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{{About|the historical concept|the documentary film|Pax Americana and the Weaponization of Space{{!}}''Pax Americana and the Weaponization of Space''|a similar concept introduced by historian Wang Gungwu|American Tianxia}}
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'''''Pax Americana'''''<ref>{{Cite journal|jstor = 2151022|title = The Changing Nature of World Power|last1 = Nye|first1 = Joseph S.|journal = Political Science Quarterly|year = 1990|volume = 105|issue = 2|pages = 177–92|doi = 10.2307/2151022}}</ref><ref name="HummelAnnal">{{Cite journal | doi=10.1177/000271621707200109|title = Pax Americana|year = 1917|last1 = Kirchwey|first1 = George W.|journal = The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|volume = 72|pages = 40–48|s2cid = 220723605}}</ref><ref>Abbott, Lyman, Hamilton Wright Mabie, Ernest Hamlin Abbott, and Francis Rufus Bellamy. ''The Outlook''. New York: Outlook Co, 1898. "[https://books.google.com/books?id=rkUAAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA465 Expansion not Imperialism]" p. 465. (''cf''. [...] Felix Adler [states ...] "if, instead of establishing the Pax Americana so far as our influence avails throughout this continent, we should enter into' the field of Old World strife, and seek the sort of glory that is written in human blood." Here it is assumed that we have failed in establishing self-government, and propose to substitute, at least in other lands, an Old World form of government. This sort of argument has no effect on the expansionist, because he believes that we have magnificently succeeded in our problem, in spite of failures, neglects, and violations of our own principles, and because what he wishes to do is, not to abandon the experiment, but, inspired by the successes of the past, extend the Pax Americana over lands not included in this continent.")</ref> ([[Latin]] for {{gloss|American Peace}}, modeled after ''[[Pax Romana]]'' and ''[[Pax Britannica]]''), often identified with the "'''[[Long Peace]]'''", is a term applied to the concept of relative [[peace]] in the [[Western Hemisphere]] and later in the world after the end of [[World War II]] in 1945, when the [[United States|United States of America]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Pax+Americana|title=Definition of PAX AMERICANA|website=merriam-webster.com|access-date=August 1, 2018|archive-date=February 24, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220224094755/https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Pax%20Americana|url-status=live}}</ref> became the world's foremost economic, cultural, and military power exercising primary responsibilities for world order. Though in large measure based on consent and cooperation, the defining feature of the Pax Americana is unipolarity, world organization around a single center of power.<ref>Sargent, Daniel J. (6 January 2018). "Pax Americana: Sketches for an undiplomatic history," lecture at the 132nd annual meeting, (Washington, DC: American Historical Association), p. 2-3, https://escholarship.org/content/qt00t9n3s7/qt00t9n3s7_noSplash_637ebc3588bd11ebd8c2d0ec2c66890b.pdf?t=pbaa2e {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250525190644/https://escholarship.org/content/qt00t9n3s7/qt00t9n3s7_noSplash_637ebc3588bd11ebd8c2d0ec2c66890b.pdf?t=pbaa2e |date=May 25, 2025 }}</ref>

In this sense, ''Pax Americana'' has come to describe the military and economic position of the United States relative to other nations. In the [[aftermath of World War II]] the [[Federal government of the United States|American federal government]] enacted the [[Marshall Plan]], the transferring of US$13.3 billion (the equivalent of $173 billion in 2023) in economic recovery programs to [[Western Europe]]an countries; the Marshall Plan has been described as "the launching of the Pax Americana".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mee |first=Charles L. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=a5yzAAAAIAAJ |title=The Marshall Plan: The Launching of the Pax Americana |date=1984 |publisher=Simon and Schuster |isbn=978-0-671-42149-6 |language=en}}</ref>

== Early period ==
{{Main|Gilded Age}}

{{See also|History of the United States (1865–1918)|Territorial evolution of the United States}}
The first articulation of a ''Pax Americana'' occurred after the end of the [[American Civil War]] (in which the United States both quashed its greatest disunity and demonstrated the ability to field millions of well-equipped soldiers utilizing modern tactics) with reference to the peaceful nature of the North American geographical region, and was abeyant at the commencement of the [[First World War]]. Its emergence was concurrent with the development of the idea of [[American exceptionalism]]. This view holds that the U.S. occupies a special niche among [[developed nation]]s<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.sagehistory.net/gildedage/documents/TurnerFT.html |title=sagehistory.net |publisher=sagehistory.net |access-date=July 29, 2014 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090629043938/http://sagehistory.net/gildedage/documents/TurnerFT.html |archive-date=June 29, 2009 }}</ref> in terms of its national [[credo]], historical evolution, political and religious institutions, and unique origins. The concept originates from [[Alexis de Tocqueville]],<ref name="politikwissenschaft.tu-darmstadt.de">{{cite web|url=http://www.politikwissenschaft.tu-darmstadt.de/fileadmin/pg/Sektionstagung_IB/Thimm-American_exceptionalism.pdf|archive-url=https://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20090225014354/http://www.politikwissenschaft.tu-darmstadt.de/fileadmin/pg/Sektionstagung_IB/Thimm-American_exceptionalism.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=February 25, 2009|title=American Exceptionalism}}</ref> who asserted that the then-50-year-old United States held a special place among nations because it was a country of immigrants and the first [[modern democracy]]. From the establishment of the United States after the [[American Revolution]] until the [[Spanish–American War]], the [[foreign policy of the United States]] had a regional, instead of global, focus. The Pax Americana, which the Union enforced upon the states of central North America, was a factor in the United States' national [[prosperity]]. The larger states were surrounded by smaller states, but these had no anxieties: no standing armies to require taxes and hinder labor; no wars or rumors of wars that would interrupt trade; there is not only peace, but security, for the Pax Americana of the Union covered all the states within the [[Federation|federal]] constitutional republic.<ref name="LalorCyclopaedia">Lalor, John J., ''Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States''. Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1884. "[https://books.google.com/books?id=OC0QAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA959 The Union] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170330182741/https://books.google.com/books?id=OC0QAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA959 |date=2017-03-30 }}", p. 959.</ref> According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first time the phrase appeared in print was in the August 1894 issue of ''Forum'': "The true cause for exultation is the universal outburst of patriotism in support of the prompt and courageous action of President Cleveland in maintaining the supremacy of law throughout the length and breadth of the land, in establishing the ''pax Americana''."<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://public.oed.com/help/|title=Help|website=Oxford English Dictionary|access-date=April 2, 2021|archive-date=April 7, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200407071332/https://public.oed.com/help/|url-status=live}}</ref>

[[File:10000 Miles From Tip to Tip 1899 Cornell CUL PJM 1133 01 (enhanced).jpg|thumb|right|1898 [[political cartoon]]: "Ten Thousand Miles From Tip to Tip" meaning the extension of U.S. domination (symbolized by a [[bald eagle]]) from Puerto Rico to the Philippines.]]
[[File:Roosevelt monroe Doctrine cartoon.jpg|thumb|right|1906 political cartoon depicting [[Theodore Roosevelt]] using the Monroe Doctrine to keep European powers out of the [[Dominican Republic]]]]
With the [[rise of the New Imperialism#New Imperialism and the emerging empires|rise of the New Imperialism]] in the Western hemisphere at the end of the 19th century, debates arose between [[imperialism|imperialist]] and [[isolationism|isolationist]] factions in the U.S. Here, ''Pax Americana'' was used to connote the peace across the United States and, more widely, as a Pan-American peace under the aegis of the [[Monroe Doctrine]]. Those who favored traditional policies of avoiding foreign entanglements included labor leader [[Samuel Gompers]] and steel tycoon [[Andrew Carnegie]]. American politicians such as [[Henry Cabot Lodge]], [[William McKinley]], and [[Theodore Roosevelt]] advocated an aggressive foreign policy, but the administration of President [[Grover Cleveland]] was unwilling to pursue such actions. On January 16, 1893, U.S. diplomatic and military personnel conspired with a small group of individuals to [[Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii|overthrow the constitutional government]] of the [[Kingdom of Hawaii]] and establish a [[Provisional Government of Hawaii|Provisional Government]] and then a [[Republic of Hawaii|republic]]. On February 15, they presented a treaty for annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the [[United States Senate|U.S. Senate]], but opposition to annexation stalled its passage. The United States finally opted to annex Hawaii by way of the [[Newlands Resolution]] in July 1898.

After its victory in the [[Spanish–American War]] of 1898 and the subsequent acquisition of Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and [[Guam]], the United States had gained a [[colonial empire]]. By ejecting Spain from the Americas, the United States shifted its position to an uncontested regional power, and extended its influence into Southeast Asia and Oceania. Although U.S. capital investments within the Philippines and Puerto Rico were relatively small, these colonies were strategic outposts for expanding trade with Latin America and Asia, particularly China. In the Caribbean area, the United States established a [[sphere of influence]] in line with the Monroe Doctrine, not explicitly defined as such, but recognized in effect by other governments and accepted by at least some of the republics in that area.<ref name="KirkpatrickWar">Kirkpatrick, F. A. [https://books.google.com/books?id=XtFCAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA18 ''South America and the War'']: Being the Substance of a Course of Lectures Delivered in the University of London, King's College Under the Tooke Trust in the Lent Term, 1918. Cambridge [England]: University Press.</ref> The events around the start of the 20th century demonstrated that the United States undertook an obligation, usual in such cases, of imposing a "Pax Americana".<ref name="KirkpatrickWar" /> As in similar instances elsewhere, this Pax Americana was not quite clearly marked in its geographical limit, nor was it guided by any theoretical consistency, but rather by the merits of the case and the test of immediate expediency in each instance.<ref name="KirkpatrickWar" /> Thus, whereas the United States enforced a peace in much of the lands southward from the Nation and undertook measures to maintain internal tranquility in such areas, the United States on the other hand withdrew from interposition in Mexico.<ref name="KirkpatrickWar" />

European powers largely regarded these matters as the concern of the United States. Indeed, the nascent Pax Americana was, in essence, abetted by the policy of the United Kingdom, and the preponderance of global [[sea power]] which the [[British Empire]] enjoyed by virtue of the strength of the [[Royal Navy]].<ref>Porter, Bernard. [https://books.google.com/books?id=m38uhldLcGsC ''Empire and Superempire: Britain, America and the World'']. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.</ref> Preserving the [[freedom of the seas]] and ensuring naval dominance had been the policy of the British since victory in the [[Napoleonic Wars]]. As it was not in the interests of the United Kingdom to permit any European power to interfere in Americas, the Monroe Doctrine was indirectly aided by the Royal Navy. British commercial interests in South America, which comprised a valuable component of the [[informal empire]] that accompanied Britain's overseas possessions, and the economic importance of the United States as a trading partner, ensured that intervention by Britain's rival European powers could not engage with the Americas.

