View source for Sentience

{{Short description|Ability to experience feelings and sensations}}
{{Distinguish|Wisdom#Sapience{{!}}Sapience}}
{{Redirect|Sentient}}
[[File:Animal diversity b.png|thumb|upright=1.4|Determining which animals can experience sensations is challenging, but scientists generally agree that [[vertebrate]]s, as well as many [[invertebrate]] species, are likely sentient.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Birch |first=Jonathan |date=2021-05-16 |title=Which animals should be considered sentient in the eyes of the law? |url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/may/16/animals-feel-humans-evidence-sentient |access-date=2024-06-09 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref><ref name="CDC2012" />]]
'''Sentience''' is the ability to experience [[feeling]]s and [[sense|sensation]]s.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-07-18 |title=Definition of SENTIENT |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sentient |access-date=2024-07-21 |website=Merriam Webster Dictionary |language=en}}</ref> It may not necessarily imply higher cognitive functions such as [[awareness]], [[reasoning]], or complex [[Thought process|thought processes]]. Some theorists define sentience exclusively as the capacity for [[Valence (psychology)|valenced]] (positive or negative) mental experiences, such as [[pain]] and [[pleasure]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Birch |first=Jonathan |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/57949 |title=The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI |date=2024-08-15 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-196672-9 |edition=1 |page=1 |language=en |doi=10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001}}</ref>

Sentience is an important concept in [[ethics]], as the ability to experience happiness or suffering often forms a basis for determining which entities deserve [[Moral patienthood|moral consideration]], particularly in [[utilitarianism]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Grounds of Moral Status |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grounds-moral-status/ |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|date=2023 }}</ref>

The word "sentience" has been used to translate a variety of concepts in Asian religions. In [[science fiction]], "sentience" is sometimes used interchangeably with "[[sapience]]", "[[self-awareness]]", or "[[consciousness]]".<ref name="Scerri2016">{{cite journal |last1=Scerri |first1=Mariella |last2=Grech |first2=Victor E. |date=2016 |title=Sentience in science fiction 101 |url=https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/25749 |journal=SFRA Review |volume=315 |pages=14–18 |doi= |access-date=31 January 2021}}</ref>

== Sentience in philosophy ==
"Sentience" was first coined by philosophers in the 1630s for the concept of an ability to feel, derived from Latin ''[[:wikt:sentiens|sentiens]]'' (feeling).<ref>{{cite web |last= |first= |date= |title=Sentient |url=https://www.etymonline.com/word/sentient |access-date=31 January 2021 |website=Etymology Online |publisher=Douglas Harper}}</ref> In philosophy, different authors draw different distinctions between [[consciousness]] and sentience. According to [[Antonio Damasio]], sentience is a minimalistic way of defining consciousness, which otherwise commonly and collectively describes sentience plus further features of the [[mind]] and consciousness, such as [[creativity]], [[intelligence]], [[sapience]], [[self-awareness]], and [[intentionality]] (the ability to have thoughts about something). These further features of consciousness may not be necessary for sentience, which is the capacity to feel sensations and emotions.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Damasio|first=Antonio|date=October 2001|title=Fundamental feelings|journal=Nature|language=en|volume=413|issue=6858|page=781|doi=10.1038/35101669|pmid=11677584|bibcode=2001Natur.413..781D|s2cid=226085|issn=1476-4687|doi-access=free}}</ref>

===Consciousness===
According to [[Thomas Nagel]] in his paper "[[What Is It Like to Be a Bat?]]", consciousness can refer to the ability of any entity to have subjective perceptual experiences, or as some philosophers refer to them, "[[qualia]]"—in other words, the ability to have states that it ''feels like something'' to be in.<ref name=Nagel1974>{{cite journal | last1 = Nagel | first1 = Thomas | year = 1974 | title = What Is It Like to Be a Bat? | journal = The Philosophical Review | volume = 83 | issue = 4| pages = 435–450 | doi=10.2307/2183914 | jstor=2183914 |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=fBGPBRX3JsQC|page=165}}}}</ref> Some philosophers, notably [[Colin McGinn]], believe that the physical process causing consciousness to happen will never be understood, a position known as "[[new mysterianism]]". They do not deny that most other aspects of consciousness are subject to scientific investigation but they argue that qualia will never be explained.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Shermer |first=Michael |date=2018-07-01 |title=Will Science Ever Solve the Mysteries of Consciousness, Free Will and God? |url=https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/will-science-ever-solve-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god/ |access-date=2024-03-10 |website=Scientific American |language=en}}</ref> Other philosophers, such as [[Daniel Dennett]], argue that qualia is not a meaningful concept.<ref name="Ransey">{{cite encyclopedia | title=Eliminative Materialism | encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | publisher=Stanford University | access-date=19 June 2014 | author=Ramsey, William | editor=Zalta, Edward N. | year=2013 | edition=Summer 2013 | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/materialism-eliminative/}}</ref>

