View source for People's Liberation Army Air Force

{{Short description|Aerial service branch of the Chinese People's Liberation Army}}
{{redirect|Chinese Air Force|the air force of the Republic of China|Republic of China Air Force|other air forces associated with that name|Chinese Air Force (disambiguation)}}
{{use dmy dates|date=December 2022}}
{{Use American English|date=December 2022}}
{{Infobox military unit|
| unit_name = People's Liberation Army Air Force
| native_name = <!--  native_name parameter is intentionally left blank since we already used chinese name infobox  -->
| image = Emblem of People's Liberation Army Air Force.svg
| image_size = 250px
| caption = Emblem of the People's Liberation Army Air Force
| start_date = {{start date and age|1949|11|11|df=yes}}<ref>{{cite web |url = http://kj.81.cn/content/2015-01/23/content_6319407.htm |title = 空军司令部的组建 |quote = 中国空军网_蓝天回眸_空军简史 |date = January 23, 2015 |access-date = September 16, 2018 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160711172529/http://kj.81.cn/content/2015-01/23/content_6319407.htm |archive-date = July 11, 2016 |url-status = dead |df = mdy-all }}</ref>
| country = {{PRC}}
| allegiance = {{CCP flag}}
| branch = 
| type = [[Air force]]
| role = {{ubl|[[Aerial warfare]]|[[Airborne forces]]|[[Air defense]]}}
| size = 403,000 active personnel {{small|(2025)}}{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|pp=245-246}}
| command_structure = {{armed forces|China}}
| garrison = [[Beijing]]
| garrison_label = Headquarters
| nickname = 
| patron = 
| motto = {{lang|zh-Hans|为人民服务}}<br />{{small|("[[Serve the People]]")}}
| colours = {{color box|{{party color|Communist Party of China}}}}{{color box|#007FFF}} Red and Blue
| colours_label = Colors
| march = March of the Chinese Air Force
| mascot = 
| anniversaries = 11 November annually
| equipment = 
| equipment_label = 
| battles = {{blist|[[Chinese Civil War]]|[[Korean War]]|[[Vietnam War]]|[[Sino-Vietnamese War]]}}
| decorations = 
| battle_honours = 
| battle_honours_label = 
| flying_hours = 
| commander1 = [[Jiang (rank)|Air Force General]] [[Chang Dingqiu]]
| commander1_label = [[Commander of the People's Liberation Army Air Force|Commander]]
| commander2 = [[Jiang (rank)|Air Force General]] [[Guo Puxiao]]
| commander2_label = [[Political Commissar]]
| commander3 = [[Jiang (rank)|Air Force General]] [[Wang Gang (general)|Wang Gang]]
| commander3_label = [[Chief of Staff]]
| notable_commanders = <!-- Insignia -->
| identification_symbol = [[File:Roundel of China.svg|125px]] [[File:Roundel of China – Low Visibility – Type 2.svg|125px]]
| identification_symbol_label = [[Military aircraft insignia|Roundel]]
| identification_symbol_2 = [[File:Air Force Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|125px]]
| identification_symbol_2_label = Flag
| identification_symbol_3 = [[File:People's Liberation Army Air Force sleeve badge.svg|100px]]
| identification_symbol_3_label = Sleeve badge
<!-- Aircraft -->| aircraft_attack = 
| aircraft_bomber = [[Xian JH-7|JH-7]], [[Xian H-6|H-6]]
| aircraft_electronic = [[Tu-154]], [[Shaanxi Y-8]], [[Shaanxi Y-9]], [[J-16D]]
| aircraft_fighter = [[Shenyang J-8]], [[Chengdu J-10]], [[Shenyang J-11]], [[Shenyang J-16]], [[Chengdu J-20]], [[Shenyang J-35|Shenyang J-35A]], [[Su-27]], [[Su-30MKK]], [[Su-35S]]
| aircraft_helicopter = [[Harbin Z-8]], [[Harbin Z-9]]
| aircraft_helicopter_attack = [[Harbin Z-19]], [[CAIC Z-10]]
| aircraft_helicopter_cargo = 
| aircraft_helicopter_multirole = 
| aircraft_helicopter_observation = 
| aircraft_helicopter_trainer = 
| aircraft_helicopter_utility = [[Harbin Z-20]]
| aircraft_interceptor = [[Shenyang J-8]]
| aircraft_patrol = 
| aircraft_recon = 
| aircraft_trainer = [[Hongdu L-15]], [[Hongdu JL-8]], [[JL-9]]
| aircraft_transport = [[Xian Y-20]], [[Shaanxi Y-9]], [[Shaanxi Y-8]], [[Xian Y-7]], [[Il-76]]
| aircraft_tanker = [[Xian H-6|H-6U]], [[Il-78]]
| aircraft_general = 
| module = {{infobox Chinese
|s = 中国人民解放军空军
|t = 中國人民解放軍空軍
|p = Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn Kōngjūn
|l = China People Liberation Army Air Army
|order = st
|child = yes}}
}}
{{PRC military sidebar}}

The '''People's Liberation Army Air Force''',{{NoteTag|'''PLAAF'''; {{lang-zh |s = 中国人民解放军空军 |p = Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn Kōngjūn}}}} also referred to as the '''Chinese Air Force''' ({{Lang-zh|s=中国空军|labels=no}}) or the '''People's Air Force''' ({{Lang-zh|s=人民空军|labels=no}}), is the primary aerial warfare service of the [[People's Liberation Army]]. The PLAAF controls most of the PLA's air assets, including tactical aircraft, large airlifters, and strategic bombers.{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|pp=245-246}} It includes ground-based air defense assets, including national early-warning radars,{{sfn|Allen|2023|pp=26-28}} and controls the [[People's Liberation Army Air Force Airborne Corps|Airborne Corps]].{{sfn|Allen|2023|pp=24-26}}

The PLAAF traces its origins to the establishment of a small aviation unit by the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) in 1924, during the early years of the Republic of China. This initial group comprised nine cadets who trained under the Guangzhou Revolutionary Government Aviation Bureau, with further advanced training in the [[Soviet Union]]. Despite initial resource constraints, including a lack of aircraft and airfields, the CCP's [[Central Military Commission (China)|Central Military Commission]] (CMC) established foundational aviation schools and, by the end of World War II, had begun significant organizational developments.

The formal establishment of the PLAAF occurred on November 11, 1949,<ref>{{Cite web |date=2011-11-11 |title=11月11日：中国人民解放军空军领导机构成立 |url=https://www.gov.cn/lssdjt/content_1990318.htm |website=Central Government of the PRC}}</ref> following the CCP's victory in the [[Chinese Civil War]]. Early on, the PLAAF operated a mix of captured Kuomintang (KMT) and Soviet aircraft and began organizing its structure around several aviation divisions. The PLAAF first faced combat in the [[Korean War]] against the United States using primarily the [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15]] fighter aircraft provided by the Soviet Union, which also assisted with the expansion of the Chinese aerospace industry. Post-Korean War, the PLAAF focused on enhancing air defense capabilities, a strategy influenced by political decisions to limit offensive operations. The 1960s brought considerable challenges due to the [[Sino-Soviet split]], which strained resources and technical support. This period also saw the detrimental impacts of the Cultural Revolution on the PLAAF's development and readiness. In the following decades, especially the 1980s, the PLAAF underwent significant reforms which included force reduction and reorganization aimed at modernizing its capabilities in line with advancing air power technology. These efforts were somewhat hampered by the aftermath of the [[1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre]], which resulted in Western sanctions but eventually led to increased military collaboration with Russia in the 1990s.

Entering the 21st century, the PLAAF made substantial progress in transitioning to more modern airpower with the acquisition and development of advanced aircraft like the Sukhoi Su-27 and domestic models such as the [[Chengdu J-10|J-10]] and [[Chengdu J-20|J-20]]. The strategic orientation of the PLAAF continued to evolve with a focus on expanding its operational capabilities, including the development of long-range bombers and enhancing joint operational capacity with other branches of the Chinese military.

== History ==
{{Further|History of the People's Liberation Army|Republic of China Air Force}}

=== Origins ===
Today's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) traces its roots back to September 1924 when a small group of nine cadets from the still-young [[Chinese Communist Party]] graduated from [[Sun Yat-sen]]'s military flight school in [[Guangzhou]]. Having only been founded three years prior in July 1921, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) formed a [[united front]] with the nationalist [[Kuomintang]] (KMT) party against competing [[Warlord Era|warlords]] in a bid to reunite a fractionalized China. The eighteen graduate pilots of the military flight school, under Sun's Guangzhou Revolutionary Government Aviation Bureau, included nine [[Nationalist government|nationalist]] and nine [[Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party|communist]] pilots who were sent to the [[Soviet Union]] for two years of advanced flight training under the tutelage of the more experienced [[Soviet Air Forces|Soviet Air Force]]. Two of the CCP's graduates, Chang Qiankun and Wang Bi, continued to serve in the Soviet Air Force for fourteen years until, in September 1938, they returned to [[Ürümqi|Dihua]] (now [[Ürümqi]]) as instructors. Chang and Wang would play instrumental roles in the founding of the PLAAF.<ref name=":0" />

In January 1941, as intensifying clashes between CCP and KMT forces ended the united front against [[Second Sino-Japanese War|invading Japanese forces]], and despite having neither aircraft nor airfields, the CCP's [[Central Military Commission (China)|Central Military Commission]] (CMC) established the Air Force Engineering School with Wang as commandant and Chang as head instructor. In May 1944, just over a year before the Japanese surrender to [[Allies of World War II|Allied forces]], the CMC established an Aviation Section in [[Yan'an]] with Wang as its director and Chang as deputy director. Two years later in May 1946 and after the withdrawal of Japanese troops, the CMC established the Northeast Old Aviation School in Jilin. By 1949 the Aviation Section of the CMC had 560 trained personnel (125 pilots and 435 ground support specialists), purchased 435 aircraft from the Soviet Union, acquired 115 Nationalist aircraft, and operated seven military flight schools.<ref name=":0" />

=== Founding ===
The first organized air unit of the People's Liberation Army was formed in July 1949 at [[Beijing Nanyuan Airport]] (an airfield built and first operated under the [[Qing dynasty|Qing Dynasty]]). The unit operated American [[North American P-51 Mustang|P-51 Mustangs]], [[Fairchild PT-19|PT-19s]], and British [[De Havilland Mosquito|DH.98 Mosquitos]].<ref name=":1">Ken Allen, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF182/CF182.ch9.pdf Chapter 9, "PLA Air Force Organization"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070929102648/http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF182/CF182.ch9.pdf|date=2007-09-29}}, The PLA as Organization, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 349.</ref> The squadron had acquired these Western-made aircraft by capturing planes that had been once donated to the KMT for use against the Japanese.<ref>{{cite web |last=Guo |first=Leo |date=1 August 2018 |title=North American P-51 Mustang in Communist Chinese Service |url=https://plane-encyclopedia.com/cold-war/north-american-p-51-mustang-in-communist-chinese-service/#:~:text=A%20total%20of%2039%20North,51D%20and%20P%2D51K%20models. |website=Plane Encyclopedia |access-date=25 December 2022 |archive-date=25 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221225044849/https://plane-encyclopedia.com/cold-war/north-american-p-51-mustang-in-communist-chinese-service/#:~:text=A%20total%20of%2039%20North,51D%20and%20P%2D51K%20models. |url-status=live }}</ref>

