View source for Space Shuttle Challenger disaster

{{Short description|1986 breakup of U.S. Space Shuttle}}
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{{italic title|string=Challenger}}
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{{Use American English|date=January 2014}}
{{Use mdy dates|date=November 2024}}
{{Infobox event
| title           = Space Shuttle ''Challenger'' disaster
| image           = Challenger explosion.jpg
| image_upright   = 1.35
| alt             =
| caption         = ''Challenger''{{'s}} [[Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster|solid rocket boosters]] fly uncontrollably after the breakup of the [[Space Shuttle External Tank|external tank]] separated them from the shuttle stack. The remains of the orbiter and tank leave thin white trails as they fall toward the Atlantic Ocean.
| date            = {{start date and age|1986|01|28}}
| time            = 16:39:13&nbsp;[[Coordinated Universal Time|UTC]] (11:39:13&nbsp;[[Eastern Time Zone|EST]])
| place           = [[Atlantic Ocean]], off the coast of [[Florida]]
| coordinates     = {{coord|28|38|24|N|80|16|48|W|region:US-FL_type:event_scale:1500000|display=title,inline}}
| mapframe-zoom = 5
| cause = [[O-ring]] seal failure in right [[Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster|SRB]] due to cold weather and wind shear
| reported deaths = {{Indented plainlist|
* [[Dick Scobee]], commander
* [[Michael J. Smith]], pilot
* [[Ronald McNair]], mission specialist
* [[Ellison Onizuka]], mission specialist
* [[Judith Resnik]], mission specialist
* [[Gregory Jarvis]], payload specialist
* [[Christa McAuliffe]], payload specialist, teacher
}}
|inquiries        = [[Rogers Commission Report]]
|outcome          = {{unbulleted indent list
 | Loss of ''Challenger'' and crew
 | [[Teacher in Space Project]] and subsequent civilian shuttle spaceflights cancelled
 | Shuttle fleet grounded for implementation of safety measures
 | Construction of replacement orbiter ''[[Space Shuttle Endeavour|Endeavour]]''
}}
}}

On January 28, 1986, [[Space Shuttle Challenger|Space Shuttle ''Challenger'']] broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, killing all seven crew members aboard. The spacecraft disintegrated {{convert|46000|ft|km}} above the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of [[Cape Canaveral]], Florida, at 16:39:13{{nbsp}}[[Coordinated Universal Time|UTC]] (11:39:13{{nbsp}}a.m. [[Eastern Time Zone|EST]], local time at the launch site). It was the first fatal accident involving an [[List of space programs of the United States|American spacecraft]] while in flight.<ref>{{cite web |last=Lotito |first=Jennifer |date=January 27, 2024 |title=3 Leadership Lessons From The Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/jenniferlotito/2024/01/27/3-leadership-lessons-from-the-challenger-space-shuttle-disaster/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240128103856/https://www.forbes.com/sites/jenniferlotito/2024/01/27/3-leadership-lessons-from-the-challenger-space-shuttle-disaster/ |archive-date=January 28, 2024 |access-date=January 28, 2024 |website=Forbes}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |date=January 28, 2024 |title=Challenger explosion was 38 years ago today; Naples' readers recall event |url=https://www.naplesnews.com/story/life/2024/01/28/naples-residents-recall-challenger-explosion-38-years-ago-on-jan-28/72096453007/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240128104057/https://www.naplesnews.com/story/life/2024/01/28/naples-residents-recall-challenger-explosion-38-years-ago-on-jan-28/72096453007/ |archive-date=January 28, 2024 |access-date=January 28, 2024 |website=Naples Daily News |language=en-US}}</ref>

The mission, designated [[STS-51-L]], was the 10th flight for the [[Space Shuttle orbiter|orbiter]] and the 25th flight of the Space Shuttle fleet. The crew was scheduled to deploy a commercial communications satellite and study [[Halley's Comet]] while they were in orbit, in addition to taking schoolteacher [[Christa McAuliffe]] into space under the [[Teacher in Space Project]]. The latter task resulted in a higher-than-usual media interest in and coverage of the mission; the launch and subsequent disaster were seen live in many schools across the United States.

The cause of the disaster was the failure of the primary and secondary [[O-ring]] seals in a joint in the right [[Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster]] (SRB). The record-low temperatures on the morning of the launch had stiffened the rubber O-rings, reducing their ability to seal the joints. Shortly after liftoff, the seals were breached, and hot pressurized gas from within the SRB leaked through the joint and burned through the aft attachment strut connecting it to the [[Space Shuttle external tank|external propellant tank]] (ET), then into the tank itself. The [[Structural integrity and failure|collapse]] of the ET's internal structures and the rotation of the SRB that followed propelled the shuttle stack, traveling at a speed of [[Mach number|Mach]] 1.92, into a direction that allowed [[aerodynamic force]]s to tear the orbiter apart. Both SRBs detached from the now-destroyed ET and continued to fly uncontrollably until the [[range safety]] officer destroyed them.

The crew compartment, containing human remains, and many other fragments from the shuttle were recovered from the ocean floor after a three-month search and recovery operation. The exact timing of the deaths of the crew is unknown, but several crew members are thought to have survived the initial breakup of the spacecraft. The orbiter had no [[Launch escape system|escape system]], and the impact of the crew compartment at [[terminal velocity]] with the ocean surface was too violent to be survivable.

The disaster resulted in a 32-month hiatus in the [[Space Shuttle program]]. President [[Ronald Reagan]] created the [[Rogers Commission Report|Rogers Commission]] to investigate the accident. The commission criticized [[NASA]]'s organizational culture and decision-making processes that had contributed to the accident. Test data since 1977 had demonstrated a potentially catastrophic flaw in the SRBs' O-rings, but neither NASA nor SRB manufacturer [[Morton Thiokol]] had addressed this known defect. NASA managers also disregarded engineers' warnings about the dangers of launching in low temperatures and did not report these technical concerns to their superiors.

As a result of this disaster, NASA established the Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance, and arranged for deployment of commercial satellites from [[expendable launch vehicles]] rather than from a crewed orbiter. To replace ''Challenger'', the construction of a new Space Shuttle orbiter,{{OV|105|full=no}}, was approved in 1987, and the new orbiter first flew in 1992. Subsequent missions were launched with redesigned SRBs and their crews wore [[Advanced Crew Escape Suit|pressurized suits]] during ascent and [[Atmospheric entry|reentry]].

== Background ==
=== Space Shuttle ===
{{main|Space Shuttle}}
[[File:STS-51-L - Space Shuttle Challenger on the Crawler-Transporter.jpg|thumb|[[Space Shuttle]] ''[[Space Shuttle Challenger|Challenger]]'' – assembled for launch along with the [[Space Shuttle external tank|ET]] and two [[Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster|SRBs]] – atop a [[crawler-transporter]] en route to the launch pad about one month before the disaster]]
The [[Space Shuttle]] was a partially reusable spacecraft operated by the US [[NASA|National Aeronautics and Space Administration]] (NASA).{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|pages=5, 195}} It [[STS-1|flew for the first time]] in April 1981,{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|pages=III–24}} and was used to conduct in-orbit research,{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|pages=III–188}} and deploy commercial,{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|pages=III–66}} military,{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|pages=III–68}} and scientific payloads.{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|pages=III–148}} At launch, it consisted of the [[Space Shuttle orbiter|orbiter]], which contained the [[List of Space Shuttle crews|crew]] and payload, the [[Space Shuttle external tank|external tank]] (ET), and the two [[Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster|solid rocket boosters]] (SRBs).<ref name=jenkins>{{cite book |last=Jenkins |first=Dennis R. |title=Space Shuttle: The History of the National Space Transportation System |publisher=Voyageur Press |year=2001 |isbn=978-0-9633974-5-4}}</ref>{{rp|page=363}} The orbiter was a reusable, winged vehicle that launched vertically and landed as a glider.{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|pages=|page=II-1}} Five orbiters were built during the [[Space Shuttle program]].{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|5}} ''Challenger'' (OV-099) was the second orbiter constructed after its conversion from a structural [[Test article (aerospace)|test article]].{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|page=I-455}} The orbiter contained the crew compartment, where the crew predominantly lived and worked throughout a mission.{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|page=II-5}} Three [[Space Shuttle main engines]] (SSMEs) were mounted at the aft end of the orbiter and provided thrust during launch.{{r|jenkins}}{{rp|page=II-170}} Once in space, the crew maneuvered using the two smaller, aft-mounted [[Orbital Maneuvering System]] (OMS) engines.{{r|jenkins}}{{rp|page=II-79}}

When it launched, the orbiter was connected to the [[Space Shuttle external tank|ET]], which held the fuel for the SSMEs.{{r|jenkins}}{{rp|page=II-222}} The ET consisted of a larger tank for liquid hydrogen (LH2) and a smaller tank for liquid oxygen (LOX), both of which were required for the SSMEs to operate.{{r|jenkins}}{{rp|pages=II-222, II-226}} After its fuel had been expended, the ET separated from the orbiter and reentered the atmosphere, where it would break apart during reentry and its pieces would land in the [[Indian Ocean|Indian]] or [[Pacific Ocean]].{{r|jenkins}}{{rp|page=II-238}}

Two solid rocket boosters (SRBs), built by [[Thiokol|Morton Thiokol]] at the time of the disaster,{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|pages=9–10}} provided the majority of thrust at liftoff. They were connected to the external tank, and burned for the first two minutes of flight.{{r|jenkins}}{{rp|page=II-222}} The SRBs separated from the orbiter once they had expended their fuel and fell into the [[Atlantic Ocean]] under a parachute.{{r|jenkins}}{{rp|page=II-289}} NASA retrieval teams recovered the SRBs and returned them to the [[Kennedy Space Center]] (KSC), where they were disassembled and their components were reused on future flights.{{r|jenkins}}{{rp|page=II-292}} Each SRB was constructed in four main sections at the factory in Utah and transported to KSC, then assembled in the [[Vehicle Assembly Building]] at KSC with three [[Clevis fastener|tang-and-clevis]] field joints, each joint consisting of a tang from the upper segment fitting into the clevis of the lower segment. Each field joint was sealed with two ~20 foot (6 meter) diameter [[FKM|Viton-rubber]] O-rings around the circumference of the SRB and had a cross-section diameter of {{convert|0.280|in|mm}}.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=48}} The O-rings were required to contain the hot, high-pressure gases produced by the burning solid propellant and allowed for the SRBs to be rated for crewed missions.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|page=24}}<ref name="heppenheimer1998">{{cite book |last=Heppenheimer |first=T.A. |title=The Space Shuttle Decision: NASA's Search for a Reusable Space Vehicle |url=https://history.nasa.gov/SP-4221.pdf |url-status=live |publisher=NASA |id=SP-4221 |year=1998 |access-date=July 19, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210812050335/http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4221.pdf |archive-date=August 12, 2021}}</ref>{{rp|page=420}} The two O-rings were configured to create a double bore seal, and the gap between segments was filled with putty. When the motor was running, this configuration was designed to compress air in the gap against the upper O-ring, pressing it against the sealing surfaces of its seat. On the SRB Critical Items List, the O-rings were listed as Criticality 1R, which indicated that an O-ring failure could result in the destruction of the vehicle and loss of life, but it was considered a redundant system due to the secondary O-ring.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=126}}

=== O-ring concerns ===
[[File:RogersCommission-v1p57 cropped.jpg|thumb|Cross-sectional diagram of the original SRB field joint. The top end of the lower rocket segment has a deep U-shaped cavity, or [[clevis]], along its circumference. The bottom end of the top segment extends to form a tang that fits snugly into the clevis of the bottom segment. Two parallel grooves near the top of the clevis inner branch hold ~20 foot (6 meter) diameter O-rings that seal the gap between the tang and the clevis, keeping hot gases out of the gap. |alt=Diagram from the Rogers Commission depicting a cross-section of the solid rocket booster field joint]]
Evaluations of the proposed SRB design in the early 1970s and field joint testing showed that the wide tolerances between the mated parts allowed the O-rings to be [[extrusion|extruded]] from their seats rather than compressed. This extrusion was judged to be acceptable by NASA and Morton Thiokol despite concerns of NASA's engineers.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|pages=122–123}}<ref name="IEEE1987-39">{{cite journal |title=The history of the flawed joint |journal=IEEE Spectrum |date=1987 |volume=24 |issue=2 |pages=39–44 |doi=10.1109/MSPEC.1987.6448025 |s2cid=26828360 |issn = 0018-9235 }}</ref> A 1977 test showed that up to {{convert|0.052|in|mm}} of joint rotation occurred during the simulated internal pressure of a launch. Joint rotation, which occurred when the tang and clevis bent away from each other, reduced the pressure on the O-rings, which weakened their seals and made it possible for combustion gases to erode the O-rings.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|pages=123–124}} NASA engineers suggested that the field joints should be redesigned to include [[Shim (spacer)|shims]] around the O-rings, but they received no response.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|pages=124–125}} In 1980, the NASA Verification/Certification Committee requested further tests on joint integrity to include testing in the temperature range of {{convert|40|to|90|F|C}} and with only a single O-ring installed. The NASA program managers decided that their current level of testing was sufficient and further testing was not required. In December{{nbsp}}1982, the Critical Items List was updated to indicate that the secondary O-ring could not provide a backup to the primary O-ring, as it would not necessarily form a seal in the event of joint rotation. The O-rings were redesignated as Criticality{{nbsp}}1, removing the "R" to indicate it was no longer considered a redundant system.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|pages=125–127}}{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|page=66}}

