View source for Pan-Blue Coalition

{{Short description|Political coalition in Taiwan (Republic of China)}}
{{Infobox political party
| name             = Pan-Blue Coalition
| native_name      = 泛藍聯盟
| colorcode        = {{party color|Kuomintang}}
| logo             = Naval Jack of the Republic of China.svg
| leader1_title    = Leader
| leader1_name     = [[Eric Chu]]
| foundation       = 
| headquarters     = 
| international    = [[United Nations General Assembly observers#Non-member observers|United Nations non-member observer]]
| ideology         = {{Nowrap|
{{Tree list}}
*'''Majority:'''
*[[Conservatism]] ([[Conservatism in Taiwan|Taiwanese]])
*[[Three Principles of the People]]
*[[Taiwan independence movement#Opposition to independence|Anti–Taiwan independence]]
*[[Federalism]]
*'''Factions:'''
*[[Anti-communism in China#Taiwan (Republic of China, 1949–present)|Anti-communism]]<ref>{{multiref2|{{Cite web |last=Evans |first=David |date=2019-04-02 |title=The KMT Paradox: The Anti-Communist Party or the 'One China' Party? |url=https://international.thenewslens.com/article/116615 |access-date=2025-03-14 |website=The News Lens International Edition |language=en-US}}|{{Cite web |date=2020-03-18 |title=Taking the KMT back to its roots |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2020/03/18/2003732895 |access-date=2025-03-14 |website=Taipei Times}}|{{Cite web |title=【The Silent War】Taiwan's Kuomintang at a Crossroads: Should the Nationalist Rethink Its China-leaning Posture? - 報導者 The Reporter |url=https://www.twreporter.org/a/kmt-china-relationship-crossroad-english |access-date=2025-03-14 |website=www.twreporter.org |language=zh-TW}}|{{Cite web |date=2020-06-22 |title=To win back Taiwan, KMT must return to its anti-communist roots |url=https://www.scmp.com/comment/letters/article/3089293/win-back-taiwan-kmt-must-return-its-anti-communist-roots |access-date=2025-03-14 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en}}|{{Cite web |date=2025-03-10 |title=國民黨從反共到親共的政治演變 |url=https://tw.news.yahoo.com/%25E5%25B0%2588%25E6%25AC%2584-%25E5%259C%258B%25E6%25B0%2591%25E9%25BB%25A8%25E5%25BE%259E%25E5%258F%258D%25E5%2585%25B1%25E5%2588%25B0%25E8%25A6%25AA%25E5%2585%25B1%25E7%259A%2584%25E6%2594%25BF%25E6%25B2%25BB%25E6%25BC%2594%25E8%25AE%258A-180458375.html |access-date=2025-03-14 |website=Yahoo News |language=zh-Hant-TW}}|{{Cite web |last=聯合新聞網 |title=覺青與台派 才是真正老蔣信徒？ |url=https://udn.com/news/story/6656/8590189 |access-date=2025-03-14 |website=聯合新聞網 |language=zh-Hant-TW}}}}</ref>
*[[Chinese unification#Pan-Blue interpretation|Chinese unification]]
*[[Huadu (Taiwan)|ROC independence]]{{refn|<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.thenewslens.com/article/150086 |title=九二共識普拉斯（上）：國民黨內部曾提過「華獨」，為何最終沒有採用？ |language=zh |work=[[The News Lens]] |date=27 April 2021 |access-date=15 February 2024}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/01/xis-top-taiwan-hand-targets-hostile-forces-in-taiwans-green-and-blue-camps/ |title=Xi's Top Taiwan Hand Targets 'Hostile Forces' in Taiwan's 'Green' and 'Blue' Camps |quote=Moreover, the blue camp’s support for the “status quo,” which is tantamount to de facto '''ROC independence''', has been reinforced by the KMT’s stated opposition to the “one country, two systems” (一國兩制) formula for unification, which Xi insists upon despite the debacle in