View source for Sinicization

{{Short description|Assimilation into Han Chinese culture}}
{{About|cultural assimilation|the linguistic meaning|Transcription into Chinese characters}}
{{Redirect|Hanhua|the subdistrict in Xinye County, Henan|Hanhua Subdistrict}}
{{Chinese
| float = left
| showflag = p|
| t = 漢化
| s = 汉化
| l = [[Han Chinese|Han]]-ization
|poj=Hàn-hoa
|tl=Hàn-hua
|j=Hon3 Faa3
|phfs=Hon-fa
| mi = {{IPAc-cmn|h|an|4|-|h|ua|4}}
| p = hànhuà
| bpmf = ㄏㄢˋㄏㄨㄚˋ
| xej = هًا خُوَ
| t2 = 中國化
| s2 = 中国化
| l2 = [[China]]-ization
|poj2=Tiong-kok-hoa
|tl2=Tiong-kok-hua
|j2=Zung1 Gwok3 Faa3
|phfs2=Chûng-ket-fa
| mi2 = {{IPAc-cmn|zh|ong|1|.|g|uo|2|-|h|ua|4}}
| p2 = zhōngguóhuà
| bpmf2 = ㄓㄨㄥ ㄍㄨㄛˊㄏㄨㄚˋ
| xej2 = جوْ قُوَع خُوَ|
| kyujitai = 中國化
| shinjitai = 中国化
| hiragana = ちゅうごくか
| romaji = Chūgokuka|
| lk = [[China]]-ization
| hangul = 중국화
| hanja = 中國化
| rr = junggukhwa|
| chuhan = 漢化<br />中國化
| lqn = [[Han Chinese|Han]]-ization<br />[[China]]-ization
| qn = Hán hóa<br />Trung Quốc hóa
}}

'''Sinicization''', '''sinofication''', '''sinification''', or '''sinonization''' (from the prefix {{Wikt-lang|en|Sino-|sino-}}, 'Chinese, relating to China') is the process by which non-Chinese societies or groups are acculturated or assimilated into [[Chinese culture]], particularly the language, societal norms, cultural practices, and ethnic identity of the [[Han Chinese]]—the largest ethnic group of China.

Areas of influence include [[Chinese cuisine|diet]], [[Chinese Writing|writing]], [[Chinese industry|industry]], [[Education in China|education]], [[Chinese language|language/lexicon]], [[Chinese law|law]], [[Chinese architecture|architectural style]], [[Chinese politics|politics]], [[Chinese philosophy|philosophy]], [[Chinese Religions|religion]], [[Science and technology in China|science and technology]], value systems, and [[Lifestyle (sociology)|lifestyle]].

The term ''sinicization'' is also often used to refer to processes or policies of [[acculturation]] or [[Cultural assimilation|assimilation]] of norms from China on neighboring [[East Asian cultural sphere|East Asian societies]], or on [[Ethnic minorities in China|minority ethnic groups]] within China. Evidence of this process is reflected in the histories of [[Chinese influence on Korean culture|Korea]], [[Chinese influence on Japanese culture|Japan]], and [[Sinicization of Vietnam|Vietnam]] in the [[adoption of Chinese literary culture|adoption of the Chinese writing system]], which has long been a unifying feature in the [[Sinosphere]] as the vehicle for exporting Chinese culture to other Asian countries.

In recent times, the term "Sinicization" has sometimes been used more narrowly in reference to specific policies of the [[Government of China]] towards ethnic minorities as well as the promotion of "ethnic unity".<ref>{{Cite web |last=Cai |first=Vanessa |date=2024-12-10 |title=Xi calls for wider use of Mandarin in China's border areas amid security push |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3290195/xi-jinping-calls-wider-use-mandarin-chinas-border-areas-amid-security-push |access-date=2024-12-11 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en}}</ref>

==Assimilation==
The assimilation policy is a type of [[Chinese nationalism]] aimed at strengthening the [[Chinese identity|Chinese national identity]] (''Zhonghua minzu'') among the population. Proponents believe it will help to develop shared values, pride in being the country's citizen, respect and acceptance towards cultural differences among citizens of China.{{cn|date=July 2023}} Critics argue that assimilation destroys [[ethnic diversity]], [[language diversity]], and [[cultural diversity]]. The historian [[James A. Millward]] has claimed that the People's Republic of China has used the concept of sinicization as a means to obscure Han [[settler colonialism]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Millward |first=James A. |author-link=James A. Millward |date=2023-07-25 |title=Sinicisation, the Tribute System and Dynasties |url=https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/sinicisation-tribute-system-and-dynasties |access-date=2023-07-25 |website=IAI Istituto Affari Internazionali |language= |archive-date=2023-07-25 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230725221042/https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/sinicisation-tribute-system-and-dynasties |url-status=live }}</ref>

In China there are 292 non-Mandarin [[Languages of China|languages]] spoken by native peoples of the region.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ethnologue.com/country/CN|title=China|website=[[Ethnologue]]|language=en|access-date=2018-12-05|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181119094726/https://www.ethnologue.com/country/CN|archive-date=2018-11-19|url-status=live}}</ref> There are also a number of [[Immigration to China|immigrant]] languages, such as [[Khmer language|Khmer]], [[Portuguese language|Portuguese]], and English.

==Sinicizations==
===Historical===
====Baiyue====
Before sinicization, non-Chinese indigenous peoples of [[South China|southern China]], collectively termed by the Chinese as ''[[Baiyue]] (''{{Lang-zh|c=百越|l=Hundreds of Yue Peoples}}''),'' inhabited the coastline of China from as far north as the [[Yangtze|Yangtze River]] to as far south as the [[Gulf of Tonkin]].

As early as the 11th century BC, some of the Baiyue peoples in the [[Yangtze River Delta]] started to sinicize, marked by their establishment of the [[Wu (state)|Wu State]]. These Yue peoples, together with their southerner neighbours who formed the [[Yue (state)|Yue State]] centuries later, are collectively termed as [[Yuyue]] peoples. Over time, the mutual contact between Baiyue peoples and Han Chinese, as well as southward spread of Han Chinese, mostly as [[war refugees]],{{Citation needed|date=June 2024}} led to the sinicization of most of the Baiyue populations that remained in southern China, be they in the [[Yangtze River valley|Yangtze Valley]] or in coastal areas from the mouth of the Yangtze to the Gulf of Tonkin.<ref>{{cite book|title = Prehistoric Settlement of the Pacific, Volume 86, Part 5|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=XiELAAAAIAAJ&q=in+the+southward+spread+of+Han+Chinese+led+to+the+sinicization+of+all+AN-speakers&pg=PA137|isbn = 9780871698650|last1 = Goodenough|first1 = Ward Hunt|year = 1996|publisher = American Philosophical Society|access-date = 2020-10-14|archive-date = 2023-09-27|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20230927034530/https://books.google.com/books?id=XiELAAAAIAAJ&q=in+the+southward+spread+of+Han+Chinese+led+to+the+sinicization+of+all+AN-speakers&pg=PA137#v=snippet&q=in%20the%20southward%20spread%20of%20Han%20Chinese%20led%20to%20the%20sinicization%20of%20all%20AN-speakers&f=false|url-status = live}}</ref> The remnants of these peoples who were not fully sinicized are now recognized officially as the [[Ethnic minorities in China|ethnic minorities]] of the [[People's Republic of China]].

====Mongolic and Turkic peoples====
{{Main|Taoyuan County}}
[[Northern Wei|Tuoba Wei]] of northern China was a sinicized empire of Mongolic-Xianbei origin. 

Historical [[Shatuo]] Turks founded three sinicized dynasties in northern China. Descendants of [[Kingdom of Qocho|Buddhist Uyghurs]] (see also [[Yugurs]], [[Kingdom of Qocho]] and [[Ganzhou Uyghur Kingdom]]) who migrated to [[Taoyuan County, Hunan]], have assimilated into the [[Hui people|Hui]] population and adopted Chinese culture practice Chinese customs, speaking [[varieties of Chinese]] as their language.

====Han, Jin, and Sixteen Kingdoms period====
{{Main|Sixteen Kingdoms}}
From the late [[Han dynasty]] to the early [[Jin dynasty (266–420)]], large numbers of non-Chinese peoples living along China's northern periphery settled in northern China. Some of these migrants such as the [[Xiongnu]] and [[Xianbei]] had been pastoralist nomads from the northern steppes. Others such as the [[Di (Five Barbarians)|Di]] and [[Qiang (historical people)|Qiang]] were farmers and herders from the mountains of western [[Sichuan]] of southwest China. As migrants, they lived among ethnic Chinese and were sinicized to varying degrees. Many worked as farm laborers. Some attained official positions in the court and military. The numerous tribal groups in the north and northwest who had been heavily drafted into the military then exploited the chaos to seize power by local Chinese warlords.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Jacques Gernet |title=A History of Chinese Civilization |url=https://archive.org/details/historyofchinese00gern |url-access=registration |date=1996 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=0521497817 |page=[https://archive.org/details/historyofchinese00gern/page/180 180] |edition=illustrated, reprint, revised}}</ref>

During the [[Three Kingdoms]] period, [[Cao Cao]] initiated the policy of settling Xiongnu nomads away from the frontier near Taiyuan in modern Shanxi province, where they would be less likely to rebel. The Xiongnu abandoned nomadism and the elite were educated in Chinese-Confucian literate culture.<ref>{{cite book |last1=David Graff |title=Medieval Chinese Warfare 300–900 |date=2003 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=1134553536 |page=48}}</ref> The migration of northern Chinese people to the south further settled China as a multi-ethnic empire.