The first occurrence of in-flight O-ring erosion occurred on the right SRB on {{nowrap|[[STS-2]]}} in November{{nbsp}}1981.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=126}} In August{{nbsp}}1984, a post-flight inspection of the left SRB on {{nowrap|[[STS-41-D]]}} revealed that soot had blown past the primary O-ring and was found in between the O-rings. Although there was no damage to the secondary O-ring, this indicated that the primary O-ring was not creating a reliable seal and was allowing hot gas to pass. The amount of O-ring erosion was insufficient to prevent the O-ring from sealing, and investigators concluded that the soot between the O-rings resulted from non-uniform pressure at the time of ignition.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=130}}{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|pages=39–42}} The January{{nbsp}}1985 launch of {{nowrap|[[STS-51-C]]}} was the coldest Space Shuttle launch to date. The air temperature was {{convert|62|F|C|sigfig=2}} at the time of launch, and the calculated O-ring temperature was {{convert|53|F|C|sigfig=2}}. Post-flight analysis revealed erosion in primary O-rings in both SRBs. Morton Thiokol engineers determined that the cold temperatures caused a loss of flexibility in the O-rings that decreased their ability to seal the field joints, which allowed hot gas and soot to flow past the primary O-ring.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|page=47}} O-ring erosion occurred on all but one ({{nowrap|[[STS-51-J]]}}) of the Space Shuttle flights in 1985, and erosion of both the primary and secondary O-rings occurred on {{nowrap|[[STS-51-B]]}}.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=131}}{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|pages=50–52, 63}}

To correct the issues with O-ring erosion, engineers at Morton Thiokol, led by [[Allan J. McDonald|Allan McDonald]] and [[Roger Boisjoly]], proposed a redesigned field joint that introduced a metal lip to limit movement in the joint. They also recommended adding a spacer to provide additional thermal protection and using an O-ring with a larger cross section.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|pages=67−69}} In July{{nbsp}}1985, Morton Thiokol ordered redesigned SRB casings, with the intention of using already-manufactured casings for the upcoming launches until the redesigned cases were available the following year.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|page=62}}
[[File:Challenger flight 51-l crew.jpg|thumb|[[STS-51-L]] crew: (back) [[Ellison Onizuka|Onizuka]], [[Christa McAuliffe|McAuliffe]], [[Gregory Jarvis|Jarvis]], [[Judith Resnik|Resnik]];

(front) [[Michael J. Smith (astronaut)|Smith]], [[Dick Scobee|Scobee]], [[Ronald McNair|McNair]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Tonguette |first=Peter |date=January 23, 2024 |title='Ohioans in Space' painting features Neil Armstrong, John Glenn, Jim Lovell, Judith Resnik |url=https://www.dispatch.com/story/entertainment/arts/2024/01/23/ohioans-in-space-painting-features-armstrong-glenn-lovell-and-rkey-ohio-figures-in-the-space-program/72309552007/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240128101726/https://www.dispatch.com/story/entertainment/arts/2024/01/23/ohioans-in-space-painting-features-armstrong-glenn-lovell-and-rkey-ohio-figures-in-the-space-program/72309552007/ |archive-date=January 28, 2024 |access-date=January 28, 2024 |website=The Columbus Dispatch}}</ref>|alt=Picture of the seven crew members in flight suits and holding their helmets]]

=== Mission ===
{{main|STS-51-L}}
The Space Shuttle mission, named {{nowrap|STS-51-L}}, was the twenty-fifth Space Shuttle flight and the tenth flight of{{OV|099|full=no}}.<ref name="rogers_com">{{cite web |last1=Rogers |first1=William P. |author1-link=William P. Rogers |last2=Armstrong |first2=Neil A. |author2-link=Neil Armstrong |last3=Acheson |first3=David C. |author3-link=David Campion Acheson |last4=Covert |first4=Eugene E. |author4-link=Eugene E. Covert |last5=Feynman |first5=Richard P. |author5-link=Richard Feynman |last6=Hotz |first6=Robert B. |last7=Kutyna |first7=Donald J. |author7-link=Donald Kutyna |last8=Ride |first8=Sally K. |author8-link=Sally Ride |last9=Rummel |first9=Robert W. |date=June 6, 1986 |title=Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident |url=https://sma.nasa.gov/SignificantIncidents/assets/rogers_commission_report.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201018005636/https://sma.nasa.gov/SignificantIncidents/assets/rogers_commission_report.pdf |archive-date=October 18, 2020 |access-date=July 13, 2021 |publisher=NASA |last10=Sutter |first10=Joseph F. |author10-link=Joe Sutter |last11=Walker |first11=Arthur B.C. |author11-link=Arthur B. C. Walker Jr. |last12=Wheelon |first12=Albert D. |last13=Yeager |first13=Charles E. |author13-link=Chuck Yeager |volume=1}}</ref>{{rp|page=6}} The crew was announced on January{{nbsp}}27,{{nbsp}}1985, and was commanded by [[Dick Scobee]]. [[Michael J. Smith (astronaut)|Michael Smith]] was assigned as the pilot, and the [[mission specialist]]s were [[Ellison Onizuka]], [[Judith Resnik]], and [[Ronald McNair]]. The two [[payload specialist]]s were [[Gregory Jarvis]], who was assigned to conduct research for the [[Hughes Aircraft Company]], and [[Christa McAuliffe]], who flew as part of the [[Teacher in Space Project]].<ref name=rogers_com />{{rp|pages=10–13}}

The primary mission of the ''Challenger'' crew was to use an [[Inertial Upper Stage]] (IUS) to deploy [[TDRS-B]], a tracking and data relay satellite. The crew also planned to study [[Halley's Comet]] as it passed near the Sun,{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|page=III-76}} and deploy and retrieve a SPARTAN satellite.<ref name="sts51l_profile">{{cite web
  | last = Dunbar
  | first = Brian
  | title = STS-51L Mission Profile
  | publisher = NASA
  | date = August 7, 2017
| url = https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/shuttlemissions/archives/sts-51L.html
  | access-date = November 3, 2021
| archive-date = May 5, 2017
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170505145220/https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/shuttlemissions/archives/sts-51L.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref>

The mission was originally scheduled for July{{nbsp}}1985, but was delayed to November and then to January{{nbsp}}1986.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=10}} The mission was scheduled to launch on January{{nbsp}}22, but was delayed until January 28.<ref name=launch_delay_NYT>{{cite news |last=Broad |first=William J. |title=24-Hour Delay Called for Shuttle Flight As Wind And Balky Bolt Bar Launching |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/28/science/24-hour-delay-called-for-shuttle-flight-as-wind-and-balky-bolt-bar-launching.html |url-status=live |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=January 28, 1986 |access-date=July 13, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210716103656/https://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/28/science/24-hour-delay-called-for-shuttle-flight-as-wind-and-balky-bolt-bar-launching.html |archive-date=July 16, 2021}}</ref>

== Decision to launch ==
The air temperature on January 28 was predicted to be a record low for a Space Shuttle launch.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|pages=47, 101}} The air temperature was forecast to drop to {{convert|18|F|C|}} overnight before rising to {{convert|22|F|C|}} at 6:00{{spaces}}a.m. and {{convert|26|F|C|}} at the scheduled launch time of 9:38{{spaces}}a.m.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=87}}{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|page=96}} Based upon O-ring erosion that had occurred in warmer launches, Morton Thiokol engineers were concerned over the effect the record-cold temperatures would have on the seal provided by the SRB O-rings for the launch.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|pages=101–103}} Cecil Houston, the manager of the KSC office of the [[Marshall Space Flight Center]] in Alabama, set up a three-way conference call with Morton Thiokol in Utah and the KSC in Florida on the evening of January 27 to discuss the safety of the launch. Morton Thiokol engineers expressed their concerns about the effect of low temperatures on the resilience of the rubber O-rings. As the colder temperatures lowered the elasticity of the rubber O-rings, the engineers feared that the O-rings would not be extruded to form a seal at the time of launch.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|pages=97–99}}<ref name="berkes20120206">{{cite news | url=https://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/02/06/146490064/remembering-roger-boisjoly-he-tried-to-stop-shuttle-challenger-launch | title=Remembering Roger Boisjoly: He Tried To Stop Shuttle Challenger Launch | work=All Things Considered | date=February 6, 2012 | access-date=July 27, 2021 | last=Berkes | first=Howard | publisher=NPR | archive-date=April 30, 2015 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150430062751/http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/02/06/146490064/remembering-roger-boisjoly-he-tried-to-stop-shuttle-challenger-launch | url-status=live }}</ref> The engineers argued that they did not have enough data to determine whether the O-rings would seal at temperatures colder than {{convert|53|F|C}}, the coldest launch of the Space Shuttle to date.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|pages=105–106}} During this discussion, Lawrence Mulloy, the NASA SRB project manager,{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|page=3}} said that he did not accept the analysis behind this decision, and demanded to know if Morton Thiokol expected him to wait until April for warmer temperatures.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|pages=104}} Morton Thiokol employees Robert Lund, the Vice President of Engineering, and Joe Kilminster, the Vice President of the Space Booster Programs, recommended against launching until the temperature was above {{convert|53|F|C}}.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|pages=107–108}}

[[File:Icicles on the Launch Tower - GPN-2000-001348.jpg|thumb|Ice on the launch tower hours before ''Challenger'' launch|alt=The underside of the orbiter wing and the SRB behind the structure of the service tower. The service tower has numerous icicles.]]
When the teleconference prepared to hold a recess to allow for private discussion amongst Morton Thiokol management, [[Allan J. McDonald]], Morton Thiokol's Director of the Space Shuttle SRM Project who was sitting at the KSC end of the call,{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|pages=110}} reminded his colleagues in Utah to examine the interaction between delays in the primary O-rings sealing relative to the ability of the secondary O-rings to provide redundant backup, believing this would add enough to the engineering analysis to get Mulloy to stop accusing the engineers of using inconclusive evidence to try and delay the launch.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|pages=105}} When the call resumed, Morton Thiokol leadership had changed their opinion and stated that the evidence presented on the failure of the O-rings was inconclusive and that there was a substantial margin in the event of a failure or erosion. They stated that their decision was to proceed with the launch. When McDonald told Mulloy that, as the onsite representative at KSC he would not sign off on the decision, Mulloy demanded that Morton Thiokol provide a signed recommendation to launch; Kilminster confirmed that he would sign it and [[fax]] it from Utah immediately, and the teleconference ended.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|pages=97, 109–110}} Mulloy called Arnold Aldrich, the NASA Mission Management Team Leader, to discuss the launch decision and weather concerns, but did not mention the O-ring discussion; the two agreed to proceed with the launch.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=99}}{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|page=116}}

An overnight measurement taken by the KSC Ice Team recorded the left SRB was {{convert|25|F|C|}} and the right SRB was {{convert|8|F|C|}}.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=111}} These measurements were recorded for engineering data and not reported, because the temperature of the SRBs was not part of the [[Launch commit criteria|Launch Commit Criteria]].{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|page=118}} In addition to its effect on the O-rings, the cold temperatures caused ice to form on the [[fixed service structure]]. To keep pipes from freezing, water was slowly run from the system; it could not be entirely drained because of the upcoming launch. As a result, ice formed from {{convert|240|ft|m}} down in the freezing temperatures. Engineers at [[Rockwell International]], which manufactured the orbiter, were concerned that ice would be violently thrown during launch and could potentially damage the orbiter's [[Space Shuttle thermal protection system|thermal protection system]] or be aspirated into one of the engines.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v5part2.htm|title=Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle ''Challenger'' Accident|publisher=[[NASA]]|volume=5|location=R. Petrone, B. Glaysher, M. Cioffoletti and A. Martin|date=June 6, 1986|chapter=TESTIMONY OF ROCCO PETRONE, PRESIDENT, SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS DIVISION, NORTH AMERICAN SPACE OPERATIONS, ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL; BOB GLAYSHER, VICE PRESIDENT AND PROGRAM MANAGER, ORBITER OPERATIONS SUPPORT, ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL; MARTIN CIOFFOLETTI, VICE PRESIDENT, SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL; AL MARTIN, SITE DIRECTOR, LAUNCH SUPPORT OPERATIONS, KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL|access-date=January 27, 2025|archive-date=December 12, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241212132627/https://www.nasa.gov/history/rogersrep/v5part2.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Rocco Petrone]], the head of Rockwell's space transportation division, and his team determined that the potential damage from ice made the mission unsafe to fly. Arnold Aldrich consulted with engineers at KSC and the [[Johnson Space Center]] (JSC) who advised him that ice did not threaten the safety of the orbiter, and he decided to proceed with the launch.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|pages=115–118}} The launch was delayed for an additional hour to allow more ice to melt. The ice team performed an inspection at T−20 minutes which indicated that the ice was melting, and ''Challenger'' was cleared to launch at 11:38&nbsp;a.m. EST, with an air temperature of {{convert|36|F|C|}}.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=17}}

== Launch and failure ==
{{Further|Timeline of the STS-51-L mission}}

=== Liftoff and initial ascent ===
[[File:STS-51-L grey smoke on SRB.jpg|thumb|Gray smoke escaping from the right-side [[Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster|solid rocket booster]]|alt=The Space Shuttle immediately following liftoff, from the viewpoint near the right SRB. Gray smoke is apparent around the SRB.]]
At T+0, ''Challenger'' launched from the [[Kennedy Space Center Launch Complex 39B]] (LC-39B) at 11:38:00{{nbsp}}a.m.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=17}}<ref name="jenkins2016">{{cite book |last= Jenkins |first= Dennis R. |title= Space Shuttle: Developing an Icon – 1972–2013|isbn=978-1-58007-249-6 |publisher= Specialty Press |date= 2016}}</ref>{{rp|pages=III–76}} Beginning at T+0.678 until T+3.375 seconds, nine puffs of dark gray smoke were recorded escaping from the right-hand SRB near the [[aft]] strut that attached the booster to the [[Space Shuttle external tank|ET]].{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=19}}{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|page=III-93}} It was later determined that these smoke puffs were caused by joint rotation in the aft field joint of the right-hand SRB at ignition.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|page=136}}

The cold temperature in the joint had prevented the O-rings from creating a seal. Rainfall from the preceding time on the launchpad had likely accumulated within the field joint, further compromising the sealing capability of the O-rings. As a result, hot gas was able to travel past the O-rings and erode them. Molten [[Aluminium oxide|aluminum oxides]] from the burned propellant unintentionally resealed the joint and created a temporary barrier against further hot gas and flame escaping through the field joint.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|page=142}} The [[Space Shuttle main engines]] (SSMEs) were throttled down as scheduled for [[max q|maximum dynamic pressure (max q)]].<ref name=jenkins2016 />{{rp|pages=III–8–9}}{{r|timeline}} During its ascent, the Space Shuttle encountered [[wind shear]] conditions beginning at {{nowrap|T+37}}, but they were within design limits of the vehicle and were countered by the guidance system.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=20}}