The United States lost its Pacific and regionally bounded nature towards the end of the 19th century. The government adopted [[protectionism]] after the [[Spanish–American War]] and built up the navy, the "[[Great White Fleet]]", to expand the reach of U.S. power. When Theodore Roosevelt became president in 1901, he accelerated a foreign policy shift away from isolationism towards foreign intervention which had begun under his predecessor, [[William McKinley]]. The [[Philippine–American War]] (1899–1913) arose from the ongoing [[Philippine Revolution]] against [[imperialism]].<ref>{{cite journal|pmid=11635503|year=1984|last1=Gates|first1=J. M.|title=War-related deaths in the Philippines 1898-1902|journal=Pacific Historical Review|volume=53|issue=3|pages=367–78|doi=10.2307/3639234|jstor=3639234|url=http://www3.wooster.edu/History/jgates/book-ch3.html|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100805061319/http://www3.wooster.edu/history/jgates/book-ch3.html|archive-date=August 5, 2010|url-access=subscription}}</ref> Interventionism found its formal articulation in the 1904 [[Roosevelt Corollary]] to the Monroe Doctrine, proclaiming the right of the United States to intervene in the affairs of weak states in the Americas in order to stabilize them, a moment that underlined the emergent U.S. regional [[hegemony]]. By 1900, the United States possessed the world's largest industrial capacity and national income, having surpassed both the United Kingdom and Germany.<ref>Kennedy, Paul. "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers." Vintage, January 1989. United States is listed as possessing 23.6% of world industrial capacity compared to 18.5% for the British.</ref>

== Interwar period ==
{{Main|Interwar period}}

The United States had been criticized for not taking up the hegemonic mantle following the disintegration of ''Pax Britannica'' before the First World War and during the interwar period due to the absence of established political structures, such as the [[World Bank]] or United Nations which would be created after World War II, and various internal policies, such as protectionism.<ref name="HummelAnnal" /><ref>James, Harold. The Interwar Depression in an International Context. München: R. Oldenbourg, 2002. [https://books.google.com/books?id=Qe0E1BEzOOEC&pg=PA96 p. 96].{{Dead link|date=February 2024 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref><ref>Richard Little, Michael Smith, ''Perspectives on World Politics''. Routledge, 2006. [https://books.google.com/books?id=tWZN2Yos2mEC&pg=PA365 p. 365].</ref><ref>Northrup, Cynthia Clark. The American Economy: A Historical Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO, 2003. ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=3DE4P7NdaycC&pg=PA135 Great Depression]'' pp. 135–36.</ref> Though, the United States participated in the Great War, according to Woodrow Wilson:

<blockquote><poem>[...] to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles.
[...] for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.<ref name="HummelAnnal" /></poem></blockquote>

[[File:The Gap in the Bridge.png|thumbnail|''The Gap in the Bridge''. Cartoon about the absence of the U.S. from the [[League of Nations]], depicted as the missing keystone of the arch.]]

The United States' entry into the Great War marked the abandonment of the traditional American policy of isolation and independence of world politics. Not at the close of the Civil War, not as the result of the Spanish War, but in the [[Interwar period]] did the United States become a part of the international system.<ref name="HummelAnnal" /> With this global reorganization from the Great War, there were those in the American populace that advocated an activist role in international politics and international affairs by the United States.<ref name="HummelAnnal" /> Activities that were initiated did not fall into political-military traps and, instead, focused on economic-ideological approaches that would increase the American Empire and general worldwide stability.<ref name="ParchamiHegemonic">{{cite book|last=Parchami|first=Ali|title=Hegemonic Peace and Empire: The Pax Romana, Britannica and Americana|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IQPEdl_cGHEC&pg=PA167|year=2009|publisher=Taylor & Francis|page=181|chapter=The Pax Americana Debate|isbn=9780203879290}}</ref> Following the prior path, a precursor to the United Nations and a league to enforce peace, the League of Nations, was proposed by Woodrow Wilson.<ref name="HummelAnnal" /> This was rejected by the American government in favor of more economic-ideological approaches and the United States did not join the League. Additionally, there were even proposals of extending the Monroe Doctrine to Great Britain put forth to prevent a second conflagration on the European theater.<ref name="EinsteinProphecy" /> Ultimately, the United States' proposals and actions did not stop the factors of European nationalism spawned by the previous war, the repercussions of Germany's defeat, and the failures of the Treaty of Versailles from plunging the globe into a Second World War.<ref>Keegan, John (1998), The First World War, Hutchinson, {{ISBN|0-09-180178-8}}</ref>

Between World War I and World War II, America also sought to continue to preserve ''Pax America'' as a [[corollary]] to the Monroe Doctrine.<ref name="EinsteinProphecy">Einstein, Lewis. [https://books.google.com/books?id=gpUMAAAAYAAJ A Prophecy of the War (1913–1914)]. New York: Columbia University Press, 1918.</ref> Some sought the peaceful and orderly evolution of existing conditions in the western hemisphere and nothing by immediate changes.<ref name="EinsteinProphecy" /> Before 1917, the position of the United States government and the feelings of the nation in respect to the "Great War" initially had properly been one of [[Neutrality (international relations)|neutrality]].<ref name="EinsteinProphecy" /> Its interests remained untouched, and nothing occurred of a nature to affect those interests.<ref name="EinsteinProphecy" />

Pax Americana was not just an idea reserved for the United States government. Business leaders from across the major corporations in the US all sought to steer America into a time of Pax Americana. For them by creating better trading conditions through peace and stability, they could expand their own businesses and maintain US superiority in the global stage.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=Cohrs |first=Patrick O. |date=2018 |title='Pax Americana.: the United States and the transformation of the 20th century's global order Cohrs, Patrick O. |url=https://find.shef.ac.uk/primo-explore/fulldisplay?docid=TN_cdi_crossref_citationtrail_10_1590_0034_7329201800202&context=PC&vid=44SFD_VU2&lang=en_US&search_scope=SCOP_EVERYTHING&adaptor=primo_central_multiple_fe&tab=everything&query=any,contains,%E2%80%9CPax%20Americana%E2%80%9D:%20the%20United%20States%20and%20%20the%20transformation%20of%20the%2020th%20century%E2%80%99s%20%20global%20order&offset=0 |journal=Revista brasileira de política internacional |volume=61 |issue=2 |pages=1–26 |doi=10.1590/0034-7329201800202 |id={{ProQuest|<-- add ProQuest data here -->}}|hdl=2158/1154321 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> As the United States government had close ties to the largest businesses in America, it was easier for these businesses to sway political acts in their favour. These businesses also helped create the conditions for Pax Americana using foreign investments, loans and trade to secure influence without military commitment.<ref name=":0" />

The average American's sympathies, on the other hand, if the feelings of the vast majority of the nation had been correctly interpreted, was with the Allied (Entente) Powers.<ref name="EinsteinProphecy" /> The population of the United States was revolted at the ruthlessness of the Prussian doctrine of war, and German designs to shift the burden of aggression encountered skeptical derision.<ref name="EinsteinProphecy" /> The American populace saw themselves safeguarding liberal peace in the Western World. To this end, the American writer Roland Hugins stated that the United States is the only strong nation that has not entered on a career of imperial conquest and does not aspire to be the Romans of tomorrow or the "masters of the world". There is in America little of militarism, the Americans are not enamored of glamour or glory. Their desire to be left alone to work out their own destiny has been manifest from the birth of the republic.<ref>Roland Hugins, ''The Possible Peace'', New York, 1916.</ref><ref name="HummelAnnal" />

It was observed during this time that the initial defeat of Germany opened a moral recasting of the world.<ref name="EinsteinProphecy" /> The battles between Germans and Allies were seen as far less battles between different nations than they represent the contrast between Liberalism and [[reactionary|reaction]], between the aspirations of democracy and the [[Wilhelminism]] [[Blood and Iron (speech)|gospel of iron]].<ref name="EinsteinProphecy" /><ref>Bismarck introduced this in the era of force.</ref>

According to Swen Holdar, the founder of [[geopolitics]] [[Rudolf Kjellen]] (1864–1922) predicted the era of US global supremacy using the term ''Pax Americana'' shortly after World War I.<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1016/0962-6298(92)90031-N|title = The ideal state and the power of geography: The life-work of Rudolf Kjellén|year = 1992|last1 = Holdar|first1 = Sven|journal = Political Geography|volume = 11|issue = 3|pages = 307–23 [314]}}</ref> Writing in 1945, [[Ludwig Dehio]] remembered that the Germans used the term ''Pax Anglosaxonica'' in a sense of Pax Americana since 1918:

{{blockquote|Now [1918] the [American colonial] cutting had grown into a tree that bade fair to overshadow the globe with its foliage. Amazed and shaken, we Germans began to discuss the possibility of a Pax Anglosaxonica as a world-wide counterpart to the Pax Romana. Suddenly the tendency toward global unification towered up, ready to gather the separate national states of Europe together under one banner and blanket in a larger cohesion&nbsp;...<ref name="auto1">Ludwig Dehio, ''The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle'', 1945 (tr. Fullman, Charles, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 244.</ref>}}

== Postwar period ==
[[File:Superpower map 1945.png|240px|thumb|A world map of 1945 with three superpowers: the United States (in blue), the [[Soviet Union]] (in red), and the [[British Empire]] (in teal).]]

The modern ''Pax Americana'' era is cited by supporters and critics of [[Foreign relations of the United States|U.S. foreign policy]] since the beginning of World War II. In 1941, before the entrance of the United States into the War, US Ambassador to Canada, [[James H. R. Cromwell]], published a book, titled ''Pax Americana''.<ref>Cromwell, James Henry Roberts (1941). ''Pax Americana: American Democracy and World Peace''. (Chicago: Kroch), https://archive.org/details/paxamericanaamer00crom</ref> As the title implies, the book envisages the postwar world order with the interventionist US policy. Another wartime book confirms that the postwar era "might well be known as Pax Americana." Both the world and the United States need American peace and the United States must insist upon it and accept nothing less.<ref>[[Neil MacNeil|MacNeil, Neil]] (1944). ''An American Peace''. (New York: Scribner), pp. 160, 264, https://archive.org/details/americanpeace0000macn/page/160/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> Explicit criticisms of the idea of Pax Americana appear in the United States synchronously.<ref>[[Nathaniel Peffer|Peffer, Nathaniel]] (1943). "America's place in the post-war world". ''Political Science Quarterly''. Vol. 58 (1): pp. 12, 14–15.</ref>

From 1945 to 1991, Pax Americana was a partial international order, as it applied only to the [[Western world]], being preferable for some authors to speak about a ''Pax Americana et Sovietica''.<ref>Ibañez Muñoz, Josep, "El desafío a la Pax americana: del 11 de septiembre a la guerra de Irak" in C. García and A. J. Rodrigo (eds) "El imperio inviable. El orden internacional tras el conflicto de Irak", Madrid: Tecnos, 2004.</ref> Many commentators and critics focus on American policies from 1992 to the present, and as such, it carries different connotations depending on the context. For example, it appears three times in the 90-page document, ''[[Project for the New American Century#Rebuilding America's Defenses|Rebuilding America's Defenses]],''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf |title=Rebuilding America's Defenses Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century |publisher=Newamericancentury.org |access-date=July 29, 2014 |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20020923154604/http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf |archive-date=September 23, 2002 }}</ref> by the [[Project for the New American Century]], but is also used by critics to characterize American dominance and hyperpower status as imperialist in function and basis. From about the mid-1940s until 1991, U.S. foreign policy was dominated by the [[Cold War]], and characterized by its significant international military presence and greater diplomatic involvement. Seeking an alternative to the isolationist policies pursued after World War I, the United States defined a new policy called [[containment]] to oppose the spread of Soviet [[communism]].

The modern ''Pax Americana'' may be seen as similar to the period of peace in [[Roman Empire|Rome]], ''[[Pax Romana]]''. In both situations, the period of peace was 'relative peace'.  During both ''Pax Romana'' and ''Pax Americana'' wars continued to occur, but it was still a prosperous time for both Western and Roman civilizations. It is important to note that during these periods, and most other times of relative tranquility, the peace that is referred to does not mean complete peace.  Rather, it simply means the civilization prospered in their military, agriculture, trade, and manufacturing.