====Northern and Southern dynasties====
{{Main|Northern and Southern dynasties}}
The Northern and Southern dynasties was a period in the [[history of China]] that lasted from 386 to 589, following the tumultuous era of the [[Sixteen Kingdoms]] period. Though an age of [[civil war]] and political chaos, it was also a time of flourishing arts and culture, advancement in technology, and the spread of [[Mahayana|Mahayana Buddhism]] and [[Taoism|Daoism]]. The period saw large-scale migration of [[Han Chinese]] to the lands south of the [[Yangtze]]. The period came to an end with the unification of all of [[China proper]] by [[Emperor Wen of Sui|Emperor Wen]] of the [[Sui dynasty]]. During this period, the process of sinicization accelerated among the non-Han arrivals in the north and among the indigenous people in the south. This process was also accompanied by the increasing popularity of Buddhism ([[Chinese Buddhism#History|introduced into China in the first century]]) and Daoism in both [[northern and southern China]].<ref name=ger>{{cite book |last1=Jacques Gernet |title=A History of Chinese Civilization |url=https://archive.org/details/historyofchinese00gern |url-access=registration |date=1996 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=0521497817 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/historyofchinese00gern/page/192 192]–193 |edition=illustrated, reprint, revised}}</ref>

====Tang dynasty====
During the eighth and ninth centuries in the [[Tang dynasty]], Chinese male soldiers moved into [[Guizhou]] ([[Chinese postal romanization|formerly romanized as]] Kweichow) and married native non-Chinese women, their descendants being known as ''Lao-han-jen'' (original Chinese), in contrast to new Chinese people who colonized Guizhou at later times. They still spoke an archaic dialect as of 1929.<ref>{{in lang|en}} {{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=eG8cAAAAMAAJ|title=Scottish geographical magazine, Volumes 45–46|author=Scottish Geographical Society|year=1929|publisher=Royal Scottish Geographical Society.|page=70|access-date=2010-06-28|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180517122808/https://books.google.com/books?id=eG8cAAAAMAAJ&q|archive-date=2018-05-17|url-status=live}}</ref> Many immigrants to Guizhou were descended from these soldiers in garrisons who married non-Chinese women.<ref>{{in lang|en}} {{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vqcSAAAAIAAJ|title=The Cowrie Shell Miao of Kweichow, Volume 32, Issue 1|author=Margaret Portia Mickey|year=1947|publisher=The Museum|page=6|access-date=2010-06-28|archive-date=2023-09-27|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927034613/https://books.google.com/books?id=vqcSAAAAIAAJ|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Yuan dynasty====
The [[Mongols|Mongol]]-led [[Yuan dynasty]] appointed a [[Muslims|Muslim]] from [[Bukhara]], ''[[Sayyid]]'' [[Ajall Shams al-Din Omar]], as governor of [[Yunnan]] after conquering the [[Bai people|Bai]]-led [[Dali Kingdom]]. Sayyid Ajall is best known among Chinese for helping sinicize Yunnan province;<ref>{{cite book|author=Michael Dillon|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BwuSpFiOFfYC&q=na+family+hui&pg=PA22|title=China's Muslim Hui community: migration, settlement and sects|publisher=Curzon Press|year=1999|isbn=0-7007-1026-4|location=Richmond|page=23|access-date=2010-06-28|archive-date=2023-09-27|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927034530/https://books.google.com/books?id=BwuSpFiOFfYC&q=na+family+hui&pg=PA22#v=snippet&q=na%20family%20hui&f=false|url-status=live}}</ref> the promotion of [[Islam in China|Islam]], [[Confucianism]], and [[Buddhism]] would be part of his '[[civilizing mission]]' upon the non-Han Chinese peoples in Yunnan, who he viewed as "backward and barbarian."<ref name="SAYYED AJALL">{{cite web|last1=Lane|first1=George|date=June 29, 2011|title=Sayyed ajall|url=http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/sayyed-ajall|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121117054524/http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/sayyed-ajall|archive-date=17 November 2012|access-date=17 November 2012|website=Encyclopædia Iranica}}</ref><ref>Atwood, Christopher P. 2004. "[https://web.archive.org/web/20140813153811/http://www.fofweb.com/History/MainPrintPage.asp?iPin=EME454&DataType=Ancient&WinType=Free Sayyid Ajall 'Umar Shams-ud-Din]." ''Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire''. New York: Facts On File, Inc. Archived from [http://www.fofweb.com/History/MainPrintPage.asp?iPin=EME454&DataType=Ancient&WinType=Free the original] on 2014-08-13.</ref>

He founded a "Chinese style" city called Zhongjing Cheng, where modern [[Kunming]] is today, and ordered that a [[Buddhist temple]], two [[mosque]]s, and a [[Confucian temple]] be built in the city.<ref>{{cite book|last=Gaubatz|first=Piper Rae|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=drGGEsi1fFEC&q=sichuan+ajall+yuan&pg=PA78|title=Beyond the Great Wall: Urban Form and Transformation on the Chinese Frontiers|publisher=Stanford University Press|year=1996|isbn=0804723990|edition=illustrated|page=78|access-date=24 April 2014|archive-date=27 September 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927034531/https://books.google.com/books?id=drGGEsi1fFEC&q=sichuan+ajall+yuan&pg=PA78|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>(Original from the University of Virginia) {{cite book|author=Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Jāmi'at al-Malik 'Abd al-'Azīz. Ma'had Shu'ūn al Aqallīyat al-Muslimah|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0FFTAAAAYAAJ&q=administrators+Shams+al-din+umar++al+bukhari|title=Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volumes 7–8|publisher=The Institute|year=1986|page=385|quote=certain that Muslims of Central Asian originally played a major role in the Yuan (Mongol) conquest and subsequent rule of south-west China, as a result of which a distinct Muslim community was established in Yunnan by the late 13th century AD. Foremost among these soldier-administrators was Sayyid al-Ajall Shams al-Din Umar al-Bukhari (Ch. Sai-tien-ch'ih shan-ssu-ting). a court official and general of Turkic origin who participated in the Mongol invasion of Szechwan&nbsp;... And Yunnan in c. 1252, and who became Yuan Governor of the latter province in 1274–79. Shams al-Din—who is widely believed by the Muslims of Yunnan to have introduced Islam to the region—is represented as a wise and benevolent ruler, who successfully "pacified and comforted" the people of Yunnan, and who is credited with building Confucian temples, as well as mosques and schools|access-date=December 20, 2011|archive-date=September 27, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927034530/https://books.google.com/books?id=0FFTAAAAYAAJ&q=administrators+Shams+al-din+umar++al+bukhari|url-status=live}}</ref> The latter temple, built in 1274 and doubled as a school, was the first Confucian temple ever to be built in Yunnan.<ref>{{cite book|author=Tan Ta Sen|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vIUmU2ytmIIC&pg=PA92|title=Cheng Ho and Islam in Southeast Asia|publisher=Institute of Southeast Asian Studies|year=2009|isbn=978-9812308375|edition=illustrated, reprint|page=92|access-date=24 April 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160513091008/https://books.google.com/books?id=vIUmU2ytmIIC&pg=PA92|archive-date=13 May 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> By incorporating Chinese and consequently Confucian thought in the dynasty, scholars now deem Kublai Khan as an adopted Chinese citizen of Mongol ethnicity, rather than simply being mutually excluded from the definition of fellow Chinese he governed.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Carter|first=James|title=How Kublai Khan's Yuan complicates the notion of 'China'|date=16 December 2020|url=https://supchina.com/2020/12/16/how-kublai-khans-yuan-complicates-the-notion-of-china/|access-date=31 May 2021|archive-date=2 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602213411/https://supchina.com/2020/12/16/how-kublai-khans-yuan-complicates-the-notion-of-china/|url-status=live}}</ref> As such, Sayyid Ajall would be the one to introduce [[Confucian education]], [[Confucian ritual religion|rituals]], and traditions into Yunnan, including Chinese social structures, [[Chinese funeral rituals|funeral rituals]], and [[Traditional Chinese marriage|marriage customs]].<ref name="SAYYED AJALL" /><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kG45gi7E3hsC&pg=PA477|title=In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period (1200–1300)|series=Asiatische Forschungen: Monographienreihe zur Geschichte, Kultur und Sprache der Völker Ost- und Zentralasiens|publisher=Otto Harrassowitz Verlag|year=1993|isbn=3447033398|editor-last=Rachewiltz|editor-first=Igor de|volume=121|page=477|issn=0571-320X|access-date=24 April 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160514030252/https://books.google.com/books?id=kG45gi7E3hsC&pg=PA477|archive-date=14 May 2016|url-status=live }}</ref> He would go on to construct numerous Confucian temples throughout his reign.<ref name="Silk Road p116">{{cite book|last=Liu|first=Xinru|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xXhhkvOULHsC&q=yunnan+sayyid+mongols+prince&pg=PA116|title=The Silk Road in World History|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2001|isbn=019979880X|page=116|access-date=24 April 2014|archive-date=27 September 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927035028/https://books.google.com/books?id=xXhhkvOULHsC&q=yunnan+sayyid+mongols+prince&pg=PA116#v=snippet&q=yunnan%20sayyid%20mongols%20prince&f=false|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kG45gi7E3hsC&q=yunnan+sayyid+mongols+prince&pg=PA476|title=In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period (1200–1300)|series=Asiatische Forschungen: Monographienreihe zur Geschichte, Kultur und Sprache der Völker Ost- und Zentralasiens|publisher=Otto Harrassowitz Verlag|year=1993|isbn=3447033398|editor-last=Rachewiltz|editor-first=Igor de|volume=121|page=476|issn=0571-320X|access-date=24 April 2014|archive-date=27 September 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927035029/https://books.google.com/books?id=kG45gi7E3hsC&q=yunnan+sayyid+mongols+prince&pg=PA476#v=snippet&q=yunnan%20sayyid%20mongols%20prince&f=false|url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Ethnic Groups – china.org.cn|url=http://www.china.org.cn/e-groups/shaoshu/shao-2-hui.htm|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141202065243/http://www.china.org.cn/e-groups/shaoshu/shao-2-hui.htm|archive-date=2014-12-02|access-date=2014-08-16|website=www.china.org.cn}}</ref>