=== Plume ===
[[File:Booster Rocket Breach - GPN-2000-001425.jpg|thumb|Plume on right SRB at {{nowrap|T+58.788}} seconds|alt=Space Shuttle challenger in-flight with an anomalous plume of fire from the side of its right solid rocket booster]]
At {{nowrap|T+58.788}}, a tracking film camera captured the beginnings of a [[plume (hydrodynamics)|plume]] near the aft attach strut on the right SRB, right before the vehicle passed through max q at {{nowrap|T+59.000}}.<ref name="timeline">{{cite web|url=https://www.cbsnews.com/network/news/space/home/memorial/51l.html|title=STS-51L|publisher=CBS News|date=2015|last=Harwood|first=William|access-date=July 29, 2021|archive-date=June 11, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210611125941/http://www.cbsnews.com/network/news/space/home/memorial/51l.html|url-status=live}}</ref> The high aerodynamic forces and wind shear likely broke the unintentional aluminum oxide seal that had replaced eroded O-rings, allowing the flame to burn through the joint.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|page=142}} Within one second from when it was first recorded, the plume became well-defined, and the enlarging hole caused a drop in internal pressure in the right SRB. A leak had begun in the [[liquid hydrogen]] (LH2) tank of the ET at {{nowrap|T+64.660}}, as indicated by the changing shape of the plume.{{r|timeline}}

The SSMEs pivoted to compensate for the booster burn-through, which was creating an unexpected thrust on the vehicle. The pressure in the external LH2 tank began to drop at {{nowrap|T+66.764}} indicating that the flame had burned from the SRB into the tank. The crew and flight controllers made no indication they were aware of the vehicle and flight anomalies. At {{nowrap|T+68}}, the [[Capsule communicator|CAPCOM]], [[Richard O. Covey]], told the crew, "''Challenger'', go at throttle up," indicating that the SSMEs had throttled up to 104% thrust.{{refn|group=note|The RS-25 engines had several improvements to enhance reliability and power. During the development program, [[Rocketdyne]] determined that the engine was capable of safe, reliable operation at 104% of the originally specified thrust. To keep the engine thrust values consistent with previous documentation and software, NASA kept the originally specified thrust at 100%, but had the RS-25 operate at higher thrust.<ref name="shuttle_manual">{{cite book |last=Baker |first=David |author-link=David Baker (author) |title=NASA Space Shuttle: Owners' Workshop Manual |publisher=[[Haynes Manual]] |year= 2011 |location=Somerset, UK |isbn=978-1-84425-866-6}}</ref>{{rp|106–107}}}} In response to Covey, Scobee said, "Roger, go at throttle up"; this was the last communication from ''Challenger'' on the air-to-ground loop.{{r|timeline}}

=== Vehicle breakup ===
[[File:NASA STS 51L Challenger.gif|thumb|The explosion of Space Shuttle Challenger, taken from the TV-3 camera]]

At {{nowrap|T+72.284}}, the right SRB pulled away from the aft strut that attached it to the ET, causing lateral acceleration that was felt by the crew. At the same time, pressure in the LH2 tank began dropping. Pilot Mike Smith said "Uh-oh," which was the last crew comment recorded. At {{nowrap|T+73.124}}, white vapor was seen flowing away from the ET, after which the aft dome of the LH2 tank fell off. The resulting release and ignition of all liquid hydrogen in the tank pushed the LH2 tank forward into the [[liquid oxygen]] (LOX) tank with a force equating to roughly {{Convert|3000000|lbf|MN|abbr=off}}, while the right SRB collided with the intertank structure.<ref name="timeline"/> The failure of the LH2 and LOX tanks resulted in a type of explosion known as [[boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion]] (BLEVE), one where a large part of the liquefied gas evaporates almost instantly.<ref name="Leiber">{{cite book |last=Leiber |first=Carl-Otto |title=Assessment of Safety and Risk with a Microscopic Model of Detonation |publisher=[[Elsevier|Elsevier Science]] |year=2003 |isbn=978-0-444-51332-8 |location=Amsterdam, The Netherlands |pages=305 |doi=10.1016/B978-0-444-51332-8.X5000-9}}</ref>{{Reference page|page=305}}

These events resulted in an abrupt change to the shuttle stack's attitude and direction,<ref name="Breakup" /> which was shrouded from view by the vaporized contents of the now-destroyed ET. As it traveled at [[Mach number|Mach]] 1.92, ''Challenger'' took aerodynamic forces it was not designed to withstand and broke into several large pieces: a wing, the (still firing) main engines, the crew cabin and hypergolic fuel leaking from the ruptured [[reaction control system]] were among the parts identified exiting the vapor cloud. The disaster unfolded at an altitude of {{convert|46000|ft|km}}.{{r|timeline}}{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=21}} Both SRBs survived the breakup of the shuttle stack and continued flying, now unguided by the attitude and trajectory control of their mothership, until their [[Range safety#Flight termination system|flight termination systems]] were activated at {{nowrap|T+110}}.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=30}}

=== Post-breakup flight controller dialogue ===
[[File:STS-51L riadiace stredisko.jpg|thumb|[[Jay Greene]] after ''Challenger''{{'s}} breakup|alt=View along the computers banks in the mission control center and a flight controller sitting in front of a terminal]]
At {{nowrap|T+73.191}}, there was a burst of static on the air-to-ground loop as the vehicle broke up, which was later attributed to ground-based radios searching for a signal from the destroyed spacecraft. NASA Public Affairs Officer Steve Nesbitt was initially unaware of the explosion and continued to read out flight information. At {{nowrap|T+89}}, after video of the explosion was seen in [[Christopher C. Kraft Jr. Mission Control Center|Mission Control]], the [[Flight controller#Ground controller (GC)|Ground Control Officer]] reported "negative contact (and) loss of [[Telecommunications link#Downlink|downlink]]" as they were no longer receiving transmissions from ''Challenger''.{{r|timeline}}
Nesbitt stated, "Flight controllers here are looking very carefully at the situation. Obviously a major malfunction. We have no downlink." Soon afterwards, he said, "We have a report from the Flight Dynamics Officer that the vehicle has exploded. The flight director confirms that. We are looking at checking with the recovery forces to see what can be done at this point."{{r|timeline}}

In Mission Control, flight director [[Jay Greene]] ordered that contingency procedures be put into effect,{{r|timeline}} which included locking the doors, shutting down telephone communications, and freezing computer terminals to collect data from them.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|page=122}}

=== Cause and time of death ===
[[File:Challenger breakup cabin.jpg|thumb|The forward section of the fuselage after breakup, indicated by the arrow|alt=A trapezoidal gray section of the shuttle among several plumes of smoke and vapor against the blue sky]]
The crew cabin, which was made of reinforced aluminum, separated in one piece from the rest of the orbiter.<ref name="Breakup">{{cite web |last=Barbree |first=Jay |author-link=Jay Barbree |date=January 1997 |title=Chapter 5: An eternity of descent |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna3078062 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200923225813/http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3078062 |archive-date=September 23, 2020 |access-date=October 31, 2020 |publisher=[[NBC News]]}}</ref> It then traveled in a [[External ballistics|ballistic arc]], reaching an [[apogee]] of {{convert|65000|ft|km}} approximately 25 seconds after the explosion. At the time of separation, the maximum acceleration is estimated to have been between 12 and 20 times that of gravity ([[g-force|g]]). Within two seconds it had dropped below 4{{nbsp}}g, and within ten seconds the cabin was in [[free fall]]. The forces involved at this stage were probably insufficient to cause major injury to the crew.<ref name=kerwin />

At least some of the crew were alive and conscious after the breakup, as [[Personal Egress Air Pack]]s (PEAPs) were activated for Smith{{r|Mullane}}{{rp|page=246}} and two unidentified crewmembers, but not for Scobee.<ref name=kerwin /> The PEAPs were not intended for in-flight use, and the astronauts never trained with them for an in-flight emergency. The location of Smith's activation switch, on the back side of his seat, indicated that either Resnik or Onizuka likely activated it for him. Investigators found their remaining unused air supply consistent with the expected consumption during the post-breakup trajectory.{{r|Mullane}}{{rp|pages=245–247}}

While analyzing the wreckage, investigators discovered that several electrical system switches on Smith's right-hand panel had been moved from their usual launch positions. The switches had lever locks on top of them that must be pulled out before the switch could be moved. Later tests established that neither the force of the explosion nor the impact with the ocean could have moved them, indicating that Smith made the switch changes, presumably in a futile attempt to restore electrical power to the cockpit after the crew cabin detached from the rest of the orbiter.<ref name=Mullane>{{cite book |last=Mullane |first=Mike |author-link=Mike Mullane |title=Riding Rockets: The Outrageous Tales of a Space Shuttle Astronaut |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8X7ceB3QEWkC&pg=PA245 |url-status=live |publisher=Simon and Schuster |year=2006 |access-date=December 31, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200612234655/https://books.google.com/books?id=8X7ceB3QEWkC&pg=PA245 |archive-date=June 12, 2020 |isbn=978-0-7432-7682-5}}</ref>{{rp|page=245}}

On July 28, 1986, NASA's Associate Administrator for Space Flight, former astronaut [[Richard H. Truly]], released a report on the deaths of the crew from physician and [[Skylab 2]] astronaut [[Joseph P. Kerwin]]:<ref name="kerwin"/>
{{blockquote|The findings are inconclusive. The impact of the crew compartment with the ocean surface was so violent that evidence of damage occurring in the seconds which followed the disintegration was masked. Our final conclusions are:
* the cause of death of the ''Challenger'' astronauts cannot be positively determined;
* the forces to which the crew were exposed during Orbiter breakup were probably not sufficient to cause death or serious injury; and
* the crew possibly, but not certainly, lost consciousness in the seconds following Orbiter breakup due to in-flight loss of crew module pressure.<ref name="kerwin"/>}}

Pressurization could have enabled consciousness for the entire fall until impact. The crew cabin hit the ocean surface at {{convert|207|mph|km/h|abbr=on}} approximately two minutes and 45 seconds after breakup. The estimated deceleration was {{val|200|u=g}}, far exceeding structural limits of the crew compartment or crew survivability levels. The mid-deck floor had not suffered buckling or tearing, as would result from a rapid decompression, but stowed equipment showed damage consistent with decompression, and debris was embedded between the two forward windows that may have caused a loss of pressure. Impact damage to the crew cabin was severe enough that it could not be determined whether the crew cabin had previously been damaged enough to lose pressurization.<ref name="kerwin">{{cite web |last=Kerwin |first=Joseph P. |author-link=Joseph P. Kerwin |title=Joseph P. Kerwin to Richard H. Truly |date=July 28, 1986 |url=https://history.nasa.gov/kerwin.html|publisher=NASA |access-date=August 2, 2021 |archive-date=January 3, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130103015825/https://history.nasa.gov/kerwin.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Prospect of crew escape ===
{{further-text|[[Space Shuttle abort modes#Ejection escape systems|Shuttle ejection escape systems]], [[Space Shuttle abort modes#Post-Challenger abort enhancements|Post-''Challenger'' abort enhancements]]}}
Unlike other spacecraft, the Space Shuttle did not allow for crew escape during powered flight. Launch escape systems had been considered during development, but NASA's conclusion was that the Space Shuttle's expected high reliability would preclude the need for one.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=181}} Modified [[Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird|SR-71 Blackbird]] ejection seats and full [[pressure suit]]s were used for the two-person crews on the first four Space Shuttle orbital test flights, but they were disabled and later removed for the operational flights.{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|page=II-7}} Escape options for the operational flights were considered but not implemented due to their complexity, high cost, and heavy weight.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=181}} After the disaster, a system was implemented to allow the crew to escape in [[gliding flight]], but this system would not have been usable to escape an explosion during ascent.<ref name=recommendation_7>{{cite web |title=Implementation of the Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Recommendation VII |date=June 1987 |url=https://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v6ch6.htm |publisher=NASA |access-date=August 3, 2021 |archive-date=February 24, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210224162050/https://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v6ch6.htm |url-status=live}}</ref>

== Recovery of debris and crew ==
Immediately after the disaster, the NASA Launch Recovery Director launched the two SRB recovery ships, [[MV Freedom Star|MV ''Freedom Star'']] and [[MV Liberty Star|MV ''Liberty Star'']], to proceed to the impact area to recover debris, and requested the support of US military aircraft and ships. Owing to falling debris from the explosion, the RSO kept recovery forces from the impact area until 12:37{{nbsp}}p.m. The size of the recovery operations increased to 12 aircraft and 8 ships by 7:00{{nbsp}}p.m. Surface operations recovered debris from the orbiter and external tank. The surface recovery operations ended on February{{nbsp}}7.<ref name="rogers o">{{cite book| last=O'Connor, Jr. |first = Edward A.| title=Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident.| chapter=Volume 3, Appendix O: NASA Search, Recovery and Reconstruction Task Force Team Report| date=June 6, 1986| chapter-url=https://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v3appo.htm| access-date=August 5, 2021| archive-date=March 1, 2021| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210301132927/https://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v3appo.htm| url-status=live}}</ref>

On January{{nbsp}}31, the [[United States Navy|US Navy]] was tasked with submarine recovery operations.{{r|usn_salvage_report}}{{rp|page=5}} The search efforts prioritized the recovery of the right SRB, followed by the crew compartment, and then the remaining payload, orbiter pieces, and ET.{{r|usn_salvage_report}}{{rp|page=16}} The search for debris formally began on February{{nbsp}}8 with the [[rescue and salvage ship]] {{USS|Preserver|ARS-8|6}}, and eventually grew to sixteen ships, of which three were managed by NASA, four by the [[United States Navy|US Navy]], one by the [[United States Air Force|US Air Force]] and eight by independent contractors.{{r|usn_salvage_report}}{{rp|pages=4–5}} The surface ships used [[side-scan sonar]] to make the initial search for debris and covered {{convert|486|sqnmi|km2}} at water depths between {{convert|70|ft|sp=us}} and {{convert|1200|ft|sp=us}}.<ref name=usn_salvage_report>{{cite web | url=https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/SUPSALV/SalvageReports/Space%20Shuttle%20Challenger.pdf | title=Space Shuttle Challenger Salvage Report | date=April 29, 1988 | department=Department of the Navy | publisher=Direction of Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command | access-date=July 19, 2021 | archive-date=September 1, 2021 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210901092830/https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/SUPSALV/SalvageReports/Space%20Shuttle%20Challenger.pdf | url-status=live }}</ref>{{rp|page=24}} The sonar operations discovered 881 potential locations for debris, of which 187 pieces were later confirmed to be from the orbiter.{{r|usn_salvage_report}}{{rp|page=24}}

