleum Economy and the Rise of a New Energy Order |location=New York |publisher=[[Houghton Mifflin Company]] |isbn=978-0-618-23977-1 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/endofoilonedgeof00robe_0/page/103 103–104] |url=https://archive.org/details/endofoilonedgeof00robe_0/page/103 }}</ref><ref name="Brief History">{{cite web |url=http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm |title=Brief History |work=OPEC |access-date=16 February 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130228051108/http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm |archive-date=28 February 2013 |url-status=live }}</ref> (Within their sovereign-controlled territories, the national governments of OPEC members are able to impose production limits on both government-owned and private oil companies.)<ref name="limit">{{cite news |url=http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2008Dec30/0,4675,MLMideastLibyaOPECCompliance,00.html |title=Libya orders oil cuts of 270K bpd |agency=Associated Press |date=30 December 2008 |quote=Libya has asked oil companies to slash production by 270,000 barrels per day. Abu Dhabi National Oil Co. told customers in letters dated Dec. 25 that it was cutting ... 10 to 15 percent of all types of ADNOC crude in February. Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa said the South American nation would suspend crude production by Italy's Agip and reduce quotas for other companies to comply with new OPEC cuts. |access-date=8 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151211182333/http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2008Dec30/0,4675,MLMideastLibyaOPECCompliance,00.html |archive-date=11 December 2015 |url-status=live }}</ref> Generally when OPEC production targets are reduced, oil prices increase.<ref name="EIA_2014">{{cite web |url=https://www.eia.gov/finance/markets/supply-opec.cfm |publisher=US Energy Information Administration |year=2014 |title=Energy & Financial Markets: What Drives Crude Oil Prices? |access-date=12 December 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141213031101/http://www.eia.gov/finance/markets/supply-opec.cfm |archive-date=13 December 2014 |url-status=live }}</ref>

===1990–2003: Ample supply and modest disruptions===
{{See also|1990 oil price shock}}
[[File:Kuwait burn oilfield.png|thumb|left|upright=1.4|alt=refer to caption|One of the hundreds of [[Kuwaiti oil fires]] set by retreating Iraqi troops in 1991<ref>{{cite web |url=https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyNET.exe/20014FNJ.txt?ZyActionD=ZyDocument&Client=EPA&Index=1991%20Thru%201994&File=D%3A%5CZYFILES%5CINDEX%20DATA%5C91THRU94%5CTXT%5C00000017%5C20014FNJ.txt&User=ANONYMOUS&Password=anonymous&Display=p%7Cf&DefSeekPage=x&SearchBack=ZyActionL&Back=ZyActionS&BackDesc=Results%20page&MaximumPages=1&ZyEntry=1 |title=Report to Congress: United States Gulf Environmental Technical Assistance |publisher=US Environmental Protection Agency |page=14 |date=1991 |access-date=11 April 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160424001604/http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyNET.exe/20014FNJ.txt?ZyActionD=ZyDocument&Client=EPA&Index=1991%20Thru%201994&File=D%3A%5CZYFILES%5CINDEX%20DATA%5C91THRU94%5CTXT%5C00000017%5C20014FNJ.txt&User=ANONYMOUS&Password=anonymous&Display=p%7Cf&DefSeekPage=x&SearchBack=ZyActionL&Back=ZyActionS&BackDesc=Results%20page&MaximumPages=1&ZyEntry=1 |archive-date=24 April 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref>]]
[[File:Brent crude oil price 1988-2015.svg|thumb|upright=2.15|alt=refer to caption|Fluctuations of Brent crude oil price, 1988–2015<ref name=Brent>{{cite web |url=https://www.quandl.com/DOE/RBRTE |title=Europe Brent Crude Oil Spot Price FOB (DOE) |publisher=Quandl |access-date=1 January 2016 }} {{dead link|date=February 2018 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>]]
{{clear}}
Leading up to his August 1990 [[Invasion of Kuwait]], Iraqi President [[Saddam Hussein]] was pushing OPEC to end overproduction and to send oil prices higher, in order to help OPEC members financially and to accelerate rebuilding from the 1980–1988 [[Iran–Iraq War]].<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/18/business/iraq-threatens-emirates-and-kuwait-on-oil-glut.html |title=Iraq Threatens Emirates and Kuwait on Oil Glut |first=Youssef M. |last=Ibrahim |newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|date=18 July 1990 |access-date=11 February 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170630060909/http://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/18/business/iraq-threatens-emirates-and-kuwait-on-oil-glut.html |archive-date=30 June 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref> But these two Iraqi wars against fellow OPEC founders marked a low point in the cohesion of the organization, and oil prices subsided quickly after the short-term supply disruptions. The September 2001 [[September 11 attacks|Al Qaeda attacks on the US]] and the March 2003 [[US invasion of Iraq]] had even milder short-term impacts on oil prices, as Saudi Arabia and other exporters again cooperated to keep the world adequately supplied.<ref>{{cite web |title=Europe Brent Spot Price FOB |url=https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RBRTE&f=M |website=www.eia.gov |access-date=23 September 2024}}</ref>

In the 1990s, OPEC lost its two newest members, who had joined in the mid-1970s. Ecuador withdrew in December 1992, because it was unwilling to pay the annual US$2&nbsp;million membership fee and felt that it needed to produce more oil than it was allowed under the OPEC quota,<ref name=Ecuador>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/18/business/ecuador-set-to-leave-opec.html |newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|title=Ecuador Set to Leave OPEC|agency=[[Associated Press]]|date=18 September 1992 |access-date=8 April 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160314210526/http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/18/business/ecuador-set-to-leave-opec.html |archive-date=14 March 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> although it rejoined in October 2007. Similar concerns prompted Gabon to suspend membership in January 1995;<ref name=Gabon>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/09/business/gabon-plans-to-quit-opec.html |title=Gabon Plans To Quit OPEC |newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|agency=[[Bloomberg News]]|date=9 January 1995 |access-date=8 April 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160314132000/http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/09/business/gabon-plans-to-quit-opec.html |archive-date=14 March 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> it rejoined in July 2016.<ref name="OPEC Member"/> Iraq has remained a member of OPEC since the organization's founding, but Iraqi production was not a part of OPEC quota agreements from 1998 to 2016, due to the country's daunting political difficulties.<ref name=ASB/><ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Industry/2010/02/05/Iraq-heads-for-OPEC-clash-over-quota/14451265409498/ |title=Iraq heads for OPEC clash over quota |work=United Press International |date=5 February 2010 |quote=Iraq, a founding member of OPEC, has not had a production quota since 1998, when it was pegged at 1.3 million bpd to allow Saddam Hussein's regime to sell oil for food during U.N. sanctions imposed in 1990... Despite the success of the 2009 auctions, problems remain – mounting violence in the run-up to March 7 parliamentary elections, uncertainty over their outcome, and, probably more importantly, the absence of a long-delayed oil law that will define revenue-sharing and regulation of the industry. |access-date=6 April 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160417085129/http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Industry/2010/02/05/Iraq-heads-for-OPEC-clash-over-quota/14451265409498/ |archive-date=17 April 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Lower demand triggered by the 1997–1998 [[Asian financial crisis]] saw the price of oil fall back to 1986 levels. After oil slumped to around US$10/bbl, joint diplomacy achieved a gradual slowing of oil production by OPEC, Mexico and Norway.<ref>{{cite book |url=http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Thematic/Oil_and_Gas_Pricing_2007_en.pdf |title=Putting a Price on Energy |publisher=Energy Charter Secretariat |year=2007 |isbn=978-90-5948-046-9 |page=90 |access-date=1 January 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160413155028/http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Thematic/Oil_and_Gas_Pricing_2007_en.pdf |archive-date=13 April 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> After prices slumped again in Nov. 2001, OPEC, Norway, Mexico, Russia, Oman and Angola agreed to cut production on 1 January 2002 for 6 months. OPEC contributed 1.5&nbsp;million barrels a day (mbpd) to the approximately 2 mbpd of cuts announced.<ref name="Ali">{{cite book |last1=Al-Naimi |first1=Ali |title=Out of the Desert |date=2016 |publisher=Portfolio Penguin |location=Great Britain |isbn=978-0-241-27925-0 |pages=201–210, 239}}</ref>

In June 2003, the [[International Energy Agency]] (IEA) and OPEC held their first joint workshop on energy issues. They have continued to meet regularly since then, "to collectively better understand trends, analysis and viewpoints and advance market transparency and predictability."<ref>{{cite journal |url=http://www.iea.org/media/ieajournal/Issue7_WEB.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160502040956/http://www.iea.org/media/ieajournal/Issue7_WEB.pdf |date=November 2014 |title=Dialogue replaces OPEC–IEA Mistrust |journal=IEA Energy |issue=7 |page=7 |archive-date=2 May 2016}}</ref>

===2003–2011: Volatility===
{{See also|2000s energy crisis}}
[[File:OPEC members' net oil export revenues in 2000 through 2020 (50562182543).png|thumb|upright=1.2|OPEC members' net oil export revenues, 2000–2020]]
Widespread insurgency and sabotage occurred during the 2003–2008 height of the [[History of Iraq (2003–2011)#Sabotage|American occupation of Iraq]], coinciding with rapidly increasing oil demand from China and [[Commodity market|commodity]]-hungry investors, recurring [[Conflict in the Niger Delta|violence against the Nigerian oil industry]], and dwindling spare capacity as a cushion against [[Peak oil|potential shortages]]. This combination of forces prompted a sharp rise in oil prices to levels far higher than those previously targeted by OPEC.<ref>{{cite news |last=Simmons |first=Greg |url=https://www.foxnews.com/story/dems-doubt-iraq-progress |title=Dems Doubt Iraq Progress |work=Fox News |date=7 December 2005 |access-date=14 January 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160105070747/http://www.foxnews.com/story/2005/12/07/dems-doubt-iraq-progress.html |archive-date=5 January 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7387203.stm |title=Oil price 'may hit $200 a barrel' |work=BBC News |date=7 May 2008 |access-date=2 January 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090411231928/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7387203.stm |archive-date=11 April 2009 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |first=Michael W. |last=Masters |title=Testimony |url=http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/052008Masters.pdf |work=[[U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs]] |date=20 May 2008 |access-date=2 January 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080528200858/http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/052008Masters.pdf |archive-date=28 May 2008 |url-status=live }}</ref> Price volatility reached an extreme in 2008, as WTI crude oil surged to a record US$147/bbl in July and then plunged back to US$32/bbl in December, during the [[Great Recession|worst global recession since World War II]].<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-05-09/saudi-arabian-algerian-oil-ministers-see-consumption-increasing-this-year |first1=Robert |last1=Tuttle |first2=Ola |last2=Galal |title=Oil Ministers See Demand Rising |publisher=Bloomberg News |date=10 May 2010 |access-date=14 January 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160206233533/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-05-09/saudi-arabian-algerian-oil-ministers-see-consumption-increasing-this-year |archive-date=6 February 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> OPEC's annual oil export revenue also set a new record in 2008, estimated around US$1&nbsp;trillion, and reached similar annual rates in 2011–2014 (along with extensive [[petrodollar recycling]] activity) before plunging again.<ref name=EIA2015>{{cite web |url=http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=OPEC |title=OPEC Revenues Fact Sheet |publisher=US Energy Information Administration |date=15 May 2017 |access-date=28 May 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151222161556/http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=OPEC |archive-date=22 December 2015 |url-status=live }}</ref> By the time of the [[2011 Libyan Civil War]] and [[Arab Spring]], OPEC started issuing explicit statements to counter "excessive speculation" in oil [[futures markets]], blaming financial speculators for increasing volatility beyond market fundamentals.<ref>{{cite press release |url=http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/2071.htm |title=Opening address to the 159th Meeting of the OPEC Conference |work=OPEC |date=8 June 2011 |access-date=12 December 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141213085839/http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/2071.htm |archive-date=13 December 2014 |url-status=live }}</ref>

