View source for USS Pueblo (AGER-2)

{{Short description|US Navy ship attacked & captured by North Korea in 1968}}
{{use dmy dates|date=July 2025}}
{{Other ships|USS Pueblo}}
{|{{Infobox ship begin
| infobox caption = yes
}}
{{Infobox ship image
| Ship image = Pueblo-at-Pyongyang-Museum-2014.jpg
| Ship caption = ''Pueblo'' in North Korea, 2014
}}
{{Infobox ship career
| Hide header = 
| Ship country = United States
| Ship flag = {{USN flag}}
| Ship name = ''Pueblo''
| Ship namesake = [[Pueblo, Colorado]] and [[Pueblo County, Colorado]]
| Ship builder = Kewaunee Shipbuilding and Engineering
| Ship laid down = 1944
| Ship launched = 16 April 1944
| Ship christened = 
| Ship completed = 
| Ship acquired = 
| Ship commissioned = 7 April 1945
| Ship in service = 1945
| Ship out of service = 
| Ship renamed = 
| Ship reclassified = * 18 June 1966: AKL-44
* 13 May 1967: AGER-2
| Ship motto = 
| Ship honors = * National Defense Service Medal
* Korean Defense Service Medal
* Combat Action Ribbon (retroactive)
| Ship captured = 23 January 1968
| Ship fate = Captured by North Korea; {{Coord|39.04051|125.73974|format=dms|region:KP-01_type:landmark|display=title,inline}}
| Ship status = Active, in commission (held by [[North Korea]] as a museum ship)
| Port Commander = Colonel Francis E. Scanlan
| Ship badge = [[File:USS Pueblo AGER-2 Crest.png|150px]]
}}
{{Infobox ship characteristics
| Hide header = 
| Header caption = 
| Ship class = * (as built) Army Freight and Supply (FS)
* Navy [[Camano-class cargo ship]] (AKL)
* (as converted) {{sclass|Banner|environmental research ship}}
| Ship type = * (as built) Light Cargo Ship
* (as converted) Intel-Gathering Vessel
| Ship displacement = 550 tons light, 895 tons full
| Ship tonnage = 345 tons [[dead weight tonnage|dwt]]
| Ship length = {{convert|177|ft|m|abbr=on}}
| Ship beam = {{convert|32|ft|m|abbr=on}}
| Ship draft = {{convert|9|ft|m|abbr=on}}
| Ship propulsion = two 500hp GM Cleveland Division 6-278A 6-cyl V6 Diesel engines
| Ship speed = {{convert|12.7|kn}}
| Ship boats = 
| Ship complement = 6 officers, 70 men
| Ship sensors = 
| Ship EW = 
| Ship armament = 2 × [[M2 Browning]] .50 cal. (12.7×99 mm) machine guns
| Ship notes = 
}}
|}

'''USS ''Pueblo'' (AGER-2)''' is a [[Banner-class environmental research ship|''Banner''-class]] [[technical research ship]], placed into service during [[World War II]], then converted to a [[spy ship]] in 1967 by the [[United States Navy]]. She gathered [[Military intelligence|intelligence]] and [[oceanographic]] information, monitoring electronic and radio signals from [[North Korea]]. On 23 January 1968, the ship was attacked and captured by a North Korean vessel, in what became known as the "'''''Pueblo'' incident'''".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://texasarchive.org/2018_00353|title=Reactions to Pueblo Incident (1968)|website=Texas Archive of the Moving Image|access-date=November 5, 2019}}</ref>

The seizure of the U.S. Navy ship and her 83 crew members, one of whom was killed in the attack, came less than a week after President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]]'s [[State of the Union]] address to the [[United States Congress]], a week before the start of the [[Tet Offensive]] in [[South Vietnam]] during the [[Vietnam War]] and three days after 31 men of [[North Korea]]'s [[Unit 124|KPA Unit 124]] had crossed the [[Korean Demilitarized Zone]] (DMZ) and killed 26 South Koreans and 4 Americans in an attempt to [[Blue House raid|attack the South Korean Blue House]] (executive mansion) in the capital [[Seoul]]. The taking of ''Pueblo'' and the abuse and torture of her crew during the next eleven months became a major [[Cold War]] incident, raising tensions between western and eastern powers.

North Korea stated that ''Pueblo'' deliberately entered their territorial waters {{convert|7.6|nmi|km|0}} away from [[Wonsan|Ryo Island]], and that the [[logbook]] shows that they intruded several times.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/news/news_view.php?14+3492 |title=Pueblo Incident |work="Naenara" News from South Korea |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150527000751/http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/news/news_view.php?14+3492  |archive-date=27 May 2015}}</ref> However, the United States maintained that the vessel was in international waters at the time of the incident and that any purported evidence supplied by North Korea to support its statements was fabricated.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/publications/coldwar/dangerous_business.pdf|title=A Dangerous Business: The U.S. Navy and National Reconnaissance During the Cold War|last=Schindler|first=John R.|page=9|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130225190328/http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/publications/coldwar/dangerous_business.pdf|archive-date=February 25, 2013|access-date=24 June 2013}}</ref> ''Pueblo'' remains held in North Korea, officially a [[Ship commissioning|commissioned vessel]] of the [[United States Navy]].<ref>{{cite web |url={{Naval Vessel Register URL|AGER-2}} |title=USS Pueblo (AGER 2) |website=[[Naval Vessel Register]] |access-date=11 June 2009}}</ref>

Since early 2013, the ship has been [[Mooring (watercraft)|moored]] along the [[Pothonggang Canal]] in [[Pyongyang]] and is displayed there as a [[museum ship]] at the [[Victorious War Museum]].<ref name="usspueblo.org">{{cite web|url=http://www.usspueblo.org/North_Korea/USS_PUEBLO_Today.html|title=USS Pueblo Today|first=R.|last=MacClintock|work=USS Pueblo Veteran's Association|access-date=25 January 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130129033436/http://www.usspueblo.org/North_Korea/USS_PUEBLO_Today.html|archive-date=29 January 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> ''Pueblo'' is the only ship of the [[United States Navy|U.S. Navy]] still on the commissioned roster and held captive.<ref>{{cite web |title=USS Ships in Commission |url=https://www.nvr.navy.mil/nvr/getpage.htm?pagetype=activeincommission |website=Naval Vessel Register |access-date=8 March 2022}}</ref>

==Initial operations==
[[File:Army Cargo Vessel FP-344.jpg|thumb|left|U.S. Army Cargo Vessel ''FP-344'' (1944). Transferred to the Navy in 1966, she became USS ''Pueblo'' (AGER-2)]]

The ship was launched at the Kewaunee Shipbuilding and Engineering Company in [[Kewaunee, Wisconsin]], on 16 April 1944, as the [[United States Army]] Freight and Passenger (FP) ''FP-344''. The Army later redesignated the FP vessels as Freight and Supply changing the designation to ''FS-344''.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/us-people/b/brogan-h-c/nh-74688.html |work=Naval History and Heritage Command Online Library of Selected Images |title=U.S. Army cargo ship ''FP-344'' (1944–1966), later renamed ''FS-344'' |access-date=17 June 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190515054902/https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/us-people/b/brogan-h-c/nh-74688.html |archive-date=15 May 2019 |url-status=live }}</ref> The ship, commissioned at New Orleans on 7 April 1945, served as a Coast Guard–manned Army vessel used for training civilians for the Army. Her first commanding officer was Lt. J. R. Choate, USCGR, succeeded by Lt. J.G. Marvin B. Barker, USCGR, on 12 September 1945.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.uscg.mil/history/webcutters/FS_Vessels.asp |title=World War II Coast Guard Manned U.S. Army Freight and Supply Ship Histories: ''FS-344'' |work=U.S. Coast Guard |access-date=11 January 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151019005817/http://www.uscg.mil/history/webcutters/FS_Vessels.asp |archive-date=19 October 2015 |url-status=live }}</ref>  ''FS-344'' was placed out of service in 1954.