Hong Kong. In fact, Wang notes that in its latest political platform, the KMT simultaneously stated its opposition to both “Taiwan independence” and “one country, two systems.” |work=Global Taiwan Institute |date=12 January 2022 |access-date=18 September 2024}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |editor=Kuang-hao Hou |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=c49yEAAAQBAJ&dq=%22ROC+independence%22+KMT&pg=PT38 |title=The Social Construction of the Ocean and Modern Taiwan |date=July 22, 2022 |publisher=Taylor & Francis | isbn=978-1-000-62302-4 }}</ref>}}
*[[National conservatism]]
*[[Liberal conservatism]]
*[[Conservative liberalism]]
{{Tree list/end}}}}
| position         = '''Majority: '''<br>{{nowrap|[[Centre-right politics|Centre-right]] to [[Right-wing politics|right-wing]]}}<br>{{nowrap|'''Factions: '''<br>[[Centrism|Centre]]<ref>{{cite news |last=Gertz |first=Bill |date=9 January 2020 |title=China's crackdown in Hong Kong upends Taiwan election |url=https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jan/9/china-crackdown-hong-kong-upends-taiwan-election/ |quote=Opinion polls show Ms. Tsai leading Mr. Han 53% to 20%. A third candidate, James Soong of the centrist People First Party, which is politically close to the KMT, is polling at around 8.5%. |access-date=25 September 2025 |work=[[The Washington Times]]}}</ref> to [[Far-right politics|far-right]]<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WiuHDAAAQBAJ&q=taiwan+New+Party+far-right&pg=PA129 |title=Working Women and State Policies in Taiwan: A Study in Political Economy |date=2000 |publisher=[[Springer Science+Business Media|Springer]] |isbn=9780230508873 |editor=Fen-ling Chen |quote=The New Party, which split from the KMT in 1994, is a conservative party and on the far Right.}}</ref>}}
| seats1_title     = [[Legislative Yuan]]
| seats1           = {{Composition bar|54|113|hex={{party color|Kuomintang}}|per=1}}
| colours          = {{color box|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}} [[Blue]]
| website          = 
| country          = the Republic of China
}}
{{Infobox Chinese
| title = Pan-Blue coalition
| t = 泛藍聯盟
| s = 泛蓝联盟
| p = Fànlán Liánméng
| poj = Hoān-lâm-liân-bêng
| altname = Pan-Blue force
| t2 = 泛藍軍
| s2 = 泛蓝军
| p2 = Fànlán Jūn
| poj2 = Hoān-lâm-kun
| altname3 = Pan-Blue groups
| t3 = 藍營
| s3 = 蓝营
| p3 = Lán Yíng
| poj3 = Lâm-iânn
| mi = {{IPAc-cmn|f|an|4|.|l|an|2|-|l|ian|2|.|m|eng|2}}
| w = {{tone superscript|Fan4-lan2 Lien2-meng2}}
| bpmf = ㄈㄢˋ ㄌㄢˊ ㄌㄧㄢˊ ㄇㄥˊ
| tp = Fàn-lán Lián-méng
| mi2 = {{IPAc-cmn|f|an|4|.|l|an|2|-|jun|1}}
| tp2 = Fàn-lán Jyun
| w2 = {{tone superscript|Fan4-lan2 Chün1}}
| bpmf2 = ㄈㄢˋ ㄌㄢˊ ㄐㄩㄣ
| tp3 = Lán Yíng
| w3 = {{tone superscript|Lan2 Ying2}}
| mi3 = {{IPAc-cmn|l|an|2|-|ying|2}}
| bpmf3 = ㄌㄢˊ ㄧㄥˊ
}}
{{Conservatism in Taiwan|Alliances}}
{{Three Principles of the People|Related}}
The '''Pan-Blue Coalition''', '''Pan-Blue force''', or '''Pan-Blue group''' is a [[political coalition]] in the [[Taiwan|Republic of China (Taiwan)]] consisting of the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT), the [[People First Party (Republic of China)|People First Party]] (PFP), the [[New Party (Taiwan)|New Party]] (CNP), the [[Non-Partisan Solidarity Union]] (NPSU), and the [[Young China Party]] (YCP). The name comes from the party color of the Kuomintang.