In May 2008, Indonesia announced that it would leave OPEC when its membership expired at the end of that year, having become a net importer of oil and being unable to meet its production quota.<ref name=Indonesia>{{cite news |url=https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7423008.stm |title=Indonesia to withdraw from OPEC |publisher=BBC |date=28 May 2008 |access-date=27 January 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131203090307/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7423008.stm |archive-date=3 December 2013 |url-status=live }}</ref> A statement released by OPEC on 10 September 2008 confirmed Indonesia's withdrawal, noting that OPEC "regretfully accepted the wish of Indonesia to suspend its full membership in the organization, and recorded its hope that the country would be in a position to rejoin the organization in the not-too-distant future."<ref>{{cite press release |url=http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/951.htm |title=149th Meeting of the OPEC Conference |work=OPEC |date=10 September 2008 |access-date=16 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151222090010/http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/951.htm |archive-date=22 December 2015 |url-status=live }}</ref>

===2008: Production dispute===
[[File:Oil Balance.png|thumb|alt=refer to caption|Countries by net oil exports (2008)]]
The differing economic needs of OPEC member states often affect the internal debates behind OPEC production quotas. Poorer members have pushed for production cuts from fellow members, to increase the price of oil and thus their own revenues.<ref name=owen032010>{{cite journal |doi=10.1016/j.enpol.2010.02.026 |first1=Nick A. |last1=Owen |first2=Oliver R. |last2=Inderwildi |first3=David A. |last3=King |title=The status of conventional world oil reserves: Hype or cause for concern? |date=August 2010 |journal=Energy Policy |volume=38 |issue=8 |pages=4743–4749|bibcode=2010EnPol..38.4743O }}</ref> These proposals conflict with Saudi Arabia's stated long-term strategy of being a partner with the world's economic powers to ensure a steady flow of oil that would support economic expansion.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.saudiembassy.net/1999News/Statements/SpeechDetail.asp?cIndex=327 |first=Ali |last=Al-Naimi |title=Saudi oil policy: stability with strength |publisher=Saudi Embassy |date=20 October 1999 |url-status=unfit |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090426011929/http://www.saudiembassy.net/1999News/Statements/SpeechDetail.asp?cIndex=327 |archive-date=26 April 2009 }}</ref> Part of the basis for this policy is the Saudi concern that overly expensive oil or unreliable supply will drive industrial nations to conserve energy and develop alternative fuels, curtailing the worldwide demand for oil and eventually leaving unneeded barrels in the ground.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-12/saudi-arabia-s-plan-to-extend-the-age-of-oil |publisher=Bloomberg News |first=Peter |last=Waldman |title=Saudi Arabia's Plan to Extend the Age of Oil |date=12 April 2015 |access-date=10 March 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170224083439/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-12/saudi-arabia-s-plan-to-extend-the-age-of-oil |archive-date=24 February 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref> To this point, Saudi Oil Minister Yamani famously remarked in 1973: "The Stone Age didn't end because we ran out of stones."<ref>{{cite news |first=Matt |last=Frei |date=3 July 2008 |url=https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7486705.stm |title=Washington diary: Oil addiction |publisher=BBC |access-date=27 January 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131031103610/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7486705.stm |archive-date=31 October 2013 |url-status=live }}</ref> To elucidate Saudi Arabia's contemporary approach, in 2024, Saudi Energy Minister Prince [[Abdulaziz bin Salman]] articulated a stance that reflects how the kingdom has adapted to the evolving economic needs within OPEC and the broader international community. Emphasizing the need for a balanced and fair global [[energy transition]], he highlighted the importance of diversifying energy sources and noted significant investments in [[natural gas]], [[petrochemical]]s, and [[Renewable energy|renewables]]. These efforts support economic development in [[Emerging market|emerging countries]] and align with global [[Climate target|climate objectives]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-04-29 |title=Geopolitical stability, inclusive growth, energy security under spotlight in Riyadh at World Economic Forum Special Meet... |url=https://www.aetoswire.com/en/news/2904202438953 |access-date=2024-05-19 |website=www.aetoswire.com}}</ref><ref name=":11">{{Cite web |last=Iordache |first=Ruxandra |date=2024-02-12 |title=Saudi energy minister pins Aramco's oil capacity halt on green transition |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/12/saudi-energy-minister-pins-aramcos-oil-capacity-halt-on-green-transition.html |access-date=2024-05-19 |website=CNBC |language=en}}</ref> Additionally, he addressed shifting [[energy security]] concerns, stating, "Energy security in the 70s, 80s, and 90s was more dependent on oil. Now, you get what happened last year... It was gas. The future problem on energy security will not be oil. It will be renewables. And the materials, and the mines."<ref name=":11" />

On 10 September 2008, with oil prices still near US$100/bbl, a production dispute occurred when the Saudis reportedly walked out of a negotiating session where rival members voted to reduce OPEC output. Although Saudi delegates officially endorsed the new quotas, they stated anonymously that they would not observe them. ''[[The New York Times]]'' quoted one such delegate as saying: "Saudi Arabia will meet the market's demand. We will see what the market requires and we will not leave a customer without oil. The policy has not changed."<ref name=discordant>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/business/worldbusiness/11oil.html|author=Jad Mouawad|title=Saudis Vow to Ignore OPEC Decision to Cut Production |newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|date=11 September 2008 |access-date=11 February 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170904202313/http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/business/worldbusiness/11oil.html |archive-date=4 September 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref> Over the next few months, oil prices plummeted into the $30s, and did not return to $100 until the Libyan Civil War in 2011.<ref name=basketprice/>

===2014–2017: Oil glut===
{{See also|2010s oil glut}}
[[File:Countries by Oil Production in 2013.svg|alt=refer to caption|Countries by oil production (2013)|400px|right]]
{{Chart|definition=Top oil-producing countries, thousand barrels per day.chart|data=Top oil-producing countries, thousand barrels per day.tab|Width=300|caption=Top oil-producing countries,<ref>{{cite web |date=25 May 2017 |title=Monthly Energy Review |at=Figure 11.1a |url=https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/archive/00351705.pdf |publisher=US Energy Information Administration |access-date=28 May 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170817203235/https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/archive/00351705.pdf |archive-date=17 August 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref> thousand barrels per day, 1973–2016}}{{clear}}
[[File:Dammam No. 7 on March 4, 1938.jpg|thumb|alt=refer to caption|Gusher well in Saudi Arabia: conventional source of OPEC production]]
[[File:Frac job in process.JPG|thumb|alt=refer to caption|Shale "fracking" in the US: important new challenge to OPEC market share]]
During 2014–2015, OPEC members consistently exceeded their production ceiling, and China experienced a slowdown in economic growth. At the same time, US oil production nearly doubled from 2008 levels and approached the world-leading "[[swing producer]]" volumes of Saudi Arabia and Russia, due to the substantial long-term improvement and spread of [[tight oil|shale]] "[[fracking]]" technology in response to the years of record oil prices. These developments led in turn to a plunge in US oil import requirements (moving closer to [[U.S. energy independence|energy independence]]), a record volume of worldwide oil inventories, and a collapse in oil prices that continued into early 2016.<ref name=basketprice/><ref>{{cite news |title=US Oil Prices Fall Below $80 a Barrel |first=Clifford |last=Krassnov |date=3 November 2014 |access-date=13 December 2014 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/business/energy-environment/us-oil-prices-fall-below-80-a-barrel.html |newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141216205651/http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/business/energy-environment/us-oil-prices-fall-below-80-a-barrel.html |archive-date=16 December 2014 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=glut/>

In spite of global oversupply, on 27 November 2014 in Vienna, Saudi oil minister [[Ali Al-Naimi]] blocked appeals from poorer OPEC members for production cuts to support prices. Naimi argued that the oil market should be left to rebalance itself competitively at lower price levels, strategically rebuilding OPEC's long-term market share by ending the profitability of high-cost US shale oil production.<ref name=PriceWar>{{cite news |title=Inside OPEC room, Naimi declares price war on US shale oil |work=Reuters |date=28 November 2014 |access-date=13 January 2016 |url=http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-opec-meeting-idUKKCN0JB0M420141128 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160211162226/http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-opec-meeting-idUKKCN0JB0M420141128 |archive-date=11 February 2016 |url-status=dead }}</ref> As he explained in an interview:<ref name=MEES>{{cite journal |url=http://oilpro.com/post/9223/mees-interview-saudi-oil-minister-ali-naimi |title=Interview With Saudi Oil Minister Ali Naimi |journal=[[Middle East Economic Survey]] |volume=57 |issue=51/52 |date=22 December 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151221021005/http://oilpro.com/post/9223/mees-interview-saudi-oil-minister-ali-naimi |archive-date=21 December 2015 }}</ref>

<blockquote>Is it reasonable for a highly efficient producer to reduce output, while the producer of poor efficiency continues to produce? That is crooked logic. If I reduce, what happens to my market share? The price will go up and the Russians, the Brazilians, US shale oil producers will take my share... We want to tell the world that high-efficiency producing countries are the ones that deserve market share. That is the operative principle in all capitalist countries... One thing is for sure: Current prices [roughly US$60/bbl] do not support all producers.</blockquote>