In 1964 the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] became interested in having smaller, less expensive, more flexible and responsive [[signals intelligence]] collection vessels than the existing [[AGTR]] and [[T-AG]] vessels. The mothballed light cargo ships were the most suitable existing DOD ships, and one was converted to {{USS|Banner|AGER-1|6}} in 1964 and began operations in 1965.<ref name="USCryptHist"/> ''Banner's'' mission was to surveil high-frequency electronic emissions with line-of-sight propagation requiring operating closer to shore than previous intelligence gathering missions.  ''Banner'' was unarmed, but the crew were issued five [[M1911 pistol]]s and three [[M1 Garand]] rifles. ''Banner'' was confronted by [[Soviet Navy]] ships while operating off the Pacific coast of the [[Soviet Union]]. These ships would sometimes display international signal flags meaning: "Heave to or I will fire," but ''Banner'' kept steaming with scrupulous attention to [[International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea]]. Soviet recognition of possible American reciprocity against Soviet ships on similar missions discouraged attacks.<ref name=lmb>{{cite journal |last=Bucher |first=Lloyd M. |author-link=Lloyd Bucher |date=Winter 1989 |title=Commander Bucher Replies |journal=Naval History |volume=3 |issue=1 |pages=44–50 |publisher=[[United States Naval Institute]] }}</ref>

''FS-344'' was transferred to the [[United States Navy]] on 12 April 1966 and was renamed USS ''Pueblo'' (AKL-44) after [[Pueblo, Colorado|Pueblo]] and [[Pueblo County, Colorado]] on 18 June. Initially, she was classified as a light cargo ship for basic refitting at [[Puget Sound Naval Shipyard]] during 1966. As ''Pueblo'' was prepared under a non-secret cover as a light cargo ship, the general crew staffing and training was on this basis, with 44% having never been to sea when first assigned. Installation of signals intelligence equipment, at a cost of $1.5 million, was delayed to 1967 for budgetary reasons, resuming service as what is colloquially known as a "[[spy ship]]" and redesignated ''AGER-2'' on 13 May 1967.<ref name="USCryptHist"/> The limited budget for conversion caused disapproval of several improvements requested by the prospective commanding officer, Lloyd Bucher. Requested engine overhaul was denied despite ''Banner's'' experience of drifting for two days unable to communicate following failure of both engines on patrol. A requested emergency [[scuttling]] system was denied, and Bucher was subsequently unable to obtain explosives for demolition charges. Replacement of [[burn barrel]]s with a fuel-fed [[incineration|incinerator]] to allow speedy destruction of classified documents was denied. After Bucher's subsequent request to reduce the ship's library of classified publications was similarly denied, he was able to purchase a less capable incinerator using some discretionary funds intended for crew comfort. Following the [[USS Liberty incident|USS ''Liberty'' incident]] on 8 June, [[Vice Chief of Naval Operations]] (VCNO) [[Horacio Rivero Jr.]] ordered that no Navy ship would operate without adequate means of defending itself. VCNO staff directed the shipyard to install a [[3-inch/50-caliber gun]] on ''Pueblo's'' [[main deck]] with provisions for ammunition storage, but Bucher successfully argued against such installation because of reduced [[ship stability]] by addition of weight above the main deck.<ref name=lmb/> After testing and deficiency rework ''Pueblo'' sailed from the shipyard on 11 September 1967 to [[Naval Base San Diego|San Diego]] for shake-down training.<ref name="USCryptHist"/>

When the unarmed ''Pueblo'' reached the U.S. Navy base at [[United States Fleet Activities Yokosuka|Yokosuka]], [[Japan]], the commander of [[Naval Forces Japan (United States)|United States Naval Forces Japan]] directed the ship to take two [[M2 Browning]] .50 caliber machine guns as a substitute for the missing deck gun. In the limited time available for training, ten of the ship's crew fired five rounds each. Bucher opted to mount these guns in exposed positions on the [[Bow (watercraft)|bow]] and [[stern]] to keep them as far as possible from his position on the [[Bridge (nautical)|bridge]]. These positions eliminated possible use of the ship's [[superstructure]] to protect the gunners and conceal the guns and ammunition service lockers. The exposed guns, with no nearby ammunition supply, were disguised under canvas covers which became rigid with frozen spray.<ref name=lmb/>

{{anchor|Activity and conflict near the DPRK}}<!-- This section is linked from [[USS Liberty incident]] -->

==''Pueblo'' incident==
{{Infobox military conflict
| conflict          = Pueblo incident
| result            = North Korean victory
| notes             = 
| casualties2       = None
| casualties1       = 1 killed<br />9 wounded<br />82 captured
| strength2         = 2 Fishing trawlers<br />2 Submarine chasers<br />4 Torpedo boats<br />2 [[MiG-21]] fighters
| strength1         = 1 Spy ship
| commander2        = {{flagicon|North Korea|1948}} [[Kim Il-chol]]
| commander1        = {{flagicon|United States}} [[Lloyd M. Bucher]]
| combatant2        = {{flag|North Korea|1948}}
| combatant1        = {{flag|United States}}
| combatants_header = 
| status            = 
| territory         = 
| partof            = the [[Korean DMZ Conflict]] and the [[Korean conflict]]
| map_label         = 
| map_caption       = 
| map_marksize      = 
| map_size          = 
| longitude         = 
| latitude          = 
| map_relief        = 
| map_type          = 
| coordinates       = 
| place             = [[Sea of Japan]]
| date              = 20–23 January 1968
| campaignbox       = {{Campaignbox Korean Cold War}}
}}
On 5 January 1968, ''Pueblo'' left [[United States Fleet Activities Yokosuka|Yokosuka]] in transit to the [[United States Fleet Activities Sasebo|U.S. naval base]] at [[Sasebo]], Japan; from there she left on 11 January 1968, headed northward through the [[Tsushima Strait]] into the [[Sea of Japan]]. She left with specific orders to intercept and conduct surveillance of [[Soviet Navy]] activity in the Tsushima Strait and to gather signal and electronic intelligence from [[North Korea]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.usspueblo.org/v2f/attack/attacked.htm |title=Attacked by North Koreans |work=USS Pueblo Veteran's Association |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080828001626/http://www.usspueblo.org/v2f/attack/attacked.htm |archive-date=28 August 2008 |access-date=11 June 2009}}</ref> Mission planners failed to recognize that the absence of similar North Korean missions around the United States would free North Korea from the possibility of retribution in kind which had restrained Soviet response.<ref name=lmb/> The declassified [[SIGAD]] for the [[National Security Agency]] (NSA) Direct Support Unit (DSU) from the [[Naval Security Group]] (NSG) on ''Pueblo'' during the patrol involved in the incident was USN-467Y.<ref name="nsa_AGER2_bkgnd">{{cite web|url=http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/uss_pueblo/USS_Pueblo_AGER-2_Background_Information.pdf|title=USS Pueblo AGER 2: Background Information|work=National Security Agency|page=10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130918031529/http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/uss_pueblo/USS_Pueblo_AGER-2_Background_Information.pdf|archive-date=18 September 2013|access-date=13 June 2013}}</ref> AGER (Auxiliary General Environmental Research) denoted a joint Naval and [[National Security Agency]] (NSA) program.<ref>{{cite DANFS |url=https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/p/pueblo-iii.html |title=Pueblo III (AGER-2) |access-date=17 June 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160801214641/http://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/p/pueblo-iii.html |archive-date=1 August 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> Aboard were the ship's crew of five officers and 38 enlisted men, one officer and 37 enlisted men of the NSG, and two civilian [[oceanography|oceanographers]] to provide a [[disinformation|cover story]].<ref name=lmb/>

On 16 January 1968, ''Pueblo'' arrived at the [[42nd parallel north|42°N parallel]] in preparation for the patrol, which was to transit down the North Korean coast from 41°N to 39°N, and then back, without getting closer than {{convert|13|nmi|km}} from the North Korean coast, at night moving out to a distance of {{convert|18|to|20|nmi|km}}. This was challenging as only two sailors had good navigational experience, with the captain later reporting, "I did not have a highly professional group of seamen to do my navigational chores for me."<ref name="USCryptHist"/>

At 17:30 on 20 January 1968, a North Korean modified [[Kronshtadt-class submarine chaser|SO-1 class]] Soviet style [[submarine chaser]] passed within {{convert|4000|yd|km}} of ''Pueblo'', which was about {{convert|15.4|nmi|km}} southeast of Mayang-do at a position 39°47'N and 128°28.5'E.<ref name="USCryptHist"/>

[[File:USS-Pueblo-Int-Report.jpg|thumb|right|Intelligence report made by USS Pueblo related to the incident.]]
In the afternoon of 22 January 1968, the two North Korean fishing [[Commercial trawler|trawlers]] ''Rice Paddy 1'' and ''Rice Paddy 2'' passed within {{convert|30|yd|m}} of ''Pueblo''. That day, a North Korean [[KPA Special Operations Force]] unit made an [[Blue House raid|assassination attempt]] at the [[Blue House]] executive mansion against South Korean president [[Park Chung Hee]], but the crew of ''Pueblo'' was not informed.<ref name="USCryptHist"/>

According to the American account, the following day, 23 January, ''Pueblo'' was approached by a submarine chaser and her nationality was challenged; ''Pueblo'' responded by raising the [[Flag of the United States|U.S. flag]] and directing the civilian oceanographers to commence water sampling procedures with their deck winch.<ref name=lmb/> The North Korean vessel then ordered ''Pueblo'' to [[wikt:stand down|stand down]] or be fired upon. ''Pueblo'' attempted to maneuver away, but was considerably slower than the submarine chaser. Several warning shots were fired. Additionally, three [[torpedo boat]]s appeared on the horizon and then joined in the chase and subsequent attack.<ref name="USCryptHist"/>

The attackers were soon joined by two [[Korean People's Army Air and Anti-Air Force|Korean People's Air Force]] [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21|MiG-21]] fighters. A fourth torpedo boat and a second submarine chaser appeared on the horizon a short time later. The ammunition on ''Pueblo'' was stored below decks, and her machine guns were wrapped in cold-weather tarpaulins. The machine guns were unmanned, and no attempt was made to man them. An NSA report quotes the sailing order:

{{Blockquote|( ... ) Defensive armament (machine guns) should be stowed or covered in such manner so that it does not cause unusual interest by surveyed units. It should be used only in the event of a threat to survival ( ... )}}

and notes:

{{Blockquote|In practice, it was discovered that, because of the temperamental adjustments of the firing mechanisms, the [[M2 Browning|.50-caliber]] machine guns took at least ten minutes to activate. Only one crew member, with former army experience, had ever had any experience with such weapons, although members of the crew had received rudimentary instructions on the weapons immediately prior to the ship's deployment.<ref name="USCryptHist">{{cite web
|title=The Capture of the USS Pueblo and Its Effect on SIGINT Operations
|url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB278/US_Cryptologic_History--The_Capture_of_the_USS_Pueblo.pdf
|year=1992
|publisher=U.S. Cryptologic History, Special Series, Crisis Collection, Vol. 7, [[National Security Agency]] (NSA)
|first=Robert E.
|last=Newton
|access-date=19 February 2010
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190105042907/https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB278/US_Cryptologic_History--The_Capture_of_the_USS_Pueblo.pdf
|archive-date=5 January 2019
|url-status=live
}}</ref>}}

[[File:428-GX-USN-1140171 (34717511891) (cropped).jpg|thumb|upright=1.3|Chart showing the 17 locations North Korea reported ''Pueblo'' had entered their {{convert|12|nmi|km}} territorial waters]]
[[File:USSPueblo positions.png|thumb|upright=1.5|Positions of ''Pueblo'' reported by the U.S. Navy]]

U.S. Navy authorities and the crew of ''Pueblo'' insist that before the capture, ''Pueblo'' was miles outside North Korean territorial waters. North Korea claims that the vessel was well within North Korean territory. The ''Pueblo''{{'}}s mission statement allowed her to approach within a nautical mile (1,852&nbsp;m) of that limit. However, North Korea describes a {{convert|50|nmi|km|0|adj=on}} [[Territorial waters|sea boundary]] even though international standards were {{convert|12|nmi|km|0}} at the time.<ref>"Questions of international law raised by the seizure of the U.S.S. ''Pueblo''", ''Proceedings of the American Society of International Law: at its sixty third annual meeting held at Washington, D.C.'', 24–26 April 1969. American Society of International Law.</ref>

The North Korean vessels attempted to board ''Pueblo'', but she was maneuvered to prevent this for over two hours. The submarine chaser then opened fire with a 57&nbsp;mm cannon and the smaller vessels fired machine guns, injuring Signalman Leach in his left calf and upper right side. Captain Bucher, too, received slight shrapnel wounds, but they were not incapacitating. The crew of ''Pueblo'' then began destroying sensitive material. The volume of material on board was so great that it was impossible to destroy it all. An NSA report quotes Lieutenant Steve Harris, the officer in charge of ''Pueblo''{{'}}s [[Naval Security Group|Naval Security Group Command]] detachment:

{{Blockquote|( ... ) we had retained on board the obsolete publications and had all good intentions of getting rid of these things but had not done so at the time we had started the mission. I wanted to get the place organized eventually and we had excessive numbers of copies on board ( ... )}}

and concludes:

{{Blockquote|Only a small percentage of the total classified material aboard the ship was destroyed.}}

Radio contact between ''Pueblo'' and the Naval Security Group in [[Naval Support Facility Kamiseya|Kamiseya]], Japan had been ongoing during the incident. As a result, [[United States Seventh Fleet|Seventh Fleet]] command was fully aware of ''Pueblo''{{'}}s situation. Air cover was promised but never arrived. The [[Fifth Air Force]] had no aircraft on strip alert, and estimated a two-to-three-hour delay in launching aircraft. {{USS|Enterprise|CVN-65|6}} was located {{convert|510|nmi|km}} south of ''Pueblo'', yet her four [[McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II|F-4B]] aircraft on alert were not equipped for an air-to-surface engagement. ''Enterprise''{{'}}s captain estimated that 1.5 hours (90 minutes) were required to get the converted aircraft into the air.<ref name="USCryptHist"/>

Eventually the shelling forced ''Pueblo'' to stop, signal compliance, and follow the North Korean vessels as ordered. ''Pueblo'' stopped again immediately outside North Korean waters in an attempt to obtain more time for destroying sensitive material, but was immediately fired upon by the submarine chaser, and a sailor, fireman Duane Hodges, was killed, after which ''Pueblo'' resumed following the North Korean vessels. The ship was finally boarded at 05:55 UTC (2:55 pm local)<ref name="NSA_NK_Transmissions">{{cite web|url=http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/uss_pueblo/North_Korean_Transmissions_from_Jan_68.pdf|title=North Korean Transmissions from January 1968: Chronology|year=1968|publisher=[[National Security Agency]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130918031655/http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/uss_pueblo/North_Korean_Transmissions_from_Jan_68.pdf|archive-date=18 September 2013|access-date=26 June 2013}}</ref> by men from a torpedo boat and the submarine chaser. Crew members had their hands tied and were blindfolded, beaten, and prodded with bayonets. Once ''Pueblo'' was in North Korean territorial waters, she was boarded again, this time by high-ranking North Korean officials.{{citation needed|date=November 2012}}

[[File:USS-Pueblo-Capture.jpg|thumb|right|Photo of captured crew, on display in war museum in Pyongyang.]]
The first official confirmation that the ship was in North Korean hands came five days later, 28 January 1968. Two days earlier, a flight by a CIA [[Lockheed A-12|A-12 Oxcart]] aircraft from the Project Black Shield squadron at [[Kadena Air Base|Kadena]], [[Okinawa Island|Okinawa]], flown by pilot Jack Weeks, made three high-altitude, high-speed flights over North Korea. When the aircraft's films were processed in the United States, they showed ''Pueblo'' to be in the [[Wonsan]] harbor area surrounded by two North Korean vessels.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mobley |first=Richard A. |title=Flash Point North Korea |publisher=Naval Institute Press |year=2003 |isbn=978-1-55750-403-6}}</ref>

There was dissent among government officials in the United States regarding the nation's response to the situation. [[List of current United States representatives|Congressman]] [[Mendel Rivers]] suggested that President Johnson issue an ultimatum for the return of ''Pueblo'' under penalty of nuclear attack, while Senator [[Gale McGee]] said that the United States should wait for more information and not make "spasmodic response[s] to aggravating incidents."<ref>{{cite web |year=1968 |url=http://www.upi.com/Audio/Year_in_Review/Events-of-1968/N.-Korea-Seize-U.S.-Ship/12303153093431-9/ |title=N. Korea Seize U.S. Ship, 1968 Year in Review |work=UPI.com |access-date=11 June 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110831120907/http://www.upi.com/Audio/Year_in_Review/Events-of-1968/N.-Korea-Seize-U.S.-Ship/12303153093431-9/ |archive-date=31 August 2011 |url-status=live }}</ref> According to [[Horace Busby]], Special Assistant to President Johnson, the president's "reaction to the hostage taking was to work very hard here to keep down any demands for retaliation or any other attacks upon North Koreans", worried that rhetoric might result in the hostages being killed.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/vietnam-fa3035-interview-with-horace-w-busby-1981 |date=24 April 1981 |title=Interview with Horace W. Busby, 1981 |work=WGBH Media Library & Archives |access-date=9 November 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121013012330/http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/vietnam-fa3035-interview-with-horace-w-busby-1981 |archive-date=13 October 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref>

On Wednesday, 24 January 1968, the day following the incident, after extensive cabinet meetings Washington decided that its initial response should be to:

*Deploy air and naval forces to the immediate area.
*Make reconnaissance flights over the location of the ''Pueblo''.
*Call up [[Reserve components of the United States Armed Forces|military reserves]] and extend terms of military service.
*Protest the incident within the framework of the [[United Nations]].
*Have President Johnson personally cable Soviet premier [[Alexei Kosygin]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d217|title=FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXIX, PART 1, KOREA|date=January 24, 1968|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180616231310/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d217|archive-date=16 June 2018|access-date=16 June 2018}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d218|title=FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXIX, PART 1, KOREA|date=January 24, 1968|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180616231333/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d218|archive-date=16 June 2018|access-date=16 June 2018}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d220|title=FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXIX, PART 1, KOREA|date=January 24, 1968|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180617015205/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d220|archive-date=17 June 2018|access-date=16 June 2018}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d221|title=FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXIX, PART 1, KOREA|date=January 24, 1968|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180617015227/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d221|archive-date=17 June 2018|access-date=16 June 2018}}</ref>

The Johnson Administration also considered a blockade of North Korean ports, air strikes on military targets and an attack across the [[Korean Demilitarized Zone|Demilitarized Zone]] separating the two Koreas.<ref>{{cite web|title=USS Pueblo: LBJ Considered Nuclear Weapons, Naval Blockade, Ground Attacks in Response to 1968 North Korean Seizure of Navy Vessel, Documents Show|editor=John Prados and Jack Cheevers|publisher=[[National Security Archive]]|url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB453/|access-date=August 10, 2018|date=January 23, 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180811031805/https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB453/|archive-date=11 August 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>