[[File:STS-51-L Recovered Debris (Burn Marks on the SRM) - GPN-2004-00004.jpg|thumb|Right SRB debris showing the hole caused by the plume|alt=The field joint of a solid rocket booster on the deck of a ship with a large hole in it]]
The debris from the SRBs was widely distributed due to the detonation of their linear shaped charges. The identification of SRB material was primarily conducted by crewed submarines and submersibles. The vehicles were dispatched to investigate potential debris located during the search phase.{{r|usn_salvage_report}}{{rp|page=32}} Surface ships lifted the SRB debris with the help of [[Technical diving|technical divers]] and underwater remotely operated vehicles to attach the necessary slings to raise the debris with cranes.{{r|usn_salvage_report}}{{rp|pages=37, 42}} The solid propellant in the SRBs posed a risk, as it became more volatile after being submerged. Recovered portions of the SRBs were kept wet during recovery, and their unused propellant was ignited once they were brought ashore. The failed joint on the right SRB was first located on sonar on March{{nbsp}}1. Subsequent dives to {{convert|560|ft|m|abbr=on}} by the {{ship|American submarine|NR-1||2}} submarine on April{{nbsp}}5 and the SEA-LINK I submersible on April{{nbsp}}12 confirmed that it was the damaged field joint,{{r|usn_salvage_report}}{{rp|page=42}} and it was successfully recovered on April{{nbsp}}13. Of the {{convert|196726|lbs|kg|abbr=on}} of both SRB shells, {{convert|102500|lbs|kg|abbr=on}} was recovered, another {{convert|54000|lbs|kg|abbr=on}} was found but not recovered, and {{convert|40226|lbs|kg|abbr=on}} was never found.{{r|usn_salvage_report}}{{rp|page=44}}

On March 7, Air Force divers identified potential crew compartment debris, which was confirmed the next day by divers from the USS ''Preserver''.{{r|usn_salvage_report}}{{rp|page=51}}<ref name=msnbc_remains>{{cite web |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna3078060 |title=Chapter 6: Raising heroes from the sea |publisher=NBC News |last=Barbree |first=Jay |date=January 25, 2004 |access-date=August 9, 2021 |archive-date=June 5, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190605131432/http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3078060/ns/technology_and_science-space/t/chapter-raising-heroes-sea/ |url-status=live}}</ref> The damage to the crew compartment indicated that it had remained largely intact during the initial explosion but was extensively damaged on impacting the ocean.{{r|rogers o}} The remains of the crew were badly damaged from impact and submersion, and were not intact bodies.<ref name=wp_remains>{{cite news |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/25/AR2006012501455.html |title=Remains of Crew Of Shuttle Found |newspaper=The Washington Post |last=Isikoff |first=Michael |date=March 10, 1986 |access-date=August 9, 2021 |archive-date=February 11, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210211023548/https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/25/AR2006012501455.html |url-status=live}}</ref> The USS ''Preserver'' made multiple trips to return debris and remains to port, and continued crew compartment recovery until April{{nbsp}}4.{{r|usn_salvage_report}}{{rp|page=51}} During the recovery of the remains of the crew, [[Gregory Jarvis|Jarvis]]'s body floated away and was not located until April{{nbsp}}15, several weeks after the other remains had been positively identified.{{r|msnbc_remains}}<ref name="schmidt_recovery">{{cite web |last=Schmidt |first=William E. |title=All Shuttle Crew Remains Recovered, NASA Says |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/20/us/all-shuttle-crew-remains-recovered-nasa-says.html |url-status=live |work=The New York Times |date=April 20, 1986 |access-date=August 9, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210715084809/https://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/20/us/all-shuttle-crew-remains-recovered-nasa-says.html |archive-date=July 15, 2021}}</ref> Once remains were brought to port, [[pathologists]] from the [[Armed Forces Institute of Pathology]] worked to identify the human remains, but could not determine the exact cause of death for any of them.{{r|wp_remains}}{{r|kerwin}} [[Medical examiner]]s in [[Brevard County, Florida|Brevard County]] disputed the legality of transferring human remains to US military officials to conduct autopsies, and refused to issue the [[death certificates]]; NASA officials ultimately released the death certificates of the crew members.<ref name="wp_autopsy">{{cite news |title=Shuttle Crew Said to Have Survived Blast |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/11/13/shuttle-crew-said-to-have-survived-blast/bd5281d0-1e05-417e-89bc-7ec64fa9477e/ |url-status=live |newspaper=The Washington Post |date=November 12, 1988 |access-date=August 11, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200818031739/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/11/13/shuttle-crew-said-to-have-survived-blast/bd5281d0-1e05-417e-89bc-7ec64fa9477e/ |archive-date=August 18, 2020}}</ref>

The IUS that would have been used to boost the orbit of the TDRS-B satellite was one of the first pieces of debris recovered.{{r|usn_salvage_report}}{{rp|page=51}} There was no indication that there had been premature ignition of the IUS, which had been one of the suspected causes for the disaster.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=50}} Debris from the three SSMEs was recovered from February{{nbsp}}14 to{{nbsp}}28,{{r|usn_salvage_report}}{{rp|page=51}} and post-recovery analysis produced results consistent with functional engines suddenly losing their LH2 fuel supply.{{r|rogers o}} Deepwater recovery operations continued until April{{nbsp}}29, with smaller scale, shallow recovery operations continuing until August{{nbsp}}29.{{r|usn_salvage_report}}{{rp|page=51}} On December 17, 1996, two pieces of the orbiter were found at [[Cocoa Beach, Florida|Cocoa Beach]].<ref name="cnn_debris">{{cite news |date=December 17, 1996 |title=Shuttle Challenger debris washes up on shore |url=http://www.cnn.com/TECH/9612/17/challenger.debris/index.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160806053827/http://www.cnn.com/TECH/9612/17/challenger.debris/index.html |archive-date=August 6, 2016 |access-date=July 15, 2021 |work=[[CNN]]}}</ref> On November 10, 2022, NASA announced that a {{convert|20|ft|m|adj=on|0}} piece of the shuttle had been found near the site of a destroyed World War II-era aircraft off the coast of Florida.<ref>{{cite news |title=Divers discover Challenger space shuttle debris |language=en-GB |publisher=[[BBC News]] |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-63597343 |access-date=November 11, 2022 |archive-date=November 11, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221111105450/https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-63597343 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Dunn |first=Marcia |title=Section of destroyed shuttle Challenger found on ocean floor |url=https://apnews.com/article/challenger-space-shuttle-found-in-ocean-064e47171452894d6494f142fea26126 |publisher=[[AP News]] |access-date=November 10, 2022 |date=November 10, 2022 |archive-date=November 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221110170420/https://apnews.com/article/challenger-space-shuttle-found-in-ocean-064e47171452894d6494f142fea26126 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Bardan |first=Roxana |date=November 10, 2022 |title=NASA Views Images, Confirms Discovery of Shuttle Challenger Artifact |url=http://www.nasa.gov/feature/nasa-views-images-confirms-discovery-of-shuttle-challenger-artifact |access-date=November 11, 2022 |website=NASA |archive-date=November 11, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221111005227/https://www.nasa.gov/feature/nasa-views-images-confirms-discovery-of-shuttle-challenger-artifact/ |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last=Diaz |first=Jaclyn |title=A piece of the wrecked 1986 Challenger space shuttle was found off Florida's coast |url=https://www.npr.org/2022/11/11/1135806581/challenger-space-shuttle-piece-history-channel |access-date=November 13, 2022 |publisher=[[NPR]] |date=November 11, 2022 |archive-date=November 13, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221113051344/https://www.npr.org/2022/11/11/1135806581/challenger-space-shuttle-piece-history-channel |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Evans |first1=Greg |title=Long-Missing Space Shuttle Challenger Wreckage Found On Ocean Floor By History Channel Filmmakers, Nasa Confirms |url=https://deadline.com/2022/11/space-shuttle-challenger-wreckage-nasa-history-channel-discovery-1235169282/ |access-date=November 13, 2022 |agency=[[Deadline Hollywood]] |date=November 10, 2022 |archive-date=November 13, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221113145014/https://deadline.com/2022/11/space-shuttle-challenger-wreckage-nasa-history-channel-discovery-1235169282/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The discovery was aired on the [[History Channel]] on November 22, 2022.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Television |first1=Hearst |title=Artifact from Space Shuttle Challenger found on ocean floor, NASA confirms |url=https://www.chron.com/news/article/Artifact-from-Space-Shuttle-Challenger-found-on-17577508.php |access-date=November 13, 2022 |agency=[[Houston Chronicle]] |date=November 11, 2022 |archive-date=November 13, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221113145010/https://www.chron.com/news/article/Artifact-from-Space-Shuttle-Challenger-found-on-17577508.php |url-status=live }}</ref> Almost all recovered non-organic debris from ''Challenger'' is buried in [[Cape Canaveral Space Force Station]] [[missile silo]]s at [[Cape Canaveral Launch Complex 31|LC-31]] and [[Cape Canaveral Launch Complex 32|LC-32]].<ref name="challenger_burial">{{cite web
  | last = Peralman
  | first = Robert Z.
  | title = NASA Exhibits Space Shuttles ''Challenger'', ''Columbia'' Debris for First Time
  | publisher = Space.com
  | date = June 29, 2015
| url = https://www.space.com/29794-space-shuttles-challenger-columbia-debris-exhibit.html
  | access-date = August 13, 2021
| archive-date = August 13, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210813072633/https://www.space.com/29794-space-shuttles-challenger-columbia-debris-exhibit.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref>

=== Funeral ceremonies ===
On April 29, 1986, the astronauts' remains were transferred on a [[Lockheed C-141 Starlifter|C-141 Starlifter]] aircraft from Kennedy Space Center to the military mortuary at [[Dover Air Force Base]] in [[Delaware]]. Their caskets were each draped with an American flag and carried past an [[Guard of honour|honor guard]] and followed by an astronaut escort.<ref name="nyt_remains_transfer">{{cite web
  | last = Schmidt
  | first = William E.
  | title = Bodies of Astronauts Flown to Delaware
  | work = The New York Times
  | date = April 30, 1986
| url = https://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/30/us/bodies-of-astronauts-flown-to-delaware.html
  | access-date = July 15, 2021
| archive-date = June 28, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210628113529/https://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/30/us/bodies-of-astronauts-flown-to-delaware.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> After the remains arrived at Dover Air Force Base, they were transferred to the families of the crew members.{{r|nyt_remains_transfer}} Scobee and Smith were buried at [[Arlington National Cemetery]].{{r|arlington_challenger}} Onizuka was buried at the [[National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific]] in [[Honolulu]], Hawaii.<ref name=onizuka_burial>{{cite web
  | title = National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific
  | work = National Cemetery Administration
  | publisher = U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
  | date = April 23, 2021
| url = https://www.cem.va.gov/cems/nchp/nmcp.asp#np
  | access-date = July 15, 2021
| archive-date = January 26, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210126093940/https://www.cem.va.gov/cems/nchp/nmcp.asp#np
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> McNair was buried in Rest Lawn Memorial Park in Lake City, South Carolina,<ref name="rest_lawn_nyt">{{cite web
  | last = Clendinen
  | first = Dudley
  | title = Astronaut Buried in Caroline; 35-Year 'Mission' is Complete
  | work = The New York Times
  | date = May 18, 1986
| url = https://www.nytimes.com/1986/05/18/obituaries/astronaut-buried-in-carolina-35-year-mission-is-complete.html
  | access-date = July 15, 2021
| archive-date = August 29, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210829185236/https://www.nytimes.com/1986/05/18/obituaries/astronaut-buried-in-carolina-35-year-mission-is-complete.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> but his remains were later moved within the town to the Dr. Ronald E. McNair Memorial Park.<ref name=discover_south_caroline>{{cite web
  | title = Dr. Ronald E. McNair Memorial
  | publisher = SC Department of Parks, Recreation and Tourism
  | date = 2021
  | url = https://discoversouthcarolina.com/products/26303
  | access-date = July 15, 2021
| archive-date = July 1, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210701054714/https://discoversouthcarolina.com/products/26303
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref><ref name=sc_picture_project>{{cite web
  | title = Ronald E. McNair Memorial Park
  | publisher = South Carolina Picture Project
  | date = 2021
  | url = https://www.scpictureproject.org/florence-county/ronald-e-mcnair-memorial-park.html
  | access-date = July 15, 2021
| archive-date = July 1, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210701205304/https://www.scpictureproject.org/florence-county/ronald-e-mcnair-memorial-park.html
  | url-status = live
}}</ref> Resnik was cremated and her ashes were scattered over the water.<ref>{{cite web |title= Some Fear Learning How Loved Ones Died : Crew Discovery Upsets Shuttle Kin |work=Los Angeles Times|date=March 16, 1986 |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-03-16-mn-26573-story.html|access-date=February 11, 2024
}}</ref> McAuliffe was buried at Calvary Cemetery in [[Concord, New Hampshire]].<ref name=mcauliffe_burial>{{cite web
  | title = McAuliffe's Grave on a Hillside Overlooks City Where She Taught
  | work = The Los Angeles Times
  | date = May 2, 1986
| url = https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-05-02-mn-3074-story.html
  | access-date = July 15, 2021
| url-access = subscription
  | archive-date = July 15, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210715080307/https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-05-02-mn-3074-story.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> Jarvis was cremated, and his ashes were scattered in the [[Pacific Ocean]].<ref name=jarvis_ashes>{{cite web
  | title = Looking back: Greg Jarvis' dream remembered
  | publisher = [[Daily Breeze]]
  | date = January 28, 2011
| url = https://www.dailybreeze.com/2011/01/28/looking-back-greg-jarvis-dream-remembered/
  | access-date = July 15, 2021
| archive-date = July 15, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210715114956/https://www.dailybreeze.com/2011/01/28/looking-back-greg-jarvis-dream-remembered/
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> Unidentified crew remains were buried at the Space Shuttle ''Challenger'' Memorial in Arlington on May 20, 1986.<ref name="arlington_challenger">{{cite web
  | title = Space Shuttle Challenger Memorial
  | publisher = Arlington National Cemetery
  | date = 2021
  | url = https://www.arlingtoncemetery.mil/Explore/Monuments-and-Memorials/Space-Shuttle-Challenger
  | access-date = July 15, 2021
| archive-date = June 28, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210628205941/https://www.arlingtoncemetery.mil/Explore/Monuments-and-Memorials/Space-Shuttle-Challenger
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref>