Regarding the [[political status of Taiwan]], the coalition primarily maintains that the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]] instead of the [[China|People's Republic of China]] is the legitimate government of China. It also favors a Chinese and Taiwanese dual identity over an exclusive Taiwanese identity and backs greater friendly exchange with [[mainland China]], as opposed to the [[Pan-Green Coalition]] which opposes Chinese identity in Taiwan.

== Political stance ==
The Pan-Blue Coalition's political stance can be characterized as [[Centre-right politics|centre-right]],<ref name="centre-right">{{cite book|editor=M. Troy Burnett |title=Nationalism Today: Extreme Political Movements around the World [2 volumes] |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OprzDwAAQBAJ&dq=centre-right+Pan-Blue+Coalition&pg=PA201 |quote= The center-right Pan-Blue Coalition, led by the KMT, maintains that the ROC is the sole legitimate government for all of China (including Taiwan) and that the aim of the government should be the eventual reunification of the mainland ... |date=2020 |page=201 |publisher=[[ABC-CLIO]] |isbn=9781440850004 }}</ref> [[conservatism|conservative]] and being of Republic of China-centered [[Chinese nationalism]].

Originally, the Pan-Blue Coalition was associated with [[Chinese unification]], but has moved towards a more conservative position supporting the present [[status quo]], while rejecting immediate unification with mainland China. It now argues that reunification is possible only after the [[Chinese Communist Party|communist regime]] in mainland China dissolves or transitions to a [[democracy]] either as a new democratic government or with the re-establishment of [[Sun Yat-sen]]'s Republic of China government which fled to [[Taiwan]] after the [[Chinese Civil War]]. This would also allow the body of [[Chiang Kai-shek]] to be returned to his ancestral home in [[Xikou]].{{citation needed|date=November 2020}}

== History ==

=== Lee Teng-hui presidency: 1988–2000 ===
Throughout the 1990s, the Kuomintang (KMT) consisted of an uneasy relationship between those party members who had mainland China backgrounds (came from mainland China in 1949) and Taiwanese political elites, Taiwanese factions led by President [[Lee Teng-hui]], who supported a stronger [[Taiwanese identity]] and distinction from Chinese nationalism. Lee won the party control after the [[1990 Taiwan presidential election|indirect election in 1990]]. This led to a split in the early 1990s, when the [[New Party (Republic of China)|New Party]] was formed by the anti-Lee dissidents in the KMT. After the dissidents of KMT members left, the KMT remained loyal and with control by President Lee Teng-hui throughout his presidency.{{citation needed|date=November 2020}}

During the [[2000 Taiwan presidential election|2000 presidential election]], Lee Teng-hui arranged for [[Lien Chan]] to be nominated as Kuomintang candidate for president rather than the more popular [[James Soong]], who left the party and formed his own [[People First Party (Republic of China)|People First Party]] after both he and Lien were defeated by [[Chen Shui-bian]] in the presidential elections. Though Chen and the DPP won the presidency, pro-KMT lawmakers held 140 out of 225 seats in the [[Legislative Yuan]]. Soong and Lien later formed a coalition in opposition to the DPP [[minority government]].{{citation needed|date=November 2020}}

