View source for Ordinary language philosophy

{{Short description|View that philosophical problems are distortions of natural language}}
{{For|the philosophy of language|Philosophy of language}}
{{use dmy dates |date=March 2024}}
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'''Ordinary language philosophy''' ('''OLP'''<ref name=Baz/>) is a [[philosophical methodology]] that sees traditional philosophical problems as rooted in misunderstandings philosophers develop by [[stipulative definition|distorting or forgetting how words are ordinarily used]] to convey [[Meaning (philosophy)|meaning]] in [[natural language|non-philosophical contexts]]. "Such 'philosophical' uses of language, on this view, create the very philosophical problems they are employed to solve."<ref name=ParkerRyan/>

This approach typically involves eschewing philosophical "theories" in favor of close attention to the details of the use of everyday "ordinary" language. Its earliest forms are associated with the later work of [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] and a number of mid-20th century philosophers who can be split into two main groups, neither of which could be described as an organized "school".<ref name=Chappell/> In its earlier stages, contemporaries of Wittgenstein at [[Cambridge University]] such as [[Norman Malcolm]], [[Alice Ambrose]], [[Friedrich Waismann]], [[Oets Kolk Bouwsma]] and [[Morris Lazerowitz]] started to develop ideas recognisable as ordinary language philosophy. These ideas were further elaborated from 1945 onwards through the work of some Oxford University philosophers led initially by [[Gilbert Ryle]], then followed by [[J. L. Austin]] and [[Paul Grice]]. This Oxford group also included [[H. L. A. Hart]], [[Geoffrey Warnock]], [[J. O. Urmson]] and [[P. F. Strawson]]. The close association between ordinary language philosophy and these later thinkers has led to it sometimes being called "Oxford philosophy". The posthumous publication of Wittgenstein's ''[[Philosophical Investigations]]'' in 1953 further solidified the notion of ordinary language philosophy. Philosophers a generation after Austin who made use of the method of ordinary language philosophy include [[Antony Flew]], [[Stanley Cavell]], [[John Searle]] and [[Oswald Hanfling]]. Today, [[Alice Crary]], [[Nancy Bauer (philosopher)|Nancy Bauer]], [[Sandra Laugier]], as well as literary theorists [[Toril Moi]], [[Rita Felski]], and [[Shoshana Felman]] have adopted the teachings of Cavell in particular, generating a resurgence of interest in ordinary language philosophy.

== Central ideas ==
{{essay-like|section|date=December 2022}}
The later Wittgenstein held that the meanings of words reside in their ordinary uses and that this is why philosophers trip over words taken in [[abstraction]]. From this came the idea that philosophy had gotten into trouble by trying to use words outside of the context of their use in ordinary language. For example, "understanding" is what you mean when you say "I understand". "Knowledge" is what you mean when you say "I know". The point is that you ''already know'' what "understanding" or "knowledge" are, at least implicitly. Philosophers are ill-advised to construct new definitions of these terms, because this is necessarily a ''re''definition, and the argument may unravel into self-referential nonsense. Rather, philosophers must explore the definitions these terms already have, without forcing convenient redefinitions onto them.

The controversy really begins when ordinary language philosophers apply the same leveling tendency to questions such as ''What is Truth?'' or ''What is Consciousness?'' Philosophers in this school would insist that we cannot assume that (for example) truth 'is' a 'thing' (in the same sense that tables and chairs are 'things') that the word 'truth' represents. Instead, we must look at the differing ways in which the words 'truth' and 'conscious' actually function in ordinary language. We may well discover, after investigation, that there is no single entity to which the word 'truth' corresponds, something Wittgenstein attempts to get across via his concept of a 'family resemblance' (cf. ''[[Philosophical Investigations]]''). Therefore, ordinary language philosophers tend to be anti-[[essentialism|essentialist]].

