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{{Short description|Philosophical tradition}}
{{About|the philosophical movement}}
{{More citations needed|date=January 2025}}
{{Use American English|date=January 2019}} 
{{Use mdy dates|date=January 2019}}
{{Research|expanded=Methodology}}

'''Pragmatism''' is a [[philosophical tradition]] that views [[language]] and [[thought]] as [[tool]]s for [[prediction]], [[problem solving]], and [[action (philosophy)|action]], rather than describing, representing, or mirroring [[reality]]. Pragmatists contend that most philosophical topics—such as the nature of knowledge, language, concepts, meaning, belief, and science—are best viewed in terms of their practical uses and successes.

Pragmatism began in the United States in the 1870s. Its origins are often attributed to philosophers [[Charles Sanders Peirce]], [[William James]] and [[John Dewey]]. In 1878, Peirce described it in his [[pragmatic maxim]]: "Consider the practical effects of the objects of your conception. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object."<ref name="Peirce1878">Peirce, C.S. (1878), "[[s:How to Make Our Ideas Clear|How to Make Our Ideas Clear]]", ''Popular Science Monthly'', v. 12, 286–302. Reprinted often, including ''Collected Papers'' v. 5, paragraphs 388–410 and ''Essential Peirce'' v. 1, 124–141. See end of §II for the pragmatic maxim. See third and fourth paragraphs in §IV for the discoverability of truth and the real by sufficient investigation.</ref>

==Origins==
[[File:Charles Sanders Peirce theb3558.jpg|thumb|Charles Peirce, an American polymath, first identified pragmatism.]]

Pragmatism as a philosophical movement began in the United States around 1870.<ref name="Stanford 2013">{{Cite SEP |last=Hookway |first=Christopher |title=Pragmatism |url-id= pragmatism |edition=Spring 2010 |access-date=13 September 2013 |date=16 August 2008}}</ref> Charles Sanders Peirce (and his pragmatic maxim) is given credit for its development,<ref name= "HaackLane2006">{{cite book|
first1= Susan| last1= Haack| first2= Robert Edwin | last2=!Lane| author-link=Susan Haack|title=Pragmatism, old & new: selected writings|date=11 April 2006| publisher= Prometheus Books|isbn=978-1-59102-359-3|pages=18–67}}</ref> 
along with later 20th-century contributors, William James and John Dewey.<ref name= "BiestaBurbules">Biesta, G.J.J. & Burbules, N. (2003). ''Pragmatism and educational research''. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.</ref> Its direction was determined by [[The Metaphysical Club]] members Peirce, Dewey, James, [[Chauncey Wright]] and [[George Herbert Mead]].

The word pragmatic has existed in English since the 1500s, borrowed from French and derived from Greek via Latin. The Greek word ''pragma'', meaning business, deed or act, is a noun derived from the verb ''prassein'', to do.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia | encyclopedia = Barnhart Concise Dictionary of Etymology| title = pragmatic | year =| page =| publisher =| isbn=}}</ref>
The first use in print of the name ''pragmatism'' was in 1898 by James, who credited Peirce with [[Neologism|coining the term]] during the early 1870s.<ref>James, William (1898), "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results", delivered before the Philosophical Union of the University of California at Berkeley, August 26, 1898, and first printed in the ''University Chronicle'' 1, September 1898, pp. 287–310. ''Internet Archive'' [https://archive.org/stream/philosophicalcon00jameuoft#page/n4/mode/1up Eprint]. On [https://archive.org/stream/philosophicalcon00jameuoft#page/290/mode/1up p. 290]: {{quote|I refer to Mr. Charles S. Peirce, with whose very existence as a philosopher I dare say many of you are unacquainted. He is one of the most original of contemporary thinkers; and the principle of practicalism or pragmatism, as he called it, when I first heard him enunciate it at Cambridge in the early [1870s] is the clue or compass by following which I find myself more and more confirmed in believing we may keep our feet upon the proper trail.}}
James credited Peirce again in 1906 lectures published in 1907 as ''[[s:Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking|Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking]]'', see Lecture 2, fourth paragraph.</ref> James regarded Peirce's "Illustrations of the Logic of Science" series—including "[[s:The Fixation of Belief|The Fixation of Belief]]" (1877), and especially "[[s:How to Make Our Ideas Clear|How to Make Our Ideas Clear]]" (1878)—as the foundation of pragmatism.<ref>{{Cite book|last=James|first=William|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wRMXL4uYEegC&pg=PA124|title=The Will to Believe: And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy|date=1896|publisher=Longmans, Green|isbn=978-0-7905-7948-1|language=en}}</ref><ref>In addition to James's lectures and publications on pragmatist ideas (''Will to Believe'' 1897, etc.) wherein he credited Peirce, James also arranged for two paid series of lectures by Peirce, including the 1903 Harvard lectures on pragmatism. See pp. 261–264, 290–2, & 324 in Brent, Joseph (1998), ''Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life'', 2nd edition.</ref> 
Peirce in turn wrote in 1906<ref>Peirce, C.S., "The Founding of Pragmatism", manuscript written 1906, published in ''The Hound & Horn: A Harvard Miscellany'' v. II, n. 3, April–June 1929, pp. 282–285, see 283–284, reprinted 1934 as "Historical Affinities and Genesis" in ''[[Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography#CP|Collected Papers]]'' v. 5, paragraphs 11–13, see 12.</ref> that [[Nicholas St. John Green]] had been instrumental by emphasizing the importance of applying [[Alexander Bain (philosopher)|Alexander Bain]]'s definition of belief, which was "that upon which a man is prepared to act". Peirce wrote that "from this definition, pragmatism is scarce more than a corollary; so that I am disposed to think of him as the grandfather of pragmatism". John Shook has said, "Chauncey Wright also deserves considerable credit, for as both Peirce and James recall, it was Wright who demanded a [[phenomenalist]] and [[Fallibilism|fallibilist]] [[empiricism]] as an alternative to rationalistic speculation."<ref>{{Cite web|last= Shook|first=John|title=The Metaphysical Club|url=http://www.pragmatism.org/research/metaphysical_club.htm |website= pragmatism.org | publisher = | access-date=2023-03-14}}</ref>

Peirce developed the idea that inquiry depends on real doubt, not mere verbal or [[hyperbolic doubt]],<ref>Peirce, C.S. (1877), [[s:The Fixation of Belief|The Fixation of Belief]], ''Popular Science Monthly'', v. 12, pp. 1–15. Reprinted often, including ''Collected Papers'' v. 5, paragraphs 358–387 and ''Essential Peirce'' v. 1, pp. 109–123).</ref> and said that, in order to understand a conception in a fruitful way, "Consider the practical effects of the objects of your conception. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object",<ref name="Peirce1878"/> which he later called the [[pragmatic maxim]]. It equates any conception of an object to the general extent of the conceivable implications for informed practice of that object's effects. This is the heart of his pragmatism as a method of experimentational mental reflection arriving at conceptions in terms of conceivable confirmatory and disconfirmatory circumstances—a method hospitable to the generation of explanatory hypotheses, and conducive to the employment and improvement of verification. Typical of Peirce is his concern with inference to explanatory hypotheses as outside the usual foundational alternative between deductivist rationalism and inductivist empiricism, although he was a [[Charles Sanders Peirce#Mathematics|mathematical logician]] and a [[Founders of statistics|founder of statistics]].{{Citation needed|date=November 2023}}

Peirce lectured and further wrote on pragmatism to make clear his own interpretation. While framing a conception's meaning in terms of conceivable tests, Peirce emphasized that, since a conception is general, its meaning, its intellectual purport, equates to its acceptance's implications for general practice, rather than to any definite set of real effects (or test results); a conception's clarified meaning points toward its conceivable verifications, but the outcomes are not meanings, but individual upshots. Peirce in 1905 coined the new name [[pragmaticism]] "for the precise purpose of expressing the original definition",<ref>{{cite journal |last= Peirce |first=C. S. |date=April 1905 |title=What Pragmatism Is |journal=The Monist |volume=15 |issue=2 |pages= [https://books.google.com/books?id=j6oLAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA161 161–181]; see [https://books.google.com/books?id=j6oLAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA165 165–166] |doi=10.5840/monist190515230}} Reprinted in ''Collected Papers'' v. 5, paragraphs 411–437, see 414.</ref> saying that "all went happily" with James's and [[F.&nbsp;C.&nbsp;S. Schiller]]'s variant uses of the old name "pragmatism" and that he nonetheless coined the new name because of the old name's growing use in "literary journals, where it gets abused". Yet in a 1906 manuscript, he cited as causes his differences with James and Schiller<ref>Manuscript "A Sketch of Logical Critics", ''Essential Peirce'' v. 2, pp. 451–462, see pp. 457–458. Peirce wrote:
{{quote|I have always fathered my pragmati''ci''sm (as I have called it since James and Schiller made the word [pragmatism] imply "the will to believe", the mutability of truth, the soundness of Zeno's refutation of motion, and pluralism generally), upon Kant, Berkeley, and Leibniz. ...}}</ref> and, in a 1908 publication,<ref name=NA>Peirce, C. S. (1908). "[[s:A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God|A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God]]", ''Hibbert Journal'' 7, reprinted in ''Collected Papers'' v. 6, paragraphs 452–85, and in ''Essential Peirce'' v. 2, 434–450, and elsewhere. After discussing James, Peirce stated (Section V, fourth paragraph) as the specific occasion of his coinage "pragmaticism", journalist, pragmatist, and literary author [[Giovanni Papini]]'s declaration of pragmatism's indefinability: see, for example, Papini's "What Is Pragmatism Like", published in translation in October 1907 in ''Popular Science Monthly'' v. 71, pp. [https://books.google.com/books?id=DKkWAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA351 351–358].</ref> his differences with James as well as literary author [[Giovanni Papini]]. Peirce regarded his own views that truth is immutable and infinity is real, as being opposed by the other pragmatists, but he remained allied with them about the falsity of [[necessitarianism]] and about the reality of generals and habits understood in terms of potential concrete effects even if unactualized.<ref name=NA />