A year later, when OPEC met in Vienna on 4 December 2015, the organization had exceeded its production ceiling for 18 consecutive months, US oil production had declined only slightly from its peak, world markets appeared to be oversupplied by at least 2&nbsp;million barrels per day despite [[Libyan Civil War (2014–present)|war-torn Libya]] pumping 1&nbsp;million barrels below capacity, oil producers were making major adjustments to withstand prices as low as $40, Indonesia was rejoining the export organization, Iraqi production had surged after years of disorder, Iranian output was poised to rebound with the lifting of [[Sanctions against Iran|international sanctions]], hundreds of world leaders at the [[Paris Climate Agreement]] were committing to limit carbon emissions from fossil fuels, and [[Solar power#Economics|solar technologies]] were becoming steadily more competitive and prevalent. In light of all these market pressures, OPEC decided to set aside its ineffective production ceiling until the next ministerial conference in June 2016.<ref name=FT2015>{{cite news |url=http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1f84e444-9ceb-11e5-8ce1-f6219b685d74.html |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221210/http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1f84e444-9ceb-11e5-8ce1-f6219b685d74.html |archive-date=10 December 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |title=OPEC discord fuels further oil price drop |newspaper=Financial Times |date=7 December 2015}}</ref><ref name=glut>{{cite news |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-04/opec-maintains-crude-production-as-group-defers-output-target-ihryzilb |title=OPEC Won't Cut Production to Stop Oil's Slump |first1=Grant |last1=Smith |first2=Angelina |last2=Rascouet |first3=Wael |last3=Mahdi |publisher=Bloomberg News |date=4 December 2015 |access-date=10 March 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170328111428/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-04/opec-maintains-crude-production-as-group-defers-output-target-ihryzilb |archive-date=28 March 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-02/iran-says-post-sanctions-crude-output-boost-won-t-hurt-prices |title=Iran Says Post-Sanctions Crude Output Boost Won't Hurt Prices |first1=Hashem |last1=Kalantari |first2=Mohammed |last2=Sergie |publisher=Bloomberg News |date=2 January 2016 |access-date=18 April 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160115230602/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-02/iran-says-post-sanctions-crude-output-boost-won-t-hurt-prices |archive-date=15 January 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> By 20 January 2016, the OPEC Reference Basket was down to US$22.48/bbl – less than one-fourth of its high from June 2014 ($110.48), less than one-sixth of its record from July 2008 ($140.73), and back below the April 2003 starting point ($23.27) of its historic run-up.<ref name=basketprice>{{cite web |url=http://www.opec.org/basket/basketDayArchives.xml |title=OPEC Basket Daily Archives |work=OPEC |access-date=21 January 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160121231540/http://www.opec.org/basket/basketDayArchives.xml |archive-date=21 January 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref>

As 2016 continued, the oil glut was partially trimmed with significant production offline in the United States, Canada, Libya, Nigeria and China, and the basket price gradually rose back into the $40s. OPEC regained a modest percentage of market share, saw the cancellation of many competing drilling projects, maintained the status quo at its June conference, and endorsed "prices at levels that are suitable for both producers and consumers", although many producers were still experiencing serious economic difficulties.<ref name=June2016>{{cite press release |url=http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/3487.htm |title=OPEC 169th Meeting concludes |work=OPEC |date=2 June 2016 |access-date=2 June 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160605025220/http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/3487.htm |archive-date=5 June 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/06/04/opec-is-very-much-alive-as-saudis-learn-to-tread-softly/ |title=OPEC is very much alive as Saudis learn to tread softly |first=Liam |last=Halligan |newspaper=The Telegraph |date=4 June 2016 |access-date=4 April 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170208231802/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/06/04/opec-is-very-much-alive-as-saudis-learn-to-tread-softly/ |archive-date=8 February 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=79687&p=irol-reportsother |title=North America Rig Count |publisher=Baker Hughes |access-date=21 February 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170302194417/http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=79687&p=irol-reportsother |archive-date=2 March 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref>

===2017–2020: Production cut and OPEC+===
As OPEC members grew weary of a multi-year supply contest with [[diminishing returns]] and shrinking financial reserves, the organization finally attempted its first production cut since 2008. Despite many political obstacles, a September 2016 decision to trim approximately one million barrels per day was codified by a new quota agreement at the November 2016 OPEC conference. The agreement (which exempted disruption-ridden members Libya and Nigeria) covered the first half of 2017—alongside promised reductions from Russia and ten other non-members, offset by expected increases in the US shale sector, Libya, Nigeria, [[#Spare capacity|spare capacity]], and surging late-2016 OPEC production before the cuts took effect. Indonesia announced another "temporary suspension" of its OPEC membership rather than accepting the organization's requested five-percent production cut. Prices fluctuated around US$50/bbl, and in May 2017, OPEC decided to extend the new quotas through March 2018, with the world waiting to see if and how the oil inventory glut might be fully siphoned off by then.<ref name=LeavingAgain/><ref>{{cite press release |url= http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/3912.htm |title= OPEC 171st Meeting concludes |work=OPEC |date=30 November 2016 |access-date=30 November 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161201015438/http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/3912.htm |archive-date=1 December 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=May2017Vienna/> Longtime oil analyst [[Daniel Yergin]] "described the relationship between OPEC and shale as 'mutual coexistence', with both sides learning to live with prices that are lower than they would like".<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-07/opec-said-to-break-bread-with-shale-in-rare-show-of-detente |title=OPEC Said to Break Bread With Shale in Rare Show of Detente |publisher=Bloomberg News |date=7 March 2017 |access-date=8 March 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170307220233/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-07/opec-said-to-break-bread-with-shale-in-rare-show-of-detente |archive-date=7 March 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref> These production cut deals with non-OPEC countries are generally referred to as "OPEC+".<ref>{{cite news |title=Where OPEC+ Oil Production Stands Now – Bloomberg |website=[[Bloomberg News]] |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/opec-production-targets/ |access-date=19 March 2020|last1=Wingfield |first1=Brian |last2=Dodge |first2=Samuel |last3=Pogkas |first3=Demetrios |last4=Sam |first4=Cedric }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=OPEC Is Dead, Long Live OPEC+ |website=[[Forbes]] |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2018/06/29/opec-is-dead-long-live-opec/#5abfd30b2217 |access-date=19 March 2020}}</ref>

In December 2017, Russia and OPEC agreed to extend the production cut of 1.8 mbpd until the end of 2018.<ref>{{Cite news| title = Russia backs gradual, managed exit from oil cuts with OPEC| work = Reuters| access-date = 25 December 2017| date = 22 December 2017| url = https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-oil-opec/russia-backs-gradual-managed-exit-from-oil-cuts-with-opec-idUSKBN1EG11V| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20171226073926/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-oil-opec/russia-backs-gradual-managed-exit-from-oil-cuts-with-opec-idUSKBN1EG11V| archive-date = 26 December 2017| url-status = live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.sharptrader.com/feature/opec-extend-production-cuts-throughout-2018/ |title=OPEC to extend production cuts throughout 2018 |date=30 November 2017 |access-date=23 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181224074148/https://www.sharptrader.com/feature/opec-extend-production-cuts-throughout-2018/ |archive-date=24 December 2018 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Qatar announced it would withdraw from OPEC effective 1 January 2019.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/qatar-withdraw-opec-january-2019-181203061900372.html|title=Qatar to withdraw from OPEC in January 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181203091543/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/qatar-withdraw-opec-january-2019-181203061900372.html|archive-date=3 December 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> According to ''[[The New York Times]]'', this was a strategic response to the [[Qatar diplomatic crisis]], which also involved Saudi Arabia, the [[United Arab Emirates|UAE]], [[Bahrain]], and [[Egypt]].<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/10/opinion/qatar-leaving-opec-saudi-arabia-blockade-failure.html|title=Why is Qatar leaving OPEC?|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|date=10 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181216040018/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/10/opinion/qatar-leaving-opec-saudi-arabia-blockade-failure.html|archive-date=16 December 2018|url-status=live|last=Ulrichsen|first=Kristian Coates }}</ref>

On 29 June 2019, Russia again agreed with Saudi Arabia to extend by six to nine months the original production cuts of 2018.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-g20-summit-putin-opec-idUSKCN1TU0AF|title=Russia agrees with Saudi Arabia to extend OPEC+ oil output deal|date=29 June 2019|work=[[Reuters]]|access-date=1 July 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190701211015/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-g20-summit-putin-opec-idUSKCN1TU0AF|archive-date=1 July 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>

In October 2019, Ecuador announced it would withdraw from OPEC on 1 January 2020, due to financial problems facing the country.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.euronews.com/2019/10/01/ecuador-to-leave-opec-in-2020-due-to-fiscal-problems-ministry|title=Ecuador to leave OPEC in 2020 due to fiscal problems – ministry|date=1 October 2019|publisher=[[Euronews]]|access-date=1 October 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191001210325/https://www.euronews.com/2019/10/01/ecuador-to-leave-opec-in-2020-due-to-fiscal-problems-ministry|archive-date=1 October 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>

In December 2019, OPEC and Russia agreed on one of the deepest output cuts so far to prevent oversupply in a deal that would last for the first three months of 2020.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-opec-idUSKBN1Y90UK|title=OPEC, allies agree to deepen oil output cuts|date=5 December 2019|work=[[Reuters]]|access-date=5 December 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191205195453/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-opec-idUSKBN1Y90UK|archive-date=5 December 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>

===2020: Saudi-Russian price war===
{{main|2020 Russia–Saudi Arabia oil price war}}
In early March 2020, OPEC officials presented an ultimatum to Russia to cut production by 1.5% of world supply. Russia, which foresaw continuing cuts as American [[shale oil]] production increased, rejected the demand, ending the three-year partnership between OPEC and major non-OPEC providers.<ref name=NYT_9March2020>{{cite news|last=Reed |first=Stanley|title=How a Saudi-Russian Standoff Sent Oil Markets into a Frenzy |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/09/business/energy-environment/oil-opec-saudi-russia.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200309181006/https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/09/business/energy-environment/oil-opec-saudi-russia.html |archive-date=9 March 2020 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=9 March 2020 |date=9 March 2020}}</ref> Another factor was [[Economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic|weakening global demand]] resulting from the [[COVID-19 pandemic]].<ref>{{cite news |last1=Mufson |first1=Steven |last2=Englund |first2=Will|author2-link=Will Englund|title=Oil price war threatens widespread collateral damage |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/oil-price-war-threatens-widespread-collateral-damage/2020/03/09/3e42c9e2-6207-11ea-acca-80c22bbee96f_story.html |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|access-date=9 March 2020}}</ref> This also resulted in 'OPEC plus' failing to extend the agreement cutting 2.1&nbsp;million barrels per day that was set to expire at the end of March. Saudi Arabia, which has absorbed a disproportionate amount of the cuts to convince Russia to stay in the agreement, notified its buyers on 7 March that they would raise output and discount their oil in April. This prompted a Brent crude price crash of more than 30% before a slight recovery and [[Black Monday (2020)|widespread turmoil in financial markets]].<ref name=NYT_9March2020/>