=== First time in opposition: 2000–2008 ===
In the 2000 presidential election itself, the split in Kuomintang votes between Soong and Lien led in part to the election of Chen Shui-bian. After the election, there was widespread anger within the Kuomintang against Lee Teng-hui, who was expelled for forming his own pro-[[Taiwan independence]] party, the [[Taiwan Solidarity Union]].<ref>{{Cite web|title=KMT breaks it off with Lee Teng-hui - Taipei Times|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2001/09/22/0000103986|date=2001-09-22|website=[[Taipei Times]]|access-date=2020-05-24}}</ref> After Lee's expulsion, the Kuomintang moved its policies back to a more conservative one and began informal but close cooperation with the People First Party and the [[New Party (Taiwan)|New Party]]. This coalition became informally known as the Pan-Blue Coalition. Although the members of the Pan-Blue Coalition maintain separate party structures, they closely cooperate in large part to ensure that electoral strategies are coordinated, so that votes are not split among them leading to a victory by the Pan-Green Coalition.{{citation needed|date=November 2020}}

The KMT and PFP ran a combined ticket in the [[2004 Taiwan presidential election|2004 presidential elections]] with Lien Chan running for president and James Soong running for vice president. The campaign emblem for the Lien-Soong campaign was a two-seat bicycle with a blue (the color of the KMT) figure in the first seat and an orange (the color of the PFP) figure in the second.{{citation needed|date=November 2020}}

There were talks in late 2004 that the KMT and the PFP would merge into one party in 2005, but these talks have been put on hold. In the [[2004 ROC legislative election|2004 legislative election]] the three parties from the pan-blue coalition organized themselves to properly divide up the votes ({{lang|zh|配票}}) to prevent splitting the vote. The New Party ran all but one of its candidates under the KMT banner. The result was that the KMT gained 11 more seats and the PFP lost 12 seats. Right after the election, PFP chairman James Soong began criticizing the KMT for sacrificing the PFP for its own gains and stated that he would not participate in any negotiations regarding to the two parties' merge. Soong's remarks have been strongly criticized by the KMT, a majority of PFP members, and the New Party, whose rank and file were largely absorbed by the PFP following the 2001 elections. Nonetheless, shortly after the legislative election, the PFP legislative caucus agreed to cooperate with the DPP over the investigation into the KMT's finances. On 24 February 2005, James Soong met with President Chen for the first time in four years and issued a 10-point declaration<ref>{{cite web|url=http://english.www.gov.tw/index.jsp?id=11|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050223010242/http://english.www.gov.tw/index.jsp?id=11|url-status=dead|archive-date=23 February 2005|title=e-Government Website/Homapage|date=23 February 2005}}</ref> supporting the name "Republic of China", the status quo in [[cross-strait relations]], and the opening of the [[Three Links]]. Unlike Soong, Lien did not respond to the offer from Chen to meet.{{citation needed|date=November 2020}}

However, after the [[2005 Pan-Blue visits to mainland China]], Soong and Chen stopped their partnership. The popular [[Taipei]] mayor [[Ma Ying-jeou]] was also elected the new head of the [[Kuomintang]], and was considered the leading contender for the KMT nomination in the [[2008 ROC presidential election|2008 presidential election]]. However, it was uncertain whether the KMT and PFP could agree to field a common ticket. On the [[2005 KMT chairmanship election|2005 chairmanship election]], Soong had made a televised endorsement of Ma's opponent [[Wang Jin-pyng]].{{citation needed|date=November 2020}}

In the [[2005 Republic of China local elections|December 2005 3-in-1 local elections]], the KMT made large gains and held 14 seats, the DPP suffered defeat and held only six, the PFP retained only one, and the TSU was completely shut out. Ma Ying-jeou was now virtually assured of leading the KMT and pan-blues for the [[2008 ROC presidential election|2008 presidential election]].{{citation needed|date=November 2020}}