Pragmatism enjoyed renewed attention after [[Willard Van Orman Quine]] and [[Wilfrid Sellars]] used a revised pragmatism to criticize [[logical positivism]] in the 1960s. Inspired by the work of Quine and Sellars, a brand of pragmatism known sometimes as [[neopragmatism]] gained influence through [[Richard Rorty]], the most influential of the late 20th century pragmatists along with [[Hilary Putnam]] and [[Robert Brandom]]. Contemporary pragmatism may be broadly divided into a strict [[Analytic philosophy|analytic tradition]] and a "neo-classical" pragmatism (such as [[Susan Haack]]) that adheres to the work of Peirce, James, and Dewey.{{Citation needed|date=November 2023}}

== Core tenets ==

A few of the various but often interrelated positions characteristic of philosophers working from a pragmatist approach include:

*[[Epistemology]] (justification): a [[Coherentism|coherentist]] theory of justification that rejects the claim that all knowledge and justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of noninferential knowledge or justified belief. Coherentists hold that justification is solely a function of some relationship between beliefs, none of which are privileged beliefs in the way maintained by [[foundationalism|foundationalist]] theories of justification.
*[[Epistemology]] (truth): a [[Deflationary theory of truth|deflationary]] or [[Pragmatic theory of truth|pragmatic]] theory of truth; the former is the epistemological claim that assertions that predicate the truth of a statement do not attribute a property called truth to such a statement while the latter is the epistemological claim that assertions that predicate the truth of a statement attribute the property of useful-to-believe to such a statement.
*[[Metaphysics]]: a [[Pluralism (philosophy)|pluralist]] view that there is more than one sound way to conceptualize the world and its content.
*[[Philosophy of science]]: an [[Instrumentalism|instrumentalist]] and [[scientific anti-realism|scientific anti-realist]] view that a scientific concept or theory should be evaluated by how effectively it explains and predicts phenomena, as opposed to how accurately it describes objective reality.
*[[Philosophy of language]]: an anti-[[representationalist]] view that rejects analyzing the [[Semantics (natural language)|semantic meaning]] of propositions, mental states, and statements in terms of a correspondence or representational relationship and instead analyzes semantic meaning in terms of notions like dispositions to action, inferential relationships, and/or functional roles (e.g. [[Behaviorism#Behaviorism in philosophy|behaviorism]] and [[inferentialism]]). Not to be confused with [[pragmatics]], a sub-field of [[linguistics]] with no relation to philosophical pragmatism.
*Additionally, forms of [[empiricism]], [[fallibilism]], [[verificationism]], and a [[Naturalized epistemology|Quinean naturalist]] metaphilosophy are all commonly elements of pragmatist philosophies. Many pragmatists are [[Factual relativism|epistemological relativists]] and see this to be an important facet of their pragmatism (e.g. [[Joseph Margolis]]), but this is controversial and other pragmatists argue such relativism to be seriously misguided (e.g. [[Hilary Putnam]], [[Susan Haack]]).

===Anti-reification of concepts and theories===
Dewey in ''The Quest for Certainty'' criticized what he called "the philosophical fallacy": Philosophers often take categories (such as the mental and the physical) for granted because they don't realize that these are [[Nominalism|nominal]] concepts that were invented to help solve specific problems.<ref name="Hildebrand 2003">{{cite book |last=Hildebrand |first=David L. |date=2003 |title=Beyond realism and antirealism: John Dewey and the neopragmatists |series=The Vanderbilt library of American philosophy |location=Nashville |publisher=[[Vanderbilt University Press]] |isbn=082651426X |oclc=51053926 |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/beyondrealismant0000hild }}</ref> This causes metaphysical and conceptual confusion. Various examples are the "[[Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate Being]]" of [[Hegelian]] philosophers, the belief in a "[[Absolute intrinsic value denial|realm of value]]", the idea that logic, because it is an abstraction from concrete thought, has nothing to do with the action of concrete thinking.

David L. Hildebrand summarized the problem: "Perceptual inattention to the specific functions comprising inquiry led realists and idealists alike to formulate accounts of knowledge that project the products of extensive abstraction back onto experience."<ref name="Hildebrand 2003"/>{{rp|40}}

===Naturalism and anti-Cartesianism===
From the outset, pragmatists wanted to reform philosophy and bring it more in line with the scientific method as they understood it. They argued that idealist and realist philosophy had a tendency to present human knowledge as something beyond what science could grasp. They held that these philosophies then resorted either to a phenomenology inspired by Kant or to [[Correspondence theory of truth|correspondence theories of knowledge and truth]].{{Citation needed|date=February 2016}} Pragmatists criticized the former for its [[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]sm, and the latter because it takes [[Correspondence theory of truth|correspondence]] as an unanalyzable fact. Pragmatism instead tries to explain the relation between knower and known.

In 1868,<ref>{{cite journal |last=Peirce |first=C. S. |date=1868 |title=Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man |journal=[[Journal of Speculative Philosophy]] |volume=2 |issue=2 |pages=103–114 |jstor=25665643 |jstor-access=free |url=http://www.peirce.org/writings/p26.html}} Reprinted in ''Collected Peirce'' v. 5, paragraphs 213–263, ''Writings'' v. 2, pp. 193–211, ''Essential Peirce'' v. 2, pp. 11–27, and elsewhere.</ref> C.S. Peirce argued that there is no power of intuition in the sense of a cognition unconditioned by inference, and no power of introspection, intuitive or otherwise, and that awareness of an internal world is by hypothetical inference from external facts. Introspection and intuition were staple philosophical tools at least since Descartes. He argued that there is no absolutely first cognition in a cognitive process; such a process has its beginning but can always be analyzed into finer cognitive stages. That which we call introspection does not give privileged access to knowledge about the mind—the self is a concept that is derived from our interaction with the external world and not the other way around.<ref>De Waal 2005, pp. 7–10</ref> At the same time he held persistently that pragmatism and epistemology in general could not be derived from principles of psychology understood as a special science:<ref>{{cite journal |last=Kasser |first=Jeff |date=Summer 1999 |title=Peirce's Supposed Psychologism |journal=Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society |volume=35 |issue=3 |pages=501–526 |jstor=40320777 |url=https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/kasser/psychol.htm}}</ref> what we do think is too different from what we should think; in his "[[Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography#illus|Illustrations of the Logic of Science]]" series, Peirce formulated both pragmatism and principles of statistics as aspects of scientific method in general.<ref>Peirce held that (philosophical) logic is a [[normative]] field, that pragmatism is a method developed in it, and that philosophy, though not deductive or so general as mathematics, still concerns positive phenomena in general, including phenomena of matter and mind, without depending on special experiences or experiments such as those of [[optics]] and [[experimental psychology]], in both of which Peirce was active. See quotes under "[http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/philosophy.html Philosophy]" at the ''Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms''. Peirce also harshly criticized the Cartesian approach of starting from hyperbolic doubts rather than from the combination of established beliefs and genuine doubts. See the opening of his 1868 "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities", ''Journal of Speculative Philosophy'' v. 2, n. 3, pp. 140–157. Reprinted ''Collected Papers'' v. 5, paragraphs 264–317, ''Writings'' v. 2, pp. 211–242, and ''Essential Peirce'' v. 1, pp. 28–55. [http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/conseq/cn-frame.htm Eprint].</ref> This is an important point of disagreement with most other pragmatists, who advocate a more thorough naturalism and psychologism.

Richard Rorty expanded on these and other arguments in ''[[Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature]]'' in which he criticized attempts by many philosophers of science to carve out a space for epistemology that is entirely unrelated to—and sometimes thought of as superior to—the empirical sciences. [[Willard Van Orman Quine|W.V. Quine]], who was instrumental in bringing [[naturalized epistemology]] back into favor with his essay "Epistemology Naturalized",<ref>{{cite book |last=Quine |first=W. V. O. |date=1969 |chapter=Epistemology naturalized |title=Ontological relativity and other essays |series=The John Dewey essays in philosophy |location=New York |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |pages=[https://archive.org/details/ontologicalrelat0000quin/page/69 69–90] |isbn=0231033079 |oclc=51301 |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/ontologicalrelat0000quin/page/69 |chapter-url-access=registration}}</ref> also criticized "traditional" epistemology and its "Cartesian dream" of absolute certainty. The dream, he argued, was impossible in practice as well as misguided in theory, because it separates epistemology from scientific inquiry.

===Reconciliation of anti-skepticism and fallibilism===
[[File:Hilary Putnam.jpg|thumb|right|upright=0.9|Hilary Putnam said that the combination of antiskepticism and fallibilism is a central feature of pragmatism.<ref name=Putnam1994/><ref name=Rescher2007/><ref name=Tiercelin2014/>]]
[[Hilary Putnam]] has suggested that the reconciliation of anti-skepticism<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|last=McKinsey|first=Michael|title=Skepticism and Content Externalism|date=2018|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/skepticism-content-externalism/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|access-date=2023-03-14|edition=Summer 2018|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref> and [[fallibilism]] is the central goal of American pragmatism.<ref name=Putnam1994>{{cite book |last=Putnam |first=Hilary |date=1994 |chapter=Pragmatism and moral objectivity |title=Words and Life |location=Cambridge, MA |publisher=Harvard University Press |page=[https://archive.org/details/wordslife0000putn/page/152 152] |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/wordslife0000putn/page/152 |chapter-url-access=registration |isbn=9780674956063 |oclc=29218832 |quote=that one can be both fallibilistic ''and'' antiskeptical is perhaps ''the'' unique insight of American pragmatism}}</ref><ref name=Rescher2007>{{cite book |last=Rescher |first=Nicholas |author-link=Nicholas Rescher |date=2007 |chapter=Pragmatism |editor-last=Boundas |editor-first=Constantin V. |title=Edinburgh Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophies |location=Edinburgh |publisher=Edinburgh University Press |page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9jAkDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA137 137] |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9jAkDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA137 |isbn=9780748620975 |oclc=85690580}}</ref><ref name=Tiercelin2014>{{cite book |last=Tiercelin |first=Claudine |chapter=Why we should take a stand, and the stand we should take |date=2014-10-14 |chapter-url=http://books.openedition.org/cdf/3658 |title=The Pragmatists and the Human Logic of Truth |series=Philosophie de la connaissance |location=Paris |publisher=Collège de France |isbn=978-2-7226-0339-4 |access-date=2022-05-31}}</ref> Although all human knowledge is partial, with no ability to take a "God's-eye-view", this does not necessitate a globalized skeptical attitude, a radical [[philosophical skepticism]] (as distinguished from that which is called [[scientific skepticism]]). Peirce insisted that (1) in reasoning, there is the presupposition, and at least the hope,<ref>{{cite web |last=Peirce |first=C. S. |date=1902 |title=The Carnegie Institute Application, Memoir 10, MS L75.361-2 |url=https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-01.htm |website=arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu |access-date=2023-04-04}}</ref> that truth and the real are discoverable and would be discovered, sooner or later but still inevitably, by investigation taken far enough,<ref name=Peirce1878/> and (2) contrary to Descartes's famous and influential methodology in the ''[[Meditations on First Philosophy]]'', doubt cannot be feigned or created by verbal fiat to motivate fruitful inquiry, and much less can philosophy begin in universal doubt.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Peirce |first=C. S. |date=1868 |title=Some Consequences of Four Incapacities |journal=[[Journal of Speculative Philosophy]] |volume=2 |issue=3 |pages=140–157 |jstor=25665649 |jstor-access=free |url=http://www.peirce.org/writings/p27.html}} [https://books.google.com/books?id=YHkqP2JHJ_IC&pg=RA1-PA140 Google Books]. See opening pages. Reprinted in ''Collected Papers'' v. 5, paragraphs 264–317, ''Writings'' v. 2, pp. 211–242, ''Essential Peirce'' v. 1, pp. 28–55.</ref> Doubt, like belief, requires justification. Genuine doubt irritates and inhibits, in the sense that belief is that upon which one is prepared to act.<ref name=Peirce1878/> It arises from confrontation with some specific recalcitrant matter of fact (which Dewey called a "situation"), which unsettles our belief in some specific proposition. Inquiry is then the rationally self-controlled process of attempting to return to a settled state of belief about the matter. Note that anti-skepticism is a reaction to modern academic skepticism in the wake of Descartes. The pragmatist insistence that all knowledge is tentative is quite congenial to the older skeptical tradition.