Several pundits saw this as a [[2020 Russia–Saudi Arabia oil price war|Saudi-Russian price war]], or [[game of chicken]] which cause the "other side to blink first".<ref name="ergm">{{cite news |last1=Reguly |first1=Eric |title=Who will win the Saudi-Russia game of chicken in the new oil war? Russia's chances look good |url=https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-who-will-win-the-saudi-russia-game-of-chicken-in-the-new-oil-war/ |publisher=The Globe and Mail Inc |date=10 March 2020}}</ref><ref name="trdt">{{cite news |last1=Rees |first1=Tom |title=Russia and Saudi Arabia wait for the other side to blink first in the oil price war |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2020/03/10/russia-saudi-arabia-wait-side-blink-first-oil-price-war/?li_source=LI&li_medium=li-recommendation-widget |agency=The Daily Telegraph  Limited |date=10 March 2020}}</ref><ref name="ptfp">{{cite news |last1=Tertzakian |first1=Peter |date=9 March 2020 |title=This crude war is about a lot more than oil prices and market share |url=https://business.financialpost.com/commodities/energy/peter-tertzakian-this-crude-war-is-about-a-lot-more-than-oil-prices-and-market-share |access-date=23 May 2024 |work=Financial Post |agency=Postmedia}}</ref> Saudi Arabia had in March 2020 $500&nbsp;billion of foreign exchange reserves, while at that time Russia's reserves were $580&nbsp;billion. The [[debt-to-GDP ratio]] of the Saudis was 25%, while the Russian ratio was 15%.<ref name=ergm/> Another remarked that the Saudis can produce oil at as low a price as $3 per barrel, whereas Russia needs $30 per barrel to cover production costs.<ref name="npfp">{{cite news |last1=Powell |first1=Naomi |date=9 March 2020 |title='Game of chicken': Saudis, Russians can wage an oil war for a long time – but at huge political cost |work=Financial Post |agency=Postmedia |url=https://business.financialpost.com/commodities/game-of-chicken-the-saudis-and-russians-can-wage-an-oil-war-for-a-long-time-but-at-a-huge-political-cost?video_autoplay=true}}</ref> "To Russia, this price war is more than just about regaining market share for oil," one analyst claims. "It’s about assaulting the Western economy, especially America’s."<ref name="ptfp" /> In order to ward off the oil exporters price war which can make shale oil production uneconomical, US may protect its crude oil market share by passing the [[NOPEC]] bill.<ref>{{cite news |last=Watkins |first=Simon |date=Mar 22, 2020 |title=Trump's Ultimate Weapon To End The Oil War |url=https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Trumps-Ultimate-Weapon-To-End-The-Oil-War.html |access-date=23 March 2020}}</ref> Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, represented by Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, maintains a conciliatory stance towards the U.S. shale industry. He clarified that harming this sector was never their intention, stating, "I made it clear that it was not on our radar or our intention to create any type of damage to their industry... they will rise again from the ashes and thrive and prosper." He also noted that Saudi Arabia is looking forward to a time when U.S. producers thrive once again in a market with higher oil demand."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Paraskova |first=Tsvetana |date=Apr 14, 2020 |title=Saudi Arabia Claims The U.S. Was Not Their Target In The Oil War |url=https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Saudi-Arabia-Claims-The-US-Was-Not-Their-Target-In-The-Oil-War.html |access-date=2024-05-23 |website=OilPrice.com |language=en}}</ref>

In April 2020, OPEC and a group of other oil producers, including Russia, agreed to extend production cuts until the end of July. The cartel and its allies agreed to cut oil production in May and June by 9.7 million barrels a day, equal to around 10% of global output, in an effort to prop up prices, which had previously [[2020 Russia–Saudi Arabia oil price war|fallen to record lows]].<ref>{{cite news|title=From The Economist Espresso: Minneapolis to disband its police force; New Zealand eliminates covid-19|url=https://espresso.economist.com/48e61db7215cd565c9976a40b7d3d1d5|archive-date=17 November 2022|access-date=8 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221117000715/https://espresso.economist.com/48e61db7215cd565c9976a40b7d3d1d5|url-status=dead}}</ref>

===2021: Saudi-Emirati dispute===
In July 2021, OPEC+ member United Arab Emirates rejected a Saudi proposed eight-month extension to oil output curbs which was in place due to [[COVID-19]] and lower oil consumption.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/opec-resumes-oil-policy-talks-amid-saudi-uae-standoff-2021-07-05/|title=OPEC+ abandons oil policy meeting after Saudi-UAE clash|publisher=Reuters|date=5 July 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/thebakersinstitute/2021/07/16/the-saudi-uae-bust-up-is-a-return-to-the-persian-gulf-status-quo/?sh=20a6db657428 |title=The Saudi-UAE Bust-Up Is A Return To The Persian Gulf Status Quo |website=Forbes |date=16 July 2021 }}</ref> The previous year, OPEC+ cut the equivalent of about 10% of demand at the time. The UAE asked for the maximum amount of oil the group would recognize the country of producing to be raised to 3.8 million barrels a day compared to its previous 3.2 million barrels. A compromise deal allowed UAE to increase its maximum oil output to 3.65 million barrels a day.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/opec-reaches-compromise-with-u-a-e-over-oil-production-standoff-11626264218|title=OPEC Reaches Compromise With U.A.E. Over Oil Production|publisher=The Wall Street Journal|date=14 July 2021}}</ref>

Under the terms of the agreement, Russia would increase its production from 11 million barrels to 11.5 million by May 2022 as well. All members would increase output by 400,000 barrels per day each month starting in August to gradually offset the previous cuts made due to the COVID pandemic.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.rferl.org/a/opec-agreement-oil-output/31364977.html |title=OPEC+ Reaches Agreement On Oil Output Increase; Russia To Boost Production |website=RFEL |date=18 July 2021 }}</ref> This compromise, achieved where Saudi Arabia met the United Arab Emirates halfway, underscored OPEC+ unity. UAE Energy Minister [[Suhail Al Mazroui|Suhail Al-Mazrouei]] thanked Saudi Arabia and Russia for facilitating dialogue leading to an agreement. He stated, "The UAE is committed to this group and will always work with it." On the Saudi side, Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman emphasized consensus building and stated that the agreement strengthens OPEC+'s ties and ensures its continuity.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Blas |first1=Javier |last2=El Wardany |first2=Salma |last3=Smith |first3=Grant |last4=Khrennikova |first4=Dina |date=July 18, 2021 |title=OPEC+ Makes Deal to Boost Output as Gulf Allies Call Truce |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-18/opec-clinches-deal-to-boost-output-as-gulf-allies-call-truce |access-date=2024-05-25 |website=Bloomberg}}</ref>

===2021–present: Global energy crisis===
{{main|2021–present global energy crisis}}
The record-high energy prices were driven by a global surge in demand as the world quit the economic recession caused by COVID-19, particularly due to strong energy demand in Asia.<ref>{{cite news |title=Covid is at the center of world's energy crunch, but a cascade of problems is fueling it |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/covid-center-world-energy-crunch-cascade-problems-fuel-rcna2688 |work=NBC News |date=8 October 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Don't Expect OPEC to Keep You Warm This Winter |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-10-17/energy-crisis-don-t-expect-opec-to-keep-you-warm-this-winter |work=Bloomberg |date=17 October 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Oil prices could hit an 'off the charts spike,' says strategist |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/06/strategist-on-oil-prices-in-winter-china-and-europe-energy-crisis.html |work=CNBC |date=5 October 2021}}</ref> In August 2021, U.S. President [[Joe Biden]]'s national security adviser [[Jake Sullivan]] released a statement calling on OPEC+ to boost [[List of countries by oil production|oil production]] to "offset previous production cuts that OPEC+ imposed during the pandemic until well into 2022."<ref>{{cite news |title=Turning to foreign leaders to fix our energy crisis is a shameful solution |url=https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/567988-turning-to-foreign-leaders-to-fix-our-energy-crisis-is-a-shameful |work=The Hill |date=16 August 2021}}</ref> On 28 September 2021, Sullivan met in [[Saudi Arabia]] with Saudi Crown Prince [[Mohammed bin Salman]] to discuss the [[Price of oil|high oil prices]].<ref>{{cite news |title=Top White House aide discussed oil prices with Saudi Arabia |url=https://www.reuters.com/business/white-house-said-top-aide-planned-discuss-oil-prices-with-saudi-arabia-2021-09-30/ |work=Reuters |date=1 October 2021}}</ref> The price of oil was about US$80 by October 2021,<ref>{{cite news |title=Global energy crunch, US burnout, and OPEC's no 1 call |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/10/1/global-energy-crunch-us-burnout-and-opecs-no-1-call |work=Al-Jazeera |date=1 October 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Oil analysts predict a prolonged rally as OPEC resists calls to ramp up supply |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/05/oil-prices-analysts-see-a-prolonged-rally-as-opec-sticks-to-its-plan.html |work=CNBC |date=5 October 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=OPEC-Plus in Driver's Seat As Global Energy Crisis Intensifies |url=https://www.naturalgasintel.com/opec-plus-in-drivers-seat-as-global-energy-crisis-intensifies/ |work=Natural Gas Intelligence |date=6 October 2021}}</ref> the highest since 2014.<ref>{{cite news |title=U.S. crude oil price tops $80 a barrel, the highest since 2014 |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/08/us-crude-oil-price-tops-80-a-barrel-the-highest-since-2014.html |work=CNBC |date=8 October 2021}}</ref> President Joe Biden and U.S. Energy Secretary [[Jennifer Granholm]] blamed the OPEC+ for rising oil and gas prices.<ref>{{cite news |title=US energy secretary blames Opec 'cartel' for high petrol prices |url=https://www.ft.com/content/cecf912d-705e-47b0-9ceb-911e7c517fd8 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221210/https://www.ft.com/content/cecf912d-705e-47b0-9ceb-911e7c517fd8 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |work=Financial Times |date=31 October 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Biden blames higher oil and gas prices on OPEC |url=https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/biden-blames-higher-oil-gas-prices-opec-2021-11-02/ |work=Reuters |date=2 November 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=OPEC+ warns of response as Biden readies to tap strategic reserve |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/11/22/opec-warn-of-response-as-biden-mulls-tapping-strategic-reserves |work=Al Jazeera |date=22 November 2021}}</ref>