=== ''Pax Britannica'' heritage ===
{{Main|Pax Britannica}}

From the end of the [[Napoleonic Wars]] in 1815 until the [[First World War]] in 1914, the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|United Kingdom]] played the role of [[Offshore balancing|offshore-balancer]] in Europe, where the [[Balance of power in international relations|balance of power]] was the main aim. It was also in this time that the British Empire became the largest empire of all time.  The global superiority of [[British Armed Forces|British military]] and commerce was guaranteed by dominance of a Europe lacking in strong [[nation-state]]s, and the presence of the [[Royal Navy]] on all of the world's oceans and seas. In 1905, the [[Royal Navy]] was superior to any two navies combined in the world. It provided services such as suppression of [[piracy]] and [[slavery]].

In this era of peace, though, there were several wars between the major powers: the [[Crimean War]], the [[Second Italian War of Independence|Franco-Austrian War]], the [[Austro-Prussian War]], the [[Franco-Prussian War]], and the [[Russo-Japanese War]], as well as numerous other wars. [[William Wohlforth]] has argued that this period of tranquility, sometimes termed ''[[La Belle Époque]]'', was actually a series of hegemonic states imposing a peaceful order. In Wohlforth's view, ''Pax Britannica'' transitioned to ''[[Pax Russica]]'' and then to ''Pax Germanica'', before ultimately, between 1853 and 1871, ceasing to be a ''Pax'' of any kind.<ref name="Unipolar World 1999 p. 39">{{Cite journal| jstor =2539346| title=The Stability of a Unipolar World| last1=Wohlforth| first1=William C.| journal=International Security|year=1999| volume=24| issue=1| pages=5–41| doi=10.1162/016228899560031| s2cid=57568539}} p. 39.</ref>

During the ''Pax Britannica'', America developed close ties with Britain, evolving into what has become known as a "[[Special Relationship|special relationship]]" between the two. The many commonalities shared with the two nations (such as language and history) drew them together as allies. Under the managed transition of the British Empire to the [[Commonwealth of Nations]], members of the [[Government of the United Kingdom|British government]], such as [[Harold Macmillan]], liked to think of [[United Kingdom–United States relations|Britain's relationship with America]] as similar to that of a progenitor [[Ancient Greece|Greece]] to America's [[Ancient Rome|Rome]].<ref>[https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3581313/Labours-love-in-with-America-is-nothing-new.html Labour's love-in with America is nothing new] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201007042000/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3581313/Labours-love-in-with-America-is-nothing-new.html |date=October 7, 2020 }} [[Daily Telegraph]] September 6, 2002</ref> Throughout the years, both have been active in North American, Middle Eastern, and Asian countries. 

In 1942, [[Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy]] envisaged that the United States may have to supplant the British Empire. Therefore, the United States "must cultivate a mental view toward world settlement after this war which will enable us to impose our own terms, amounting perhaps to a Pax Americana".<ref>Cited in Michio Kaku and David Axelrod, ''To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon Secret War Plans'', Boston: South End Press, 1987, p. 64.</ref> The transition from the British Empire to the Pax Americana is commonly dated to 1947 when the British rule ended in India, Pakistan, Palestine and the eastern Mediterranean, and the Truman Doctrine announced.<ref>[[Peter Clarke (historian)|Clarke, Peter]] (2008). ''The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Birth of the Pax Americana''. (New York: Bloomsbury Press). pp. 487-489, 500-504.</ref>

=== Late 20th century ===
{{Main|American Century}}
{{See also|History of the United States (1945–1964)|History of the United States (1964–1980)}}

After the Second World War, no [[War|armed conflict]] emerged among major Western nations themselves, and no [[nuclear weapon]]s were used in open conflict.  The United Nations was also soon developed after World War II to help keep peaceful relations between nations and establishing the veto power for the permanent members of the [[UN Security Council]], which included the United States.

In the second half of the 20th century, the [[USSR]] and US superpowers were engaged in the [[Cold War]], which can be seen as a struggle between hegemonies for global dominance. After 1945, the United States enjoyed an advantageous position with respect to the rest of the industrialized world. In the [[Post–World War II economic expansion]], the US was responsible for half of global industrial output, held 80 percent of the world's gold reserves, and was the world's sole [[list of countries with nuclear weapons|nuclear power]]. The catastrophic destruction of life, infrastructure, and capital during the Second World War had exhausted the imperialism of the [[Old World]], victor and vanquished alike. The largest economy in the world at the time, the United States recognized that it had come out of the war with its domestic infrastructure virtually unscathed and its [[United States Armed Forces|military forces]] at unprecedented strength. Military officials recognized the fact that Pax Americana had been reliant on the effective United States [[air power]], just as the instrument of Pax Britannica a century earlier was its [[Command of the sea|sea power]].<ref>Futrell, Robert Frank, "Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907–1960". DIANE Publishing, 1989. [https://books.google.com/books?id=kps2EhXM-lwC&pg=PA239 p. 239].</ref> In addition, a ''[[Unipolarity#Unipolarity|unipolar moment]]'' was seen to have occurred following the [[Collapse of the Soviet Union (1985–1991)#Dissolution of the USSR|collapse]] of the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>Cronin, Patrick P. ''From Globalism to Regionalism: New Perspectives on US Foreign and Defense Policies''. [Washington, D.C.]: [National Defense Univ. Press], 1993. [https://books.google.com/books?id=RQ-jjUbxveUC&pg=PA213 p. 213] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170330180233/https://books.google.com/books?id=RQ-jjUbxveUC&pg=PA213 |date=March 30, 2017 }}.</ref>

The term ''Pax Americana'' was explicitly used by [[John F. Kennedy]] in the 1960s, who advocated against the idea, arguing that the Soviet bloc was composed of human beings with the same individual goals as Americans and that such a peace based on "American weapons of war" was undesirable:

<blockquote>I have, therefore, chosen this time and place to discuss a topic on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth too rarely perceived. And that is the most important topic on earth: peace. What kind of peace do I mean and what kind of a peace do we seek? Not a ''Pax Americana'' enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, and the kind that enables men and nations to grow, and to hope, and build a better life for their children – not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women, not merely peace in our time but peace in all time.<ref>{{cite web |author=Michael E. Eidenmuller |url=https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkamericanuniversityaddress.html |title=Commencement Address American University |publisher=Americanrhetoric.com |date=1963-06-10 |access-date=2014-07-29 |archive-date=2021-05-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210502155545/https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkamericanuniversityaddress.html |url-status=live }}</ref></blockquote>

No other US Presidents claimed Pax Americana. As Kennedy, Richard Nixon and George Bush the senior referred to Pax Americana but exclusively to deny its existence in fact and intent. For this reason, the concept was called "undiplomatic".<ref>Sargent, J. Daniel (2018). "Pax Americana: Sketches for an undiplomatic history," lecture at the 132nd Annual Meeting. (Washington DC: American Historical Society), pp. 4-5, https://escholarship.org/content/qt00t9n3s7/qt00t9n3s7_noSplash_637ebc3588bd11ebd8c2d0ec2c66890b.pdf?t=pbaa2e {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250525190644/https://escholarship.org/content/qt00t9n3s7/qt00t9n3s7_noSplash_637ebc3588bd11ebd8c2d0ec2c66890b.pdf?t=pbaa2e |date=May 25, 2025 }}</ref>

Beginning around the [[Vietnam War]], the 'Pax Americana' term had started to be used by the critics of [[American Imperialism]]. Here in the late 20th-century conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, the charge of ''[[Neocolonialism]]'' was often aimed at Western involvement in the affairs of the [[Third World]] and other developing nations.<ref>{{Cite book|doi = 10.1017/CBO9780511895449.009|chapter = Soviet new thinking on national liberation movements: Continuity and change|title = Soviet Foreign Policy in Transition|year = 1992|last1 = Chenoy|first1 = Anuradha M.|pages = 145–160|isbn = 9780521413657|editor1-last = Kanet|editor1-first = Roger E|editor2-last = Miner|editor2-first = Deborah N|editor3-last = Resler|editor3-first = Tamara J}} See especially pp. 149–50 of the internal definitions of neocolonialism in soviet bloc academia.</ref><ref>Rosemary Radford Ruether. ''Christianity and Social Systems: Historical Constructions and Ethical Challenges''. Rowman & Littlefield, (2008) {{ISBN|0-7425-4643-8}}  p. 138: "Neocolonialism means that European powers and the United States no longer rule dependent territories directly through their occupying troops and imperial bureaucracy. Rather, they control the area's resources indirectly through business corporations and the financial lending institutions they dominate..."</ref><ref>Yumna Siddiqi. ''Anxieties of Empire and the Fiction of Intrigue''. Columbia University Press, (2007) {{ISBN|0-231-13808-3}} pp. 123–24 giving the classical definition limited to US and European colonial powers.</ref><ref>Thomas R. Shannon. ''An introduction to the world-system perspective''. 2nd Ed. Westview Press, (1996) {{ISBN|0-8133-2452-1}} pp. 94–95 classicially defined as a capitalist phenomenon.</ref><ref>William H. Blanchard. Neocolonialism American style, 1960–2000. Greenwood Publishing Group, (1996) {{ISBN|0-313-30013-5}}  pp. 3–12, definition p. 7.</ref> [[NATO]] became regarded as a symbol of ''Pax Americana'' in West Europe:

{{blockquote|The visible political symbol of the Pax Americana was NATO itself ... The Supreme Allied Commander, always an American, was an appropriate title for the American proconsul whose reputation and influence outweighed those of European premiers, presidents, and chancellors.<ref>{{Cite journal|jstor = 24911288|title = Western Europe in 'The American Century': A Retrospective View|last1 = Kaplan|first1 = Lawrence S.|journal = Diplomatic History|year = 1982|volume = 6|issue = 2|pages = 111–23 [115]|doi = 10.1111/j.1467-7709.1982.tb00367.x}}</ref>}}

In one of the first criticisms of "Pax Americana" in 1943 [[Nathaniel Peffer]] wrote:

{{blockquote|It is neither feasible nor desirable ... Pax Americana can be established and maintained only by force, only by means of a new, gigantic imperialism operating with the instrumentalities of militarism and the other concomitants of imperialism ... The way to dominion is through empire and the price of dominion is empire, and empire generates its own opposition.<ref name=Peffer1943>{{Cite journal|jstor=2144425|title=America's Place in the Post-War World|last1=Peffer|first1=Nathaniel|journal=Political Science Quarterly|year=1943|volume=58|issue=1|pages=11–24|doi=10.2307/2144425}} pp. 12, 14–15.</ref>}}

He did not know if it would happen: "It is conceivable that&nbsp;... America might drift into empire, imperceptibly, stage by stage, in a kind of power-politics gravitation." He also noted that America was heading precisely in that direction: "That there are certain stirrings in this direction is apparent, though how deep they go is unclear."<ref name=Peffer1943/>

The depth soon became clarified. Two later critics of ''Pax Americana'', [[Michio Kaku]] and [[David Axelrod (political consultant)|David Axelrod]], interpreted the outcome of Pax Americana: "[[Gunboat diplomacy]] would be replaced by Atomic diplomacy. ''[[Pax Britannica]]'' would give way to ''Pax Americana''." After the war, with the German and British militaries in tatters, only one force stood on the way to Pax Americana: the [[Soviet Army]].<ref name="To Win a Nuclear War, p. 64">''To Win a Nuclear War'', ''op. cit.'', p. 64.</ref> Four years after this criticism was written, the Red Army withdrew, paving the way for the [[Unipolarity#Unipolarity|unipolar moment]]. [[Joshua Muravchik]] commemorated the event by titling his 1991 article, "At Last, Pax Americana". He detailed:

{{blockquote|Last but not least, the Gulf War marks the dawning of the Pax Americana. True, that term was used immediately after World War II. But it was a misnomer then because the Soviet empire – a real competitor with American power – was born at the same moment. The result was not a "pax" of any kind, but a cold war and a bipolar world&nbsp;... During the past two years, however, Soviet power has imploded and a bipolar world has become unipolar.<ref>Joshua Muravchick, "[https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/24/opinion/at-last-pax-americana.html At Last, Pax Americana] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180716054000/https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/24/opinion/at-last-pax-americana.html |date=2018-07-16 }}", ''The New York Times'' (January 24, 1991)</ref>}}

The following year, in 1992, a US strategic draft for the post-Cold War period was leaked to the press. The person responsible for the confusion, former Assistant Secretary of State, [[Paul Wolfowitz]], confessed seven years later: "In 1992 a draft memo prepared by my office at the Pentagon&nbsp;... leaked to the press and sparked a major controversy." The draft's strategy aimed "to prevent any hostile power from dominating" a Eurasian region "whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power". He added: "Senator [[Joe Biden|Joseph Biden]] ridiculed the proposed strategy as 'literally a ''Pax Americana''&nbsp;... It won't work&nbsp;...' Just seven years later, many of these same critics seem quite comfortable with the idea of a ''Pax Americana''."<ref>{{Cite journal|url = https://nationalinterest.org/article/remembering-the-future-855|jstor = 42897259|title = Remembering the Future|last1 = Wolfowitz|first1 = Paul|journal = The National Interest|year = 2000|issue = 59|pages = 35–45 [36]|access-date = October 3, 2020|archive-date = April 22, 2021|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210422001232/https://nationalinterest.org/article/remembering-the-future-855|url-status = live}}</ref> The post-Cold War period, concluded [[William Wohlforth]], much less ambiguously deserves to be called ''Pax Americana''. "Calling the current period the true Pax Americana may offend some, but it reflects reality".<ref name="Unipolar World 1999 p. 39" />

=== Contemporary power ===
{{Main|Great power|Superpower}}
{{See also|History of the United States (1980–1991)|History of the United States (1991–2016)|History of the United States (2016–present)}}
[[File:American bases worldwide.svg|thumb|280px|Countries with a [[United States military deployments|U.S. military presence]] or which allow the U.S. military use of its facilities]]

Since 1991,<ref>Wolfowitz, Paul (2000). "Remembering the Future". ''The National Interest''. (59): p. 36.</ref> the ''Pax Americana'' was based on the military preponderance beyond challenge by any combination of rival powers and projection of power throughout the world's ''commons'' – neutral sea, air and space. This projection is coordinated by the [[Unified Command Plan]] which divides the world on regional branches controlled by a single command. The "right to command", translated into Latin, gives ''imperium'', "commands" (plural) ''imperia''.<ref>Max Ostrovsky, (2018). ''Military Globalization: Geography, Strategy, Weaponry'', (New York: Edwin Mellen Press), p. 247, https://archive.org/details/military-globalization/page/247/mode/2up?q=command&view=theater</ref> The US Combatant Commanders have often been associated with the Roman proconsuls<ref>Kaplan, Lawrence (1982). "Western Europe in 'The American Century,'" ''Diplomatic History'', vol. 6 (2), p. 115.</ref><ref>Cohen, Eliot A. (2004), "History and the hyperpower," ''Foreign Affairs'', vol 83 (4): p. 60.</ref><ref>Ferguson, Niall (2005). ''Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire''. (New York: Penguin Books), p. 17.</ref><ref>^Bischoff, Guenter (2009). "Empire discourses: The 'American Empire' in decline?" ''Kurswechsel'', vol 2: p. 18.</ref> and a complete book was devoted to the comparison.<ref>Cranes, Lord (2012). ''Proconsuls: Delegated Political-Military Leadership from Rome to America Today''. (New York: Cambridge University Press), p. 6.</ref>

Integrated with it are global network of military alliances (the [[Rio Pact]], NATO, [[ANZUS]] and bilateral alliances with Japan and several other states) coordinated by Washington in a hub-and-spokes system and worldwide network of several hundreds of military bases and installations. Neither the Rio Treaty, nor NATO, for [[Robert J. Art]], "was a regional collective security organization; rather both were regional imperia run and operated by the United States".<ref>{{Cite journal|jstor=2539339|title=Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement|last1=Art|first1=Robert J.|journal=International Security|year=1998|volume=23|issue=3|pages=79–113 [102]|doi=10.2307/2539339}}</ref> Former Security Advisor [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]] drew an expressive summary of the military foundation of ''Pax Americana'' shortly after the ''[[New world order (politics)|unipolar moment]]'':

{{blockquote|In contrast [to the earlier empires], the scope and pervasiveness of American global power today are unique. Not only does the United States control all the world's oceans, its military legions are firmly perched on the western and eastern extremities of Eurasia&nbsp;... American vassals and tributaries, some yearning to be embraced by even more formal ties to Washington, dot the entire Eurasian continent&nbsp;... American global supremacy is&nbsp;... buttered by an elaborate system of alliances and coalitions that literally span the globe.<ref>[[Zbigniew Brzezinski]], ''[[The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives]]'', (Perseus Books, New York, 1997, p. 23).</ref> }}

Besides the military foundation, there are significant non-military international institutions backed by American financing and diplomacy (like the United Nations and [[WTO]]). The United States invested heavily in programs such as the [[Marshall Plan]] and in the reconstruction of Japan, economically cementing defense ties that owed increasingly to the establishment of the [[Iron Curtain]]/[[Eastern Bloc]] and the widening of the [[Cold War]].

[[File:Antiimperialismo caracas.jpg|thumb|Street art in [[Caracas]], depicting [[Uncle Sam]] and accusing the American government of [[imperialism]]]]

Being in the best position to take advantage of [[free trade]], culturally indisposed to traditional empires, and alarmed by the rise of [[communism]] in China and the detonation of the first Soviet [[atom bomb]], the historically [[Noninterventionism|non-interventionist]] US also took a keen interest in developing multilateral institutions which would maintain a favorable world order among them. The [[International Monetary Fund]] and [[International Bank for Reconstruction and Development]] (World Bank), part of the [[Bretton Woods system]] of [[international financial system|international financial management]] was developed and, until the early 1970s, the existence of a [[fixed exchange rate]] to the US dollar. The [[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]] (GATT) was developed and consists of a protocol for normalization and reduction of trade [[tariff]]s.

With [[revolutions of 1989|the fall of the Iron Curtain]], the demise of the notion of a ''[[Pax Sovietica]]'', and the end of the [[Cold War]], the US maintained significant contingents of armed forces in Europe and East Asia. The institutions behind the Pax Americana and the rise of the United States unipolar power have persisted into the early 21st century. The ability of the United States to act as "the world's policeman" has been constrained by its own citizens' historic aversion to foreign wars.<ref>Westerfield, H. Bradford. ''The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy''. New York: Crowell, 1963. p. 138. (''cf''. "the traditional American aversion to foreign wars, but also related to some recent disillusionment with the fruits of total wars&nbsp;...")</ref> Though there have been calls for the continuation of military leadership, as stated in "Rebuilding America's Defenses":

<blockquote>The American peace has proven itself peaceful, stable, and durable. It has, over the past decade, provided the geopolitical framework for widespread economic growth and the spread of American principles of liberty and democracy. Yet no moment in international politics can be frozen in time; even a global ''Pax Americana'' will not preserve itself. [... What is required is] a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities.<ref name=RAD2000>{{Cite news
 |title       = Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources For a New Century
 |url         = http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf
 |date        = September 2000
 |access-date  = May 30, 2007
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20090104053418/http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf
 |archive-date = 4 January 2009
 |url-status     = usurped
}}</ref></blockquote>

This is reflected in the research of [[American exceptionalism]], which shows that "there is some indication for [being a leader of an 'American peace'] among the [US] public, but very little evidence of [[unilateral]] attitudes".<ref name="politikwissenschaft.tu-darmstadt.de" /> Resentments have arisen at a country's dependence on American military protection, due to disagreements with United States foreign policy or the presence of American military forces.

In the ''[[post-communism]]'' world of the 21st-century, the French Socialist politician and former Foreign Minister [[Hubert Védrine]] describes the US as a hegemonic hyperpower, while the US political scientists [[John Mearsheimer]] counter that the US is not a "true" hegemony, because it does not have the resources to impose a proper, formal, global rule; despite its political and military strength, the US is economically equal to Europe, thus, cannot rule the international stage. Several other countries are either emerging or re-emerging as powers, such as China, Russia, India, and the [[European Union]].

In 1998, American political author, Charles A. Kupchan, described the world order "After Pax Americana"<ref>{{Cite journal|jstor=2539379|title=After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity|last1=Kupchan|first1=Charles A.|journal=International Security|year=1998|volume=23|issue=2|pages=40–79|doi=10.1162/isec.23.2.40|s2cid=57569142}}</ref> and the next year "The Life after Pax Americana".<ref>{{Cite journal|jstor = 40209641|title = Life after Pax Americana|last1 = Kupchan|first1 = Charles A.|journal = World Policy Journal|year = 1999|volume = 16|issue = 3|pages = 20–27}}</ref> In 2003, he announced "The End of the American Era".<ref>Charles Kupchan, ''The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century'', New York: Vintage Books, 2003.</ref> In 2012, he projected: "America's military strength will remain as central to global stability in the years ahead as it has been in the past."<ref>Charles Kupchan, "[http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/23/grand-strategy-the-four-pillars-of-the-future/ Grand Strategy: The Four Pillars of the Future] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220224094758/https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/23/grand-strategy-the-four-pillars-of-the-future/ |date=2022-02-24 }}", ''Democracy Journal'', 23, Winter 2012</ref>

The Russian analyst [[Leonid Grinin]] argues that at present and in the nearest future ''Pax Americana''  will remain an effective tool of supporting the world order since the US concentrates too many leadership functions which no other country is able to take to the full extent. Thus, he warns that the destruction of ''Pax Americana''  will bring critical transformations of the [[World-system]] with unclear consequences.<ref>Grinin, Leonid; Ilyin, Ilya V.; Andreev, Alexey I. 2016. "[http://www.sociostudies.org/journal/articles/445705/ World Order in the Past, Present, and Future] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171201081057/https://www.sociostudies.org/journal/articles/445705/ |date=2017-12-01 }}". In ''Social Evolution & History''. Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 58–84</ref>

American political analyst [[Ian Bremmer]] argued that with the election of [[Donald Trump]] and the subsequent rise in [[populism]] in the west,<ref>{{Cite web |title=BREMMER: 'The Pax Americana, as of tomorrow, is over' |date=January 19, 2017 |url=https://www.yahoo.com/news/bremmer-pax-americana-tomorrow-over-192927449.html |access-date=April 16, 2022 |publisher=Yahoo! |language=en-US |archive-date=April 16, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220416200637/https://www.yahoo.com/news/bremmer-pax-americana-tomorrow-over-192927449.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Bremner |first=Ian |date=2016-11-21 |title=It really is the end of the world as we know it... |url=https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/it-really-is-the-end-of-the-world-as-we-know-it |access-date=April 16, 2022 |website=The Telegraph |via=Eurasia Group |archive-date=April 22, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220422160129/https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/it-really-is-the-end-of-the-world-as-we-know-it |url-status=live }}</ref> as well as US withdrawal from international agreements such as the [[Trans-Pacific Partnership]], [[North American Free Trade Agreement|NAFTA]], and the [[Paris Agreement|Paris Climate Accords]], that the ''Pax Americana'' is over.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Cheng |first=Evelyn |date=January 3, 2017 |title='Pax Americana' is over, and that could mean a much more turbulent world: Ian Bremmer |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/03/bremmer-pax-americana-is-over-and-that-means-a-more-turbulent-world.html |access-date=April 16, 2022 |publisher=CNBC |language=en |archive-date=April 16, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220416200637/https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/03/bremmer-pax-americana-is-over-and-that-means-a-more-turbulent-world.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