Confucian rituals were taught to students in newly founded schools by [[Sichuanese people|Sichuanese]] scholars.<ref>{{cite book|last=Yang|first=Bin|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CZQMAQAAMAAJ&q=pioneered+salary+school+kunming|title=Between winds and clouds: the making of Yunnan (second century BCE to twentieth century CE)|publisher=Columbia University Press|year=2009|isbn=978-0231142540|page=154|access-date=24 April 2014|archive-date=27 September 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927035029/https://books.google.com/books?id=CZQMAQAAMAAJ&q=pioneered+salary+school+kunming|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Yang 2008">{{cite book|last=Yang|first=Bin|title=Between winds and clouds: the making of Yunnan (second century BCE to twentieth century CE)|publisher=Columbia University Press|year=2008|isbn=978-0231142540|chapter=Chapter 5 Sinicization and Indigenization: The Emergence of the Yunnanese|access-date=24 April 2014|chapter-url=http://www.gutenberg-e.org/yang/pdf/yang-chapter5.pdf|archive-date=23 March 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140323041235/http://www.gutenberg-e.org/yang/pdf/yang-chapter5.pdf|url-status=live}}{{page needed|date=December 2014}}</ref> The natives of Yunnan were instructed by Sayyid Ajall in such Confucian ceremonies as weddings, matchmaking, funerals, ancestor worship, and kowtow. The native leaders had their "barbarian" clothing replaced by clothing given to them by Sayyid Ajall as well.<ref name="Yang 2008" /><ref>{{cite book|last=Yang|first=Bin|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CZQMAQAAMAAJ&q=For+instance%2C+Sayyid%27Ajall+Shams+Al-Din+taught+indigenous+peoples+to+perform+the+Confucian+rituals+of+kneeling+%28kowtow%29%2C+matchmaking+for+marriage%2C+marriage+ceremonies%2C+funerals%2C+and+ancestral+worship.+He+also+presented+native+chieftains+with+clothes%2C+hats%2C+socks%2C+and+shoes+to+replace+their+%22barbarian%22+dress.|title=Between winds and clouds: the making of Yunnan (second century BCE to twentieth century CE)|publisher=Columbia University Press|year=2009|isbn=978-0231142540|page=157|access-date=24 April 2014|archive-date=27 September 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927035033/https://books.google.com/books?id=CZQMAQAAMAAJ&q=For+instance%2C+Sayyid%27Ajall+Shams+Al-Din+taught+indigenous+peoples+to+perform+the+Confucian+rituals+of+kneeling+%28kowtow%29%2C+matchmaking+for+marriage%2C+marriage+ceremonies%2C+funerals%2C+and+ancestral+worship.+He+also+presented+native+chieftains+with+clothes%2C+hats%2C+socks%2C+and+shoes+to+replace+their+%22barbarian%22+dress.|url-status=live}}</ref> The governor was praised and described as making "the orangutans and butcherbirds become unicorns and phoenixes and their felts and furs were exchanged for gowns and caps" by [[He Hongzuo]], the Regional Superintendent of Confucian studies.<ref>{{cite book|author=Thant Myint-U|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FE9taNzMa5IC&q=nasr+al+din+yunnan&pg=PT238|title=Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia|publisher=Macmillan|year=2011|isbn=978-1-4668-0127-1|quote=claimed descent from the emir of Bokhara&nbsp;... and was appointed as the top administrator in Yunnan in the 1270s. Today the Muslims of Yunnan regard him as the founder of their community, a wise and benevolent ruler who 'pacified and comforted' the peoples of Yunnan. Sayyid Ajall was officially the Director of Political Affairs of the Regional Secretariat of Yunnan&nbsp;... According to Chinese records, he introduced new agricultural technologies, constructed irrigation systems, and tried to raise living standards. Though a Muslims, he built or rebuilt Confucian temples and created a Confucian education system. His contemporary, He Hongzuo, the Regional Superintendent of Confucian studies, wrote that through his efforts 'the orangutans and butcherbirds became unicorns and phonixes<!--spell check--> and their felts and furs were exchanged for gowns and caps'&nbsp;...|access-date=December 20, 2011|archive-date=September 27, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927040058/https://books.google.com/books?id=FE9taNzMa5IC&q=nasr+al+din+yunnan&pg=PT238#v=onepage&q=nasr%20al%20din%20yunnan&f=false|url-status=live}}{{page needed|date=December 2014}}</ref>

Sayyid Ajall would also be the first to bring Islam to the area, and thus the widespread presence of Islam in Yunnan is credited to his work.<ref>{{cite book|author=M. Th Houtsma|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rezD7rvuf9YC&q=nasr+al+din+yunnan&pg=PA847|title=First encyclopaedia of Islam: 1913–1936|publisher=BRILL|year=1993|isbn=90-04-09796-1|page=847|quote=Although Saiyid-i Adjall certainly did much for the propagation of Islam in Yunnan, it is his son Nasir al-Din to whom is ascribed the main credit for its dissemination. He was a minister and at first governed the province of Shansi: he later became governor of Yunnan where he died in 1292 and was succeeded by his brother Husain. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the direction of this movement was from the interior, from the north. The Muhammadan colonies on the coast were hardly affected by it. On the other hand it may safely be assumed that the Muslims of Yunnan remained in constant communication with those of the northern provinces of Shensi and Kansu.|access-date=December 20, 2011|archive-date=September 27, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927040057/https://books.google.com/books?id=rezD7rvuf9YC&q=nasr+al+din+yunnan&pg=PA847#v=onepage&q=nasr%20al%20din%20yunnan&f=false|url-status=live}}</ref> Both [[Marco Polo]] and [[Rashid al-Din Vatvat]] recorded that Yunnan was heavily populated by Muslims during the Yuan dynasty, with Rashid naming a city with all Muslim inhabitants as the "great city of Yachi."<ref>(Original from the University of Virginia) {{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0FFTAAAAYAAJ&q=al+din+yachi+exclusively+prominent|title=Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volumes 7–8|year=1986|author=Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Jāmi'at al-Malik 'Abd al-'Azīz. Ma'had Shu'ūn al Aqallīyat al-Muslimah|publisher=The Institute|page=174|quote=from the Yuan Dynasty, and indicated further Muslim settlement in northeastern and especially southwestern Yunnan. Marco Polo, who travelled through Yunnan "Carajan" at the beginning of the Yuan period, noted the presence of "Saracens" among the population. Similarly, the Persian historian Rashid al-Din (died 1318 AD) recorded in his Jami' ut-Tawarikh that the 'great city of Yachi' in Yunnan was exclusively inhabited by Muslims.|access-date=December 20, 2011|archive-date=September 27, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927040058/https://books.google.com/books?id=0FFTAAAAYAAJ&q=al+din+yachi+exclusively+prominent|url-status=live}}</ref> It has been suggested that Yachi was [[Dali City]] (''Ta-li''), which had many Hui people.<ref>(Original from the University of Virginia) {{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0FFTAAAAYAAJ&q=when+early+al+din+yachi+exclusively+ta-li+centre+though|title=Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volumes 7–8|year=1986|author=Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Jāmi'at al-Malik 'Abd al-'Azīz. Ma'had Shu'ūn al Aqallīyat al-Muslimah|publisher=The Institute|page=387|quote=when Maroco Polo visited Yunnan in the early Yuan period he noted the presence of "Saracens" among the population while the Persian historian Rashid al-Din (died 1318 AD) recorded in his Jami' ut-Tawarikh that 'the great city of Yachi' in Yunnan was exclusively inhabited by Muslims. Rashid al-Din may have been referring to the region around Ta-li in western Yunnan, which was to emerge as the earliest centre of Hui Muslim settlement in the province.|access-date=December 20, 2011|archive-date=September 27, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927040058/https://books.google.com/books?id=0FFTAAAAYAAJ&q=when+early+al+din+yachi+exclusively+ta-li+centre+though|url-status=live}}</ref>

Sayyid Ajall's son [[Nasr al-Din (Yunnan)|Nasir al-Din]] became Governor of Yunnan in 1279 after his death.<ref>( ){{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FE9taNzMa5IC&q=nasr+al+din+yunnan&pg=PT238|title=Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia|year=2011|author=Thant Myint-U|publisher=Macmillan|isbn=978-1-4668-0127-1|quote=In this way, Yunnan became known to the Islamic world. When Sayyid Ajall died in 1279 he was succeeded by his son Nasir al-Din who governed for give years and led the invasion of Burma. His younger brother became the Transport Commissioner and the entire family entrenched their influence.|access-date=December 20, 2011|archive-date=September 27, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927040058/https://books.google.com/books?id=FE9taNzMa5IC&q=nasr+al+din+yunnan&pg=PT238#v=onepage&q=nasr%20al%20din%20yunnan&f=false|url-status=live}}{{page needed|date=December 2014}}</ref><ref>(Original from the University of Virginia) {{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0FFTAAAAYAAJ&q=son+Nasir|title=Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volumes 7–8|year=1986|author=Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Jāmi'at al-Malik 'Abd al-'Azīz. Ma'had Shu'ūn al Aqallīyat al-Muslimah|publisher=The Institute|page=385|quote=On his death he was succeeded by his eldest son, Nasir al-Din (Ch. Na-su-la-ting, the "Nescradin" of Marco Polo), who governed Yunnan between 1279 and I284. While Arab and South Asian Muslims, pioneers of the maritime expansion of Islam in the Bay of Bengal, must have visited the|access-date=December 20, 2011|archive-date=September 27, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927040059/https://books.google.com/books?id=0FFTAAAAYAAJ&q=son+Nasir|url-status=live}}</ref>

Historian Jacqueline Armijo-Hussein has written on Sayyid Ajall's confucianization and sinicization policies in various papers, including in her dissertation "Sayyid 'Ajall Shams al-Din: A Muslim from Central Asia, serving the Mongols in China, and bringing 'civilization' to Yunnan" (1997);<ref>{{cite web|url=http://cesww.fas.harvard.edu/ces_dis_History.html|title="CESWW" – Dissertations in Central Eurasian Studies – History|website=cesww.fas.harvard.edu|access-date=2014-08-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140825130022/http://cesww.fas.harvard.edu/ces_dis_History.html|archive-date=2014-08-25|url-status=live}}</ref> and in "The Origins of Confucian and Islamic Education in Southwest China: Yunnan in the Yuan Period" (n.d.)<ref>{{cite web|title=Session 8: Individual Papers: New Work on Confucianism, Buddhism, and Islam from Han to Yuan|url=https://www.asian-studies.org/absts/1998abst/china/c8.htm|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150715144153/https://www.asian-studies.org/absts/1998abst/china/c8.htm|archive-date=2015-07-15|access-date=2014-08-16}}</ref> and "The Sinicization and Confucianization in Chinese and Western Historiography of a Muslim from Bukhara Serving Under the Mongols in China" (1989).<ref>{{cite book|last=Gladney|first=Dru C.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_hJ9aht6nZQC&q=armijo&pg=PA366|title=Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic|publisher=Harvard University Asia Center|year=1996|isbn=0674594975|series=Harvard East Asian Monographs 149|page=424|issn=0073-0483|access-date=24 April 2014|orig-year=1991|archive-date=27 September 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927040602/https://books.google.com/books?id=_hJ9aht6nZQC&q=armijo&pg=PA366#v=snippet&q=armijo&f=false|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Ming dynasty====
{{Main|Ming conquest of Yunnan|Miao rebellions in the Ming dynasty}}
During the [[Ming conquest of Yunnan]] Chinese military soldiers were settled in Yunnan, and many married the native women.