In March 1949, the CMC elevated its Aviation Section to the short-lived Aviation Bureau with Chang Qiankun and Wang Bi appointed as the bureau's director and political commissar, respectively. On 1 October 1949, the victorious communist forces established the People's Republic of China and, on 11 November 1949, the CMC dissolved its Aviation Section, instead founding the People's Liberation Army Air Force. Initially manned by a variety of units taken from the ground forces, the new PLAAF organized its headquarters (PLAAF HQ) in Beijing and organized administrative aviation divisions for each of the PLA's six military regions, later to be named Military Region Air Forces (MRAFs). The new organization, which was not yet seen as a service separate from the army, was headed by ground force commander [[Liu Yalou]] with [[Xiao Hua (general)|Xiao Hua]] (formerly a ground force commander and political commissar) as the PLAAF's first political commissar.<ref name=":0">{{cite web |last=Allen |first=Kenneth W. |date=12 April 2021 |title=70 Years of the PLA Air Force |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLAAF/2021-04-12%20CASI_70%20Years%20of%20the%20PLAAF_FINAL%20ALL.pdf?ver=hTom1CXAjt0VTGTJzJBGAQ%3D%3D |website=[[China Aerospace Studies Institute]] |access-date=23 December 2022 |archive-date=17 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230117222131/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLAAF/2021-04-12%20CASI_70%20Years%20of%20the%20PLAAF_FINAL%20ALL.pdf?ver=hTom1CXAjt0VTGTJzJBGAQ%3d%3d |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":1" /> Chang Qiankun was appointed as a PLAAF deputy commander and as director of the PLAAF's Training Department while Wang Bi was named deputy political commissar and director of the Aeronautical Engineering Department.<ref name=":0" />

In June 1950, the first full PLAAF aviation unit, the 4th Composite Air Brigade ({{Lang-zh|s=混成旅|labels=no}}) was established in Nanjing based on the 30th Army's 90th Division and commanding the 10th, 11th and 12th Air Regiments. In the same year, the PLAAF created the 2nd and 3rd Composite Air Brigades. Although the 4th Composite Air Brigade would be renamed in 1950 to the PLAAF 4th Air Division, it would become the 1st Air Division in 1956 with the 2nd and 3rd Composite Air Brigades becoming the 2nd and 3rd Air Divisions, respectively.<ref name=":0" />

In 1950, the PLAAF had fewer than 100 fighters.<ref name=":022">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Xiaobing |title=The Cold War in East Asia |date=2018 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-1-138-65179-1 |location=Abingdon, Oxon}}</ref>{{Rp|page=66}}

=== Korean War to the Sino-Soviet Split ===
[[File:1952-04 1952年 中国女飞行员.png|thumb|left|PLAAF female pilots in 1952]]
[[File:1967-10 1967年解放军空军.jpg|thumb|left|PLAAF fighter pilots in 1967]]
The PLAAF expanded rapidly during the [[Korean War]]. Two brigades were created in 1950, but they were disbanded in the early 1950s and replaced by [[division (military)|divisions]]; both unit types had subordinate regiments.<ref name="Trevethan_2019_8">Trevethan (2019): pg. 8</ref> During the war, 26 divisions and a smaller number of independent regiments and schools were created by personnel transfers from the army; the air force inherited the army's organization and was commanded by army officers.<ref name="Xiang_2012_73">Xiang (2012): pg. 73</ref> By early 1954, there were 28 divisions, with 70 regiments, and five independent regiments operating 3,000 aircraft.<ref name="Trevethan_2019_8" /> The Soviets provided [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15]] aircraft (named J-2 in Chinese service), training, and support for developing the domestic aviation industry. [[Shenyang Aircraft Corporation]] built the two-seat MiG-15UTI trainer as the [[JJ-2]],{{citation needed|date=February 2023}} and during the war manufactured various components to maintain the Soviet-built fighters.

In 1955, the PLAAF had grown to be the world's third largest air force.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=66}} By 1956 the People's Republic was assembling licensed copies<ref name="rand_kenneth" /> of MiG-15s and eight years later it was producing both the [[Shenyang J-5]] (MiG-17) and the [[Shenyang J-6]] (MiG-19) under license.<ref name="PLAAFCS584">{{cite journal |publisher=[[Library of Congress]] |journal=Country Studies |url=https://cdn.loc.gov/master/frd/frdcstdy/ch/chinacountrystud00word/chinacountrystud00word_djvu.txt |title=A Country Study: China |page=584 |access-date=2017-08-05 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170216100624/https://cdn.loc.gov/master/frd/frdcstdy/ch/chinacountrystud00word/chinacountrystud00word_djvu.txt |archive-date=2017-02-16 |url-status=live }}</ref>

The PLAAF emerged from the war as an air defense force. Its main role was to support the army by achieving air superiority using fighters, radar, and ground-based weapons.<ref name="Xiang_2012_73-74">Xiang (2012): pg. 73-74</ref> This was reinforced through the 1950s and 1960s when the PLAAF's main activities were skirmishing with the [[Republic of China Air Force]] near the [[Taiwan Strait]], and intercepting American aircraft. The PLAAF was passive in applying offensive airpower due to the limited range of capabilities and political considerations.<ref name="Xiang_2012_74">Xiang (2012): pg. 74</ref> PLAAF was used as a deterrent due to the political culture at the time. The Chinese leadership, in many instances, would cancel offensive bombing missions to prevent escalation, affecting the decision-making autonomy of the PLAAF.<ref name="Xiang_2012_76-77">Xiang (2012): pg. 76-77</ref>

In 1960, Soviet engineers and advisors left China due to the [[Sino-Soviet split]]; although the Soviet Union granted licensed rights to MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19, MiG-21, Il-28, and Tu-16, China didn't retain either the technical materials or the machinery as the Soviet advisors withdrew. China had to reverse-engineer aircraft and missile systems to set up production lines.<ref name="rand_kenneth" /> Internal political and economic chaos from the [[Great Leap Forward]] and the [[Cultural Revolution]] severely impacted the modernization and development of the PLAAF.<ref name="casi_lumbering_23">''Lumbering Forward'': pg. 23</ref>

The prioritization of the [[People's Republic of China and weapons of mass destruction|missile and nuclear weapon programs]] also removed necessary resources from the aviation industry, which markedly declined through 1963.<ref name=PLAAFCS584 /> PLAAF as a whole stagnated, in metrics such as flight safety, pilot education, training, and strategic planning. However, flight hours recovered around 1965 as China started to support [[North Vietnam]] and became involved in the [[Vietnam War]]. Due to difficult conditions, the accident rates raised from 0.249 to 0.6 per 10,000 sorties in 1965.<ref name="rand_kenneth">{{cite web |url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR580.html |last1=Allen |first1=Kenneth W. |first2=Glenn |last2=Krumel |first3=Jonathan |last3=D. Pollack |title=China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century |publisher=RAND Corporation |date=1995 |access-date=8 March 2023 |archive-date=8 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230308200109/https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR580.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

Between January 1954 and 1971, 22 new divisions were created for a total of 50.<ref name="Trevethan_2019_8"/>

===1970s to 1980s===
In the 1970s, the [[Cultural Revolution]] (1966–1976) continued to damage the PLAAF readiness, leading to a devastating impact on pilot training, maintenance operations, and logistics. All PLAAF technical and maintenance schools were closed for a prolonged time, halting nearly every activity besides pilot flights. Moreover, the Chinese aviation industrial base was vandalized heavily due to the political turmoil, with many aircraft development programs stretched out, and the quality control in factories could not be sustained due to disruptions caused by [[Red Guards]]. The political fallout from the Cultural Revolution could still be felt by the leadership, and recovery only began in the 1980s.<ref name="rand_1995" />

PLAAF leadership recognized the importance of modern airpower and the existing weakness of the force in the late 1980s.<ref name="diplomat_2105" /> After critical assessments, the 1985 reform led to force reduction, reorganization, and streamlining. Before the 1985 reorganization, the Air Force reportedly had four branches: [[air defense]], [[Ground-attack aircraft|ground attack]], [[bomb]]ing, and independent air regiments.<ref name=PLAAFCS>{{cite journal |publisher=[[Library of Congress]] |journal=Country Studies |url=https://cdn.loc.gov/master/frd/frdcstdy/ch/chinacountrystud00word/chinacountrystud00word_djvu.txt |title=A Country Study: China |page=583 |access-date=2017-08-05 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170216100624/https://cdn.loc.gov/master/frd/frdcstdy/ch/chinacountrystud00word/chinacountrystud00word_djvu.txt |archive-date=2017-02-16 |url-status=live }}</ref> In peacetime the Air Force Directorate, under the supervision of the [[People's Liberation Army General Staff Department|PLA General Staff Department]], controlled the Air Force through headquarters located with, or in communication with, each of the seven [[PLA Military Region|military region]] headquarters. In war, control of the Air Force probably reverted to the regional commanders. In 1987 it was not clear how the reorganization and the incorporation of air support elements into the group armies affected air force organization. The largest Air Force organizational unit was the [[division (military)|division]], which consisted of 17,000 personnel in three [[regiment]]s. A typical air defense regiment had three [[Squadron (aviation)|squadrons]] of three flights; each flight had three or four aircraft. The Air Force also had 220,000 air defense personnel who controlled about 100 [[surface-to-air missile]] sites and over 16,000 [[Anti-aircraft warfare|AA]] guns. In addition, it had a large number of [[Early-warning radar|early-warning]], [[Ground-controlled interception|ground-control-intercept]], and air-base radars operated by specialized troops organized into at least twenty-two independent regiments.{{citation needed|date=February 2021}}

In the 1980s, the Air Force made serious efforts to raise the educational level and improve the training of its pilots.<ref name=PLAAFCS /> [[Superannuate]]d pilots were retired or assigned to other duties. All new pilots were to be at least [[middle-school]] graduates. The time it took to train a qualified pilot capable of performing combat missions reportedly was reduced from four or five years to two years. The training emphasized raising technical and tactical skills in individual pilots and participation in [[combined-arms]] operations. [[Flight safety]] also increased.{{citation needed|date=February 2021}}

From 1986 to 1988, each military region converted a division into a [[division grade]] transition training base (改装训练基地),<ref name="Allen_2012_104">Allen (2012): pg 104</ref> which replaced training regiments in operational divisions.<ref name="Trevethan_2019_16">Trevethan (2019): pg. 16</ref>

In 1987 the Air Force had serious technological deficiencies — especially when compared with its principal threat, the [[Soviet Armed Forces]] — and had many needs that it could not satisfy.<ref>China: A Country Study, 585</ref> It needed more advanced aircraft, better [[avionics]], [[electronic countermeasures]] equipment, more powerful [[aircraft weaponry]], a low-altitude [[surface-to-air missile]], and better controlled [[antiaircraft artillery]] guns. Some progress was made in aircraft design with the incorporation of Western avionics into the [[Chengdu J-7]] and [[Shenyang J-8]], the development of refueling capabilities for the [[Xi'an H-6#Variants|H-6D]] bomber and the [[Nanchang Q-5]] attack fighter, increased aircraft all-weather capabilities, and started production of the [[HQ-2J]] high-altitude surface-to-air missile and the [[C-601]] air-to-ship missile.{{citation needed|date=February 2021}}

Although the PLAAF received significant support from Western nations in the 1980s when China was seen as a counterweight to Soviet power, this support ended in 1989 as a result of the Chinese crackdown on the [[Tiananmen protests of 1989]] and the later collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. After the fall of the [[USSR]], the [[Russian Federation]] became China's principal arms supplier, to the extent that Chinese economic growth allowed Russia to sustain its aerospace industry.{{citation needed|date=February 2021}}