American writer and academic [[Michael Lind]] stated that the ''Pax Americana'' withstood both the Cold War and the post-Cold War era, and "today's [[Second Cold War]] has strengthened rather than weakened America's informal empire," at least for now.<ref>{{cite web
|url=https://www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/geopolitics/2023/09/last-days-pax-americana
|title=The last days of Pax Americana
|date=September 16, 2023
|access-date=2024-08-30
|archive-date=August 30, 2024
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240830103410/https://www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/geopolitics/2023/09/last-days-pax-americana
|url-status=live
}}</ref>

=== Comparison with Pax Romana ===
In 1914, an Italian Historian, [[Guglielmo Ferrero]], published ''Ancient Rome and Modern America: A Comparative Study of Morals and Manners''. The title is misleading because the work does not pertain specifically to the United States. Instead, it compares Rome and what Ferrero labels the "New World" and broadens the discussion to modern civilization in general.<ref>Adler, Eric (2008). "Post-9/11 views of Rome and the nature of 'defensive imperialism.'" ''International Journal of the Classical Tradition'', vol 15 (4): p. 589.</ref> However, Ferrero's pioneering comparison echoed in the 1961 article by [[Mason Hammond]], titled "Ancient Rome and modern America reconsidered."<ref>Hammond, Mason (1961). "Ancient Rome and modern America reconsidered." ''Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society'', vol. 73: p. 5.</ref> Highly critical of the use of the past for the present, he still associated: "The modern world, like the Mediterranean world of the First century BC, faces a choice between self-annihilation... or of unification and peace... Rome of the second century BC and the United States of today face without adequate preparation the responsibilities of world dominance and the dilemma of how to reconcile recognition of the sovereignty of other states with national security."<ref>Hammond, Mason (1961). "Ancient Rome and modern America reconsidered." ''Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society'', vol. 73: pp. 11, 15.</ref>

Hammond considered five moments in Roman history which offer tempting similarities to the American present and suggested the differences which "render such parallels deceptive".<ref>Hammond, Mason (1961). "Ancient Rome and modern America reconsidered." ''Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society'', vol. 73: pp. 6-7.</ref> Two of his differences refer to the parallel between Rome in 150 BC and the United States in 1960. First, [[world federalism|representative federalism]] today offers for international rivalries an alternative solution to Pax Americana. "Rome moved toward imperialistic control; the United States can still hope for a cooperative federal solution through the United Nations." Unwilling to trust the lessons of history, Hammond bet on the utopian idea of world federalism. Second, the world is bipolar and it would be "foolish to equate Antiochus the Great of Syria in the 190s BC or Parthia in the 150s as rivals to Rome with Russia as a rival to the United States" because Russia is more formidable.<ref>Hammond, Mason (1961). "Ancient Rome and modern America reconsidered." ''Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society'', vol. 73: pp. 7-8, 11, 15.</ref> What Hammond called "representative federalism" remains where it was in his days, but thirty years after he published his parallels, Pax Americana leaped relatively to Pax Sovietica. The parallel proved to be "deceptive" indeed but in the opposite sense.

Writing in 1945, [[Ludwig Dehio]] remembered that the Germans used the term ''Pax Anglosaxonica'' in a sense of Pax Americana since 1918 and discussed the possibility of a Pax Anglosaxonica as a world-wide counterpart to the Pax Romana.<ref name="auto1"/> The United States, Dehio associates on the same page, withdrew to isolation on that occasion. "Rome, too, had taken a long time to understand the significance of her world role."

With the outbreak of World War II, British Prime Minister, [[Neville Chamberlain]], resolved that England would win the Second World War too as Rome had won the Second Punic War. Hitler disagreed: history has not yet determined who shall play Rome and who shall play Carthage in this case.<ref>Hitler, Adolf (September 3, 1939). ''The Complete Hitler Speeches and Proclamations 1932 1945''. (tr. Domarus, Max, Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 1997), p. 1787, 1872, https://archive.org/details/the-complete-hitler-speeches-and-proclamations-1932-1945_202409/page/1787/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> The War fast took a clear turn towards what the contemporary Germans feared as the fatal ''Pax Anglosaxonica''. In 1943, Hitler tried to encourage his team: "They will never become Rome. America will never be the Rome of the future."<ref>Hitler, Adolf (1942-45). ''Hitler and His Generals: Military Conferences, 1942-1945''. (tr. Heiber, Helmut & Glantz, David. New York: Enigma Books, 2002), p. 92, https://archive.org/details/hitler-and-his-generals-1942-1945/page/92/mode/2up</ref> The same year, however, Hitler's compatriot and the founder of the [[Paneuropean Union]], [[Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi]], whom Hitler called "cosmopolitan bastard",<ref>Hitler, Adolf (1928). ''[[Secret Book]]''. (ed. Taylor, Telford, tr. Attanasio, Salvator, New York: Grove Press, 1962), p. 107.</ref> projected a new "Pax Romana" based on the preponderant US air power:

{{blockquote|During the third century BC the Mediterranean world was divided on five great powers – Roma and Carthage, Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt. The balance of power led to a series of wars until Rome emerged the queen of the Mediterranean and established an incomparable era of two centuries of peace and progress, the 'Pax Romana'&nbsp;... It may be that America's air power could again assure our world, now much smaller than the Mediterranean at that period, two hundred years of peace&nbsp;... This is the only realistic hope for a lasting peace.<ref>''Crusade for Pan-Europe'' (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1943), pp. 299–304.</ref>}}

Soon many scholars found that what Coudenhove-Kalergi called the "only realistic hope for peace" is coming true. In 1953, British Classicist [[Gilbert Murray]] encouraged that across the Atlantic is waiting a "greater Rome" which can establish world peace or at least maintain Europe in an "ocean of barbarism" as Rome maintained [[Ancient Greece|Hellas]].<ref>Murray, Gilbert (1954). ''Hellenism and the Modern World''. (Boston: Beacon Press), pp. 57–58, https://archive.org/details/hellenismmodernw00murr_0/page/58/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> In the mid-1960s, some scholars concluded that the United States had outstripped the Soviet Union beyond the bipolar model and instead looked to the model of Rome.<ref>Bull, Hedley (1977). ''The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics''. (London: Macmillan), p. 201.</ref> One of those scholars, George Liska, argued that historical superstates in general and the Roman Empire in particular rather than the recent colonial empires have relevance for the contemporary US foreign policy.<ref>Liska, George (1967). ''Imperial American: The International Politics of Primacy''. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 9–10, 23.</ref> 

Prefacing his ''Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire'' in 1976,<ref>(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), p. xii, https://archive.org/details/grandstrategyofr0000lutt/page/n13/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> Pentagon employee [[Edward Luttwak]] stressed that the United States pursues similar to Rome goals, faces a similar kind of resistance, and hence must apply a similar strategy. In the late 1990s,<ref name="auto2">Elliot, Justin (4 April 2008). "Don't know much about history: The Pentagon looks back to four great empires for tip on how to rule the world,"  ''Global Policy Forum'', https://archive.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/155-history/26017.html {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210406214416/https://archive.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/155-history/26017.html |date=April 6, 2021 }}</ref> Pentagon initiated new research on "military advantage in history" and how to keep it. Of four empires they selected, Rome was emphasized as the most relevant model for the contemporary United States.<ref>Herman, Mark et al (2002). "Military advantage in history," [[Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center]]. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense), chapter 6, pp. 81–82, https://www.motherjones.com/wp-content/uploads/legacy/news/featurex/2008/07/military-advantage-in-history.pdf</ref> The "whole bunch" of copies went out to the government.<ref name="auto2"/> A decade later, former [[United States National Security Council|NSC]] employee, Carnes Lord, compared US combatant commanders, Roman proconsuls, British colonial officials, Persian [[satrap]]s and Spanish [[viceroy]]s. He found the American version most similar to the Roman proconsular model.<ref>Lord, Cranes (2012). ''Proconsuls: Delegated Political–Military Leadership from Rome to America Today''. (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 2, 6.</ref>

While Pentagon and NSC employees turned into Roman Historians, Roman Historian [[Arthur M. Eckstein]] proceeded in the reverse direction. He noted that the theoretical framework of hierarchy, unipolarity, and empire as political scientists have defined these terms is a procedure rarely pursued among scholars of Mediterranean antiquity<ref>Eckstein, Arthur M. (2008). ''Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230–170 B.C.'' (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell), p. 343.</ref> and decided to fill the gap.  Eckstein presented his subject in terms of the 20th-century [[International Relations]]. The five-year (196–192 BC) diplomatic confrontation between Rome and [[Antiochus III]] was a classic contest between the two superpowers in a "bipolar system".<ref>Eckstein, Arthur M. (2008). ''Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230–170 B.C.'' (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 312–315.</ref> The confrontation turned into war and in 189 BC Rome defeated Antiochus. This victory resulted in an unprecedented for the Mediterranean world unipolar moment with Rome established as a "unipolar hegemon". There remained only one political and military focus, only one preponderant power. "Rome was now the sole remaining superpower." A unified "unipolar system" stretched from Spain to Syria.<ref>Eckstein, Arthur M. (2008). ''Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230–170 B.C.'' (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell),  pp. 340-342.</ref>

Anti-imperialist empire is not a modern invention. Initially, Rome had appeared in the East as an anti-imperialist power – the champion of the weaker states against the aggression of the great powers of [[Philip V of Macedon]] and Antiochus III.<ref>Eckstein, Arthur M. (2008). ''Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230–170 B.C.'' (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell), p. 344.</ref> Eckstein's student, Paul Burton, adds that [[Achaean League]] statesman Lycortas, father of [[Polybius]], interpreted the Roman foreign policy in words that might sound familiar to the critics of US foreign policy: The message the Romans are sending by criticizing the Achaeans is that "freedom, in the Roman mind, is also empire" ([[Livy|Livius]] 39.36.5 – 37.17).<ref>Burton, Paul J. (2019). ''Roman Imperialism''. (Leiden & Boston: Brill), p. 33.</ref>

But Eckstein cared to provide the contemporary world with an emergency exit from Pax Americana. The Roman achievement of unipolarity was only one step along the spectrum of interstate relations that leads towards empire. And unipolarity, even when once achieved, can nevertheless be reversed. Historically this has frequently occurred and in the late 2000s the United States is discovering that unipolarity is unstable.<ref>Eckstein, Arthur M. (2008). ''Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230–170 B.C.'' (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell),  pp. 336, 343.</ref>