Regarding [[animal consciousness]], the [[Animal consciousness#Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness|Cambridge Declaration of Consciousness]], publicly proclaimed on 7 July 2012 at Cambridge University, states that many non-human animals possess the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states, and can exhibit intentional behaviors.{{Ref label|A|a|none}} The declaration notes that all [[Vertebrate|vertebrates]] (including fish and reptiles) have this neurological substrate for consciousness, and that there is strong evidence that many invertebrates also have it.<ref name="CDC2012">{{cite web |last=Low |first=Philip |date=7 July 2012 |title=The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness |url=http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf |access-date=5 August 2020 |website=FCM Conference |publisher=Cambridge University |quote=it is indisputable that all vertebrates, including fish and reptiles do possess the neurological substrates of [[phenomenal consciousness|consciousness]], and that there is further very strong evidence to support that invertebrates, including but not limited to decapod crustaceans, cephalopod mollusks, and insects, also do}}</ref>

==== Phenomenal vs. affective consciousness====

[[David Chalmers]] argues that sentience is sometimes used as shorthand for ''phenomenal consciousness'', the capacity to have any subjective experience at all, but sometimes refers to the narrower concept of ''affective consciousness'', the capacity to experience subjective states that have affective valence (i.e., a positive or negative character), such as pain and pleasure.<ref name="chalmers">{{cite AV media |people=Massimo Pigliucci, David Chalmers |date=Dec 18, 2020 |title=Philosophy Day 2020: David Chalmers - Consciousness and moral status |medium=YouTube |language=English |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZP3ReZHGn7E | archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211031/ZP3ReZHGn7E| archive-date=2021-10-31 | url-status=live|access-date=Sep 12, 2021 |publisher=Figs in Winter }}{{cbignore}}</ref>

===Sentience quotient===
The sentience quotient concept was introduced by [[Robert A. Freitas Jr.]] in the late 1970s. It defines sentience as the relationship between the information processing rate of each individual processing unit (neuron), the weight/size of a single unit, and the total number of processing units (expressed as mass). It was proposed as a measure for the sentience of all living beings and computers from a single neuron up to a hypothetical being at the theoretical computational limit of the entire universe. On a [[logarithmic scale]] it runs from −70 up to +50.<ref name="Freitas">{{cite journal |author=Freitas, R.A. Jr. |date=April 1984 |title=Xenopsychology |journal=[[Analog Science Fiction/Science Fact]] |volume=104 |pages=41–53|url=https://www.rfreitas.com/Astro/Xenopsychology.htm}}</ref>

==Eastern religions==
{{See also|Sentient beings (Buddhism)}}
[[Eastern religions]] including [[Hinduism]], [[Buddhism]], [[Sikhism]], and [[Jainism]] recognise [[non-human]]s as sentient beings.<ref>{{cite journal
 | last = Shanta
 | first = Bhakti Niskama 
 | title = Life and consciousness – The Vedāntic view
 | journal = Communicative & Integrative Biology
 | volume = 8
 | issue = 5
 | article-number = e1085138
 | date = September–October 2015
 | doi = 10.1080/19420889.2015.1085138
 | pmid = 27066168 
 | pmc = 4802748 
 | id = 27066168
 | doi-access = free
 }}</ref> The term ''sentient beings'' is translated from various Sanskrit terms (''jantu, bahu jana, jagat, [[sattva]]'') and "conventionally refers to the mass of living things subject to illusion, suffering, and rebirth ([[Saṃsāra]])".<ref name="Getz">Getz, Daniel A. (2004). "Sentient beings"; cited in Buswell, Robert E. (2004). ''Encyclopedia of Buddhism''. Volume 2. New York, USA: Macmillan Reference USA. {{ISBN|0-02-865720-9}} (Volume 2): pp.760</ref> It is related to the concept of [[ahimsa]], non-violence toward other beings.<ref>{{Cite web |title=ahimsa |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/ahimsa |access-date=2024-03-10 |website=Britannica |language=en}}</ref>