===1990s to 2000s===
[[File:Chinese military honor guard.jpg|thumb|PLAAF airmen on parade during a full honors arrival ceremony in 2000]]
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, PLAAF still remained a large yet antiqued force. As of 1995, the air force consisted of approximately 4,500 combat aircraft based on 50s and 60s technologies, which were approaching the end of their service life. The overall force strategy is defensive, with the primary objectives limited to protecting cities, airbases, economic and industrial centers, and important institutions and facilities. The air fleet continued to shrink, with [[RAND Corporation]] predicting PLAAF would be halved by the early 2000s.<ref name="rand_1995">{{cite journal |url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB32.html |title=China's Air Force: The Long March to Modernization |journal=RAND Corporation |first1=Allen |last1=Kenneth W. |first2=Jonathan |last2=D. Pollack |first3=Glenn |last3=Krumel |date=January 1995 |access-date=5 March 2023 |archive-date=5 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230305164314/https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB32.html |url-status=live }}</ref> PLAAF leadership also lacked strategic options, given the severe constraints in China's budgets, manpower, and technology at the time. The force lacked joint operation capabilities, had no combat experience since 1979, and lacked command and control infrastructure to support offensive operations beyond the Chinese borders. The Chinese aviation industrial base was inadequate and weak, and China lacked the capacity to produce modern avionics, composites, turbofan engines, and integrated systems.<ref name="rand_1995" />

Despite the difficulties, PLAAF was determined to introduce modern air power and secure technological self-sufficiency.<ref name="rand_1995" /> The air force inducted the [[Sukhoi Su-27]], the most sophisticated fighter Soviets had at the time. The sales were approved in December 1990, with three fighters delivered to China before the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Contracts with the Soviet Union and later Russia also included manufacture license for China to build the Su-27 domestically, which helped the Chinese aviation industry to accumulate know-how and experience. Other technology transfer and license agreements were also signed between China and countries such as Russia, France,<ref name="sipri_chinasale">{{cite web|url=https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/PP/SIPRIPP43.pdf |title=Western Arms Exports to China |publisher=SIPRI |first=Oliver |last=Bräuner |date=2015}}</ref> Israel,<ref>{{cite journal|title=Between Beijing and Washington: Israel's Technology Transfers to China |last=Evron |first=Yoram |journal=Journal of East Asian Studies |volume=13 |issue=3 |date=2013 |pages=503–28 |doi=10.1017/S1598240800008328 |jstor=26335261 |s2cid=155997202 |doi-access=free}}</ref> which allowed Chinese access to many state-of-the-art technologies.<ref name="rand_1995" /> China and Western countries also made several attempted to modernize the aging Chinese fleet in the form of [[Shenyang J-8#Peace Pearl|Peace Pearl program]] and Chengdu Super 7. However, the political fallout from the [[1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre]] terminated some of these efforts.<ref name="fc1">{{cite web |title=CAC FC-1 Xiaolong |work=[[Jane's All the World's Aircraft]] |publisher=[[Jane's Information Group]] |date=10 March 2009 |url=http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-All-the-Worlds-Aircraft/CAC-FC-1-Xiaolong-China.html}}</ref><ref name="plaaf_1990s" /><ref name="sipri_chinasale" />

In the early 1990s, PLAAF continued to invest in domestic aircraft programs, including the [[Chengdu J-10|J-10]],<ref name="rand_1995" /> the [[Project Sabre II]], and the Sino-Pakistani [[CAC/PAC JF-17 Thunder|FC-1]].<ref name="fc1" /><ref name="plaaf_1990s">{{cite book |last1=Wood |first1=Peter |last2=Stewart |first2=Robert |date=26 September 2019 |title=China's Aviation Industry: Lumbering Forward |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/Books/Lumbering_Forward_Aviation_Industry_Web_2019-08-02.pdf?ver=2019-08-05-102041-830 |publisher=[[United States Air Force]] [[Air University (United States Air Force)|Air University]] China Aerospace Studies Institute |isbn=978-1-0827-4040-4 |access-date=8 February 2021 |archive-date=28 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210628053922/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/Books/Lumbering_Forward_Aviation_Industry_Web_2019-08-02.pdf?ver=2019-08-05-102041-830 |url-status=dead }}</ref> However, the concerns over the US possible intervention during a [[Taiwan independence]] scenario in 1992 to 1993 pressurized PLAAF to build near-term combat capability by prioritizing [[procurement]] of foreign platforms, which led to the further induction of platforms such as the [[Sukhoi Su-30]] and the [[S-300 missile system|S-300 PMU-1]].<ref name="Saunders_07">{{cite journal |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep11975.11.pdf |title=The Future Force Structure of the Chinese Air Force |journal=Asia Policy |volume=4 |date=2007 |last1=Saunders |first1=Phillip C. |first2=Erik |last2=Quam |pages=377–436 |doi=10.1353/asp.2007.0027 |jstor=resrep11975.11 |s2cid=110741734 |access-date=6 March 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306045438/https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep11975.11.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

At the same time, PLAAF leadership advocated for more active roles in the Chinese military, but was sidelined by the PLA headquarters due to concerns over political reliability and a general lack of capabilities. PLAAF continued persuasive efforts, and their plans were eventually endorsed by the PLA leadership in the late 1990s and early 2000s.<ref name="diplomat_2105" /> In 1999, PLAAF set up a combined arms training base to conduct multi-force joint operations. In 2003, PLAAF began structural reforms and reduced the number of personnel by 200,000 (85% of whom were officials), freeing up resources for the force overhaul. The leadership was consolidated to become more operationally efficient. Three dedicated training bases were established to provide research, testing, training, and combat support.{{sfn|Trevethan|2019|p=9}} In 2004, PLAAF released the force reform concept named "Strategic Air Force", aiming to reconstruct the PLAAF into an integrated fighting force capable of both offensive and defensive operations in air and space.<ref name="diplomat_2105">{{cite web |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/assessing-70-years-of-chinas-pla-air-force/ |title=Assessing 70 Years of China's PLA Air Force |website=The Diplomat |date=25 May 2021 |first=Cristina |last=Garafola |access-date=6 March 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306045440/https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/assessing-70-years-of-chinas-pla-air-force/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The 2004 reform included changes in doctrine, equipment, training, education, organizational structure, and strategic thinking.<ref name="diplomat_2105" />

By 2005, PLAAF was in the process of modernizing force composition by retiring obsolete aircraft. The antiquated [[Shenyang J-6]] fighters were completely phased out of the service, and the more competent but still obsolescent [[Chengdu J-7]] and [[Shenyang J-8]] platforms were partially retired with the remaining fleet upgraded with improved technologies. The number of second and third-generation aircraft was reduced to about 1,000 planes.<ref name="Saunders_07" /> Fighters of foreign and domestic origin with modern avionics and missiles began to enter the service more rapidly. From 2000 to 2004, PLAAF incorporated 95 home-built [[Shenyang J-11|Shenyang J-11A]] (licensed versions of the [[Sukhoi Su-27|Su-27]]),<ref name="Saunders_11">{{cite journal |last1=Saunders |first1=Phillip C. |last2=Wiseman |first2=Joshua K. |date=December 2011 |title=Buy, Build, or Steal: China's Quest for Advanced Military Aviation Technologies |url=http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-4.pdf |journal=Chinese Strategic Perspectives |publisher=Institute for National Strategic Studies, [[National Defense University (Washington, D.C.)|National Defense University]] |issue=4 |access-date=6 March 2023 |archive-date=12 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210512005839/https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-4.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> acquired 76 [[Sukhoi Su-30MKK]] and 24 [[Sukhoi Su-30MKK|Su-30MK2]] from Russia with improved composite material, weapons, and avionics akin to the [[Sukhoi Su-35]],<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.airforceworld.com/pla/english/Su-30-fighter-china.html |title=Su-30MKK fighter jet in Chinese PLAAF |date=5 June 2013 |work=AirForceWorld.com |access-date=6 June 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130501093616/http://www.airforceworld.com/pla/english/Su-30-fighter-china.html |archive-date=1 May 2013 |url-status=dead }}</ref> and negotiated the purchase of 38 [[Ilyushin Il-76]] and [[Ilyushin Il-78]] transport/tanker aircraft.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.flightglobal.com/il-76-transports-and-il-78-tankers-top-15bn-russia-china-arms-deal/62674.article |title=Il-76 transports and Il-78 tankers top $1.5bn Russia-China arms deal |work=FlightGlobal |date=13 September 2005}}</ref> To replace the antiquated [[Nanchang Q-5]] attack plane, PLAAF introduced fighter-bomber [[Xi'an JH-7|Xi'an JH-7A]] with precision-strike capabilities.<ref name="Saunders_07" /> The homegrown [[Chengdu J-10]] platform also matured into a highly capable, multirole fighter as PLAAF continued to accumulate experience in operating modern aircraft since the 1990s.<ref name="Saunders_07" /> By the mid-2000s, PLAAF had grown familiar with precision-guided munitions, aerial refueling, AEW&C aircraft, and networked command&control systems.<ref name="Saunders_07" />

Several uncertainties troubled the PLAAF leadership, including China's inability to produce advanced jet engines, the lack of bombers to conduct long-range strike missions, and the dilemma between procuring foreign designs or supporting the homegrown defense industry that could only produce less capable ones.<ref name="Saunders_07" /> Thus, generous resources were devoted to research and development, with every possible approach, including purchase, license, technology transfer, [[reverse-engineering]], and [[espionage|intelligence gathering]] to absorb foreign technology and build up the domestic defense industry.<ref name="Saunders_07" /><ref name="Saunders_11" /> New home-built airframes emerged in the late 2000s, the including [[CAIC Z-10]] attack helicopter and [[KJ-2000]] airborne early warning & control aircraft in 2003,<ref>{{cite web |url=https://airrecognition.com/index.php/world-air-force-military-equipment-aircraft-/asia-air-force-countries-aircraft-military-equipment/china-chinese-pla-plaaf-air-force/china-chinese-air-force-helicopters-data-sheet-specifications-pictures-video/560-z-10-wz-10-attack-fighting-helicopter-technical-data-sheet-specifications-intelligence-description-information-identification-pictures-photos-images-video-caic-china-chinese-pla-air-force-defence-industry-technology-.html |title=Z-10 |website=Army Recognition |access-date=6 March 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306055904/https://airrecognition.com/index.php/world-air-force-military-equipment-aircraft-/asia-air-force-countries-aircraft-military-equipment/china-chinese-pla-plaaf-air-force/china-chinese-air-force-helicopters-data-sheet-specifications-pictures-video/560-z-10-wz-10-attack-fighting-helicopter-technical-data-sheet-specifications-intelligence-description-information-identification-pictures-photos-images-video-caic-china-chinese-pla-air-force-defence-industry-technology-.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |url=https://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-AWACS-Programs.html#mozTocId452088 |title=PLA-AF Airborne Early Warning & Control Programs |website=Air Power Australia |date=June 2011 |first=Carlo |last=Kopp |pages=1 |access-date=6 March 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306063021/https://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-AWACS-Programs.html#mozTocId452088 |url-status=live }}</ref> the [[Shenyang J-11|Shenyang J-11B]] air superiority fighter in 2006, [[Shaanxi Y-9]] medium airlifter<ref name= "fisher_modern_2008">{{cite book |last= Fisher |first=Richard D. Jr. |date= 2008 |title=China's Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach |publisher= Greenwood |pages=180–81 |isbn= 978-0-275-99486-0}}</ref> and [[Shenyang J-15]] carrier-born fighter in 2009, and most notably, the [[Chengdu J-20]] [[Fifth-generation fighter|fifth-generation]] stealth fighter in 2010.<ref name="Saunders_11" /> Other crucial aviation technologies that support the airframes, such as [[turbofan engines]], advanced aerospace materials, [[full authority digital engine control]] (FADEC), integrated avionics, missile technologies, and [[active electronically scanned array]] (AESA) radar, saw substantial progress in this decade.<ref>{{cite report |url=https://isic-japan.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Chinas-Development-of-Advanced-Fighter-Technology-5-21-2021-Final10492.pdf |title=China's Development of Advanced Fighter Technology |publisher=International Security Industry Council Japan |first=Roger |last=Cliff |date=21 May 2021 |access-date=6 March 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306063025/https://isic-japan.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Chinas-Development-of-Advanced-Fighter-Technology-5-21-2021-Final10492.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