=== Ma Ying-jeou presidency: 2008–2016 ===
In the [[2008 Taiwan legislative election|2008 legislative election]], the coalition won 86 of 113 seats in the [[Legislative Yuan]], giving it the [[supermajority]] needed to recall the president and pass constitutional amendments for a referendum. The KMT, PFP, and NP coordinated their candidate lists in the new single-member constituency system. Candidates of the [[Non-Partisan Solidarity Union]], who despite their party's official stance of non-affiliation, were deemed sympathetic to the coalition and ran unopposed by other blue candidates in almost all the seats it contested. The PFP ran almost all of their candidates under the KMT banner, with some placed under the KMT party list. While having all its district candidates run under the KMT banner, the New Party ran its own party list but failed to gain the 5% threshold for representation. The Kuomintang controlled the Legislative Yuan during the [[Ma Ying-jeou]] presidency from 2008 to 2016.{{citation needed|date=November 2020}}

=== In opposition during Tsai Ing-wen presidency: 2016–2024 ===
In [[2016 Taiwan general election|2016 general election]], the KMT lost the presidential election and, for the first time in the history of the Republic of China, the control in the Legislative Yuan.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Tsai Ing-wen wins Taiwan leadership election[1]- Chinadaily.com.cn|url=https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-01/16/content_23117027.htm |website=[[China Daily]] |access-date=2020-05-24}}</ref><ref name="chu">{{cite news|title=ELECTIONS: Chu concedes, resigns as KMT chair|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/01/17/2003637407 |newspaper=[[Taipei Times]] |date=2016-01-17}}</ref> The [[Democratic Progressive Party]] (DPP) took control of the legislature for the first time, winning the presidency. The KMT became the largest opposition party. The PFP's leader [[James Soong]], despite being a member of the coalition, cooperated with [[Tsai Ing-wen]]'s administration, becoming the representative of [[Chinese Taipei]] in the [[APEC summit]].{{citation needed|date=November 2020}}

=== In opposition during Lai Ching-te presidency: 2024–present ===
Although [[Taiwan People's Party]] (TPP) (known as the "white camp") positions itself as a [[centrism|centrist party]], its cooperative relationship with the KMT has prompted belief that it aligns more closely with the Pan-Blue camp.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hioe |first1=Brian |title=Trends in Political Identity: Where Does Taiwan Go from Here? |journal=Asia Policy |date=2024 |volume=19 |issue=2 |pages=81–89 |url=https://muse.jhu.edu/article/927091/summary |access-date=25 November 2024 |issn=1559-2960}}</ref> Prior to the [[2024 Taiwanese presidential election|2024 presidential election]], prospects for ‘{{ill|blue-white cooperation|zh|藍白合作}}’ had been met with optimism from both parties, as they sought to jointly minimise the DPP's chances of procuring a third consecutive term of presidency. The two opposition parties then engaged in negotiations to form a joint presidential ticket in November 2023, with the proposal that either the KMT's [[Hou Yu-ih]] or the TPP's [[Ko Wen-je]] would be selected as the presidential candidate and the other the vice-presidential candidate.

