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{{Short description|Conflict between communist blocs}}
{{Redirect|Sino-Soviet conflict|the 1929 event|Sino-Soviet conflict (1929)|the 1969 event|Sino-Soviet border conflict}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=March 2022}}
{{Infobox civil conflict
| title = Sino-Soviet split
| partof = the [[Cold War]]
| image = Mao Tsé-toung, portrait en buste, assis, faisant face à Nikita Khrouchtchev, pendant la visite du chef russe 1958 à Pékin.jpg
| caption = [[Mao Zedong]] (left) and [[Nikita Khrushchev]] (right) in [[Beijing]], 1957
| date = 1961–1989
| causes = [[De-Stalinization]] of the Soviet Union, [[Anti-revisionism (Marxism–Leninism)|Anti-revisionism]] and [[Maoism–Third Worldism]]
| result = Competition between PRC and USSR for [[Eastern Bloc]] allies
| methods = [[Proxy war]], [[propaganda]] and [[Sino-Soviet border conflict|border skirmishes]]
| place = {{flatlist|
*[[China]]
*[[Soviet Union]]
*[[Mongolia]]
*[[Mainland Southeast Asia|Indochina]]
*[[Afghanistan]]
}}
| side1 = {{plainlist|
* '''{{Flag|China}}'''
----
* {{flag|People's Republic of Albania|name=Albania}} (until [[Sino-Albanian split|1978]])
* {{flag|Democratic Kampuchea|1976}} (until 1979)
* {{flag|Somali Democratic Republic|name=Somalia}} (until 1991)
}}
| side2 = {{plainlist}}
* '''{{flag|Soviet Union}}'''
----
{{ tree list}}
*{{flag|Comecon|name=COMECON}} ([[De-satellization of the Socialist Republic of Romania|except]] [[Socialist Republic of Romania|Romania]])
** [[File:Warsaw Pact Logo.svg|20px]] [[Warsaw Pact]]
{{ tree list/end}}
{{endplainlist}}
{{plainlist|
* {{flag|Mongolian People's Republic|name=Mongolia}} (from 1962)
* {{flag|Cuba}} (from 1972)
* {{flag|Vietnam}} (from [[Cambodian–Vietnamese War|1978]])
* {{flagicon|Afghanistan|1978}}{{flagicon|Afghanistan|1987}} [[Democratic Republic of Afghanistan|Afghanistan]] (from [[Saur Revolution|1978]])
* {{flag|North Korea|1948}} (from 1962)
}}
| leadfigures1 = {{plainlist|
* {{flagdeco|China}} [[Mao Zedong]] (until 1976)
* {{flagdeco|China}} [[Hua Guofeng]] (1976–1978)
* {{flagdeco|China}} [[Deng Xiaoping]] (1978–1989)
}}
| leadfigures2 = {{plainlist|
* {{flagdeco|Soviet Union}} [[Nikita Khrushchev]] (until 1964)
* {{flagdeco|Soviet Union}} [[Leonid Brezhnev]] (1964–1982)
* {{flagdeco|Soviet Union}} [[Yuri Andropov]] (1982–1984)
* {{flagdeco|Soviet Union}} [[Konstantin Chernenko]] (1984–1985)
* {{flagdeco|Soviet Union}} [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] (1985–1989)
}}
}}
{{Infobox Chinese
| t = 中蘇交惡
| s = 中苏交恶
| p = Zhōngsū jiāowù
| rus = Советско–китайский раскол
| rusr = Sovetsko–kitayskiy raskol
}}
[[File:Soviet Union and China map including the three co-bordering countries.svg|thumb|upright=1.6|
{{legend|#FFCC00|People's Republic of China}}
{{legend|#ff0000|[[Soviet Union]]}}
{{legend|#FF6600|Countries that shared borders with both: [[Mongolian People's Republic|Mongolia]] was Soviet-aligned while [[Kingdom of Afghanistan|Afghanistan]] and [[North Korea]] remained neutral, with the former eventually [[Democratic Republic of Afghanistan|becoming Soviet-aligned in the late 1970s]].}}]]

The '''Sino-Soviet split''' was the gradual worsening of relations between [[China]] and the [[Soviet Union|Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]] (USSR) during the [[Cold War]]. This was primarily caused by divergences that arose from their different interpretations and practical applications of [[Marxism–Leninism]], as influenced by their respective [[geopolitics]] during the Cold War of 1947–1991.<ref name="World History 2000. p. 769">{{cite book |title=Chambers Dictionary of World History |editor-first1=Bruce |editor-last1=Lenman |editor-first2=Trevor |editor-last2=Anderson |editor-first3=Hilary |editor-last3=Marsden |publisher=[[Chambers (publisher)|Chambers]] |location=Edinburgh |year=2000 |page=769 |isbn=9780550100948}}</ref> In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Sino-Soviet debates about the interpretation of [[orthodox Marxism]] became specific disputes about the Soviet Union's policies of national [[de-Stalinization]] and international [[peaceful coexistence]] with the [[Western Bloc]], which Chinese leader [[Mao Zedong]] decried as [[Revisionism (Marxism)|revisionism]]. Against that ideological background, China took a belligerent stance towards the [[Western world]], and publicly rejected the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence between the Western Bloc and [[Eastern Bloc]].<ref name="World History 2000. p. 769" /> In addition, [[Beijing]] resented the Soviet Union's growing [[India–Soviet Union relations|ties with India]] due to factors such as the [[Sino-Indian border dispute]], while [[Moscow]] feared that Mao was unconcerned about the drastic consequences of [[nuclear warfare]].<ref>John W. Garver, ''China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic'' (2016) pp 113–45.</ref>

In 1956, Soviet leader [[Nikita Khrushchev]] denounced [[Joseph Stalin]] and [[Stalinism]] in the speech "[[On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences]]" and began the de-Stalinization of the USSR. Mao and the Chinese leadership were appalled as the PRC and the USSR progressively diverged in their interpretations and applications of Leninist theory. By 1961, their intractable ideological differences provoked the PRC's formal denunciation of [[Ideology of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Soviet communism]] as the work of "revisionist traitors" in the USSR.<ref name="World History 2000. p.&nbsp;769" /> The PRC also declared the Soviet Union [[Social imperialism|social imperialist]].<ref name=":2" /> For Eastern Bloc countries, the Sino-Soviet split was a question of who would lead the revolution for [[world communism]], and to whom (China or the USSR) the [[Vanguardism|vanguard parties]] of the world would turn for political advice, financial aid, and military assistance.<ref>Robert A. Scalapino, "Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa", ''Foreign Affairs'' (1964) 42#4, pp.&nbsp;640–654. {{JSTOR|20029719}}; {{Cite journal |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20029719 |title=Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa |jstor=20029719 |access-date=29 January 2018 |archive-date=9 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181009092822/https://www.jstor.org/stable/20029719 |url-status=bot: unknown |last1=Scalapino |first1=Robert A. |journal=Foreign Affairs |date=1964 |volume=42 |issue=4 |pages=640–654 |doi=10.2307/20029719 |url-access=subscription }}.</ref> In that vein, both countries competed for the leadership of world communism through the vanguard parties native to the countries in their [[Hegemony|spheres of influence]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Scalapino |first1=Robert A. |year=1964 |title=Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa |journal=Foreign Affairs |volume=42 |issue=4|pages=640–654 |jstor=20029719|doi=10.2307/20029719 }}</ref> The conflict culminated after the [[Zhenbao Island incident|Zhenbao Island Incident]] in 1969, when the Soviet Union reportedly considered the possibility of launching a large-scale nuclear strike against China, and the Chinese leadership, including Mao, was evacuated from [[Beijing]], before both sides eventually returned to diplomatic negotiations.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web |last=O'Neill |first=Mark |date=May 12, 2010 |title=Nixon intervention saved China from Soviet nuclear attack |url=https://www.scmp.com/article/714064/nixon-intervention-saved-china-soviet-nuclear-attack |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150912221259/https://www.scmp.com/article/714064/nixon-intervention-saved-china-soviet-nuclear-attack |archive-date=2015-09-12 |website=[[South China Morning Post]]}}</ref><ref name=":4">{{Cite web |date=1969-09-10 |title=MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: The Possibility of a Soviet Strike Against Chinese Nuclear Facilities |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.19.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241112193950/https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.19.pdf |archive-date=2024-11-12 |website=The George Washington University |publisher=[[United States Department of State]]}}</ref><ref name=":9">{{Cite web |date=2011 |title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972: 59. Editorial Note |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d59 |url-status=live |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20241217085844/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d59 |archive-date=2024-12-17 |access-date= |website=United States Department of State |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":29" /><ref name=":62">{{Cite web |last=Aftergood |first=Steven |date=2011-10-25 |title=Purpose of 1969 Nuclear Alert Remains a Mystery |url=https://fas.org/publication/1969_nuclear_alert/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240912163147/https://fas.org/web/20240912163147/https://fas.org/publication/1969_nuclear_alert/ |archive-date=2024-09-12 |access-date=2025-01-14 |website=[[Federation of American Scientists]] |language=en-US}}</ref><ref name=":7">{{Cite web |last=Xu |first=Ni |date=2008 |title=1969年, 中苏核危机始末 |trans-title=The nuclear crisis between China and the Soviet Union in 1969 |url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/85039/7218846.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220303213408/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/85039/7218846.html |archive-date=2022-03-03 |website=[[People's Daily|People's Net]] |language=zh}}</ref>

In the Western world, the Sino-Soviet split transformed the bi-polar cold war into a tri-polar cold war. The rivalry facilitated Mao's realization of Sino-American rapprochement with the [[1972 Nixon visit to China|US president Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972]]. In the West, the policies of [[triangular diplomacy]] and [[Linkage (policy)|linkage]] emerged.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976 |volume=I: ''Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972'' |url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/i/21100.htm|url-status=live|access-date=27 August 2021|website=2001-2009.state.gov|language=en|archive-date=9 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210709185228/https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/i/21100.htm}}</ref> Like the [[Tito–Stalin split]], the occurrence of the Sino-Soviet split also weakened the concept of monolithic communism, the Western perception that the communist nations were collectively united and would not have significant ideological clashes.<ref>Rothbard, Murray N. "The Myth of Monolithic Communism", ''Libertarian Review'', Vol. 8., No. 1 (February 1979), p.&nbsp;32.</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Lawrance |first=Alan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=a7mGAgAAQBAJ |title=China Under Communism |date=2002-09-11 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-134-74792-4 |pages=53 |language=en}}</ref> However, the USSR and China both continued to cooperate with [[North Vietnam]] during the [[Vietnam War]] into the 1970s, despite rivalry elsewhere.<ref name=":1" /> Historically, the Sino-Soviet split facilitated the Marxist–Leninist ''[[Realpolitik]]'' with which Mao established the tri-polar geopolitics (PRC–USA–USSR) of the late-period Cold War (1956–1991) to create an anti-Soviet front, which Maoists connected to the [[Three Worlds Theory]].<ref name=":2">{{Cite web |last=Yi |first=Zhou |date=February 2020 |title=Less Revolution, More Realpolitik: China's Foreign Policy in the Early and Middle 1970s |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/less-revolution-more-realpolitik-chinas-foreign-policy-early-and-middle-1970s |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210827130203/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/less-revolution-more-realpolitik-chinas-foreign-policy-early-and-middle-1970s |archive-date=27 August 2021 |access-date=27 August 2021 |website=The Wilson Center |language=en}}</ref> According to Lüthi, there is "no documentary evidence that the Chinese or the Soviets thought about their relationship within a triangular framework during the period."<ref>{{cite book|last=Lüthi|first=Lorenz M.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dl4TRDxqexMC|title=The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=2010|isbn=9781400837625|page=6|access-date=6 July 2017|archive-date=9 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190609073503/https://books.google.com/books?id=dl4TRDxqexMC|url-status=live}}</ref>

== Origins ==
=== Reluctant co-belligerents ===
[[File:Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong.jpg|thumb|right|250px|Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, 1945]]
During the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]], the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) and the nationalist [[Kuomintang]] party (KMT) set aside their [[Chinese Civil War|civil war]] to expel the [[Empire of Japan]] from the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]]. To that end, the Soviet leader, [[Joseph Stalin]], ordered [[Mao Zedong]], leader of the CCP, to co-operate with [[Chiang Kai-shek]], leader of the KMT, in fighting the Japanese. Following the [[surrender of Japan]] at the end of [[World War II]], both parties resumed their civil war, which the communists [[Chinese Communist Revolution|won]] by 1949.{{Sfn|Zubok|Pleshakov|1996|p=56}}

At World War II's conclusion, Stalin advised Mao not to seize political power at that time, and, instead, to collaborate with Chiang due to the 1945 [[Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance|USSR–KMT Treaty of Friendship and Alliance]]. Mao obeyed Stalin in communist solidarity.{{Sfn|Kohn|2007|p=121}} Three months after the Japanese surrender, in November 1945, when Chiang opposed the annexation of [[Tannu Uriankhai]] (Mongolia) to the USSR, Stalin broke the treaty requiring the Red Army's withdrawal from [[Manchukuo|Manchuria]] (giving Mao regional control) and ordered Soviet commander [[Rodion Malinovsky]] to give the Chinese communists the Japanese leftover weapons.{{Sfn|Goncharov|Lewis|Xue|1993|pp=2–14}}{{Sfn|Clubb|1972|p=344–372}}

In the five-year post-World War II period, the United States partly financed Chiang, his nationalist political party, and the [[National Revolutionary Army]]. However, Washington put heavy pressure on Chiang to form a joint government with the communists. US envoy [[George Marshall]] spent 13 months in China trying without success to broker peace.<ref>Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, ''The China Mission: George Marshall's Unfinished War, 1945–1947'' (2018).</ref> In the concluding three-year period of the Chinese Civil War, the CCP defeated and expelled the KMT from mainland China. Consequently, the [[Republic of China retreat to Taiwan|KMT retreated to Taiwan]] in December 1949.

=== Chinese communist revolution ===
[[File:1967-12 1967年 毛泽东与安娜·斯特朗.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Chairman Mao with US journalist [[Anna Louise Strong]], whose work presented and explained the Chinese Communist revolution to the Western world. (1967)]]
As a revolutionary theoretician of [[communism]] seeking to realize a [[socialist state]] in China, Mao developed and adapted the urban ideology of [[Orthodox Marxism]] for practical application to the agrarian conditions of pre-industrial China and the [[Chinese people]].<ref>Lüthi, Lorenz M. Historical Background, 1921–1955, ''The Sino-Soviet split: Cold War in the Communist World'' (2008) p. 26.</ref> Mao's Sinification of Marxism–Leninism, [[Mao Zedong Thought]], established political pragmatism as the first priority for realizing the accelerated [[modernization]] of a country and a people, and ideological orthodoxy as the secondary priority because Orthodox Marxism originated for practical application to the socio-economic conditions of industrialized [[Western Europe]] in the 19th century.<ref>''The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought'', Third Edition (1999) Allan Bullock and Stephen Trombley, Eds., p.&nbsp;501.</ref>

During the Chinese Civil War in 1947, Mao dispatched American journalist [[Anna Louise Strong]] to the West, bearing political documents explaining China's socialist future, and asked that she "show them to Party leaders in the United States and Europe", for their better understanding of the [[Chinese Communist Revolution]], but that it was not "necessary to take them to Moscow."