In Jainism, many things are endowed with a soul, ''[[Jīva (Jainism)|jīva]]'', which is sometimes translated as 'sentience'.<ref>{{citation | last1=Nemicandra |first1=Acarya |last2=Balbir |first2=Nalini | title=Dravyasamgrha: Exposition of the Six Substances | publisher =[[Hindi Granth Karyalay]] | year=2010 | location=Mumbai | version=(in Prakrit and English) Pandit Nathuram Premi Research Series (vol-19) |pages=1 of Introduction | isbn=978-81-88769-30-8 }}</ref><ref>{{citation |last=Grimes |first=John |title=A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English |pages=118–119 |publisher=SUNY Press | year=1996 |location=New York |isbn=0-7914-3068-5 }}</ref> Some things are without a soul, ''[[ajiva|ajīva]]'', such as a chair or spoon.<ref name="Shah">{{citation |last=Shah |first=Natubhai |title=Jainism: The World of Conquerors |publisher=Sussex Academic Press |date=November 1998 |isbn=1-898723-30-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g120RG8GkHAC&pg=PA50 |page=50 }}</ref> There are different rankings of ''jīva'' based on the number of senses it has. Water, for example, is a sentient being of the first order, as it is considered to possess only one sense, that of touch.<ref>{{citation |editor-last=Doniger |editor-first=Wendy |editor-link=Wendy Doniger |title=Purana Perennis: Reciprocity and Transformation in Hindu and Jaina Texts |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-kZFzHCuiFAC |year=1993 |publisher=[[State University of New York Press]] |isbn=0-7914-1381-0 }}</ref>

[[Sentient beings (Buddhism)|Sentience in Buddhism]] is the state of having senses. In Buddhism, there are six senses, the sixth being the subjective experience of the mind. Sentience is simply awareness prior to the arising of [[Skandha]]. Thus, an animal qualifies as a sentient being. According to Buddhism, sentient beings made of pure consciousness are possible. In [[Mahayana]] Buddhism, which includes [[Zen]] and [[Tibetan Buddhism]], the concept is related to the [[Bodhisattva]], an enlightened being devoted to the liberation of others. The first [[Bodhisattva vows|vow]] of a Bodhisattva states, "Sentient beings are numberless; I vow to free them." In traditional Tibetan Buddhism, plants, stones and other inanimate objects are described as possessing spiritual vitality or a form of 'sentience'.<ref>Keiji, Nishitani (ed.)(1976). ''The Eastern Buddhist''. 9.2: p.72. Kyoto: Eastern Buddhist Society; cited in Dumoulin, Henrich (author); Heisig, James (translator); and Knitter, Paul (translator)(2005). ''Zen Buddhism: A History ~ Volume 2: Japan.'' With an Introduction by Victor Sogen Hori. Bloomington, Indiana, USA: World Wisdom, Inc. {{ISBN|978-0-941532-90-7}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Ray |first=Reginald A. |title=Indestructible truth: the living spirituality of Tibetan Buddhism |date=2002 |publisher=Shambhala |isbn=978-1-57062-910-5 |series=World of Tibetan Buddhism |location=Boston |pages=26–27}}</ref>