[[Russian invasion of Ukraine|Russia's invasion of Ukraine]] in February 2022 has altered the global oil trade. EU leaders tried to ban the majority of Russian crude imports, but even prior to the official action imports to Northwest Europe were down. More Russian oil is now sold outside of Europe, more specifically to India and China.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Stevens |first=Pippa |date=31 May 2022 |title=These charts show how Russia's invasion of Ukraine has changed global oil flows |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/31/these-charts-show-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-has-changed-global-oil.html#:~:text=Russia's%20invasion%20of%20Ukraine%20has%20altered%20the%20global%20oil%20trade,nations%20including%20India%20and%20China. |access-date=5 September 2022 |website=CNBC}}</ref>

In October 2022, key OPEC+ ministers agreed to oil production cuts of 2 million barrels per day, the first production cut since 2020.<ref>{{Cite news |date=5 October 2022 |title=OPEC+ JMMC agrees oil output cuts of 2 mln bpd – sources|work=[[Reuters]]|url=https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/opec-jmmc-agrees-oil-output-cuts-2-mln-bpd-sources-2022-10-05/ |access-date=5 October 2022}}</ref> This led to renewed interest in the passage of NOPEC.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/why-nopec-keeps-arising-as-a-us-answer-to-opec/2022/10/07/5f36eede-465d-11ed-be17-89cbe6b8c0a5_story.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230408201050/https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/why-nopec-keeps-arising-as-a-us-answer-to-opec/2022/10/07/5f36eede-465d-11ed-be17-89cbe6b8c0a5_story.html|archive-date=8 April 2023|title=Why 'NOPEC' Keeps Arising as a U.S. Answer to OPEC |date=10 October 2022|access-date=12 March 2023|author=Ari Natter|agency=[[Bloomberg News]]|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]}}</ref>

===2022: Oil production cut===
[[File:Al Nahyan-Putin meeting (2022-10-11) 3.jpg|thumb|[[United Arab Emirates|UAE]]'s President [[Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan]] with Russian president [[Vladimir Putin]], days after OPEC+ cut oil production, 11 October 2022<ref>{{cite news |title=Putin hosts United Arab Emirates leader for economic talks |url=https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-business-abu-dhabi-a51f254dc2a8c8d068d9ca1e6ec0afb1 |work=Associated Press |date=11 October 2022}}</ref>]]
In October 2022, OPEC+ led by Saudi Arabia  announced a large cut to its oil output target in order to aid Russia.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Brower |first1=Derek |last2=Sheppard |first2=David |last3=England |first3=Andrew |last4=Schwartz |first4=Felicia |date=7 October 2022 |title=The new oil war: Opec moves against the US |url=https://www.ft.com/content/70853af8-b7a4-4a28-bdfe-b4f3e375a1f0 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20221030162955/https://www.ft.com/content/70853af8-b7a4-4a28-bdfe-b4f3e375a1f0 |archive-date=30 October 2022 |newspaper=Financial Times}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Sheppard |first1=David |last2=Brower |first2=Derek |date=5 October 2022 |title=Saudi Arabia and Russia plan deep oil cuts in defiance of US |url=https://www.ft.com/content/476d8174-1ad5-4dbe-8092-37853b2a7673 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20221004182633/https://www.ft.com/content/476d8174-1ad5-4dbe-8092-37853b2a7673 |archive-date=4 October 2022 |newspaper=Financial Times}}</ref> In response, US President [[Joe Biden]] vowed "consequences" and said the US government would "re-evaluate" the longstanding [[Saudi Arabia–United States relations|U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia]].<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.reuters.com/world/us-president-biden-re-evaluating-relationship-with-saudi-after-opec-decision-2022-10-11/ | title=Biden vows consequences for Saudi Arabia after OPEC+ decision | newspaper=Reuters | date=13 October 2022 | last1=Holland | first1=Steve }}</ref> [[Robert Menendez]], the Democratic chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called for a freeze on cooperation with and arms sales to Saudi Arabia, accusing the kingdom of helping Russia underwrite its war with Ukraine.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Kirchgaessner |first1=Stephanie |last2=Borger |first2=Julian |date=2022-10-13 |title=Democrats issue fresh ultimatum to Saudi Arabia over oil production |url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/oct/12/us-democrats-threaten-saudi-arabia-with-arms-freeze-over-oil-output |access-date=2024-12-15 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref>

Saudi Arabia's foreign ministry stated that the OPEC+ decision was "purely economic" and taken unanimously by all members of the conglomerate, pushing back on pressure to change its stance on the Russo-Ukrainian War at the UN.<ref>{{cite web |last=Betz |first=Bradford |date=13 October 2022 |title=Saudi Arabia defends OPEC+ oil cut decision as 'purely economic' |url=https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/saudi-arabia-defends-opec-oil-cut-decision-purely-economic |website=[[Fox Business]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Inayatullah |first=Saim Dušan |date=2022-10-13 |title=Saudi Arabia: OPEC+ oil production cut 'purely economic' |url=https://www.dw.com/en/saudi-arabia-opec-decision-to-reduce-oil-production-purely-economic/a-63421428 |website=[[Deutsche Welle]]}}</ref> In response, the White House accused Saudi Arabia of pressuring other OPEC nations into agreeing with the production cut, some of which felt coerced, saying the United States had presented the Saudi government with an analysis showing there was no market basis for the cut. United States National Security Council spokesman [[John Kirby (admiral)|John Kirby]] said the Saudi government knew the decision will "increase Russian revenues and blunt the effectiveness of sanctions" against Moscow, rejecting the Saudi claim that the move was "purely economic".<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/white-house-pushes-back-saudi-claim-oil-cut-was-purely-economic-2022-10-13/ | title=Saudi Arabia pushed other OPEC nations into oil cut, White House claims | newspaper=Reuters | date=14 October 2022 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Northam |first=Jackie |date=13 October 2022 |title=The White House accuses Saudi Arabia of aiding Russia and coercing OPEC oil producers |url=https://www.npr.org/2022/10/13/1128523146/saudi-arabia-russia-opec-oil-cut-biden-congress-washington |website=NPR}}</ref> According to a report in ''The Intercept'', sources and experts said that Saudi Arabia had sought even deeper cuts than Russia, saying Saudi Crown Prince [[Mohammed bin Salman]] wants to sway the [[2022 United States elections]] in favor of the [[Republican Party (United States)|GOP]] and the [[2024 United States presidential election]] in favor of [[Donald Trump]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Klippenstein |first=Ken |date=2022-10-20 |title=Saudis Sought Oil Production Cut So Deep It Surprised Even Russia |url=https://theintercept.com/2022/10/20/saudi-oil-production-cut/ |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20221020223536/https://theintercept.com/2022/10/20/saudi-oil-production-cut/ |archive-date=2022-10-20 |access-date=2024-12-15 |website=The Intercept |language=en-US}}</ref> In contrast, Saudi officials maintain that their decision to reduce oil production was driven by concerns over the [[World economy|global economy]], not political motivations. They state that the cuts were a response to the global economic situation and low inventories, which could trigger a rally in [[Price of oil|oil prices]].<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Farchy |first1=Jack |last2=Hordern |first2=Annmarie |last3=Bartenstein |first3=Ben |date=October 6, 2022 |title=Saudi Arabia Snubs Biden and Aids Putin With Oil Output Cut |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-05/saudi-arabia-enrages-biden-and-aids-putin-with-oil-output-cut?sref=AZ3pROx3 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20221006081048/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-05/saudi-arabia-enrages-biden-and-aids-putin-with-oil-output-cut |archive-date=6 October 2022 |access-date=2024-05-31 |website=Bloomberg}}</ref> Saudi Arabia affirms its actions by emphasizing its strategic partnership with the U.S., focusing on peace, security, and prosperity.<ref>{{Cite web |title=A statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the statements issued about the Kingdom following the OPEC+ decision {{!}} The Embassy of The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia |url=https://www.saudiembassy.net/statements/statement-ministry-foreign-affairs-regarding-statements-issued-about-kingdom-following |access-date=2024-05-31 |website=www.saudiembassy.net}}</ref>

In 2023, the [[International Energy Agency|IEA]] predicted that demand for fossil fuels such as oil, natural gas and coal would reach an all-time high by 2030.<ref>{{cite news |last=Timperley |first=Jocelyn |date=27 July 2023 |title=Is the decline of oil in sight? |url=https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20230726-an-experts-guide-to-peak-oil-and-what-it-really-means |publisher=BBC}}</ref> OPEC rejected the IEA's forecast, saying "what makes such predictions so dangerous, is that they are often accompanied by calls to stop investing in new oil and gas projects."<ref>{{cite news |title=OPEC says IEA estimate of peak fossil fuel demand by 2030 not 'fact-based' |url=https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/opec-says-iea-estimate-peak-fossil-fuel-demand-by-2030-not-fact-based-2023-09-14/ |work=Reuters |date=14 September 2023}}</ref>

In November 2024, [[S&P Global]] alleged that the UAE ignored the OPEC's oil production cuts and produced around 700,000 barrels more than the agreed quota, that is, 2.91m barrels per day. Analysts asserted that the Emirates’ “quota busting” would underestimate Saudi and Russia's efforts to increase oil prices by cutting production. While Russia was seeking to fund its war with Ukraine, Saudi had its own plans of diversifying the economy.<ref>{{cite news|title=UAE accused of defying Opec oil cartel |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2024/11/27/uae-accused-of-defying-opec-oil-cartel/ |newspaper=The Telegraph |date=27 November 2024}}
</ref>

=== 2025: Production Increases ===
In 2025, OPEC+ began the process of reversing voluntary production cuts. As of September 2025, the group had already cuts of about 2.5 million barrels per day—equivalent to ~2.4% of global demand.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-09-07 |title=OPEC+ agrees on a further oil output boost in October to regain market share |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2025/09/07/opec-agrees-to-oil-output-increase-in-october.html |access-date=2025-09-08 |website=CNBC |language=en}}</ref> OPEC+ announced it would continue to reverse cuts and said it would boost production by 137,000 barrels per day in October.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Petroni |first=Giulia |title=OPEC+ to Boost Oil Output Further Despite Supply Glut Concerns |url=https://www.wsj.com/business/energy-oil/opec-to-boost-oil-output-further-despite-supply-glut-concerns-32c98430 |access-date=2025-09-08 |website=The Wall Street Journal |date=7 September 2025 |language=en-US}}</ref>