Mao trusted Strong because of her positive reportage about him, as a theoretician of communism, in the article "The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung", and about the CCP's communist revolution, in the 1948 book ''Dawn Comes Up Like Thunder Out of China: An Intimate Account of the Liberated Areas in China'', which reports that Mao's [[Intellectualism|intellectual]] achievement was "to change Marxism from a European [form] to an Asiatic form . . . in ways of which neither Marx nor Lenin could dream."{{citation needed|reason=could not find the book online|date=September 2022}}

=== Treaty of Sino-Soviet friendship ===
{{Main|Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance}}

In 1950, Mao and Stalin safeguarded the national interests of China and the Soviet Union with the [[Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance|Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance]]. The treaty improved the two countries' geopolitical relationship on political, military and economic levels.<ref>Lüthi, Lorenz M. ''The Sino-Soviet split: Cold War in the Communist World'' (2008) pp. 31–32.</ref> Stalin's largesse to Mao included a loan for $300 million; military aid, should Japan attack the PRC; and the transfer of the [[Chinese Eastern Railway]] in Manchuria, [[Lüshunkou District|Port Arthur]] and [[Dalian]] to Chinese control. In return, the PRC recognized the independence of the [[Mongolian People's Republic]].

Despite the favourable terms, the treaty of socialist friendship included the PRC in the geopolitical [[hegemony]] of the USSR, but unlike the governments of the Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe, the USSR did not control Mao's government. In six years, the great differences between the Soviet and the Chinese interpretations and applications of Marxism–Leninism voided the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship.<ref>Crozier, Brian ''The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire'' (1999) pp. 142–157.</ref><ref>Peskov, Yuri. "Sixty Years of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the U.S.S.R. and the PRC, 14 February 1950" ''Far Eastern Affairs'' (2010) 38#1 pp. 100–115.</ref>

In 1953, guided by Soviet economists, the PRC applied the USSR's model of [[command economy]], which gave first priority to the development of [[heavy industry]], and second priority to the production of consumer goods. Later, ignoring the guidance of technical advisors, Mao launched the [[Great Leap Forward]] to [[Chinese industrialization|transform agrarian China into an industrialized country]] with disastrous results for people and land. Mao's unrealistic goals for [[Agriculture in China|agricultural production]] went unfulfilled because of poor planning and realization, which aggravated rural starvation and increased the number of deaths caused by the [[Great Chinese Famine]], which resulted from three years of drought and poor weather.<ref>Lüthi, Lorenz M. ''The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World'' (2008) p. 31.</ref><ref>[[Shen Zhihua|Shen, Zhihua]] and Xia, Yafeng. "The Great Leap Forward, the People's Commune and the Sino-Soviet split" ''Journal of contemporary China'' 20.72 (2011): pp. 861–880.</ref> An estimated 30 million Chinese people starved to death, more than any other famine in recorded history.<ref name="China's Great Leap Forward">{{Cite web |title=China's Great Leap Forward |url=https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/chinas-great-leap-forward/ |access-date=2024-03-20 |website=Association for Asian Studies |language=en-US}}</ref> Mao and his government largely downplayed the deaths.<ref name="China's Great Leap Forward"/>

===Socialist relations repaired===
In 1954, Soviet first secretary [[Nikita Khrushchev]] repaired relations between the USSR and the PRC with trade agreements, a formal acknowledgement of Stalin's economic unfairness to the PRC, fifteen industrial-development projects, and exchanges of technicians (c. 10,000) and political advisors (c. 1,500), whilst Chinese labourers were sent to fill shortages of manual workers in [[Siberia]]. Despite this, Mao and Khrushchev disliked each other, both personally and ideologically.<ref name="Luthi40">{{cite book |last1=Luthi |first1=Lorenz |title=The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World |date=2008 |publisher=Princeton University Press |location=Princeton, NJ |isbn=978-0691135908 |pages=39–40 |chapter=Historical Background, 1921–1955}}</ref> However, by 1955, consequent to Khrushchev's having repaired Soviet relations with Mao and the Chinese, 60% of the PRC's exports went to the USSR, by way of the [[five-year plans of China]] begun in 1953.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Shabad |first1=Theodore |title=Communist China's 5 Year Plan |journal=Far Eastern Survey |date=December 1955 |volume=24 |issue=12 |pages=189–191 |jstor=3023788 |doi=10.2307/3023788}}</ref>

=== Discontents of de-Stalinization ===
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-B0628-0015-035, Nikita S. Chruschtschow.jpg|thumb|The Sino-Soviet split initially arose in the late 1950s over the ideological divergence between Soviet leader [[Khrushchev]]'s policies of De-Stalinisation and peaceful coexistence and Mao's affirmation of Stalinism and confrontation with the West. By the late 1970s, the positions were reversed; the [[Cold War#New Cold War (1979–1985)|New Cold War]] was beginning with the Soviet Union and the West in confrontation and [[China–United States relations#Normalization|China having achieved rapprochement with the United States]].]]
In early 1956, Sino-Soviet relations began deteriorating, following Khrushchev's [[de-Stalinization]] of the USSR, which he initiated with the speech ''[[On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences|On the Cult of Personality and its Consequences]]'' that criticized [[Stalin]] and [[Stalinism]] – especially the [[Great Purge]] of Soviet society, of the rank-and-file of the [[Soviet Armed Forces]], and of the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] (CPSU). In light of de-Stalinization, the CPSU's changed ideological orientation – from Stalin's confrontation of the West to Khrushchev's [[peaceful coexistence]] with it – posed problems of ideological credibility and political authority for Mao, who had emulated Stalin's style of leadership and practical application of Marxism–Leninism in the development of [[socialism with Chinese characteristics]] and the PRC as a country.{{sfnp|Lüthi|2010|pages=49-50}}

The [[Hungarian Revolution of 1956]] against the rule of Moscow was a severe political concern for Mao, because it had required military intervention to suppress, and its occurrence weakened the political legitimacy of the Communist Party to be in government. In response to that discontent among the European members of the Eastern Bloc, the Chinese Communist Party denounced the USSR's de-Stalinization as [[Marxist revisionism|revisionism]], and reaffirmed the Stalinist ideology, policies, and practices of Mao's government as the correct course for achieving socialism in China. This event, indicating Sino-Soviet divergences of Marxist–Leninist practice and interpretation, began fracturing "monolithic communism" — the Western perception of absolute ideological unity in the Eastern Bloc.{{sfnp|Lüthi|2010|pages=62–63}}

From Mao's perspective, the success of the Soviet foreign policy of peaceful coexistence with the West would geopolitically isolate the PRC;{{sfnp|Lüthi|2010||page=48}} whilst the Hungarian Revolution indicated the possibility of revolt in the PRC, and in China's sphere of influence. To thwart such discontent, Mao launched in 1956 the [[Hundred Flowers Campaign]] of political liberalization – the freedom of speech to criticize government, the bureaucracy, and the CCP publicly. However, the campaign proved too successful when [[Anti-Rightist Campaign|blunt criticism of Mao was voiced]].{{sfnp|Lüthi|2010|pages=71–73}} Consequent to the relative freedoms of the de-Stalinized USSR, Mao retained the Stalinist model of Marxist–Leninist economy, government, and society.

Ideological differences between Mao and Khrushchev compounded the insecurity of the new communist leader in China. Following the Chinese civil war, Mao was especially sensitive to ideological shifts that might undermine the CCP. In an era saturated by this form of ideological instability, Khrushchev's anti-Stalinism was particularly impactful to Mao. Mao saw himself as a descendent in a long Marxist–Leninist lineage of which Stalin was the most recent figurehead. Chinese leaders began to associate Stalin's successor with anti-party elements within China. Khrushchev was pinned as a revisionist. Popular sentiment within China regarded Khrushchev as a representative of the upper-class, and Chinese Marxist-Leninists viewed the leader as a blight on the communist project. While the two nations had significant ideological similarities, domestic instability drove a wedge between the nations as they began to adopt different visions of communism following the death of Stalin in 1953.

Popular sentiment within China changed as Khrushchev's policies changed. Stalin had accepted that the USSR would carry much of the economic burden of the Korean War, but, when Khrushchev came to power, he created a repayment plan under which the PRC would reimburse the Soviet Union within an eight-year period. However, China was experiencing significant food shortages at this time, and, when grain shipments were routed to the Soviet Union instead of feeding the Chinese public, faith in the Soviets plummeted. These policy changes were interpreted as Khrushchev's abandonment of the communist project and the nations' shared identity as Marxist-Leninists. As a result, Khrushchev became Mao's scapegoat during China's food crisis.{{sfnp|Lüthi|2010|pages=76–77}}

=== Chinese radicalization and distrust ===
[[File:Taiwan Strait.png|thumb|upright=1.2|The strait of Taiwan]]
In the first half of 1958, Chinese domestic politics developed an anti-Soviet tone from the ideological disagreement over de-Stalinization and the radicalization that preceded the [[Great Leap Forward]]. It coincided with greater Chinese sensitivity over matters of sovereignty and control over foreign policy - particularly where Taiwan was concerned. The result was a growing Chinese reluctance to cooperate with the Soviet Union. The deterioration of the relationship manifested throughout the year.{{sfnp|Lüthi|2010|pages=80-104}}

In April, the Soviets proposed the construction of a joint radio transmitter. China rejected it after counter-proposing that the transmitter be Chinese owned and that Soviet usage be limited to wartime. A similar Soviet proposal in July was also rejected.{{sfnp|Lüthi|2010|page=92}} In June, China requested Soviet assistance to develop nuclear attack submarines. The following month, the Soviets proposed the construction of a joint strategic submarine fleet, but the proposal as delivered failed to mention the type of submarine. The proposal was strongly rejected by Mao under the belief that the Soviet wanted to control China's coast and submarines. Khrushchev secretly visited Beijing in early August in an unsuccessful attempt to salvage the proposal; Mao was in an ideological furor and would not accept. The meeting ended with an agreement to construct the previously rejected radio station with Soviet loans.{{sfnp|Lüthi|2010|pages=92-95}}

Further damage was caused by the [[Second Taiwan Strait Crisis]] toward the end of August. China did not notify or consult the Soviet Union before initiating the conflict, contradicting China's previous desire to share information for foreign affairs and violating - at least the spirit - the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty. This may have been partially in response to what the Chinese viewed as the timid Soviet response to the West in the [[1958 Lebanon crisis]] and [[1958 Iraqi coup d'état]]. The Soviets opted to publicly support China at the end of August, but became concerned when the US replied with veiled threats of nuclear war in early September and mixed-messaging from the Chinese. China stated that its goal was the resumption of ambassadorial talks that had started after the [[First Taiwan Strait Crisis]] while simultaneously framing the crisis as the start of a nuclear war with the capitalist bloc.{{sfnp|Lüthi|2010|pages=95-103}}

Chinese nuclear brinkmanship was a threat to peaceful coexistence. The crisis and ongoing nuclear disarmament talks with the US helped to convince the Soviets to renege on its 1957 commitment to deliver a model nuclear bomb to China. By this time, the Soviets had already helped create the foundations of China's nuclear weapons program.{{sfnp|Lüthi|2010|pages=103-104}}

=== Mao's nuclear-war remarks and two Chinas ===
[[File:Peng Dehuai, Ye Jianying, Nikita Khrushchev, Nikolai Bulganin.jpg|thumb|A meeting of some Chinese and Soviet leaders in 1958. From left to right: [[Ye Jianying]], [[Peng Dehuai]], [[Nikolai Bulganin]], and [[Nikita Khrushchev]].]]
Throughout the 1950s, Khrushchev maintained positive Sino-Soviet relations with foreign aid, especially nuclear technology for the Chinese atomic bomb project, [[Project 596]]. However, political tensions persisted because the economic benefits of the USSR's peaceful-coexistence policy voided the belligerent PRC's geopolitical credibility among the nations under Chinese hegemony, especially after a failed PRC–US rapprochement. In the Chinese sphere of influence, that Sino-American diplomatic failure and the presence of [[Taiwan and weapons of mass destruction|US nuclear weapons in Taiwan]] justified Mao's confrontational foreign policies with Taiwan ([[Republic of China]]).{{sfnp|Lüthi|2010|page=80}}