===Theory of truth and epistemology===
{{main|Pragmatic theory of truth}}
{{Epistemology sidebar|expanded=Schools}}
Pragmatism was not the first to apply evolution to theories of knowledge: [[Schopenhauer]] advocated a biological idealism as what's useful to an organism to believe might differ wildly from what is true. Here knowledge and action are portrayed as two separate spheres with an absolute or [[Transcendental idealism|transcendental]] truth above and beyond any sort of inquiry organisms used to cope with life. Pragmatism challenges this idealism by providing an "ecological" account of knowledge: inquiry is how organisms can get a grip on their environment. ''Real'' and ''true'' are functional labels in inquiry and cannot be understood outside of this context. It is not ''realist'' in a traditionally robust sense of realism (what [[Hilary Putnam]] later called [[metaphysical realism]]), but it is [[Philosophical realism|realist]] in how it acknowledges an external world which must be dealt with.{{citation needed|date=June 2018}}

Many of James' best-turned phrases—"truth's cash value"<ref>James 1907, p.&nbsp;200</ref> and "the true is only the expedient in our way of thinking" <ref>James 1907, p.&nbsp;222</ref>—were taken out of context and caricatured in contemporary literature as representing the view where any idea with practical utility is true. William James wrote:

{{quotation|It is high time to urge the use of a little imagination in philosophy. The unwillingness of some of our critics to read any but the silliest of possible meanings into our statements is as discreditable to their imaginations as anything I know in recent philosophic history. Schiller says the truth is that which "works." Thereupon he is treated as one who limits verification to the lowest material utilities. Dewey says truth is what gives "satisfaction"! He is treated as one who believes in calling everything true which, if it were true, would be pleasant.<ref>James 1907, p.&nbsp;90</ref>}}

In reality, James asserts, the theory is a great deal more subtle.<ref group="nb">See Dewey 1910 for a "FAQ."</ref>

The role of belief in representing reality is widely debated in pragmatism. Is a belief valid when it represents reality? "Copying is one (and only one) genuine mode of knowing".<ref>James 1907, p.&nbsp;91</ref> Are beliefs dispositions which qualify as true or false depending on how helpful they prove in inquiry and in action? Is it only in the struggle of intelligent organisms with the surrounding environment that beliefs acquire meaning? Does a belief only become true when it succeeds in this struggle? In James's pragmatism nothing practical or useful is held to be [[Logical truth|necessarily true]] nor is anything which helps to survive merely in the short term. For example, to believe my cheating spouse is faithful may help me feel better now, but it is certainly not useful from a more long-term perspective because it doesn't accord with the facts (and is therefore not true).

==In other fields==
While pragmatism started simply as a criterion of meaning, it quickly expanded to become a full-fledged epistemology with wide-ranging implications for the entire philosophical field. Pragmatists who work in these fields share a common inspiration, but their work is diverse and there are no received views.

===Philosophy of science<!--'Conceptual pragmatism' redirects here-->===
In the philosophy of science, [[instrumentalism]] is the view that concepts and theories are merely useful instruments and progress in science cannot be couched in terms of concepts and theories somehow mirroring reality. Instrumentalist philosophers often define scientific progress as nothing more than an improvement in explaining and predicting phenomena. Instrumentalism does not state that truth does not matter, but rather provides a specific answer to the question of what truth and falsity mean and how they function in science.

One of [[C.&nbsp;I. Lewis]]' main arguments in ''Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge'' (1929) was that science does not merely provide a copy of reality but must work with conceptual systems and that those are chosen for pragmatic reasons, that is, because they aid inquiry. Lewis' own development of multiple [[modal logic]]s is a case in point. Lewis is sometimes called a proponent of '''conceptual pragmatism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> because of this.<ref>Sandra B. Rosenthal, ''C.I. Lewis in Focus: The Pulse of Pragmatism'', Indiana University Press, 2007, p. 28.</ref>

Another development is the cooperation of [[logical positivism]] and pragmatism in the works of [[Charles W. Morris]] and [[Rudolf Carnap]]. The influence of pragmatism on these writers is mostly limited to the incorporation of the [[pragmatic maxim]] into their epistemology. Pragmatists with a broader conception of the movement do not often refer to them.

[[W.&nbsp;V. Quine]]'s paper "[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]", published in 1951, is one of the most celebrated papers of 20th-century philosophy in the analytic tradition. The paper is an attack on two central tenets of the logical positivists' philosophy. One is the distinction between analytic statements (tautologies and contradictions) whose truth (or falsehood) is a function of the meanings of the words in the statement ('all bachelors are unmarried'), and synthetic statements, whose truth (or falsehood) is a function of (contingent) states of affairs. The other is reductionism, the theory that each meaningful statement gets its meaning from some logical construction of terms which refers exclusively to immediate experience. Quine's argument brings to mind Peirce's insistence that axioms are not a priori truths but synthetic statements.

===Logic===
Later in his life Schiller became famous for his attacks on logic in his textbook, ''Formal Logic''. By then, Schiller's pragmatism had become the nearest of any of the classical pragmatists to an [[ordinary language philosophy]]. Schiller sought to undermine the very possibility of formal logic, by showing that words only had meaning when used in context. The least famous of Schiller's main works was the constructive sequel to his destructive book ''Formal Logic''. In this sequel, ''Logic for Use'', Schiller attempted to construct a new logic to replace the formal logic that he had criticized in ''Formal Logic''. What he offers is something philosophers would recognize today as a logic covering the context of discovery and the hypothetico-deductive method.

Whereas Schiller dismissed the possibility of formal logic, most pragmatists are critical rather of its pretension to ultimate validity and see logic as one logical tool among others—or perhaps, considering the multitude of formal logics, one set of tools among others. This is the view of C.&nbsp;I. Lewis. C.&nbsp;S. Peirce developed multiple methods for doing formal logic.

[[Stephen Toulmin]]'s ''The Uses of Argument'' inspired scholars in informal logic and rhetoric studies (although it is an epistemological work).

===Metaphysics===
James and Dewey were [[empiricism|empirical]] thinkers in the most straightforward fashion: experience is the ultimate test and experience is what needs to be explained. They were dissatisfied with ordinary empiricism because, in the tradition dating from Hume, empiricists had a tendency to think of experience as nothing more than individual sensations. To the pragmatists, this went against the spirit of empiricism: we should try to explain all that is given in experience including connections and meaning, instead of explaining them away and positing sense data as the ultimate reality. [[Radical empiricism]], or Immediate Empiricism in Dewey's words, wants to give a place to meaning and value instead of explaining them away as subjective additions to a world of whizzing atoms.

[[File:Chicago Club 1896.jpg|thumb|right|The "Chicago Club" including Mead, Dewey, Angell, and Moore. Pragmatism is sometimes called American pragmatism because so many of its proponents were and are Americans.]]
William James gives an interesting example of this philosophical shortcoming:
{{quotation|[A young graduate] began by saying that he had always taken for granted that when you entered a philosophic classroom you had to open relations with a universe entirely distinct from the one you left behind you in the street. The two were supposed, he said, to have so little to do with each other, that you could not possibly occupy your mind with them at the same time. The world of concrete personal experiences to which the street belongs is multitudinous beyond imagination, tangled, muddy, painful and perplexed. The world to which your philosophy-professor introduces you is simple, clean and noble. The contradictions of real life are absent from it. ... In point of fact it is far less an account of this actual world than a clear addition built upon it ... It is no explanation of our concrete universe<ref>James 1907, pp. 8–9</ref>}}

[[F.&nbsp;C.&nbsp;S. Schiller]]'s first book ''Riddles of the Sphinx'' was published before he became aware of the growing pragmatist movement taking place in America. In it, Schiller argues for a middle ground between materialism and absolute metaphysics. These opposites are comparable to what William James called tough-minded empiricism and tender-minded rationalism. Schiller contends on the one hand that mechanistic naturalism cannot make sense of the "higher" aspects of our world. These include free will, consciousness, purpose, universals and some would add God. On the other hand, abstract metaphysics cannot make sense of the "lower" aspects of our world (e.g. the imperfect, change, physicality). While Schiller is vague about the exact sort of middle ground he is trying to establish, he suggests that metaphysics is a tool that can aid inquiry, but that it is valuable only insofar as it does help in explanation.

In the second half of the 20th century, [[Stephen Toulmin]] argued that the need to distinguish between reality and appearance only arises within an explanatory scheme and therefore that there is no point in asking what "ultimate reality" consists of. More recently, a similar idea has been suggested by the [[postanalytic philosophy|postanalytic philosopher]] [[Daniel Dennett]], who argues that anyone who wants to understand the world has to acknowledge both the "syntactical" aspects of reality (i.e., whizzing atoms) and its emergent or "semantic" properties (i.e., meaning and value).{{citation needed|date=July 2014}}

Radical empiricism gives answers to questions about the limits of science, the nature of meaning and value and the workability of [[reductionism]]. These questions feature prominently in current debates about the [[relationship between religion and science]], where it is often assumed—most pragmatists would disagree—that science degrades everything that is meaningful into "merely" [[materialism|physical phenomena]].