== Public response ==

=== White House response ===
[[File:President Ronald Reagan's Speech on Space Shuttle Challenger, January 28, 1986.webm|thumb|President Ronald Reagan's Speech on Space Shuttle Challenger, January 28, 1986]]
[[President of the United States|President]] [[Ronald Reagan]] had been scheduled to give the [[1986 State of the Union Address]] on January{{nbsp}}28,{{nbsp}}1986, the evening of the ''Challenger'' disaster. After a discussion with his aides, Reagan postponed the State of the Union, and instead addressed the nation about the disaster from the [[Oval Office]].<ref>{{cite book|title=Words of a Century: The Top 100 American Speeches, 1900–1999 |first1=Stephen E. |last1=Lucas |first2=Martin J. |last2=Medhurst |isbn=978-0-19-516805-1 |year= 2008 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | publisher=Ronald Reagan Presidential Library | url=https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-explosion-space-shuttle-challenger | title= Address to the Nation on the Explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger | date=January 28, 1986 | access-date=July 29, 2021 | archive-date=March 22, 2021 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210322210340/https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-explosion-space-shuttle-challenger | url-status=live }}</ref> On January{{nbsp}}31, Ronald and [[Nancy Reagan]] traveled to the Johnson Space Center to speak at a memorial service honoring the crew members. During the ceremony, an Air Force band sang "[[God Bless America]]" as NASA [[Northrop T-38 Talon|T-38 Talon]] jets flew directly over the scene in the traditional [[missing man formation|missing-man formation]].<ref name="BWeintraub">{{cite news |author=Weintraub |first=Bernard |date=February 1, 1986 |title=Reagan Pays Tribute to 'Our 7 Challenger Heroes' |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/01/us/reagan-pays-tribute-to-our-challenger-heroes.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170201045658/http://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/01/us/reagan-pays-tribute-to-our-challenger-heroes.html |archive-date=February 1, 2017 |access-date=February 12, 2017 |work=The New York Times |page=A1}}</ref>

[[File:President Ronald Reagan and Nancy Reagan and families of the "Challenger" victims at the memorial service for the space shuttle crew in Houston Texas.jpg|thumb|President Reagan and [[First Lady of the United States|First Lady]] Nancy Reagan (left) at the memorial service on January 31, 1986|alt=A group of spectators at a funeral]]

Soon after the disaster, US politicians expressed concern that White House officials, including [[White House Chief of Staff|Chief of Staff]] [[Donald Regan]] and [[White House Communications Director|Communications Director]] [[Pat Buchanan]], had pressured NASA to launch ''Challenger'' before the scheduled January 28 State of the Union address, because Reagan had planned to mention the launch in his remarks.<ref name="nyt_sotu">{{cite web |last=Boyd |first=Gerald M. |title=White House Finds no Pressure to Launch |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/04/us/white-house-finds-no-pressure-to-launch.html |url-status=live |work=The New York Times |date=April 4, 1986 |access-date=August 11, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210811120627/https://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/04/us/white-house-finds-no-pressure-to-launch.html |archive-date=August 11, 2021}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{cite web |last=Hunt |first=Terence |title=NASA Suggested Reagan Hail Challenger Mission in State of Union |url=https://apnews.com/00a395472559b3afcd22de473da2e65f |url-status=live |publisher=Associated Press |date=March 13, 1986 |access-date=August 24, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210830132858/https://apnews.com/00a395472559b3afcd22de473da2e65f |archive-date=August 30, 2021}}</ref> In March 1986, the White House released a copy of the original State of the Union speech. In that speech, Reagan had intended to mention an [[X-ray]] experiment launched on ''Challenger'' and designed by a guest he had invited to the address, but he did not further discuss the ''Challenger'' launch.<ref name=":1" /><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ith7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA283|title=Ronald Reagan and the Space Frontier|last=Logsdon|first=John M.|year=2018 |publisher=Springer|isbn=978-3-319-98962-4|pages=283|access-date=November 21, 2020|archive-date=February 4, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210204125449/https://books.google.com/books?id=Ith7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA283|url-status=live}}</ref> In the rescheduled State of the Union address on February 4, Reagan mentioned the deceased ''Challenger'' crew members and modified his remarks about the X-ray experiment as "launched and lost".<ref name="1986_sotu_transcript">{{cite web|url=https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-joint-session-congress-state-union-1986|title=Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union – 1986|access-date=July 19, 2021|date=February 4, 1986|last=Reagan|first=Ronald|author-link=Ronald Reagan|publisher=Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum|archive-date=July 19, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210719065002/https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-joint-session-congress-state-union-1986|url-status=live}}</ref> In April{{nbsp}}1986, the White House released a report that concluded there had been no pressure from the White House for NASA to launch ''Challenger'' prior to the State of the Union.{{r|nyt_sotu}}

=== Media coverage ===
Nationally televised live coverage of the launch and explosion was provided by [[CNN]].<ref name="cnn_coverage">{{cite web |last=Escobedo |first=Tricia |title=When a national disaster unfolded live in 1986 |publisher=CNN |date=March 31, 2016 |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/31/us/80s-cnn-challenger-coverage/index.html |access-date=August 27, 2021 |archive-date=August 27, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210827110908/https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/31/us/80s-cnn-challenger-coverage/index.html |url-status=live}}</ref> To promote the Teacher in Space program with McAuliffe as a crewmember, NASA had arranged for many students in the US to view the launch live at school with their teachers.{{r|cnn_coverage}}<ref name="children">{{cite journal |last1=Wright |first1=John C. |last2=Kunkel |first2=Dale |last3=Pinon |first3=Marites |last4=Huston |first4=Aletha C. |date=Spring 1989 |title=How Children Reacted to Televised Coverage of the Space Shuttle Disaster |journal=Journal of Communication |publisher=International Communication Association |volume=39 |issue=2 |page=27 |doi=10.1111/j.1460-2466.1989.tb01027.x}}</ref> Other networks, such as [[CBS News|CBS]], soon cut in to their affiliate feeds to broadcast continuous coverage of the disaster and its aftermath.<ref name="SpaceflightNowHarwood">{{cite web |last1=Harwood |first1=William |title=Reporters remember Challenger coverage |url=https://spaceflightnow.com/2016/01/27/reporters-remember-challenger-coverage/ |website=Spaceflight Now |access-date=July 22, 2024 |date=January 27, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240303093434/https://spaceflightnow.com/2016/01/27/reporters-remember-challenger-coverage/ |archive-date=March 3, 2024 |url-status=live}}</ref> Press interest in the disaster increased in the following days; the number of reporters at KSC increased from 535 on the day of the launch to 1,467 reporters three days later.<ref name="harwood 6" /> In the aftermath of the accident, NASA was criticized for not making key personnel available to the press.<ref>{{cite news |last=Reinhold |first=Robert |title=The Shuttle Explosion; At Mission Control, Silence and Grief Fill a Day Of Horror Long Dreaded |work=The New York Times |access-date=July 19, 2021 |date=January 29, 1986 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/29/us/shuttle-explosion-mission-control-silence-grief-fill-day-horror-long-dreaded.html |archive-date=June 9, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210609232134/https://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/29/us/shuttle-explosion-mission-control-silence-grief-fill-day-horror-long-dreaded.html |url-status=live}}</ref> In the absence of information, the press published articles suggesting the external tank was the cause of the explosion.<ref name="harwood 6">{{cite news |last=Harwood |first=William |title=Voyage into History; Chapter Six: The Reaction |year=1986 |url=http://www.cbsnews.com/network/news/space/51Lchap6reaction.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060504192714/http://www.cbsnews.com/network/news/space/51Lchap6reaction.html |archive-date=May 4, 2006}} Archived by the Internet Archive on May 4, 2006.</ref><ref name="nytimes_et">{{cite web |last=Browne |first=Malcolm W. |title=How could it happen? Fuel Tank Leak Feared |work=The New York Times |date=January 29, 1986 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/29/us/how-could-it-happen-fuel-tank-leak-feared.html |access-date=August 30, 2021 |archive-date=August 30, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210830092242/https://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/29/us/how-could-it-happen-fuel-tank-leak-feared.html |url-status=live}}</ref> Until 2010, CNN's live broadcast was the only known footage filmed from the launch site. Additional amateur and professional recordings have since become publicly available.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/28/space-shuttle-challenger-home-video_n_4677745.html |title=Challenger Disaster Home Video Surfaces After 28 Years |date=January 28, 2014 |first=Timothy |last=Stevonec |work=The Huffington Post |access-date=September 12, 2021 |archive-date=February 1, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170201011159/http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/28/space-shuttle-challenger-home-video_n_4677745.html |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/01/new-challenger-video-space-shuttle-footage_n_1463495.html |title=New Challenger Video: Rare Footage Of 1986 Disaster Uncovered |date=May 1, 2012 |first=Timothy |last=Stevonec |work=The Huffington Post |access-date=September 12, 2021 |archive-date=December 23, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181223085259/https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/01/new-challenger-video-space-shuttle-footage_n_1463495.html |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.theguardian.com/science/2010/feb/04/challenger-space-shuttle-video-discovered |title=Challenger space shuttle disaster amateur video discovered |first=Richard |last=Luscombe |date=February 4, 2010 |work=The Guardian |access-date=September 12, 2021 |archive-date=July 12, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210712074115/https://www.theguardian.com/science/2010/feb/04/challenger-space-shuttle-video-discovered |url-status=live}}</ref> In the Soviet Union, footage of the disaster was played on the news, with coverage reflecting a tone that was described as being "somber and sympathetic" and "for the most part free of political overtones."<ref>{{Cite news |last=Schmemann |first=Serge |date=January 30, 1986 |title=The Shuttle Inquiry: Reaction Here and Abroad; Gorbachev Expresses His Condolences |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/30/us/the-shuttle-inquiry-reaction-here-and-abroad-gorbachev-expresses-his-condolences.html |access-date=March 5, 2025 |work=The New York Times}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=January 29, 1986 |title=Gorbachev Tells His Grief; Czechs, Poles See 'Star Wars' Link |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-01-29-mn-1121-story.html |access-date=March 5, 2025 |work=The Los Angeles Times |agency=Times Wire Services}}</ref>

=== Engineering case study ===
The ''Challenger'' accident has been used as a case study for subjects such as [[safety engineering|engineering safety]], the ethics of [[Whistleblower|whistleblowing]], communications and group decision-making, and the dangers of [[groupthink]].<ref name="boisjoly_ethics_paper">{{cite journal
  | last1 = Boisjoly
  | first1 = Russell P.
  | last2 = Curtis
  | first2 = Ellen Foster
  | last3 = Mellican
  | first3 = Eugene
  | title = Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions
  | date = April 1989
  | url = https://www.jstor.org/stable/25071892
  | journal = Journal of Business Ethics
  | publisher = Springer
  | volume = 8
  | issue = 4
  | pages = 217–230
  | doi = 10.1007/BF00383335
 | jstor = 25071892
 | s2cid = 144135586
 | access-date = August 27, 2021
| archive-date = August 27, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210827103035/https://www.jstor.org/stable/25071892
  | url-status = live
  | url-access = subscription
  }}</ref> Roger Boisjoly and Allan McDonald became speakers who advocated for responsible workplace decision making and engineering ethics.{{r|berkes20120206}}<ref name="mcdonald_npr_obit">{{cite web
  | last = Berkes
  | first = Howard
  | title = Remembering Allan McDonald: He Refused To Approve Challenger Launch, Exposed Cover-Up
  | work = Obituaries
  | publisher = National Public Radio
  | date = March 7, 2021
| url = https://www.npr.org/2021/03/07/974534021/remembering-allan-mcdonald-he-refused-to-approve-challenger-launch-exposed-cover
  | access-date = August 27, 2021
| archive-date = August 2, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210802223416/https://www.npr.org/2021/03/07/974534021/remembering-allan-mcdonald-he-refused-to-approve-challenger-launch-exposed-cover
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> Information designer [[Edward Tufte]] has argued that the ''Challenger'' accident was the result of poor communications and overly complicated explanations on the part of engineers, and stated that showing the correlation of ambient air temperature and O-ring erosion amounts would have been sufficient to communicate the potential dangers of the cold-weather launch. Boisjoly contested this assertion and stated that the data presented by Tufte were not as simple or available as Tufte stated.<ref name=WadeNAE96>{{cite journal |last1=Robison |first1=Wade |last2=Boisjoly |first2=Roger |last3=Hoeker |first3=David |last4=Young |first4=Stefan |name-list-style=amp |year=2002 |title=Representation and Misrepresentation: Tufte and the Morton Thiokol Engineers on the Challenger |journal=Science and Engineering Ethics |volume=8 |issue=1 |pages=59–81 |url=https://people.rit.edu/wlrgsh/FINRobison.pdf |access-date=July 12, 2021 |doi=10.1007/s11948-002-0033-2 |pmid=11840958 |s2cid=19219936 |archive-date=August 23, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210823015842/https://people.rit.edu/wlrgsh/FINRobison.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