==Membership==
{{clear left}}

===Current member countries===
As of January 2024, OPEC has 12 member countries: five in the [[Middle East]] ([[West Asia]]), six in [[Africa]], and one in South America.<ref>{{Cite web |last=OPEC |first=Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries |title=Member Countries |url=https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm}}</ref> According to the U.S. [[Energy Information Administration]] (EIA), OPEC's combined rate of oil production (including [[natural-gas condensate|gas condensate]]) represented 44% of the world's total in 2016,<ref name="EIA Production">{{cite web |title=Production of Crude Oil including Lease Condensate 2016 |url=https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/#/?pa=00000000000000000000000000000000002&c=ruvvvvvfvtvnvv1vrvvvvfvvvvvvfvvvou20evvvvvvvvvvvvuvo&ct=0&tl_id=5-A&vs=INTL.57-1-AFG-TBPD.A&vo=0&v=H&start=2014&end=2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170427031435/https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/#/?pa=00000000000000000000000000000000002&c=ruvvvvvfvtvnvv1vrvvvvfvvvvvvfvvvou20evvvvvvvvvvvvuvo&ct=0&tl_id=5-A&vs=INTL.57-1-AFG-TBPD.A&vo=0&v=H&start=2014&end=2016 |archive-date=27 April 2017 |access-date=28 May 2017 |publisher=US Energy Information Administration |format=CVS download}}</ref> and OPEC accounted for 81.5% of the world's "proven" oil reserves. Subsequent reports from 2022 indicate that OPEC member countries were then responsible for about 38% of total world crude oil production.<ref name=":4" /> It is also estimated that these countries hold 79.5% of the globe's proven oil reserves, with the Middle East alone accounting for 67.2% of OPEC's reserves.<ref name=":52"/><ref name=":62"/>

Approval of a new member country requires agreement by three-quarters of OPEC's existing members, including all five of the founders.<ref name=statute/> In October 2015, [[Sudan]] formally submitted an application to join,<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article56814 |title=Sudan awaiting decision on its OPEC membership application: minister |work=Sudan Tribune |date=22 October 2015 |access-date=19 November 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151120071426/http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article56814 |archive-date=20 November 2015 |url-status=live }}</ref> but it is not yet a member.

{| class="wikitable sortable plainrowheaders"
|-
! scope="col" | Country
! scope="col" | Region
! scope="col" | Duration of membership<ref name="OPEC Member"/><ref name=May2017Vienna/>
! scope="col" | Population<br />(2022)<ref name=":8">{{Cite web |title=World Bank Open Data |url=https://data.worldbank.org/ |access-date=2024-04-17 |website=World Bank Open Data}}</ref><ref name=":9">{{Cite web |title=Population 2022 |url=https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/POP.pdf}}</ref>
! scope="col" | Area<br />{{small|(km<sup>2</sup>)}}<ref name="CIA Area">{{cite web |url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2147.html |title=Field Listing: Area |access-date=4 January 2009 |work=The World Factbook |publisher=Central Intelligence Agency |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140131115000/https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2147.html |archive-date=31 January 2014 }}</ref><ref name=":2">Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. (2023). OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (58th ed.). Retrieved April 17, 2024, from <nowiki>https://www.opec.org</nowiki></ref>
! scope="col" data-sort-type="number"| [[List of countries by oil production|Oil production]] {{small|(bbl/day, 2023)}}<br />{{efn-ua|name=bbl|One petroleum barrel ([[barrel (unit)|bbl]]) is approximately 42 U.S. gallons, or 159&nbsp;liters, or 0.159&nbsp;m<sup>3</sup>, varying slightly with temperature. To put the production numbers in context, a [[Oil tanker#Size categories|supertanker]] typically holds 2,000,000&nbsp;barrels (320,000&nbsp;m<sup>3</sup>),<ref>{{cite book |last1=Hayler |first1=William B. |last2=Keever |first2=John M. |title=American Merchant Seaman's Manual |year=2003 |publisher= Cornell Maritime Press |isbn= 978-0-87033-549-5 |page=14.3}}</ref> and the world's current production rate would take approximately 56 years to exhaust the world's current proven reserves.}}<ref name=":10">{{Cite web |title=International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) |url=https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world/petroleum-and-other-liquids/annual-petroleum-and-other-liquids-production?pd=5&p=0000000000000000000000000000000000vg&u=0&f=A&v=mapbubble&a=-&i=none&vo=value&t=C&g=00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001&l=249-ruvvvvvfvtvnvv1vrvvvvfvvvvvvfvvvou20evvvvvvvvvvnvvvs0008&s=94694400000&e=1672531200000& |access-date=2024-04-17 |website=www.eia.gov}}</ref>
! scope="col" data-sort-type="number"| [[List of countries by proven oil reserves|Proven reserves]]<br />{{small|([[barrel (unit)|bbl]], 2022)}}{{efn-ua|name=bbl}}<ref>{{Cite web |last=OPEC |first=Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries |title=OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves |url=https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm |access-date=16 April 2024 |website=www.opec.org}}</ref><ref name=":2" />
|-
! scope="row" | {{flag|Algeria}}
| North Africa
| data-sort-value="1969" | Since 1969
| align=right | 44,903,220
| align=right |       2,381,740
| align=right |       1,183,096
| align=right |  12,200,000,000
|-
! scope="row" | {{flag|Republic of the Congo}}
| Central Africa
| data-sort-value="2018" | Since 2018<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://uk.reuters.com/article/congorepublic-opec/congo-republic-becomes-opec-oil-cartels-newest-member-idUKL8N1TO3R2|title=Congo Republic becomes OPEC oil cartel's newest member|type=editorial|agency=[[Reuters]]|work=U.K.|access-date=22 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180622220328/https://uk.reuters.com/article/congorepublic-opec/congo-republic-becomes-opec-oil-cartels-newest-member-idUKL8N1TO3R2|archive-date=22 June 2018|url-status=dead}}</ref>
| align=right | 5,970,000
| align=right | 342,000
| align=right | 261,986
| align=right | 1,810,000,000
|-
! scope="row" style="min-width:7em" | {{flag|Equatorial Guinea}}
| Central Africa
| data-sort-value="2017" | Since 2017
| align=right | 1,674,910
| align=right |    28,050
| align=right |   88,126
| align=right |   1,100,000,000
|-
! scope="row" | {{flag|Gabon}}
| Central Africa
| data-sort-value="1975" | {{ubl|1975–1995,|Since 2016}}
| align=right | 2,388,990
| align=right |         267,667
| align=right |         204,273
| align=right |   2,000,000,000
|-
! scope="row" | {{flag|Iran}}
| [[Middle East]]
| data-sort-value="1960" | Since 1960{{efn-ua|name=Founder|The five founding members attended the first OPEC conference in September 1960.}}
| align=right | 88,550,570
| align=right |       1,648,195
| align=right |       3,623,455
| align=right | 208,600,000,000
|-
! scope="row" | {{flag|Iraq}}
| Middle East
| data-sort-value="1960" | Since 1960{{efn-ua|name=Founder}}
| align=right | 44,496,120
| align=right |         437,072
| align=right |       4,341,410
| align=right | 145,020,000,000
|-
! scope="row" | {{flag|Kuwait}}
| Middle East
| data-sort-value="1960" | Since 1960{{efn-ua|name=Founder}}
| align=right | 4,268,870
| align=right |          17,820
| align=right |       2,709,958
| align=right | 101,500,000,000
|-
! scope="row" | {{flag|Libya}}
| North Africa
| data-sort-value="1962" | Since 1962
| align=right | 6,812,340
| align=right |       1,759,540
| align=right |         1,225,430
| align=right |  48,360,000,000
|-
! scope="row" | {{flag|Nigeria}}
| West Africa
| data-sort-value="1971" | Since 1971
| align=right | 218,541,210
| align=right |         923,768
| align=right |       1,441,674
| align=right |  36,970,000,000
|-
! scope="row" | {{flag|Saudi Arabia}}
| Middle East
| data-sort-value="1960" | Since 1960{{efn-ua|name=Founder}}
| align=right | 36,408,820
| align=right |       2,149,690
| align=right |      9,733,479
| align=right | 267,190,000,000
|-
! scope="row" | {{flag|United Arab Emirates}}
| Middle East
| data-sort-value="1967" | Since 1967{{efn-ua|name=UAE|The UAE was founded in December 1971. Its OPEC membership originated with the [[Emirate of Abu Dhabi]].}}
| align=right | 9,441,130
| align=right |          83,600
| align=right |       3,393,506
| align=right |  113,000,000,000
|-
! scope="row" | {{flag|Venezuela}}
| {{nowrap|South America}}
| data-sort-value="1960" | Since 1960{{efn-ua|name=Founder}}
| align=right | 28,301,700
| align=right |         916,445
| align=right |         750,506
| align=right | 303,220,000,000
|- class="sortbottom"
! colspan="3" | OPEC total
! 491,757,880
! 10,955,392
! 28,956,906
! 1,240,970,000,000
|-
! colspan=3| World total
! 7,951,150,000
!                   510,072,000
!                    81,803,545
!             1,564,441,000,000
|-
! colspan=3| OPEC percent
!                           6.18%
!                           2.14%
!                           35.39%
!                           79%
|}

=== OPEC+ ===
A number of non-OPEC member countries also participate in the organisation's initiatives such as voluntary supply cuts in order to further bind policy objectives between OPEC and non-OPEC members.<ref name="ope2"/> This loose grouping of countries, known as OPEC+, includes [[Azerbaijan]], [[Bahrain]], [[Brunei]], [[Brazil]], [[Kazakhstan]], [[Malaysia]], [[Mexico]], [[Oman]], [[Russia]], [[South Sudan]] and [[Sudan]].<ref>{{cite news |author=Prashanth Perumal J. |date=5 June 2022 |title=Opec Plus The cartel and its allies that keep oil on the boil |work=The Hindu |url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/opec-plus-the-cartel-and-its-allies-that-keep-oil-on-the-boil/article65493511.ece}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=OPEC: OPEC makes history in Vienna |url=https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/4052.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190802092851/https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/4052.htm |archive-date=2 August 2019 |access-date=2 August 2019 |website=opec.org}}</ref>

The collaboration among OPEC+ member countries has led to the establishment of the Declaration of Cooperation (DoC) in 2017, which has been subsequently extended multiple times due to its remarkable success. The DoC serves as a framework for cooperation and coordination between OPEC and non-OPEC countries. Additionally, OPEC+ members engage in further cooperative efforts through the Charter of Cooperation (CoC), which provides a platform for long-term collaboration. The CoC facilitates dialogue and the exchange of views on global oil and [[energy market]] conditions, with the overarching goal of ensuring a secure energy supply and fostering lasting stability that benefits producers, consumers, investors, and the [[World economy|global economy]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries |first=OPEC |title=Declaration of Cooperation |url=https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/4580.htm#:~:text=The%20Charter%20provides%20a%20platform,investors%20and%20the%20global%20economy. |access-date=1 April 2014 |website=www.opec.org}}</ref>