===Philosophy of mind===
Both [[John Dewey]] in ''Experience and Nature'' (1929) and, half a century later, [[Richard Rorty]] in his ''Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature'' (1979) argued that much of the debate about the relation of the mind to the body results from conceptual confusions. They argue instead that there is no need to posit the mind or mindstuff as an [[ontological]] category.

Pragmatists disagree over whether philosophers ought to adopt a quietist or a naturalist stance toward the mind-body problem. The former, including Rorty, want to do away with the problem because they believe it is a pseudo-problem, whereas the latter believe that it is a meaningful empirical question. {{citation needed|date=September 2019}}

===Ethics===
{{main|Pragmatic ethics}}

Pragmatism sees no fundamental difference between practical and theoretical reason, nor any ontological difference between facts and values. Pragmatist ethics is broadly [[humanism|humanist]] because it sees no ultimate test of morality beyond what matters for us as humans. Good values are those for which we have good reasons, viz. the [[good reasons approach]]. The pragmatist formulation pre-dates those of other philosophers who have stressed important similarities between values and facts such as [[Jerome Schneewind]] and [[John Searle]].

[[File:william james small.png|thumb|right|William James tried to show the meaningfulness of (some kinds of) spirituality but, like other pragmatists, did not see religion as the basis of meaning or morality.]]
William James' contribution to ethics, as laid out in his essay ''The Will to Believe'' has often been misunderstood as a plea for relativism or irrationality. On its own terms it argues that ethics always involves a certain degree of trust or faith and that we cannot always wait for adequate proof when making moral decisions.
{{quotation|Moral questions immediately present themselves as questions whose solution cannot wait for sensible proof. A moral question is a question not of what sensibly exists, but of what is good, or would be good if it did exist. ... A social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs. Wherever a desired result is achieved by the co-operation of many independent persons, its existence as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those immediately concerned. A government, an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is even attempted.<ref>[http://falcon.jmu.edu/~omearawm/ph101willtobelieve.html The Will to Believe] James 1896</ref>}}

Of the classical pragmatists, John Dewey wrote most extensively about morality and democracy.<ref>Edel 1993</ref> In his classic article "Three Independent Factors in Morals",<ref>Dewey 1930</ref> he tried to integrate three basic philosophical perspectives on morality: the right, the virtuous and the good. He held that while all three provide meaningful ways to think about moral questions, the possibility of conflict among the three elements cannot always be easily solved.<ref>Anderson, SEP</ref>

Dewey also criticized the dichotomy between means and ends which he saw as responsible for the degradation of our everyday working lives and education, both conceived as merely a means to an end. He stressed the need for meaningful labor and a [[Definitions of education|conception of education]] that viewed it not as a preparation for life but as life itself.<ref>Dewey 2004 [1910] ch. 7; Dewey 1997 [1938], p.&nbsp;47</ref>

Dewey was opposed to other ethical philosophies of his time, notably the [[emotivism]] of [[Alfred Ayer]]. Dewey envisioned the possibility of ethics as an experimental discipline, and thought values could best be characterized not as feelings or imperatives, but as hypotheses about what actions will lead to satisfactory results or what he termed ''consummatory experience''. An additional implication of this view is that ethics is a fallible undertaking because human beings are frequently unable to know what would satisfy them.

During the late 1900s and first decade of 2000, pragmatism was embraced by many in the field of [[bioethics]] led by the philosophers [[John Lachs]] and his student [[Glenn McGee]], whose 1997 book ''The Perfect Baby: A Pragmatic Approach to Genetic Engineering'' (see [[designer baby]]) garnered praise from within classical [[American philosophy]] and criticism from bioethics for its development of a theory of pragmatic bioethics and its rejection of the principalism theory then in vogue in [[medical ethics]]. An anthology published by the [[MIT Press]] titled ''Pragmatic Bioethics'' included the responses of philosophers to that debate, including Micah Hester, Griffin Trotter and others many of whom developed their own theories based on the work of Dewey, Peirce, Royce and others. Lachs developed several applications of pragmatism to bioethics independent of but extending from the work of Dewey and James.

A recent pragmatist contribution to [[meta-ethics]] is Todd Lekan's ''Making Morality''.<ref>Lekan 2003</ref> Lekan argues that morality is a fallible but rational practice and that it has traditionally been misconceived as based on theory or principles. Instead, he argues, theory and rules arise as tools to make practice more intelligent.

===Aesthetics===
John Dewey's ''Art as Experience'', based on the William James lectures he delivered at Harvard University, was an attempt to show the integrity of art, culture and everyday experience (''IEP''). Art, for Dewey, is or should be a part of everyone's creative lives and not just the privilege of a select group of artists. He also emphasizes that the audience is more than a passive recipient. Dewey's treatment of art was a move away from the [[Transcendental idealism|transcendental]] approach to [[aesthetics]] in the wake of [[Immanuel Kant]] who emphasized the unique character of art and the disinterested nature of aesthetic appreciation. A notable contemporary pragmatist aesthetician is [[Joseph Margolis]]. He defines a work of art as "a physically embodied, culturally emergent entity", a human "utterance" that isn't an ontological quirk but in line with other human activity and culture in general. He emphasizes that works of art are complex and difficult to fathom, and that no determinate interpretation can be given.

===Philosophy of religion===
Both Dewey and James investigated the role that religion can still play in contemporary society, the former in ''A Common Faith'' and the latter in ''The Varieties of Religious Experience''.

From a general point of view, for William James, something is true only insofar as it works. Thus, the statement, for example, that prayer is heard may work on a psychological level but (a) may not help to bring about the things you pray for (b) may be better explained by referring to its soothing effect than by claiming prayers are heard. As such, pragmatism is not antithetical to religion but it is not an apologetic for faith either. James' metaphysical position however, leaves open the possibility that the ontological claims of religions may be true. As he observed in the end of the Varieties, his position does not amount to a denial of the existence of [[Transcendence (religion)|transcendent realities]]. Quite the contrary, he argued for the legitimate epistemic right to believe in such realities, since such beliefs do make a difference in an individual's life and refer to claims that cannot be verified or falsified either on intellectual or common sensorial grounds.

[[Joseph Margolis]] in ''Historied Thought, Constructed World'' (California, 1995) makes a distinction between "existence" and "reality". He suggests using the term "exists" only for those things which adequately exhibit Peirce's ''Secondness'': things which offer brute physical resistance to our movements. In this way, such things which affect us, like numbers, may be said to be "real", although they do not "exist". Margolis suggests that God, in such a linguistic usage, might very well be "real", causing believers to act in such and such a way, but might not "exist".

===Education===
{{Expand section|date=October 2023}}
Pragmatic pedagogy is an [[Philosophy of education|educational philosophy]] that emphasizes teaching students knowledge that is practical for life and encourages them to grow into better people. American philosopher [[John Dewey]] is considered one of the main thinkers of the pragmatist educational approach.

==Neopragmatism<!--'Radical pragmatism' and 'Methodological pragmatism' redirect here-->==
{{main|Neopragmatism}}
[[Neopragmatism]] is a broad contemporary category used for various thinkers that incorporate important insights of, and yet significantly diverge from, the classical pragmatists. This divergence may occur either in their philosophical methodology (many of them are loyal to the analytic tradition) or in conceptual formation: for example, conceptual pragmatist [[C.&nbsp;I. Lewis]] was very critical of Dewey; [[neopragmatist]] [[Richard Rorty]] disliked Peirce.

Important [[Analytic pragmatism|analytic pragmatists]] include early [[Richard Rorty]] (who was the first to develop neopragmatist philosophy in his ''[[Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature]]'' (1979),<ref name=IEP>{{Cite web|title=Pragmatism |website=[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]|url=https://iep.utm.edu/pragmati/|access-date=2023-03-14|language=en-US}}</ref> [[Hilary Putnam]], [[W.&nbsp;V.&nbsp;O. Quine]], and [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]]. Brazilian social thinker [[Roberto Unger]] advocates for a '''radical pragmatism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->, one that "de-naturalizes" society and culture, and thus insists that we can "transform the character of our relation to social and cultural worlds we inhabit rather than just to change, little by little, the content of the arrangements and beliefs that comprise them".<ref>{{cite book|last=Unger|first=Roberto|title=The Self Awakened: Pragmatism Unbound|url=https://archive.org/details/selfawakenedprag00unge|url-access=limited|year=2007|publisher=Harvard University Press|isbn=978-0-674-03496-9|pages=[https://archive.org/details/selfawakenedprag00unge/page/n17 6]–7}}</ref> Late Rorty and [[Jürgen Habermas]] are closer to [[Continental philosophy|Continental thought]].

Neopragmatist thinkers who are more loyal to classical pragmatism include [[Sidney Hook]] and [[Susan Haack]] (known for the theory of [[foundherentism]]). Many pragmatist ideas (especially those of Peirce) find a natural expression in the decision-theoretic reconstruction of epistemology pursued in the work of [[Isaac Levi]]. [[Nicholas Rescher]] advocated his version of '''methodological pragmatism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->, based on construing pragmatic efficacy not as a replacement for truths but as a means to its evidentiation.<ref>Nicholas Rescher, "Methodological Pragmatism", ''Journal of Philosophy'' '''76'''(6):338–342 (1979).</ref> Rescher was also a proponent of [[pragmatic idealism]].

Not all pragmatists are easily characterized. With the advent of [[postanalytic philosophy]] and the diversification of Anglo-American philosophy, many philosophers were influenced by pragmatist thought without necessarily publicly committing themselves to that philosophical school. [[Daniel Dennett]], a student of Quine's, falls into this category, as does [[Stephen Toulmin]], who arrived at his philosophical position via [[Ludwig Wittgenstein|Wittgenstein]], whom he calls "a pragmatist of a sophisticated kind".<ref>foreword for Dewey 1929 in the 1988 edition, p. xiii</ref> Another example is [[Mark Johnson (professor)|Mark Johnson]] whose [[embodied philosophy]]<ref>Lakoff and Johnson 1999</ref> shares its psychologism, direct realism and anti-cartesianism with pragmatism. Conceptual pragmatism is a theory of knowledge originating with the work of the philosopher and logician [[Clarence Irving Lewis]]. The epistemology of conceptual pragmatism was first formulated in the 1929 book ''Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge''.