According to various sources including official CCP publications, at the [[1957 International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties]] in Moscow, Mao Zedong made some controversial remarks on nuclear wars, saying that "I'm not afraid of nuclear war. There are 2.7 billion people in the world; it doesn't matter if some are killed. China has a population of 600 million; even if half of them are killed, there are still 300 million people left."<ref name=":18">{{Cite web |last=Shen |first=Zhihua |author-link=Shen Zhihua |date=2011-01-14 |title=毛泽东讲核战争吓倒一大片：中国死3亿人没关系 (4) |trans-title=Mao Zedong scared a lot of people when he talked about nuclear war: It doesn’t matter if 300 million people die in China (4) |url=http://history.people.com.cn/GB/205396/13725760.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120323002721/http://history.people.com.cn/GB/205396/13725760.html |archive-date=2012-03-23 |website=[[People's Daily|People's Net]] |language=zh |quote=大不了就是核战争，核战争有什么了不起，全世界27亿人，死一半还剩一半，中国6亿人，死一半还剩3亿，我怕谁去。}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Xie |first=Jiashu |date=2014-08-25 |title=毛泽东是否说过"死3亿人没关系" |trans-title=Whether Mao Zedong actually said "it doesn't matter if 300 million people die"? |url=https://www.dswxyjy.org.cn/n1/2019/0228/c423725-30920896.html |url-status=live |journal=Chinese Social Sciences Today |language=zh |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240827031636/https://www.dswxyjy.org.cn/n1/2019/0228/c423725-30920896.html |archive-date=2024-08-27 |quote=大不了就是核战争，核战争有什么了不起，全世界27亿人，死一半还剩一半，中国6亿人，死一半还剩3亿，我怕谁去。 |via=[[Institute of Party History and Literature]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=2019-11-21 |title=China's nuclear arsenal was strikingly modest, but that is changing |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2019/11/21/chinas-nuclear-arsenal-was-strikingly-modest-but-that-is-changing |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191121134129/https://www.economist.com/china/2019/11/21/chinas-nuclear-arsenal-was-strikingly-modest-but-that-is-changing |archive-date=2019-11-21 |access-date=2025-01-08 |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |issn=0013-0613}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Wolfsthal |first=Jon B. |date=2025-01-09 |title=How to Reason With a Nuclear Rogue |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/12/north-korea-nukes-icbm-test-nuclear-weapons/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170712125048/https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/12/north-korea-nukes-icbm-test-nuclear-weapons/ |archive-date=2017-07-12 |access-date=2025-01-08 |website=[[Foreign Policy]] |language=en-US}}</ref> His remarks shocked many people, and according to the recollection of Khrushchev, "the audience was dead silent".<ref name=":19">{{Cite journal |last1=Shen |first1=Zhihua |author-link1=Shen Zhihua |last2=Xia |first2=Yafeng |date=2009 |title=Hidden Currents during the Honeymoon: Mao, Khrushchev, and the 1957 Moscow Conference |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26922964 |journal=Journal of Cold War Studies |volume=11 |issue=4 |pages=111 |doi=10.1162/jcws.2009.11.4.74 |jstor=26922964 |issn=1520-3972|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name=":20">{{Cite journal |last=Shen |first=Zhihua |author-link=Shen Zhihua |date=April 2012 |title=毛澤東與1957年莫斯科會議 |trans-title=Mao Zedong and the Moscow Conference in 1957 |url=https://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/media/articles/c105-200701085.pdf |url-status=live |journal=[[Twenty-First Century]] |issue=105 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240611072555/https://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/media/articles/c105-200701085.pdf |archive-date=2024-06-11 |via=[[Chinese University of Hong Kong]]}}</ref><ref name=":18" /> A number of Communist leaders, including [[Antonín Novotný]], [[Władysław Gomułka]] and [[Shmuel Mikunis]], expressed concerns after the meeting, eventually aligning themselves with the Soviet due to the combativeness of Mao's policies.<ref name=":19" /><ref name=":20" /><ref name=":18" /> Novotný, then First Secretary of the [[Communist Party of Czechoslovakia]], complained that "Mao Zedong says he is prepared to lose 300 million people out of a population of 600 million. What about us? We have only twelve million people in [[Czechoslovakia]]."<ref name=":19" /><ref name=":20" /> Mao had reportedly said similar things in 1956 when meeting with a delegation of journalists from [[Yugoslavia]],<ref>{{Cite web |last=Mao |first=Zedong |date=1956-04-21 |title=接见南斯拉夫新闻工作者代表团时的谈话（摘录） |trans-title=Conversation when receiving a delegation of Yugoslav journalists (excerpt) |url=https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/1968/3-081.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240421205409/https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/1968/3-081.htm |archive-date=2024-04-21 |access-date=2025-01-08 |website=[[Marxists Internet Archive]] |language=zh}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=October 17, 1964 |title=Mao's theory on atomic bomb: They can't kill us all |url=https://www.upi.com/Archives/1964/10/17/Maos-theory-on-atomic-bomb-They-cant-kill-us-all/1653831424805/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241225162035/https://www.upi.com/Archives/1964/10/17/Maos-theory-on-atomic-bomb-They-cant-kill-us-all/1653831424805/ |archive-date=2024-12-25 |access-date=2025-01-08 |website=[[United Press International]] |language=en}}</ref> and in 1958 at the second meeting of the [[8th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Mao |first=Zedong |date=1958-05-17 |title=在八大二次会议上的讲话（二） |trans-title=Talk at the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (2) |url=https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/1968/4-030.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240611190338/https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/1968/4-030.htm |archive-date=2024-06-11 |access-date=2025-01-08 |website=[[Marxists Internet Archive]] |language=zh |quote=原子仗现在没经验不知要死多少。最好剩一半。次好剩三分之一。二十几亿人口剩几亿，几个五年计划就发展起来，换来了一个资本主义全部灭亡。取得永久和平，这不是坏事。}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Yang |first=Kuisong |author-link=Yang Kuisong |date=2014-05-23 |title=毛泽东清楚建国后中国农村仍存在逃荒及卖儿卖女现象 |trans-title=Mao Zedong knew that after the founding of the People's Republic of China, there were still phenomena of fleeing from famine and selling sons and daughters in rural areas of China |url=https://news.ifeng.com/a/20140523/40427960_0.shtml |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140722220309/https://news.ifeng.com/a/20140523/40427960_0.shtml |archive-date=2014-07-22 |access-date=2025-01-08 |website=[[Phoenix New Media]] |publisher=[[Caijing]] |language=zh}}</ref> In 1963, the Chinese government issued a statement, calling the quote of "300 million people" was a slander from the Soviet Union.<ref>{{Cite web |date=1963-09-01 |title=中华人民共和国政府发言人声明——评苏联政府八月二十一日的声明 |trans-title=Statement by the Spokesperson of the Government of the People's Republic of China - Comment on the Statement of the Soviet Government on August 21 |url=https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/shuju/1963/gwyb196316.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240702191343/https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/shuju/1963/gwyb196316.pdf |archive-date=2024-07-02 |website=[[Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China]] |pages=299–300 |language=zh}}</ref>

In late 1958, the CCP revived Mao's guerrilla-period [[Mao cult|cult of personality]] to portray ''Chairman Mao'' as the charismatic, visionary leader solely qualified to control the policy, administration, and popular mobilization required to realize the Great Leap Forward to industrialize China.{{sfnp|Lüthi|2010|pages=81–83}} Moreover, to the Eastern Bloc, Mao portrayed the PRC's warfare with Taiwan and the accelerated modernization of the Great Leap Forward as Stalinist examples of Marxism–Leninism adapted to Chinese conditions. These circumstances allowed ideological Sino-Soviet competition, and Mao publicly criticized Khrushchev's economic and foreign policies as deviations from Marxism–Leninism.

== Onset of the disputes ==
To Mao, the events of the 1958–1959 period indicated that Khrushchev was politically untrustworthy as an orthodox Marxist.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/one-fingers-worth-historical-events-new-russian-and-chinese-evidence-the-sino-soviet|title=One Finger's Worth of Historical Events: New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948–1959|author=David Wolff|date=7 July 2011|website=Wilson Center|access-date=24 February 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160307170823/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/one-fingers-worth-historical-events-new-russian-and-chinese-evidence-the-sino-soviet|archive-date=7 March 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> In 1959, First Secretary Khrushchev met with US President [[Dwight Eisenhower]] to decrease US-Soviet geopolitical tensions. To that end, the USSR: (i) reneged an agreement for technical aid to develop [[Project 596]], and (ii) sided with India in the [[Sino-Indian War]]. Each US-Soviet collaboration offended Mao and he perceived Khrushchev as an opportunist who had become too tolerant of the West. The CCP said that the CPSU concentrated too much on "Soviet–US co-operation for the domination of the world", with geopolitical actions that contradicted Marxism–Leninism.<ref>{{cite web|title=Chinese Communist Party: The Leaders of the CPSU are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times, February 4, 1964|url=http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1964CCP-onCPSU.html|website=Modern History Sourcebook|publisher=Fordham University|access-date=1 July 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151231225103/http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1964CCP-onCPSU.html|archive-date=31 December 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref>

The final face-to-face meeting between Mao and Khruschev took place on 2 October 1959, when Khrushchev visited Beijing to mark the 10th anniversary of the [[proclamation of the People's Republic of China]]. By this point relations had deteriorated to the level where the Chinese were going out of their way to humiliate the Soviet leader - for example, there was no honour guard to greet him, no Chinese leader gave a speech, and when Khrushchev insisted on giving a speech of his own, no microphone was provided. The speech in question would turn out to contain praise of the US President Eisenhower, whom Khrushchev had recently met, obviously an intentional insult to Communist China. The leaders of the two Socialist states would not meet again for the next 30 years.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/khrushchev-in-water-wings-on-mao-humiliation-and-the-sino-soviet-split-80852370/ | title=Khrushchev in Water Wings: On Mao, Humiliation and the Sino-Soviet Split }}</ref>

===Khrushchev's criticism of Albania at the 22nd CPSU Congress===

In June 1960, at the zenith of de-Stalinization, the USSR denounced the [[People's Republic of Albania]] as a politically backward country for retaining Stalinism as government and model of socialism. In turn, Bao Sansan said that the CCP's message to the cadres in China was:

<blockquote>"When Khrushchev stopped Russian aid to Albania, [[Enver Hoxha|Hoxha]] said to his people: 'Even if we have to eat the roots of grass to live, we won't take anything from Russia.' China is not guilty of [[chauvinism]], and immediately sent food to our brother country."<ref>Sansan, Bao and Lord, Bette Bao (1964–1966) ''Eighth Moon: The True Story of a Young Girl's Life in Communist China'', New York: Scholastic, p.&nbsp;123.</ref></blockquote>

[[File:Mao Zedong and Enver Hoxha.jpg|thumb|Solidarity: China's Mao Zedong and Albania's [[Enver Hoxha]] were united in both their stance against [[Revisionism (Marxism)|Revisionism]] as well as ideologically upholding Stalin.]]

During his opening speech at the CPSU's [[22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|22nd Party Congress]] on 17 October 1961 in Moscow, Khrushchev once again criticized Albania as a politically backward state and the [[Albanian Party of Labour]] as well as its leadership, including [[Enver Hoxha]], for refusing to support reforms against Stalin's legacy, in addition to their criticism of [[Belgrade declaration|rapprochement with Yugoslavia]], leading to the [[Soviet–Albanian split]].<ref>{{cite web |title=1961: Zhou Enlai calls for reunification of all communist parties |url=http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/228081.htm |website=China.org |publisher=China Internet Information Center |access-date=3 April 2022}}</ref> In response to this rebuke, on the 19 October the delegation representing China at the Party Congress led by [[Premier of the People's Republic of China|Chinese Premier]] [[Zhou Enlai]] sharply criticised Moscow's stance towards Tirana:

<blockquote>"We hold that should a dispute or difference unfortunately arise between fraternal parties or fraternal countries, it should be resolved patiently in the spirit of [[proletarian internationalism]] and according to the principles of equality and of unanimity through consultation. Public, one-sided censure of any fraternal party does not help unity and is not helpful in resolving problems. To bring a dispute between fraternal parties or fraternal countries into the open in the face of the enemy cannot be regarded as a serious Marxist–Leninist attitude."<ref>{{cite book |title=Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts, Issues 245-246 |date=18 December 1962 |publisher=Central Intelligence Agency |page=BBB2}}</ref></blockquote>

Subsequently, on 21 October, Zhou visited the [[Lenin Mausoleum]] (then still entombing Stalin's body), laying two wreaths at the base of the site, one of which read "Dedicated to the great Marxist, Comrade Stalin". On 23 October, the Chinese delegation left Moscow for Beijing early, before the Congress' conclusion; within days, Khrushchev had Stalin's body removed from the mausoleum.<ref>{{cite web |title=This week in history: December 5–11 |url=https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2011/12/twih-d05.html |website=World Socialist Website |date=5 December 2011 |access-date=3 April 2022}}</ref><ref name="MacFarquhar">{{cite book |last1=MacFarquhar |first1=Roderick |title=The Origins of the Cultural Revolution |date=1999 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=0-231-11083-9 |page=128 |ref=MacFarquhar}}</ref>

===Mao, Khrushchev, and the US===
In 1960, Mao expected Khrushchev to deal aggressively with US President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] by holding him to account for the USSR having [[1960 U-2 incident|shot down a U-2 spy plane]], the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s photographing of military bases in the USSR; aerial espionage that the US said had been discontinued. In Paris, at the [[1960 Paris Summit|Four Powers Summit]] meeting, Khrushchev demanded and failed to receive Eisenhower's apology for the CIA's continued aerial espionage of the USSR. In China, Mao and the CCP interpreted Eisenhower's refusal to apologize as disrespectful of the national sovereignty of socialist countries, and held political rallies aggressively demanding Khrushchev's military confrontation with US aggressors; without such decisive action, Khrushchev lost face with the PRC.<ref>Gordon H. Chang, ''Friends and enemies : the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972'' (1990) [[iarchive:friendsenemiesth00chan|online]]</ref>

In the Romanian capital of [[Bucharest]], at the [[1960 International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties|International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties]] (November 1960), Mao and Khrushchev respectively attacked the Soviet and the Chinese interpretations of [[Marxism-Leninism]] as the wrong road to world socialism in the USSR and in China. Mao said that Khrushchev's emphases on consumer goods and material plenty would make the Soviets ideologically soft and un-revolutionary, to which Khrushchev replied: "If we could promise the people nothing, except revolution, they would scratch their heads and say: 'Isn't it better to have good goulash?{{' "}}{{sfnp|Chi-Kwan|2013|page=49}}

=== Ho Chi Minh's attempts to defuse the split ===
In 1960, [[Ho Chi Minh]], uniquely among Marxist-Leninist world leaders, attempted to mediate the growing Sino-Soviet tensions, staking his own personal reputation by doing so. On 14 August 1960, Ho attended a meeting in [[Sochi]] with Khrushchev, [[Władysław Gomułka]], [[Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal]], and [[Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej]], the purpose of which was to discuss the growing tensions with China. Khrushchev expressed reservations about Mao's growing nationalism, which he perceived as similar to the racial, pan-Asian nationalist propaganda of [[Empire of Japan|Imperial Japan]]. Later, when Ho met with Deng Xiaoping, Deng used the information he had received from Ho to denounce the Soviets and accuse them of spreading [[Yellow Peril]]. Although Ho was able to foster dialogue between the two states, the limited influence of North Vietnam within the Marxist-Leninist world resulted in Ho failing to prevent the split.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Grundy |first=Steven Crawford |date=2 July 2024 |title=Mission Impossible: Explaining the Failure of Ho Chi Minh's Mediation Efforts Inside the Marxist-Leninist World, 1960-1961 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2024.2329284#abstract |journal=[[Cold War History (journal)|Cold War History]] |language=en |volume=24 |issue=3 |pages=423–452 |doi=10.1080/14682745.2024.2329284 |issn=1468-2745 |access-date=8 April 2025 |via=Taylor and Francis Online|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

===Personal attacks and USSR technical support ceased===
In the 1960s, public displays of acrimonious quarrels about Marxist–Leninist doctrine characterized relations between hardline Stalinist Chinese and post-Stalinist Soviet Communists. At the [[Romanian Communist Party|Romanian Communist Party Congress]], the CCP's senior officer [[Peng Zhen]] quarrelled with Khrushchev, after the latter had insulted Mao as being a Chinese nationalist, a geopolitical adventurist, and an [[Deviationism|ideological deviationist]] from Marxism–Leninism. In turn, Peng insulted Khrushchev as a [[Anti-revisionism|revisionist]] whose régime showed him to be a "patriarchal, arbitrary, and tyrannical" ruler.<ref>Allen Axelrod, ''The Real History of the Cold War: A New Look at the Past'', p.&nbsp;213.</ref> In the event, Khrushchev denounced the PRC with 80 pages of criticism to the congress of the PRC.

In response to the insults, Khrushchev withdrew 1,400 Soviet technicians from the PRC, which cancelled some 200 joint scientific projects. According to Chinese records, the Soviet Union suddenly withdrew 1390 technicians and ended 600 contracts with PRC in 1960.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Wang |first=Zhenyou |date=2015-01-12 |title=20世纪60年代初期苏联驻华商务机构撤销问题的历史考察 |url=http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2015/0112/c83867-26370025.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240611070122/http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2015/0112/c83867-26370025.html |archive-date=2024-06-11 |access-date=2024-12-29 |website=[[People's Daily|People's Net]] |publisher=Contemporary China History Studies (当代中国史研究) |language=zh}}</ref> In response, Mao justified his belief that Khrushchev had somehow caused China's great economic failures and the famines that occurred in the period of the Great Leap Forward. Nonetheless, the PRC and the USSR remained pragmatic allies, which allowed Mao to alleviate famine in China and to resolve Sino-Indian border disputes. To Mao, Khrushchev had lost political authority and ideological credibility, because his US-Soviet ''[[détente]]'' had resulted in successful military (aerial) espionage against the USSR and public confrontation with an unapologetic capitalist enemy. Khrushchev's miscalculation of person and circumstance voided US-Soviet diplomacy at the [[1960 Paris Summit|Four Powers Summit in Paris]].{{sfnp|Chi-Kwan|2013|pages=49–50}}

=== Monolithic communism fractured ===
[[File:Jupiter IRBM.jpg|thumb|right|250px|In late 1962, the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] concluded when the US and the USSR respectively agreed to remove intermediate-range [[PGM-19 Jupiter]] nuclear missiles from Italy and Turkey, and to remove intermediate-range [[R-12 Dvina]] and [[R-14 Chusovaya]] nuclear missiles from Cuba. In the context of the Sino-Soviet split, Mao said that the USSR's military stand-down was Khrushchev's betrayal of Marxist–Leninist geopolitics.]]