===2010s===
[[File:PeacefulMission2018-20.jpg|thumb|PLAAF pilots standing in front of their [[Xi'an JH-7|Xian JH-7As]] in 2018]]
In the 2010s, PLAAF began to transform expeditiously and emerged as one of the most significant global competitors in airpower. According to the US Air Force's National Air and Space Intelligence Center, PLAAF was projected to become one of the most capable air forces by 2020. PLAAF improved capabilities in several areas, including fighters, advanced missiles, early warning systems, and air defense systems; the force also started major reforms in training and doctrines.<ref name="afmag_1310">{{cite web |title=Meet the New PLAAF |url=https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0113plaaf/ |date=1 January 2013 |access-date=2022-10-17 |website=Air & Space Forces Magazine |first=Rebecca |last=Grant |language=en-US |archive-date=21 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221021003546/https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0113plaaf/ |url-status=live }}</ref> PLAAF leadership realized the current force was insufficient to counter US intervention in a Taiwan strait confrontation, thus invested heavily in a wider range of conventional capabilities to transition the PLAAF from a large, technologically inferior force to a force able to hold advantageous positions in both quality and quantity in its own geopolitical theater.<ref name="afmag_1310" />

In 2013, it was estimated that China had 400 modern fighters in the [[Fourth-generation fighter|fourth-generation]] class, and the number of fourth-generation aircraft was projected to increase further with improvements in training and force composition.<ref name="afmag_1310" /> According to a 2015 [[The Pentagon|Pentagon]] report, PLAAF had approximately 600 modern aircraft and was phasing out more outdated platforms.<ref name="pentagon_2015" /> The percentage of fourth-generation fighters raised from 30 percent in 2010 to 50 percent in 2015,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/a-2016-assessment-of-the-growth-in-plaaf-capabilities#_ednref6 |title=A 2016 Assessment of the Growth in PLAAF Capabilities |date=26 July 2016 |first=Daniel |last=Urchick |website=Small Wars Journal}}</ref> projecting a majority fourth-generation force structure in the near future.<ref name="diplomat_1406">{{cite web |url=https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-air-force-modernization-unprecedented-in-history/ |title=China's Air Force Modernization: 'Unprecedented in History' |website=The Diplomat |date=6 July 2014 |first=Zachary |last=Keck |access-date=6 March 2023 |archive-date=12 May 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240512231329/https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-air-force-modernization-unprecedented-in-history/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The PLAAF also focused on developing long-range strike options with improved bomber platforms based on the [[Xian H-6K]],<ref name="diplomat_1406" /> long-range cruise missiles, as well as fielding more [[Multirole combat aircraft|multirole aircraft]] such as the [[Shenyang J-16]].<ref name="pentagon_2015">{{cite web|title=Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2015|url=http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150514072529/https://www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf|archive-date=14 May 2015|access-date=8 June 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref> In 2014, the Pentagon noted PLAAF was rapidly closing the gap in its training, equipment, and power projection capabilities with the United States.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep23376.13. |title=Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2016: A Comparative Analysis |publisher=Center for Strategic and International Studies |date=2016 |first1=Cordesman |last1=Anthony H |first2=Joseph |last2=Kendall}}</ref>

From 2014 to 2016, PLAAF intensified its joint operations efforts with the [[PLA Navy]], building up power projection and expeditionary strike capabilities with other service branches, and engaged in joint patrol missions with the PLA Navy in the [[East China Sea|East]] and [[South China Sea]].<ref>{{cite journal |url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2057.html |title=People's Liberation Army Air Force Operations over Water |date=2017 |journal=RAND Corporation |last1=Cozad |first1=Mark |first2=Nathan |last2=Beauchamp-Mustafaga |access-date=5 March 2023 |archive-date=25 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221225073145/https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2057.html |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2015, the PLA separated [[PLA Ground Force]] headquarters from the senior position, putting all service branches in the same echelon, thus ending the tradition of Army domination in PLA's command structure. A joint command structure under the newly reformed [[Theater commands of the People's Liberation Army|theater commands]] was established, improving inter-service support, command, and control efficiency, and cross-service warfighting capability.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/pla-reforms-and-their-ramifications.html |title=People's Liberation Army Reforms and Their Ramifications |website=Rand Corporation |date=23 September 2016 |first=Cristina |last=L. Garafola |access-date=5 March 2023 |archive-date=18 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220518204550/https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/pla-reforms-and-their-ramifications.html |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2016, PLA established the [[People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force]], which stripped PLAAF's responsibilities in space and information domain, leaving the air force focused on air operations, air defense, electronic warfare, airborne early warning, and air-to-ground surface strike missions.<ref name="casi_tool" /> At the same time, PLAAF actively developed one of the most sophisticated integrated air defense systems in actual deployment, capable of providing air defense coverage far beyond China's coastline and borders.<ref name="casi_tool">{{cite web |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/3247237/csaf-announces-casi-toolkit-for-china/ |title=CSAF Announces CASI Toolkit for China |work=China Aerospace Studies Institute |date=15 December 2022 |publisher=Air University |access-date=3 March 2023 |archive-date=3 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230303224644/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/3247237/csaf-announces-casi-toolkit-for-china/ |url-status=live }}</ref> In the same year, PLAAF general [[Ma Xiaotian]] announced that China was developing a new type of long-range bomber on the air force's open day,<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-defence-idUSKCN11809E |title=China says developing new type of long-range bomber |agency=Reuters |date=2 September 2016 |website=Reuters |access-date=3 March 2023 |archive-date=3 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230303224642/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-defence-idUSKCN11809E |url-status=live }}</ref> which was later named the [[Xian H-20]] stealth bomber.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/24226/china-reportedly-plans-to-unveil-h-20-stealth-bomber-at-air-force-anniversary-parade-in-2019 |title=China Reportedly Plans To Unveil H-20 Stealth Bomber At Air Force Anniversary Parade In 2019 |website=The Drive |date=15 October 2018 |first=Joseph |last=Trevithick |access-date=3 March 2023 |archive-date=3 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230303224643/https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/24226/china-reportedly-plans-to-unveil-h-20-stealth-bomber-at-air-force-anniversary-parade-in-2019 |url-status=live }}</ref>

After the reform, analysts noted PLAAF's joint operation and integrated fighting capabilities were considerably improved.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-air-force-modernization-unprecedented-in-history/ |title=The Early Returns of China's Military Reforms |website=The Diplomat |date=13 January 2018 |first=Ying Yu |last=Lin |access-date=6 March 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306045440/https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-air-force-modernization-unprecedented-in-history/ |url-status=live }}</ref> In March 2017, PLAAF incorporated [[Chengdu J-20]] stealth fighter into service<ref name="Dominguez_2018-02-12">{{cite web |last1=Dominguez |first1=Gabriel |url=http://www.janes.com/article/77794/plaaf-inducts-j-20-into-combat-units |title=PLAAF inducts J-20 into combat units |website=Jane's 360 |date=2 February 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181202054926/https://www.janes.com/article/77794/plaaf-inducts-j-20-into-combat-units |archive-date=2 December 2018 |access-date=5 March 2023 |url-status=live }}</ref> and formed the first combat unit in February 2018,<ref name="Dominguez_2018-02-12"/> making China the second country in the world and the first in Asia to field an operational [[stealth aircraft]].<ref name="seidel_2017-10-20">{{cite news |last1=Seidel |first1=Jamie |title=With the J20 stealth fighter in fully operation service, China leaps ahead in Asian arms race |url=http://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/with-the-j20-stealth-fighter-in-fully-operational-military-service-china-leaps-ahead-in-asian-arms-race/news-story/d5a65bfd8da252a1bb0240026591d575 |work=Australian News |date=20 October 2017 |language=en |archive-date=26 February 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180226131148/http://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/with-the-j20-stealth-fighter-in-fully-operational-military-service-china-leaps-ahead-in-asian-arms-race/news-story/d5a65bfd8da252a1bb0240026591d575 |url-status=live |access-date=6 March 2023 }}</ref> Around the same time, PLAAF introduced the [[PL-10 (ASR)|PL-10]] and [[PL-15]] missiles, which noticeably improved the PLAAF's air combat capability.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2018/mb2018-01-essays-1 |title=Chinese and Russian air-launched weapons: a test for Western air dominance |website=International Institute for Strategic Studies |date=February 2018 |access-date=3 March 2023 |archive-date=12 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211112185728/https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2018/mb2018-01-essays-1 |url-status=live }}</ref> By 2019, aviation researchers believed that Chinese weapon platforms have reached approximate parity with Western equivalents,<ref>{{cite report |last=Bronk |first=Justin |date=October 2020 |title=Russian and Chinese Combat Air Trends: Current Capabilities and Future Threat Outlook |url=https://static.rusi.org/russian_and_chinese_combat_air_trends_whr_final_web_version.pdf |series=Whitehall Report |volume=3-20 |location=London |publisher=Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies |issn=1750-9432 |access-date=3 March 2023 |archive-date=8 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220308161533/https://static.rusi.org/russian_and_chinese_combat_air_trends_whr_final_web_version.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> and surpassed Russia in most aspects of aviation technology development and implementation.<ref name="forbes_2110">{{cite web|last=Roblin|first=Sebastien|date=10 November 2020|title=Why China's Latest Jets Are Surpassing Russia's Top Fighters|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2020/11/10/why-chinas-latest-jets-are-surpassing-russias-top-fighters/?sh=4767e8e72e26|website=Forbes|access-date=26 October 2021|archive-date=26 October 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211026011430/https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2020/11/10/why-chinas-latest-jets-are-surpassing-russias-top-fighters/?sh=4767e8e72e26|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/does-russian-military-aviation-have-anything-left-to-offer-china/ |title=Does Russian Military Aviation Have Anything Left to Offer China? |website=The Diplomat |first=Abraham |last=Ait |date=5 April 2019 |access-date=26 October 2021 |archive-date=26 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211026011430/https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/does-russian-military-aviation-have-anything-left-to-offer-china/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/china-surpassing-russia-in-airpower-technology-rusi/141053.article |title=China surpassing Russia in airpower technology: RUSI |website=FlightGlobal |first=Greg |last=Waldron |date=10 November 2020 |access-date=26 October 2021 |archive-date=23 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210923215514/https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/china-surpassing-russia-in-airpower-technology-rusi/141053.article |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2019 and 2020, PLAAF began to reform its pilot curriculum and transitional training programs, inducting advanced jet trainers and active-service fighters at dedicated training academies, ending the traditional practice of training pilot at operational units. The measure improved training efficiency and prevented distraction to the defense responsibilities of the active units.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2831138/pla-air-force-shifts-transition-training-to-the-schoolhouse/ |title=PLA Air Force Shifts Transition Training to the Schoolhouse |work=China Aerospace Studies Institute |date=3 November 2021 |first=Derek |last=Solen |access-date=5 March 2023 |archive-date=5 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230305171554/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2831138/pla-air-force-shifts-transition-training-to-the-schoolhouse/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="xiaoke">{{Cite web |last=Qi |first=Xiaoke |date=2025-01-27 |title=2025 PLA Pilot Recruitment Cycle |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLAAF/2025-01-27%202025%20PLAAF%20and%20PLAN%20Pilot%20Recruitment%20Policy.pdf?ver=iRunlZCWxT7FnrGI_-Ry1w%3D%3D |access-date=2025-03-11 |website=China Aerospace Studies Institute}}</ref>