French pragmatism is attended with theorists such as [[Michel Callon]], [[Bruno Latour]], [[Michel Crozier]], [[Luc Boltanski]], and [[Laurent Thévenot]]. It often is seen as opposed to structural problems connected to the French [[critical theory]] of [[Pierre Bourdieu]]. French pragmatism has more recently made inroads into American sociology and anthropology as well.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Simko |first1=Christina |title=Rhetorics of Suffering |journal=American Sociological Review |date=2012 |volume=77 |issue=6 |pages=880–902 |doi=10.1177/0003122412458785|s2cid=145559039 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Dromi |first1=Shai M. |last2=Stabler |first2=Samuel D. |title=Good on paper: sociological critique, pragmatism, and secularization theory |journal=Theory and Society |date=2019 |volume=48 |issue=2 |pages=325–350 |doi=10.1007/s11186-019-09341-9|s2cid=151250246 |url=http://osf.io/ke2d8/ |url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Cohen |first1=Andrew C. |last2=Dromi |first2=Shai M. |title=Advertising morality: maintaining moral worth in a stigmatized profession |journal=Theory and Society |date=15 February 2018 |volume=47 |issue=2 |pages=175–206 |doi=10.1007/s11186-018-9309-7 |s2cid=49319915 |url=http://osf.io/h6kvu/ |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Philosophers John R. Shook and Tibor Solymosi said that "each new generation rediscovers and reinvents its own versions of pragmatism by applying the best available practical and scientific methods to philosophical problems of contemporary concern".<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Shook |first1=John R. |last2=Solymosi |first2=Tibor |date=April 2013 |title=Pragmatism: key resources |journal=[[Choice: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries|Choice]] |volume=50 |pages=1367–1377 (1367) |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271041927}}</ref>

==Legacy and contemporary relevance==
In the 20th century, the movements of [[logical positivism]] and [[ordinary language philosophy]] have similarities with pragmatism. Like pragmatism, logical positivism provides a verification criterion of meaning that is supposed to rid us of nonsense metaphysics; however, logical positivism doesn't stress action as pragmatism does. The pragmatists rarely used their maxim of meaning to rule out all metaphysics as nonsense. Usually, pragmatism was put forth to correct metaphysical doctrines or to construct empirically verifiable ones rather than to provide a wholesale rejection.

According to [[Gilbert Ryle]], James' pragmatism was "one minor source of the Principle of Verifiability".<ref>{{cite book |author1=Gilbert Ryle |editor1-last=Ayer |editor1-first=A.J. |title=The Revolution in Philosophy |page=9 |chapter=Introduction}}</ref>

Ordinary language philosophy is closer to pragmatism than other [[philosophy of language]] because of its [[nominalism|nominalist]] character (although Peirce's pragmatism is not nominalist<ref name=NA/>) and because it takes the broader functioning of language in an environment as its focus instead of investigating abstract relations between language and world.

Pragmatism has ties to [[process philosophy]]. Much of the classical pragmatists' work developed in dialogue with process philosophers such as [[Henri Bergson]] and [[Alfred North Whitehead]], who aren't usually considered pragmatists because they differ so much on other points.<ref>Douglas Browning et al. 1998; Rescher, SEP</ref> Nonetheless, philosopher Donovan Irven argues there's a strong connection between Henri Bergson, pragmatist William James, and the existentialist [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] regarding their theories of truth.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Irven|first=Donovan|date=2020-08-24|title=The Pragmatic Truth of Existentialism|url=http://erraticus.co/2020/08/24/pragmatic-truth-existentialism-bergson-sartre-james-pragmatism/|access-date=2023-03-14|website=Erraticus|language=en-US}}</ref>

[[Behaviorism]] and [[Functional psychology|functionalism]] in psychology and sociology also have ties to pragmatism, which is not surprising considering that James and Dewey were both scholars of psychology and that [[George Herbert Mead|Mead]] became a sociologist.

Pragmatism emphasizes the connection between thought and action. Applied fields like [[public administration]],<ref>[[Patricia M. Shields]]. 2008. "Rediscovering the Taproot: Is Classical Pragmatism the Route to Renew Public Administration?" ''Public Administration Review'' 68(2), 205–221</ref> [[political science]],<ref>Ansell, Christopher. 2011. ''Pragmatist Democracy: Evolutionary Learning as Public Philosophy''. New York: Oxford University Press</ref> leadership studies,<ref>Weber, Eric Thomas. 2013. ''Democracy and Leadership: On Pragmatism and Virtue''. New York: Lexington Books.</ref> [[international relations]],<ref>Ralston, Shane (Ed). 2013. ''Philosophical Pragmatism and International Relations: Essays for a Bold New World''. New York: Lexington.</ref> conflict resolution,<ref>Caspary, William. 2000. ''Dewey on Democracy''. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.</ref> and research methodology<ref>[[Patricia M. Shields|Shields, Patricia]] and Rangarjan, N. 2013. ''A Playbook for Research Methods: Integrating Conceptual Frameworks and Project Management''. [https://books.google.com/books?id=tVYbAgAAQBAJ]. Stillwater, OK: New Forums Press. Shields relies primarily on Dewey's logic of Inquiry.</ref> have incorporated the tenets of pragmatism in their field. Often this connection is made using Dewey and Addams's expansive notion of democracy.

=== Effects on social sciences ===
In the early 20th century, [[Symbolic interactionism]], a major perspective within sociological social psychology, was derived from pragmatism, especially the work of [[George Herbert Mead]] and [[Charles Cooley]] as well as the work of [[Charles Sanders Peirce|Peirce]] and [[William James]].<ref>Stryker, S. (1980). ''Symbolic Interactionism: A Social Structural Version.''. Benjamin/Cummings Publishing.</ref><ref>Nungesser, Frithjof. 2021. "Pragmatism and Interaction." In: ''Routledge International Handbook of Interactionism'', edited by Dirk Vom Lehn, Natalia Ruiz-Junco, and Will Gibson. London; New York: Routledge: 25–36. {{ISBN|9780367227708}}</ref>

Increasing attention is being given to pragmatist epistemology in other branches of the social sciences, which have struggled with divisive debates over the status of social scientific knowledge.<ref name="BiestaBurbules" /><ref>Baert, P. (2004). "Pragmatism as a philosophy of the social sciences." ''European Journal of Social Theory'', 7(3), 355–369.</ref>

Proponents suggest that pragmatism offers an approach that is both pluralist and practical.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Cornish|first1=Flora|last2=Gillespie|first2=Alex|date=2009|title=A Pragmatist Approach to the Problem of Knowledge in Health Psychology|url=https://www.academia.edu/189124|journal=Journal of Health Psychology|volume=14|issue=6|pages=800–809|doi=10.1177/1359105309338974 |pmid=19687117 |hdl=1893/2453 |s2cid=467193 |issn=1359-1053|hdl-access=free}}</ref>

=== Effects on public administration ===
The classical pragmatism of [[John Dewey]], [[William James]], and [[Charles Sanders Peirce]] has influenced research in the field of public administration. Scholars claim classical pragmatism had a profound influence on the origin of the field of public administration.<ref>[[Patricia M. Shields]]. 2008. Rediscovering the Taproot: Is Classical Pragmatism the Route to Renew Public Administration? ''Public Administration Review'' 68(2), 205–221</ref><ref>Hildebrand, David L. 2008. Public Administration as Pragmatic, Democratic and Objective. ''Public Administration Review''. 68(2), 222–229</ref> At the most basic level, public administrators are responsible for making programs "work" in a pluralistic, problems-oriented environment. Public administrators are also responsible for the day-to-day work with citizens. Dewey's [[participatory democracy]] can be applied in this environment. Dewey and James' notion of theory as a tool, helps administrators craft theories to resolve policy and administrative problems. Further, the birth of American [[public administration]] coincides closely with the period of greatest influence of the classical pragmatists.

Which pragmatism (classical pragmatism or neo-pragmatism) makes the most sense in public administration has been the source of debate. The debate began when [[Patricia M. Shields]] introduced Dewey's notion of the Community of Inquiry.<ref>Shields, Patricia 2003. The community of Inquiry: Classical Pragmatism and Public Administration." Administration & Society 35(5): 510–538. [http://aas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/5/510 abstract]</ref> Hugh Miller objected to one element of the community of inquiry (problematic situation, scientific attitude, participatory democracy): scientific attitude.<ref>Miller, Hugh. 2004. "Why Old Pragmatism Needs an Upgrade. Administration & Society 36(2), 234–249.</ref> A debate that included responses from a practitioner,<ref>Stolcis, Gregory 2004. "A view from the Trenches: Comment on Miller's 'Why Old Pragmatism needs and upgrade" ''Administration & Society'' 36(3):326–369</ref> an economist,<ref>Webb, James "Comment on Hugh T. Miller's 'Why old Pragmatism needs and upgrade'. ''Administration & Society'' 36(4), 479–495.</ref> a planner,<ref>Hoch C. 2006. "What Can Rorty teach an old pragmatist doing public administration or planning? Administration & Society. 38(3):389–398. [http://aas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/38/3/389 abstract]</ref> other public administration scholars,<ref>Evans, Karen. 2005. "Upgrade or a different animal altogether?: Why Old Pragmatism Better Informs Public Management and New Pragmatism Misses the Point." ''Administration & Society'' 37(2), 248–255.</ref><ref>Snider, Keith. 2005. Rortyan Pragmatism: 'Where's the beef' for public administration." ''Administration & Society'' 37(2), 243–247.</ref> and noted philosophers<ref>Hildebrand, David. 2005. "Pragmatism, Neopragmatism and public administration." Administration & Society 37(3): 360–374. [http://aas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/345 abstract]</ref><ref>Hickman, Larry 2004. "On Hugh T. Miller on 'Why old pragmatism needs an upgrade." ''[[Administration & Society]]'' 36(4):496–499.</ref> followed. Miller<ref>Miller, Hugh 2005. "Residues of foundationalism in Classical Pragmatism." ''Administration & Society''. 37(3):345–359.</ref> and Shields<ref>[[Patricia M. Shields]]. 2004. "Classical Pragmatism: Engaging practitioner experience." ''Administration & Society'', 36(3):351–361</ref><ref>[[Patricia M. Shields]]. 2005. "Classical Pragmatism does not need an upgrade: Lessons for Public Administration." ''Administration & Society''. 37(4):504–518. [http://aas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/504 abstract]</ref> also responded.