== History ==
Early [[analytic philosophy]] had a less positive view of ordinary language. [[Bertrand Russell]] tended to dismiss language as being of little philosophical significance, and ordinary language as just too confused to help solve metaphysical and epistemological problems. [[Gottlob Frege]], the [[Vienna Circle]] (especially [[Rudolf Carnap]]), the young Wittgenstein, and [[W. V. O. Quine]] all attempted to improve upon it, in particular using the resources of modern [[logic]]. In his ''[[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus]]'' Wittgenstein more or less agreed with Russell that language ought to be reformulated so as to be unambiguous, so as to accurately represent the world, so that we can better deal with philosophical questions.

By contrast, Wittgenstein later described his task as bringing "words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use".<ref name=Wittgenstein/> The sea change brought on by his unpublished work in the 1930s centered largely on the idea that there is nothing ''wrong'' with ordinary language as it stands, and that many traditional philosophical problems are only illusions brought on by misunderstandings about language and related subjects. The former idea led to rejecting the approaches of earlier analytic philosophy—arguably, of any earlier philosophy—and the latter led to replacing them with careful attention to language in its normal use, in order to "dissolve" the appearance of philosophical problems, rather than attempt to solve them. At its inception, ordinary language philosophy (also called [[linguistic philosophy]]) was taken as either an extension of or as an alternative to analytic philosophy.

Ordinary language analysis largely flourished and developed at [[Oxford University]] in the 1940s, under Austin and Ryle, and was quite widespread for a time before declining rapidly in popularity in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Despite this decline, Stanley Cavell and John Searle (both students of Austin) published seminal texts which draw significantly from the ordinary language tradition in 1969.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=t3_WhfknvF0C|title = Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language|isbn = 9780521096263|last1 = Searle|first1 = John R.|last2 = Searle|first2 = John Rogers|date = 2 January 1969| publisher=Cambridge University Press }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cavells-must-we-mean-what-we-say-at-50/92E0C03C4FC70DCACE5999D128279AAF|isbn=9781316515259|title=Cavell's Must We Mean What We Say? At 50|series=Cambridge Philosophical Anniversaries|year=2022|publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/9781009099714 |s2cid=247288246 |editor-last1=Chase |editor-last2=Floyd |editor-last3=Laugier |editor-first1=Greg |editor-first2=Juliet |editor-first3=Sandra }}</ref> Cavell more explicitly adopted the banner of ordinary language philosophy and inspired a generation of philosophers and literary theorists to reexamine the merits of this philosophical approach, all the while distancing himself from the limitations of traditional analytic philosophy. This caused a relatively recent resurgence of interest in this methodology, with some updates particularly due to the literature and teachings of Cavell, has also become a mainstay of what might be called [[postanalytic philosophy]]. Seeking to avoid the increasingly metaphysical and abstruse language found in mainstream [[analytic philosophy]], [[posthumanism]], and [[post-structuralism]], a number of feminist philosophers have adopted the methods of ordinary language philosophy.<ref>{{cite journal |url=http://newliteraryhistory.org/articles/46-2-intro.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150906165053/https://newliteraryhistory.org/articles/46-2-intro.pdf |archive-date=6 September 2015 |title=Introduction |journal=New Literary History |volume=46 |issue=2 |date=Spring 2015 |pages=v-xiii |first1=Nancy |last1=Bauer |first2=Sarah |last2=Beckwith |first3=Alice |last3=Crary |first4=Sandra |last4=Laugier |first5=Toril |last5=Moi |first6=Linda |last6=Zerilli |publisher=Johns Hopkins University Press |doi=10.1353/nlh.2015.0012 |access-date=2 February 2022 |url-status=dead }}</ref> Many of these philosophers were students or colleagues of Cavell.