In late 1961, at the [[22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|22nd Congress of the CPSU]], the PRC and the USSR revisited their doctrinal disputes about the orthodox interpretation and application of Marxism–Leninism.<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,873466,00.html One-Third of the Earth] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110204212557/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,873466,00.html |date=4 February 2011 }}, ''Time'', 27 October 1961</ref> In December 1961, the USSR broke diplomatic relations with Albania, which escalated the Sino-Soviet disputes from the political-party level to the national-government level.

During the [[Yi–Ta incident]] from March to May 1962, over 60,000 Chinese citizens, mostly ethnic Kazakhs driven in part by uncertainty over the Sino-Soviet split, crossed the border from [[Xinjiang]] into [[Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic|Soviet Kazakhstan]].<ref>{{cite journal |last=Kraus |first=Charles |title=Laying Blame for Flight and Fight: Sino-Soviet Relations and the 'Yi–Ta' Incident in Xinjiang, 1962 |journal=The China Quarterly |date=June 2019 |volume=238 |doi=10.1017/S0305741018001789 |s2cid=159226403 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/laying-blame-for-flight-and-fight-sinosoviet-relations-and-the-yita-incident-in-xinjiang-1962/D22C7C77E535CCE504AE7512D2C9015F |language=en |issn=0305-7410 |access-date=13 January 2024 |archive-date=5 January 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240105022350/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/laying-blame-for-flight-and-fight-sinosoviet-relations-and-the-yita-incident-in-xinjiang-1962/D22C7C77E535CCE504AE7512D2C9015F |url-status=live |pages=516–517|url-access=subscription }}</ref> In late 1962, the PRC broke relations with the USSR because Khrushchev did not go to war with the US over the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]]. Regarding that Soviet loss-of-face, Mao said that "Khrushchev has moved from adventurism to capitulationism" with a negotiated, bilateral, military stand-down. Khrushchev replied that Mao's belligerent foreign policies would lead to an East–West nuclear war.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ibiblio.org/chinesehistory/contents/03pol/c05s04.html|title=Exploring Chinese History: Politics: International Relations: Sino- Soviet Relations|author=Richard R. Wertz|website=ibiblio.org|access-date=15 April 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160407175611/http://www.ibiblio.org/chinesehistory/contents/03pol/c05s04.html|archive-date=7 April 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> For the Western powers, the averted atomic war threatened by the Cuban Missile Crisis made [[nuclear disarmament]] their political priority. To that end, the US, the UK, and the USSR agreed to the [[Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty]] in 1963, which formally forbade [[Nuclear weapons testing|nuclear-detonation tests]] in the [[Atmosphere of Earth|Earth's atmosphere]], in [[outer space]], and [[under water]] – yet did allow the underground testing and detonation of atomic bombs. In that time, the PRC's nuclear-weapons program, [[Project 596]], was nascent, and Mao perceived the test-ban treaty as the nuclear powers' attempt to thwart the PRC's becoming a nuclear superpower.{{sfnp|Chi-Kwan|2013|pages=53–55}}

Between 6 and 20 July 1963, a series of Soviet-Chinese negotiations were held in Moscow. However, both sides maintained their own ideological views and, therefore, negotiations failed.<ref>Mihai Croitor, Sanda Borşa (2014), Moscova 1963: eşecul negocierilor sovieto-chineze, Editura Eikon & Editura Mega, p.23-299</ref> In March 1964, the [[Romanian Communist Party|Romanian Workers' Party]] publicly announced the intention of the Bucharest authorities to mediate the Sino-Soviet conflict. In reality, however, the Romanian mediation approach represented only a pretext for forging a Sino-Romanian rapprochement, without arousing the Soviets' suspicions.<ref>Mihai Croitor, (2009) România şi conflictul sovieto-chinez (1956-1971), Editura Mega, p.250-284;Mihai Croitor, From Moscow to Beijing Romania and the Mediation of the Sino-Soviet Split, Transylvanian Review, Vol. 21, p. 449-459</ref>

Romania was neutral in the Sino-Soviet split.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=NWwRzLr-Y7MC&q=%22they+remained+neutral%22|title=Civilization in the West|first1=Crane|last1=Brinton|first2=John B.|last2=Christopher|first3=Robert Lee|last3=Wolff|date=24 January 1973|publisher=Prentice-Hall|isbn=9780131350120|via=Google Books|access-date=28 July 2021|archive-date=28 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210728220404/https://books.google.ro/books?id=NWwRzLr-Y7MC&q=%22they+remained+neutral%22|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lnBnN7tqFSoC&q=%22Soviet-led+efforts+at+condemning+China%22|title=Today's Isms: Communism, Fascism, Capitalism, Socialism|first1=William|last1=Ebenstein|first2=Edwin|last2=Fogelman|date=24 January 1980|publisher=Prentice-Hall|isbn=9780139243998|via=Google Books|access-date=28 July 2021|archive-date=28 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210728221749/https://books.google.ro/books?id=lnBnN7tqFSoC&q=%22Soviet-led%2Befforts%2Bat%2Bcondemning%2BChina%22|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8ExpAAAAMAAJ&q=%22strict+neutrality%22|title=Romania: Politics, Economics and Society : Political Stagnation and Simulated Change|first=Michael|last=Shafir|date=24 January 1985|publisher=Pinter|isbn=9780861874385|via=Google Books|access-date=28 July 2021|archive-date=28 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210728220407/https://books.google.ro/books?hl=en&id=8ExpAAAAMAAJ&dq=%22strict+neutrality%22|url-status=live}}</ref> Its neutrality along with being the small communist country with the most influence in global affairs enabled Romania to be recognized by the world as the "third force" of the communist world. Romania's independence - achieved in the early 1960s through its [[De-satellization of the Socialist Republic of Romania|freeing from its Soviet satellite status]] - was tolerated by Moscow because Romania was surrounded by socialist states and because its ruling party was not going to abandon communism.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hafLHZgZtt4C&pg=PA1075,|title=Europe Since 1945: An Encyclopedia|first1=Bernard A.|last1=Cook|first2=Bernard Anthony|last2=Cook|date=24 January 2001|publisher=Taylor & Francis|isbn=9780815340584|via=Google Books|access-date=28 July 2021|archive-date=28 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210728214456/https://books.google.ro/books?id=hafLHZgZtt4C&pg=PA1075,|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=j2KzAAAAIAAJ&q=%22third+force%22|title=The Reporter|first=Max|last=Ascoli|date=24 January 1965|publisher=Reporter Magazine, Company|via=Google Books|access-date=28 July 2021|archive-date=28 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210728214457/https://books.google.ro/books?hl=en&id=j2KzAAAAIAAJ&dq=%22third%2Bforce%22|url-status=live}}</ref> [[North Korea]] under [[Kim Il Sung]] also remained neutral because of its strategic status after the [[Korean War]], although it later moved more decisively towards the USSR after [[Deng Xiaoping]]'s [[reform and opening up]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Cha |first=Victor D. |url=http://archive.org/details/impossiblestaten0000chav_j2c1 |title=The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future |publisher=Ecco |year=2013 |isbn=978-0-06-199850-8 |location=New York |pages=29–30 |language=en}}</ref>

The [[Italian Communist Party]] (PCI), one of the largest and most politically influential communist parties in Western Europe, adopted an ambivalent stance towards Mao's split from the USSR. Although the PCI chastised Mao for breaking the previous global unity of socialist states and criticised the Cultural Revolution brought about by him, it simultaneously applauded and heaped praise on him for the People's Republic of China's enormous assistance to [[North Vietnam]] in its war against [[South Vietnam]] and the United States.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Clivio |first1=Carlotta |date=20 December 2018 |title=Neither for, nor against Mao: PCI-CCP interactions and the normalisation of Sino-Italian Relations, 1966–71 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2018.1529758 |journal=[[Cold War History (journal)|Cold War History]] |volume=19 |issue=3 |pages=383–400 |doi=10.1080/14682745.2018.1529758 |s2cid=158702260 |access-date=13 February 2023|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

As a Marxist–Leninist, Mao was much angered that Khrushchev did not go to war with the US over their failed [[Bay of Pigs Invasion]] and the [[United States embargo against Cuba]] of continual economic and agricultural sabotage. For the Eastern Bloc, Mao addressed those Sino-Soviet matters in "Nine Letters" critical of Khrushchev and his leadership of the USSR. Moreover, the break with the USSR allowed Mao to reorient the development of the PRC with formal relations (diplomatic, economic, political) with the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.{{sfnp|Chi-Kwan|2013|pages=53–55}}

=== Formal and informal statements ===
{{History of the Soviet Union}}
In the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet split allowed only written communications between the PRC and the USSR, in which each country supported their geopolitical actions with formal statements of Marxist–Leninist ideology as the true road to [[world communism]], which is the [[general line of the party]]. In June 1963, the PRC published ''The Chinese Communist Party's Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement'',<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/proposal.htm|title=A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement|website=marxists.org|access-date=24 February 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160131074829/https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/proposal.htm|archive-date=31 January 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> to which the USSR replied with the ''Open Letter of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union''; each ideological stance perpetuated the Sino-Soviet split.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.etext.org/Politics/MIM/classics/mao/polemics/sevenlet.html |title=Seven Letters Exchanged Between the Central Committees of the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union |access-date=21 October 2007 |url-status=bot: unknown |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071225024740/http://www.etext.org/Politics/MIM/classics/mao/polemics/sevenlet.html |archive-date=25 December 2007 |website=Etext Archives }}</ref> In 1964, Mao said that, in light of the Chinese and Soviet differences about the interpretation and practical application of Orthodox Marxism, a counter-revolution had occurred and re-established capitalism in the USSR; consequently, following Soviet suit, the [[Warsaw Pact]] countries broke relations with the PRC.

In late 1964, after Nikita Khrushchev had been deposed, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai met with the new Soviet leaders, First Secretary [[Leonid Brezhnev]] and Premier [[Alexei Kosygin]], but their ideological differences proved a diplomatic impasse to renewed economic relations. The Soviet defense minister's statement damaged the prospects of improved Sino-Soviet relations. Historian Daniel Leese noted that improvement of the relations "that had seemed possible after Khrushchev's fall evaporated after the Soviet minister of defense, [[Rodion Malinovsky]]... approached Chinese Marshal [[He Long]], member of the Chinese delegation to Moscow, and asked when China would finally get rid of Mao like the [[CPSU]] had disposed of Khrushchev."<ref>Daniel Leese, ''Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China's Cultural Revolution'' (Cambridge University Press, 2011) p84</ref> Back in China, Zhou reported to Mao that Brezhnev's Soviet government retained the policy of peaceful coexistence which Mao had denounced as "[[Khrushchevism]] without Khrushchev"; despite the change of leadership, the Sino-Soviet split remained open. At the [[Glassboro Summit Conference]], between Kosygin and US President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]], the PRC accused the USSR of betraying the peoples of the Eastern bloc countries. The official interpretation, by [[Radio Peking]], reported that US and Soviet politicians discussed "a great conspiracy, on a worldwide basis ... criminally selling the rights of the revolution of [the] Vietnam people, [of the] Arabs, as well as [those of] Asian, African, and Latin-American peoples, to US imperialists".<ref name="ap19670624">{{cite news |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=WAFOAAAAIBAJ&pg=6332%2C5746364 |title=At the Summit: Cautious Optimism |work=The Free Lance-Star |date=24 June 1967 |agency=Associated Press |access-date=17 July 2013 |location=Fredericksburg, Virginia |pages=1 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160427111356/https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=WAFOAAAAIBAJ&sjid=AYwDAAAAIBAJ&pg=6332,5746364 |archive-date=27 April 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref>

== Conflict ==
=== Cultural Revolution ===
[[File:1966-11 1966年毛泽东林彪与红卫兵.jpg|thumb|250px|right|A public appearance of Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman [[Lin Biao]] among Red Guards, in Beijing, during the Cultural Revolution (November 1966)]]

To regain political supremacy in the PRC, Mao launched the [[Cultural Revolution]] in 1966 to counter the Soviet-style bureaucracies (personal-power-centres) that had become established in education, agriculture, and industrial management. Abiding Mao's proclamations for universal ideological orthodoxy, schools and universities closed throughout China when students organized themselves into politically radical [[Red Guards (China)|Red Guards]]. Lacking a leader, a political purpose, and a social function, the ideologically discrete units of Red Guards soon degenerated into political factions, each of whom claimed to be more Maoist than the other factions.<ref>''Dictionary of Wars'', Third Edition (2007), George Childs Kohn, Ed., pp.&nbsp;122–223.</ref>

In establishing the ideological orthodoxy presented in the [[Little Red Book]] (''Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung''), the political violence of the Red Guards provoked civil war in parts of China, known as the [[Violent Struggle|violent struggle]], which Mao suppressed with the [[People's Liberation Army]] (PLA), who imprisoned the fractious Red Guards. Moreover, when Red Guard factionalism occurred within the PLA – Mao's base of political power – he dissolved the Red Guards, and then reconstituted the CCP with the new generation of Maoists who had endured and survived the Cultural Revolution that [[purge]]d the "anti-communist" old generation from the party and from China.<ref name="The Columbia Encyclopedia 1993. p.&nbsp;696">''The Columbia Encyclopedia'', Fifth Edition. Columbia University Press:1993. p.&nbsp;696.</ref>

As social engineering, the Cultural Revolution reasserted the political primacy of [[Maoism]], but also stressed, strained, and broke the PRC's relations with the USSR and the West.<ref>''Dictionary of Historical Terms'', Second Edition, Chris Cook, Ed. Peter Bedrick Books: New York:1999, p.&nbsp;89.</ref> The Soviet Union ridiculed and criticized Mao's Cultural Revolution fiercely,<ref>{{Cite web |title=Pravda, The Anti-Soviet Policy of Communist China, Feb. 16, 1967 |url=https://china.usc.edu/pravda-anti-soviet-policy-communist-china-feb-16-1967 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240714074826/https://china.usc.edu/pravda-anti-soviet-policy-communist-china-feb-16-1967 |archive-date=2024-07-14 |access-date=2024-12-29 |website=University of Southern California |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=McGuire |first=Elizabeth |date=2001-05-01 |title=China, the Fun House Mirror: Soviet Reactions to the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969 |url=https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0fs1526m |journal=Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies |language=en}}</ref> and some publications in USSR and Eastern Bloc also compared Mao meeting Red Guards on [[Tiananmen]] to [[Adolf Hitler]] giving speeches to his supporters.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Bai |first=Hua |date=2016-05-18 |title=文革与苏联 红卫兵成贬义 毛形象恶劣 |trans-title=Cultural Revolution and the Soviet Union: Red Guards' negative meaning and Mao's poor image |url=https://www.voachinese.com/a/3334409.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241130110228/https://www.voachinese.com/a/3334409.html |archive-date=2024-11-30 |access-date=2024-12-29 |website=[[Voice of America]] |language=zh}}</ref> Geopolitically, despite their querulous "Maoism vs. Marxism–Leninism" disputes about interpretations and practical applications of Marxism–Leninism, the USSR and the PRC advised, aided, and supplied [[North Vietnam]] during the [[Vietnam War]],<ref>''The Red Flag: A History of Communism'' (2009) p.&nbsp;461.</ref> which Mao had defined as a peasant revolution against foreign imperialism. In socialist solidarity, the PRC allowed safe passage for the Soviet Union's ''matériel'' to North Vietnam to prosecute the war against the US-sponsored [[South Vietnam|Republic of Vietnam]], until 1968, after the Chinese withdrawal.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/chinese-and-soviet-involvement/|title=CHINESE AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM|date=20 June 2019}}</ref><ref>''Dictionary of Historical Terms'', Second Edition, Chris Cook, Ed. Peter Bedrick Books: New York:1999, p.&nbsp;218.</ref>