Although American officials assumed that the seizure of ''Pueblo'' had been directed by the Soviet Union, declassified Soviet archives later showed that the Soviet leadership was caught by surprise, and became fearful of war on the Korean peninsula. [[Eastern Bloc]] ambassadors urged North Korea to exercise caution after the incident. Several documents suggest that North Korea's aggressive action may have been an attempt to signal a tilt towards the [[Chinese Communist Party]] in the aftermath of the [[Sino-Soviet split]] in 1966.<ref name="wilsoncenter">{{cite web |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/new-romanian-evidence-the-blue-house-raid-and-the-uss-pueblo-incident |last1=Lerner |first1=Mitchell |last2=Shin |first2=Jong-Dae |title=New Romanian Evidence on the Blue House Raid and the USS Pueblo Incident. NKIDP e-Dossier No. 5. |work=Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars |date=20 April 2012 |access-date=23 April 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120504051205/http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/nkidp-e-dossier-no-5-new-romanian-evidence-the-blue-house-raid-and-the-uss-pueblo |archive-date=4 May 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref>

==Aftermath==
{{See also|Operation Combat Fox|Operation Formation Star}}

''Pueblo'' was taken into port at [[Wonsan]] and the crew was moved twice to [[Prisoner-of-war camp|prisoner-of-war (POW) camps]]. The crew members reported upon release that they were starved and regularly tortured while in North Korean custody. This treatment turned worse<ref>{{cite web
 |first1      = Harry
 |last1       = Iredale
 |first2      = Ralph
 |last2       = McClintock
 |title       = Compound 2 'The Farm'
 |url         = http://www.usspueblo.org/Prisoners/the_Farm.html
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20100823225423/http://www.usspueblo.org/Prisoners/the_Farm.html
 |publisher   = USS Pueblo Veteran's Association
 |archive-date = 23 August 2010
 |access-date  = 30 September 2010
 |quote       = The treatment would become better or worse depending upon the day, the week, the guard, the duty officer or the situation.
 }}</ref> when the North Koreans realized that crewmen were secretly giving them "[[the finger]]" in staged propaganda photos.<ref>{{cite web
 |first       = Russell
 |last        = Stu
 |title       = The Digit Affair
 |url         = http://www.usspueblo.org/Prisoners/The_Digit_Affair.html
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20101001012936/http://www.usspueblo.org/Prisoners/The_Digit_Affair.html
 |publisher   = USS Pueblo Veteran's Association
 |archive-date = 1 October 2010
 |access-date  = 30 September 2010
 |quote       = The finger became an integral part of our anti-propaganda campaign. Any time a camera appeared, so did the fingers.
 }}</ref>
[[File:North_Korea_Propaganda_Photograph_of_prisoners_of_the_USS_Pueblo,_with_the_Hawaiian_Good_Luck_Sign,_1968.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|North Korean Propaganda Photograph of prisoners of USS ''Pueblo''. Photo and explanation from the ''[[Time Magazine|Time]]'' article that exposed the Hawaiian Good Luck Sign secret. The sailors were flipping the middle finger, as a way to covertly protest their captivity in North Korea, and the propaganda on their treatment and guilt. The North Koreans for months photographed them without knowing the real meaning of flipping the middle finger, while the sailors explained that the sign meant good luck in Hawaii.]]
Commander [[Lloyd M. Bucher]] was psychologically tortured, including being put through a [[Mock execution|mock firing squad]] in an effort to make him confess. Eventually the North Koreans threatened to execute his men in front of him, and Bucher relented and agreed to "confess to his and the crew's transgression." Bucher wrote the confession since a "confession" by definition needed to be written by the confessor himself. They verified the meaning of what he wrote, but failed to catch the pun when he said "We paean the DPRK [North Korea]. We paean their great leader [[Kim Il Sung]]".<ref>{{Cite news |url=http://www.thepalmbeachtimes.com/Pages/Korea.html |title=End of North Korea? |newspaper=[[The Palm Beach Times]] |access-date=4 April 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061120150253/http://www.thepalmbeachtimes.com/Pages/Korea.html |archive-date=20 November 2006 |url-status=live }}</ref> (Bucher pronounced "''[[wikt:paean|paean]]''" as "''[[Urination|pee on]]''.")<ref>{{cite book |last=Cheevers |first=Jack |title=Act of War: Lyndon Johnson, North Korea, and the Capture of the Spy Ship Pueblo |publisher=Penguin |year=2013 |isbn=978-0-45146-619-8}}</ref>

Negotiations for the release of the crew took place at [[Panmunjom]]. At the same time, U.S. officials were concerned with conciliating the South Koreans, who expressed discontent about being left out of the negotiations. Richard A. Ericson, a political counselor for the [[Embassy of the United States, Seoul|American embassy in Seoul]] and operating officer for the ''Pueblo'' negotiations, notes in his oral history:

<blockquote>The South Koreans were absolutely furious and suspicious of what we might do. They anticipated that the North Koreans would try to exploit the situation to the ROK's disadvantage in every way possible, and they were rapidly growing distrustful of us and losing faith in their great ally. Of course, we had this other problem of how to ensure that the ROK would not retaliate for the Blue House Raid and to ease their growing feelings of insecurity. They began to realize that the DMZ was porous and they wanted more equipment and aid. So, we were juggling a number of problems.<ref name="Richard A. Ericson, Jr.">{{cite web|last=Kennedy|first=Charles S.|title=The USS Pueblo Incident – Assassins in Seoul, A Spy Ship Captured|url=http://adst.org/2013/01/the-uss-pueblo-incident-assassins-in-seoul-a-spy-ship-captured/|work=The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training: Foreign Affairs Oral History Project|access-date=20 February 2013|date=27 March 1995|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130608021745/http://adst.org/2013/01/the-uss-pueblo-incident-assassins-in-seoul-a-spy-ship-captured/|archive-date=8 June 2013}}</ref></blockquote>

He also noted how the meetings at Panmunjom were usually unproductive because of the particular negotiating style of the North Koreans:

<blockquote>As one example, we would go up with a proposal of some sort on the release of the crew and they would be sitting there with a card catalog ... If the answer to the particular proposal we presented wasn't in the cards, they would say something that was totally unresponsive and then go off and come back to the next meeting with an answer that was directed to the question. But there was rarely an immediate answer. That happened all through the negotiations. Their negotiators obviously were never empowered to act or speak on the basis of personal judgment or general instructions. They always had to defer a reply and presumably they went over it up in Pyongyang and passed it around and then decided on it. Sometimes we would get totally nonsensical responses if they didn't have something in the card file that corresponded to the proposal at hand.<ref name="Richard A. Ericson, Jr."/></blockquote>

Ericson and George Newman, the [[Deputy Chief of Mission]] in Seoul, wrote a telegram for the [[United States Department of State|State Department]] in February 1968, predicting how the negotiations would play out:

<blockquote>What we said in effect was this: If you are going to do this thing at Panmunjom, and if your sole objective is to get the crew back, you will be playing into North Korea's hands and the negotiations will follow a clear and inevitable path. You are going to be asked to sign a document that the North Koreans will have drafted. They will brook no changes. It will set forth their point of view and require you to confess to everything they accuse you of ... If you allow them to, they will take as much time as they feel they need to squeeze every damn thing they can get out of this situation in terms of their propaganda goals, and they will try to exploit this situation to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the ROK. Then when they feel they have accomplished all they can, and when we have agreed to sign their document of confession and apology, they will return the crew. They will not return the ship. This is the way it is going to be because this is the way it has always been.<ref name="Richard A. Ericson, Jr."/></blockquote>

Following an apology, a written admission by the U.S. that ''Pueblo'' had been spying, and an assurance that the U.S. would not spy in the future, the North Korean government decided to release the 82 remaining crew members, although the written apology was preceded by an oral statement that it was done only to secure the release.<ref name="USCryptHist"/><ref name="probst">{{Cite report |last=Probst|first=Reed R.|date=16 May 1977|title=Negotiating With the North Koreans: The U.S. Experience at Panmunjom|url=https://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Negotiating-with-the-North-Koreans-The-U.S.-Experience-at-Panmunjom.pdf|url-status=live|location=Carlisle Barracks, PA |publisher=U.S. Army War College|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150406220813/https://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Negotiating-with-the-North-Koreans-The-U.S.-Experience-at-Panmunjom.pdf |archive-date=2015-04-06 |access-date=2021-12-16 |via=Nautilus Institute}}</ref> On 23 December 1968, the crew was taken by buses to the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) border with South Korea and crossing at the "[[Bridge of No Return]]", carrying with them the body of Fireman Duane D. Hodges, who was killed during the capture. Exactly 11 months after being taken prisoner, the captain led the long line of crewmen, followed at the end by the executive officer, Lieutenant [[Edward R. Murphy (military officer)|Ed Murphy]], the last man across the bridge.<ref name="USCryptHist"/><ref name="schumacher">FC Schumacher and GC Wilson (1971) ''Bridge of No Return: The Ordeal of the USS Pueblo'', [[Harcourt (publisher)|Harcourt Brace Jovanovich]], New York.</ref>

Bucher and all of the officers and crew subsequently appeared before a [[Naval Board of Inquiry|Navy Court of Inquiry]]. A [[court-martial]] was recommended for Bucher and the officer in charge of the research department, Lieutenant Steve Harris, for surrendering without a fight and for failing to destroy classified material, but [[Secretary of the navy|Secretary of the Navy]] [[John Chafee]], rejected the recommendation, stating, "They have suffered enough." Commander Bucher was never found guilty of any indiscretions and continued his Navy career until retirement.<ref name="utsandiego">{{cite news|last=Wilkins|first=John|url=http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/dec/19/remembering-the-pueblo-and-north-korea/|title=Remembering the Pueblo and North Korea|date=19 December 2011|newspaper=[[The San Diego Union-Tribune]]|access-date=18 October 2014}}</ref>