== Reports ==
=== Rogers Commission Report ===
{{Main|Rogers Commission Report}}
The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle ''Challenger'' Accident, also known as the Rogers Commission after its chairman, was formed on February{{nbsp}}6.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=206}} Its members were Chairman [[William P. Rogers]], Vice Chairman [[Neil Armstrong]], [[David Campion Acheson|David Acheson]], [[Eugene E. Covert|Eugene Covert]], [[Richard Feynman]], Robert Hotz, [[Donald J. Kutyna|Donald Kutyna]], [[Sally Ride]], Robert Rummel, [[Joe Sutter|Joseph Sutter]], [[Arthur B. C. Walker Jr.|Arthur Walker]], Albert Wheelon, and [[Chuck Yeager]].{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|pages=iii-iv}}

The commission held hearings that discussed the NASA accident investigation, the Space Shuttle program, and the Morton Thiokol recommendation to launch despite O-ring safety issues. On February{{nbsp}}15, Rogers released a statement that established the commission's changing role to investigate the accident independent of NASA due to concerns of the failures of the internal processes at NASA. The commission created four investigative panels to research the different aspects of the mission. The Accident Analysis Panel, chaired by Kutyna, used data from salvage operations and testing to determine the exact cause behind the accident. The Development and Production Panel, chaired by Sutter, investigated the hardware contractors and how they interacted with NASA. The Pre-Launch Activities Panel, chaired by Acheson, focused on the final assembly processes and pre-launch activities conducted at KSC. The Mission Planning and Operations Panel, chaired by Ride, investigated the planning that went into mission development, along with potential concerns over crew safety and pressure to adhere to a schedule. Over a period of four months, the commission interviewed over 160 individuals, held at least 35 investigative sessions, and involved more than 6,000 NASA employees, contractors, and support personnel.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|pages=206−208}} The commission published its report on June 6, 1986.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|pages=iii-iv}}
[[File:Rogers Commission members arrive at Kennedy Space Center.jpg|thumb|Members of the [[Rogers Commission]] arrive at [[Kennedy Space Center]]|alt=Black-and-white photo of a group of individuals at the Kennedy Space Center with the rocket garden behind them]]

The commission determined that the cause of the accident was hot gas blowing past the O-rings in the field joint on the right SRB, and found no other potential causes for the disaster.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=71}} It attributed the accident to a faulty design of the field joint that was unacceptably sensitive to changes in temperature, dynamic loading, and the character of its materials.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=71}} The report was critical of NASA and Morton Thiokol, and emphasized that both organizations had overlooked evidence that indicated the potential danger with the SRB field joints. It noted that NASA accepted the risk of O-ring erosion without evaluating how it could potentially affect the safety of a mission.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=149}} The commission concluded that the safety culture and management structure at NASA were insufficient to properly report, analyze, and prevent flight issues.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=162}} It stated that the pressure to increase the rate of flights negatively affected the amount of training, quality control, and repair work that was available for each mission.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=177}}

The commission published a series of recommendations to improve the safety of the Space Shuttle program. It proposed a redesign of the joints in the SRB that would prevent gas from blowing past the O-rings. It also recommended that the program's management be restructured to keep project managers from being pressured to adhere to unsafe organizational deadlines, and should include astronauts to address crew safety concerns better. It proposed that an office for safety be established reporting directly to the NASA administrator to oversee all safety, reliability, and quality assurance functions in NASA programs. Additionally, the commission addressed issues with overall safety and maintenance for the orbiter, and it recommended the addition of the means for the crew to escape during controlled gliding flight.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|pages=198–200}}

During a televised hearing on February{{nbsp}}11, Feynman demonstrated the loss of rubber's elasticity in cold temperatures using a glass of cold water and a piece of rubber, for which he received media attention. Feynman, a [[Nobel Prize]]-winning physicist, advocated for harsher criticism towards NASA in the report and repeatedly disagreed with Rogers. He threatened to remove his name from the report unless it included his personal observations on reliability, which appeared as Appendix F.<ref name="feynman_nyt">{{cite web
  | last = Boffrey
  | first = Philip M.
  | title = Amid Disputes, Shuttle Panel Finally Forged an Agreement
  | work = The New York Times
  | date = June 7, 1986
| url = https://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/07/us/amid-disputes-shuttle-panel-finally-forged-an-agreement.html
  | access-date = August 24, 2021
| archive-date = August 24, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210824111359/https://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/07/us/amid-disputes-shuttle-panel-finally-forged-an-agreement.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref><ref name="appendixF">{{cite book|url=https://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v2appf.htm|title=Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle ''Challenger'' Accident|publisher=[[NASA]]|volume=2|location=Appendix F|date=June 6, 1986|chapter=Personal Observations on Reliability of Shuttle|last=Feynman|first=R.P.|access-date=August 26, 2021|archive-date=May 5, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190505212635/https://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v2appf.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> In the appendix, he lauded the engineering and software accomplishments in the program's development, but he argued that multiple components, including the avionics and SSMEs in addition to the SRBs, were more dangerous and accident-prone than original NASA estimates had indicated.{{r|appendixF}}<ref name="feynman_physics_today">{{cite web
  | last = Feynman
  | first = Richard P.
  | author-link = Richard Feynman
  | title = An Outsider's Inside View of the Challenger Inquiry
  | publisher = Physics Today
  | date = February 1988
  | url = https://authors.library.caltech.edu/51304/1/challenger.pdf
  | access-date = August 26, 2021
| archive-date = August 17, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210817022920/https://authors.library.caltech.edu/51304/1/challenger.pdf
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref>

=== US House Committee report ===
The [[United States House Committee on Science|US House Committee on Science and Technology]] conducted an investigation of the ''Challenger'' disaster and released a report on October{{nbsp}}29, 1986.<ref name="House Committee">{{cite web |author= |date=October 29, 1986 |title=Investigation of the Challenger Accident; Report of the Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives |url=https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/pdf/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210813110313/https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/pdf/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016.pdf |archive-date=August 13, 2021 |access-date=August 26, 2021 |publisher=US House Committee on Science and Technology |publication-place=US Government Printing Office}}</ref>{{rp|page=i}} The committee, which had authorized the funding for the Space Shuttle program, reviewed the findings of the Rogers Commission as part of its investigation. The committee agreed with the Rogers Commission that the failed SRB field joint was the cause of the accident, and that NASA and Morton Thiokol failed to act despite numerous warnings of the potential dangers of the SRB. The committee's report further emphasized safety considerations of other components and recommended a risk management review for all critical systems.{{r|House Committee}}{{rp|pages=2–5}}

== NASA response ==
=== SRB redesign ===
In response to the commission's recommendation, NASA initiated a redesign of the SRB, later named the redesigned solid rocket motor (RSRM), which was supervised by an independent oversight group.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=198}}{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|page=III-101}}<ref name="implementation report">{{cite web|title = Report to the President: Actions to Implement the Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident|publisher = NASA|date = July 14, 1986|url = https://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/actions.pdf|access-date = July 19, 2021|archive-date = February 24, 2021|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210224225122/https://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/actions.pdf|url-status = live}}</ref> The redesigned joint included a capture feature on the tang around the interior wall of the clevis to prevent joint rotation. The space between the capture feature and the clevis was sealed with another O-ring. The capture feature reduced the potential of joint rotation to 15% of that which had occurred during the disaster. Should joint rotation occur, any rotation that reduced the O-ring seal on one side of the clevis wall would increase it on the other side. Additionally, heaters were installed to maintain consistent, higher temperatures of the O-rings.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|pages=429–430}} The RSRM was first tested on August 30, 1987. In April and August 1988, the RSRM was tested with intentional flaws that allowed hot gas to penetrate the field joint. These tests permitted the engineers to evaluate whether the improved field joint prevented joint rotation. Following the successful tests, the RSRM was certified to fly on the Space Shuttle.{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|page=III-101}}

=== Space Shuttle modifications ===
In addition to the SRBs, NASA increased the safety standards on other Space Shuttle program components. The critical items lists and failure modes for the SSMEs were updated, along with 18 hardware changes. The maximum thrust of the SSMEs was limited to 104%, with 109% only allowed in an abort scenario.{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|page=II-172}} The landing gear was updated to improve its steering and handling abilities while the Space Shuttle was landing.{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|page=III-101}} NASA implemented an escape option in which the astronauts would jettison the side hatch and extend a pole out of the orbiter; they would slide down the pole to avoid hitting the orbiter as they bailed out before they activated their [[parachutes]]. The orbiter's software was modified to maintain stable flight while all of the flight crew left the controls to escape.{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|page=III-103}} This escape method would not have saved the crew in the ''Challenger'' disaster, but was added in the event of another emergency.{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|page=III-102}}

=== Safety office ===
In 1986 NASA created a new Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance, headed by a NASA associate administrator who reported directly to the NASA administrator, as the commission had specified.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=199}}{{r|recommendation_7}}<ref name="nasa_implementation">{{cite web
  | title = NASA's Actions to Implement the Rogers Commission Recommendations after the Challenger Accident
  | publisher = NASA
  | date = July 18, 2000
| url = https://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/actions.html
  | access-date = September 2, 2021
| archive-date = March 5, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210305171248/https://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/actions.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Harwood |first=William |date=July 8, 1986 |title=NASA safety office established |url=https://www.upi.com/Archives/1986/07/08/NASA-safety-office-established/5007521179200/ |access-date=March 18, 2024 |website=UPI}}</ref> Former ''Challenger'' flight director Greene became chief of the Safety Division of the directorate.<ref name="jh-greene-bio">{{cite web
  | title = Jay H. Greene
  | work = Oral History Project
  | publisher = NASA
  | date = July 12, 2004
| url = https://historycollection.jsc.nasa.gov/JSCHistoryPortal/history/oral_histories/GreeneJH/GreeneJH_Bio.pdf
  | access-date = September 2, 2021
| archive-date = June 24, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210624211302/https://historycollection.jsc.nasa.gov/JSCHistoryPortal/history/oral_histories/GreeneJH/GreeneJH_Bio.pdf
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> After the [[Space Shuttle Columbia disaster|Space Shuttle ''Columbia'' disaster]] in 2003, the [[Columbia Accident Investigation Board|''Columbia'' Accident Investigation Board]] (CAIB) concluded that NASA had not set up a "truly independent" office for safety oversight.<ref name="caib_report">{{cite web |last1=Gehman |first1=Harold |author-link1=Harold W. Gehman Jr. |last2=Barry |first2=John |last3=Deal |first3=Duane |last4=Hallock |first4=James |author-link4=James N. Hallock |last5=Hess |first5=Kenneth |last6=Hubbard |first6=G. Scott |author-link6=G. Scott Hubbard |last7=Logsdon |first7=John |author-link7=John Logsdon |last8=Logsdon |first8=John |author-link8=Douglas Osheroff |last9=Ride |first9=Sally |author-link9=Sally Ride |last10=Tetrault |first10=Roger |last11=Turcotte |first11=Stephen |author-link11=Stephen A. Turcotte |last12=Wallace |first12=Steven |last13=Widnall |first13=Sheila |author-link13=Sheila Widnall |date=August 26, 2003 |title=Report of Columbia Accident Investigation Board |url=https://s3.amazonaws.com/akamai.netstorage/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/CAIB_highres_full.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208033510/https://s3.amazonaws.com/akamai.netstorage/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/CAIB_highres_full.pdf |archive-date=December 8, 2015 |access-date=January 11, 2022 |publisher=NASA |volume=1}}</ref>{{rp|pages=178–180}} The CAIB concluded that the ineffective safety culture that had resulted in the ''Challenger'' accident was also responsible for the subsequent disaster.{{r|caib_report}}{{rp|page=195}}

=== Teacher in Space ===
The Teacher in Space program, which McAuliffe had been selected for, was canceled in 1990 as a result of the ''Challenger'' disaster. In 1998, NASA replaced Teacher in Space with the Educator Astronaut Project, which differed in that it required the teachers to become professional astronauts trained as mission specialists, rather than short-term payload specialists who would return to their classrooms following their spaceflight. [[Barbara Morgan]], who had been the backup teacher for McAuliffe, was selected to be part of [[NASA Astronaut Group 17]] and flew on [[STS-118]].{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|page=III-116}}

=== Return to flight ===
{{Further-text| [[Space Shuttle program]] | [[STS-26]] }}
The projected launch schedule of 24 per year was criticized by the Rogers Commission as an unrealistic goal that created unnecessary pressure on NASA to launch missions.{{r|rogers_com}}{{rp|page=165}} In August 1986, President Reagan approved the construction of an orbiter, which would later be named {{OV|105|full=no}}, to replace ''Challenger''. Construction of ''Endeavour'' began in 1987 and was completed in 1990, and it first flew on [[STS-49]] in May 1992.<ref name="endeavour_nasa">{{cite web
  | last = Ryba
  | first = Jeanne
  | title = Space Shuttle Overview: Endeavour (OV-105)
  | publisher = NASA
  | date = April 12, 2013
| url = https://www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/shuttleoperations/orbiters/endeavour-info.html
  | access-date = October 5, 2021
| archive-date = May 20, 2017
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170520114900/https://www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/shuttleoperations/orbiters/endeavour-info.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> He also announced that the program would no longer carry commercial [[satellite]] payloads, and that these would be launched using commercial [[expendable launch vehicle]]s.<ref name="reagan_latimes">{{cite web
  | last = Abramson
  | first = Rudy
  | title = Reagan Orders Shuttle, Limits NASA Mission
  | work = [[The Los Angeles Times]]
  | date = August 16, 1986
| url = https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-08-16-mn-7268-story.html
  | access-date = September 2, 2021
| archive-date = September 2, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210902120558/https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-08-16-mn-7268-story.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> These commercial payloads were reallocated from the Space Shuttle program to end the dependence on a single launch vehicle and limit the pressure on NASA to launch crewed missions to satisfy its customers.<ref name="wilford_shuttle">{{cite web
  | last = Wilford
  | first = John Noble
  | authorlink =
  | title = Reagan is reported near decision to approve a new Space Shuttle
  | work = The New York times
  | date = May 25, 1986
| url = https://www.nytimes.com/1986/05/25/us/reagan-is-reported-near-decision-to-approve-a-new-space-shuttle.html
  | access-date = November 10, 2021
| archive-date = November 10, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20211110125348/https://www.nytimes.com/1986/05/25/us/reagan-is-reported-near-decision-to-approve-a-new-space-shuttle.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref>