=== Siege of the Soviet embassy in Beijing ===
In August 1966 the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the first of several notes to the Chinese embassy in Moscow protesting aggressive Chinese behavior near the [[Embassy of Russia, Beijing|Soviet embassy in Beijing]]. On January 25, 1967, the Chinese visiting the [[Lenin Mausoleum]] on [[Moscow]] [[Red Square]] jumped over a barrier and began chanting Mao quotes. Then one Chinese allegedly hit a Soviet woman, and a scuffle took place. After this incident new outrages against the Soviet embassy in Beijing began. The threat of physical danger caused the Soviets to evacuate women and children from their embassy in Beijing in February 1967. Even as the women and children were boarding the plane, they were harassed by hostile [[Red Guards (China)|Red Guards]].<ref>[https://iseees.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/2001_02-mcgu.pdf CHINA, THE FUN HOUSE MIRROR: SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 1966-1969]</ref><ref>[http://web.stanford.edu/group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/2709-1975-Borisov-JHS.pdf Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-1970]</ref>

=== Border conflict ===
{{Main|Sino-Soviet border conflict}}

[[File:China USSR E 88.jpg|thumb|upright=1.1|The Sino-Soviet split allowed minor border disputes to escalate to firefights for areas of the Argun and Amur rivers (Damansky–Zhenbao is southeast, north of the lake (2 March – 11 September 1969).]]
In the late 1960s, the continual quarrelling between the CCP and the CPSU about the correct interpretations and applications of Marxism–Leninism escalated to small-scale warfare at the [[China–Russia border|Sino-Soviet border]].<ref name="Lüthi, Lorenz M. 2008 p. 340">Lüthi, Lorenz M. ''The Sino-Soviet split: Cold War in the Communist World'' (2008), p. 340.</ref>

In 1966, for diplomatic resolution, the Chinese revisited the national matter of the Sino-Soviet border demarcated in the 19th century, but originally imposed upon the [[Qing dynasty]] by way of unequal treaties that annexed Chinese territory to the [[Russian Empire]]. Despite not asking the return of territory, the PRC asked the USSR to acknowledge formally and publicly that such an historic injustice against China (the 19th-century border) was dishonestly realized with the 1858 [[Treaty of Aigun]] and the 1860 [[Convention of Peking]]. The Soviet government ignored the matter.

In 1968, the [[Soviet Army]] had massed along the {{convert|4380|km|mi|adj=on}} border with the PRC, especially at the [[Xinjiang]] frontier, in [[Northwest China|north-west China]], where the Soviets might readily induce the [[Turkic peoples]] into a separatist insurrection. In 1961, the USSR had stationed 12 divisions of soldiers and 200 aeroplanes at that border. By 1968, the Soviet Armed Forces had stationed six divisions of soldiers in [[Outer Mongolia]] and 16 divisions, 1,200 aeroplanes, and 120 medium-range missiles at the Sino-Soviet border to confront 47 light divisions of the Chinese Army. By March 1969, the border confrontations [[Sino-Soviet border conflict|escalated]], including fighting at the [[Ussuri|Ussuri River]], the [[Zhenbao Island incident]], and [[Tielieketi]].<ref name="Lüthi, Lorenz M. 2008 p. 340"/>

After the border conflict, "spy wars" involving numerous espionage agents occurred on Soviet and Chinese territory through the 1970s.<ref>{{Cite web|title=The Soviet-Chinese Spy Wars in the 1970s: What KGB Counterintelligence Knew, Part I|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/soviet-chinese-spy-wars-1970s-what-kgb-counterintelligence-knew-part-i|access-date=29 September 2021|website=www.wilsoncenter.org|date=15 April 2021 |language=en|archive-date=29 September 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210929034413/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/soviet-chinese-spy-wars-1970s-what-kgb-counterintelligence-knew-part-i|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=The Soviet-Chinese Spy Wars in the 1970s: What KGB Counterintelligence Knew, Part II|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/soviet-chinese-spy-wars-1970s-what-kgb-counterintelligence-knew-part-ii|access-date=29 September 2021|website=www.wilsoncenter.org|date=22 April 2021 |language=en|archive-date=29 September 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210929034402/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/soviet-chinese-spy-wars-1970s-what-kgb-counterintelligence-knew-part-ii|url-status=live}}</ref> In 1972, the Soviet Union also [[Renaming of geographical objects in the Russian Far East|renamed placenames in the Russian Far East]] to the [[Russian language]] and [[Russification|Russified]] [[Toponymy|toponyms]], replacing the native and/or Chinese names.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Saparov |first=Arseny |date=2003-01-01 |title=The alteration of place names and construction of national identity in Soviet Armenia |journal=Cahiers du monde russe. Russie - Empire russe - Union soviétique et États indépendants |language=fr |volume=44 |issue=1 |pages=179–198 |doi=10.4000/monderusse.8604 |issn=1252-6576 |quote=The deterioration of Russian-Chinese relations in December 1972 resulted in the replacement of Chinese place-names in the border districts (Charles B. Peterson, art. cit.: 15-24). Up to 500 place-names were changed in the Far East. (B.A. Diachenko, "Pereimenovaniia v primor'e," in Vsesoiuznaia nauchno-prakticheskaia konferentsiia "Istoricheskie nazvaniia -- pamiatniki kul'tury" 17-20 aprelia 1989. Tezisy dokladov i soobshchenii (Moscow, 1989): 111.|doi-access=free }}</ref>

=== Nuclear China with the US and the USSR ===

==== US strategy on China's nuclear development ====
{{see also|Two Bombs, One Satellite}}
In the early 1960s, the United States feared that a "nuclear China" would imbalance the bi-polar Cold War between the US and the USSR. To keep the PRC from achieving the geopolitical status of a nuclear power, the US administrations of both [[John F. Kennedy]] and [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] considered ways either to sabotage or to attack directly the [[China and weapons of mass destruction|Chinese nuclear program]] — aided either by [[Republic of China (1949-present)|Republic of China]] based in Taiwan or by the USSR. To avert nuclear war, Khrushchev refused the US offer to participate in a US-Soviet pre-emptive attack against the PRC.
<ref name="jstor2626706">{{cite journal |last1=Burr |first1=W. |last2=Richelson |first2=J. T. |year=2000–2001 |title=Whether to "Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–64 |journal=International Security |volume=25 |issue=3 |pages=54–99 |jstor=2626706 |url=https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/whether-strangle-baby-cradle-united-states-and-chinese-nuclear-program-1960-64 |doi=10.1162/016228800560525 |s2cid=57560352 |access-date=29 April 2019 |archive-date=30 April 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190430032544/https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/whether-strangle-baby-cradle-united-states-and-chinese-nuclear-program-1960-64 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

To prevent the Chinese from building a nuclear bomb, the [[United States Armed Forces]] recommended indirect measures, such as diplomacy and propaganda, and direct measures, such as infiltration and sabotage, an invasion by the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan, maritime blockades, a South Korean invasion of North Korea, conventional air attacks against the nuclear production facilities, and dropping a nuclear bomb against a "selected CHICOM [Chinese Communist] target".<ref>LeMay, Curtis. "A Study of Chinese Communist Vulnerability" (1963), in "Whether to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–64 (2000)</ref> On 16 October 1964, the PRC detonated their first nuclear bomb, a uranium-235 [[Nuclear weapon design|implosion-fission device]],<ref name=":0">[https://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/16-october-1964-first-chinese-nuclear-test "16 October 1964 – First Chinese nuclear test: CTBTO Preparatory Commission"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200222034939/https://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/16-october-1964-first-chinese-nuclear-test/ |date=22 February 2020 }}. ''ctbto.org''. Retrieved 1 June 2017.</ref> with an explosive yield of 22 [[kiloton]]s of TNT;<ref>Oleg; Podvig, Pavel Leonardovich; Hippel, Frank Von (2004). [https://books.google.com/books?id=CPRVbYDc-7kC&pg=PA441 ''Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191017052346/https://books.google.be/books?id=CPRVbYDc-7kC&pg=PA441 |date=17 October 2019 }}. MIT Press. p. 441. {{ISBN|9780262661812}}.</ref> and publicly acknowledged the USSR's technical assistance in realizing [[596 (nuclear test)|Project 596]].<ref>{{cite web |title=CTBTO World Map |url=https://www.ctbto.org/map/#mode=nuclear |website=www.ctbto.org |access-date=31 January 2019 |archive-date=1 February 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190201065733/https://www.ctbto.org/map/#mode=nuclear |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Planned Soviet nuclear strike on China ====
[[File:Brezhnev-color.jpg|left|thumb|[[Leonid Brezhnev]], the leader of the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1982, held tough position towards China.]]
According to declassified sources from both the PRC and the United States, the Soviet Union planned to launch a massive nuclear strike on China after the [[Zhenbao Island incident]] in March 1969.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web |last=O'Neill |first=Mark |date=May 12, 2010 |title=Nixon intervention saved China from Soviet nuclear attack |url=https://www.scmp.com/article/714064/nixon-intervention-saved-china-soviet-nuclear-attack |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150912221259/https://www.scmp.com/article/714064/nixon-intervention-saved-china-soviet-nuclear-attack |archive-date=2015-09-12 |website=[[South China Morning Post]]}}</ref><ref name=":4">{{Cite web |date=1969-09-10 |title=MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: The Possibility of a Soviet Strike Against Chinese Nuclear Facilities |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.19.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241112193950/https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.19.pdf |archive-date=2024-11-12 |website=The George Washington University |publisher=[[United States Department of State]]}}</ref><ref name=":9">{{Cite web |date=2011 |title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972: 59. Editorial Note |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d59 |url-status=live |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20241217085844/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d59 |archive-date=2024-12-17 |access-date= |website=United States Department of State |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":7">{{Cite web |last=Xu |first=Ni |date=2008 |title=1969年, 中苏核危机始末 |trans-title=The nuclear crisis between China and the Soviet Union in 1969 |url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/85039/7218846.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220303213408/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/85039/7218846.html |archive-date=2022-03-03 |website=[[People's Daily|People's Net]] |language=zh}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite web |date=1969-08-18 |title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972: 63. Memorandum of Conversation |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d63 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241104110630/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d63 |archive-date=2024-11-04 |website=[[United States Department of State]]}}</ref><ref name=":6">{{Cite web |date=August 28, 1969 |title=27. Memorandum From William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d27 |url-status=live |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20241010040418/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d27 |archive-date=2024-10-10 |access-date= |website=United States Department of State |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":11">{{Cite web |date=2010-05-13 |title=USSR planned nuclear attack on China in 1969 |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7720461/USSR-planned-nuclear-attack-on-China-in-1969.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100516014916/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7720461/USSR-planned-nuclear-attack-on-China-in-1969.html |archive-date=2010-05-16 |access-date= |website=[[The Daily Telegraph|The Telegraph]] |language=en}}</ref> Soviet diplomat [[Arkady Shevchenko]] also mentioned in his memoir that "the Soviet leadership had come close to using nuclear arms on China" with [[Andrei Grechko]], then [[Minister of Defence (Soviet Union)|Soviet's Minister of Defence]], called for "unrestricted use of the multimegaton bomb known in [[Western world|the West]] as the 'blockbuster'";<ref name=":29">{{Cite magazine |last=Shevchenko |first=Arkady |author-link=Arkady Shevchenko |date=February 11, 1985 |title=Breaking with Moscow |url=https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,960276-15,00.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250114011523/https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0%2C33009%2C960276-15%2C00.html |archive-date=2025-01-14 |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]]}}</ref> while many documents are still classified.<ref name=":28">{{Cite web |last=Wu |first=Riqiang |date=2010–2011 |title=Certainty of Uncertainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics |url=https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156889/4%20Wu%20POSSEIV.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240717043921/https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156889/4%20Wu%20POSSEIV.pdf |archive-date=2024-07-17 |website=[[ETH Zurich]] |pages=18–21}}</ref> As a turning point during the [[Cold War]], this crisis almost led to a major nuclear war, seven years after the [[Cuban Missile Crisis|Cuban missile crisis]].<ref name=":11" /><ref name=":10" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Yu |first=Miles |author-link=Miles Yu |date=December 13, 2022 |title=The 1969 Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts As A Key Turning Point Of The Cold War |url=https://www.hoover.org/research/1969-sino-soviet-border-conflicts-key-turning-point-cold-war |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241222132336/https://www.hoover.org/research/1969-sino-soviet-border-conflicts-key-turning-point-cold-war |archive-date=2024-12-22 |access-date=2024-12-30 |website=[[Hoover Institution]] |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":12">{{Cite journal |last=Rajagopalan |first=Rajesh |date=2000-06-01 |title=Deterrence and nuclear confrontations: The Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-soviet border war |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700160008455225 |journal=Strategic Analysis |volume=24 |issue=3 |pages=441–457 |doi=10.1080/09700160008455225 |issn=0970-0161|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Radchenko |first=Sergey |author-link=Sergey Radchenko |date=2019-03-02 |title=The Island That Changed History |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/02/opinion/soviet-russia-china-war.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250101053207/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/02/opinion/soviet-russia-china-war.html |archive-date=2025-01-01 |access-date=2025-01-03 |work=[[The New York Times]] |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>

On August 18, 1969, Boris N. Davydov, the Second Secretary of the [[Embassy of Russia, Washington, D.C.|Soviet Embassy to the United States]], brought up the idea of a Soviet attack on China's nuclear installations, during a luncheon in Washington.<ref name=":4" /><ref name=":5" /> According to Chinese sources, then [[Soviet Ambassador to the United States|Soviet ambassador to the US]], [[Anatoly Dobrynin]], met with [[Henry Kissinger]] on August 20 and informed him of the Soviets' intention to launch a nuclear strike on China.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":10" /> On August 21, the US sent out a secret telegram to its [[embassies]] worldwide warning that "the Soviets have set in motion an extensive series of measures" which could "permit them a variety of military options".<ref>{{Cite web |date=1969-08-21 |title=Outgoing Telegram |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.11.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090903202126/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.11.pdf |archive-date=2009-09-03 |website=The George Washington University |publisher=United States Department of State}}</ref>