In addition, applied scholarship of public administration that assesses [[charter schools]],<ref>Perez, Shivaun, "Assessing Service Learning Using Pragmatic Principles of Education: A Texas Charter School Case Study" (2000). Applied Research Projects. Texas State University Paper 76. http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/76</ref> contracting out or [[outsourcing]],<ref>Alexander, Jason Fields, "Contracting Through the Lens of Classical Pragmatism: An Exploration of Local Government Contracting" (2009). Applied Research Projects. Texas State University. Paper 288. http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/288</ref> financial management,<ref>Bartle, John R. and Shields, Patricia M., "Applying Pragmatism to Public Budgeting and Financial Management" (2008). Faculty Publications-Political Science. Paper 48. http://ecommons.txstate.edu/polsfacp/48</ref> [[performance measurement]],<ref>Wilson, Timothy L., "Pragmatism and Performance Measurement: An Exploration of Practices in Texas State Government" (2001). Applied Research Projects. Texas State University. Paper 71. http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/71</ref> urban quality of life initiatives,<ref>Howard-Watkins, Demetria C., "The Austin, Texas African-American Quality of Life Initiative as a [[Community of inquiry]]: An Exploratory Study" (2006). Applied Research Projects. Texas State University. Paper 115. http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/115</ref> and [[urban planning]]<ref>Johnson, Timothy Lee, "The Downtown Austin Planning Process as a [[Community of inquiry]]: An Exploratory Study" (2008). Applied Research Projects. Paper 276. http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/276.</ref> in part draws on the ideas of classical pragmatism in the development of the [[conceptual framework]] and focus of analysis.<ref>[[Patricia M. Shields]] and Hassan Tajalli (2006), "Intermediate Theory: The Missing Link in Successful Student Scholarship," ''Journal of Public Affairs Education'' 12(3):313–334. https://digital.library.txstate.edu/handle/10877/3967</ref><ref>[[Patricia M. Shields]] (1998). "Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Science: A Tool for Public Administration," ''Research in Public Administration.'' Volume 4: 195–225. ([https://digital.library.txstate.edu/handle/10877/3954 Online].)</ref><ref>[[Patricia M. Shields]] and Nandhini Rangarajan (2013). [https://archive.today/20130719014203/http://www.academia.edu/4044051/A_Playbook_for_Research_Methods_Integrating_conceptual_frameworks_and_project_management ''A Playbook for Research Methods: Integrating Conceptual Frameworks and Project Management'']. Stillwater, OK: New Forums Press.</ref>

The health sector's administrators' use of pragmatism has been criticized as incomplete in its pragmatism, however,<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Cornish|first1=Flora|last2=Gillespie|first2=Alex|date=2009|title=A Pragmatist Approach to the Problem of Knowledge in Health Psychology|url=https://www.academia.edu/1308521|journal=Journal of Health Psychology|volume=14|issue=6|pages=800–809|doi=10.1177/1359105309338974 |pmid=19687117 |hdl=1893/2453 |s2cid=467193 |issn=1359-1053|hdl-access=free}}</ref> according to the classical pragmatists, knowledge is always shaped by human interests. The administrator's focus on "outcomes" simply advances their own interest, and this focus on outcomes often undermines their citizen's interests, which often are more concerned with process. On the other hand, David Brendel argues that pragmatism's ability to bridge dualisms, focus on practical problems, include multiple perspectives, incorporate participation from interested parties (patient, family, health team), and provisional nature makes it well suited to address problems in this area.<ref>Brendel, David. 2006. ''Healing Psychiatry: Bridging the Science/Humanism Divide''. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.</ref>

=== Effects on feminism ===
Since the mid 1990s, feminist philosophers have re-discovered classical pragmatism as a source of feminist theories. Works by Seigfried,<ref>Seigfried, C.H. (2001). Feminist interpretations of John Dewey. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press; Seigfried, C.H. (1996). Pragmatism and feminism: Reweaving the social fabric. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; Seigfried, C. H. (1992). Where are all the pragmatists feminists? Hypatia, 6, 8–21.</ref> Duran,<ref>Duran, J. (2001). A holistically Deweyan feminism. Metaphilosophy, 32, 279–292. Duran, J. (1993). The intersection of pragmatism and feminism. Hypatia, 8</ref> Keith,<ref>Keith, H. (1999). Feminism and pragmatism: George Herbert Mead's ethics of care. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 35, 328–344.</ref> and Whipps<ref>Whipps, J.D. (2004). Jane Addams social thought as a model for a pragmatist-feminist communitarianism. Hypatia, 19, 118–113.</ref> explore the historic and philosophic links between feminism and pragmatism. The connection between pragmatism and feminism took so long to be rediscovered because pragmatism itself was eclipsed by logical positivism during the middle decades of the twentieth century. As a result, it was lost from feminist discourse. Feminists now consider pragmatism's greatest strength to be the very features that led to its decline. These are "persistent and early criticisms of positivist interpretations of scientific methodology; disclosure of value dimension of factual claims"; viewing aesthetics as informing everyday experience; subordinating logical analysis to political, cultural, and social issues; linking the dominant discourses with domination; "realigning theory with praxis; and resisting the turn to epistemology and instead emphasizing concrete experience".<ref>Seigfried, C.H. (1996). ''Pragmatism and Feminism: Reweaving the Social Fabric''. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. p. 21</ref>

Feminist philosophers point to [[Jane Addams]] as a founder of classical pragmatism. [[Mary Parker Follett]] was also an important feminist pragmatist concerned with organizational operation during the early decades of the 20th century.<ref>{{cite book |first1=Chris |last1=Ansell |chapter=Mary Parker Follett and Pragmatist Organization |editor1-last=Adler |editor1-first=Paul |title=The Oxford Handbook of Sociology and Organization Studies: Classical Foundations |date=2009 |pages=464–485 |publisher=Oxford University Press |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199535231.003.0021 |isbn=978-0199535231 |chapter-url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199535231.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199535231-e-021}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |editor1-last=Graham |title=Mary Parker Follett, Prophet of Management: A Celebration of Writings from the 1920s |date=1995 |publisher=Harvard Business Press |location=Cambridge MA}}</ref> In addition, the ideas of Dewey, Mead, and James are consistent with many feminist tenets. Jane Addams, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead developed their philosophies as all three became friends, influenced each other, and were engaged in the [[Hull House]] experience and [[women's rights]] causes.

==Criticisms==
In the 1908 essay "The Thirteen Pragmatisms", [[Arthur Oncken Lovejoy]] argued that there's significant ambiguity in the notion of the effects of the ''truth'' of a proposition and those of ''belief'' in a proposition in order to highlight that many pragmatists had failed to recognize that distinction.<ref name=13pragmatisms>{{cite journal |last=Lovejoy |first=Arthur O. |date=January 2, 1908 |title=The thirteen pragmatisms. I |journal=[[The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods]] |volume=5 |issue=1 |pages=5–12 |jstor=2012277 |jstor-access=free |doi=10.2307/2012277 |doi-access=}} And: {{cite journal |last=Lovejoy |first=Arthur O. |date=January 16, 1908 |title=The thirteen pragmatisms. II |journal=[[The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods]] |volume=5 |issue=2 |pages=29–39 |jstor=2011563 |jstor-access=free |doi=10.2307/2011563 |doi-access=}}</ref> He identified 13 different philosophical positions that were each labeled pragmatism.<ref name=13pragmatisms/>

The [[Order of Friars Minor|Franciscan]] friar Celestine Bittle presented multiple criticisms of pragmatism in his 1936 book ''Reality and the Mind: Epistemology''.<ref name="Bittle">{{cite book |last=Bittle |first=Celestine Nicholas Charles |date=1936 |title=Reality and the Mind: Epistemology |location=New York |publisher=The Bruce Publishing Company |oclc=1017084}}</ref> He argued that, in William James's pragmatism, truth is entirely subjective and is not the widely accepted definition of truth, which is correspondence to reality. For Bittle, defining truth as what is useful is a "perversion of language".<ref name="Bittle" /> With truth reduced essentially to what is good, it is no longer an object of the intellect. Therefore, the problem of knowledge posed by the intellect is not solved, but rather renamed. Renaming truth as a product of the will cannot help it solve the problems of the intellect, according to Bittle. Bittle cited what he saw as contradictions in pragmatism, such as using objective facts to prove that truth does not emerge from objective fact; this reveals that pragmatists do recognize truth as objective fact, and not, as they claim, what is useful. Bittle argued there are also some statements that cannot be judged on human welfare at all. Such statements (for example the assertion that "a car is passing") are matters of "truth and error" and do not affect human welfare.<ref name="Bittle" />

British philosopher [[Bertrand Russell]] devoted a chapter each to James and Dewey in his 1945 book ''[[A History of Western Philosophy]]''; Russell pointed out areas in which he agreed with them but also ridiculed James's views on truth and Dewey's views on inquiry.<ref name="Putnam 1992">{{cite journal |last=Putnam |first=Hilary |date=December 1992 |title=The permanence of William James |journal=[[Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences]] |volume=46 |issue=3 |pages=17–31 |doi=10.2307/3824783 |jstor=3824783}}</ref>{{rp|17}}<ref name="Burke 1994">{{cite book |last=Burke |first=F. Thomas |date=1994 |title=Dewey's new logic: a reply to Russell |location=Chicago |publisher=[[University of Chicago Press]] |isbn=0226080692 |oclc=29844394}}</ref>{{rp|120–124}} Hilary Putnam later argued that Russell "presented a mere caricature" of James's views<ref name="Putnam 1992"/>{{rp|17}} and a "misreading of James",<ref name="Putnam 1992"/>{{rp|20}} while Tom Burke argued at length that Russell presented "a skewed characterization of Dewey's point of view".<ref name="Burke 1994"/>{{rp|121}} Elsewhere, in Russell's book ''The Analysis of Mind'', Russell praised James's radical empiricism, to which Russell's own account of [[neutral monism]] was indebted.<ref name="Putnam 1992"/>{{rp|17}}<ref>{{Cite SEP |url-id=james |title=William James |edition=Winter 2017 |first=Russell |last=Goodman |date=October 20, 2017}}</ref> Dewey, in ''[[The Bertrand Russell Case]]'', defended Russell against an attempt to remove Russell from his chair at the College of the City of New York in 1940.<ref>{{cite book |last=Edwards |first=Paul |author-link=Paul Edwards (philosopher) |date=1957 |chapter=How Bertrand Russell was prevented from teaching at the College of the City of New York |editor-last=Russell |editor-first=Bertrand |title=Why I am not a Christian, and other essays on religion and related subjects |location=New York |publisher=[[Simon and Schuster]] |pages=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pc0x2bxOSUgC&pg=PA207 207–259] |isbn=0671203231 |oclc=376363}}</ref>