The Space Shuttle fleet was grounded for two years and eight months while the program underwent investigation, redesign, and restructuring. On September 29, 1988, ''Discovery'' launched on [[STS-26]] mission from LC-39B with a crew of five veteran astronauts.<ref>{{cite web |first=John A. |last=Logsdon |url=https://history.nasa.gov/SP-4219/Chapter15.html |publisher=NASA |title=Return to Flight: Richard H. Truly and the Recovery from the Challenger Accident |access-date=July 27, 2021 |date=1998 |archive-date=February 24, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210224180805/https://history.nasa.gov/SP-4219/Chapter15.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Its payload was [[TDRS-3]], which was a substitute for the satellite lost with ''Challenger''. The launch tested the redesigned boosters, and the crew wore [[Launch Entry Suit|pressure suits]] during the ascent and reentry. The mission was a success, and the program resumed flying.<ref name="sts26">{{cite web
  | last = Mars
  | first = Kelli
  | title = 30 Years Ago: STS-26 Returns Shuttle to Flight
  | publisher = NASA
  | date = September 28, 2018
| url = https://www.nasa.gov/feature/30-years-ago-sts-26-returns-shuttle-to-flight
  | access-date = September 2, 2021
| archive-date = May 26, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210526152213/https://www.nasa.gov/feature/30-years-ago-sts-26-returns-shuttle-to-flight/
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref>

=== Second accident ===
{{Main|Space Shuttle Columbia disaster|Space Shuttle retirement}}
On February 1, 2003, the program had its second accident when ''Columbia'' disintegrated during reentry during [[STS-107]], killing all seven crew members on board. The cause was bipod foam from the external tank striking the orbiter's left wing during launch. Once again, NASA's organizational culture was heavily scrutinized.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Kestenbaum |first=David |date=2003-08-26 |title=Shuttle Report Faults NASA |url=https://www.npr.org/2003/08/26/1413180/columbia-report-blasts-nasas-culture |access-date=2025-06-10 |work=NPR}}</ref> As with the O-ring erosion, NASA did not consider foam strikes to be a potential risk to the astronauts, despite multiple instances of foam strikes on previous missions.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Schwartz |first1=John |last2=Wald |first2=Matthew L. |date=2003-08-26 |title=Final Shuttle Report Cites 'Broken Safety Culture' at NASA |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/26/national/final-shuttle-report-cites-broken-safety-culture-at-nasa.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210211072610/https://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/26/national/final-shuttle-report-cites-broken-safety-culture-at-nasa.html |archive-date=2021-02-11 |access-date=2025-06-10 |work=The New York Times |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> In addition, scheduling issues had once again risen, as NASA was under internal pressure to adhere to a launch schedule for assembling the International Space Station. The CAIB concluded that NASA had failed to learn many lessons from the ''Challenger'' disaster, stating: "NASA's response to the Rogers Commission did not meet the Commission's intent" and "the causes of the institutional failure responsible for ''Challenger'' have not been fixed."{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|pages=178, 195}} The Space Shuttle returned to flight in 2005 with [[STS-114]].<ref>{{cite magazine |last=Portree |first=David S. F. |date=January 30, 2014 |title=Challenger and the Diminishment of the NASA Space Program |url=https://www.wired.com/2014/01/responses-challenger/ |access-date=March 7, 2025 |magazine=[[Wired (magazine)|Wired]]}}</ref>

== Legacy ==
<!-- Please don't list every memorial, naming, or popular culture reference for the Challenger disaster. This is not meant to be a comprehensive list! -->
[[File:Challenger Disaster Memorial KSC-9.jpg|thumb|Fragment of ''Challenger''{{'s}} fuselage on display at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex|alt=A portion of the Challenger's fuselage hanging vertically, displaying the American flag.]]
In 2004, President [[George W. Bush]] conferred posthumous [[Congressional Space Medal of Honor|Congressional Space Medals of Honor]] to all 14 crew members killed in the ''Challenger'' and ''Columbia'' accidents.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://history.nasa.gov/spacemedal.htm|title=Congressional Space Medal of Honor|publisher=NASA|date=April 28, 2006|access-date=July 19, 2021|archive-date=February 20, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110220213828/http://history.nasa.gov/spacemedal.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> An unpainted decorative oval in the [[Brumidi Corridors]] of the [[United States Capitol]] was finished with a portrait depicting the crew by Charles Schmidt in 1987. The scene was painted on canvas and then applied to the wall.<ref name="aoc1">{{cite web|title=Brumidi Corridors Murals|date=2021|url=https://www.aoc.gov/explore-capitol-campus/art/brumidi-corridors-murals|publisher=[[Architect of the Capitol]]|access-date=July 19, 2021|archive-date=August 31, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210831014536/https://www.aoc.gov/explore-capitol-campus/art/brumidi-corridors-murals|url-status=live}}</ref> The "Forever Remembered" exhibit at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex opened in July 2015 and includes a display of a {{convert|12|ft|m|adj=on}} section of ''Challenger''{{'s}} recovered fuselage. The exhibit was opened by NASA Administrator Charles Bolden along with family members of the crew.{{r|jenkins2016}}{{rp|III-97}} A tree for each astronaut was planted in NASA's Astronaut Memorial Grove at the Johnson Space Center, along with trees for each astronaut from the [[Apollo 1]] and ''Columbia'' disasters.<ref name="memorial_grove">{{cite news
  | last = Mikati
  | first = Massarah
  | title = Memorial Grove at Johnson Space Center offers tribute to late astronauts
  | newspaper = [[Houston Chronicle]]
  | date = May 7, 2019
| url = https://www.houstonchronicle.com/local/space/mission-moon/article/Where-NASA-honors-its-fallen-Memorial-grove-at-13818043.php
  | access-date = July 19, 2021
| archive-date = July 19, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210719083636/https://www.houstonchronicle.com/local/space/mission-moon/article/Where-NASA-honors-its-fallen-Memorial-grove-at-13818043.php
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref>
Seven [[asteroids]] were named after the crew members: {{MoMP|3350|3350 Scobee}}, {{MoMP|3351|3351 Smith}}, {{MoMP|3352|3352 McAuliffe}}, {{MoMP|3353|3353 Jarvis}}, {{MoMP|3354|3354 McNair}}, {{MoMP|3355|3355 Onizuka}}, and {{MoMP|3356|3356 Resnik}}. The approved naming citation was published by the [[Minor Planet Center]] on March 26, 1986 ({{small|[[Minor Planet Circulars|M.P.C.]] 10550}}).<ref name="MPC-Circulars-Archive">{{cite web
 |title        = Minor Planet Circulars/Minor Planets and Comets
 |pages = MPC 10457–10586
 |publisher    = Minor Planet Center – Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory 
 |url          = https://minorplanetcenter.net/iau/ECS/MPCArchive/1986/MPC_19860326.pdf
 |access-date  = July 30, 2021
|date         = March 26, 1986
|archive-date = July 27, 2021
|archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20210727220035/https://minorplanetcenter.net/iau/ECS/MPCArchive/1986/MPC_19860326.pdf
 |url-status   = live
}}</ref> In 1988, seven craters on the far side of the [[Moon]], within the [[Apollo (crater)|Apollo Basin]], were named after the astronauts by the [[International Astronomical Union|IAU]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Byrne |first=Charles |title=The Far Side of the Moon A Photographic Guide |year=2014 |publisher=[[Springer Science]] |isbn=978-1-4899-8806-5 |oclc=1244446759 }}</ref> The [[Soviet Union]] named two craters on [[Venus]] after McAuliffe and Resnik.<ref name="nyt_venus_craters">{{cite web
  | last = Schmemann
  | first = Serge
  | title = Soviet Union to name 2 Venus craters for Shuttle's women
  | work = The New York Times
  | date = February 2, 1986
| url = https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/02/us/soviet-union-to-name-2-venus-craters-for-shuttle-s-women.html
  | access-date = October 25, 2021
| archive-date = October 25, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20211025160902/https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/02/us/soviet-union-to-name-2-venus-craters-for-shuttle-s-women.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> The landing site of the [[Mars Exploration Rover|''Opportunity'' Mars rover]] was named [[Challenger memorial station|''Challenger'' Memorial Station]].<ref>{{Cite web |last= |date=January 28, 2004 |title=Space Shuttle Challenger Crew Memorialized on Mars |url=https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/news/space-shuttle-challenger-crew-memorialized-on-mars |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220903225527/https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/news/space-shuttle-challenger-crew-memorialized-on-mars |archive-date=September 3, 2022 |access-date=November 8, 2023 |website=NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)}}</ref>

[[File:ChallengerPlaque-20231125.jpg|thumb|Plaque at TRW's [[Space Park]] honoring the ''Challenger'' crew. Its maiden flight and this final one had carried their TDRS satellites.]]

Several memorials have been established in honor of the ''Challenger'' disaster. The public Peers Park in [[Palo Alto, California]], features the ''Challenger'' Memorial Grove including redwood trees grown from seeds carried aboard [[STS-51-F|''Challenger'' in 1985]].<ref name=peers_park>{{cite web |url=https://www.cityofpaloalto.org/Departments/Community-Services/Open-Space-and-Parks-Home/Neighborhood-Parks/Peers-Park |date=January 14, 2021 |publisher=City of Palo Alto, California |title=Peers Park |access-date=July 19, 2021 |archive-date=July 19, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210719085745/https://www.cityofpaloalto.org/Departments/Community-Services/Open-Space-and-Parks-Home/Neighborhood-Parks/Peers-Park |url-status=live }}</ref> Schools and streets have been renamed to include the names of the crew or ''Challenger''.<ref name="street_rename">{{cite web
  | last = Levine
  | first = Jay
  | title = Challenger Crew Recognized With Monument
  | publisher = NASA
  | date = June 27, 2018
| url = https://www.nasa.gov/centers/armstrong/feature/challenger_crew_monument.html
  | access-date = July 25, 2021
| archive-date = July 25, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210725174804/https://www.nasa.gov/centers/armstrong/feature/challenger_crew_monument.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref><ref name="scobee_school">{{cite web
  | last = McCarthy
  | first = Kathy
  | title = Challenger Astronaut Remembered in Hometown
  | publisher = Associated Press
  | date = April 28, 1986
| url = https://apnews.com/article/3c6c77cdb85da83ff1041d3f0d9245f0
  | access-date = July 25, 2021
| archive-date = November 7, 2022
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20221107132106/https://apnews.com/article/3c6c77cdb85da83ff1041d3f0d9245f0
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref><ref name="mcauliffe_school">{{cite web
  | last = Dodson
  | first = Andrew
  | title = School named after astronaut Christa McAuliffe remembers Challenger explosion
  | publisher = MLive
  | date = January 19, 2019
| url = https://www.mlive.com/news/bay-city/2016/01/school_named_after_christa_mca.html
  | access-date = July 25, 2021
| archive-date = July 25, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210725174804/https://www.mlive.com/news/bay-city/2016/01/school_named_after_christa_mca.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> In 1990, a 1/10 scale replica of ''Challenger'' in liftoff position was erected in [[Little Tokyo, Los Angeles|Little Tokyo]] district of [[Los Angeles, California]].<ref name="little_tokyo_memorial">{{cite web
  | title = Space Shuttle Challenger Monument (Los Angeles, California)
  | publisher = Astronaut Ellison S. Onizuka Memorial
  | date = 2021
  | url = https://onizukamemorial.org/space-shuttle-challenger-and-monument
  | access-date = April 27, 2021
| archive-date = April 27, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210427084153/https://onizukamemorial.org/space-shuttle-challenger-and-monument
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> [[Challenger Point]] is a mountain peak of the [[Sangre de Cristo Range]].<ref name=GNIS>{{cite gnis|id=196427|name=Challenger Point|entry-date=August 31, 1992|access-date=July 15, 2021}}</ref> The [[McAuliffe-Shepard Discovery Center]], a science museum and planetarium in [[Concord, New Hampshire]], is named in honor of McAuliffe, a Concord High School teacher, and [[Alan Shepard]], who was from [[Derry, New Hampshire]].<ref name=mcauliffe-shepard>{{cite web
  | title = About
  | publisher = [[McAuliffe-Shepard Discovery Center]]
  | date = 2021
  | url = https://www.starhop.com/about
  | access-date = April 27, 2021
| archive-date = April 27, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210427085847/https://www.starhop.com/about
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref>
The crew's families established the [[Challenger Center for Space Science Education]] as an educational [[non-profit]] organization.<ref name="challenger_center">{{cite web
  | title = About Us
  | publisher = Challenger Center for Space Science Education
  | date = 2019
  | url = https://www.challenger.org/who-we-are/#about_us
  | access-date = November 3, 2021
| archive-date = October 6, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20211006203754/https://www.challenger.org/who-we-are/#about_us
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref>

An American flag, later named the [[Challenger flag|''Challenger'' flag]], was carried aboard the ''Challenger''. It was sponsored by [[Scouting in Colorado|Boy Scout]] Troop 514 of [[Monument, Colorado]], and was recovered intact, still sealed in its plastic container.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.techrepublic.com/article/geek-trivia-rising-from-the-ashes/6030167|title=Rising from the ashes|last=Garmon|first=Jay|date=January 24, 2006|publisher=Tech Republic|access-date=July 19, 2021|archive-date=July 12, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210712074114/https://www.techrepublic.com/article/geek-trivia-rising-from-the-ashes/|url-status=live}}</ref> Onizuka had included a [[Ball (association football)|soccer ball]] with his personal effects that was recovered and later flown to the [[International Space Station]] aboard Soyuz [[Expedition 49]] by American astronaut [[Shane Kimbrough]]. It is on display at [[Clear Lake High School (Texas)|Clear Lake High School]] in Houston, which was attended by Onizuka's children.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Malinowski |first1=Tonya |date=June 29, 2018 |title=NASA astronaut Ellison Onizuka's soccer ball that survived the Challenger explosion |url=http://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/23902766/nasa-astronaut-ellison-onizuka-soccer-ball-survived-challenger-explosion |publisher=[[ESPN]] |access-date=July 19, 2021 |archive-date=August 20, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210820134511/https://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/23902766/nasa-astronaut-ellison-onizuka-soccer-ball-survived-challenger-explosion |url-status=live }}</ref>