There are some affinities between contemporary ordinary language philosophy and philosophical [[pragmatism]] (or [[neopragmatism]]). Interestingly, the pragmatist philosopher [[F. C. S. Schiller]] might be seen as a forerunner to ordinary language philosophy, especially in his noted publication ''Riddles of the Sphinx''.<ref>{{cite book |last=Schiller |first=F.C.S. |date=1891 |title=Riddles of the Sphinx: a study in the philosophy of evolution |oclc=850714 |url=https://www.biodiversitylibrary.org/item/72321}}</ref>

[[Seneca the Younger]] described the activities of other philosophers in ways that reflect some of the same concerns as ordinary language philosophers.<ref>{{cite book |chapter-url=https://www.stoics.com/seneca_epistles_book_1.html#%E2%80%98XLV1 |first=Lucius Annaeus |last=Seneca |title=Moral Epistles |translator-first=Richard M. |translator-last=Gummere|publisher=Harvard University Press |volume=I |chapter=XLV+ On Sophistical Argumentation}}</ref>

<blockquote> For these men, too, have left to us, not positive discoveries, but problems whose solution is still to be sought.  They might perhaps have discovered the essentials, had they not sought the superfluous also.  They lost much time in quibbling about words and in sophistical argumentation; all that sort of thing exercises the wit to no purpose.  We tie knots and bind up words in double meanings, and then try to untie them. Have we leisure enough for this?  Do we already know how to live, or die?  We should rather proceed with our whole souls towards the point where it is our duty to take heed lest things, as well as words, deceive us.  Why, pray, do you discriminate between similar words, when nobody is ever deceived by them except during the discussion?  It is things that lead us astray: it is between things that you must discriminate.</blockquote>

== Criticism ==

One of the most ardent critics of ordinary language philosophy was a student at Oxford (and later a philosopher himself), [[Ernest Gellner]], who said:<ref name=Gellner/>

{{blockquote|"[A]t that time the orthodoxy best described as linguistic philosophy, inspired by Wittgenstein, was crystallizing and seemed to me totally and utterly misguided. Wittgenstein's basic idea was that there is no general solution to issues other than the custom of the community. Communities are ultimate. He didn't put it this way, but that was what it amounted to. And this doesn't make sense in a world in which communities are not stable and are not clearly isolated from each other. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein managed to sell this idea, and it was enthusiastically adopted as an unquestionable revelation. It is very hard nowadays for people to understand what the atmosphere was like then. This was ''the'' Revelation. It wasn't doubted. But it was quite obvious to me it was wrong. It was obvious to me the moment I came across it, although initially, if your entire environment, and all the bright people in it, hold something to be true, you assume ''you'' must be wrong, not understanding it properly, and they must be right. And so I explored it further and finally came to the conclusion that I did understand it right, and it ''was'' rubbish, which indeed it is."|Ernest Gellner|Interview with John Davis, 1991}}
Gellner criticized ordinary language philosophy in his book ''Words and Things'' published in 1959.

==See also==
* [[Definitions of philosophy]]
* [[Ideal language philosophy]]
* [[Linguistic phenomenology]]

==References==
<references>
<ref name=Chappell>
{{cite book |title= Ordinary Language: essays in philosophical method |url= https://archive.org/details/ordinarylanguage00chap |url-access= registration |first=VC |last=Chappell |pages=[https://archive.org/details/ordinarylanguage00chap/page/2 2–4] |publisher=Englewood Cliffs N.J. : Prentice-Hall |year=1964}}
</ref>

<ref name=Baz>
{{cite book |title= When Words Are Called For: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy |url= https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674055223c |first=Avner |last=Baz |page= xiii|publisher=Harvard University Press MA |year=2012}}
</ref>

<!-- <ref name=Forguson>
{{cite journal |first=Lynd |last=Forguson |title=Oxford and the "epidemic" of ordinary language philosophy |journal=The Monist: The Epidemiology of Ideas |volume=84 |number=3  |date= July 2001 |pages= 325–345 |jstor= 27903734}}
</ref> -->