According to International Institute for Strategic Studies, PLAAF had an unprecedented military build-up between 2016 and 2022. The force successfully closed the gap with the West due to improved domestic production, introducing indigenously developed airframes, composite materials, turbofan engines, advanced avionics, and weapon systems. In six years, PLAAF incorporated over 600 fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft in more than 19 frontline combat brigades.<ref name="plaaf_modern">{{cite web |url=https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2023/02/chinas-air-force-modernisation-gaining-pace |title=China's air force modernisation: gaining pace |website=International Institute for Strategic Studies |date=21 February 2023 |first=Douglas |last=Barrie |access-date=3 March 2023 |archive-date=29 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230329110354/https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2023/02/chinas-air-force-modernisation-gaining-pace |url-status=live }}</ref> The modern [[Chengdu J-10|Chengdu J-10C]], [[Shenyang J-16]], and [[Chengdu J-20]] are all equipped with [[AESA radar|AESA]] radar systems, domestic [[WS-10]] engines, [[Standoff missile|standoff weapons]], and long-range air-to-air missiles. PLAAF also made substantial progress with larger aircraft design and production in the form of [[Xian Y-20]] and [[WS-20]] engines.<ref name="plaaf_modern" /> In 2021, PLAAF announced the force had achieved the status of "Strategic Air Force". Though this self-claimed designation wasn't universally agreed upon, many analysts acknowledged its rapid modernization progress.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3147362/chinese-military-says-it-has-strategic-air-force-experts |title=Chinese military says it has a strategic air force – experts disagree |website=South China Morning Post |date=3 September 2021 |first=Kristin |last=Huang |access-date=6 March 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306063040/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3147362/chinese-military-says-it-has-strategic-air-force-experts |url-status=live }}</ref> According to an [[Air University (United States Air Force)|Air University]] assessment in 2022, PLAAF was adjudged a strategic air force with the capabilities of long-distance [[power projection]], maintaining combat readiness, and conducting global operations to protect Chinese interests.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3111108/the-dragons-wing-the-peoples-liberation-army-air-forces-strategy/ |title=The Dragon's Wing: The People's Liberation Army Air Force's Strategy |first=Xiaobing |last=Li |date=1 August 2022 |publisher=[[United States Air Force]] [[Air University (United States Air Force)|Air University]] |access-date=6 March 2023 |archive-date=22 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220822012050/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3111108/the-dragons-wing-the-peoples-liberation-army-air-forces-strategy/ |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2023, PLAAF planned to decommission all older [[Chengdu J-7]] and [[Shenyang J-8]] platforms, which completed the PLAAF's transition to an air fleet composed of only fourth-generation and fifth-generation combat aircraft.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-j7-fighter-jets-may-be-converted-into-combat-drones-2023-2?r=US&IR=T |title=China is getting rid of its 'grandpa' fighter jets, but they may make a comeback for a one-way mission against Taiwan |website=Insider |date=20 February 2023 |first=Michael |last=Peck |access-date=3 March 2023 |archive-date=28 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230228111552/https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-j7-fighter-jets-may-be-converted-into-combat-drones-2023-2?r=US&IR=T |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3140627/why-has-chinas-pla-started-sending-grandpa-fighter-jets-test |title=Why has China's PLA started sending 'grandpa fighter jets' to test Taiwan's air defences? |date=11 July 2021 |website=South China Morning Post |first=Minnie |last=Chan |access-date=3 March 2023 |archive-date=7 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230307103229/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3140627/why-has-chinas-pla-started-sending-grandpa-fighter-jets-test |url-status=live }}</ref> 
===2020s===
In 2020, the force started replacing older jet training aircraft, unsuited as introductions to the newer generations of Chinese aircraft, with the [[Hongdu JL-10]]. Using the JL-10 reduced the flight training program from four to three years.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Solen |first=Derek |date=2024-11-18 |title=Modernization of Fighter Pilot Training in the PLA Air Force Proceeds Apace |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLAAF/2024-11-18%20Modernization%20of%20Fighter%20Pilot%20Training%20in%20PLAAF%20Proceeds%20Apace.pdf?ver=UohKp62x8xot-laygKRXCg== |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241203184530/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLAAF/2024-11-18%20Modernization%20of%20Fighter%20Pilot%20Training%20in%20PLAAF%20Proceeds%20Apace.pdf?ver=UohKp62x8xot-laygKRXCg%3D%3D |archive-date=3 December 2024 |access-date=2025-03-17 |website=www.airuniversity.af.edu |url-status=live }}</ref> 

In 2022, it was reported by UK media sources that around 30 former British military helicopter and jet fighter pilots had been recruited via a third-party by the Chinese government to train the PLAAF on typical [[NATO]] member's air force tactics and capabilities, with some individuals being offered annual salaries of up to US$270,000.<ref>{{Cite news |date=18 October 2022|title=Ex-UK pilots lured to help Chinese military, MoD says|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-63293582|newspaper=[[BBC News]]|language=en}}</ref> Pilots from across all branches (the Royal Airforce, the Royal Navy and the British Army) were allegedly hired in order teach PLAAF pilots how best to counter the capabilities of various aircraft used on both aircraft carriers and by land forces.<ref>{{Cite news |date=18 October 2022|title=China's armed forces recruiting dozens of British ex military pilots in 'threat to UK interests'|url=https://news.sky.com/story/chinas-armed-forces-recruiting-dozens-of-british-ex-military-pilots-in-threat-to-uk-interests-12723395|newspaper=[[Sky News]]|language=en}}</ref> In 2023, the UK government made changes to the National Security Act so as to allow the prosecution of former military personnel for "disclosing protected information". The changes to the law was specifically made in response to former British military pilots training the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force, according to a communiqué from the Ministry of Defence.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.gov.uk/government/news/former-armed-forces-personnel-training-foreign-militaries-could-be-prosecuted-under-national-security-act|title=Former Armed Forces personnel training foreign militaries could be prosecuted under National Security Act|work=Ministry of Defence (UK) }}</ref>

==Personnel==
===Ranks and insignia===
{{Main|Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Air Force}}
[[File:Roundel_of_China.svg|thumb|PLAAF roundel.]]
[[File:Roundel of China – Low Visibility.svg|thumb|PLAAF low-visibility roundel.]]
The ranks in the Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force are identical to those of the other three services, except that those of the PLA Air Force are prefixed by {{Lang-zh|s=空军|p=Kōngjūn|labels=no|l=Air Force}}. See [[Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force|Ranks of the People's Liberation Army]] or the article on an individual rank for details on the evolution of rank and insignia in the PLAAF. The above main article primarily covers the existing ranks and insignia as of 2017.

The main [[roundel]] of the PLAAF is the PLA emblem, a red star [[fimbriation|fimbriated]] yellow, [[Charge (heraldry)|charged]] with yellow [[Chinese character]]s for "eight" and "one",<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.aircraft-insignia.com/page7.htm|title=Military Aircraft Insignia of the World - D|access-date=25 December 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181027144551/http://www.aircraft-insignia.com/page7.htm|archive-date=27 October 2018|url-status=usurped}}</ref>{{NoteTag|representing 1 August 1927, the date of the formation of the PLA}} in front of a red band fimbriated yellow,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/cn~round.html|title=Roundels of China|access-date=25 December 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150914175642/http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/cn~round.html|archive-date=14 September 2015|url-status=live}}</ref> similar to the [[Soviet Air Forces|Soviet]] and [[Russian Air Force]]'s roundels. PLAAF aircraft usually carry these markings on the fins as well as the wings, usually the low-visibility version.

===Leadership===
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'''Commanders'''
* [[Liu Yalou]] (刘亚楼)<small>Sr Gen</small> (Oct 1949－May 1965)<ref name="gswshang">{{Cite web|title=附卷二 中国人民解放军组织(1949.10—1997.9) 上部 过渡时期和社会主义建设时期(1949.10—1966.5) 第四章 中国人民解放军各军兵种 第二节 空军及空军党委|url=http://www.hprc.org.cn/gsw/detail_zzslk.jsp?channelid=75034&record=3150|accessdate=2017-09-16|publisher=中华人民共和国国史网|archive-date=2017-09-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170916182946/http://www.hprc.org.cn/gsw/detail_zzslk.jsp?channelid=75034&record=3150|url-status=live}}</ref>
* [[Wu Faxian]] (吴法宪) <small>Lt Gen</small> (May 1965－Sep 1971)<ref name="gswshang" /><ref name="gswzhong">{{Cite web|title=附卷二 中国人民解放军组织(1949.10—1997.9) 中部 "文化大革命"时期(1966.5—1976.10) 第四章 中国人民解放军各军兵种 第二节 空军及空军党委|url=http://www.hprc.org.cn/gsw/detail_zzslk.jsp?channelid=75034&record=3188|accessdate=2017-09-16|publisher=中华人民共和国国史网|archive-date=2017-09-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170916225122/http://www.hprc.org.cn/gsw/detail_zzslk.jsp?channelid=75034&record=3188|url-status=live}}</ref>
* [[Ma Ning]] (马宁) <small>Maj Gen</small> (May 1973－Feb 1977)<ref name="gswzhong" /><ref name="gswxia">{{Cite web|title=附卷二 中国人民解放军组织(1949.10—1997.9) 下部 社会主义事业发展新时期(1976.10—1997.9) 第四章 中国人民解放军各军兵种 第二节 空军及空军党委|url=http://www.hprc.org.cn/gsw/detail_zzslk.jsp?channelid=75034&record=3221|accessdate=2017-09-16|publisher=中华人民共和国国史网|archive-date=2017-09-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170916183043/http://www.hprc.org.cn/gsw/detail_zzslk.jsp?channelid=75034&record=3221|url-status=live}}</ref>
* [[Zhang Tingfa]] (张廷发) <small>Maj Gen</small> (Apr 1977－Jul 1985)<ref name="gswxia" />
* [[Wang Hai]] (王海) <small>Gen</small> (Jul 1985－Nov 1992)<ref name="gswxia" />
* [[Cao Shuangming]] (曹双明) <small>Gen</small> (Nov 1992－Oct 1994)<ref name="gswxia" />
* [[Yu Zhenwu]] (于振武) <small>Gen</small> (Oct 1994－Nov 1996)<ref name="gswxia" />
* [[Liu Shunyao]] (刘顺尧) <small>PLAAF Gen</small> (November 1996－May 2002)<ref name="gswxia" />
* [[Qiao Qingchen]] (乔清晨) <small>PLAAF Gen</small> (May 2002－Sep 2007)
* [[Xu Qiliang]] (许其亮) <small>PLAAF Gen</small> (Sep 2007－Oct 2012)
* [[Ma Xiaotian]] (马晓天) <small>PLAAF Gen</small> (Oct 2012－Aug 2017)
* [[Ding Laihang]] (丁来杭) <small>PLAAF Gen</small> (Aug 2017－Sep 2021)
* [[Chang Dingqiu]] (常丁求) <small>PLAAF Gen</small> (Sep 2021－present)
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'''Political commissars'''
* [[Xiao Hua (general)|Xiao Hua]] (萧华) <small>Sr Gen</small> (Oct 1949－Apr 1950)<ref name="gswshang" />
* [[Wu Faxian]] (吴法宪) <small>Lt Gen</small> (Feb 1957－May 1965)<ref name="gswshang" />
* [[Yu Lijin]] (余立金) (May 1965－March 1968)<ref name="gswshang" /><ref name="gswzhong" />
* [[Wang Huiqiu]] (王辉球) (Sep 1968－May 1973)<ref name="gswzhong" />
* [[Fu Chuanzuo]] (傅传作) (May 1973－Oct 1975)<ref name="gswzhong" />
* [[Zhang Tingfa]] (张廷发) (Oct 1975－Apr 1977)<ref name="gswzhong" /><ref name="gswxia" />
** [[Yu Lijin]] (余立金) (Aug 1975－Dec 1978; <small>2nd cmssr</small>)<ref name="gswzhong" /><ref name="gswxia" />
* [[Gao Houliang]] (高厚良) (Apr 1977－Jul 1985)<ref name="gswxia" />
* [[Zhu Guang]] (朱光) <small>Lt Gen</small> (Jul 1985－Nov 1992)<ref name="gswxia" />
* [[Ding Wenchang]] (丁文昌) <small>Gen</small> (Nov 1992－Jan 1999)<ref name="gswxia" />
* [[Qiao Qingchen]] (乔清晨) <small>PLAAF Gen</small> (Jan 1999－May 2002)
* [[Deng Changyou]] (邓昌友) <small>PLAAF Gen</small> (May 2002－Oct 2012)
* [[Tian Xiusi]] (田修思) <small>PLAAF Gen</small> (Oct 2012－Jul 2015)
* [[Yu Zhongfu]] (于忠福) <small>PLAAF Gen</small> (Jul 2015－2022年1月)
* [[Guo Puxiao]] (郭普校) <small>PLAAF Gen</small> (Jan 2022－)<ref>{{cite web |title=张又侠在出席中央军委纪委扩大会议时强调 坚决贯彻全面从严治党战略方针 深入做好新时代军队纪检监察工作 |url=https://tv.cctv.com/2022/01/22/VIDEGvAYf6VkuhyfCN3YHBPZ220122.shtml |website=CCTV7军事报道 |accessdate=2022-01-22 |date=2022-01-22 |archive-date=2022-01-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220122134924/https://tv.cctv.com/2022/01/22/VIDEGvAYf6VkuhyfCN3YHBPZ220122.shtml }}</ref>
{{col-end}}