The United States authorities subsequently informed certain [[News media in the United States|US news media]] regarding the possible Soviet attack, and the latter made the reports public on August 28 and the following days.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":6" /><ref name=":8" /><ref name=":21">{{Cite web |last=Gerson |first=Michael S. |date=November 2010 |title=The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict—Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969 |url=https://www.cna.org/reports/2010/d0022974.a2.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241218120231/https://www.cna.org/reports/2010/d0022974.a2.pdf |archive-date=2024-12-18 |website=[[Center for Naval Analyses]]}}</ref> Among them were a report appearing on ''[[The Washington Post]]'' on August 28,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Roberts |first=Chalmers M. |date=1969-08-28 |title=Russia Reported Eying Strikes at China A-Sites |url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01284A001800110052-9.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250111060458/https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01284A001800110052-9.pdf |archive-date=2025-01-11 |website=[[CIA]] |publisher=[[The Washington Post]]}}</ref> with another one reportedly mentioning further details that the Soviet Union had planned to launch nuclear missiles onto major Chinese cities including [[Beijing]], [[Changchun]] and [[Anshan]], as well as China's nuclear sites including [[Jiuquan]], [[Xichang]] and [[Lop Nur]].<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":28" /><ref name=":8" /> Meanwhile, unusual Soviet military activity in the [[Far East]] (including a prelude to a possible attack known as the "stand-down" by the [[Soviet Air Forces]]<ref name=":28" /><ref name=":12" /><ref name=":21" />) was detected by the US intelligence in late August, with Soviet's ''[[Pravda]]'' on August 28 warning that a war with Communist China, if broke out, would involve "lethal armaments and modern means of delivery" and "would leave no continent untouched."<ref name=":28" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=[[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan)|Ministry of Foreign Affairs]] |date=1969-10-01 |title=Foreign Views |url=https://taiwantoday.tw/Politics/Taiwan-Review/6124/Foreign--Views |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250113100709/https://taiwantoday.tw/Politics/Taiwan-Review/6124/Foreign--Views |archive-date=2025-01-13 |access-date=2025-01-13 |website=[[Taiwan Today]] |language=en}}</ref> Besides the United States, the Soviet Union also approached a number of other foreign governments, including its Communist allies, and asked for their opinions and reactions if the Soviets were to launch nuclear strike against China.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" /><ref name=":21" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Schumann |first=Anna |date=2023-11-13 |title=Fact Sheet: The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute |url=https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-the-sino-soviet-border-dispute/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240909112503/https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-the-sino-soviet-border-dispute/ |archive-date=2024-09-09 |access-date=2024-12-30 |website=[[Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation]] |language=en}}</ref>
[[File:Muhammed Ayub Khan and Alexei Kosygin (cropped).jpg|thumb|Alexei Kosygin, Premier of the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1980]]
As a result, the PRC soon entered the phase of war preparation.<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":8">{{Cite web |date=2010-05-23 |title=1969年，苏联欲对中国实施核打击 |trans-title=In 1969, the Soviet Union wanted to launch a nuclear strike on China |url=https://news.sina.com.cn/o/2010-05-23/095817551950s.shtml |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241209060523/https://news.sina.com.cn/o/2010-05-23/095817551950s.shtml |archive-date=2024-12-09 |access-date= |website=[[Sina Corporation|Sina]] |publisher=[[Changsha Evening News]] & Wenshi Cankao (文史参考) |language=zh}}</ref><ref name=":21" /> On September 4, 1969, Soviet diplomat [[Arkady Shevchenko]] told [[Michael Newlin]] that the Chinese wrongly assumed that the Soviets would never use larger-than-[[Tactical nuclear weapon|tactical nuclear weapons]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=1969-09-05 |title=Telegram Exdis Soviet-Chinese relations |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.18.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241205141917/https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.18.pdf |archive-date=2024-12-05 |website=The George Washington University |publisher=[[United States Department of State]]}}</ref> On September 11, 1969, [[Alexei Kosygin]], then [[Premier of the Soviet Union]], briefly met with Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] in Beijing after attending the funeral of [[Ho Chi Minh]] in [[Vietnam]], in order to de-escalate the tension.<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":8" /><ref name=":21" /><ref name=":22" /> On September 16, however, [[Victor Louis (journalist)|Victor Louis]], a Soviet journalist with a [[KGB]] background, again claimed in ''[[The Evening News (London newspaper)|The Evening News]]'' that the Soviet Union might launch a nuclear airstrike against China.<ref name=":9" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":10">{{Cite web |last1=Lewis |first1=John Wilson |author-link1=John Wilson Lewis |last2=Xue |first2=Litai |date=2010-10-26 |title=1969年中国安危系于千钧一发——苏联核袭击计划胎死腹中 |trans-title=In 1969, China's security was at a critical moment——Soviet nuclear attack plan aborted |url=http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK10/cr604.gb.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241202202634/http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK10/cr604.gb.html |archive-date=2024-12-02 |access-date= |website=China News Digest |publisher=Leaders (领导者) |language=zh}}</ref><ref name=":21" /><ref name=":22" /> [[Chiang Kai-shek]], then [[President of the Republic of China]], also recorded numerous outreaches from Victor Louis in 1968 and 1969 on potential cooperation to attack the Communist PRC and re-gain control of [[mainland China]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Tai |first=Paul H. |date=July 2, 2010 |title=The Russia Option |url=https://www.hoover.org/research/russia-option |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220823202656/https://www.hoover.org/research/russia-option |archive-date=2022-08-23 |access-date=2025-01-13 |website=[[Hoover Institution]] |language=en}}</ref> In late September, both the USSR and the PRC went on to conduct nuclear tests, with China successfully conducting its first [[underground nuclear test]] on September 22.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2011 |title=67. Editorial Note |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d67 |url-status=live |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20241103111455/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d67 |archive-date=2024-11-03 |access-date= |website=United States Department of State |language=en}}</ref> The PRC leadership initially anticipated a Soviet attack on October 1, the [[National Day of China|National Day of PRC]], but when the attack did not come, they soon received new classified intelligence and formed another anticipation of October 20, the scheduled starting day of border negotiations with the Soviets.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":21" /><ref name=":22">{{Cite journal |last=Lüthi |first=Lorenz M. |date=2012 |title=Restoring Chaos to History: Sino-Soviet-American Relations, 1969 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23510691 |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=210 |issue=210 |pages=378–397 |doi=10.1017/S030574101200046X |jstor=23510691 |issn=0305-7410}}</ref>

[[File:Tiananmen palace 1967.jpg|thumb|From left to right: [[Zhou Enlai]], Mao Zedong and [[Lin Biao]] (1967). Zhou and Lin were holding the ''[[Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung|Little Red Book]]'' on [[Tiananmen]], at the height of the [[Cultural Revolution]]. ]]

On October 14, 1969, the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]] issued an urgent evacuation order to the [[Party and state leaders]] in Beijing, requiring all leaders to leave Beijing by October 20 (they eventually returned to Beijing in 1971 after the [[Lin Biao incident|Lin Biao Incident]]), with Mao travelling to [[Wuhan]] (returned to Beijing in April 1970) and [[Lin Biao]] travelling to [[Suzhou, Jiangsu|Suzhou]].<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":8" /><ref name=":13">{{Cite web |title=中国共产党大事记·1969年 |trans-title=Major events of the Chinese Communist Party (1969) |url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64164/4416087.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240806101132/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64164/4416087.html |archive-date=2024-08-06 |access-date= |website=[[People's Daily|People's Net]] |language=zh}}</ref> All central government and military agencies were moved to underground nuclear-proof castles in [[Western Hills]] of Beijing, with Zhou Enlai remaining in charge.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":28" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":8" /> On October 17, Lin Biao issued an emergency order to put all [[People's Liberation Army]] personnel on combat alert, and on October 18, Lin's followers released the order as "[[Order Number One (Lin Biao)|Order Number One]]".<ref name=":21" /><ref name=":13" /><ref name=":02">{{Citation |last=Xu |first=Jinzhou |title=9 Analysis of 1969's "Order Number One" |date=2015-01-01 |work=Selected Essays on the History of Contemporary China |pages=168–193 |url=https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789004292673/B9789004292673_010.xml |access-date=2025-01-03 |publisher=Brill |language=en |isbn=978-90-04-29267-3}}</ref> Over 940,000 soldiers, together with more than four thousand planes and over six hundred ships received the evacuation order, while important documents and archives were relocated from Beijing to southwestern China.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":28" /><ref name=":8" />

According to a number of sources, U.S. President [[Richard Nixon]] decided to intervene in the end, and on October 15, the Soviet side was informed that the United States would launch a nuclear attack on approximately 130 cities in the Soviet Union if the latter attacked China.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":11" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":8" /> The U.S. government later confirmed that "the U.S. military, including its nuclear forces, secretly went on alert" in October 1969—known as the ''[[Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test]]'' which culminated in the [[Operation Giant Lance]]—and that Nixon indeed once considered using nuclear weapons.<ref name=":9" /><ref name=":62">{{Cite web |last=Aftergood |first=Steven |date=2011-10-25 |title=Purpose of 1969 Nuclear Alert Remains a Mystery |url=https://fas.org/publication/1969_nuclear_alert/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240912163147/https://fas.org/web/20240912163147/https://fas.org/publication/1969_nuclear_alert/ |archive-date=2024-09-12 |access-date=2025-01-14 |website=[[Federation of American Scientists]] |language=en-US}}</ref> Kissinger recalled in his memoirs that the United States "raised our profile somewhat to make clear that we were not indifferent to these Soviet threats."<ref name=":9" /><ref name=":62" /> Eventually, the Soviet Union abandoned its planned attack on China.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":11" /> Researchers and scholars have also speculated that the U.S. authorities might have ordered a nuclear alert in October 1969 in order to deter a Soviet nuclear or conventional attack on China, and such speculation, according to [[Scott Sagan]] and [[Jeremi Suri]], "appears logically to be the most likely one".<ref name=":62" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":26">{{Cite journal |last1=Sagan |first1=Scott D. |last2=Suri |first2=Jeremi |date=2003 |title=The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137607 |journal=International Security |volume=27 |issue=4 |pages=156–158 |doi=10.1162/016228803321951126 |jstor=4137607 |issn=0162-2889|url-access=subscription }}</ref> However, there were also evidence and arguments that the nuclear alert was Nixon's effort to influence [[Vietnam War|events in North Vietnam]].<ref name=":9" /><ref name=":62" /><ref name=":26" />

Both sides resumed diplomatic negotiations soon afterwards.<ref name=":10" /><ref>{{Cite web |date=July 31, 1970 |title=Untitled Soviet report on Soviet-Chinese negotiations on border issues |url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/untitled-soviet-report-soviet-chinese-negotiations-border-issues?_gl=1%2Anpwnp0%2A_gcl_au%2AMjY2NjE5NTA2LjE3NTU0Njg2MzI.%2A_ga%2AMTc5ODQ3NTYxMi4xNzU1NDY4NjMy%2A_ga_6MDYB7KP94%2AczE3NTU0Njg2MzEkbzEkZzAkdDE3NTU0Njg2MzEkajYwJGwwJGgw |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250817221631/https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/untitled-soviet-report-soviet-chinese-negotiations-border-issues?_gl=1%2Anpwnp0%2A_gcl_au%2AMjY2NjE5NTA2LjE3NTU0Njg2MzI.%2A_ga%2AMTc5ODQ3NTYxMi4xNzU1NDY4NjMy%2A_ga_6MDYB7KP94%2AczE3NTU0Njg2MzEkbzEkZzAkdDE3NTU0Njg2MzEkajYwJGwwJGgw |archive-date=2025-08-17 |website=[[Wilson Center]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=1969-11-10 |title=Intelligence Memorandum Sino-Soviet Border Talks: Problems and Prospects |url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000326154.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250421181101/https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000326154.pdf |archive-date=2025-04-21 |website=[[C.I.A]]}}</ref> In early 1970, the Chinese military eventually lowered their alert level,<ref name=":10" /> but since the late 1960s, the Soviet Union had replaced the US as the primary focus of Chinese nuclear developments.<ref name=":12" /><ref name=":14">{{Cite web |last=Tan |first=Lu |date=2010-02-05 |title=北京地下城往事：毛主席九字方针"深挖洞"(图) |trans-title=Stories of the underground city in Beijing: Chairman Mao's nine-word guideline |url=https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cul/news/2010/02-05/2111098.shtml |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240613053610/https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cul/news/2010/02-05/2111098.shtml |archive-date=2024-06-13 |access-date= |website=[[China News Service]] |publisher=[[Beijing Youth Daily]] |language=zh}}</ref> Throughout the 1970s, aware of the Soviet nuclear threat, the PRC built large-scale underground bomb shelters, such as the [[Underground City (Beijing)|Underground City]] in Beijing, and the military bomb shelters of [[Underground Project 131]], a command center in [[Hubei]], and the [[816 Nuclear Military Plant]], in the [[Fuling District]] of [[Chongqing]].<ref name=":14" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Wang |first=Zhiyong |date=April 15, 2005 |title=Beijing's Underground City |url=http://www.china.org.cn/english/travel/125961.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241211095658/http://www.china.org.cn/english/travel/125961.htm |archive-date=2024-12-11 |access-date=2024-12-30 |website=[[China Internet Information Center]]}}</ref>

=== Military buildup and geopolitical pragmatism ===
[[File:President Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong.jpg|thumb|To counter the USSR, Chairman Mao met with US President Nixon, and established Sino-American rapprochement, in 1972.]]
Since October 1969, the USSR and the PRC had engaged in decade-long diplomatic negotiations over border issues.<ref name=":17">{{Cite web |last=Zhou |first=Xiaopei |title=我看中苏关系近四十年变迁 |trans-title=My view on the Sino-Soviet relation of nearly forty years |url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/68742/112510/112512/6785024.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210609131847/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/68742/112510/112512/6785024.html |archive-date=2021-06-09 |website=[[People's Daily|People's Net]] |language=zh}}</ref> Meanwhile, both sides also continued to increase their military buildup along the border throughout the 1970s.<ref name=":15">{{Cite web |date=December 1982 |title=China Strengthens Its Force on the Soviet Front |url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP03T02547R000101110001-8.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250103202058/https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP03T02547R000101110001-8.pdf |archive-date=2025-01-03 |website=[[CIA]] |page=3}}</ref><ref name=":16">{{Cite web |last=Elleman |first=Bruce |date=1996-04-20 |title=Sino-Soviet Relations and the February 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Conflict |url=https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/events/1996_Symposium/96papers/elleviet.php |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241204064717/https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/events/1996_Symposium/96papers/elleviet.php |archive-date=2024-12-04 |access-date= |website=[[Texas Tech University]]}}</ref> It is estimated that the USSR had placed 1 million to 1.2 million troops along the Soviet-China border (also the Mongolia-China border),<ref name=":15" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Chen |first=Qimao |date=1999 |title=18. Sino-Russian relations after the break-up of the Soviet Union |url=https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI99Chu/SIPRI99Chu18.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231211132323/https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI99Chu/SIPRI99Chu18.pdf |archive-date=2023-12-11 |website=[[SIPRI]]}}</ref> and the PRC had placed as many as 1.5 million troops along the border.<ref name=":16" />