=== Observers ===
Since the 1980s, representatives from Canada<!-- The source does not mention Canada. However, Kazakhstan and Sudan are mentioned and could be added. -->, Egypt, Mexico, Norway, Oman, Russia, and other oil-exporting nations have attended many OPEC meetings as observers. This arrangement serves as an informal mechanism for coordinating policies.<ref name="observers3">{{cite news |date=14 September 2010 |title=OPEC: Fifty Years Regulating Oil Market Roller Coaster |agency=Inter Press Service |url=http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/09/opec-fifty-years-regulating-oil-market-roller-coaster/ |url-status=live |access-date=23 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151224104031/http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/09/opec-fifty-years-regulating-oil-market-roller-coaster/ |archive-date=24 December 2015}}</ref>
<!--
==New members==
[[WP:CRYSTAL]], unattributed speculation: Uganda and Somalia with exploration of crude oil may join OPEC in the future, with likely new production dates of 2024-2025, expansion of OPEC with OPEC+ and new country's in exploration, where criteria of OPEC Charter is production of crude oil.
-->
==Lapsed members==
<!-- Editors, if this table is empty, please keep it here in comment brackets, as a placeholder until the next OPEC departure. -->
{| class="wikitable sortable plainrowheaders"
|-
! scope="col" | Country
! scope="col" | Region
! scope="col" | Membership years<ref name="OPEC Member"/>
! scope="col" | Population<br />(2022)<ref name=":8" /><ref name=":9" />
! scope="col" | Area<br />{{small|(km<sup>2</sup>)}}<ref name="CIA Area"/>
! scope="col" | [[List of countries by oil production|Oil production]]<br />{{small|([[Barrel (unit)|bbl]]/day, 2023)}}<ref name=":10" />
! scope="col" | [[List of countries by proven oil reserves|Proven reserves]]<br />(2022)<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=22}}
|-
! scope="row" | [[Angola]]
| Southern Africa
| data-sort-value="2007" | {{ubl|2007–2023<ref>{{Cite web |date=22 December 2023 |title=Angola leaves Opec oil cartel in output quota row |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67793369 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231221180523/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67793369 |archive-date=21 December 2023 |website=[[BBC News]]}}</ref>}}
| style="text-align:right" |      35,588,987
| style="text-align:right" |       1,246,700
| style="text-align:right" |       1,144,402
| style="text-align:right" |   2,550,000,000
|-
! scope="row" | [[Ecuador]]
| South America
| data-sort-value="1973" | {{ubl|1973–1992,|2007–2020<ref name="EcuadorExitStatement20200102">{{cite press release |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |date=2 January 2020 |title=Comunicado Oficial |trans-title=Official Statement |language=es |url=https://www.recursosyenergia.gob.ec/comunicado-oficial-7/ |url-status=live |location=Metropolitan District of Quito, Ecuador |publisher=Ministry of Energy and Non-Renewable Natural Resources |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200107043240/https://www.recursosyenergia.gob.ec/comunicado-oficial-7/ |archive-date=7 January 2020 |access-date=6 January 2020}}</ref>}}
| style="text-align:right" | 18,001.000
| style="text-align:right" |         283,560
| style="text-align:right" |         475,274
| style="text-align:right" |   8,273,000,000
|-
! scope="row" | [[Indonesia]]
| Southeast Asia
| data-sort-value="1962" | {{ubl|1962–2008,|Jan–Nov 2016}}
| style="text-align:right" | 275,501,000
| style="text-align:right" |       1,904,569
| style="text-align:right" |         608,299
| style="text-align:right" |   2,250,000,000
|-
! scope="row" | [[Qatar]]
| Middle East
| data-sort-value="1961" | 1961–2019<ref name="qtrleave"/>
| style="text-align:right" | 2,695,122
| style="text-align:right" |          11,437
| style="text-align:right" |       1,322,000
| style="text-align:right" |  25,244,000,000
|-
|}

For countries that export petroleum at relatively low volume, their limited negotiating power as OPEC members does not necessarily justify the burdens imposed by OPEC [[production quota]]s and membership costs. [[Ecuador]] withdrew from OPEC in December 1992, because it was unwilling to pay the annual US$2 million membership fee and felt that it needed to produce more oil than it was allowed under its OPEC quota at the time.<ref name=Ecuador/> Ecuador then rejoined in October 2007 before leaving again in January 2020.<ref name="eqrleave">{{cite web
| url=https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/ecuador-to-leave-opec-in-january-amid-efforts-to-boost-income-1.1324853
| title=Ecuador to Leave OPEC in January Amid Efforts to Boost Income
| first=Kueffner
| last=Stephan
| date=1 October 2019
| website=BNN Bloomberg
| access-date=6 October 2019
| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191006225119/https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/ecuador-to-leave-opec-in-january-amid-efforts-to-boost-income-1.1324853
| archive-date=6 October 2019| url-status=live}}</ref> Ecuador's Ministry of Energy and Non-Renewable Natural Resources released an official statement on 2 January 2020 which confirmed that Ecuador had left OPEC.<ref name="EcuadorExitStatement20200102"/> Similar concerns prompted [[Gabon]] to suspend membership in January 1995;<ref name=Gabon/> it rejoined in July 2016.

In May 2008, [[Indonesia]] announced that it would leave OPEC when its membership expired at the end of that year, having become a net importer of oil and being unable to meet its production quota.<ref name=Indonesia/> It rejoined the organization in January 2016,<ref name="OPEC Member"/> but announced another "temporary suspension" of its membership at year-end when OPEC requested a 5% production cut.<ref name=LeavingAgain>{{cite news |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-opec-meeting-indonesia-idUSKBN13Q3M7 |title=Net oil importer Indonesia leaves producer club OPEC, again |first1=Fergus |last1=Jensen |first2=Wilda |last2=Asmarini |work=Reuters |date=1 December 2016 |access-date=1 December 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161201141227/http://www.reuters.com/article/us-opec-meeting-indonesia-idUSKBN13Q3M7 |archive-date=1 December 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Qatar left OPEC on 1 January 2019, after joining the organization in 1961, to focus on [[natural gas]] production, of which it is the world's largest exporter in the form of [[Liquefied natural gas|liquified natural gas]] (LNG).<ref name="qtrleave">{{cite web
| url=https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/03/business/qatar-opec-withdrawal/index.html
| title=Qatar is pulling out of OPEC to focus on gas
| first=Zahraa
| last=Alkhalisi
| date=3 December 2018
| work=CNN
| access-date=3 December 2018
| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181203142630/https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/03/business/qatar-opec-withdrawal/index.html
| archive-date=3 December 2018| url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news
|url=https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/12/08/qatar-quit-opec-because-of-politics-not-oil
|title=Qatar quit OPEC because of politics, not oil
|date=6 December 2018|newspaper=[[The Economist]]
|access-date=25 January 2019
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190126000855/https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/12/08/qatar-quit-opec-because-of-politics-not-oil|archive-date=26 January 2019
|url-status=live}}</ref>

In an OPEC meeting in November 2023, Nigeria and Angola, the biggest oil producers in Sub-Saharan Africa, expressed their discontent over OPEC's quotas which, according to them, blocked their efforts to ramp up oil production and boost their foreign reserves. In December 2023, Angola announced it was leaving the OPEC because it disagreed with the organization's production quotas scheme.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-12-21 |title=Angola to quit OPEC over oil production quotas disagreement |url=https://news.yahoo.com/angola-quit-opec-over-oil-133032949.html |access-date=2023-12-21 |website=Yahoo! News |language=en-US}}</ref>

==Market information==
As one area in which OPEC members have been able to cooperate productively over the decades, the organisation has significantly improved the quality and quantity of information available about the international oil market. This is especially helpful for a natural-resource industry whose smooth functioning requires months and years of careful planning.

===Publications and research===
[[File:Jodi-circle-logo.png|thumb|alt=refer to caption|Logo for [[Joint Organisations Data Initiative|JODI]], in which OPEC is a founding member]]
In April 2001, OPEC collaborated with five other international organizations ([[Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation|APEC]], [[Eurostat]], [[International Energy Agency|IEA]], {{interlanguage link|Latin American Energy Organisation|es|Organización Latinoamericana de Energía|lt=OLADE}}, [[United Nations Statistics Division|UNSD]]) to improve the availability and reliability of oil data. They launched the Joint Oil Data Exercise, which in 2005 was joined by [[International Energy Forum|IEF]] and renamed the [[Joint Organisations Data Initiative]] (JODI), covering more than 90% of the global oil market. [[Gas Exporting Countries Forum|GECF]] joined as an eighth partner in 2014, enabling JODI also to cover nearly 90% of the global market for natural gas.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.jodidata.org/about-jodi/history.aspx |title=History of the Joint Organisations Data Initiative |work=JODI |access-date=23 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151012051500/https://www.jodidata.org/about-jodi/history.aspx |archive-date=12 October 2015 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Since 2007, OPEC has published the "World Oil Outlook" (WOO) annually, in which it presents a comprehensive analysis of the global oil industry including medium- and long-term projections for supply and demand.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/340.htm |title=World Oil Outlook |work=OPEC |access-date=31 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151224154110/http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/340.htm |archive-date=24 December 2015 |url-status=live }}</ref> OPEC also produces an "Annual Statistical Bulletin" (ASB),<ref name=ASB>{{cite web |url=http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/202.htm |title=Annual Statistical Bulletin |work=OPEC |access-date=31 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180821113032/https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/202.htm |archive-date=21 August 2018 |url-status=live }}</ref> and publishes more-frequent updates in its "Monthly Oil Market Report" (MOMR)<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/338.htm |title=Monthly Oil Market Report |work=OPEC |access-date=31 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151227170559/http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/338.htm |archive-date=27 December 2015 |url-status=live }}</ref> and "OPEC Bulletin".<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/76.htm |title=OPEC Bulletin |work=OPEC |access-date=31 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160105070452/http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/76.htm |archive-date=5 January 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Crude oil benchmarks===
{{See also|Benchmark (crude oil)}}
A "crude oil benchmark" is a standardized [[Petroleum#Classification|petroleum]] product that serves as a convenient reference price for buyers and sellers of crude oil, including standardized contracts in major [[futures markets]] since 1983. Benchmarks are used because oil prices differ (usually by a few dollars per barrel) based on variety, grade, delivery date and location, and other legal requirements.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/904748.stm |title=Oil markets explained |work=BBC News |date=18 October 2007 |access-date=6 April 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180913114404/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/904748.stm |archive-date=13 September 2018 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |url=http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/603911468739482147/pdf/multi-page.pdf |title=The new era of petroleum trading: spot-oil, spot-related contracts, and futures markets |first=Hossein |last=Razavi |publisher=The World Bank |date=April 1989 |isbn=978-0-8213-1199-8 |pages=65–69 |access-date=4 February 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170205095734/http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/603911468739482147/pdf/multi-page.pdf |archive-date=5 February 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref>