[[Joseph Nye]] titled his 2002 article "The New Rome Meets the New Barbarians".<ref>{{Cite magazine |title=The new Rome meets the new barbarians |url=https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2002/03/21/the-new-rome-meets-the-new-barbarians |magazine=The Economist |issn=0013-0613|last=Nye|first= Joseph|date= March 21, 2002|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190915234602/https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2002/03/21/the-new-rome-meets-the-new-barbarians|archive-date=September 15, 2019 }}</ref> His book of the same year he opens: "Not since Rome has one nation loomed so large above the others."<ref>''The Paradox of American Power'', (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002).</ref> And his 1991 book he titled ''Bound to Lead''.<ref>''Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature Of American Power'' (Basic Books, 1991).</ref> ''Leadership'', translated into Greek, renders ''[[hegemony]]''; an alternative translation is ''archia'' – Greek common word for ''empire''. Decline, he writes, is not necessarily imminent. "Rome remained dominant for more than three centuries after the peak of its power&nbsp;...<ref>"[https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2010-11-01/future-american-power The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161220122032/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2010-11-01/future-american-power |date=December 20, 2016 }}", ''Foreign Affairs'' (November–December 2010).</ref>

The Pax Americana motif and its Roman parallel reached their peak in the context of the 2003 [[Iraq War]]. Comparing the United States to the Roman Empire has become somewhat of a cliché.<ref>[[Niall Ferguson|Ferguson, Niall]] (2005). ''Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire'' (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 14.</ref><ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built – and America Is Building – a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p. 9.</ref> [[Jonathan Freedland]] observed:
{{Blockquote|Of course, enemies of the United States have shaken their fist at its "imperialism" for decades&nbsp;... What is more surprising, and much newer, is that the notion of an American empire has suddenly become a live debate inside the United States Accelerated by the post-9/11 debate on America's role in the world, the idea of the United States as a 21st-century Rome is gaining a foothold in the country's consciousness.<ref>"[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/18/usa.comment Rome, AD&nbsp;... Rome, DC] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161022165503/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/18/usa.comment |date=2016-10-22 }}", ''The Guardian'' (September 18, 2002)</ref>}}
<!-- [[WP:NFCC]] violation: [[File:Ave Bush.gif|thumbnail|left|Ave Bush! The article in the culture section of the Italian newspaper ''La Stampa'' featured the banner headline "Ave Bush" ("Hail Bush") in large type and depicted George W. Bush behind his presidential podium, index finger pointing, next to a photo of the ''prima porta'' statue of the emperor Augustus.]] -->
''[[The New York Review of Books]]'' illustrated a 2002 piece on US might with a drawing of George Bush togged up as a [[Roman centurion]], complete with shield and spears.<ref>[[Ronald Dworkin]], "[http://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0891/0192/products/d561dcf238a6043d82261585af83865b_2048x2048.gif?v=1448134567 The Threat to Patriotism] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161224164357/http://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0891/0192/products/d561dcf238a6043d82261585af83865b_2048x2048.gif?v=1448134567 |date=2016-12-24 }}", ''The New York Review of Books'' (February 28, 2002)</ref> Bush's visits to Germany in 2002 and 2006 resulted in further Bush-as-Roman-emperor invective appearing in the German press. In 2006, freelance writer, political satirist, and correspondent for the left-leaning ''[[Die Tageszeitung]]'', Arno Frank, compared the spectacle of the visit by ''[[Imperator]]'' Bush to "elaborate inspection tours of Roman emperors in important but not completely pacified provinces – such as [[Germania]]".<ref>Cited in {{Cite journal | doi=10.1007/s12138-013-0320-0|title = Pax Romana/Pax Americana: Views of the "New Rome" from "Old Europe", 2000–2010|year = 2013|last1 = Burton|first1 = Paul J.|journal = International Journal of the Classical Tradition|volume = 20|issue = 1–2|pages = 15–40|s2cid = 162321437}}</ref> In September 2002, Boston's [[WBUR-FM]] radio station titled a special on US imperial power with the tag "''Pax Americana''".<ref>Jonathan Freedland, "[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/18/usa.comment Rome, AD&nbsp;... Rome, DC] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161022165503/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/18/usa.comment |date=2016-10-22 }}", ''The Guardian'' (September 18, 2002)</ref> The phrase "American Empire" appeared in one thousand news stories over a single six-month period in 2003.<ref>Julian Go, ''Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present'' (New York: Cambridge University Press,  2011), p. 2.</ref> A 2009 [[Google search]] yielded policy analyst [[Vaclav Smil]] 22 million hits for "America as a new Rome", and 23 million for "American Empire." Intrigued, Smil titled his 2010 book by what he intended to explain: ''Why America Is Not a New Rome''.<ref>{{Cite book|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=jkhTtZbdc4sC|title = Why America is Not a New Rome|isbn = 9780262288293|last1 = Smil|first1 = Vaclav|date = 2010|publisher = The MIT Press|location = Massachusetts|pages = xi–xii}}</ref> The volume of the Rome-US comparisons made a bewildering impression on reviewers: "As the trickle turns into a flood, it is impossible to keep up with the many articles, books, internet sites, and documentaries that pose the comparison. Even after 2009... the number of works about Rome and the USA shows no sign of abating."<ref>Vasunia, Phiroze (2011). "The comparative study of empires." ''Journal of Roman Studies''. Vol. 101: p. 232.</ref>

Two Classicists, Paul J. Burton<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1007/s12138-013-0320-0|title = Pax Romana/Pax Americana: Views of the "New Rome" from "Old Europe", 2000–2010|year = 2013|last1 = Burton|first1 = Paul J.|journal = International Journal of the Classical Tradition|volume = 20|issue = 1–2|pages = 15–40|s2cid = 162321437}}</ref> and Eric Adler, decided that the volume of comparisons between America and Rome requires research of its own. Adler's comparison of comparisons revealed that most interventionists dissociate America from Rome while most critics of US interventions emphasize similarities between the two. The same he finds true for the Edwardian and Victorian debates regarding the British Empire. Isolationists use the polemical value of the "New Rome" to "shock" the reader while interventionists offer the same reader a therapy by distinguishing Rome from America. Adler also observed that many notable authors are more interested in expressing their opinion about recent US foreign policy rather than offering a nuanced interpretation of Roman history checked against primary sources. Instead, from secondary sources they select elements fitting their line and disregard whether these elements are from the republican Rome, or imperial Rome, or even the Byzantine Empire.<ref>Adler, Eric (2008). "Post-9/11 views of Rome and the nature of 'defensive imperialism.'" ''International Journal of the Classical Tradition'', vol 15 (4): pp. 599, 602–05.</ref>

Like Smil, Classicist and military Historian [[Victor Davis Hanson]] dissociates the United States from Rome. The U.S. does not pursue [[world domination]], but maintains worldwide influence by a system of mutually beneficial exchanges.<ref name=Hanson2002/> He dismisses the notion of an American Empire altogether, with a mocking comparison to historical empires: "We do not send out proconsuls to reside over client states, which in turn impose taxes on coerced subjects to pay for the legions. Instead, American bases are predicated on contractual obligations&nbsp;— costly to us and profitable to their hosts. We do not see any profits in Korea, but instead accept the risk of losing almost 40,000 of our youth to ensure that Kias can flood our shores and that shaggy students can protest outside our embassy in Seoul."<ref name=Hanson2002>{{cite journal | last=Hanson|first= Victor Davis |date=November 2002 | title = A Funny Sort of Empire | journal=National Review | url = http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson112702.asp | access-date =October 8, 2009|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20080511233845/http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson112702.asp |archive-date= 2008-05-11 }}</ref>

The existence of "proconsuls", however, has been recognized by many since the early Cold War. In 1957, French Historian [[Amaury de Riencourt]] associated the American "proconsul" with "the Roman of our time."<ref>Cited in [[Geir Lundestad]], ''The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From 'Empire' by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift'', (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p 112.</ref> Expert on recent American history, [[Arthur M. Schlesinger]], detected several contemporary imperial features, including "proconsuls". Washington does not directly run many parts of the world. Rather, its "informal empire" was one "richly equipped with imperial paraphernalia: troops, ships, planes, bases, proconsuls, local collaborators, all spread wide around the luckless planet".<ref>Schlesinger, Arthur Meier. ''The Cycles of American History'', (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), p 141. {{OCLC|13455179}}</ref> "The [[Supreme Allied Commander]], always an American, was an appropriate title for the American proconsul whose reputation and influence outweighed those of European premiers, presidents, and chancellors."<ref>[[Lawrence Kaplan]], "Western Europe in 'The American Century{{'"}}, ''Diplomatic History'', 6/2, (1982): p 115.</ref> U.S. "[[Unified Combatant Command|combatant commanders]]&nbsp;... have served as its proconsuls. Their standing in their regions has usually dwarfed that of ambassadors and assistant secretaries of state."<ref>{{Cite journal |jstor = 20034046|title = History and the Hyperpower|journal = Foreign Affairs|volume = 83|issue = 4|pages = 49–63|last1 = Cohen|first1 = Eliot A.|year = 2004|doi = 10.2307/20034046|url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2004-07-01/history-and-hyperpower|author-link1=Eliot A. Cohen|url-access = subscription}} pp. 60-61</ref><ref>Reveron, Derek S. (2007). ''America's Viceroys: The Military and US Foreign Policy''. (Palgrave Macmillan), p 4.</ref><ref>Wrage, Stephen D. (2007). "US Combatant Commander: The man in the middle," ''America's Viceroys: The Military and US Foreign Policy''. (Ed. Reveron, Derek S. Palgrave Macmillan), p 193.</ref>

[[Andrew J. Bacevich]] in his 2002 book about American Empire titled a chapter "Rise of the proconsuls," where he identifies a new class of uniformed proconsuls presiding over vast "quasi-imperial" domains who emerged in the 1990s.<ref>Bacevich, Andrew J. (2002). ''American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy''. (Harvard university Press), chapter 7, p 167.</ref> In September 2000, ''Washington Post'' reporter [[Dana Priest]] published a series of articles whose central premise was Combatant Commanders' inordinate amount of political influence within the countries in their areas of responsibility. They "had evolved into the modern-day equivalent of the Roman Empire's proconsuls—well-funded, semi-autonomous, unconventional centers of U.S. foreign policy."<ref>Cited in Andrew Feickert, "[https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress]", (Congressional Research Service, Washington: White House, 2013), p 59.</ref> A book, titled ''America's Viceroys'', responds to Priest, claiming that US Combatant Commanders pose no threat of marching on Washington while Roman proconsuls "always presented" such threat.<ref>Reveron, Derek S. (2007). ''America's Viceroys: The Military and US Foreign Policy''. (Palgrave Macmillan), p 2.</ref><ref>Wrage, Stephen D. (2007). "US Combatant Commander: The man in the middle." ''America's Viceroys: The Military and US Foreign Policy''. (Ed. Reveron, Derek S. Palgrave Macmillan), p 185.</ref> Many Roman historians however reduce the period of the threat from "always" to the last century of the Republic (133-31 BC). One of most honorable Roman proconsuls who won for Rome supremacy over the Mediterranean, [[Scipio Africanus]], was unsuccessful in the 184 BC campaign for the censorship and retired from politics. Founded c. 509 BC, the Republic still firmly controlled its proconsuls. Stephen Wrage precludes future complications with Combatant Commanders,<ref>Wrage, Stephen D. (2007). "US Combatant Commander: The man in the middle." ''America's Viceroys: The Military and US Foreign Policy''. (Ed. Reveron, Derek S. Palgrave Macmillan), p 185.</ref> while some Roman historians are more cautious, supposing that the United States might be in the Roman sequence "somewhere between the great wars of conquest [202-146 BC] and the rise of the Caesars."<ref>[[Mike Duncan (podcaster)|Duncan, Mike]] (2017). ''The Storm Before the Storm: The Beginning of the End of the Roman Republic''. (Public Affairs), p XXIII.</ref><ref>[[Thomas F. Madden|Madden, Thomas F]]. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p 201, 210, 250.</ref><ref>[[J. Rufus Fears|Fears, Rufus Jesse]] (19 December 2005). "The lessons of the Roman Empire for America today." ''Heritage Foundation'', p. 8.</ref>