The first diplomatic negotiation took place in Beijing on October 20, 1969, attended by the deputy foreign ministers from both sides.<ref name=":13" /> Despite the border demarcation remaining indeterminate, the meetings restored Sino-Soviet diplomatic communications, which by 1970 allowed Mao to understand that the PRC could not simultaneously fight the US and the USSR while suppressing internal disorders throughout China.<ref name=":17" /> In July 1971, the US advisor for national security, [[Henry Kissinger]], went to Beijing to arrange for President [[Richard Nixon]]'s [[1972 visit by Richard Nixon to China|visit to China]]. Kissinger's Sino-American rapprochement offended the USSR, and Brezhnev then convoked a summit-meeting with Nixon, which re-cast the bi-polar geopolitics of the US-Soviet cold war into the tri-polar geopolitics of the PRC-US-USSR cold war. As relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States improved, so too did relations between the Soviet Union and the by now largely unrecognised Republic of China in Taiwan, although this thaw in diplomatic relations stopped well short of any Soviet official recognition of Taiwan.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Share |first1=M. |date=6 September 2010 |title=From Ideological Foe to Uncertain Friend: Soviet Relations with Taiwan, 1943-82 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713999981 |journal=[[Cold War History (journal)|Cold War History]] |volume=3 |issue=2 |pages=1–34 |doi=10.1080/713999981 |s2cid=154822714 |access-date=15 February 2023|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Concerning the Sino-Soviet disputes about the demarcation of {{convert|4380|km}} of territorial borders, [[Propaganda in the Soviet Union|Soviet propaganda]] agitated against the PRC's complaint about the unequal 1858 [[Treaty of Aigun]] and the 1860 [[Convention of Peking]], which cheated Imperial China of territory and natural resources in the 19th century. To that effect, in the 1972–1973 period, the USSR deleted the Chinese and Manchu place-names – Iman (伊曼, Yiman), Tetyukhe (野猪河, yĕzhūhé), and Suchan – from the map of the [[Russian Far East]], and replaced them with the Russian place-names: [[Dalnerechensk]], [[Dalnegorsk]], and [[Partizansk]], respectively.<ref name=stephan>Stephan, John J. ''The Russian Far East: A History'', Stanford University Press:1996. {{ISBN|0-8047-2701-5}} [https://books.google.com/books?id=Jce4rBWjG5wC Partial text] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160617144953/https://books.google.com/books?id=Jce4rBWjG5wC |date=17 June 2016 }} on Google Books. pp.&nbsp;18–19, 51.</ref><ref>Connolly, Violet ''Siberia Today and Tomorrow: A Study of Economic Resources, Problems, and Achievements'', Collins:1975. [https://books.google.com/books?id=osW5AAAAIAA Snippet view only] on Google Books.</ref> To facilitate social acceptance of such cultural revisionism, the [[Printed media in the Soviet Union|Soviet press]] misrepresented the historical presence of [[Ethnic Chinese in Russia|Chinese people]] – in lands gained by the [[Russian Empire]] – which provoked Russian violence against the local Chinese populations; moreover, politically inconvenient exhibits were removed from museums,<ref name=stephan /> and vandals covered with cement the [[Jurchen script|Jurchen-script]] stele, about the [[Jin dynasty (1115–1234)|Jin dynasty]], in [[Khabarovsk]], some 30 kilometres from the Sino-Soviet border, at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers.<ref>Georgy Permyakov (Георгий ПЕРМЯКОВ) ''The Ancient Tortoise and the Soviet Cement'' ([http://85.114.94.194/page.php?page=1787&date_id_num=2000-04-30&year=2000&month=04&day_id=27 «Черепаха древняя, цемент советский»]{{dead link|date=December 2017 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}), ''Tikhookeanskaya Zvezda'', 30 April 2000</ref>

=== Rivalry in the Third World ===
In the 1970s, the ideological rivalry between the PRC and the USSR extended into the countries of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, where each socialist country funded the vanguardism of the local [[Marxism–Leninism|Marxist–Leninist]] parties and militias. Their political advice, financial aid, and military assistance facilitated the realization of [[wars of national liberation]], such as the [[Ogaden War]] between Ethiopia and Somalia (also linked to the [[Ethiopian Civil War]], [[Somali Rebellion]], and [[Eritrean War of Independence]]); the [[Rhodesian Bush War]] between white European colonists and anti-colonial black natives; the aftermath of the Bush War, the Zimbabwean [[Gukurahundi]] massacres; the [[Angolan Civil War]] between competing national-liberation groups of guerrillas, which proved to be a US–Soviet [[proxy war]]; the [[Mozambican Civil War]]; and the [[Palestinian political violence|guerrilla factions fighting for the liberation of Palestine]]. In [[Thailand]], the pro-Chinese front organizations were based upon the local [[Thai Chinese|Chinese minority population]], and thus proved politically ineffective as a Maoist revolutionary vanguard.<ref>{{cite book|author=Gregg A. Brazinsky|title=Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=t_IxDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA252|year=2017|publisher=University of North Carolina Press|page=252|isbn=9781469631714|access-date=15 October 2017|archive-date=19 August 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200819230458/https://books.google.com/books?id=t_IxDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA252|url-status=live}}</ref>

During the Sino-Soviet split, Vietnam initially sought to balance relations with China on one hand and the USSR on the other.<ref name=":Wang">{{Cite book |last=Wang |first=Frances Yaping |title=The Art of State Persuasion: China's Strategic Use of Media in Interstate Disputes |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9780197757512}}</ref>{{Rp|page=93}} Vietnamese leadership was divided over which of the countries to support.<ref name=":Wang" />{{Rp|page=93}} The pro-Soviet group led by [[Lê Duẩn]] eventually developed momentum, especially as China sought to improve [[China–United States relations|its relations with the United States]], which Vietnamese leadership viewed as a betrayal of the [[China–Vietnam relations|China-Vietnam relationship]].<ref name=":Wang" />{{Rp|page=93}} Vietnam's increasing closeness with the USSR in turn alarmed Chinese leadership, which feared encirclement by the USSR.<ref name=":Wang" />{{Rp|pages=93–94}} This contributed to China's decision to invade Vietnam, beginning the [[Sino-Vietnamese War|1979 Sino-Vietnamese War]].<ref name=":Wang" />{{Rp|pages=93–94}}

=== Occasional cooperation ===
{{see also|International participation in the Vietnam War#Soviet Union|China in the Vietnam War}}
[[File:Nicolae Ceaușescu, Deng Xiaoping & Leonid Brejnev, 1965.jpg|thumb|[[Deng Xiaoping]], [[Nicolae Ceaușescu]] and [[Leonid Brezhnev]] attending the 9th Congress of the [[Romanian Communist Party]] in [[Bucharest]] in July 1965.]]
At times, the "competition" led to the USSR and PRC supporting the same factions in concert, such as when both countries supported [[North Vietnam]] during the [[Vietnam War]]. Both Soviet and Chinese support was vital for the supply of [[NLF and PAVN logistics and equipment|logistics and equipment to the NLF and PAVN]]. Most of the supplies were Soviet, sent through China overland.<ref>{{Cite web|title=The Vietnam War - CCEA - GCSE History Revision - CCEA|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/z8kw3k7/revision/8|access-date=27 July 2021|website=BBC Bitesize|language=en-GB|archive-date=27 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210727024025/https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/z8kw3k7/revision/8|url-status=live}}</ref> Some analyses find that Chinese economic aid was larger than that of the Soviets as early as 1965–1968.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=MEHTA|first=HARISH C.|date=2012|title=Soviet Biscuit Factories and Chinese Financial Grants: North Vietnam's Economic Diplomacy in 1967 and 1968|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/44376154|journal=Diplomatic History|volume=36|issue=2|pages=301–335|doi=10.1111/j.1467-7709.2011.01024.x|jstor=44376154|issn=0145-2096|access-date=27 July 2021|archive-date=27 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210727024025/https://www.jstor.org/stable/44376154|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref> One estimate finds that 1971–1973, the PRC sent the largest amount of aid constituting 90 billion [[Renminbi|yuan]].<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|last=Roberts|first=Priscilla Mary|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=anotqEyBmqQC&pg=PA303|title=Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World Beyond Asia|date=2006|publisher=Stanford University Press|isbn=978-0-8047-5502-3|pages=303–311|language=en|access-date=11 August 2021|archive-date=26 January 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220126034046/https://books.google.com/books?id=anotqEyBmqQC&pg=PA303|url-status=live}}</ref> Soviet supplies flowed freely through China from before 1965 until 1969, when they were cut off. In 1971 however, China encouraged Vietnam to seek more supplies from the Soviet Union.

From 1972, Chinese premier [[Zhou Enlai]] encouraged expeditions of Soviet rail trips, missile shipments, allowed 400 Soviet experts to pass to Vietnam, and on 18 June 1971, reopened Soviet freight in Chinese ports. China then agreed to all Vietnamese requests of allowing Soviet warehouses to store materiel for shipment to Vietnam. The result was a solid and relatively continuous joint support for North Vietnam during the Sino-Soviet split.<ref name=":1" /> However, some of the surmounting Soviet and Chinese tensions would grow into the [[Sino-Vietnamese War]] in 1979.<ref name=":1" />

== After Mao ==
=== Transition from idealism to pragmatism (1976–1978) ===
[[File:Lin Biao.jpg|thumb|right|The elimination of Marshal [[Lin Biao]] in 1971 lessened the political damage caused by Mao's Cultural Revolution and facilitated the PRC's transition to the ''[[Realpolitik]]'' of the Tri-polar Cold War.]]
In 1971, the politically radical phase of the [[Cultural Revolution]] concluded with the failure of [[Project 571]] (the ''coup d'état'' to depose Mao) and the [[Lin Biao incident|death]] of the conspirator Marshal [[Lin Biao]] (Mao's executive officer), who had colluded with the [[Gang of Four]]—[[Jiang Qing]] (Mao's last wife), [[Zhang Chunqiao]], [[Yao Wenyuan]], and [[Wang Hongwen]]—to assume command of the PRC. As reactionary political radicals, the Gang of Four argued for regression to Stalinist ideological orthodoxy at the expense of internal economic development, but soon were suppressed by the PRC's secret intelligence service.<ref name="Yao Wenyuan">{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/obituary/2006/01/12/yao-wenyuan|title=Yao Wenyuan|newspaper=The Economist|issn=0013-0613|access-date=22 May 2016|archive-date=1 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180501231531/https://www.economist.com/node/5381892|url-status=live}}</ref>

The re-establishment of Chinese domestic tranquility ended armed confrontation with the USSR but it did not improve diplomatic relations, because in 1973, the [[Soviet Army]] garrisons at the Sino-Soviet border were twice as large as in 1969. The continued military threat from the USSR&nbsp;prompted the PRC to denounce "Soviet [[social imperialism]]", by accusing the USSR of being an enemy of [[world revolution]].<ref>{{cite journal|first1=Albert|last1=Szymanski|title=Soviet Social Imperialism, Myth or Reality: An Empirical Examination of the Chinese Thesis|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/41035250|journal=Berkeley Journal of Sociology|date=n.d.|issn=0067-5830|pages=131–166|volume=22|jstor=41035250|access-date=7 August 2021|archive-date=2 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602214218/https://www.jstor.org/stable/41035250|url-status=live}}</ref> Mao's statement that "the Soviet Union today is under the [[dictatorship of the bourgeoisie]], a dictatorship of the big bourgeoisie, a dictatorship of the [[Nazism|German fascist]] type, a dictatorship of the Hitler type." was also repeated by China's state press many times in the 1970s, reiterating the diplomatic position.<ref>{{Cite book|title=China and the three worlds : a foreign policy reader|date=2018|others=King C. Chen|isbn=978-1-351-71459-4|location=London [England]|chapter=13|oclc=1110226377}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Salisbury|first=Harrison E.|date=3 May 1970|title=Peril to Chinese-Soviet Talks Is Seen in Diatribes|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1970/05/03/archives/peril-to-chinesesoviet-talks-is-seen-in-diatribes-chinasoviet-talks.html|access-date=29 September 2021|issn=0362-4331|archive-date=29 September 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210929034352/https://www.nytimes.com/1970/05/03/archives/peril-to-chinesesoviet-talks-is-seen-in-diatribes-chinasoviet-talks.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Soviet Union today: socialist or fascist?|url=https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-5/cpml-soviet-fascists.htm|access-date=29 September 2021|website=www.marxists.org|archive-date=12 August 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210812111904/https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-5/cpml-soviet-fascists.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> Sino-Soviet relations would slowly and gradually improve during the 1980s.

Soon after [[Death and state funeral of Mao Zedong|Mao's death]] in September 1976, the Gang of Four were arrested, putting an end to the Cultural Revolution. [[Hua Guofeng]] succeeded as the [[paramount leader of China]], but only briefly.<ref name=":27">{{Cite news |last=Faison |first=Seth |date=1997-02-20 |title=DENG XIAOPING IS DEAD AT 92; ARCHITECT OF MODERN CHINA |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/20/world/deng-xiaoping-is-dead-at-92-architect-of-modern-china.html |access-date=2021-01-12 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> At the [[11th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party]] in summer 1977, the politically rehabilitated [[Deng Xiaoping]] was appointed to manage internal modernization programs, and in December 1978, Deng replaced Hua as the new paramount leader at the [[3rd plenary session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]].<ref name=":27" /><ref>{{Cite news |date=2021-12-07 |title=40 years ago, Deng Xiaoping changed China — and the world |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/12/19/40-years-ago-deng-xiaoping-changed-china-and-the-world/ |access-date=2024-03-14 |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref> Avoiding attacks upon Mao, Deng's political moderation began the realization of [[Chinese economic reform]] by way of systematic reversals of Mao's inefficient policies, and the transition from a [[planned economy]] to a [[socialist market economy]].<ref name="Modern Thought 1999. pp.&nbsp;349">''The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought'', Third Edition, Allan Bullock, Stephen Trombley editors. HarperCollins Publishers:London:1999. pp.&nbsp;349–350.</ref><ref name="Political Terms 1983. pp.&nbsp;127">''Dictionary of Political Terms'', Chris Cook, editor. Peter Bedrick Books: New York: 1983. pp.&nbsp;127–128.</ref>

=== From confrontation to thaw (1978–1989) ===
{{see also|Boluan Fanzheng|Chinese economic reform|New political thinking|Glasnost}}
[[File:Jimmy Carter, Richard Nixon and Deng Xiaoping during the state dinner for the Vice Premier of China. - NARA - 183214.tif|thumb|In January 1979, [[Deng Xiaoping]] met with Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, whom he informed of China's intention to [[Sino-Vietnamese War|attack the Soviet-backed Vietnam]].<ref name=":23">{{Cite web |title=China Policy |url=https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/china-policy |url-status=live |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20250101023730/https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/china-policy |archive-date=2025-01-01 |access-date=2025-01-11 |website=United States Department of State |language=en}}</ref>]]
In 1978, the United States and the PRC began to [[China–United States relations#Normalization|establish diplomatic relations]]. On January 1, 1979, the two countries formally established diplomatic relation, soon followed by [[Visit by Deng Xiaoping to the United States|Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States]], when Deng met with US President [[Jimmy Carter]] and discussed the relations among PRC, USSR and the US.<ref name=":23" /><ref>{{Cite web |title=The Establishment of Sino-U.S. Diplomatic Relations and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States |url=https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zy/wjls/3604_665547/202405/t20240531_11367534.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250111222605/https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zy/wjls/3604_665547/202405/t20240531_11367534.html |archive-date=2025-01-11 |access-date=2025-01-11 |website=[[Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China]]}}</ref> During the visit, Deng informed Carter of China's intention to attack Vietnam, who was backed by the Soviet Union, in response to the [[Cambodian–Vietnamese War#Invasion of Kampuchea|Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia]] which ended the rule of [[Khmer Rouge]] backed by the PRC.<ref name=":23" /><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-01-13 |title=The Chinese Communist Party's Relationship with the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s: An Ideological Victory and a Strategic Failure |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-chinese-communist-partys-relationship-the-khmer-rouge-the-1970s-ideological-victory |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241225015718/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-chinese-communist-partys-relationship-the-khmer-rouge-the-1970s-ideological-victory |archive-date=2024-12-25 |access-date=2025-01-11 |website=[[Wilson Center]] |language=en}}</ref> The Soviet Union provided intelligence and equipment support for Vietnam during the 1979 [[Sino-Vietnamese War]], meanwhile Soviet troops were deployed at the Sino-Soviet and Mongolian-Chinese border as an act of showing support to Vietnam. However, the Soviet Union refused to take any direct action to defend their ally.<ref name=":16" />