In 1970, Bucher published an autobiographical account of the USS ''Pueblo'' incident entitled ''Bucher: My Story''.<ref>{{cite book |last=Bucher |first= Lloyd M. |author2=Mark Rascovich  |title= Bucher: My Story |publisher= [[Doubleday & Company]] |year= 1970 |isbn= 0-385-07244-9}}</ref> Bucher died in [[San Diego]] on 28 January 2004, at the age of 76. James Kell, a former sailor under his command, suggested that the injuries that Bucher suffered during his time in North Korea contributed to his death.<ref name="articles2004">{{cite news |url=http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/lloyd-bucher-captain-of-the-pueblo-buried-in-san-diego/article_cab6e1ac-b29a-5fbf-9e9d-924a8df028ab.html |title=Lloyd Bucher, captain of the Pueblo, buried in San Diego |newspaper=[[North County Times]] |date=3 February 2004 |access-date=11 June 2009 }}{{dead link|date=January 2018 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>

Along with the [[Battle of Khe Sanh]] and the [[Tet Offensive]], the ''Pueblo'' incident was a key factor in turning U.S. public opinion against the [[Vietnam War]] and influencing [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] into withdrawing from the [[1968 United States presidential election|1968 presidential election]].<ref>{{cite book | last=Gould | first=Lewis L. | title=1968: the election that changed America | publisher=Ivan R. Dee | publication-place=Chicago | year=2010 | isbn=978-1-56663-910-1 | oclc=694792997}}</ref>

USS ''Pueblo'' is still held by North Korea. In October 1999, she was towed from Wonsan on the east coast, around the [[Korea|Korean Peninsula]], to the port of [[Nampo]] on the west coast. This required moving the vessel through international waters, and was undertaken just before the visit of U.S. presidential envoy [[James A. Kelly|James Kelly]] to [[Pyongyang]]. After the stop at the [[Nampo Shipyard|Nampo shipyard]], ''Pueblo'' was relocated to Pyongyang and moored on the [[Taedong River]] near the spot where the [[General Sherman incident|''General Sherman'' incident]] is believed to have taken place. In late 2012, ''Pueblo'' was moved again to the [[Pothonggang Canal]] in Pyongyang, next to a new addition to the [[Fatherland Liberation War Museum]].<ref name="usspueblo.org" />

Today, ''Pueblo'' remains the second-oldest commissioned ship in the U.S. Navy, behind {{USS|Constitution}} ("Old Ironsides"). ''Pueblo'' is one of only a few American ships to have been captured since the [[First Barbary War]].{{citation needed|date=February 2024}}

=== Breach of U.S. communications security ===
Reverse engineering of communications devices on ''Pueblo'' allowed the North Koreans to share knowledge with the Soviet Union that led to the replication of those communications devices. This allowed the two nations access to the US Navy's communication systems until the US Navy revised those systems. The seizure of ''Pueblo'' followed soon after US Navy [[warrant officer]] [[John Anthony Walker]] introduced himself to Soviet authorities, setting up the [[Walker spy ring]].  It has been argued (by John Prados in the June 2010 issue of [[Naval History (magazine)|''Naval History Magazine'']]<ref>Prados, John. [http://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2010-06/navys-biggest-betrayal The Navy's Biggest Betrayal.] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151117040227/http://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2010-06/navys-biggest-betrayal |date=17 November 2015 }} ''Naval History'' 24, no. 3 (June 2010): 36.</ref>) that the seizure of ''Pueblo'' was executed specifically to capture the encryption devices aboard. Without them, it was difficult for the Soviets to make full use of Walker's information.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.usspueblo.org/Aftermath/John_Walker_KW7.html |title=Crypto gear, John Walker and the History Channel |website=USS Pueblo Veteran's Association |access-date=30 November 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151003075838/http://www.usspueblo.org/Aftermath/John_Walker_KW7.html |archive-date=3 October 2015 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>Heath, Laura J. [https://fas.org/irp/eprint/heath.pdf Analysis of the Systemic Security Weaknesses of the U.S. Navy Fleet Broadcasting System, 1967–1974, as Exploited by CWO John Walker] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160307020157/http://fas.org/irp/eprint/heath.pdf |date=7 March 2016 }} (PDF) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Master's Thesis. 2005.</ref> Mitchell Lerner and Jong-Dae Shin argue that Soviet-bloc Romanian dossiers demonstrate that the Soviets had no knowledge of the capture of the ship and were taken by surprise when it happened.<ref name="wilsoncenter2">{{cite web |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/new-romanian-evidence-the-blue-house-raid-and-the-uss-pueblo-incident |last1=Lerner |first1=Mitchell |last2=Shin |first2=Jong-Dae |title=New Romanian Evidence on the Blue House Raid and the USS Pueblo Incident. NKIDP e-Dossier No. 5. |work=Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars |date=20 April 2012 |access-date=23 April 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120504051205/http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/nkidp-e-dossier-no-5-new-romanian-evidence-the-blue-house-raid-and-the-uss-pueblo |archive-date=4 May 2012 |url-status=live |quote="Yet, as this e-Dossier makes clear, the Soviets were not only uninvolved in the planning but they were also exceedingly unhappy with both the attack itself and Kim's unwillingness to accept an early resolution."}}</ref>

After debriefing the released crew, the U.S. prepared a "Cryptographic Damage Assessment" that was declassified in late 2006.<ref name=NSAEBB453>{{cite web|title=Cryptographic Damage Assessment, USS Pueblo, AGER-2, 23 January - 23 December 1968|url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB453/docs/doc25.pdf|date=February 28, 1969|access-date=January 7, 2020}}</ref> The report concluded that, while the crew made a diligent effort to destroy sensitive material,<ref>''ibid'' p. 16:  "For the short time available and the tools at hand a very concentrated and noteworthy effort was made by the crewmen involved to destroy the COMSEC equipment."</ref> most of them were not familiar with cryptographic equipment and publications, had not received training in their proper destruction, and that their efforts were not sufficient to prevent the North Koreans from recovering most of the sensitive material. The crew itself thought the North Koreans would be able to rebuild much of the equipment.

Cryptographic equipment on board at the time of capture included "one [[KL-47]] for off-line encryption, two KW-7s<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/usa/kw7/index.htm|title=KW-7|website=www.cryptomuseum.com|access-date=2020-04-24}}</ref> for on-line encryption, three [[KWR-37]]s for receiving the Navy Operational Intelligence Broadcast, and four KG-14s<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.jproc.ca/crypto/kg14.html|title=KG 14|website=www.jproc.ca|access-date=2020-04-24}}</ref> which are used in conjunction with the KW-37 for receiving the Fleet Broadcasts." Additional tactical systems and [[one-time pad]]s were captured, but they were considered of little significance since most messages sent using them would be of value for only a short time.

The ship's cryptographic personnel were subject to intense interrogation by what they felt were highly knowledgeable electronics experts. When crew members attempted to withhold details, they were later confronted with pages from captured manuals and told to correct their earlier accounts. The report concluded that the information gained from the interrogations saved the North Koreans three to six months of effort, but that they would have eventually understood everything from the captured equipment and accompanying technical manuals alone. The crew members were also asked about many U.S. cryptographic systems that were not on board the ''Pueblo'', but only supplied superficial information.

The ''Pueblo'' carried [[key (cryptography)|key lists]] for January, February and March 1968, but immediately after the ''Pueblo'' was captured, instructions were sent to other holders of those keys not to use them, so damage was limited. However it was discovered in the debriefing that the ''Pueblo'' had onboard superseded key lists for November and December 1967 which should have been destroyed by January 15, well before the ''Pueblo'' arrived on station, according to standing orders.<ref name=NSAEBB453/>{{rp|p. 19}} The report considered the capture of the superseded keys for November and December the most damaging cryptographic loss. The capture of these keys likely allowed North Korea and its allies to read more than 117,000 classified messages sent during those months.<ref name=NSAEBB453/>{{rp|p. 30}} The North Koreans would also have gained a thorough knowledge of the workings of the captured systems but that would only have been of use if additional key material was compromised in the future. The existence of the Walker spy ring was, of course, not known at the time of the report.