==Animal welfare, rights, and sentience==
{{Main|Animal rights by country or territory|Animal consciousness|Animal cognition|Animal welfare|Animal rights|Pain in animals|Sentientism}}
[[File:Octopus shell.jpg|thumb|An [[octopus]] traveling with shells collected for protection. Despite evolving independently from humans for over 600 million years, octopuses show various signs of sentience.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Henriques |first=Martha |date=25 July 2022 |title=The mysterious inner life of the octopus |url=https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20220720-do-octopuses-feel-pain |access-date=2024-06-29 |website=BBC |language=en-GB}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Birch |first1=Jonathan |author-link=Jonathan Birch (philosopher) |last2=Burn |first2=Charlotte |last3=Schnell |first3=Alexandra |last4=Browning |first4=Heather |last5=Crump |first5=Andrew |date=November 2021 |title=Review of the Evidence of Sentience in Cephalopod Molluscs and Decapod Crustaceans |url=https://www.lse.ac.uk/News/News-Assets/PDFs/2021/Sentience-in-Cephalopod-Molluscs-and-Decapod-Crustaceans-Final-Report-November-2021.pdf |journal=The London School of Economics and Political Science}}</ref> Octopuses, along with all other [[cephalopod]] molluscs and [[decapod crustaceans]], were recognized as sentient by the United Kingdom in 2023.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ho Tran |first=Tony |date=2021-11-23 |title=United Kingdom Declares Octopuses, Squids Are Sentient Beings |url=https://futurism.com/the-byte/united-kingdom-octopus-sentient |access-date=2024-06-29 |website=Futurism}}</ref>]]
Sentience has been a central concept in the animal rights movement, tracing back to the well-known writing of [[Jeremy Bentham]] in ''[[An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation]]'': "The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?"

[[Richard D. Ryder]] defines [[sentientism]] broadly as the position according to which an entity has moral status if and only if it is sentient.<ref name="ryder1991">{{cite journal|last1=Ryder|first1=Richard D.|title=Souls and Sentientism|journal=Between the Species|date=1991|volume=7|issue=1|page=Article 3|doi=10.15368/bts.1991v7n1.1|doi-access=free}}</ref> In David Chalmer's more specific terminology, Bentham is a ''narrow sentientist'', since his criterion for moral status is not only the ability to experience any phenomenal consciousness at all, but specifically the ability to experience conscious states with negative affective valence (i.e. suffering).<ref name="chalmers" /> Animal welfare and rights advocates often invoke similar capacities. For example, the documentary ''[[Earthlings (film)|Earthlings]]'' argues that while animals do not have all the desires and ability to comprehend as do humans, they do share the desires for food and water, shelter and companionship, freedom of movement and avoidance of pain.<ref name="Earthlings2005">Monson S (2005), "Earthlings".</ref>{{Ref label|B|b|none}}

[[Animal welfare]] advocates typically argue that sentient beings should be protected from unnecessary suffering, whereas [[animal rights]] advocates propose a set of basic rights for animals, such as the right to life, liberty, and freedom from suffering.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024 |title=Animal Rights: Overview |url=https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/religion-and-philosophy/animal-rights-overview |access-date=2025-05-10 |website=EBSCO |language=en}}</ref>

[[Gary Francione]] also bases his [[abolitionism (animal rights)|abolitionist]] theory of animal rights, which differs significantly from [[Peter_Singer#Animal_liberation_and_speciesism|Singer's]], on sentience. He asserts that, "All sentient beings, humans or nonhuman, have one right: the basic right not to be treated as the property of others."<ref>Francione, Gary. [http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/?page_id=52 Official blog]</ref>

[[Andrew Linzey]], a British [[theologian]], considers that [[Christianity]] should regard sentient animals according to their intrinsic worth, rather than their utility to humans.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2009-08-03 |title=BBC - Religions - Christianity: Animal rights |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/christianethics/animals_1.shtml |access-date=2024-03-10 |website=www.bbc.co.uk |language=en-GB}}</ref>

In 1997 the concept of [[Animal consciousness|animal sentience]] was written into the basic law of the European Union. The legally binding protocol annexed to the [[Treaty of Amsterdam]] recognises that animals are "sentient beings", and requires the EU and its member states to "pay full regards to the welfare requirements of animals".<ref>{{Cite web |date=1 December 2009 |title=The Lisbon Treaty: recognising animal sentience |url=https://www.ciwf.org.uk/news/2009/12/the-lisbon-treaty-recognising-animal-sentience |access-date=2024-03-10 |website=CIWF |language=en}}</ref>

=== Indicators of sentience ===
[[File:European honey bee extracts nectar.jpg|thumb|Experiments suggest that bees can display an optimistic mood, engage in playful behavior, and strategically avoid threats or harmful situations unless the reward is significant.<ref name=":1" />]]
[[Nociception]] is the process by which the [[nervous system]] detects and responds to potentially harmful stimuli, leading to the sensation of [[pain]]. It involves specialized receptors called [[Nociceptor|nociceptors]] that sense damage or threat and send signals to the brain. Nociception is widespread among animals, even among insects.<ref name=":02">{{Cite magazine |last=Reynolds |first=Matt |title=Insect Farming Is Booming. But Is It Cruel? |url=https://www.wired.com/story/insect-farming-sentience/ |access-date=2024-06-06 |magazine=Wired |language=en-US |issn=1059-1028}}</ref>