In December 1979, the [[Soviet invasion of Afghanistan]] led the Chinese to suspend the talks on normalizing relations with the Soviet Union, which began in September of the same year.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Levine |first1=Steven I. =|date=1980 |title=The Unending Sino-Soviet Conflict |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/45314865 |journal=Current History |volume=79 |issue=459 |pages=70–104 | doi=10.1525/curh.1980.79.459.70 |jstor = 45314865| s2cid=249071971 |access-date=28 March 2022|url-access=subscription }}</ref> China also declared no intention to renew the expired ''[[Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance]]'' in 1979'','' and over the next several years, China trained anti-Soviet [[Afghan mujahideen]] forces and provided them with millions of dollars of weaponry.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Girard |first=Bonnie |title=How 1980 Laid the Groundwork for China's Major Foreign Policy Challenges |url=https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/how-the-1980-laid-the-groundwork-for-chinas-major-foreign-policy-challenges/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241203024229/https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/how-the-1980-laid-the-groundwork-for-chinas-major-foreign-policy-challenges/ |archive-date=2024-12-03 |access-date=2025-01-11 |website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |language=en-US}}</ref> The PRC also joined the [[1980 Summer Olympics boycott|US-led boycott]] of the [[1980 Summer Olympic Games]] in Moscow.<ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=2008-05-08 |title=The Olympic Boycott, 1980 |url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/qfp/104481.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090205234313/https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/qfp/104481.htm |archive-date=2009-02-05 |access-date=2025-01-11 |website=United States Department of State |language=en}}</ref> In the Soviet–Afghan War, China covertly supported the opposing guerillas;<ref>{{cite book |last=Kumar |first=Satish |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gsBcCgAAQBAJ |title=India's National Security: Annual Review 2013 |publisher=Routledge |year=2015 |isbn=9781317324614 |access-date=6 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210625221111/https://books.google.com/books?id=gsBcCgAAQBAJ |archive-date=25 June 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref>{{page needed|date=August 2020}} even before the Soviet deployment, Moscow had accused Peking of using a newly built highway from [[Xinjiang]] to [[Hunza District|Hunza]] in Pakistan to arm Afghan rebels, which China denied.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Phillips |first=James |title=The Heritage Foundation |url=https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/afghanistan-the-soviet-quagmire |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170603073650/http://www.heritage.org/europe/report/afghanistan-the-soviet-quagmire |url-status=unfit |archive-date=3 June 2017 |access-date=2023-01-09 |website=The Heritage Foundation |language=en}}</ref> The KGB and Afghan [[KHAD]] cracked down on many prominent pro-China and anti-Soviet activists and guerillas in 1980.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Afghanistan |url=https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft7b69p12h;chunk.id=0;doc.view=print |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210813153023/https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft7b69p12h;chunk.id=0;doc.view=print |archive-date=13 August 2021 |access-date=5 August 2021 |website=publishing.cdlib.org}}</ref> 
[[File:Mikhail Gorbachev in the White House Library (cropped).jpg|thumb|270x270px|Soviet leader [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] normalized USSR's relation with the PRC in 1989.]]On the other hand, the US-China military cooperation began in 1979 and in 1981 it was revealed that a joint US-China listening post had been operated in [[Xinjiang]] to monitor Soviet missile testing bases.<ref>{{cite web |author=Philip Taubman |date=18 June 1981 |title=U.S. and Peking Join in Tracking Missiles in Soviet Union |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/18/world/us-and-peking-join-in-tracking-missiles-in-soviet.html |access-date=28 March 2022 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref> In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the PRC under Deng went through the [[Boluan Fanzheng]] period and started [[Reform and Opening]] after the Cultural Revolution, pursuing [[Realpolitik]] policies such as ''[[seek truth from facts|seeking truth from facts]]'' and ''[[Socialism with Chinese characteristics]]'', which withdrew the PRC from the high-level abstractions of ideology, [[polemic]] as well as the [[Revisionism (Marxism)|revisionism]] of the USSR, therefore diminishing the political importance of the Sino-Soviet split.<ref name="Modern Thought 1999. pp.&nbsp;349" /><ref name="Political Terms 1983. pp.&nbsp;127" /> In March 1982, then Soviet leader [[Leonid Brezhnev]] delivered a speech in [[Tashkent]], in which he made an appeal for improved relations with the PRC, saying <nowiki>''We remember well the time when the Soviet Union and People'</nowiki>s China were united by bonds of friendship and comradely cooperation."<ref name=":24">{{Cite news |date=1982-11-11 |title=BREZHNEV ATTEMPTED TO ADVANCE SOVIET GOALS THROUGH DETENTE; SOVIET LEADER USED CONSENSUS IN POLITBURO ON DOMESTIC ISSUES |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/11/obituaries/brezhnev-attempted-advance-soviet-goals-through-detente-soviet-leader-used.html |access-date=2025-01-11 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Joshi |first=Nirmala |date=1987 |title=The Sino-Soviet thaw |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23001454 |journal=India International Centre Quarterly |volume=14 |issue=1 |pages=57–69 |jstor=23001454 |issn=0376-9771}}</ref>

In the autumn of 1982, the Sino-Soviet negotiations resumed.<ref name=":24" /> In March 1985, [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] "reaffirmed that the Soviet side would like to have a serious improvement of relations with the PRC".<ref>{{Cite news |last=Mydans |first=Seth |date=1985-03-16 |title=GORBACHEV HINTS TO OPENING TO CHINA |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/16/world/gorbachev-hints-to-opening-to-china.html |access-date=2025-01-12 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> Deng Xiaoping pointed out three major obstacles to normalizing the relation with the USSR: the Soviet Union's support over Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, the Soviet's massive military buildup along Sino-Soviet as well as Sino-Mongolian border, and Soviet's armed occupation of Afghanistan.<ref>{{Cite web |title="End the past and open up the future"-the normalization of relations between China and the Soviet Union |url=https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/wjls/3604_665547/202405/t20240531_11367539.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241210035555/https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/wjls/3604_665547/202405/t20240531_11367539.html |archive-date=2024-12-10 |access-date=2025-01-11 |website=[[Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China]]}}</ref><ref name=":25">{{Cite web |title=Meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping (Excerpts) |url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/meeting-between-mikhail-gorbachev-and-deng-xiaoping-excerpts |url-status=live |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20240529030054/https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/meeting-between-mikhail-gorbachev-and-deng-xiaoping-excerpts |archive-date=2024-05-29 |access-date=2025-01-11 |website=[[Wilson Center]] |language=en}}</ref> The Sino-Soviet relations were finally normalized after [[1989 Sino-Soviet Summit|Mikhail Gorbachev visited China in 1989]] and shook Deng's hand.<ref name=":25" /><ref>{{cite book |last=Lüthi |first=Lorenz |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=NRfWxeBOQ3MC |title=Cold War: The Essential Reference Guide |publisher=ABC-CLIO |year=2012 |isbn=9781610690041 |editor1-last=Arnold |editor1-first=James R. |pages=190–193 |chapter=Sino-Soviet Split (1956–1966) |access-date=19 August 2020 |editor2-last=Wiener |editor2-first=Roberta |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210509164443/https://books.google.com/books?id=NRfWxeBOQ3MC |archive-date=9 May 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> The meeting took place right before the [[Tiananmen Square Massacre]] in June 1989, for which the Soviets expressed diverging opinions at many levels, from the official rhetoric, to media coverage and to the public reaction.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Lukin |first=Alexander |date=1991 |title=The Initial Soviet Reaction to the Events in China in 1989 and the Prospects for Sino-Soviet Relations |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/654480 |journal=The China Quarterly |issue=125 |pages=119–136 |doi=10.1017/S0305741000030332 |jstor=654480 |issn=0305-7410|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

== See also ==
{{Portal|China|Soviet Union|Russia|Communism|Socialism|Politics}}
* [[Anti-Chinese sentiment]]
* [[Anti-Russian sentiment]]
* [[History of the Soviet Union (1953–1964)]]
* [[History of the Soviet Union (1964–1982)]]
* [[History of the Soviet Union (1982–1991)]]
* [[History of the People's Republic of China]]
* [[Sino-Albanian split]]
* [[Sino-American relations]]
* [[Sino-Soviet relations]]
* [[Soviet imperialism]]

== Footnotes ==
{{reflist}}

== Bibliography ==
* {{Cite book |last1=Zubok |first1=Vladislav |title=Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev |last2=Pleshakov |first2=Constantine |publisher=Harvard University Press |year=1996}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Goncharov |first1=Sergei N. |title=Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War |last2=Lewis |first2=John W. |last3=Xue |first3=Litai |publisher=Stanford University Press |year=1993}}
* {{Cite book |last=Clubb |first=O. Edmund |title=China and Russia: The Great Game |publisher=Columbia University Press |year=1972}}
* {{Cite book |last=Kohn |first=George Childs |title=Dictionary of Wars, Third Edition |publisher=Checkmark Books |year=2007}}
* Athwal, Amardeep. "The United States and the Sino-Soviet Split: The Key Role of Nuclear Superiority." ''Journal of Slavic Military Studies'' 17.2 (2004): 271–297.
* Chang, Jung, and Jon Halliday. ''[[Mao: The Unknown Story]]''. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005.
* Ellison, Herbert J., ed. ''The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective'' (1982) [https://www.questia.com/library/101611113/the-sino-soviet-conflict-a-global-perspective online]
* Floyd, David. ''Mao against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict'' (1964) [https://www.questia.com/library/32878/mao-against-khrushchev-a-short-history-of-the-sino-soviet online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200926001909/https://www.questia.com/library/32878/mao-against-khrushchev-a-short-history-of-the-sino-soviet |date=26 September 2020 }}
* Ford, Harold P., "Calling the Sino-Soviet Split " [https://web.archive.org/web/20060811005137/https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/winter98_99/art05.html Calling the Sino-Soviet Split]", ''[[Studies in Intelligence]]'', Winter 1998–99.
* Friedman, Jeremy. "Soviet policy in the developing world and the Chinese challenge in the 1960s." ''Cold War History'' (2010) 10#2 pp.&nbsp;247–272.
* Friedman, Jeremy. ''Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World'' (UNC Press Books, 2015).
* Garver, John W. ''China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic'' (2016) pp 113–45.
* Goh, Evelyn. ''Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From "Red Menace" to "Tacit Ally"'' (Cambridge UP, 2005)
* Heinzig, Dieter. ''The Soviet Union and Communist China, 1945–1950: An Arduous Road to the Alliance'' (M. E. Sharpe, 2004). 
* Jersild, Austin. ''The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History'' (2014) [https://www.questia.com/library/120089427/the-sino-soviet-alliance-an-international-history online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200807085445/https://www.questia.com/library/120089427/the-sino-soviet-alliance-an-international-history |date=7 August 2020 }}
* Jian, Chen. ''Mao's China & the Cold War.'' (U of North Carolina Press, 2001). [https://www.questia.com/library/120089402/mao-s-china-and-the-cold-war online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200807064625/https://www.questia.com/library/120089402/mao-s-china-and-the-cold-war |date=7 August 2020 }}
* Kochavi, Noam. "The Sino-Soviet Split." in ''A Companion to John F. Kennedy'' (2014) pp.&nbsp;366–383.
* Li, Danhui, and Yafeng Xia. "Jockeying for Leadership: Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1961 – July 1964." ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 16.1 (2014): 24–60.
* Lewkowicz, Nicolas. [https://archive.org/details/the-role-of-ideology-in-the-origins-of-the-cold-war ''The Role of Ideology in the Origins of the Cold War''] (Scholar's Press, 2018).
* Li, Hua-Yu et al., eds ''China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present'' (The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series) (2011) [https://www.amazon.com/Learns-Soviet-1949-Present-Harvard-Studies/dp/0739142232/ excerpt and text search]
* Li, Mingjiang. "Ideological dilemma: Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet split, 1962–63." ''Cold War History'' 11.3 (2011): 387–419.
* Lukin, Alexander. ''The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia's Perceptions of China and the Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations Since the Eighteenth Century'' (2002) [https://www.amazon.com/Bear-Watches-Dragon-Perceptions-Russian-Chinese/dp/0765610256 excerpt] 
* {{cite book|author=Lüthi, Lorenz M. |title=The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dl4TRDxqexMC|year=2010|publisher=Princeton UP|isbn=9781400837625}}
* {{cite book|first=Mark|last=Chi-Kwan|title=China and the World since 1945: An International History|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0oioAgAAQBAJ|series=The Making of the Contemporary World|chapter=Chapter 4: Ideological Radicalization and the Sino-Soviet split|publisher=Routledge|year=2013|isbn=9781136644771}}
* Olsen, Mari. ''Soviet-Vietnam Relations and the Role of China 1949–64: Changing Alliances'' (Routledge, 2007)
* Ross, Robert S., ed. ''China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War'' (1993) [https://www.questia.com/library/77420976/china-the-united-states-and-the-soviet-union-tripolarity online]
* {{cite journal | last1 = Scalapino | first1 = Robert A | year = 1964 | title = Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa | journal = Foreign Affairs | volume = 42 | issue = 4| pages = 640–654 | jstor=20029719| doi = 10.2307/20029719 }}
* [[Shen Zhihua|Shen, Zhihua]], and Yafeng Xia. "The great leap forward, the people's commune and the Sino-Soviet split." Journal of contemporary China 20.72 (2011): 861–880.
* Wang, Dong. "The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a Reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959–1962." ''Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series'' 2005) [https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/WP49DW_rev.pdf online].
* Westad, Odd Arne, ed. ''Brothers in arms: the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance, 1945–1963'' (Stanford UP. 1998)
* Zagoria, Donald S. ''The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961'' (Princeton UP, 1962), major scholarly study.

=== Primary sources ===
* {{cite journal | last1 = Luthi | first1 = Lorenz M. | year = 2008 | title = Twenty-Four Soviet-Bloc Documents on Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1964–1966 |journal = Cold War International History Project Bulletin | volume = 16 |pages = 367–398 }}
* [Bao] Sansan and [[Bette Bao Lord]] (1964/1966), ''Eighth Moon: The True Story of a Young Girl's Life in Communist China'', reprint, New York: Scholastic, Ch. 9, pp.&nbsp;120–124. [summary of lectures to cadres on Sino-Soviet split]. 
* Prozumenshchikov, Mikhail Yu. "The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives." ''Cold War International History Project Bulletin'' (1996) 8#9 pp.&nbsp;1996–1997. [https://web.archive.org/web/20140429183544/http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/Cuba_and_SinoIndian_conflict.pdf online]

== External links ==
{{Library resources box}}
* [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.browse&sort=Collection&item=Sino-Soviet%20Split The CWIHP Document Collection on the Sino-Soviet Split] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605132936/http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.browse&sort=Collection&item=Sino-Soviet%20Split |date=5 June 2011 }}
* [http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/index.htm The Great Debate: Documents of the Sino-Soviet Split] at Marxists Internet Archive

{{Cold War}}
{{Soviet Union topics}}
{{Authority control}}

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