====Qing dynasty====
The rulers of the [[Qing dynasty]] were [[Manchu people|ethnic Manchus]] who adopted the norms of the [[Mandate of Heaven]] to justify their rule. The "orthodox" historical view emphasized the power of Han Chinese to "sinicize" their conquerors, although more recent research such as the [[New Qing History]] school revealed Manchu rulers were savvy in their manipulation of their subjects and from the 1630s through at least the 18th century, the emperors developed a sense of Manchu identity and used [[Central Asia]]n models of rule as much as Confucian ones. There is also evidence of sinicization, however. For example, Manchus originally had their own separate style of naming from the Han Chinese, but eventually adopted Han Chinese naming practices.

[[Manchu name]]s consisted of more than the two or one syllable [[Chinese name]]s, and when phonetically transcribed into Chinese, they made no sense at all.<ref>{{cite book|year=2001|publisher=Stanford University Press|quote=famous Manchu figure of the early Qing who belonged to the Niohuru clan) would have been the unwieldy "Niu-gu-lu E-bi-long" in Chinese. Moreover, the characters used in names were typically chosen to represent the sounds of Manchu, and not to carry any particular meaning in Chinese. For educated Han Chinese accustomed to names composed of a familiar surname and one or two elegang characters drawn from a poem or a passage from the classics, Manchu names looked not just different, but absurd. What was oneo to make of a name like E-bi-long, written in Chinese characters meaning "repress-must flourish," or Duo-er-gun, meaning "numerous-thou-roll"? S.... To them they looked like nonsense.... But they are not nonsense in Manchu: "E-bi-long" is the transcription of ebilun, meaning "a delicate or sickly child," and "Duo-er-gun" is the Chinese transcription of dorgon, the Manchu word for badger.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_qtgoTIAiKUC&pg=PA242|isbn=0-8047-4684-2|page=242|title=The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China|edition=illustrated, reprint|author=Mark C. Elliott|access-date=March 2, 2012}}</ref> The meaning of the names that Manchus used were also very different from the meanings of Chinese names.<ref>{{cite book|year=2001|publisher=Stanford University Press|quote=Thus we find names like Nikan (Chinese), Ajige (little), Asiha (young), Haha (nale), Mampi (knot—a reference to the hair?), Kara (black), Fulata (red-eyed), Necin (peaceful), Kirsa (steppe fox), Unahan (colt), Jumara (squirrel), Nimašan (sea eagle), Nomin (lapis lazuli), and Gacuha (toy made out of an animal's anklebone).44 Names such as Jalfungga (long-lived), Fulingga (lucky one), Fulungga (majestic), and Hūturingga (fortunate), were not unknown, either, particularly after the seventeenth century. Although mightily foreign when written as Zha-la-feng-a, Fu-ling-a, Fu-long-a, or Hu-tu-ling-ga|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_qtgoTIAiKUC&pg=PA242|isbn=0-8047-4684-2|page=242|title=The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China|edition=illustrated, reprint|author=Mark C. Elliott|access-date=March 2, 2012}}</ref> The Manchus also gave [[number]]s as personal names.<ref>{{cite book|year=2001|publisher=Stanford University Press|quote=While Chinese names, too, sometimes ended in characters with the sounds "zhu," "bao," and "tai," more often than not, such names in the Qing belonged to Manchus and other bannermen (Chinese bannermen and Mongols sometimes took Manchu-sounding names), even if the attached meaning is not clear (it is not certain that all names in fact had a specific meaning). Giving "numeral names" was another unique Manchu habit. These were names that actually referred to numbers. Sometimes they were given using Manchu numbers—for example, Nadanju (seventy) or Susai (fifty). Other times number names used the Manchu transcriptions of Chinese numbers, as in the name Loišici (= Liushi qi, "sixty-seven"), Bašinu (= bashi wu, "eight-five").45 Such names, unheard of among the Han, were quite common among the Manchus, an appeared from time to time among Chinese bannermen. Popular curiosity about this odd custom in Qing was partly satisfied by the nineteenth-century bannerman-writer Fu-ge, who explained in his book of "jottings" that naming children for their grandparents' ages was a way of wishing longevity to the newly born.46|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_qtgoTIAiKUC&pg=PA243|isbn=0-8047-4684-2|page=243|title=The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China|edition=illustrated, reprint|author=Mark C. Elliott|access-date=March 2, 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140105080620/http://books.google.com/books?id=_qtgoTIAiKUC&pg=PA243|archive-date=January 5, 2014|url-status=live}}</ref>

Historical records report that as early as 1776, the [[Qianlong Emperor]] was shocked to see a high Manchu official, [[Guo'ermin]], not understand what the emperor was telling him in Manchu, despite coming from the Manchu stronghold of Shengjing (now [[Shenyang]]).<ref>Yu Hsiao-jung, [http://lacito.vjf.cnrs.fr/colloque/diaporamas/yu2.pdf Manchu Rule over China and the Attrition of the Manchu Language] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130619102136/http://lacito.vjf.cnrs.fr/colloque/diaporamas/yu2.pdf |date=19 June 2013 }}</ref> By the 19th century even the imperial court had lost fluency in the language. The [[Jiaqing Emperor]] (reigned 1796–1820) complained that his officials were not proficient at understanding or writing Manchu.<ref name="rhoads">Edward J. M. Rhoads, ''Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928.'' University of Washington Press, 2000. Pages 52–54. {{ISBN|0-295-98040-0}}. Partially available [https://books.google.com/books?id=QiM2pF5PDR8C on Google Books] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927040544/https://books.google.com/books?id=QiM2pF5PDR8C |date=2023-09-27 }}</ref>

Eventually, the Qing royal family (the [[Aisin Gioro]]) gave their children Chinese names, which were separate from the Manchu names, and even adopted the Chinese practice of [[generation name]]s, although its usage was inconsistent and error-ridden. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Manchu royal family stopped using Manchu names.<ref>{{cite book|year=2001|publisher=University of Washington Press|quote=At Xiuyan, in eastern Fengtian, the Manchus in the seventh or eighth generation continued as before to give their sons polysyllabic Manchu personal names that were meaningless when transliterated into Chinese, but at the same time they began to also give them Chinese names that were disyllabic and meaningful and that conformed to the generational principle. Thus, in the seventh generation of the Gūwalgiya lineage were sons with two names, one Manchu and one Chinese, such as Duolunbu/Shiman, Delinbu/Shizhu, and Tehengbu/Shizhen. Within the family and the banner, these boys used their Manchu name, but outside they used their Han-style name. Then, from the eighth or ninth generation one, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Gūwalgiya at Xiuyan stopped giving polysyllabic Manchu names to their sons, who thereafter used Chinese names exclusively.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tgq1miGno-4C&pg=PA56|page=56|title=Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861–1928|edition=reprint, illustrated|author=Edward J. M. Rhoads|access-date=March 2, 2012|isbn=9780295804125|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140105080701/http://books.google.com/books?id=tgq1miGno-4C&pg=PA56|archive-date=January 5, 2014|url-status=live}}</ref>

The [[Niohuru]] family of the Manchu changed their family name to [[Lang (Chinese surname)|Lang]], which sounded like "wolf" in Chinese, since wolf in Manchu was Niohuru; thus forming a translation.<ref>{{cite book|year=2001|publisher=University of Washington Press|quote=and when the ancient and politically prominent Manchu lineage of Niohuru adopted the Han-style surname Lang, he ridiculed them for having "forgotten their roots." (The Niohuru, whose name was derived from niohe, Manchu for wolf," had chosen Lang as their surname because it was a homophone for the Chinese word for "wolf.")|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tgq1miGno-4C&pg=PA56|page=56|title=Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861–1928|edition=reprint, illustrated|author=Edward J. M. Rhoads|access-date=March 2, 2012|isbn=9780295804125|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140105080701/http://books.google.com/books?id=tgq1miGno-4C&pg=PA56|archive-date=January 5, 2014|url-status=live}}</ref>

Although the Manchus replaced their Manchu names with Chinese personal names, the [[Eight Banners|Manchu bannermen]] followed their traditional practice in typically used their first/personal name to address themselves and not their last name, while Han Chinese bannermen used their last name and first in normal Chinese style.<ref>{{cite book|year=2001|publisher=University of Washington Press|quote=Manchu men had abandoned their original polysyllabic personal names infavor of Han-style disyllabic names; they had adopted the Han practice of choosing characters with auspicious meanings for the names; and they had assigned names on a generational basis.... Except among some Hanjun such as the two Zhao brothers, bannermen still did not, by and large, use their|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tgq1miGno-4C&pg=PA56|page=56|title=Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861–1928|edition=reprint, illustrated|author=Edward J. M. Rhoads|access-date=March 2, 2012|isbn=9780295804125|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140105080701/http://books.google.com/books?id=tgq1miGno-4C&pg=PA56|archive-date=January 5, 2014|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|year=2001|publisher=University of Washington Press|quote=family name but called themselves only by their personal name—for example, Yikuang, Ronglu, Gangyi, Duanfang, Xiliang, and Tieliang. In this respect, most Manchus remained conspicuously different from Han.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tgq1miGno-4C&pg=PA57|page=57|title=Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861–1928|edition=reprint, illustrated|author=Edward J. M. Rhoads|access-date=March 2, 2012|isbn=9780295804125|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140105080808/http://books.google.com/books?id=tgq1miGno-4C&pg=PA57|archive-date=January 5, 2014|url-status=live}}</ref>