The report noted that "the North Koreans did not display any of the captured cryptographic material to the crew, except for some equipment diagrams, or otherwise publicize the material for propaganda purposes. When contrasted with the international publicity given to the capture of other highly classified Special Intelligence documents, the fact that this material was not displayed or publicized would indicate that they thoroughly understood its significance and the importance of concealing from the United States the details of the information they had acquired."<ref name=NSAEBB453/>{{rp|A.7}}

=== In the communist camp ===

Documents released from [[National Archives of Romania]] suggest it was the Chinese rather than the Soviets who actively encouraged the reopening of hostilities in Korea during 1968, promising North Korea vast material support should hostilities in Korea resume.<ref name="wilsoncenter"/> Together with the Blue House raid, the ''Pueblo'' incident turned out to be part of an increasing divergence between the Soviet leadership and North Korea. Fostering a resumption of hostilities in Korea, allegedly, was seen in Beijing as a way to mend relations between North Korea and China, and pull North Korea back in the Chinese sphere of influence in the context of the [[Sino-Soviet split]]. After the (then secret) diplomatic efforts of the Soviets to have the American crew released fell on deaf ears in Pyongyang, [[Leonid Brezhnev]] publicly denounced North Korea's actions at the 8th plenary session of the [[23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]].<ref name="wilsoncenter"/> In contrast, the [[Mass media in China|Chinese (state controlled) press]] published declarations supportive of North Korea's actions in the ''Pueblo'' incident.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XZBMCgAAQBAJ&pg=PT130|title=China and North Korea: Strategic and Policy Perspectives from a Changing China|first=C.|last=Freeman|date=30 June 2015|publisher=Springer|isbn=978-1-137-45566-6|via=Google Books|access-date=5 May 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190515040417/https://books.google.com/books?id=XZBMCgAAQBAJ&pg=PT130|archive-date=15 May 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>

Furthermore, [[State Archive of the Russian Federation|Soviet archives]] reveal that the Soviet leadership was particularly displeased that North Korean leader Kim Il-sung had contradicted the assurances he previously gave Moscow that he would avoid a military escalation in Korea. Previously secret documents suggest the Soviets were surprised by the ''Pueblo'' incident, first learning of it in the press. The same documents reveal that the North Koreans also kept the Soviets completely in the dark regarding ongoing negotiations with the Americans for the crew's release, which was another bone of contention. The Soviet reluctance at a reopening of hostilities in Korea was partly motivated by the fact that they had a [[Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty|1961 treaty with North Korea]] that obliged them to intervene<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3005971-1961-Treaty-of-Friendship-Cooperation-and-Mutual.html |title=DocumentCloud |access-date=28 November 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171201030920/https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3005971-1961-Treaty-of-Friendship-Cooperation-and-Mutual.html |archive-date=1 December 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref> in case the latter got attacked. Brezhnev however had made it clear in 1966 that just as in the case of the [[Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty|similar treaty they had with China]], the Soviets were prepared to ignore it rather than go to all-out war with the United States.<ref name="Radchenko">{{cite web|author1-link=Sergey Radchenko|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHP_WP_47.pdf|title=The Soviet Union and the North Korean Seizure of the USS Pueblo: Evidence from Russian Archives|last=Radchenko|first=Sergey S.|work=Cold War International History Project|publisher=Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars|location=Washington, D.C.|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160307074400/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHP_WP_47.pdf|archive-date=7 March 2016|access-date=5 May 2016}}</ref>{{rp|12–15}}

Given that Chinese and North Korean archives surrounding the incident remain secret, Kim Il-sung's intentions cannot be known with certainty. The Soviets revealed however that Kim Il-sung sent a letter to [[Alexei Kosygin]] on 31 January 1968 demanding further military and economic aid, which was interpreted by the Soviets as the price they would have to pay to restrain Kim Il-sung's bellicosity. Consequently, Kim Il-sung was invited to Moscow, but he refused to go in person owing to "increased defense preparations" he had to attend to, sending instead his defense minister, [[Kim Chang-bong]], who arrived on 26 February 1968. During a long meeting with Brezhnev, the Soviet leader made it clear that they were not willing to go to war with the United States, but agreed to an increase in subsidies for North Korea, which did happen in subsequent years.<ref name="Radchenko"/>{{rp|15–18}}

{{Gallery
|align=center
|title=Aftermath: capture and repatriation
|width=200
|height=140
|File:428-GX-USN-1136344 (34006925584).jpg|''Pueblo's'' crew being released by the North Koreans across the [[Bridge of No Return]] in the [[Joint Security Area]] of the [[Korean Demilitarized Zone|DMZ]] (De-militarized Zone) in [[Panmunjom]], [[Korea]] on 23 December 1968.
|Image:Repatriation of USS Pueblo Crew.jpg|Crew of USS ''Pueblo''<br /> upon release on 23 December 1968.
|File:USS Pueblo crew (January 1969).jpg|Official Navy photograph of ''Pueblo's'' crew taken on the grounds of the [[Balboa Naval Hospital]] in San Diego shortly after their arrival.
<!-- |Image:Pueblo a12 26 January 68 1.jpg|USS ''Pueblo'' in North Korean custody at Wonsan on 26 January 1968 (CIA [[Lockheed A-12|A-12]] imagery). -->
}}

==Timeline of negotiations==
Major General Pak Chung-kuk represented North Korea (DPRK) and U.S. Navy Rear Admiral John Victor Smith represented the [[United States]] until April 1968, at which point he was replaced by [[United States Army|U.S. Army]] Major General [[Gilbert H. Woodward]]. The timeline and quotations are taken from ''Matter of Accountability'' by Trevor Armbrister.<ref>{{cite book|last=Armbrister|first=Trevor|title=Matter of Accountability|year=1971|publisher=Barrie & Jenkins|isbn=978-0-214-65214-1}}</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Date !! Chief Negotiator !! Event / Position of respective government
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| 23 January 1968 <br /> (around noon local time)
|
| ''Pueblo'' is intercepted by North Korean forces close to the North Korean port city of Wonsan.
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| rowspan="4" | 24 January 1968 <br /> (11{{nbsp}}am local time)
| rowspan="2" | Admiral Smith
| Protests the "heinous" Blue House raid and subsequently plays a tape of a captured North Korean soldier's "confession" ... 
|- style="background:#6699CC"
| ''I want to tell you, Pak, that the evidence against you North Korean Communists is overwhelming ... I now have one more subject to raise which is also of an extremely serious nature. It concerns the criminal boarding and seizure of ... Pueblo in international waters. It is necessary that your regime do the following: one, return the vessel and crew immediately; two, apologize to the Government of the United States for this illegal action. You are advised that the United States reserves the right to ask for compensation under international law.''
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| rowspan = "2" | General Pak
| style="background:#FE6F5E" | ''Our saying goes, 'A mad dog barks at the moon', ... At the two hundred and sixtieth meeting of this commission held four days ago, I again registered a strong protest with your side against having infiltrated into our coastal waters a number of armed spy boats ... and demanded you immediately stop such criminal acts ... this most overt act of the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces was designed to aggravate tension in Korea and precipitate another war of aggression ... ''
|- style="background:#F88379"
| ''The United States must admit that Pueblo entered North Korean waters, must apologize for this intrusion, and must assure the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that such intrusions will never happen again.'' <br /> Admit, Apologize and Assure (the "Three As").
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| 4 March 1968
|
| Names of dead and wounded prisoners are provided by the DPRK.
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| late April 1968
|
| Admiral Smith is replaced by U.S. Army Major General Gilbert H. Woodward as chief negotiator.
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| 8 May 1968
|
| General Pak presents General Woodward with the document by which the United States would admit that ''Pueblo'' had entered the DPRK's waters, would apologize for the intrusion and assure the DPRK that such an intrusion would never happen again. It cited the Three A's as the only basis for a settlement and went on to denounce the United States for a whole host of other "crimes".
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| rowspan = "3" | 29 August 1968
| rowspan = "2" | General Woodward
| A proposal drafted by U.S. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach [the "overwrite" strategy] is presented.
|- style="background:#6699CC"
| ''If I acknowledge receipt of the crew on a document satisfactory to you as well as to us, would you then be prepared to release all of the crew?''
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| General Pak
| style="background:#FE6F5E" | ''Well, we have already told you what you must sign ... ''
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| 17 September 1968
| General Pak
| style="background:#FE6F5E" | ''If you will sign our document, something might be worked out ... ''
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| rowspan = "2" | 30 September 1968
| General Pak
| style="background:#FE6F5E" | ''If you will sign the document, we will at the same time turn over the men.''
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| General Woodward
| style="background:#6699CC" | ''We do not feel it is just to sign a paper saying we have done something we haven't done. However, in the interest of reuniting the crew with their families, we might consider an 'acknowledge receipt'''
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| rowspan = "3" | 10 October 1968
| rowspan = "2" | General Woodward
| (demonstrating to General Pak the nature of the 'signing')
|- style="background:#6699CC"
| ''I will write here that I hereby acknowledge receipt of eighty-two men and one corpse ... ''
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| General Pak
| style="background:#FE6F5E" | ''You are employing sophistries and petty stratagems to escape responsibility for the crimes which your side committed ... ''
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| 23 October 1968
|
| The "overwrite" proposal is again set out by General Woodward and General Pak again denounces it as a "petty strategem".
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| rowspan = "2" | 31 October 1968
| General Woodward
| style="background:#6699CC" | ''If I acknowledge receipt of the crew on a document satisfactory to you as well as to us, would you then be prepared to release all of the crew?''
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| General Pak
| style="background:#F88379" | ''The United States must admit that Pueblo had entered North Korean waters, must apologize for this intrusion, and must assure the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that this will never happen again.''
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| rowspan = "3" | 17 December 1968
| General Woodward
| Explains a proposal by State Department Korea chief James Leonard: the "prior refutation" scheme. The United States would agree to sign the document but General Woodward would then verbally denounce it once the prisoners had been released.
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| rowspan = "2" | General Pak
| [following a 50 min recess]
|- style="background:#FE6F5E"
| ''I note that you will sign my document ... we have reached agreement.''
|- style="background:lightgrey"
| 23 December 1968
|
| General Woodward on behalf of the United States signs the Three As document and the DPRK at the same time allows ''Pueblo's'' prisoners to return to U.S. custody.
|}