The presence of nociception indicates an organism's ability to detect harmful stimuli. A further question is whether the way these noxious stimuli are processed within the brain leads to a [[subjective experience]] of pain.<ref name=":02" /> To address that, researchers often look for behavioral cues. For example, "if a dog with an injured paw whimpers, licks the wound, limps, lowers pressure on the paw while walking, learns to avoid the place where the injury happened and seeks out analgesics when offered, we have reasonable grounds to assume that the dog is indeed experiencing something unpleasant." Avoiding painful stimuli unless the reward is significant can also provide evidence that pain avoidance is not merely an unconscious reflex (similarly to how humans "can choose to press a hot door handle to escape a burning building").<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |last=Chittka |first=Lars |date=2023-07-01 |title=Do Insects Feel Joy and Pain? |url=https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-insects-feel-joy-and-pain/ |access-date=2024-06-08 |website=Scientific American |language=en}}</ref>

=== Sentient animals ===
Animals such as [[Pig|pigs]], [[Chicken|chickens]], and [[fish]] are typically recognized as sentient. There is more uncertainty regarding [[Insect|insects]], and findings on certain insect species may not be applicable to others.<ref name=":02" />

Historically, fish were not considered sentient, and their behaviors were often viewed as "reflexes or complex, unconscious species-typical responses" to their environment. Their dissimilarity with humans, including the absence of a direct equivalent of the [[neocortex]] in their brain, was used as an argument against sentience.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Woodruff |first=Michael |date=3 July 2020 |title=Fish are nothing like us, except that they are sentient beings |url=https://aeon.co/essays/fish-are-nothing-like-us-except-that-they-are-sentient-beings |access-date=2024-06-08 |website=Aeon |language=en}}</ref> [[Jennifer Jacquet]] suggests that the belief that fish do not feel pain originated in response to a 1980s policy aimed at banning [[catch and release]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-06-25 |title=Do fish feel emotions? Experts weigh in on the ethics of fish farming |url=https://www.euronews.com/green/2023/06/25/fish-have-feelings-too-why-animal-sentience-means-we-should-rethink-food |access-date=2024-06-08 |website=euronews |language=en}}</ref> The range of animals regarded by scientists as sentient or conscious has progressively widened, now including animals such as fish, lobsters and octopus.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-04-19 |title=Scientists push new paradigm of animal consciousness, saying even insects may be sentient |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/animal-consciousness-scientists-push-new-paradigm-rcna148213 |access-date=2024-06-08 |website=NBC News |language=en}}</ref>

== Digital sentience ==
{{Main articles|Artificial consciousness}}

Digital sentience (or artificial sentience) means the sentience of [[Artificial intelligence|artificial intelligences]]. The question of whether artificial intelligences can be sentient is controversial.<ref name=":0">{{Cite news |last=Jackson |first=Lauren |date=2023-04-12 |title=What if A.I. Sentience Is a Question of Degree? |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/12/world/artificial-intelligence-nick-bostrom.html |access-date=2023-06-23 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> 

The AI research community does not consider sentience (that is, the "ability to feel sensations") as an important research goal, unless it can be shown that consciously "feeling" a sensation can make a machine more intelligent than just receiving input from sensors and processing it as information. [[Stuart J. Russell|Stuart Russell]] and [[Peter Norvig]] wrote in 2021: "We are interested in programs that behave intelligently. Individual aspects of consciousness—awareness, self-awareness, attention—can be programmed and can be part of an intelligent machine. The additional project making a machine conscious in exactly the way humans are is not one that we are equipped to take on."{{sfn|Russell|Norvig|2021|p=986}} 
Indeed, leading AI textbooks do not mention "sentience" at all.<ref>Leading AI textbooks in 2023:
* {{Cite book
|first1=Stuart J.|last1=Russell|author1-link=Stuart J. Russell
|first2=Peter|last2=Norvig|author2-link=Peter Norvig
|title=[[Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach]]
|year=2021
|edition=4th
|isbn=978-0-13-461099-3
|lccn=20190474
|publisher=Pearson|location=Hoboken
}}
* {{Cite book
| first1 = Elaine | last1 = Rich | author1-link = Elaine Rich
| first2 = Kevin  | last2 = Knight
| first3 = Shivashankar B | last3 = Nair
| title = Artificial Intelligence
| date = 1 January 2010
| isbn = 978-0-07-008770-5
| language = en
| publisher = Tata McGraw Hill India | location = New Delhi
| edition = 3rd
}}
</ref>