Usage of surnames was not traditional to the Manchu while it was to the Han Chinese.<ref>{{cite book|year=2001|publisher=Stanford University Press|quote=Chinese names consist typically of a single-character surname and a given name of one or two characters, the latter usually chosen for their auspicious meaning. Manchu names were different. For one thing, Manchus did not commonly employ surnames, identifying themselves usually by their banner affiliation rather than by their lineage. Even if they had customarily used both surname and given name, this would not have eliminated the difference with Han names, since Manchu names of any kind were very often longer than two characters—that is, two syllables— in length. Where a Han name (to pick at random two names from the eighteenth century) might read Zhang Tingyu or Dai Zhen, the full name of, say, Ebilun (a|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_qtgoTIAiKUC&pg=PA241|isbn=0-8047-4684-2|page=241|title=The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China|edition=illustrated, reprint|author=Mark C. Elliott|access-date=March 2, 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131231223407/http://books.google.com/books?id=_qtgoTIAiKUC&pg=PA241|archive-date=December 31, 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Nguyễn dynasty (Vietnam)====
{{Main|Sinicization of Vietnam}}
The Vietnamese Nguyễn emperor [[Minh Mạng]] sinicized ethnic minorities such as [[Khmer people|Khmers]], [[Chams]] and [[Montagnard (Vietnam)|Montagnards]], claimed the legacy of [[Vietnamese philosophy#Confucianism in Vietnam|Confucianism]] and China's Han dynasty for Vietnam.<ref name="Owen2005">{{cite book|author=Norman G. Owen|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=py5Xh0-pw18C&q=minh+mang+han&pg=PA115|title=The Emergence Of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History|publisher=University of Hawaii Press|year=2005|isbn=978-0-8248-2890-5|pages=115–|access-date=2020-10-14|archive-date=2023-09-27|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927041045/https://books.google.com/books?id=py5Xh0-pw18C&q=minh+mang+han&pg=PA115#v=snippet&q=minh%20mang%20han&f=false|url-status=live}}</ref> Directing his policies at the Khmers and [[hill tribes]],<ref name="PeerenboomPetersen2006">{{cite book|author1=Randall Peerenboom|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2j6GNiMMc1oC&q=kinh+people+of+capital&pg=PA474|title=Human Rights in Asia: A Comparative Legal Study of Twelve Asian Jurisdictions, France and the USA|author2=Carole J. Petersen|author3=Albert H.Y. Chen|date=27 September 2006|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-134-23881-1|pages=474–|access-date=14 October 2020|archive-date=27 September 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927041046/https://books.google.com/books?id=2j6GNiMMc1oC&q=kinh+people+of+capital&pg=PA474#v=snippet&q=kinh%20people%20of%20capital&f=false|url-status=live}}</ref> Minh Mang declared that "We must hope that their barbarian habits will be subconsciously dissipated, and that they will daily become more infected by Han [Sino-Vietnamese] customs."<ref name="Moses2008">{{cite book|author=A. Dirk Moses|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RBgoNN4MG-YC&q=minh+mang+han&pg=PA209|title=Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History|date=1 January 2008|publisher=Berghahn Books|isbn=978-1-84545-452-4|pages=209–|access-date=14 October 2020|archive-date=27 September 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927041144/https://books.google.com/books?id=RBgoNN4MG-YC&q=minh+mang+han&pg=PA209#v=snippet&q=minh%20mang%20han&f=false|url-status=live}}</ref> Moreover, he would use the term ''Han'' ({{Linktext|漢人}}) to refer to the Vietnamese people,<ref name="Owen2005" /> and the name {{Langx|vi|{{linktext|Trung Quốc}}|label=none}} (中國, the same [[Chinese characters]] as for 'China') to refer to Vietnam.<ref>{{Cite web|title=H-Net Discussion Networks – FW: H-ASIA: Vietnam as "Zhongguo" (2 REPLIES)|url=http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-asia&month=9906&week=e&msg=28mq4qDZEWt3sD%2B6t6h%2Flw&user=&pw=|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181031103133/http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-asia&month=9906&week=e&msg=28mq4qDZEWt3sD%2B6t6h%2Flw&user=&pw=|archive-date=2018-10-31|access-date=2020-05-25}}</ref> Likewise, the lord [[Nguyễn Phúc Chu]] had referred to Vietnamese as ''Han'' people in 1712 when differentiating between Vietnamese and Chams.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/issue/issue4/article_353.html | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040617071243/http://kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/issue/issue4/article_353.html | archive-date=2004-06-17 | title=Vietnam-Champa Relations and the Malay-Islam Regional Network in the 17th–19th Centuries}}</ref>

Chinese clothing was also adopted by the Vietnamese people. Variations of them are still being used today.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://angelasancartier.net/ao-dai-vietnams-national-dress | title=Angelasancartier.net | access-date=2016-02-22 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160121182241/http://angelasancartier.net/ao-dai-vietnams-national-dress | archive-date=2016-01-21 | url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url = http://beyondvictoriana.com/2010/03/14/beyond-victoriana-18-transcultural-tradition-of-the-vietnamese-ao-dai/|title = #18 Transcultural Tradition of the Vietnamese Ao Dai|date = 2010-03-14|access-date = 2016-02-22|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20100323122205/http://beyondvictoriana.com/2010/03/14/beyond-victoriana-18-transcultural-tradition-of-the-vietnamese-ao-dai/|archive-date = 2010-03-23|url-status = live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=http://fashion-history.lovetoknow.com/clothing-types-styles/ao-dai | title=Ao Dai | access-date=2016-02-22 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160204032753/http://fashion-history.lovetoknow.com/clothing-types-styles/ao-dai | archive-date=2016-02-04 | url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url = http://www.tor.com/2010/10/20/ao-dai-and-i-steampunk-essay/|title = The Ao Dai and I: A Personal Essay on Cultural Identity and Steampunk|date = 2010-10-20|access-date = 2016-02-22|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160307004314/http://www.tor.com/2010/10/20/ao-dai-and-i-steampunk-essay/|archive-date = 2016-03-07|url-status = live}}</ref>

=== Republic of China ===

==== Ma Clique ====
Hui Muslim General [[Ma Fuxiang]] created an assimilationist group and encouraged the integration of Muslims into Chinese society.<ref>{{cite book |author=Joseph Mitsuo Kitagawa |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5LSvkQvvmAMC&q=ma+fu-hsiang&pg=PA368 |title=The religious traditions of Asia: religion, history, and culture |publisher=Routledge |year=2002 |isbn=0-7007-1762-5 |page=368 |access-date=2010-06-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927041047/https://books.google.com/books?id=5LSvkQvvmAMC&q=ma+fu-hsiang&pg=PA368#v=snippet&q=ma%20fu-hsiang&f=false |archive-date=2023-09-27 |url-status=live}}</ref> Ma Fuxiang was a hardcore assimilationist and said that Hui should assimilate into Han.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Lipman |first=Jonathan N. |date=Jul 1984 |title=Ethnicity and Politics in Republican China: The Ma Family Warlords of Gansu |journal=Modern China |publisher=Sage Publications, Inc. |volume=10 |issue=3 |page=296 |doi=10.1177/009770048401000302 |jstor=189017 |s2cid=143843569}}</ref>

===Contemporary===
{{Further|National Ethnic Affairs Commission}}

====Hong Kong and Macau====
{{Main|Hong Kong–Mainland China conflict}}

====Xinjiang====
{{Main|Xinjiang conflict|Xinjiang internment camps|Persecution of Uyghurs in China}}

The [[Hui Muslim]] [[36th Division (National Revolutionary Army)]] governed the southern region of [[Xinjiang]] in 1934–1937. The administration that was set up was colonial in nature, importing Han cooks and baths,<ref>{{cite book|author=Andrew D. W. Forbes|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IAs9AAAAIAAJ&q=ma+hushan&pg=PA134|title=Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: a political history of Republican Sinkiang 1911–1949|publisher=CUP Archive|year=1986|isbn=0-521-25514-7|location=Cambridge, England|page=130|access-date=2010-06-28|archive-date=2023-09-27|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927041550/https://books.google.com/books?id=IAs9AAAAIAAJ&q=ma+hushan&pg=PA134#v=snippet&q=ma%20hushan&f=false|url-status=live}}</ref> changing the [[Uyghur language|Uyghur-language]]-only street names and signs to Chinese, as well as switching carpet patterns in state-owned carpet factories from Uyghur to Han.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IAs9AAAAIAAJ&q=ma+hushan&pg=PA134|title=Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: a political history of Republican Sinkiang 1911–1949|author=Andrew D. W. Forbes|year=1986|publisher=CUP Archive|location=Cambridge, England|isbn=0-521-25514-7|page=131|access-date=2010-06-28|archive-date=2023-09-27|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927041550/https://books.google.com/books?id=IAs9AAAAIAAJ&q=ma+hushan&pg=PA134#v=snippet&q=ma%20hushan&f=false|url-status=live}}</ref>