== Organizational structure ==

The post-[[2015 People's Republic of China military reform|2015 reforms]] reorganized the PLAAF in a similar fashion to the other services. PLAAF headquarters became a [[Grades of the armed forces of China|theater command grade]] unit.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=5}} It was removed from the operational chain of command, and its responsibilities refocused on force building. The new Theater Command Air Force (TCAF) headquarters, deputy theater command grade units, were assigned command responsibilities and responsibility for most tactical assets. PLAAF headquarters retained control some units, including special mission aircraft, transport aircraft, and the Airborne Corps.{{sfn|Allen|2023|pp=19-20}} The TCAFs were operationally subordinated to theater commands, which in turn were subordinated to the CMC.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=6}}

=== Headquarters ===

PLAAF headquarters is responsible for force building. Its operational control is limited to special mission aviation unit, one transport division, one search and rescue brigade, and the Airborne Corps.{{sfn|Allen|2023|pp=19-20}}

CCP oversight, in accordance to the dual command system, is exercised through PLAAF headquarter's Party Standing Committee. It includes the headquarters' senior officers and is chaired by the PLAAF's [[political commissar]] (the party secretary and a theater grade office) and the PLAAF's commander (the party deputy secretary). The larger PLAAF Party Congress meets twice a year.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=9}}

==== Departments ====

The headquarters has four departments.

The Staff Department (SD) is a deputy theater command grade unit responsible for organizational structure, personnel management, intelligence, communications, radar, air traffic control, weather support, developing air force military theory, and managing education and safety. It was formerly the Headquarters Department.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=16}}

The Political Work Department (PWD) is a deputy theater command grade{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=9}} unit responsible for the maintaining personnel records, propaganda, security, education, cultural activities, civilian–military relations, party discipline, and party organizations. It was formerly the Political Department.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=16}}

The Logistics Department is corps grade unit{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=9}} responsible for transportation, finances, materials, supplies, and medical care.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=16}}

The Equipment Department is corps grade unit{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=9}} responsible for managing all equipment through their entire lifecycle.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=16}}

In 2016, the former Political Department's Discipline Inspection Commission (DIC) was upgraded to an independent deputy theater command grade unit. It is the main body responsible for maintaining party discipline and controlling corruption and works closely with the CMC's DIC. The DIC ranks ahead of the other departments in protocol order and is also represented in the Party Standing Committee.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=16}}

The units directly subordinate to HQ include:

==== Subordinated operational units ====

* [[PLAAF Airborne Corps]]
* Transport Regiment
* Special Missions Division

==== Subordinated research and training units ====
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* [[66th Brigade (People's Republic of China)|66th Blue Brigade]]
*[[PLAAF Experimental Training Base|Air Force Experimental Training Base]] (空军试验训练基地)
*[[PLAAF Research Institute|Air Force Research Institute]] (空军研究院)<ref>{{Cite web |date=2019-11-25 |title=Air Force Research Institute |url=https://unitracker.aspi.org.au/universities/air-force-research-institute/ |access-date=2025-03-11 |website=Chinese Defence Universities Tracker |publisher=Australia Strategic Policy Institute |archive-date=6 March 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250306034914/https://unitracker.aspi.org.au/universities/air-force-research-institute/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=李建文 |last2=鲁泰来 |last3=杨晓峰 |last4=刘华冠 |date=2023-08-07 |editor-last=刘秋丽 |title=空军研究院某研究所：我们的科研是为了服务战斗力 |url=http://www.81.cn/kj_208559/jdt_208560/16243056.html |access-date=2025-03-11 |website=www.81.cn}}</ref>
{{col-2}}

*[[PLAAF Flight Experimental Training Base|Air Force Flight Experimental Training Base]] (飞行试验训练基地)<ref>{{Cite web |date=2020-10-27 |title=我们在战位报告丨空军某试验训练基地：戈壁深处崛起军事科技人才高地 |url=http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-10/27/c_1126665169.htm |access-date=2025-03-11 |website=www.xinhuanet.com}}</ref>
*[[PLAAF Paratroopers Training Base|Paratroopers Training Base]] (空降兵训练基地)<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-08-10 |title=揭秘中国空降兵：精简指挥层级，扩编升格数个"特色旅" |trans-title=Uncovering the Chinese Airborne Forces: Streamlined Command Levels and Several "Selected Brigades" Expanded and Upgraded. |url=https://m.thepaper.cn/wifiKey_detail.jsp?contid=1774287&from=wifiKey# |access-date=2025-03-11 |website=The Paper}}</ref>

{{col-end}}

====Subordinated academic units====
{{col-begin}}

{{col-2}}

*[[Air Force Command College]]
*[[Air Force Engineering University]]
*[[Air Force Aviation University]]
*[[Air Force Early Warning Academy]]
*[[Air Force Harbin Flight Academy]]

{{col-2}}

*[[Air Force Shijiazhuang Flight Academy]]
*[[Air Force Xi'an Flight Academy]]
*[[Air Force Medical University]] 
*[[Air Force Logistics Academy]]
*[[Air Force Communication NCO Academy]]

{{col-end}}

=== Theater commands ===

[[Supreme command of the armed forces in the People's Republic of China|Supreme command of the PLA]] is vested in the CMC. The CMC exercises control through the theater command headquarters to which the Theater Command Air Forces (TCAFs) are subordinated.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=6}} TCAF headquarters have operational control over PLAAF units in the theater.{{sfn|Allen|2023|pp=19-20}} The TCAF headquarters were created from the previous MRAF headquarters im early 2016.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=18}}

TCAF headquarters have staff, political works, and support departments; the last combines the logistics and equipment management functions.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=20}}

Each theater command has a PLAAF component. These and their headquarter locations are:

* [[Central Theater Command Air Force|Central Theatre Command Air Force]] (Beijing)
* [[Eastern Theater Command Air Force]] (Nanjing)
* [[Northern Theater Command Air Force]] (Shenyang)
* [[Southern Theater Command Air Force]] (Guangzhou)
* [[Western Theater Command Air Force]] (Chengdu)

=== Bases and command posts ===

Prior to their abolition, each [[Military regions of the People's Liberation Army|military region]] had a Military Region Air Force (MRAF). The MRAF had multiple subordinate command organizations - the MRAF headquarters, "air corps", "command posts", and "bases" - and all could be directly assigned tactical units. The corps leader-grade air corps{{sfn|Mulvenon|Yang|2002|p=390}} were primarily made up of staff. They did not necessarily have organic units and could be moved to control units in another area.{{sfn|Mulvenon|Yang|2002|p=386}} The air corps were used to control air divisions.{{sfn|Mulvenon|Yang|2002|p=390}} The corps leader-grade command posts{{sfn|Mulvenon|Yang|2002|p=390}} were responsible for geographical areas.{{sfn|Mulvenon|Yang|2002|p=429}} Bases were practically corps deputy leader-grade command posts.{{sfn|Mulvenon|Yang|2002|p=429}} MRAF headquarters could act as command posts{{sfn|Trevethan|2019|p=5}} and typically had control of tactical aviation units in the provinces the headquarters was located in.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=21}}

Initially, command posts were administrative organizations. In the 1980s, they became operational organizations. All but five air corps being converted into command posts. Some command posts administrative functions, duplicated in the MRAF and air corps, were removed. All the command posts, except for Lhasa, were downgraded into bases in 1993.{{sfn|Mulvenon|Yang|2002|p=390}}

By 2004, the MRAFs had a total of five corps leader-grade air corps, six corps leader-grade bases, and three division leader-grade command posts. In 2004, the air corps and bases were converted into command posts, and all tactical units were subordinated directly to MRAF headquarters.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=21}}

New corps deputy leader-grade bases began to be created in 2012 to control new{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=21}} division deputy leader-grade{{sfn|Trevethan|2019|p=18}} aviation brigades created by the abolishment or conversion of aviation divisions and regiments.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=21}} In 2017, some bases were renamed as "air defense bases". By this time, no tactical units remained directly subordinated to MRAF or TCAF headquarters. In 2023, there were 12 bases and 3 command posts;{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=21}} it was not clear whether bases and command posts are in the chain of command or if TCAF headquarters have direct control over brigades.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=29}}

Bases and command posts have a DIC, and staff, political works and support departments.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=22}}

=== Operational units ===

The early PLAAF used a hierarchy of air corps, air divisions, and air regiments.