Digital sentience is of considerable interest to the [[philosophy of mind]]. [[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|Functionalist]] philosophers consider that sentience is about "causal roles" played by mental states, which involve information processing. In this view, the physical substrate of this information processing does not need to be biological, so there is no theoretical barrier to the possibility of sentient machines.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Manzotti |first1=Riccardo |last2=Chella |first2=Antonio |date=2018 |title=Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Consciousness and the Intermediate Level Fallacy |journal=Frontiers in Robotics and AI |volume=5 |article-number=39 |doi=10.3389/frobt.2018.00039 |pmid=33500925 |pmc=7805708 |issn=2296-9144 |doi-access=free }}</ref> According to [[type physicalism]] however, the physical constitution is important; and depending on the types of physical systems required for sentience, it may or may not be possible for certain types of machines (such as electronic computing devices) to be sentient.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Searle |first=John R. |date=1980 |title=Minds, brains, and programs |url=http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/MindsBrainsPrograms.html |journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences |language=en |volume=3 |issue=3 |pages=417–424 |doi=10.1017/S0140525X00005756 |s2cid=55303721 |issn=1469-1825|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071210043312/http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/MindsBrainsPrograms.html |archive-date=2007-12-10 |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

The discussion on the topic of alleged sentience of artificial intelligence has been reignited in 2022 by the claims made about [[Google]]'s [[LaMDA]] ([[Language model|Language Model]] for Dialogue Applications) artificial intelligence system that it is "sentient" and had a "[[soul]]".<ref>{{Cite web |last=Brandon Specktor published |date=2022-06-13 |title=Google AI 'is sentient,' software engineer claims before being suspended |url=https://www.livescience.com/google-sentient-ai-lamda-lemoine |access-date=2022-06-14 |website=livescience.com |language=en}}</ref> LaMDA is an [[Artificial Intelligence System|artificial intelligence system]] that creates [[chatbot]]s—AI robots designed to communicate with humans—by gathering vast amounts of text from the internet and using [[Algorithm|algorithms]] to respond to queries in the most fluid and natural way possible. The transcripts of conversations between scientists and LaMDA reveal that the AI system excels at this, providing answers to challenging topics about the nature of [[Emotion|emotions]], generating [[Aesop's Fables|Aesop]]-style fables on cue, and even describing its alleged fears.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Lemoine |first=Blake |date=2022-06-11 |title=Is LaMDA Sentient? — an Interview |url=https://cajundiscordian.medium.com/is-lamda-sentient-an-interview-ea64d916d917 |access-date=2022-06-14 |website=Medium |language=en}}</ref>

[[Nick Bostrom]] considers that while LaMDA is probably not sentient, being very sure of it would require understanding how consciousness works, having access to unpublished information about LaMDA's architecture, and finding how to apply the philosophical theory to the machine.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Leith |first=Sam |date=2022-07-07 |title=Nick Bostrom: How can we be certain a machine isn't conscious? |url=https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/nick-bostrom-how-can-we-be-certain-a-machine-isnt-conscious/ |access-date=2023-06-23 |website=The Spectator |language=en-US}}</ref> He also said about LLMs that "it's not doing them justice to say they're simply regurgitating text", noting that they "exhibit glimpses of creativity, insight and understanding that are quite impressive and may show the rudiments of reasoning". He thinks that "sentience is a matter of degree".<ref name=":0" />

In 2022, philosopher [[David Chalmers]] made a speech on whether [[large language model|large language models]] (LLMs) can be conscious, encouraging more research on the subject. He suggested that current LLMs were probably not conscious, but that the limitations are temporary and that future systems could be serious candidates for consciousness.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Chalmers |first=David |date=August 9, 2023 |title=Could a Large Language Model Be Conscious? |url=https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/could-a-large-language-model-be-conscious/ |work=Boston Review}}</ref>