==Tourist attraction==
[[File:North Korean General.jpg|thumb|left|Captain Pak In Ho, who led the 7-man squad of North Korean sailors who stormed the USS Pueblo, often works as a tour guide of the captured ship at the [[Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum]].]]
''Pueblo'' is a tourist attraction in Pyongyang, North Korea, since being moved to the [[Taedong River]].<ref>{{Cite news |first=Caroline |last=Gluck |title=North Korea drags its feet |work=BBC News |date=29 October 2001 |url=https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1626579.stm |access-date=23 January 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090201072040/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1626579.stm |archive-date=1 February 2009 |url-status=live }}</ref> ''Pueblo'' used to be anchored at the spot where it is believed the [[General Sherman incident|''General Sherman'' incident]] took place in 1866. In late November 2012 ''Pueblo'' was moved from the Taedong river dock to a casement on the Pothong river next to the new [[Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum]]. The ship was renovated and made open to tourists with an accompanying video<ref>{{cite web |url=http://mediaryugyong.com.kp/data/video/en/11.flv |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170317143448/http://mediaryugyong.com.kp/data/video/en/11.flv |archive-date=2017-03-17 |work=Ryugyong Programming Center, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's media website |title=North Korean DPRK Liberation War Museum Video: Pueblo, U.S. Armed Spy Ship }}</ref> of the North Korean perspective in late July 2013. To commemorate the anniversary of the [[Korean War]], the ship had a new layer of paint added.<ref>{{Cite news|title = North Korea to put US spy ship captured in 1968 on display|date = 25 July 2013|url = https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/25/north-korea-us-spy-ship-museum?|newspaper = The Guardian|access-date = 25 July 2013|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20131104031209/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/25/north-korea-us-spy-ship-museum|archive-date = 4 November 2013|url-status = live}}</ref> Visitors are allowed to board the ship and see its superstructure, secret [[code room]] and crew artifacts.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Donenfeld |first1=Jeffrey |title=Full report: Visit to North Korea and the Pyongyang marathon |url=http://jeffreydonenfeld.com/blog/2015/04/exploring-north-korea-and-running-the-pyongyang-marathon/ |website=Jeffreydonenfeld.com |date=19 April 2015 |access-date=19 August 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150822190610/http://jeffreydonenfeld.com/blog/2015/04/exploring-north-korea-and-running-the-pyongyang-marathon/ |archive-date=22 August 2015 |url-status=live }}</ref> Sailors of the [[Korean People's Navy|KPN]], as well as officers of the [[Korean People's Army Ground Force|KPA]], lead tourists through the ship.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Tours |first=Koryo |date=29 April 2020 |title=USS Pueblo {{!}} North Korea Travel Guide |url=https://koryogroup.com/travel-guide/uss-pueblo-north-korea-travel-guide |access-date=September 19, 2024 |website=Koryo Tours}}</ref>

{{Gallery
|align=center
|title=USS ''Pueblo'' in [[Pyongyang]], North Korea
|width=200
|height=150
|File:Pueblo-at-Pyongyang-Museum-2014.jpg||File:USS Pueblo 2.JPG
|
|File:USS Pueblo 3.JPG 
|
|File:USS Pueblo 4.JPG
|
}}

==Offer to repatriate==
During an August 2005 diplomatic session in North Korea, former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea [[Donald Gregg]] received verbal indications from high-ranking North Korean officials that the state would be willing to repatriate ''Pueblo'' to United States authorities, on the condition that a prominent U.S. government official, such as the Secretary of State, come to Pyongyang for high level talks. While the U.S. government has publicly stated on several occasions that the return of the still-commissioned Navy vessel is a priority,<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.shippingtimes.co.uk/item479_uss_pueblo.htm |title=Saturday feature: Old flag for an old spy ship |website=Shipping Times |access-date=11 June 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090201025544/http://www.shippingtimes.co.uk/item479_uss_pueblo.htm |archive-date=1 February 2009 }}</ref> there has been no indication that the matter was brought up by U.S. Secretary of State [[Mike Pompeo]] on his April 2018 visit.

==Lawsuits==
Former ''Pueblo'' crew members William Thomas Massie, Dunnie Richard Tuck, Donald Raymond McClarren, and Lloyd Bucher sued the North Korean government for the abuse they suffered at its hands during their captivity. North Korea did not respond to the suit. In December 2008, U.S. District Judge [[Henry H. Kennedy, Jr.]], in Washington, D.C., awarded the plaintiffs $65 million in damages, describing their ill treatment by North Korea as "extensive and shocking."<ref>''[[Washington Post]]'', "[https://web.archive.org/web/20190727122153/https://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-washington-post/20081231/281595236401954 Damages Awarded in USS ''Pueblo'' Case]", 31 December 2008, p. 5.</ref> The plaintiffs, as of October 2009, were attempting to collect the judgement from North Korean assets frozen by the U.S. government.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wilber |first=Del Quentin |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/07/AR2009100703890.html |title=Hell Hath a Jury: North Korea Tortured the Crew of USS ''Pueblo'' in 1968. 4 Victims Fought for Solace in the Courts |newspaper=Washington Post |date=8 October 2009 |page=C1 |access-date=22 August 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170803125037/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/07/AR2009100703890.html |archive-date=3 August 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref>

In February 2021 a U.S. court awarded the survivors and their families $2.3 billion. It is uncertain if they will be able to collect the money from North Korea.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/26/asia/uss-pueblo-judgment-intl-hnk/index.html|title=US court awards $2.3 billion to USS Pueblo crew held hostage by North Korea more than 50 years ago|publisher=CNN|last=Griffiths|first=James|date=February 26, 2021|access-date=February 26, 2021}}</ref>

==Awards==
''Pueblo'' has earned the following awards:

{| style="margin:1em auto; text-align:center;"
!colspan=3 align=center|As FS-344
|-
|{{ribbon devices|number=0|type=award-star|ribbon=American Campaign Medal ribbon.svg|width=103}} 
|{{ribbon devices|number=0|type=award-star|ribbon=World War II Victory Medal ribbon.svg|width=103}}
|{{ribbon devices|number=0|type=service-star|ribbon=National Defense Service Medal ribbon.svg|width=103}}
|}

{| class="wikitable" style="margin:1em auto; text-align:center;"
| style="width:33.33%;" | [[American Campaign Medal]] 
| style="width:33.33%;" | [[World War II Victory Medal]] 
| style="width:33.33%;" | [[National Defense Service Medal]]
|}

{| style="margin:1em auto; text-align:center;"
!colspan=3 align=center|As USS ''Pueblo''
|-
|-
|colspan="4"|{{ribbon devices|number=0|type=service-star|ribbon=Combat Action Ribbon.svg|width=103}} {{ribbon devices|number=2|type=service-star|ribbon=National Defense Service Medal ribbon.svg|width=103}}
|-
|{{ribbon devices|number=0|type=service-star|ribbon=Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal ribbon.svg|width=103}}
|{{ribbon devices|number=0|type=service-star|ribbon=Global War on Terrorism Service Medal ribbon.svg|width=103}}
|{{ribbon devices|number=0|type=service-star|ribbon=Korea Defense Service ribbon.svg|width=103}}
|}

{|class="wikitable" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center; margin-bottom: -1px;"
|-
|colspan="4"|[[Combat Action Ribbon]]
|[[National Defense Service Medal]] <br />with two [[Service star#Navy warships|service stars]]
|}
{|class="wikitable" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center; margin-top: -1px;"
|-
| [[Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal]]
| [[Global War on Terrorism Service Medal]]
| [[Korea Defense Service Medal]]
|}

As for the crew members, they did not receive full recognition for their involvement in the incident until decades later. In 1988, the military announced it would award [[Prisoner of War medal]]s to those captured in the nation's conflicts. While thousands of American prisoners of war were awarded medals, the crew members of ''Pueblo'' did not receive them. Instead, they were classified as "detainees". It was not until Congress passed a law overturning this decision that the medals were awarded; the crew finally received the medals at San Diego in May 1990.<ref name="utsandiego"/>

[[File:24-01-135-uss-peublo.jpg|thumb|right|Memorial at [[Andersonville National Historic Site]]]]

==Representation in popular culture==
The 1968 ''[[Star Trek: The Original Series|Star Trek]]'' episode "[[The Enterprise Incident|The ''Enterprise'' Incident]]" was very loosely based upon the ''Pueblo'' incident. In the episode written by [[D. C. Fontana]], Captain [[James T. Kirk|Kirk]] takes the [[United Federation of Planets|Federation]] [[starship]] USS ''Enterprise'', apparently without authorization, into enemy [[Romulan]] space.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Sarantakes |first=Nicholas Evan |title=Cold War Pop Culture and the Image of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Perspective of the Original Star Trek Series |journal=Journal of Cold War Studies |volume=7 |issue=4 |date=Fall 2005 |pages=97–99 |doi=10.1162/1520397055012488 |jstor=26925852|s2cid=57563417 }}</ref>