[[Neopragmatism]] as represented by Richard Rorty has been criticized as relativistic both by other neopragmatists such as [[Susan Haack]]<ref>Haack 1997</ref> and by many analytic philosophers.<ref>Dennett 1998</ref> Rorty's early analytic work, however, differs notably from his later work which some, including Rorty, consider to be closer to [[literary criticism]] than to philosophy, and which attracts the brunt of criticism from his detractors. Rorty has defended his views against charges of relativism by claiming that such charges simply beg the question. The people who accuse him of being a relativist presuppose the relative–absolute, appearance–reality, made–found, etc. dualisms, their rejection being a defining feature of pragmatism to begin with. For the pragmatist, relativism about truth makes as little sense as absolutism about truth, since they do not believe in a metaphysical, extra-linguistic Truth which exists outside human vocabularies. Rorty instead believes that scientific, philosophical, and moral progress is made through conversation about which vocabularies are best at solving society's problems.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Rorty |first=R. |title=Philosophy and Social Hope |date=1999 |publisher=Penguin Books |isbn=978-0-14-026288-9 |location=New York (N.Y.) |pages=xvi–xxxii}}</ref>

==List of pragmatists==
{{col-begin}}
{{col-break}}

===Classical (1850–1950)===
{|class="sortable wikitable"
! width="10%" | Name
! width="8%" | Lifetime
! class="unsortable" width="78%" | Notes
|- valign="top"
| {{sortname|Charles Sanders|Peirce}}
| 1839–1914
| was the founder of American pragmatism (later called by Peirce [[pragmaticism]]). He wrote on a wide range of topics, from mathematical logic and semiotics to psychology.
|-
| {{sortname|William|James}}
| 1842–1910
| influential psychologist and theorist of religion as well as philosopher. First to be widely associated with the term "pragmatism" due to Peirce's lifelong unpopularity.
|-
| {{sortname|John|Dewey}}
| 1859–1952
| prominent [[philosophy of education|philosopher of education]], referred to his brand of pragmatism as [[instrumentalism]].
|-
| {{sortname|Jane|Addams}}
| 1860–1935
| social [[Reform|reformer]], [[pacifist]], her [[settlement movement|settlement activism]] deeply inspired James and especially Dewey, who often included her writings on reading lists for his students.
|-
| {{sortname|Oliver Wendell|Holmes Jr.}}	
| 1841–1935
| [[Supreme Court of the United States|U.S. Supreme Court]] Associate Justice.
|-
| {{sortname|F.&nbsp;C.&nbsp;S.|Schiller}}
| 1864–1937
| one of the most important pragmatists of his time, Schiller is largely forgotten today.
|-
|}

'''Protopragmatists or related thinkers'''
{|class="sortable wikitable"
! width="10%" | Name
! width="8%" | Lifetime
! class="unsortable" width="78%" | Notes
|- valign="top"
| {{sortname|George Herbert|Mead}}
| 1863–1931
| philosopher and sociological [[social psychology|social psychologist]].
|-
| {{sortname|Josiah|Royce}}
| 1855–1916
| colleague of James at Harvard who employed pragmatism in an idealist metaphysical framework, he was particularly interested in the philosophy of religion and community; his work is often associated with [[neo-Hegelianism]].
|-
| {{sortname|George|Santayana}}
| 1863–1952
| although he eschewed the label "pragmatism" and called it a "heresy", several critics argue that he applied pragmatist methodologies to [[naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]], especially in his early masterwork, ''[[The Life of Reason]]''.
|-
| {{sortname|W.&nbsp;E.&nbsp;B.| Du Bois}}
| 1868–1963
| student of James at Harvard who applied pragmatist principles to his sociological work, especially in ''[[The Philadelphia Negro]]'' and ''Atlanta University Studies''.
|-
|}

'''Other'''
{|class="sortable wikitable"
! width="10%" | Name
! width="8%" | Lifetime
! class="unsortable" width="78%" | Notes
|- valign="top"
| {{sortname|Giovanni|Papini}}
| 1881–1956
| Italian essayist, mostly known because James occasionally mentioned him.
|-
| {{sortname|Giovanni|Vailati}}
| 1863–1909
| Italian analytic and pragmatist philosopher.
|-
| {{sortname|Hu|Shih}}
| 1891–1962
| Chinese intellectual and reformer, student and translator of Dewey's and advocate of pragmatism in China.
|-
| {{sortname|Reinhold|Niebuhr}}
| 1892–1971
| American philosopher and theologian, inserted pragmatism into his theory of [[Christian realism]].
|}

{{col-break|gap=3em}}

===Analytic, neo- and other (1950–present)===
{|class="sortable wikitable"
! width="10%" | Name
! width="8%" | Lifetime
! class="unsortable" width="78%" | Notes
|- valign="top"
| {{sortname|Richard J.|Bernstein}}
| 1932–2022
| Author of ''Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis'', ''The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity'', ''The Pragmatic Turn''
|-
| F. Thomas Burke
| 1950–
| Author of ''What Pragmatism Was'' (2013), ''Dewey's New Logic'' (1994). His work interprets contemporary philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic through the lens of classical American pragmatism.
|-
| {{sortname|Arthur|Fine}}
| 1937–
| Philosopher of Science who proposed the [[Natural Ontological Attitude]] to the debate of [[scientific realism]].
|-
| {{sortname|Stanley|Fish}}
| 1938–
| Literary and Legal Studies pragmatist. Criticizes Rorty's and Posner's legal theories as "almost pragmatism"<ref>In: [[Stanley Fish]], ''There's No Such Thing as Free Speech'', Oxford University Press, 1994.</ref> and authored the afterword in the collection ''The Revival of Pragmatism''.<ref>Ed. Morris Dickstein, Duke University Press, 1998</ref>
|-
| {{sortname|Robert|Brandom}}
| 1950–
| A student of Rorty, has developed a complex analytic version of pragmatism in works such as ''Making It Explicit'', ''Between Saying and Doing'', and ''Perspectives on Pragmatism''.
|-
| {{sortname|Clarence Irving|Lewis}}
| 1883–1964
|a leading authority on symbolic logic and on the philosophic concepts of knowledge and value.
|-
| {{sortname|Joseph|Margolis}}
| 1924–2021
| still proudly defends the original Pragmatists and sees his recent work on Cultural Realism as extending and deepening their insights, especially the contribution of [[Charles Sanders Peirce|Peirce]] and Dewey, in the context of a rapprochement with Continental philosophy.
|-
| {{sortname|Hilary|Putnam}}
| 1926–2016
| in many ways the opposite of Rorty and thinks classical pragmatism was too permissive a theory.
|-
| {{sortname|Richard|Rorty}}
| 1931–2007
| famous author of ''[[Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature]]''.
|-
| {{sortname|John J.|Stuhr}}
| 
|-
| {{sortname|Willard van Orman|Quine}}
| 1908–2000
| pragmatist philosopher, concerned with [[philosophy of language|language]], [[logic]], and [[philosophy of mathematics]].
|-
| {{sortname|Mike|Sandbothe}}
| 1961–
| Applied Rorty's neopragmatism to media studies and developed a new branch that he called media philosophy. Together with authors such as Juergen Habermas, Hans Joas, Sami Pihlstroem, Mats Bergmann, Michael Esfeld, and Helmut Pape, he belongs to a group of European pragmatists who make use of Peirce, James, Dewey, Rorty, Brandom, Putnam, and other representatives of American pragmatism in continental philosophy.
|-
| {{sortname|Richard|Shusterman}}
| 1949–
| philosopher of art.
|-
| {{sortname|Jason|Stanley}}
| 1969–
| Defends a pragmatist form of contextualism against semantic varieties of contextualism in his ''Knowledge and Practical Interest''.
|-
| {{sortname|Robert B.|Talisse}}
| 1970–
| defends an epistemological conception of democratic politics that is explicitly opposed to [[John Dewey|Deweyan democracy]] and yet rooted in a conception of [[social epistemology]] that derives from the pragmatism of [[Charles Sanders Peirce|Charles Peirce]]. His work in [[argumentation theory]] and [[informal logic]] also demonstrates pragmatist leanings.
|-
| {{sortname|Stephen|Toulmin}}
| 1922–2009
| student of Wittgenstein, known especially for his ''The Uses of Argument''.
|-
| {{sortname|Roberto|Unger}}
| 1947–
| in ''The Self Awakened: Pragmatism Unbound'', advocates for a "radical pragmatism", one that "de-naturalizes" society and culture, and thus insists that we can "transform the character of our relation to social and cultural worlds we inhabit rather than just to change, little by little, the content of the arrangements and beliefs that comprise them."
|-
| {{sortname|Sidney|Hook}}
| 1902–1989
| a prominent [[New York Intellectuals|New York intellectual]] and philosopher, a student of Dewey at Columbia.
|-
| {{sortname|Isaac|Levi}}
| 1930–2018
| seeks to apply pragmatist thinking in a decision-theoretic perspective.
|-
| {{sortname|Susan|Haack}}
| 1945–
| teaches at the University of Miami, sometimes called the intellectual granddaughter of C.S. Peirce, known chiefly for [[foundherentism]].
|-
| {{sortname|Nicholas|Rescher}}
| 1928–2024
| advocates a methodological pragmatism that sees functional efficacy as evidentiating validity.
|-
|}