Divisions were divided by role. Divisions had two regiments prior to 1953, after which they had three,{{sfn|Mulvenon|Yang|2002|p=387}} including a training regiment.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=23}} In the 1980s, each MRAF converted a division to a division leader-grade training base, and transferred the training regiments from operational division to the base.{{sfn|Trevethan|2019|p=16}} There were 50 divisions by the end of the 1980s. Divisions began to be discarded in the 2000s.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=23}} By 2010, most divisions had two regiments.{{sfn|Allen|2012|p=104}} By 2017, there were nine divisions with subordinate regiments; these were for bombers, transports, and special mission aircraft, and were directly subordinated to PLAAF or TCAF headquarters instead of bases.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=23}} Divisions have a regiment leader-grade "air station" responsible for logistics tasks.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=24}}

Early regiments were divided into 3 or 4 battalion leader-grade ''dadui'' ({{lang-zh|s=大队}}) ("flight groups"), which were further subdivided into 3 or 4 company leader-grade ''zhongdui'' ({{lang-zh|s=中队}}) ("flight squadrons").{{sfn|Trevethan|2019|p=18}} Fighter regiments had 24 aircraft and bomber regiments had 18.{{sfn|Mulvenon|Yang|2002|p=388}} Regiments were called "groups" between 1964 and 1970 with no change in organization.{{sfn|Trevethan|2019|p=18}} Modern regiments have a battalion leader-grade maintenance group.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=24}}

Division deputy leader-grade brigades began to be formed and subordinated to bases in 2011, with the process accelerating in 2016; this was part of the general conversion from the division-regiment structure to the base-brigade structure. In aviation units, this affected fighter and ground attack units. Brigades have 24 aircraft in three flight groups. Brigades were originally multifunctional with each flight group using a different type of aircraft. In 2018, this was changed to have a brigade equipped with closely related types of aircraft to improve efficiency and/or reduce the number of airframe-specific maintenance personnel required in each brigade.{{sfn|Trevethan|2019|p=18}} Brigades have an air station for logistics and a maintenance group.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=24}}

Senior staff in divisions, brigades, and regiments have roles that mirror the DIC, staff, political, and support departments of higher echelons.{{sfn|Allen|2023|p=24}}

Divisions, brigades, and regiments are classified as "units" ({{Lang-zh|s=部队|labels=no}}), while every formation below regiment-size, from battalions to flights, is classified as a "subunit" ({{Lang-zh|s=分队|labels=no}}).{{sfn|Allen|2012|pp=109-110}}

== Branches ==
=== Aviation Force ===
{{Context|section|date=March 2025|details=describing the role of the branch and not repeating details of the 21st century reforms already covered elsewhere.}}
The initial force structure of the aviation forces was on a Corps-Division-Regiment-Group-Squad format. By 1971, the PLAAF had created a total of 50 air divisions. Each division was normally composed of two combat regiments and one training regiment. These 50 divisions remained in service until the end of the 1980s, when the first PLAAF force reductions took place. During the 2000s, the number of air divisions fell to 29, and then reduced to a mere 9 by 2017. Those 9 divisions are exclusively composed of long-range operating units, specifically bombers, transports, and special mission aircraft, and remain directly subordinate to the PLAAF HQ or the TCAF HQ rather than to a Base. Some service aircraft independent regiments also remain.
All fighter and attack plane are as of 2025 organized into brigades, all subordinated to a Base, not to the TCAF HQ (with the exception of [[airlift]] and [[search and rescue]] brigades).{{citation needed|date=March 2025}}

==== Aerobatic display team ====

The [[August 1st (aerobatic team)|August 1st aerobatic team]] is the first PLAAF aerobatics team, established in 1962. It flies mostly the [[Chengdu J-10|J-10]] fighter, having recently (2023) upgraded to the [[Chengdu J-10#J-10C|J-10C]]<ref>[https://gbp.com.sg/stories/plaaf-august-1st-display-team-makes-lima-debut-with-new-j-10c/ PLAAF August 1st Display Team Makes LIMA Debut with New J-10C]</ref> version. It previously flew the [[Shenyang J-5|J-5]] and [[Chengdu J-7|J-7]]. The Sky Wing and Red Falcon air demonstration teams, which operate [[Nanchang CJ-6]] and [[Hongdu JL-8]] respectively, were established in 2011.

=== Airborne Force Branch ===
{{Main|People's Liberation Army Air Force Airborne Corps}}

The Airborne Force (空降兵), which is also more commonly known the Airborne Corps (空降兵军) or the Airborne Troops, was created under the PLAAF in 1950. It did not become a formal branch until 1992, under the name of 15th Airborne Corps (空降兵第15军). In 2017 it was renamed into the plain unnumbered "Airborne Corps", with a [[corps grade]], and placed under the direct subordinate control of the PLAAF HQ. The three airborne divisions were converted into six airborne brigades, an [[air assault]] brigade, a [[Special Forces]] brigade, an air transport brigade, a helicopter regiment, and a training base.

The Corps is a "rapid reaction unit" designed for air assault, airborne infiltration, long-range penetration, and special force missions in enemy rear areas. It practices airborne, air-mobile, and air-transportable missions.<ref name="Trevethan_2019_16" />

=== Ground-to-Air Missile Force ===
{{distinguish|People's Liberation Army Ground Force Air Defense Forces|text=the [[People's Liberation Army Ground Force Air Defense Forces]], which are the Army's tactic air defense units.}}

The Ground Air Defense Branch (地面防空兵) was the result of the merger of the former Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM/地空导弹兵) Branch and Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA/高射炮兵) Branch in approximately 2007, which it has identified in English as the Ground-to-Air Missile Branch (地面防空兵). Its subordinate units are identified as [[Surface to Air Missile|SAM]] (地空导弹/地导) divisions, brigades, and regiments{{NoteTag|only the Central TCAF (protecting Beijing) retain a division and its subordinate regiments, all other theater units have been made into brigades.}}, which are directly subordinate to the Bases, not the TCAF HQ.

After the 2023 reforms of the PLAN Aviation forces, the GADB received three air defense brigades from the PLAN (and the Radar Forces received three naval radar brigades), and simultaneously, it gained control over the air defense of [[Hainan]], the [[Zhoushan]] to [[Wenzhou]] stretch of coast, and full command of the air defense for [[Shandong|Shandong province]], meaning that for the first time it had complete responsibility for defending the entire coastal airspace of China.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Lee |first=Rod |date=2023-07-31 |title=PLA Naval Aviation Reorganization 2023 |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLAN/2023-07-31%20PLAN%20Aviation%20Reorg%202023%20Clean.pdf?ver=N848BtqfMRRjojcS2ThCtw%3d%3d |access-date=2025-03-21 |website=China Airspace Studies Institute}}</ref>

=== Radar Forces ===
The first independent radar troop units were established in 1949. In 1950, radar units were divided into two types: 1) those subordinate to the Air Defense Department of the General Staff were responsible for early warning, and 2) those subordinate to the PLAAF were responsible for directly supporting aviation units. The Radar Troops were formally created in 1955 under the then independent [[PLA Air Defense Force]] (PLAADF). The [[PLAAF Radar Forces|radar troops]] became a formal branch (雷达兵) of the PLAAF in 1957, when the PLAAF and PLAADF merged.

The current (2025) PLAAF Radar Forces have three basic types of radar sites. The first type of sites are located at airfields and are used for [[air traffic control]] (ATC) and for vectoring pilots toward targets. The second type consists of the long-and medium-range radar [[picket line]] along China's borders, with an extensive network of radar stations mostly located on mountain tops (高山雷达站). The third type consists of [[over-the-horizon radar]]s (OTHR—超视距雷达) based on the coastline or on islands (在海岛雷达站) that are used for early warning. The RF relationship with satellite-based early warning is unclear.{{sfn|Allen|2023}}

In the 2010s, all radar regiments were converted to brigades, each controlling a fairly large number of radar stations covering a wide geographical area. Today, each TCAF has one or several subordinate radar brigades, each with subordinate battalions, elements, and stations. The radar brigades, also identified as intelligence stations (情报站), are responsible for collecting, managing, and disseminating radar intelligence to all PLAAF field units. All radar brigades are now directly subordinate to Bases; however, some Bases also have directly subordinate company-level radar stations that are apparently not subordinate to a brigade.{{sfn|Allen|2023}}

Besides the surveillance network of long range, medium range, and short range radars (further categorized into low, medium, and high altitude), the PLAAF's aviation and SAM units have their own attached specialized (专业部队) radar units. These tend to be mobile units to diminish their vulnerability to enemy [[SEAD]] missions.{{sfn|Allen|2023}}

=== Electronic Countermeasures Branch ===
The PLAAF [[Electronic Countermeasures|ECM]] (or [[electronic warfare]]) troops (电子对抗兵) were organized as an independent branch in 2009, being separated from the then joint Electronic Countermeasures and Radar Department (电子对抗雷达部). The PLAAF HQ most likely directly manages all ECM activities throughout the PLAAF.{{sfn|Allen|2023}}

=== Communications Corps ===

The PLAAF communication (or signals) units were raised into a branch ( 通信兵 ) in 2008. Today, the Communications Branch appears to be responsible for providing communications, navigation, and automated command support to the entire PLAAF, under the Staff Department's Information and Communications Bureau (信息通信局). All HQ units, PLAAF HQ, TCAF HQ, Base HQ, brigade, regiment and air station HQs have organic signals troops. Kenneth Allen points out that a high percentage of communications personnel are female.{{sfn|Allen|2023}}

The PLAAF HQ and each TCAF HQ has a [[regiment grade]] General Communications
Station Center (通信总站中心) assigned to them, which are likely to also be their radar
intelligence central station (雷达情报总站).{{sfn|Allen|2023}} Each TCAF seems to have subordinate several communications brigades. Communications regiments (通信团) are assigned to various organizations, such as the PLAAF HQ's Staff Department and the Airborne Corps HQ. Each Base Staff Department has its own subordinate Communications Station (通信站) and each Command Post has a communications battalion. Each brigade has subordinate battalions, elements, groups, companies, and/or stations depending on their missions and locations, often mobile facilities. The PLAAF HQ also has at least one subordinate communications training base (通信训练基地) located in [[Baoding]].