The ''Pueblo'' incident was dramatically depicted in the 1973 ''[[ABC Theater]]'' televised production ''[[Pueblo (film)|Pueblo]]''. [[Hal Holbrook]] starred as Captain Lloyd Bucher. The two-hour drama was nominated for three [[Emmy Awards]], winning two.<ref>{{citation |url=https://www.emmys.com/bios/hal-holbrook#awards |title=Hal Holbrook |website=Television Academy |access-date=2021-12-16}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://movies.nytimes.com/movie/128338/Pueblo/overview |title=Pueblo – Trailer – Cast – Showtimes |access-date=5 September 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110531152604/http://movies.nytimes.com/movie/128338/Pueblo/overview |archive-date=31 May 2011 |department=Movies & TV |newspaper=[[The New York Times]] |author=Hal Erickson |author-link=Hal Erickson (author) |date=2011}}</ref>

A 2000 North Korean film titled ''Pueblo'' based on the incident stars [[Charles Robert Jenkins]]. This was his final role in a North Korean film.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Fowler |first=Simon |date=2017-12-12 |title=The US defectors who became film stars in North Korea |url=https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20150923-the-us-defectors-who-became-film-stars-in-north-korea |access-date=2025-06-22 |website=BBC |language=en-GB}}</ref>

==See also==
* [[1969 EC-121 shootdown incident]]
* [[Korean DMZ Conflict (1966–1969)]]
* [[List of museums in North Korea]]

'''Other conflicts:'''
* [[Gulf of Tonkin incident]]
* [[Hainan Island incident]]
* [[Mayaguez incident|''Mayaguez'' incident]]
* [[USS Liberty incident|USS ''Liberty'' incident]]

'''General:'''
* [[Technical research ship]]
* [[List of hostage crises]]

==References==
{{Reflist}}

'''Sources'''
* [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/crisis-and-confrontation-the-korean-peninsula-1968-1969 NKIDP: Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula: 1968–1969, A Critical Oral History]
* [http://www.usspueblo.org/North_Korea/USS_PUEBLO_Today.html USS ''Pueblo'' Today usspueblo.org] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130129033436/http://www.usspueblo.org/North_Korea/USS_PUEBLO_Today.html |date=29 January 2013 }}

==Further reading==
{{Div col|colwidth=30em}}
* Armbrister, Trevor. ''A Matter of Accountability: The True Story of the Pueblo Affair''. Guilford, Conn: Lyon's Press, 2004. {{ISBN|1-59228-579-1}}.
* Brandt, Ed. ''The Last Voyage of USS Pueblo''. New York: Norton, 1969. {{ISBN|0-393-05390-3}}.
* Bucher, Lloyd M., and Mark Rascovich. ''Pueblo and Bucher''. London: M. Joseph, 1971. {{ISBN|0-7181-0906-6}}. {{OCLC|3777130}}.
* Cheevers, Jack. ''Act of War: Lyndon Johnson, North Korea, and the Capture of the Spy Ship Pueblo''. New York : NAL Caliber, 2013. {{ISBN|978-0-451-46619-8}}.
* Crawford, Don. ''Pueblo Intrigue; A Journey of Faith''. Wheaton, Ill: Tyndale House Publishers, 1969. {{OCLC|111712}}.
* {{cite journal|last1=Frampton|first1=Viktor|last2=Morison|first2=Samuel Loring|year=1991 |title=Question 41/89|journal=Warship International|publisher= International Naval Research Organization|volume=XXVIII|issue=1|issn=0043-0374|pages=83–84|name-list-style=amp}}
* Gallery, Daniel V. ''The Pueblo Incident''. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970. {{OCLC|49823}}.
* Harris, Stephen R., and James C. Hefley. ''My Anchor Held''. Old Tappan, N.J.: F.H. Revell Co, 1970. {{ISBN|0-8007-0402-9}}. {{OCLC|101776}}.
* Hyland, John L., and John T. Mason. ''Reminiscences of Admiral John L. Hyland, USN (Ret.)''. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1989. {{OCLC|46940419}}.
* Lerner, Mitchell B. ''The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy''. Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas, 2002. {{ISBN|0-7006-1171-1}}. {{OCLC|48516171}}.
* Liston, Robert A. ''The Pueblo Surrender: A Covert Action by the National Security Agency''. New York: M. Evans, 1988. {{ISBN|0-87131-554-8}}. {{OCLC|18683738}}.
* Michishita, Narushige. ''North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966–2008''. London: Routledge, 2010. {{ISBN|978-0-203-87058-7}} .
* Mobley, Richard A. ''Flash Point North Korea: The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises''. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 2003. {{ISBN|1-55750-403-2}}.
* [[Edward R. Murphy (military officer)|Murphy, Edward R.]], and [[Curt Gentry]]. ''Second in Command: The Uncensored Account of the Capture of the Spy Ship Pueblo''. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. {{ISBN|0-03-085075-4}}.
* Newton, Robert E. ''The Capture of the USS Pueblo and Its Effect on SIGINT Operations''. [Fort George G. Meade, Md.]: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 1992. {{OCLC|822026554}}.
* {{cite magazine|last=Spiva|first=Dave|date=December 2018|title=11 Months of Hell|magazine=VFW Magazine|volume=106|number=3|location=Kansas City, Mo.|publisher=[[Veterans of Foreign Wars|Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States]]|page=40|issn=0161-8598|quote=Dec. 23 marks 50 years since the release of USS ''Pueblo'' crew members from North Korea's custody. One died heroically and the rest were tortured daily for nearly a year. The ship, to this day, remains in North Korean custody.}}
{{Div col end}}

==External links==
{{sister project links|auto=yes}}
* {{youTube|yBdP8xj3FUk|The Pueblo Incident}} "The Pueblo Incident"  briefing and analysis by the US Navy (1968)
* {{youTube|HlXiFpDoJ28|USS ''Pueblo''}} YouTube video taken of and aboard the USS ''Pueblo'' in Korea
* {{Internet Archive short film|gov.archives.arc.12053|The Pueblo Incident}}
* [http://www.usspueblo.org/ Official website by former USS ''Pueblo'' crew members]
* [http://freekorea.us/litigation/ Complaint and court judgment from crew members' lawsuit against North Korea] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210225094948/http://freekorea.us/litigation/ |date=25 February 2021 }}
* {{Cite web |url=http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/West/01/29/obit.bucher.ap/index.html |title=CNN.com obituary for Commander Lloyd M. Bucher |publisher=[[CNN]] |access-date=3 February 2004 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040409084045/http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/West/01/29/obit.bucher.ap/index.html |archive-date=9 April 2004 }}
* ''[https://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&ll=39.040399,125.739703&spn=0.001598,0.00339&t=k&z=19 Pueblo]'' [https://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&ll=39.040399,125.739703&spn=0.001598,0.00339&t=k&z=19 on Google Maps satellite image]
* {{IMDb title|qid=Q28458143|id=tt0070573|title=Pueblo}} – a 1973 TV movie about the ''Pueblo'' incident
* [https://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/north-korea-international-documentation-project North Korean International Documentation Project]
* {{youTube|XVCaB-qsEFU|Movie sold in Pyongyang on Pueblo Incident}}—A North Korean video on the issue
* A Navy and Marine Corps report of investigation of the "USS ''Pueblo'' seizure" conducted pursuant to chapter II of the Manual of the [[Judge Advocate General of the Navy|Judge Advocate General]] [https://web.archive.org/web/20090509191036/http://www.jag.navy.mil/FOIA/FOIAJAGMANinvestigations.htm (JAGMAN)] published as six [[Portable Document Format|PDF]] files: [https://web.archive.org/web/20120915085943/http://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/pueblo%20basic%20pt%201.pdf 1] [http://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/pueblo%20basic%20pt%202.pdf 2] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201019132944/https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/pueblo%20basic%20pt%202.pdf |date=19 October 2020 }} [http://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/pueblo%20basic%20pt%203.pdf 3] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201020092028/https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/pueblo%20basic%20pt%203.pdf |date=20 October 2020 }} [http://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/pueblo%20basic%20pt%204.pdf 4] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201019125227/https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/pueblo%20basic%20pt%204.pdf |date=19 October 2020 }} [http://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/pueblo%20basic%20pt%205.pdf 5] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201019132929/https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/pueblo%20basic%20pt%205.pdf |date=19 October 2020 }} [http://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/pueblo%20basic%20pt%206.pdf 6] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201020092131/https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/pueblo%20basic%20pt%206.pdf |date=20 October 2020 }}
* [https://www.usna.edu/Library/sca/man-findingaids/MS_237.EAD.xml Pueblo Court of Inquiry Scrapbook, 1969–1976, MS 237] held by Special Collection & Archives, Nimitz Library at the United States Naval Academy
* [https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/85/uss-pueblo-crisis "USS ''Pueblo'' Crisis," Wilson Center Digital Archive]
* [https://texasarchive.org/2018_00353 Reactions to ''Pueblo'' Incident (1968)], [[Texas Archive of the Moving Image]]

{{Cold War}}
{{Attacks on US Navy ships}}
{{Design 381 coastal freighters|state=collapsed}}
{{Museums in North Korea}}
{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Pueblo (Ager-2)}}
[[Category:1944 ships]]
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