<ref name=Gellner>
Interview with Gellner by John Davis, section 2. Quoted by {{cite book |title=Wittgenstein's Ethical Thought |first=Yaniv |last=Iczkovits |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ORmccR7o9VMC&pg=PT91  |year=2012 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |isbn=978-1137026354}}
</ref>

<ref name=ParkerRyan>
{{cite encyclopedia |first=Sally |last=Parker-Ryan |title=Ordinary language philosophy |encyclopedia= The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/ord-lang/ |date=April 3, 2012}}
</ref>

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<ref name=Preston>
{{cite encyclopedia |title=Analytic philosophy |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/analytic/ |author=Aaron Preston |date=March 25, 2006 |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}
</ref>
-->

<ref name=Wittgenstein>
See §116 in {{cite book |title= Philosophical Investigations |author=Ludwig Wittgenstein |editor1=Peter Hacker |editor2=Joachim Schulte |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qEEqAQAAMAAJ&q=editions:1s7rw-a9lRMC |year=2009 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1405159289 |edition =Translation by Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, 4th}} Posthumously published in 1953. Part 1: Philosophical Investigations; Part 2: Philosophy of Psychology - A fragment. 
</ref>
</references>

==Further reading==

===Primary sources===
*[[J. L. Austin|Austin, J. L]]. ''How to do things with Words'', ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975.
*-----. "A Plea for Excuses". In Austin, ''Philosophical Papers'', ed. J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1961.
*-----. ''[[Sense and Sensibilia (Austin)|Sense and Sensibilia]]'',  ed. G. J. Warnock. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1962.
*[[Oswald Hanfling|Hanfling, Oswald]]. ''Philosophy and Ordinary Language''.
*[[H. L. A. Hart|Hart, H. L. A]]. "The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights". ''Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society'', 1949.
*[[Gilbert Ryle|Ryle, Gilbert]]''. [[The Concept of Mind]]''. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1965.
* -----. ''Dilemmas''.
*[[P. F. Strawson|Strawson, P. F.]] ''Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics''. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963.
*-----. "On Referring". Reprinted in ''Meaning and Reference'', ed. A. W. Moore. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1993.
*[[John Wisdom]], ''Other Minds'', 1952, ''Philosophy & Psychoanalysis'', 1953, ''Paradox and Discovery'', 1965
*[[Ludwig Wittgenstein|Wittgenstein, Ludwig]]. ''Blue and Brown Books''
* -----.''Philosophical Investigations'',  trans. [[G. E. M. Anscombe]]. New York: Macmillan, 1953.

===Secondary sources===
*[[Forguson, Lynd]]. "Oxford and the "Epidemic" of Ordinary Language Philosophy", The Monist 84: 325–345, 2001.
*[[John Passmore|Passmore, John]]. ''A Hundred Years of Philosophy'', revised edition. New York: Basic Books, 1966. See chapter 18, "Wittgenstein and Ordinary Language Philosophy".
*[[Scott Soames|Soames, Scott]]. ''Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: Volume Two, The Age of Meaning''. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005.
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20100901103519/http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/vol11/iss2/ Ordinary Language Philosophy: A Reappraisal]&nbsp;– edited by Anthony Coleman & Ivan Welty.
* {{cite web |title=Analysis of ordinary language |author=Garth Kemerling |url=http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/6u.htm |work=The Philosophy Pages |date=November 12, 2011}}
* {{cite web |title=Ludwig Wittgenstein: Analysis of language |author=Garth Kemerling |url=http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/6s.htm |work=The Philosophy Pages |date=November 12, 2011}}

==External links==
{{Commons category}}
*{{cite web |title=Ordinary language philosophy |url=https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/idea/1946.html |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130626175654/https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/idea/1946.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=June 26, 2013 |work=InPho |publisher=Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project }} 
* [http://www.iep.utm.edu/ord-lang/ "Ordinary Language Philosophy"]. ''[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''.

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