Strict surveillance and mass detentions of Uyghurs in the [[Xinjiang internment camps]] is a part of the ongoing sinicization policy by the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP).<ref>{{Cite news |title=Chinese official says 'sinicization' of religion in Xinjiang must go on |work=[[South China Morning Post]], [[Reuters]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2168460/chinese-official-says-sinicization-religion-xinjiang-must-go |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200110150415/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2168460/chinese-official-says-sinicization-religion-xinjiang-must-go |archive-date=2020-01-10}}</ref> Since 2015, it has been estimated that over a million Uyghurs have been detained in these camps.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/detainees-11232019223242.html|title=Expert Says 1.8 Million Uyghurs, Muslim Minorities Held in Xinjiang's Internment Camps|last=Lipes|first=Joshua|date=November 24, 2019|work=[[Radio Free Asia]]|access-date=November 28, 2019|archive-date=November 28, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191128002703/https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/detainees-11232019223242.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url= https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-rights-un/u-n-says-it-has-credible-reports-china-holds-million-uighurs-in-secret-camps-idUSKBN1KV1SU |title= U.N. says it has credible reports China holds million Uighurs in secret camps |work= Reuters |date= 10 August 2018 |access-date= 10 August 2018 |archive-date= 12 January 2020 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20200112115131/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-rights-un/u-n-says-it-has-credible-reports-china-holds-million-uighurs-in-secret-camps-idUSKBN1KV1SU |url-status= live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|date=2019-11-24|title=Data leak details China's 'brainwashing system'|language=en-GB|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50511063|access-date=2020-07-21|archive-date=2019-11-26|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191126020034/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50511063|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url= https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/former-inmates-of-chinas-muslim-re-education-camps-tell-of-brainwashing-torture/2018/05/16/32b330e8-5850-11e8-8b92-45fdd7aaef3c_story.html|title= Former inmates of China's Muslim 're-education' camps tell of brainwashing, torture|work= www.washingtonpost.com|access-date= 17 May 2018|archive-date= 16 May 2018|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20180516195117/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/former-inmates-of-chinas-muslim-re-education-camps-tell-of-brainwashing-torture/2018/05/16/32b330e8-5850-11e8-8b92-45fdd7aaef3c_story.html|url-status= live}}</ref> The camps were established under [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP General Secretary]] [[Xi Jinping]]'s [[Xi Jinping Core Administration|administration]] with the main goal of ensuring adherence to national ideology.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html|title='Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims|last1=Ramzy|first1=Austin|date=2019-11-16|work=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=2019-11-16|last2=Buckley|first2=Chris|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|archive-date=2020-01-08|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200108214926/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Critics of China's treatment of Uyghurs have accused the Chinese government of propagating a policy of sinicization in Xinjiang in the 21st century, calling this policy a [[cultural genocide]], or [[ethnocide]], of Uyghurs.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-muslim-children-uighur-family-separation-thought-education-a8989296.html |title="'Cultural genocide': China separating thousands of Muslim children from parents for 'thought education'" – The Independent, 5 July 2019 |website=[[Independent.co.uk]] |date=5 July 2019 |access-date=27 April 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200422051855/https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-muslim-children-uighur-family-separation-thought-education-a8989296.html |archive-date=22 April 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=17 December 2019 |title='Cultural genocide' for repressed minority of Uighurs |website=[[The Times]] |url=https://www.thetimes.com/article/cultural-genocide-for-repressed-minority-of-uighurs-bp0w6dw89 |url-status=live |access-date=27 April 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200425012712/https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/cultural-genocide-for-repressed-minority-of-uighurs-bp0w6dw89 |archive-date=25 April 2020}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Zand |first1=Bernhard |date=28 November 2019 |title=China's Oppression of the Uighurs 'The Equivalent of Cultural Genocide' |newspaper=[[Der Spiegel]] |url=https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/chinese-oppression-of-the-uighurs-like-cultural-genocide-a-1298171.html |url-status=live |access-date=27 April 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200121105242/https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/chinese-oppression-of-the-uighurs-like-cultural-genocide-a-1298171.html |archive-date=21 January 2020}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Shepherd |first1=Christian |date=12 September 2019 |title=Fear and oppression in Xinjiang: China's war on Uighur culture |newspaper=[[Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/48508182-d426-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77 |url-status=live |access-date=27 April 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200414154451/https://www.ft.com/content/48508182-d426-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77 |archive-date=14 April 2020}}</ref>

====Taiwan====
After the Republic of China [[Retrocession of Taiwan|took control]] of [[Geography of Taiwan|Taiwan]] from the [[Empire of Japan]] in 1945 and [[Republic of China retreat to Taiwan|relocated its capital]] to [[Taipei]] in 1949, the intention of [[Chiang Kai-shek]] was to eventually go back to [[mainland China]] and retake control of it. Chiang believed that to retake mainland China, it would be necessary to re-Sinicize Taiwan's inhabitants who had undergone assimilation [[Taiwan under Japanese rule|under Japanese rule]]. Examples of this policy included the renaming of Japanese-named streets with mainland geographical names, the use of [[Mandarin Chinese]] in schools and punishments for using other regional Chinese languages, or "[[Varieties of Chinese|dialects]]" (such as [[Hakka Chinese|Hakka]] and [[Hokkien]]), and teaching students to revere traditional ethics, develop pan-Chinese nationalism, and view Taiwan from the perspective of China.<ref>{{cite conference | first = June Teufel | last = Dreyer | title = Taiwan's Evolving Identity | url = http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&event_id=31149 | location = [[Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars]] | quote = In order to shore up his government's legitimacy, Chiang set about turning Taiwan's inhabitants into Chinese. To use Renan's terminology, Chiang chose to re-define the concept of shared destiny to include the mainland. Streets were re-named; major thoroughfares in Taipei received names associated with the traditional Confucian virtues. The avenue passing in front of the foreign ministry en route to the presidential palace was named chieh-shou (long life), in Chiang's honor. Students were required to learn Mandarin and speak it exclusively; those who disobeyed and spoke Taiwanese Min, Hakka, or aboriginal tongues could be fined, slapped, or subjected to other disciplinary actions. | date = July 17, 2003 | access-date = May 20, 2009 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110605131558/http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&event_id=31149 | archive-date = June 5, 2011 | url-status = dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/17827189.html|quote=The new KMT concluded that it must "Sinicize" Taiwan if it were ever to unify mainland China. Textbooks were designed to teach young people the dialect of North China as a national language. Pupils also were taught to revere Confucian ethics, to develop Han Chinese nationalism, and to accept Taiwan as a part of China.|title=Starting Anew on Taiwan|publisher=Hoover Institution|year=2008|access-date=2009-06-05|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090408074759/http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/17827189.html|archive-date=2009-04-08|url-status=dead}}</ref> Other reasons for the policy were to combat the Japanese influences on the culture that had occurred in the previous 50 years, and to help unite the [[Waishengren|recent immigrants]] from mainland China that had come to Taiwan with the KMT and among whom there was a tendency to be more loyal to [[Ancestral home (Chinese)|one's city, county or province]] than to China as a nation.<ref>{{cite web|title=Third-Wave Reform|url=http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=102&CtNode=119|quote=.... The government initiated educational reform in the 1950s to achieve a number of high-priority goals. First, it was done to help root out fifty years of Japanese colonial influence on the island's populace--"resinicizing" them, one might say- -and thereby guarantee their loyalty to the Chinese motherland. Second, the million mainlanders or so who had fled to Taiwan themselves had the age-old tendency of being more loyal to city, county, or province than to China as a nation. They identified themselves as Hunanese, Cantonese, or Sichuanese first, and as Chinese second.|access-date=2019-01-01|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110716110421/http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=102&CtNode=119|archive-date=2011-07-16|url-status=dead}}</ref>

The process of re-asserting non-Chinese identity, as in the case of ethnic groups in Taiwan, is sometimes known as [[desinicization]]. This is an issue in, for example, the [[Taiwan independence movement]] and [[Taiwanization|Taiwan localization movements]].

====Tibet====
{{Main|Sinicization of Tibet}}
{{See also|Antireligious campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party}}

The sinicization of [[Tibet]] is the change of Tibetan society to Han Chinese standards by means of state [[propaganda]], police presence, [[cultural assimilation]], [[religious persecution]], [[immigration]], [[population transfer]], land development, land transfer, and [[political reform]].<ref>Burbu, Dawa (2001) ''China's Tibet Policy'', Routledge, {{ISBN|978-0-7007-0474-3}}, pp. 100–124</ref><ref name="Samdup">Samdup, Tseten (1993) [http://www.tibet.com/Humanrights/poptrans.html Chinese population—Threat to Tibetan identity] [[Government of Tibet in exile]], {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090205140639/http://tibet.com/Humanrights/poptrans.html|date=2009-02-05}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Warren |first1=James |date=May 18, 1997 |title=On Tibet, Senator's Daughter Shows More Spine Than the U.S. |work=[[Chicago Tribune]] |url=https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1997-05-18-9705180201-story.html |url-status=dead |access-date=10 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181022210938/http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1997-05-18-9705180201-story.html |archive-date=22 October 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |date=2013-06-27 |title="They Say We Should Be Grateful" Mass Rehousing and Relocation Programs in Tibetan Areas of China |url=https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/06/27/they-say-we-should-be-grateful/mass-rehousing-and-relocation-programs-tibetan |url-status=live |website=[[Human Rights Watch]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190910131806/https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/06/27/they-say-we-should-be-grateful/mass-rehousing-and-relocation-programs-tibetan |archive-date=10 September 2019 |access-date=10 September 2019}}</ref> According to the U.S. branch of the [[Offices of Tibet (Dharamsala)|Offices of Tibet]], it has been underway since the Chinese regained control of Tibet in 1951.<ref>{{cite web |title=Invasion & After: Tibet Since the Chinese Invasion |url=http://tibetoffice.org/tibet-info/invasion-after |website=tibetoffice.org |publisher=Office of Tibet, Washington, D.C. |access-date=10 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140502040015/http://tibetoffice.org/tibet-info/invasion-after |archive-date=2 May 2014 |url-status=live }}</ref> Sources quoted by [[Radio Free Asia]] have stated that in present-day Tibet, traditional Tibetan festivals have "been turned into a platform for propaganda and political theater" where "government workers and retirees are barred from engaging in religious activities, and government workers and students in Tibetan schools are forbidden from visiting local monasteries."<ref>{{cite news |last1=Lodoe |first1=Kalden |last2=Demo |first2=Yangdon |last3=Gelek |first3=Lobsang |title=Tibetan Religious Festival Marred by Police Presence, State Propaganda |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/festival-09062019162424.html |access-date=10 September 2019 |publisher=[[Radio Free Asia]] |date=September 6, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190909031105/https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/festival-09062019162424.html |archive-date=9 September 2019 |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Religion===
{{See also|Antireligious campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party}}
In April 2016, CCP general secretary Xi Jinping declared that to "actively guide the adaptation of religions to socialist society, an important task is supporting China's religions' persistence in the direction of sinicization."<ref name="diplomat-2018">{{cite news |last1=Bowie |first1=Julia |last2=Gitter |first2=David |title=The CCP's Plan to 'Sinicize' Religions |url=https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/the-ccps-plan-to-sinicize-religions/ |access-date=9 February 2020 |work=The Diplomat |date=14 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200418105410/https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/the-ccps-plan-to-sinicize-religions/ |archive-date=18 April 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=习近平：全面提高新形势下宗教工作水平-新华网 |url=http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-04/23/c_1118716540.htm |website=www.xinhuanet.com |access-date=9 February 2020 |language=zh |date=23 April 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200129162636/http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-04/23/c_1118716540.htm |archive-date=29 January 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref> He later reiterated this plan to the [[19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|19th Communist Party Congress]] saying "We will fully implement the Party's basic policy on religious affairs, insist on the sinicization of Chinese religions, and provide active guidance for religion and socialism to coexist."<ref name="diplomat-2018"/><ref>{{cite news |title=习近平：决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利——在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告-新华网 |url=http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/27/c_1121867529.htm |access-date=9 February 2020 |work=www.xinhuanet.com |date=27 October 2017 |language=zh |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180420173945/http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/27/c_1121867529.htm |archive-date=20 April 2018 |url-status=live }}</ref>