During this period, polls from Mirror Media indicated that support rates for both Ko-Hou ticket and Hou-Ko ticket would outperform their Lai-Hsiao counterpart, standing at 46.6% and 46.5% respectively.<ref>{{cite news |title=【鏡新聞政經情勢民調6】藍白怎合？「柯侯」46.6%vs.賴蕭33.1% 「侯柯」46.5%vs.賴蕭34.9% |url=https://www.mnews.tw/story/20231117nm002 |access-date=25 November 2024 |work=鏡新聞 |date=17 November 2023 |language=zh-Hant}}</ref> However, the alliance subsequently collapsed on 18 November following the disagreement over the selection method for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, resulting in both Hou and Ko entering the race as separate presidential candidates.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Dotson |first1=John |last2=Levine |first2=Ben |title=The Outcomes of Taiwan’s 2024 Legislative Elections |journal=Global Taiwan Institute |date=24 January 2024 |volume=9 |issue=2 |pages=6–9 |url=https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/01/the-outcomes-of-taiwans-2024-legislative-elections/ |access-date=25 November 2024}}</ref> The division among Hou and Ko's overlapping support bases eventually led to [[vote-splitting]], culminating in their defeat and the victory of DPP's [[Lai Ching-te]], who holds dissimilar ideology with the other two candidates in major issues such as national defence and the view on the [[Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mahdi |first1=Maya |title=The Complexity of Ranked Choice Voting and How It Can Improve the U.S. Election System |journal=The Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Review |date=2024 |volume=3 |pages=5–14 |url=https://pressbooks.lib.vt.edu/pper/chapter/the-complexity-of-ranked-choice-voting-and-how-it-can-improve-the-u-s-election-system/ |access-date=25 November 2024 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Arvidsson |first1=Lina |title=Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election and cross-Strait relations: Consequences for the European Union |journal=Swedish National China Centre |date=2023 |url=https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/other-publications/taiwans-2024-presidential-election-and-cross-strait-relations-consequences-for-the-european-union.pdf |access-date=25 November 2024}}</ref> But since Ko and Hou together secured 60% of the votes, Lai would likely not have won had the deal succeeded.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Copper |first1=John F |title=The Outlook for Taiwan’s New President, Lai Ching-te |journal=East Asian Policy |date=2024 |volume=16 |issue=3 |pages=69–83 |url=https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S1793930524000217?srsltid=AfmBOoq8ZKhFVBwswStgFlqcc7_y2qyV6AbI91rzc4UbvwH1zNSxsTNS |access-date=25 November 2024}}</ref>

Despite this setback, an opposition coalition has still been established between the two parties in the Legislative Yuan since February 2024, forming a majority against the DPP's minority government. The two parties have since cooperated in numerous bill amendments, including the Act Governing the Legislative Yuan's Power,<ref>{{cite news |last1=Tshua |first1=Siu-ui |title=Cross-party dialogue is crucial to restore trust - Taipei Times |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2024/05/25/2003818354 |access-date=25 November 2024 |work=Taipei Times |date=25 May 2024}}</ref> Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures,<ref>{{cite news |last1=Thompson |first1=James |last2=Pan |first2=Tzu-yu |title=Continued disagreement over funding allocation bill leads to impasse - Focus Taiwan |url=https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202411110018 |access-date=25 November 2024 |work=Focus Taiwan |date=11 November 2024}}</ref> and others.

==Member parties==

=== Current members ===
{| class=wikitable style=text-align:left
|-
!colspan=2|Party
!Ideology
!Leader
|-
| bgcolor="{{party color|Kuomintang}}" |
| [[Kuomintang]] (KMT)
| [[Conservatism]]
| [[Eric Chu]]
|-
| bgcolor="{{party color|New Party (Taiwan)}}" |
| [[New Party (Taiwan)|New Party]] (NP)
| [[National conservatism]]
| [[Wu Cherng-dean]]
|-
| bgcolor="{{party color|People First Party (Taiwan)}}" |
| [[People First Party (Taiwan)|People First Party]] (PFP)
| [[Liberal conservatism]]
| [[James Soong]]
|-
| bgcolor="{{party color|Non-Partisan Solidarity Union}}" |
| [[Non-Partisan Solidarity Union]] (NPSU)
| [[Conservative liberalism]]
| [[Lin Pin-kuan]]
|}