Carnes Lord observes that since the 2000s, the notion that the Combatant Commanders are in effect the "proconsuls" of a new American Empire has become a standard trope in the literature on American foreign policy.<ref name="Lord2012">Lord, Cranes (2012). ''Proconsuls: Delegated Political-Military Leadership from Rome to America Today''. (New York: Cambridge University Press), p 2, 6, 167.</ref> Harvard professor Niall Ferguson calls the regional combatant commanders, among whom the whole globe is divided, the "pro-consuls" of this "imperium".<ref>Niall Ferguson, ''Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire'', (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), p 17.</ref> [[Günter Bischof]] calls them "the all powerful proconsuls of the new American empire. Like the proconsuls of Rome they were supposed to bring order and law to the unruly and anarchical world."<ref>Günter Bischof, "[http://www.beigewum.at/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2009_2_014-23.pdf Empire Discourses: The 'American Empire' in Decline?] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250430192343/http://www.beigewum.at/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2009_2_014-23.pdf |date=April 30, 2025 }}" ''Kurswechsel'', 2, (2009): p 18</ref> The Romans often preferred to exercise power through friendly client regimes, rather than direct rule: "Until Jay Garner and L. Paul Bremer became U.S. proconsuls in Baghdad, that was the American method, too".<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2007/06/14/bushs-amazing-achievement/ |url-status=live |title=Bush's Amazing Achievement |last=Freedland |first=Jonathan |date=June 14, 2007 |language=en |issn=0028-7504|magazine=The New York Review of Books|author-link1=Jonathan Freedland|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151210200739/http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2007/06/14/bushs-amazing-achievement/ |archive-date=2015-12-10 }}</ref>

Carnes Lord devoted a book to comparison between the Roman proconsuls, British colonial officials and US Combatant Commanders. The latter for him also associate with the Persian [[Satrap|satraps]] and Spanish [[Viceroy|viceroys]]. He found the American version most similar to the Roman proconsular model. As they contributed importantly to the policy on the marches of empire, all of them qualify as proconsuls in proper sense of the term. With all due qualification, he confessed, his study is about imperial governance in the imperial periphery.<ref name="Lord2012"/>

Another distinction of [[Victor Davis Hanson]]—that US bases, contrary to the legions, are costly to America and profitable for their hosts—expresses the American view. The hosts express a diametrically opposite view. Japan pays for 25,000 Japanese working on US bases. 20% of those workers provide entertainment: a list drawn up by the Japanese Ministry of Defense included 76 bartenders, 48 vending machine personnel, 47 golf course maintenance personnel, 25 club managers, 20 commercial artists, 9 leisure-boat operators, 6 theater directors, 5 cake decorators, 4 bowling alley clerks, 3 tour guides and 1 animal caretaker. Shu Watanabe of the [[Democratic Party of Japan]] asks: "Why does Japan need to pay the costs for US service members' entertainment on their holidays?"<ref>Cited in {{Cite journal |jstor = 20699853|title = The United States–Japan Security Treaty at 50: Still a Grand Bargain?|journal = Foreign Affairs|volume = 89|issue = 2|pages = 92–103|last1 = Packard|first1 = George R.|year = 2010|url=https://documents.pub/amp/document/the-united-statesjapan-security-treaty-at-50-still-a-grand-bargain.html}} pp. 98–99</ref> One research on host nations support concludes that the general trend of the South Korean and Japanese alliance burden sharing is towards increase.<ref>Sung Woo Kim, "[https://iro.uiowa.edu/esploro/outputs/doctoral/System-polarities-and-alliance-politics/9983777286802771 System Polarities and Alliance Politics]", (PhD thesis, University of Iowa, 2012), pp. 149–151</ref> Increasing the "economic burdens of the allies" is one of the major priorities of President [[Donald Trump]].<ref>Swapna Venugopal Ramaswamy, (2025). "Trump says NATO countries are 'taking advantage' and should contribute 5% of GDP." ''USA Today'', https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2025/01/07/nato-5-percent-gdp-defense-trump/77514412007/</ref>

Classicist Eric Adler notes that Hanson earlier had written about the decline of the classical studies in the United States and insufficient attention devoted to the classical experience. "When writing about American foreign policy for a lay audience, however, Hanson himself chose to castigate Roman imperialism in order to portray the modern United States as different from—and superior to—the Roman state."<ref name=Adler2008>{{Cite journal |jstor = 25691268|title = Post-9/11 Views of Rome and the Nature of "Defensive Imperialism"|journal = International Journal of the Classical Tradition|volume = 15|issue = 4|pages = 587–610|last1 = Adler|first1 = Eric|s2cid = 143223136|year = 2008|doi = 10.1007/s12138-009-0069-7|url=https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/1442670/IJCT.15.4.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DPost-9_11_Views_of_Rome_and_the_Nature.pdf&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A%2F20200121%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20200121T193424Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=092808f15515bd339c803262e576ae506c9dd7f25b0e800c45f34a52ae21b66f|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200121193546/https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/1442670/IJCT.15.4.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DPost-9_11_Views_of_Rome_and_the_Nature.pdf&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A%2F20200121%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20200121T193424Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=092808f15515bd339c803262e576ae506c9dd7f25b0e800c45f34a52ae21b66f|archive-date = 2020-01-21}} Quoting p. 593.</ref> As a supporter of a hawkish unilateral American foreign policy, Hanson's "distinctly negative view of Roman imperialism is particularly noteworthy, since it demonstrates the importance a contemporary supporter of a hawkish American foreign policy places on criticizing Rome."<ref name=Adler2008/>

Scholars list many additional parallels with the early ''Pax Romana'' (especially between 189 BC when the supremacy over the Mediterranean was won and the first annexation in 168 BC). By contrast to other empires, the early ''Pax Romana'' did not impose regular taxation on other states.<ref>Sands, Perry Cooper (1975). ''The Client Princes unde the Republic''. (New York: Amo Press), pp. 127–28, 152–55.</ref><ref>[[John North (historian)|North, John A]]. (1981). "The development of Roman imperialism," ''Journal of Roman Studies'', vol. 71: p. 2.</ref> The first good evidence of such a taxation comes from Judea as late as 64 BC.<ref>[[Andrew Lintott|Lintott, Andrew]] (1993). ''Imperium Romanum''. (London: Routeledge), p. 35.</ref> Client states made irregular military or economic contributions in case of the hegemonic campaigns, as is the case under the ''Pax Americana''.<ref>Ostrovsky, Max (2006). ''The Hyperbola of the World Order''. (Lanham: University Press of America), p. 225.</ref>

Formally, client states remained independent and very seldom were called "clients". The latter term became widely used only in the late medieval period. Usually, other states were called "friends and allies" – a popular expression under the ''Pax Americana''. [[Arnold J. Toynbee]] stressed the similarity of the US alliances with the [[Client kingdoms in ancient Rome|Roman client system]]<ref>Toynbee, Arnold (1962). ''America and the World Revolution''. (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 105–06, https://archive.org/details/americaworldrevo0000toyn/page/104/mode/2up?view=theater&q=annexation</ref> and [[Ronald Steel]] cited Toynbee's parallel at length in his book, titled ''Pax Americana''.<ref>Steel, Ronald (1967). ''Pax Americana''. (New York: Viking Press), p. 17, https://archive.org/details/paxamericana0000stee/page/16/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> Nominally independent allies were offered Roman or US protection which, according to Peter Bender, meant their control and limit on other states' sovereignty.<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1016/S0030-4387(02)00180-1|title = America: The New Roman Empire?|year = 2003|last1 = Bender|first1 = Peter|journal = Orbis|volume = 47|pages = 152}}</ref> Bender, in his 2003 article "America: The New Roman Empire", summarized: "When politicians or professors are in need of a historical comparison in order to illustrate the United States' incredible might, they almost always think of the Roman Empire."<ref>"America: The New Roman Empire", p. 145.</ref> The article abounds with analogies. The Romans similarly were isolationists until they expanded outside of Italy.<ref>"America: The New Roman Empire", pp. 146–47.</ref> The factor for the overseas engagement is the same in both cases: the seas or oceans [[defensive imperialism|ceased to offer protection]], or so it seemed:
{{blockquote|Rome and America both expanded in order to achieve security. Like concentric circles, each circle in need of security demanded the occupation of the next larger circle. The Romans made their way around the Mediterranean, driven from one challenger to their security to the next. The struggles&nbsp;... brought the Americans to Europe and East Asia; the Americans soon wound up all over the globe, driven from one attempt at containment to the next. The boundaries between security and power politics gradually blurred. The Romans and Americans both eventually found themselves in a geographical and political position that they had not originally desired, but which they then gladly accepted and firmly maintained.<ref>"America: The New Roman Empire", pp. 148, 151.</ref>}}
Both Rome and the United States claimed the unlimited right to render their enemies permanently harmless." Postwar treatments of Carthage, Macedon, Germany and Japan are similar. "When they later extended their power to overseas territories, they shied away from assuming direct control wherever possible." In the Hellenistic world, Rome withdrew its legions after three wars and instead settled for a role of all-powerful patron and arbitrator.<ref>"America: The New Roman Empire", p. 145.</ref> "World powers without rivals are a class unto themselves. They&nbsp;... are quick to call loyal followers friends, or amicus populi Romani. They no longer know any foes, just rebels, terrorists, and rogue states. They no longer fight, merely punish. They no longer wage wars but merely create peace. They are honestly outraged when vassals fail to act as vassals."<ref>"America: The New Roman Empire", p. 155.</ref> [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]] comments on the latter analogy: "One is tempted to add, they do not invade other countries, they only liberate."<ref>''The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership'' (New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 216.</ref>

Some scholars deemed [[Asiatic Vespers|Mithridates' massacre]] of Roman citizens in 88 BC Rome's "9/11 moment" and described the ways in which the vicissitudes of contemporary Pax Americana are reminiscent of Rome's reaction to Mithridates' revolt.<ref>[[Jonathan Freedland|Freedland, Jonathan]] (18 September 2002). "Rome, AD ... Rome, DC?" ''The Guardian'', https://mg.co.za/article/2002-11-15-rome-ad-rome-dc/</ref><ref>Merry, Robert W. (2005). ''Sands of Empire: Missionary Zeal, American Foreign Policy, and the Hazards of Global Ambition''. (New York: Simon & Schuster), pp. 217–31.</ref> Robert Fisk used the association to claim that Pax Romana was more cruel than Pax Americana: Following the massacre, the Romans "crucified their enemies to extinction. Human rights knew no dimensions in ancient Rome."<ref>Fisk, Robert (4 December 2006). "Echoes of the Roman Empire." ''ZNet Articles'', https://znetwork.org/znetarticle/echoes-of-the-roman-empire-by-robert-fisk/</ref> Alternatively, Max Ostrovsky defines such conclusions as pre-determined and unrelated to [[History|what really happened]]. No mass crucification occurred. Having defeated Mithridates in 84 BC, [[Lucius Cornelius Sulla]] concluded with him peace and recognized him as friend and ally of Rome. No modern ruler would survive having massacred 80,000 American citizens, neither in power nor physically.<ref>Ostrovsky, Max (2007). ''The Hyperbola of the World Order''. (Lanham: University Press of America), p. 223.</ref> On the occasion, the tolerance of Pax Romana appears exaggerated by both ancient and modern standards. Cicero (''[[De Imperio Cn. Pompei]]'') wondered how Mithridates was left upon throne and allowed to initiate two more [[Mithridatic Wars|anti-Roman wars]]. Only after the [[Third Mithridatic War]] in 64 BC [[Pompey]] finally put an end to his kingship and annexed the rogue Kingdom.