====Protestantism====
The [[Three-Self Patriotic Movement]] (TSPM) of [[Protestantism|Protestant]] churches in China has described the [[Boxer Rebellion]] and the anti-Christian movement of 1922–1927 as early efforts to sinicize Christianity.<ref name="scmp-may-2019">{{cite news |last1=Gan |first1=Nectar |title=Chinese Protestant church head wants purge of Western influences |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3001240/official-head-chinas-protestant-churches-says-religions-must-be |access-date=9 February 2020 |work=South China Morning Post |date=12 March 2019 |language=en |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200219091314/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3001240/official-head-chinas-protestant-churches-says-religions-must-be |archive-date=19 February 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref>

The TSPM and [[China Christian Council]] arranged a conference in Shanghai on August 4–6, 2014, commemorating the anniversary of the TSPM. This conference included a seminar on the sinicizaton of Christianity, with Fu Xianwei, chairman of the TSPM, saying "churches in China will continue to explore the sinicization of Christianity [and] ensure Christianity takes root in the soil of Chinese culture, ethnicity, and society... To advance the sinicization of Christianity, churches will need guidance and support from government agencies in charge of religious affairs."<ref>{{cite web |date=April 2015 |title=2014 Annual Report: Religious and Human Rights Persecution in China |url=https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B024UfutRtHodGVzbWhyLUtCdjg/view |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200414174149/https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B024UfutRtHodGVzbWhyLUtCdjg/view |archive-date=14 April 2020 |access-date=9 February 2020 |publisher=ChinaAid |location=Texas, USA |quote=The National Committee of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of Protestant Churches in China marked its 60th anniversary in 2014. Subsequently, China's government-sponsored China Christian Council (CCC) and the TSPM orchestrated a conference in Shanghai on August 4–6 to commemorate the anniversary of the TSPM, which included a seminar on the so-called "sinicization" of Christianity. Fu Xianwei, chairman of the TSPM, was quoted as saying that "churches in China will continue to explore the sinicization of Christianity [and] ensure Christianity takes root in the soil of Chinese culture, ethnicity, and society... To advance the sinicization of Christianity, churches will need guidance and support from government agencies in charge of religious affairs." Gao Feng, chairman of the CCC, stated that the TSPM would "take on a new mission in this age, adhere to the path of sinicization, and deepen and advance the process of sinicizing Christianity." Wang Zuo'an, director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), also reinforced the need for the sinicization of Christianity.}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title='Sinicization' of Christianity China's aim |url=http://bpnews.net/44702/sinicization-of-christianity-chinas-aim |access-date=9 February 2020 |work=Baptist Press |date=6 May 2015 |language=en |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181127142159/http://www.bpnews.net/44702/sinicization-of-christianity-chinas-aim |archive-date=27 November 2018 |url-status=live }}</ref>

In 2019, TSPM chairman Xu Xiaohong made a pledge to eliminate any Western "imprint" from Chinese faith saying "[We] must recognise that Chinese churches are surnamed 'China', not 'the West'" and "No matter how much effort or time it takes, our resolution in upholding the Sinicisation of Protestantism will never change, and our determination to walk a path that is adapted to a socialist society will never waver."<ref name="scmp-may-2019"/>

In December 2023, [[Wang Huning]] stated that Christian groups must "adhere to the direction of the sinicisation of Christianity."<ref>{{Cite news |last=Woo |first=Ryan |date=December 25, 2023 |title=Christmas in China brings glittering decor and foreign influence concerns |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/christmas-china-brings-glittering-decor-foreign-influence-concerns-2023-12-25/ |access-date=December 25, 2023}}</ref>

====Catholicism====
{{Further|Catholic Church in China}}
In December 2016, the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Catholic Representatives reaffirmed their plan for the [[United Front Work Department]]'s [[Catholic Patriotic Association]] to uphold the principle of independence and self-governance, along with the promotion of sinicization.<ref>{{cite news |author1=Shan Ren Shen Fu |title=The Ninth Assembly of Chinese Catholic Representatives: More smog and pollution in 2017 |work=[[Asianews.it]] |url=http://www.asianews.it/news-en/The-Ninth-Assembly-of-Chinese-Catholic-Representatives:-More-smog-and-pollution-in-2017-39552.html |url-status=live |access-date=9 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170602162518/http://www.asianews.it/news-en/The-Ninth-Assembly-of-Chinese-Catholic-Representatives:-More-smog-and-pollution-in-2017-39552.html |archive-date=2 June 2017}}</ref>

In March 2018, Archbishop [[Paul Gallagher (bishop)|Paul Gallagher]], [[Section for Relations with States (Roman Curia)|Secretary for Relations with States]] within the [[Holy See]]'s [[Secretariat of State (Holy See)|Secretariat of State]], said that "two expressions or, more precisely, two principles stand out, which should interact with each other, namely "sinicization" and "[[inculturation]]." I am convinced that an important intellectual and pastoral challenge arises in an almost natural way from the bringing together of these two terms, which indicate two real visions of the world."<ref>{{cite web |author1=H.E. Msgr. Paul Richard Gallagher |title=Intervention of the Secretary for Relations with States at the International Conference on "Christianity in the Chinese Society: Impact, Interaction and Inculturation" |url=http://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2018/03/26/180326c.html |website=Summary of Bulletin |publisher=Holy See Press Office |access-date=9 February 2020 |date=26 March 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191203172928/https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2018/03/26/180326c.html |archive-date=3 December 2019 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Valente |first1=Gianni |title=Gallagher: we are not afraid of China's new global leadership – La Stampa |url=https://www.lastampa.it/vatican-insider/en/2018/03/22/news/gallagher-we-are-not-afraid-of-china-s-new-global-leadership-1.33995315?refresh_ce |access-date=9 February 2020 |work=Vatican Insider |date=22 March 2018 |language=it-IT |archive-date=27 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210127172150/https://www.lastampa.it/vatican-insider/en/2018/03/22/news/gallagher-we-are-not-afraid-of-china-s-new-global-leadership-1.33995315?refresh_ce |url-status=live }}</ref>

In June 2018, the Bishops' Conference of the Catholic Church in China and the Catholic Patriotic Association issued a "Five-Year Plan on Carrying Forward the Catholic Church's Adherence to the Direction of Sinicization in Our Country".<ref>{{cite news |title=Sinicization of China Church: the plan in full – UCA News |url=https://www.ucanews.com/news/sinicization-of-china-church-the-plan-in-full/82931 |access-date=9 February 2020 |work=Union of Catholic Asian News Limited |date=31 July 2018 |location=Hong Kong, China |language=en |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181216070823/https://www.ucanews.com/news/sinicization-of-china-church-the-plan-in-full/82931 |archive-date=16 December 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Zhicheng |first1=Wang |title=Ahead of China-Vatican dialogue, a five-year plan to Sinicize the Church under the Party |url=http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Ahead-of-China-Vatican-dialogue,-a-five-year-plan-to-Sinicize-the-Church-under-the-Party-44038.html |access-date=9 February 2020 |work=AsiaNews |date=31 May 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200225064026/http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Ahead-of-China-Vatican-dialogue,-a-five-year-plan-to-Sinicize-the-Church-under-the-Party-44038.html |archive-date=25 February 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref> This document calls for Catholics to accept Communist party leadership, love the motherland and obey the state, as well as to embrace the state's directive to implement Chinese cultural integration within Catholicism. [[Christianity in Hebei|Churches in Hebei province]] and the [[Diocese of Suifu|Yibin Diocese]] of [[Catholic Church in Sichuan|Sichuan province]] began holding training seminars immediately.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Jones |first1=Kevin |title=In China, government-aligned bishops release 'Sinicization' plan |url=https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/38959/in-china-government-aligned-bishops-release-sinicization-plan |access-date=9 February 2020 |work=Catholic News Agency |date=25 July 2018 |language=en |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200517041624/https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/in-china-government-aligned-bishops-release-sinicization-plan-52052 |archive-date=17 May 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=China's Catholics told to create five-year plan to Sinicise Church |url=https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/coe/chinas-catholics-told-to-formulate-five-year-plan-to-sinicise-church/ |access-date=9 February 2020 |work=World Watch Monitor |date=26 July 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190616154201/https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/coe/chinas-catholics-told-to-formulate-five-year-plan-to-sinicise-church/ |archive-date=16 June 2019 |url-status=live }}</ref>