== Legislative strength ==

=== [[Legislative Yuan]] ===
{| class="wikitable"
!Term
!Member Party Seats
!
!KMT Seats
!NP Seats
!PFP Seats
!NPSU Seats
|-
|'''1st'''(1992)
|{{Composition bar|95|130|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
|
|{{Composition bar|95|95|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
| -
| -
| -
|-
|'''2nd'''
|{{Composition bar|95|162|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
|
|{{Composition bar|95|95|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
| -
| -
| -
|-
|'''3rd'''
|{{Composition bar|106|164|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
|
|{{Composition bar|85|106|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
|{{Composition bar|21|106|{{party color|New Party (Taiwan)}}}}
| -
| -
|-
|'''4th'''
|{{Composition bar|134|225|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
|
|{{Composition bar|123|134|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
|{{Composition bar|11|134|{{party color|New Party (Taiwan)}}}}
| -
| -
|-
|'''5th'''
|{{Composition bar|115|225|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
|
|{{Composition bar|68|115|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
|{{Composition bar|1|115|{{party color|New Party (Taiwan)}}}}
|{{Composition bar|46|115|{{party color|People First Party (Taiwan)}}}}
| -
|-
|'''6th'''
|{{Composition bar|120|225|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
|
|{{Composition bar|79|120|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
|{{Composition bar|1|120|{{party color|New Party (Taiwan)}}}}
|{{Composition bar|34|120|{{party color|People First Party (Taiwan)}}}}
|{{Composition bar|6|120|{{party color|Non-Partisan Solidarity Union}}}}
|-
|'''[[7th Legislative Yuan|7th]]'''
|{{Composition bar|85|113|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
|
|{{Composition bar|81|85|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
| -
|{{Composition bar|1|85|{{party color|People First Party (Taiwan)}}}}
|{{Composition bar|3|85|{{party color|Non-Partisan Solidarity Union}}}}
|-
|'''[[8th Legislative Yuan|8th]]'''
|{{Composition bar|69|113|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
|
|{{Composition bar|64|69|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
| -
|{{Composition bar|3|69|{{party color|People First Party (Taiwan)}}}}
|{{Composition bar|2|69|{{party color|Non-Partisan Solidarity Union}}}}
|-
|'''[[9th Legislative Yuan|9th]]'''
|{{Composition bar|39|113|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
|
|{{Composition bar|35|39|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
| -
|{{Composition bar|3|39|{{party color|People First Party (Taiwan)}}}}
|{{Composition bar|1|39|{{party color|Non-Partisan Solidarity Union}}}}
|-
|'''[[10th Legislative Yuan|10th]]'''
|{{Composition bar|40|113|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
|
|{{Composition bar|40|40|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}{{Efn|Includes two KMT-aligned Independents.|name=Ref1}}
| -
| -
| -
|-
|'''[[11th Legislative Yuan|11th]]'''
|{{Composition bar|54|113|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}
|
|{{Composition bar|54|54|{{party color|Kuomintang}}}}{{Efn|Includes two KMT-aligned Independents.|name=Ref1}}
| -
| -
| -
|}

==Media==
* ''[[China Times]]''
* ''[[Commercial Times]]''
* ''[[United Daily News]]''
* ''[[China Television]]''
* ''[[Chung T'ien Television]]''
* ''[[TVBS]]''

== See also ==
* [[History of the Republic of China]]
* [[Chinese nationalism#In Taiwan|Chinese nationalism in Taiwan]]
* [[One nation, two states]]
* [[Pan-Purple Coalition]]
* [[Pro–Republic of China sentiment]]
** [[Pro-ROC camp]] (Hong Kong)

== Explanatory notes ==
<references group="lower-alpha" />

==References==
{{reflist}}

==External links==
* [http://www.kmt.org.tw/ Kuomintang – Official website] (中國國民黨, Zhōngguó Guómín Dǎng)
* [http://www.pfp.org.tw/ People First Party – Official website] (親民黨, Qīnmín Dǎng)
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20161229214650/http://www.np.org.tw/ New Party – Official website] (新黨, Xīn Dăng)

{{Taiwanese political parties}}

[[Category:Centre-right politics]]
[[Category:Chinese nationalism outside mainland China]]
[[Category:Chinese nationalist political parties|*]]
[[Category:Conservatism in Taiwan]]
[[Category:Kuomintang]]
[[Category:Opposition to Taiwan independence]]
[[Category:Political party alliances in Taiwan]]
[[Category:Right-wing politics in Taiwan]]
[[Category:Three Principles of the People]]