== Order of battle ==
{{Main|People's Liberation Army Air Force Order of Battle}}

== Airbases ==
{{Main list|List of People's Liberation Army Air Force airbases}}

The PLAAF has over 150 air bases distributed across each theater command.<ref>{{cite web |title=Meet the New PLAAF |url=https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0113plaaf/ |access-date=2022-10-17 |website=Air & Space Forces Magazine |language=en-US |archive-date=21 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221021003546/https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0113plaaf/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

== Equipment ==
{{Main list|List of active People's Liberation Army Air Force aircraft|List of active People's Liberation Army aircraft|List of historic aircraft of the People's Liberation Army Air Force|People's Liberation Army Air Force Airborne Corps#Equipment}}

The People's Liberation Army Air Force operates a large and varied fleet of some 4,000 aircraft, of which around 2,566 are combat aircraft (fighter, attack, and bombers).<ref name="IISS_2023a">{{cite book |title=The Military Balance 2023 |date=15 February 2023 |publisher=Routledge |location=London |chapter=6 Asia |isbn=978-1-003-40022-6 |doi=10.4324/9781003400226 |author=The International Institute For Strategic Studies (IISS) |s2cid=256916955}}</ref> According to [[FlightGlobal]], China has the second-largest active combat aircraft fleet and the third-largest total aircraft fleet in the world.<ref name=":02">{{cite web |last=Embraer |first=In association with |title=2023 World Air Forces directory |url=https://www.flightglobal.com/reports/2023-world-air-forces-directory/151088.article |access-date=2022-12-03 |website=Flight Global |language=en |archive-date=7 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221207235701/https://www.flightglobal.com/reports/2023-world-air-forces-directory/151088.article |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="World Air Forces 2023" /> In 2023, the [[People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force|PLANAF]] transferred the majority of its fixed-wing combat aircraft to the PLAAF, with the intent of simplifying logistics and focusing on carrier-based planes.<ref name="IISS_2024">{{cite book |title=The Military Balance 2024 |date=15 February 2024 |publisher=Routledge |location=London |chapter=6 Asia |isbn=978-1-032-78004-7 |author=The International Institute For Strategic Studies (IISS)}}</ref>

According to the [[International Institute for Strategic Studies]], PLAAF combat pilots acquire an average of 100-150 flying hours annually.{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2014|page=236}}<ref name="IISS2022_p261">[[International Institute for Strategic Studies]]: The Military Balance 2022, p.261</ref>

According to the Department of the Air Force's [[China Aerospace Studies Institute]] (CASI) the PLAAF has a long history of developing [[Unmanned aerial vehicle|UAVs]], and continues to work on their development.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Kania |first=Elsa |date=Aug 8, 2018 |title=The PLA's Unmanned Aerial Systems – New Capabilities for a "New Era" of Chinese Military Power |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLAAF/2018-08-29%20PLAs_Unmanned_Aerial_Systems.pdf |website=www.airuniversity.af.edu}}</ref>
===Air defense===
The People's Liberation Army Air Force operates a multi-layered, integrated air defense system combining [[radar station]]s, [[electronic warfare]] systems, [[early warning]] and surveillance zones, and air-[[missile defense]] systems of various ranges.<ref name="china_iads" />

Chinese air defense systems are highly distributed and mobile, in order to improve survivability against [[Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses|SEAD]] and [[Destruction of Enemy Air Defense|DEAD]] missions.<ref name="china_iads" />{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2021|page=255}}

{| class="wikitable"
|+
! style="text-align:center; background:#acc;" |Name
! style="text-align: center; background:#acc;" |Origin
! style="text-align:l center; background:#acc;" |Type
! style="text-align:left; background:#acc;"|Variant
! style="text-align:center; background:#acc;" |In service
! style="text-align: center; background:#acc;" |Notes
|-
! colspan="6" style="align: center; background: lavender;" | [[Surface-to-air missile|SAM]]
|-
| [[HQ-9]]
| [[China]]
| [[Surface-to-air missile|Long-range SAM]]
| HQ-9/9B/9C
| 292+{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|pp=245-246}}
|derivative of the [[S-300 missile system]]<ref name="rusi_iads_bronk" /> 
|-
|[[HQ-19]]
|China
|Long-range SAM
|
|n/a<ref>{{Cite web |last=Wong |first=Hayley |date=2025-03-19 |title=China's rival to US' THAAD: a missile that can counter hypersonic weapons |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3302865/chinas-hq-19-system-shield-against-hypersonic-weapons-and-nuclear-threats |access-date=2025-03-30 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en}}</ref>
|
|-
| [[HQ-22]]
| China
| Long-range SAM
|HQ-22/22A
| 130+{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|pp=245-246}}
| 
|-
| [[S-300 missile system|S-300]]
| [[Russia]]
| Long-range SAM
| S-300PMU/U1/U2
| 216{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|pp=245-246}}
| 
|-
| [[S-400 missile system|S-400]]
| Russia
| Long-range SAM
|
| 32{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|pp=245-246}}
| 
|-
| [[HQ-12]]
| China
| [[Surface-to-air missile|Medium-range SAM]]
|
| 150{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|pp=245-246}}
|
|-
| [[HQ-6]]
| China
| [[Surface-to-air missile|Short-range SAM]]
| HQ-6A/6D
| 74+{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|pp=245-246}}
| 
|-
|[[HQ-11]]
|China
|Short-range SAM
|
|4+{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|pp=245-246}}
|
|-
! colspan="6" style="align: center; background: lavender;" | [[Anti-aircraft warfare|Anti-aircraft]] gun
|-
| [[AZP S-60]]{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|pp=245-246}}
| Soviet Union
| Anti-aircraft [[autocannon]]
| PG-59
| 
| 
|}

==See also==
* [[List of historic aircraft of the People's Liberation Army Air Force]]
* [[People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force]]
* [[People's Liberation Army Ground Force]]
* [[List of aircraft produced by China]]
* [[List of Chinese aircraft engines]]
* [[People's Liberation Army Air Force Airborne Corps]]

==Notes==
{{notelist}}
{{NoteFoot}}

== References ==
=== Citations ===
{{reflist|33em|refs=

<ref name="china_iads">{{cite web |url=https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/modern-russian-and-chinese-integrated-air-defence-systems-nature-threat-growth-trajectory-and |title=Modern Russian and Chinese Integrated Air Defence Systems: The Nature of the Threat, Growth Trajectory and Western Options |website=Royal United Services Institute |date=15 January 2020 |first=Justin |last=Bronk |access-date=14 January 2023 |archive-date=14 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230114004017/https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/modern-russian-and-chinese-integrated-air-defence-systems-nature-threat-growth-trajectory-and/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="rusi_iads_bronk">{{cite report |last1=Bronk |first1=Justin |date=January 2020 |title=Modern Russian and Chinese Integrated Air Defence Systems: The Nature of the Threat, Growth Trajectory and Western Options |url=https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/modern-russian-and-chinese-integrated-air-defence-systems-nature-threat-growth-trajectory-and/ |publisher=Royal United Services Institute |page=20 |access-date=11 December 2021 |archive-date=12 May 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240512231252/https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/modern-russian-and-chinese-integrated-air-defence-systems-nature-threat-growth-trajectory-and/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="World Air Forces 2023">{{cite news |url=https://www.flightglobal.com/download?ac=90688 |title=World Air Forces 2023 |newspaper=Flight Global |publisher=Flightglobal Insight |year=2022 |access-date=8 March 2023 |archive-date=7 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221207224755/https://www.flightglobal.com/download?ac=90688 |url-status=live }}</ref>
}}

=== Sources ===
{{refbegin}}
* {{cite book |last=Allen |first=Kenneth W. |chapter=The Organizational Structure of the PLAAF |title=The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities |chapter-url=http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/chinese-air-force.pdf |year=2012 |publisher=[[National Defense University Press]] |isbn=978-0-16-091386-0 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170712121335/http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/chinese-air-force.pdf |archive-date=2017-07-12 |url-status=live }}
* {{Cite web |last=Allen |first=Kenneth W. |date=2023-08-29 |title=Current Overview of the PLA Air Force's Organizational Structure |url=https://cira.exovera.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/PLAAF-Overview.pdf |access-date=2025-03-11 |website=Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis}}
* Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, [https://cdn.loc.gov/master/frd/frdcstdy/ch/chinacountrystud00word/chinacountrystud00word_djvu.txt A Country Study: China] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170216100624/https://cdn.loc.gov/master/frd/frdcstdy/ch/chinacountrystud00word/chinacountrystud00word_djvu.txt |date=16 February 2017 }}, 1987
* {{cite book |author=International Institute for Strategic Studies |editor-last = Hacket |editor-first = James |title = The Military Balance 2014 |publisher = Routledge |location = Oxfordshire |year = 2014 |isbn = 978-1-85743-722-5 |author-link = International Institute for Strategic Studies}}
* {{cite book |author=International Institute for Strategic Studies |title = The Military Balance 2020 |date=15 February 2020 |publisher = [[Routledge]] |location = London, England |isbn = 978-0-367-46639-8}}
* {{cite book |author=International Institute for Strategic Studies |title = The Military Balance 2021 | publisher = Routledge | year = 2021 | isbn = 978-1032012278 |author-link = International Institute for Strategic Studies}}
* {{Cite book |author=International Institute for Strategic Studies |title=The Military Balance 2025 |date=2025 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-041-04967-8  |location=London}}
* {{cite report |last1=Mulvenon |first1=James C. |last2=Yang |first2=Andrew N. D. |date=2002 |title=The People's Liberation Army as Organization: Reference Volume v1.0 |url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF182.html |publisher= RAND Corporation |docket=CF-182}}
* {{cite book |editor1-last=Saunders |editor1-first=Phillip C. |editor2-last=Ding |editor2-first=Arthur S. |editor3-last=Scobell |editor3-first=Andrew |editor4-last=Yang |editor4-first=Andrew N.D. |editor5-last=Joel |editor5-first=Wuthnow |title=Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/Chairman-Xi-Remakes-the-PLA/ |date=2019 |publisher=National Defense University Press |location=Washington, D.C. |isbn=978-1070233420 |ref={{harvid|Saunders et al.|2019}}}}
* {{cite book |last = Trevethan |first = Lawrence |date = 25 September 2019 |title = "Brigadization" of the PLA Air Force |url = https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Brigade_paper.pdf |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210405123026/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Brigade_paper.pdf |url-status = dead |archive-date = 5 April 2021 |publisher = United States Air Force Air University China Aerospace Studies Institute |isbn = 978-1-7187-2115-9 }}
*{{cite book |last1=Wood |first1=Peter |last2=Stewart |first2=Robert |date=26 September 2019 |title=China's Aviation Industry: Lumbering Forward |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/Books/Lumbering_Forward_Aviation_Industry_Web_2019-08-02.pdf?ver=2019-08-05-102041-830 |publisher=[[United States Air Force]] [[Air University (United States Air Force)|Air University]] China Aerospace Studies Institute |isbn=978-1-0827-4040-4 |access-date=8 February 2021 |archive-date=28 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210628053922/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/Books/Lumbering_Forward_Aviation_Industry_Web_2019-08-02.pdf?ver=2019-08-05-102041-830 |url-status=dead }}
* {{cite book |last1=Xiang |first1=Xiaoming |chapter=The PLAAF's Evolving Influence within the PLA and upon National Policy |title=The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities |chapter-url=http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/chinese-air-force.pdf |year=2012 |publisher=[[National Defense University Press]] |isbn=978-0-16-091386-0 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170712121335/http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/chinese-air-force.pdf |archive-date=2017-07-12 |url-status=live }}
{{refend}}

== Further reading ==
* Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper: ''Modern Chinese Warplanes, Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation'', Harpia Publishing (2012), {{ISBN|0985455403}}, {{ISBN|978-0985455408}}
* Gordon, Yefim and Komissarov, Dmitry. ''Chinese Aircraft''. Hikoki Publications. Manchester. 2008. {{ISBN|978-1-902109-04-6}}

== External links ==
{{Commons category|Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force}}
* [http://www.sinodefence.com/ Articles on the Chinese military, from Sinodefence.com]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20031207153458/http://www.softwar.net/plaaf.html Chinese Air Power]
* [http://www.ausairpower.net/region.html Regional Capability Growth on APA]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20061207070630/http://www.ausairpower.net/Analysis-PLAAF-Aug-02.pdf The Sleeping Giant Awakens (Australian Aviation)]
* [http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-AFBs.html PLA Airbase Page on APA]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20071210162051/http://www.freewebs.com/riverman/flygvapenplaaf.htm/ PLA idag-PLAAF] (Swedish)
* USAF [[Air University (United States Air Force)|Air University]], {{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20110815154405/http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nasic/pla_af_2010.pdf The PLAAF in 2010]}}

{{Clear}}{{Structure of the People's Liberation Army Air Force}}{{People's Liberation Army}}
{{Chinese Military Aircraft}}
{{Chinese Missiles}}
{{Air forces}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:People's Liberation Army Air Force| ]]
[[Category:People's Liberation Army branches|3]]
[[Category:Military units and formations established in 1949]]
[[Category:1949 establishments in China]]
[[Category:Theater Command grade units of the Armed Forces of China]]