The [[OPEC Reference Basket|OPEC Reference Basket of Crudes]] has been an important benchmark for oil prices since 2000. It is calculated as a [[weighted average]] of prices for petroleum blends from the OPEC member countries: [[Sahara Blend|Saharan Blend]] (Algeria), Girassol (Angola), Djeno (Republic of the Congo)<!--New Zafiro? (Equatorial Guinea),--> Rabi Light (Gabon), Iran Heavy (Islamic Republic of Iran), Basra Light (Iraq), Kuwait Export (Kuwait), Es Sider (Libya), [[Bonny Light oil|Bonny Light]] (Nigeria), Arab Light (Saudi Arabia), Murban (UAE), and Merey (Venezuela).<ref name=basket>{{cite web |url=http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/40.htm |title=OPEC Basket Price |work=OPEC |access-date=4 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190501131417/https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/40.htm |archive-date=1 May 2019 |url-status=live }}</ref>

[[Brent Crude|North Sea Brent Crude Oil]] is the leading [[Benchmark (crude oil)|benchmark]] for Atlantic basin crude oils and is used to price approximately two-thirds of the world's traded crude oil. Other well-known benchmarks are [[West Texas Intermediate]] (WTI), [[Dubai Crude]], [[DME Oman Crude Oil Futures Contract|Oman Crude]], and [[Urals oil]].<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/8429184/Brent-crude-and-other-oil-price-benchmarks.html |title=Brent crude and other oil price benchmarks |agency=Reuters |date=5 April 2011 |access-date=4 April 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170925075958/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/8429184/Brent-crude-and-other-oil-price-benchmarks.html |archive-date=25 September 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref>

[[File:Oil price benchmarks.webp|thumb|300px|
{{legend-line|#929292 solid 3px|[[West Texas Intermediate]]}}
{{legend-line|#000000 solid 3px|[[Brent Crude]]}}
{{legend-line|#EE220C solid 3px|[[Urals oil]] (Russian export mix)}}
{{legend-line|#00A2FF solid 3px|[[Dubai Crude]]}}
{{legend-line|#A21726 solid 3px|OPEC Basket Price}}
]]

===Spare capacity===
The [[Energy Information Administration|US Energy Information Administration]], the statistical arm of the [[US Department of Energy]], defines spare capacity for crude oil market management "as the volume of production that can be brought on within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days&nbsp;... OPEC spare capacity provides an indicator of the world oil market's ability to respond to potential crises that reduce oil supplies."<ref name="EIA_2014" />

In November 2014, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that OPEC's "effective" spare capacity, adjusted for ongoing disruptions in countries like Libya and Nigeria, was {{convert|3.5|Moilbbl/d|m3/d}} and that this number would increase to a peak in 2017 of {{convert|4.6|Moilbbl/d|m3/d}}.<ref>{{cite journal |title='Effective' OPEC Spare Capacity: Reality-Based Data |url=http://www.iea.org/media/ieajournal/Issue7_WEB.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160502040956/http://www.iea.org/media/ieajournal/Issue7_WEB.pdf |journal=IEA Energy |issue=7 |page=13 |date=November 2014 |archive-date=2 May 2016}}</ref> By November 2015, the IEA changed its assessment{{quantify|date=March 2020}} "with OPEC's spare production buffer stretched thin, as Saudi Arabia – which holds the lion's share of excess capacity – and its [Persian] Gulf neighbours pump at near-record rates."<ref>{{cite journal |title=3 billion barrel cushion |journal=Oil Market Report |url=https://www.iea.org/oilmarketreport/reports/2015/1115/ |date=13 November 2015 |access-date=15 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151222164633/https://www.iea.org/oilmarketreport/reports/2015/1115/ |archive-date=22 December 2015 |url-status=live }}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|Energy}}
* [[Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries]]
* [[Big Oil]]
* [[Energy diplomacy]]
* [[List of country groupings]]
* [[List of intergovernmental organizations]]
* [[Oligopoly]]
* [[World oil market chronology from 2003]]
* [[Gasoline]]
* [[Peak oil]]
* [[Peak gas]]
* [[Arun gas field]]

==Notes==
{{notelist-ua}}

==References==
{{Reflist|30em}}

==Further reading==
{{Refbegin|30em}}
* Ansari, Dawud. (2017) "OPEC, Saudi Arabia, and the shale revolution: Insights from equilibrium modelling and oil politics." ''Energy Policy'' 111 (2017): 166–178. [https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/82613/1/MPRA_paper_82613.pdf online]
* Claes, Dag Harald, and Giuliano Garavini eds. (2019) ''Handbook of OPEC and the Global Energy Order: Past, Present and Future Challenges'' (Routledge 2019) [https://www.amazon.com/Handbook-OPEC-Global-Energy-Order/dp/0367195658/ excerpt]
* Colgan, Jeff D. (2014) "The emperor has no clothes: The limits of OPEC in the global oil market." ''International Organization'' 68.3 (2014): 599–632. [http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/OPEC-Colgan.2013Mar.Copyedit-IO.pdf online]
*Dudley, Bob. (2019) "BP energy outlook." ''Report–BP Energy Economics–London: UK'' 9 (2019) [https://vcmstudy.ir/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/bp-energy-outlook-2017-presentation-slides.pdf online].
* Economou, Andreas, and Bassam Fattouh. (2021) "OPEC at 60: the world with and without OPEC." OPEC ''Energy Review'' 45.1 (2021): 3-28. [https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/opec.12205 online], a historical perspective from 1990 to 2018.
* Evans, John (1986). ''OPEC, Its Member States and the World Energy Market''. {{ISBN|978-0-8103-2148-9}}.
* Fesharaki, Fereidun (1983). ''OPEC, the Gulf, and the World Petroleum Market: A Study in Government Policy and Downstream Operations''. {{ISBN|978-0-367-28193-9}}.
* Garavini, Giuliano. (2019). ''[https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-rise-and-fall-of-opec-in-the-twentieth-century-9780198832836?cc=us&lang=en& The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century]''. Oxford University Press.
* Gately, Dermot. (1984) "A ten-year retrospective: OPEC and the world oil market." ''Journal of Economic Literature'' 22.3 (1984): 1100–1114. summary of scholarly literature [http://www-personal.umich.edu/~twod/oil-ns/articles/research-oil/dermot_gatley_opec_10-yr_pricing_oil_sep84.pdf online]
*{{Cite journal|title=The Power of Oil: The Arab Oil Weapon and the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and the United States |first=Roy |last=Licklider |journal=[[International Studies Quarterly]]|volume=32 |issue=2 |year=1988 |pages=205–226 |doi=10.2307/2600627 |jstor=2600627 |s2cid=155591645 |url=https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/92db/ddba23893560a127a5ec353346b5af1feeb6.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200218111805/https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/92db/ddba23893560a127a5ec353346b5af1feeb6.pdf |archive-date=18 February 2020|ref=none}}
* {{cite news|last=Monbiot|first=George|author-link=George Monbiot|url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jun/26/shell-not-green-saviour-death-machine-greenwash-oil-gas|title=Shell is not a green saviour. It's a planetary death machine|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|date=26 June 2019|access-date=12 March 2023|ref=none}}{{Relevance inline|date=March 2023|reason=Does the article say anything about OPEC?}}
* Painter, David S (2014). [https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/40394/ssoar-hsr-2014-4-painter-Oil_and_geopolitics_the_oil.pdf?sequence=1 "Oil and geopolitics: The oil crises of the 1970s and the cold war"]. ''Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung''. 186–208.
* Pickl, Matthias J. (2019) "The renewable energy strategies of oil majors–From oil to energy?." ''Energy Strategy Reviews'' 26 (2019): 100370. [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211467X19300574 online]
* Ratti, Ronald A., and Joaquin L. Vespignani. (2015) "OPEC and non-OPEC oil production and the global economy." ''Energy Economics'' 50 (2015): 364–378. [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988314003053 online]
* Skeet, Ian (1988). ''OPEC: Twenty-five Years of Prices and Politics''. Cambridge UP. {{ISBN|978-0-521-40572-0}} [https://archive.org/details/opectwentyfiveye00skee online]
* Van de Graaf, Thijs. (2020) "Is OPEC dead? Oil exporters, the Paris agreement and the transition to a post-carbon world." in ''Beyond market assumptions: Oil price as a global institution'' (Springer, Cham, 2020) pp.&nbsp;63–77. [https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8137111/file/8137112.pdf online]
* Wight, David M. ''Oil Money: Middle East Petrodollars and the Transformation of US Empire, 1967-1988'' (Cornell University Press, 20210 [https://issforum.org/to/jrt14-23   Website: rjissf.org online reviews]
* Woolfson, Charles, and Matthias Beck. (2019) "Corporate social responsibility in the international oil industry." in ''Corporate social responsibility failures in the oil industry. '' (Routledge, 2019) pp.&nbsp;1–14. [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Charles-Woolfson/publication/333570020_Corporate_Social_Responsibility_in_the_International_Oil_Industry/links/5d922415a6fdcc2554a95f81/Corporate-Social-Responsibility-in-the-International-Oil-Industry.pdf online]
* Yergin, Daniel (1991). ''The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power''. {{ISBN|978-1-4391-1012-6}} [https://archive.org/details/prizeepicquestfo0000yerg_g3v1 online]
* Yergin, Daniel (2011). ''The quest : energy, security and the remaking of the modern world'' (2011) [https://archive.org/details/questenergysecur0000yerg online]
{{Refend}}

==External links==
{{Commons category}}
* {{Official website}}
* [http://www.opecfund.org/ The OPEC Fund for International Development official website]

{{OPEC|state=expanded}}
{{Heads of state of OPEC member states}}
{{Energy in Russia}}
{{Petroleum industry|collapsed}}
{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Opec}}
[[Category:OPEC| ]]
[[Category:Cartels]]
[[Category:History of the petroleum industry]]
[[Category:Intergovernmental commodity organizations|Petroleum]]
[[Category:International energy organizations]]
[[Category:Petroleum economics]]
[[Category:Petroleum organizations]]
[[Category:Petroleum politics]]
[[Category:Organisations based in Vienna]]
[[Category:Organizations established in 1960]]
[[Category:20th century in Baghdad]]