====In the extended sense====
{|class="sortable wikitable"
! width="10%" | Name
! width="8%" | Lifetime
! class="unsortable" width="78%" | Notes
|- valign="top"
| {{sortname|Cornel|West}}
| 1953–
| thinker on race, politics, and religion; operates under the sign of "prophetic pragmatism".
|-
| {{sortname|Wilfrid|Sellars}}
| 1912–1989
| broad thinker, attacked mainstream variants of [[foundationalism]] in the analytic tradition.
|-
| {{sortname|Frank P.|Ramsey}}
| 1903–1930
| author of the philosophical work ''[[Universals]]''.
|-
| {{sortname|Karl-Otto|Apel}}
| 1922–2017
|author of "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism (1981)"
|-
| {{sortname|Randolph|Bourne}}
| 1886–1918
| author of the 1917 pragmatist anti-war essay "Twilight of Idols" 
|-
| {{sortname|C. Wright|Mills}}
| 1916–1962
| author of ''Sociology and Pragmatism: The Higher Learning in America'' and was a commentator on Dewey.
|-
| {{sortname|Jürgen|Habermas}}
| 1929–
| author of "What Is [[Universal pragmatics|Universal Pragmatics]]?"
|-

|}
{{col-end}}

==See also==
* {{annotated link|American philosophy}}
* {{annotated link|Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography}}
* {{section link|Communication Theory as a Field|Russill, pragmatism as an eighth tradition}}
* {{annotated link|Doctrine of internal relations}}
* {{annotated link|Morton White}}
* {{annotated link|New legal realism}}

==Notes==
{{reflist|group="nb"}}

==References==
{{Reflist|30em}}

==Sources==
{{refbegin}}
* [[James Mark Baldwin|Baldwin, James Mark]] (ed., 1901–1905), ''[[James Mark Baldwin#dpp|Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology]]'', 3 volumes in 4, Macmillan, New York.
* [[John Dewey|Dewey, John]] (1900–1901), ''Lectures on Ethics 1900–1901'', Donald F. Koch (ed.), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1991.
* Dewey, John (1910), ''[[How We Think]]'', [[D.C. Heath]], Lexington, MA, 1910. Reprinted, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY, 1991.
* Dewey, John (1929), ''The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action'', Minton, Balch, and Company, New York. Reprinted, pp.&nbsp;1–254 in ''John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925–1953, Vol. 4: 1929'', Jo Ann Boydston (ed.), Harriet Furst Simon (text. ed.), [[Stephen Toulmin]] (intro.), [[Southern Illinois University]] Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1984.
* Dewey, John (1932), ''Theory of the Moral Life'', Part 2 of John Dewey and [[James H. Tufts]], ''Ethics'', Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1908. 2nd ed., Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1932. Reprinted, Arnold Isenberg (ed.), Victor Kestenbaum (pref.), Irvington Publishers, New York, 1980.
* Dewey, John (1938), ''Logic: The Theory of Inquiry'', Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1938. Reprinted, pp.&nbsp;1–527 in ''John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925–1953, Vol. 12: 1938'', Jo Ann Boydston (ed.), Kathleen Poulos (text. ed.), [[Ernest Nagel]] (intro.), [[Southern Illinois University]] Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1986.
* [[William James|James, William]] (1902), "[[s:Baldwin Dictionary Definition of Pragmatic (1) and (2) Pragmatism|Pragmatic and Pragmatism]]", 1 paragraph, vol. 2, pp.&nbsp;321–322 in J.M. Baldwin (ed., 1901–1905), ''Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology'', 3 volumes in 4, Macmillan, New York. Reprinted, CP 5.2 in C.S. Peirce, ''Collected Papers''.
* {{cite book |last=James |first=William |year=1907 |url=https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5116 |title=Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Popular Lectures on Philosophy |publisher=Longmans, Green, and Company |location=New York}}
* {{cite book |last=James |first=William |year=1909 |url=https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5117 |title=The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to 'Pragmatism' |publisher=Longmans, Green, and Company |location=New York}}
* {{cite book |last=Lundin |first=Roger |year=2006 |title=From Nature to Experience: The American Search for Cultural Authority |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield}}
* [[Charles Sanders Peirce|Peirce, C.S.]], ''[[Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography#CP|Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce]]'', vols. 1–6, [[Charles Hartshorne]] and [[Paul Weiss (philosopher)|Paul Weiss]] (eds.), vols. 7–8, [[Arthur W. Burks]] (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1931–1935, 1958. Cited as CP vol.para.
* Peirce, C.S., ''[[Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography#EP|The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings]], Volume 1 (1867–1893)'', Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1992.
* Peirce, C.S., ''The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893–1913)'', Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1998.
* {{cite book |author-link=Hilary Putnam |last=Putnam |first=Hilary |year=1994 |title=Words and Life |editor-first=James |editor-last=Conant |publisher=Harvard University Press |location=Cambridge, MA}}
* {{cite journal |author-link=Willard Van Orman Quine |last=Quine |first=W. V.  |title=Two Dogmas of Empiricism |journal=Philosophical Review |date=January 1951|doi=10.2307/2181906 |jstor=2181906 }}
** {{cite book |pages=20–46 |first=W. V. |last=Quine |title=From a Logical Point of View: Logico-Philosophical Essays |year= 1980}}
* {{cite book |last=Quine |first=W. V. |year=1980 |title=From a Logical Point of View: Logico-Philosophical Essays |edition=2nd |publisher=Harvard University Press |location=Cambridge, MA}}
* {{cite book |last=Ramsey |first=F. P. |year=1990 |title=Philosophical Papers |editor-first=David Hugh |editor-last=Mellor |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge}}
* {{cite journal |author-link=Frank Plumpton Ramsey |last1=Ramsey |first1=F. P. |last2=Moore |first2=G. E. |year=1927 |title=Symposium: Facts and Propositions |journal=Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes |volume=7 |pages=153–170 |doi=10.1093/aristoteliansupp/7.1.153 |jstor=4106403}} 
** {{cite book |chapter=Facts and Propositions (1927) |pages=34–51 |first=F. P. |last=Ramsey |title=Philosophical Papers |editor-first=David Hugh |editor-last=Mellor |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge |year=1990}}
* {{cite book |last=Rescher |first=N. |year=1977 |title=Methodological Pragmatism |location=Oxford |publisher=Blackwell}}
* {{cite book |last=Rescher |first=N. |year=2000 |title=Realistic Pragmatism |location=Albany |publisher=SUNY Press}}
{{refend}}

==Further reading==
'''Surveys'''
* John J. Stuhr, ed. ''One Hundred Years of Pragmatism: William James's Revolutionary Philosophy'' (Indiana University Press; 2010) 215 pages; Essays on pragmatism and American culture, pragmatism as a way of thinking and settling disputes, pragmatism as a theory of truth, and pragmatism as a mood, attitude, or temperament.

'''Primary texts'''<br />
Note that this is an introductory list: some important works are left out and some less monumental works that are excellent introductions are included.
* C.S. Peirce, "[[s:The Fixation of Belief|The Fixation of Belief]]" (paper)
* C.S. Peirce, "[[s:How to Make Our Ideas Clear|How to Make Our Ideas Clear]]" (paper)
* C.S. Peirce, "A Definition of Pragmatism" (paper as titled by Menand in ''Pragmatism: A Reader'', from ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'' v. 8, some or all of paragraphs 191–195.)
* William James, ''[[s:Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking|Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking]]'' (especially lectures I, II and VI)
* John Dewey, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=ZUg8AAAAIAAJ Reconstruction in Philosophy]''
* John Dewey, "Three Independent factors in Morals" (lecture published as paper)
* John Dewey, "[https://web.archive.org/web/20061231084020/http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/Dewey/Dewey_1910b/Dewey_1910_06.html A short catechism concerning truth]" (chapter)
* W.V.O. Quine, "[http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html ''Two Dogmas of Empiricism'']". (paper)

'''Secondary texts'''
* Cornelis De Waal, ''On Pragmatism''
* Louis Menand, ''[[The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America]]''
* Hilary Putnam, ''Pragmatism: An Open Question''
* Abraham Edel, [https://web.archive.org/web/20061207201054/http://crvp.org/book/Series01/I-11/chapter_i.htm ''Pragmatic Tests and Ethical Insights'']
* D.S. Clarke, ''Rational Acceptance and Purpose''
* Haack, Susan & Lane, Robert, Eds. (2006). ''Pragmatism Old and New: Selected Writings''. New York: Prometheus Books.
* Louis Menand, ed., ''Pragmatism: A Reader'' (includes essays by Peirce, James, Dewey, Rorty, others)
* For a discussion of the ways in which pragmatism offers insights into the theory and practice of urbanism, see: [https://www.amazon.com/Designing-Urban-Transformation-Aseem-Inam/dp/0415837707 Aseem Inam, ''Designing Urban Transformation'' New York and London: Routledge, 2013.] {{ISBN|978-0415837705}}.

'''Criticism'''
* Edward W. Younkins, [http://rebirthofreason.com/Articles/Younkins/Deweys_Pragmatism_and_the_Decline_of_Education.shtml ''Dewey's Pragmatism and the Decline of Education''].
* [http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/pragmatism.html ''Pragmatism''], Ayn Rand Lexicon.
* [[Albert Schinz]], ''Anti-Pragmatism: An Examination into the Respective Rights of Intellectual Aristocracy and Social Democracy''. Boston: Small, Maynard and Company, 1909.

==External links==
{{wiktionary|pragmatism}}
{{wikiquote}}
{{commons category}}

'''General sources'''
*{{PhilPapers|category|pragmatism}}
*{{cite SEP |url-id=pragmatism |title=Pragmatism}}
*{{cite IEP |url-id=pragmati/ |title=Pragmatism}}
*{{InPho|idea|461}}
* {{In Our Time|Pragmatism|p003k9f5|Pragmatism}}
*{{YouTube|GlrEbffVVjM|A short film about the pragmatist revival}}

'''Journals and organizations'''
There are several peer-reviewed journals dedicated to pragmatism, for example
* [[Contemporary Pragmatism]], affiliated with the [http://international.pragmatism.org/ International Pragmatism Society]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20100608171855/http://lnx.journalofpragmatism.eu/ European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy], affiliated with the [http://www.associazionepragma.com/ Associazione Culturale Pragma (Italy)]
* [http://www.nordprag.org/nsp/ Nordic Studies in Pragmatism], journal of the [http://www.nordprag.org/ Nordic Pragmatism Network]
* [http://www.pragmatismtoday.eu/ Pragmatism Today], journal of the [http://www.cepf.sk/ Central European Pragmatist Forum (CEPF)]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20071011065724/http://peircesociety.org/transactions.html Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society], journal of the [http://www.peircesociety.org/ Charles S. Peirce Society]
* [http://williamjamesstudies.org/ William James Studies], journal of the [http://www.wjsociety.org/ William James Society]

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