Besides the books of Vaclav Smil and Peter Bender, a book completely devoted to the comparison between Rome and the United States is ''The Empires of Trust'' by Roman Historian [[Thomas F. Madden]].<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built – and America Is Building – a New World''. (Dutton Adult).</ref> Madden outlines numerous parallels, many in agreement with Bender, such as beginning of both Empires as frontier societies and following isolationist policy, their later pattern of [[defensive imperialism]], and allying other states rather than conquering them. Besides causes and patterns, he devotes much attention to the analogous results of Pax Romana and Pax Americana. The elimination of external threat leads to decline in internal social harmony.

The Roman synchronous establishment of the empire and the fall of the republic is causally linked by almost all writers on the subject, ancient and modern, and the thesis is often applied to the United States. US increasing imperialism and expansionism, modern experts warn, would exert a similar impact. The warning was traditionally repeated by anti-imperialists and isolationists from Mark Twain to [[Robert A. Taft]] to [[Patrick Buchanan]] and grew louder with the increased intervention during the [[war on terror]] from such authors as [[Chalmers Johnson]], Robert Merry, and Michael Vlahos.<ref>Adler, Eric (2008). "Post-9/11 views of Rome and the nature of 'defensive imperialism.'" ''International Journal of the Classical Tradition'', vol 15 (4): p.  602.</ref> The distinction of Madden's research is the focus on Pax. The new and bitter civil strife that erupted in Rome and led to the fall of the Republic was a by-product of Pax which paradoxically bears fierce internal divisions. The Romans remained a closely knit group so long as they continued to have powerful outside enemies  –  so long as the collective focus of their lives was the defense and preservation of their society.<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built – and America Is Building – a New World''. (Dutton Adult), pp. 234, 237, 239.</ref>

The powerful outside enemies were eliminated by 146 BC. And in 133 BC, violence broke on the [[Capitoline Hill]] in Rome. For the first time, the people did not defer to the Senate. And perhaps not anymore. Law was dispensed with and blood began to flow. Romans were killing Romans.<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built – and America Is Building – a New World''. (Dutton Adult), pp. 230, 233–34, 238–39.</ref>

Both classics<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built – and America Is Building – a New World''. (Dutton Adult), pp. 239–45.</ref> and modern historians stressed the absent external threat as the factor of civil wars in the 1st century BC followed by the fall of the Republic. But Madden seems to be the first scholar to apply the thesis to the United States: "Do the same dangers await America?"<ref name="auto">Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built – and America Is Building – a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p. 250.</ref> Writing before the [[January 6 United States Capitol attack|2021 Capitol attack]], he reflects:
{{blockquote|
[[Capitoline Hill|Capitol Hill]] was the city's highest and most revered of the seven hills that made up Rome. Of course, [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] has a [[Capitol Hill]] too, named after the Roman one, and which has seen its own share of political fights. But not like this... No blood has yet flowed on America's Capitol Hill, but the Pax Americana is still young.<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built – and America Is Building – a New World''. (Dutton Adult), pp. 230, 234.</ref>}}
In 146 BC, thirteen years before the first outbreak of civil violence, Rome had eliminated two more external threats (from Carthage and Greece). The United States lost its last grave (Soviet) external threat in 1991. Supposing that we might be in the Roman sequence, where 146 BC corresponds to AD 1991, Madden asks whether the United States has reached the level of Pax that Rome had achieved by 146 BC.<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built – and America Is Building – a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p. 201.</ref> His estimation is either yes or very close,<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built – and America Is Building – a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p. 210.</ref> but either way external threats will remain too small to wield the pre-1991 national unity.<ref name="auto"/>

Thus, America is likely to repeat the Roman sequence and, though writing before 2020, he finds that indeed since 1991 the Americans, like the Romans since 146 BC, have been losing their internal harmony. Without external threats, he says, it is not surprising that we can detect the same turn inward in the United States as well. The dynamics that had bound Americans so closely together gave way to those that bound them together into smaller groups, such as red states and blue states.<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built – and America Is Building – a New World''. (Dutton Adult), pp. 238, 250.</ref>

Political rivalries under the Pax Romana became fierce  –  so fierce that they undermined the fabric of the Republic. The Roman experience suggests that a republic cannot survive such a turmoil. But it was neither the Empire that was at stake, nor the Pax Romana that it brought. Those would remain secure for centuries. It was, instead, the republican form of government that fell. Hence, in worst case, Pax Americana would continue under imperial government.<ref name="auto"/>

== See also ==
{{Div col|colwidth=20em}}
* ''[[American Tianxia]]''
* [[American Imperialism]]
* [[Anti-communism]]
* [[Bretton Woods system]]
* [[Bush Doctrine]]
* [[Cold War (1985–1991)]]
* [[Neoconservatism]]
* [[New world order (politics)|New world order]]
* [[Overseas interventions of the United States]]
* ''[[Pax Americana and the Weaponization of Space]]''
* ''[[Pax Russica]]''
* [[Platt Amendment]]
* [[Reagan Doctrine]]
* [[Timeline of United States military operations]]
* [[Truman Doctrine]]
* [[War on terror]]
{{colend}}

== References ==
{{Reflist}}
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== Further reading ==
<!-- Listed newest to oldest --><!-- But not currently. -->
{{refbegin}}
* {{cite book|last=Ankerl|first=Guy|title=Coexisting Contemporary Civilizations: Arabo-Muslim, Bharati, Chinese and Western|series=INU Societal Research|volume=1|year=2000|publisher=INU Press|location=Geneva|isbn=978-2-88155-004-1|pages=256–332|chapter=Global communication without universal civilization}}
* {{cite book|last=Brown|first=Michael E.|title=America's Strategic Choices|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rrwTxggJJT0C|year=2000|publisher=MIT Press|location=Cambridge, MA|isbn=9780262265249}}
* {{Cite journal | doi=10.1007/s12138-013-0320-0|title = Pax Romana/Pax Americana: Views of the "New Rome" from "Old Europe", 2000–2010|year = 2013|last1 = Burton|first1 = Paul J.|journal = International Journal of the Classical Tradition|volume = 20|issue = 1–2|pages = 15–40|s2cid = 162321437}}
* Clarke, Peter. ''The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Birth of the Pax Americana'' (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010)
* {{cite book|last=Gottlieb|first=Gidon|title=Nation against State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hBw49OofkEkC|year=1993|publisher=[[Council on Foreign Relations]] Press|location=New York|isbn=9780876091562}}
* {{cite book|last=Hull|first=William I.|title=The Monroe Doctrine: National or International|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=P8kMAAAAYAAJ|year=1915|publisher=G.P. Putnam|location=New York}}
* {{cite book|last=Kahrstedt|first=Ulrich|title=Pax Americana; ein historische Betrachtung am Wendepunkte der europäischen Geschichte|year=1920|publisher=Drei Masken Verlag|location=Munich|language=de|trans-title=Pax Americana, a historical look at the turning points in European history}}
* {{cite book|last=Kiernan|first=V.G.|title=America, the New Imperialism: From White Settlement to World Hegemony|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UjmO-h63uzQC|year=2005|publisher=Verso|location=London|isbn=9781844675227}}
* {{cite book|last=Kupchan|first=Charles|title=The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21st-century|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=krECAAAACAAJ|year=2002|publisher=A. Knopf|location=New York}}{{Dead link|date=February 2024 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}
* {{Cite journal | doi=10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00704.x|title = This Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana|year = 2012|last1 = Layne|first1 = Christopher|journal = International Studies Quarterly|volume = 56|issue = 1|pages = 203–13|jstor=41409832|doi-access = free}}
* {{cite book|last=LaFeber|first=Walter|title=The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PNOwdBf-dzcC|year=1998|publisher=Cornell University Press|location=Ithaca, NY|isbn=978-0801485954}}
* [[Jackson Lears|Lears, Jackson]], "The Forgotten Crime of War Itself" (review of [[Samuel Moyn]], ''Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War'', Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2021, 400 pp.), ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', vol. LXIX, no. 7 (April 21, 2022), pp.&nbsp;40–42. "After September 11 [2001] no politician asked whether the proper response to a [[terrorist attack]] should be a US war or an international police action. [...] Debating [[torture]] or other abuses, while indisputably valuable, has diverted Americans from 'deliberating on the deeper choice they were making to ignore constraints on starting war in the first place.' [W]ar itself causes far more suffering than violations of its rules." (p.&nbsp;40.)
* {{cite book|last=Louis|first=William Roger|title=Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization: Collected Essays|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=NQnpQNKeKKAC&pg=PA999|year=2006|publisher=I.B. Tauris|location=London|page=999+|chapter=The Pax Americana: Sir Keith Hancock, The British Empire, and American Expansion|isbn=9781845113476}}
* Mee, Charles L. ''The Marshall Plan: The launching of the pax americana'' (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984)
* {{Cite journal | doi=10.1111/j.1467-923X.2012.02294.x|title = From Pax Americana to Pax Mosaica? Bargaining over a New Economic Order|year = 2012|last1 = Narlikar|first1 = Amrita|last2 = Kumar|first2 = Rajiv|journal = The Political Quarterly|volume = 83|issue = 2|pages = 384–94}}
* {{cite book|last=Nye|first=Joseph S.|title=Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dMfArUL7hycC|year=1990|publisher=Basic Books|location=New York|isbn=9780465007448}}
* {{cite journal|last=Snow|first=Francis Haffkine|year=1921|title=American as a World Tyrant: A German Historian's Attempt to Prove That Europe is Becoming a Serf of the United States|journal=Current History|volume=13|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jbcqAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA497}}
{{refend}}

== External links ==
{{Wikiquote|American benevolence}}
* [https://www.salon.com/2009/09/29/obama_pax_americana/ The end of the Pax Americana?] by Michael Lind
* [https://benjaminschwarz.org/1996/06/01/why-america-thinks-it-has-to-run-the-world/ Why America Thinks it Has to Run the World] by Benjamin Schwarz
* [https://www.scribd.com/document/382613540/It-s-Over-Over-There-The-Coming-Crack-up-in-Transatlantic-Relations-Christopher-Layne It's Over, Over There: The Coming Crack-up in Transatlantic Relations] by Christopher Layne
* [https://www.scribd.com/document/132781206/War-in-the-Contest-for-a-New-World-Order-Peter-Gowan War in the Contest for a New World Order] by Peter Gowan
* [https://www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n14/thomas-meaney/so-it-must-be-for-ever So it must be for ever] by Thomas Meaney
* [https://www.academia.edu/38401632/Instrumental_Internationalism_The_American_Origins_of_the_United_Nations_1940_3 Instrumental Internationalism: The American Origins of the United Nations, 1940–3] by Stephen Wertheim
* [https://www.lrb.co.uk/v41/n09/tom-stevenson/what-are-we-there-for What are we there for?] by Tom Stevenson
* [https://archive.org/details/PeterGowanInterview2009 Peter Gowan interview on U.S. foreign policy since 1945], Interview with Against the Grain

{{Paxes}}
{{US history}}

[[Category:Aftermath_of_World_War_II]]
[[Category:American exceptionalism]]
[[Category:Eras of United States history]]
[[Category:History_of_the_foreign_relations_of_the_United_States]]
[[Category:International security]]
[[Category:Latin political words and phrases]]
[[Category:Pax|Americana]]
[[Category:Political terminology]]