The 1986 motion picture ''[[Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home]]'' was dedicated to the crew of the ''Challenger'' with an opening message which stated "The cast and crew of ''Star Trek'' wish to dedicate this film to the men and women of the spaceship ''Challenger'' whose courageous spirit shall live to the 23rd century and beyond..."<ref>{{cite web
|url=https://musingsfromus.com/star-trek-iv-voyage-home-1986-2670/
|title=Star Trek IV The Voyage Home (1986)
|website=Musings From Us
|date=January 25, 2011
|access-date=January 28, 2022
|archive-date=February 2, 2022
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220202022723/https://musingsfromus.com/star-trek-iv-voyage-home-1986-2670/
|url-status=live
}}</ref>

The last track on French musician [[Jean-Michel Jarre]]'s 1986 album ''[[Rendez-Vous (Jean-Michel Jarre album)|Rendez-Vous]]'' was originally scheduled to include a saxophone part recorded by Ron McNair on board the ''Challenger'', which would have made it the first piece of music to be recorded in space.<ref>{{cite web |title=RENDEZ-VOUS |url=http://www.connollyco.com/discography/jeanmichel_jarre/rendezvous.html |website=Connoly & Company LLC |access-date=16 January 2022}}</ref>

==In media==
=== Books ===
[[File:Space Shuttle Challenger tribute poster.jpg|thumb|The tribute poster of Challenger]]
In the years immediately after the ''Challenger'' disaster, several books were published describing the factors and causes of the accident and the subsequent investigation and changes. In 1987, Malcolm McConnell, a journalist and a witness of the disaster, published ''Challenger–A Major Malfunction: A True Story of Politics, Greed, and the Wrong Stuff''. McConnell's book was criticized for arguing for a conspiracy involving NASA Administrator Fletcher awarding the contract to Morton Thiokol because it was from his home state of Utah.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|588}}<ref name=tomayko>{{cite journal |last1=Tomayko |first1=James E. |date=June 1987 |title=Challenger: A Major Malfunction |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/44524264 |journal=Aerospace Historian |volume=34 |issue=2 |pages=139 |access-date=October 5, 2021 |publisher=Air Force Historical Foundation |jstor=44524264 |archive-date=October 5, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211005090201/https://www.jstor.org/stable/44524264 |url-status=live }}</ref> The book ''Prescription for Disaster: From the Glory of Apollo to the Betrayal of the Shuttle'' by Joseph Trento was also published in 1987, arguing that the Space Shuttle program had been a flawed and politicized program from its inception.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|588–589}}<ref name=hallion>{{cite journal |last1=Hallion |first1=Richard P. |date=June 1987 |title=Prescription for Disaster: From the Flory of Apollo to the Betrayal of the Shuttle |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/44525431 |journal=Aerospace Historian |volume=345 |issue=2 |pages=151 |access-date=October 5, 2021 |publisher=Air Force Historical Foundation |jstor=44525431 |archive-date=October 5, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211005091613/https://www.jstor.org/stable/44525431 |url-status=live }}</ref> In 1988, Feynman's memoir, [[What Do You Care What Other People Think?|''"What Do You Care What Other People Think?": Further Adventures of a Curious Character'']], was published. The latter half of the book discusses his involvement in the Rogers Commission and his relationship with Kutyna.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|594}}<ref name=shair_review>{{cite journal |last1=Shair |first1=Frederick H. |date=June 1989 |title=What Do You Care What Other People Think? Further Adventures of a Curious Character |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/27855729 |journal=American Scientist |volume=77 |issue=3 |pages=267–268 |access-date=October 5, 2021 |publisher=Sigma Xi |jstor=27855729 |archive-date=October 5, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211005120725/https://www.jstor.org/stable/27855729 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Books were published long after the disaster. In 1996, Diane Vaughan published ''The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA'', which argues that NASA's structure and mission, rather than just Space Shuttle program management, created a climate of risk acceptance that resulted in the disaster.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|pages=591–592}}<ref name=vaughan_review>{{cite journal |last1=Weick |first1=Karl E. |date=June 1997 |title=The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2393925 |journal=Administrative Science Quarterly |volume=42 |issue=2 |pages=395–401 |access-date=October 5, 2021 |publisher=Sage Publications |doi=10.2307/2393925 |jstor=2393925 |archive-date=October 5, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211005111914/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2393925 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref> Also in 1996, Claus Jensen published ''No Downlink: A Dramatic Narrative About the Challenger Accident and Our Time'', which primarily discusses the development of rocketry prior to the disaster, and was criticized for its reliance on secondary sources with little original research conducted for the book.{{r|mcdonald}}{{rp|page=592}}<ref name=jensen_review>{{cite web
  | last = Roland
  | first = Alex
  | title = Large Craft Warnings
  | work = The New York Times
  | date = January 28, 1996
| url = https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/28/books/large-craft-warnings.html
  | access-date = October 5, 2021
| archive-date = October 5, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20211005113744/https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/28/books/large-craft-warnings.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref><ref name="No Downlink">{{cite book |last=Jensen |first=Claus |url=https://archive.org/details/nodownlinkdramat00jens |title=No Downlink: A Dramatic Narrative about the Challenger Accident and Our Time |date=1996 |publisher=Farrar, Straus, Giroux |isbn=978-0-374-12036-8 |location=New York |oclc=33078775}}</ref> In 2009, Allan McDonald published his memoir written with space historian James Hansen, ''Truth, Lies, and O-Rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster'', which focuses on his personal involvement in the launch, disaster, investigation, and return to flight, and is critical of NASA and Morton Thiokol leadership for agreeing to launch ''Challenger'' despite engineers' warnings about the O-rings.<ref name=mcondald_publish>{{Cite web|url=https://www.nasa.gov/centers/langley/news/researchernews/rn_Colloquium1012.html|title=Engineer Who Opposed Challenger Launch Offers Personal Look at Tragedy|last=Atkinson|first=Joe|publisher=NASA|date=October 9, 2012|access-date=September 1, 2021|archive-date=August 2, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210802222204/https://www.nasa.gov/centers/langley/news/researchernews/rn_Colloquium1012.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="mcdonald">{{cite book
  | last1 = McDonald
  | first1 = Allan J.
  | author-link1 = Allan J. McDonald
  | last2 = Hansen
  | first2 = James R.
  | author-link2 = James R. Hansen
  | title = Truth, Lies, and O-rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster
  | publisher = [[University Press of Florida]]
  | date = 2009
  | location = Gainesville
  | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=w33SEAAAQBAJ&q=editions:Ek9UvWnYdXUC
  | isbn = 978-0-8130-3326-6
  | access-date = February 9, 2025
  }} [https://archive.org/details/truthliesoringsi0000mcdo/page/n7/mode/2up Alt URL]</ref><ref name=pomeroy_review>{{cite journal |last1=Pomeroy |first1=Steven |date=October 2010 |title=Truth, Lies, and O-Rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster |journal=Technology and Culture |volume=51 |issue=4 |pages=1038–1040 |publisher=The Johns Hopkins University Press |doi=10.1353/tech.2010.0077 |jstor=40928051 |s2cid=109441993 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name=rubinson_review>{{cite journal |last1=Rubinson |first1=Paul |date=2010 |title=Truth, Lies, and O-rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/29765138 |journal=The Florida Historical Quarterly |volume=88 |issue=4 |pages=574–577 |access-date=October 6, 2021 |publisher=Florida Historical Society |jstor=29765138 |archive-date=October 6, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211006054700/https://www.jstor.org/stable/29765138 |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Film and television ===
The [[American Broadcasting Company|ABC]] [[Television film|television movie]] titled ''[[Challenger (1990 film)|Challenger]]'' was broadcast on February 25, 1990.<ref name="nytimes_abc">{{cite web
  | last = O'Connor
  | first = John J.
  | title = To View; Arrogance in the Name of Liftoff?
  | work = The New York Times
  | date = February 25, 1990
| url = https://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/25/arts/to-view-arrogance-in-the-name-of-liftoff.html
  | access-date = September 7, 2021
| archive-date = September 7, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210907150803/https://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/25/arts/to-view-arrogance-in-the-name-of-liftoff.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> It stars [[Barry Bostwick]] as Scobee and [[Karen Allen]] as McAuliffe. The movie is critical of NASA and positively portrays the engineers who argued against launching. The movie was criticized by the widows of Smith, McNair, and Onizuka as an inaccurate portrayal of events.<ref name="abc_tulsaworld">{{cite web
  | last = Zurawik
  | first = David
  | title = Turning Tragedy into Entertainment, 'Challenger' Invades Survivors' Private Grief
  | publisher = [[Tulsa World]]
  | date = February 25, 1990
| url = https://tulsaworld.com/archive/turning-tragedy-into-entertainment-challenger-invades-survivors-private-grief/article_7321f1ea-501a-5b9e-ba08-ec066046c92f.html
  | access-date = September 7, 2021
| archive-date = June 2, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210602212205/https://tulsaworld.com/archive/turning-tragedy-into-entertainment-challenger-invades-survivors-private-grief/article_7321f1ea-501a-5b9e-ba08-ec066046c92f.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> A [[BBC]] [[docudrama]] titled ''[[The Challenger Disaster]]'' was broadcast on March 18, 2013. It starred [[William Hurt]] as Feynman and portrayed the investigation into the causes of the disaster.<ref name=bbc_two_challenger>{{cite web|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00zstkn|title=The Challenger|publisher=[[British Broadcasting Corporation]]|access-date=October 5, 2021|date=2021|archive-date=April 18, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190418181131/https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00zstkn|url-status=live}}</ref> A film directed by Nathan VonMinden, ''The Challenger Disaster'', was released on January 25, 2019, depicts fictional characters participating in the decision process to launch.<ref name="forbes_disaster_review">{{cite web
  | last = Baldoni
  | first = John
  | title = The Challenger Disaster: A Dramatic Lesson In The Failure To Communicate
  | work = Forbes
  | date = January 28, 2019
| url = https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbaldoni/2019/01/28/the-challenger-disaster-a-dramatic-lesson-in-the-failure-to-communicate
  | access-date = September 13, 2021
| archive-date = September 13, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210913131129/https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbaldoni/2019/01/28/the-challenger-disaster-a-dramatic-lesson-in-the-failure-to-communicate/
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref>

The eleventh episode of the American sitcom ''[[Mixed-ish]]'', titled "When Doves Cry", revolves around the characters' grief, trauma, and eventual acceptance after watching the Challenger disaster.

The four-part docuseries ''[[Challenger: The Final Flight]]'', created by Steven Leckart and Glen Zipper, was released by [[Netflix]] on September 16, 2020. It uses interviews with NASA and Morton Thiokol personnel to argue against their flawed decision-making which produced a preventable disaster.<ref name="vulture_docuseries">{{cite web
  | last = Chaney
  | first = Jen
  | title = Challenger: The Final Flight Unpacks a Moment of American Hope and Heartbreak
  | publisher = [[New York (magazine)#Vulture|Vulture]]
  | date = September 16, 2020
| url = https://www.vulture.com/article/challenger-the-final-flight-netflix-docuseries-review.html
  | access-date = September 2, 2021
| archive-date = September 2, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210902094116/https://www.vulture.com/article/challenger-the-final-flight-netflix-docuseries-review.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref>

The [[The Newsreader#ep1|first episode]] of the Australian television drama ''[[The Newsreader]]'', broadcast on August 15, 2021, depicts the disaster from the perspective of the television industry, specifically the journalists and crew within, and of, an Australian television newsroom at the time; a co-lead character's hosting of a newsflash weaving in with an overarching background storyline about the shift in news presentation from serious to that of allowing emotion into its delivery.<ref>{{Cite episode |title=Three, Two, One... |title-link=The Newsreader#ep1 |series=[[The Newsreader]] |first=Michael |last=Lucas |network= [[ABC (Australian TV network)|ABC Television]] |date= August 15, 2021 |series-no=1 |number=1}}</ref>

The first episode of [[This Is Us (season 6)|Season 6]] of the television drama series ''[[This Is Us]]'', titled "The Challenger"<ref>{{Cite episode |title=The Challenger |title-link=This Is Us#ep89 |series=[[This Is Us]] |network=[[NBC]] |date=January 4, 2022 |series-no=6 |number=1}}</ref> features the incident of the explosion in 1986 in the flashback scenes.

== See also ==
{{Portal|Spaceflight|United States|Florida|1980s}}
* [[Criticism of the Space Shuttle program]]
* [[Normalization of deviance]]
* [[Engineering disasters]]
* [[List of spaceflight-related accidents and incidents]]
* [[List of photographs considered the most important]]
* [[PEPCON disaster]]
<!-- The Columbia disaster is linked in the article body and not here, per WP:SEEALSO.-->

== Notes ==
{{reflist|group=note}}

== References ==
{{Reflist}}

== External links ==
{{Sister project links
 |1= |display=Space Shuttle ''Challenger'' disaster |auto= |collapsible= |position= |style=
 |wikt=no |c=Space Shuttle Challenger disaster |n=no |q=Space Shuttle Challenger disaster |s=no |b=yes |v=yes
 |voy=no |species=no |d=Q858145 |m=no |mw=no |f=no
 |commonscat=Space Shuttle Challenger disaster
}}

* [https://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/genindex.htm Rogers Commission Report NASA webpage (crew tribute, five report volumes and appendices)]
* {{librivox book | title=Report to the President by the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident}}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20060127122917/http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11031097/ 7 myths about the Challenger shuttle disaster: It didn't explode, the crew didn't die instantly and it wasn't inevitable] [[MSNBC.com]]
* [https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p053j5c1 BBC World Service June 2017 documentary]
* CBS Radio news bulletin of the ''Challenger'' disaster anchored by Christopher Glenn from January 28, 1986: [http://donswaim.com/wcbs-challenger-1.mp3 Part 1], [http://donswaim.com/wcbs-challenger-2.mp3 Part 2], [http://donswaim.com/wcbs-challenger-3.mp3 Part 3], and [http://donswaim.com/wcbs-challenger-4.mp3 Part 4]

{{STS-51L}}
{{Space Shuttle Challenger}}
{{Space Shuttle}}
{{Authority control}}

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