[[Pietro Parolin|Cardinal Parolin]], the Vatican secretary of state, in a 2019 interview with the CCP-owned ''[[Global Times]]'' newspaper, claimed that sinicization was a form of 'inculturation', which is a Catholic missionary term that refers to adopting local culture to proclaim the gospel. He cited Matteo Ricci as an example and pointed out that the Chinese leadership had promised not to undermine the doctrine and nature of each religion. He stated in the interview: "These two terms, "inculturation" and "sinicization," refer to each other without confusion and without opposition: in some ways, they can be complementary and can open avenues for dialogue on the religious and cultural level."<ref>https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/41269/beijing-and-rome-can-work-together-parolin-tells-chinese-media {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230602194803/https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/41269/beijing-and-rome-can-work-together-parolin-tells-chinese-media |date=2023-06-02 }}, Beijing and Rome can work together, Parolin tells Chinese media, Catholic News Agency, retrieved June 2nd 2023</ref><ref>https://www.catholicworldreport.com/2019/05/13/no-opposition-between-sinicization-and-inculturation-parolin-tells-china-media/ {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230602201809/https://www.catholicworldreport.com/2019/05/13/no-opposition-between-sinicization-and-inculturation-parolin-tells-china-media/ |date=2023-06-02 }}, 'No opposition between sinicization and inculturation' Parolin tells China media, Catholic World Report, retrieved June 2nd 2023</ref><ref>https://www.heraldmalaysia.com/news/beijing-and-rome-can-work-together-parolin-tells-chinese-media/47797/1 {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230603162429/https://www.heraldmalaysia.com/news/beijing-and-rome-can-work-together-parolin-tells-chinese-media/47797/1 |date=2023-06-03 }}, Beijing and Rome can work together, Parolin tells Chinese media, Herald Malaysia Online, retrieved June 3rd 2023</ref><ref>https://www.vaticannews.va/zh/vatican-city/news/2019-05/cardinal-parolin-interview-chinese-newspaper-china-holy-see.html {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230603162429/https://www.vaticannews.va/zh/vatican-city/news/2019-05/cardinal-parolin-interview-chinese-newspaper-china-holy-see.html |date=2023-06-03 }}, 帕罗林枢机："我们与中国正在开创一种积极的方法", Vatican News</ref>

====Islam====
{{See also|Xinjiang internment camps|}}
[[File:Front_gate_of_Ximen_Mosque,_Dali.jpg|thumb|Mosque with dome removed due to sinicization policy]]
In 2015, CCP general secretary [[Xi Jinping]] first raised the issue of "sinicization of Islam". In 2018, a confidential directive was issued ordering local officials to "prevent Islam from interfering with secular life and the state's functions".<ref>{{cite news |last1=Myers |first1=Steven Lee |title=A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/21/world/asia/china-islam-crackdown.html |access-date=9 February 2020 |work=The New York Times |date=21 September 2019 |quote=The restrictions they now face can be traced to 2015, when Mr. Xi first raised the issue of what he called the "Sinicization of Islam," saying all faiths should be subordinate to Chinese culture and the Communist Party. Last year, Mr. Xi's government issued a confidential directive that ordered local officials to prevent Islam from interfering with secular life and the state's functions. |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190924010442/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/21/world/asia/china-islam-crackdown.html |archive-date=24 September 2019 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Yang Faming, leader of the [[Islamic Association of China]], said in a 2018 speech that "We must allow traditional Chinese culture to permeate Islam and jointly guard the spiritual homeland of the Chinese people."<ref>{{cite news |title=杨发明委员：坚持我国伊斯兰教中国化方向-新华网 |url=http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-03/10/c_1122518319.htm |access-date=9 February 2020 |work=www.xinhuanet.com |date=10 March 2018 |language=zh |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200424145056/http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-03/10/c_1122518319.htm |archive-date=24 April 2020 |url-status=dead }}</ref> He encouraged Chinese characteristics to be present in religious ceremony, culture, and architecture.<ref name="diplomat-2018"/>

In 2018, over one million Chinese government workers began forcibly living in the homes of Uyghur Muslim families to monitor and assess resistance to assimilation, and to watch for frowned-upon religious or cultural practices.<ref name=":23">{{Cite news|last=Byler|first=Darren|date=9 November 2018|title=Why Chinese civil servants are happy to occupy Uyghur homes in Xinjiang|work=CNN|url=https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/09/opinions/uyghur-home-visit-opinion-intl/index.html|access-date=|archive-date=19 October 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211019154249/https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/09/opinions/uyghur-home-visit-opinion-intl/index.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=":8">{{Cite web|last1=Westcott|first1=Ben|last2=Xiong|first2=Yong|title=Xinjiang's Uyghurs didn't choose to be Muslim, new Chinese report says|date=22 July 2019|url=https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/22/asia/china-xinjiang-uyghur-muslim-intl-hnk/index.html|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191219115041/https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/22/asia/china-xinjiang-uyghur-muslim-intl-hnk/index.html|archive-date=2019-12-19|access-date=2019-12-02|publisher=CNN}}</ref> These government workers were trained to call themselves "relatives" and have been described in Chinese state media as being a key part of enhancing "ethnic unity".<ref name=":23" />

{{As of|2019}}, it was estimated that Chinese authorities may have detained one and a half million people in secretive internment camps. The vast majority of those forcibly interned are Muslim Uyghurs but [[Kazakhs in China|Kazakhs]] and other minority groups have also been included.<ref>{{Cite news|date=14 March 2019|title=1.5 million Muslims could be detained in China's Xinjiang: academic|newspaper=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rights/15-million-muslims-could-be-detained-in-chinas-xinjiang-academic-idUSKCN1QU2MQ|access-date=11 January 2021|archive-date=9 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210109115341/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rights/15-million-muslims-could-be-detained-in-chinas-xinjiang-academic-idUSKCN1QU2MQ|url-status=live}}</ref>

In September 2020, sinicization policies targeted Muslim [[Utsul]]s in [[Hainan]] province. Restrictions included limiting the size of mosques, requiring a Communist Party member on mosque management committees, forbidding the use of Arabic words on food stalls (such as "[[halal]]"), and banning the [[hijab]] in schools and government offices.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Baptista |first1=Eduardo |title=Tiny Muslim community becomes latest target for China's religious crackdown |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3103253/tiny-muslim-community-chinas-far-south-becomes-latest-target |access-date=5 April 2021 |work=South China Morning Post |date=28 September 2020 |language=en |archive-date=16 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201016015718/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3103253/tiny-muslim-community-chinas-far-south-becomes-latest-target |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Seibt |first1=Sébastian |date=30 September 2020 |title=Beijing's crackdown on religious minorities takes aim at 10,000 Muslim Utsuls |language=en |work=[[France 24]] |url=https://www.france24.com/en/20200930-beijing-s-crackdown-on-religious-minorities-takes-aim-at-10-000-muslim-utsuls |access-date=5 April 2021 |archive-date=31 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210331072438/https://www.france24.com/en/20200930-beijing-s-crackdown-on-religious-minorities-takes-aim-at-10-000-muslim-utsuls |url-status=live }}</ref>

In June 2023, [[CNN]] reported that Chinese authorities had forcibly rebuilt a number of mosques to eliminate traditional Islamic architecture (e.g. minarets, domes) and replace them with Chinese architecture.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Thousands of ethnic minority Muslims defy Chinese authorities in defense of mosque |url=https://www.cnnphilippines.com/world/2023/6/2/china-mosque-protest.html |access-date=2023-06-03 |website=[[CNN Philippines]] |language=en |archive-date=2023-06-03 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230603104435/https://www.cnnphilippines.com/world/2023/6/2/china-mosque-protest.html |url-status=dead }}</ref> In July 2023, the United Front Work Department's [[Central Institute of Socialism]] developed a plan to "meld Islam with Confucianism" using the [[Han Kitab]] texts as a guide.<ref>{{Cite web |date=September 14, 2023 |title=Among Uyghurs, China aims to 'meld Islam with Confucianism' |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/uyghur-sinicizing-islam-09142023171912.html |access-date=2023-09-16 |website=[[Radio Free Asia]] |language=en |archive-date=2023-09-15 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230915205443/https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/uyghur-sinicizing-islam-09142023171912.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|China|Taiwan|Hong Kong|Macau}}
{{div col|colwidth=30em}}
* [[Chinese Rites controversy]]
* [[Conquest dynasty]]
* [[De-Sinicization]]
* [[Ethnic groups in Chinese history]]
* [[Little China (ideology)]]
* [[New Qing History]]
* [[Silk Road transmission of Buddhism]]
* [[Sinicization of Tibet]]
* [[Sinocentrism]]
* [[Sinosphere]]
* [[Taiwanese wave]]
* ''[[Zhonghua minzu]]''
* [[Mongolization]]
{{div col end}}

== References ==
{{reflist}}

==External links==
{{Library resources box}}

*[https://web.archive.org/web/20080106091854/http://orpheus.ucsd.edu/chinesehistory/pgp/xiaoweiqingessay.htm Sinicization vs. Manchuness] (by Xiaowei Zheng).
*[[openlibrary:a/OL77645A/Jean Berlie|''Sinicization: at the crossing of three China regions, an ethnic minority becoming increasingly more Chinese: the Kam People, officially called Dong People'' (in French)/ ''Sinisation: à la limite de trois provinces de Chine, une minorité de plus en plus chinoise: les locuteurs kam, officiellement appelés Dong'']], [[Jean Berlie]], Guy Trédaniel editor, Paris, France, published in 1998.
*[https://books.google.com/books?id=aSduHAAACAAJ ''Sinicization of the Kam (Dong People), a China minority'' (in French)/ ''Sinisation d'une minorité de Chine, les Kam (Dong)''], [[Jean Berlie]], s.n. editor, published in 1994.
*[http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3359949 ''Islam in China, Hui and Uyghurs: between modernization and sinicization''], the study of the [[Hui people|Hui]] and [[Uyghurs]] of China, [[Jean Berlie|Jean A. Berlie]], White Lotus Press editor, Bangkok, Thailand, published in 2004. {{ISBN|974-480-062-3}}, {{ISBN|978-974-480-062-6}}.

{{Cultural assimilation|sp=ize}}

[[Category:Chinese culture]]
[[Category:Chinese nationalism]]
[[Category:Cultural assimilation]]
[[Category:Culture of East Asia]]
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[[Category:Korean language]]
[[Category:Politics of Taiwan]]