According to [[Jonathan Birch (philosopher)|Jonathan Birch]], "measures to regulate the development of sentient AI should run ahead of what would be proportionate to the risks posed by current technology, considering also the risks posed by credible future trajectories." He is concerned that AI sentience would be particularly easy to deny, and that if achieved, humans might nevertheless continue to treat AI systems as mere tools. He notes that the linguistic behaviour of LLMs is not a reliable way to assess whether they are sentient. He suggests to apply theories of consciousness, such as the [[global workspace theory]], to the algorithms implicitly learned by LLMs, but noted that this technique requires advances in [[AI interpretability]] to understand what happens inside. He also mentions some other pathways that may lead to AI sentience, such as the [[brain emulation]] of sentient animals.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Birch |first=Jonathan |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/57949 |title=The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI |date=19 July 2024 |publisher=Oxford University Press |chapter=Part V: preparing for artificial sentience|doi=10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 |isbn=978-0-19-196672-9 }}</ref>

==See also==
{{div col|colwidth=15em}}
* [[Blindsight]]
* [[Binding problem]]
* [[Causality]]
* [[Ethics of uncertain sentience]]
* [[Explanatory gap]]
* [[Hard problem of consciousness]]
* [[Ideasthesia]]
* [[Mind–body problem]]
* [[Mirror test]]
* [[Omniscience]]
* [[Pain in invertebrates]]
* [[Philosophical zombie]]
* [[Philosophy of mind]]
* [[Problem of other minds]]
* [[Solipsism]]
* [[Turing test]]
* [[Vertiginous question]]
* [[Wisdom]]
{{div col end}}

==Notes==
{{Refbegin}}
'''a.''' {{Note label|A|a|none}} Quote: "The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates."<ref name="CDC2012"/>

'''b.''' {{Note label|B|b|none}} Quote: "Granted, these animals do not have all the desires we humans have; granted, they do not comprehend everything we humans comprehend; nevertheless, we and they do have some of the same desires and do comprehend some of the same things. The desires for food and water, shelter and companionship, freedom of movement and avoidance of pain."<ref name="Earthlings2005"/>
{{Refend}}

==References==
{{Reflist|2}}

==Further reading==
* Sugunasiri, Suwanda H.J., The Whole Body, not Heart, as 'Seat of Consciousness': the Buddha's View', Philosophy East & West, vol. 45, no. 3, pp.&nbsp;409–430). Prof. Sugunasiri is Founder of Nalanda College of Buddhist Studies, Toronto, Canada
* [http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/poltheory/bentham/ipml/index.html Jeremy Bentham - Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20060923170322/http://www.oup.com/uk/catalogue/?ci=9780198238515 Book about A Theory of Sentience] Readership: Philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists interested in sensation and perception. Authors, Austen Clark, Professor of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, Storrs
* [http://www.d.umn.edu/~dcole/sense5.html D. Cole: Sense and Sentience SENSE5 8/18/90; rev. 1-19-98. (original 1983) copyright David Cole University of Minnesota, Duluth]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20090717033015/http://www.ciwf.org.uk/animal_sentience/policy_and_culture/suggested_reading/default.aspx Science, policy and cultural implications of animal sentience, Suggested Reading, Compassion in World Farming]
* "[https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/apr/02/bees-intelligence-minds-pollination 'Bees are sentient': inside the stunning brains of nature's hardest workers]". Annette McGivney, ''The Guardian'', April 2, 2023
* Knight, Sam, "Hive Mind: Is beekeeping wrong?", ''[[The New Yorker]]'', 28 August 2023, pp. 26–30, 32. "Last year, the U.K. passed legislation that recognized animals as sentient beings, capable of feeling pain and joy. So far, the bill dignifies [[vertebrate]]s, [[decapod crustacean]]s... and [[cephalopod]]s... but not a single conscious bee." (p. 29.)
{{Animal welfare}}{{Animal rights}}
{{Consciousness}} 
{{Authority control}}
[[Category:17th-century neologisms]]
[[Category:Animal ethics]]
[[Category:Animal rights]]
[[Category:Consciousness]]
[[Category:Personhood]]
[[Category:Concepts in the philosophy of mind]]
[[Category:Subjective experience]]