Arctic convoys of World War II
Template:Short description Template:Use dmy dates Template:Infobox military conflict
The Arctic convoys of World War II were oceangoing convoys which sailed from the United Kingdom, Iceland, and North America to northern ports in the Soviet Union, most to Arkhangelsk (Archangel) or Murmansk in Russia. There were 78 convoys, Convoy PQ 1 to Convoy PQ 18 (outbound), Convoy QP 1 to Convoy QP 15 (inbound), Convoy JW 51 – Convoy JW 67 (outbound) and Convoy RA 51 to Convoy RA 67 (inbound). Convoys ran from August 1941 to May 1945, sailing via the Atlantic and Arctic oceans, with periods of no sailings during several months in 1942 and in the summers of 1943 and 1944.
About 1,400 merchant ships delivered supplies to the Soviet Union under the Anglo-Soviet Agreement and US Lend-Lease programme, mainly escorted by ships of the Royal Navy with support from the Royal Canadian Navy, and the U.S. Navy. Eighty-five merchant vessels and 16 British warships (two cruisers, six destroyers, eight other escort ships) were lost. The Template:Lang lost a number of vessels including the Template:Sclass Template:Ship, three destroyers, 30 U-boats and the Template:Lang suffered the loss of many aircraft. The convoys demonstrated the Western Allied commitment to helping the Soviet Union, prior to the opening of a second front and tied up a substantial part of Germany's naval and air forces.Template:Sfn
Background
First World War
During the First World War (1914–1918), Central Powers blockades halted traffic between Imperial Russia and its Allies via the Black Sea and the Baltic. The Tsarist authorities sped up development of an ice-free port at Romanov-on-Murman (now Murmansk); supplies arriving via the Arctic came too little and too late to prevent the Allied collapse on the Eastern Front.Template:Sfn The operation of Murmansk proved and established the feasibility of an Arctic supply-line for military materiel.Template:Cn
Arctic convoys
The Soviet authorities had claimed that the unloading capacity of Arkhangelsk was Template:Cvt, Vladivostok Template:Cvt and Template:Cvt by the Persian Gulf route. When surveyed by British and US technicians, the capacity of the ten berths at Arkhangelsk was assessed as Template:Cvt and the same from Murmansk from its eight berths.Template:Sfnm By late 1941, the convoy system used in the Atlantic had been established on the Arctic run; a convoy commodore ensured that the ships' masters and signals officers attended a briefing before sailing to make arrangements for the management of the convoy, which sailed in a formation of long rows of short columns. The commodore was usually a retired naval officer, aboard a ship identified by a white pendant with a blue cross. The commodore was assisted by a Naval signals party of four men, who used lamps, semaphore flags and telescopes to pass signals, coded from books carried in a bag, weighted to be dumped overboard. In large convoys, the commodore was assisted by vice- and rear-commodores to direct the speed, course and zig-zagging of the merchant ships and liaise with the escort commander.Template:SfnTemplate:Efn
Following Convoy PQ 16 and the disaster to Convoy PQ 17 in July 1942, Arctic convoys were postponed for nine weeks and much of the Home Fleet was detached to the Mediterranean for Operation Pedestal, a Malta convoy. During the lull, Admiral John Tovey concluded that the Home Fleet had been of no great protection to convoys beyond Bear Island, midway between Spitsbergen and the North Cape. Tovey would oversee the operation from Scapa Flow, where the fleet was linked to the Admiralty by landline, immune to variations in wireless reception. The next convoy should be accompanied by sufficient protection against surface attack; the longer-range destroyers of the Home Fleet could be used to augment the close escort force of anti-submarine and anti-aircraft ships, to confront a sortie by German ships with the threat of a massed destroyer torpedo attack. The practice of meeting homeward-bound QP convoys near Bear Island was dispensed with and Convoy QP 14 was to wait until Convoy PQ 18 was near its destination, despite the longer journey being more demanding of crews, fuel and equipment. The new escort carrier Template:HMS (Commander Anthony Colthurst) had arrived from the United States and was added to the escort force.Template:Sfn
First Protocol
The Soviet leaders needed to replace the colossal losses of military equipment lost after the German invasion, especially when Soviet war industries were being moved out of the war zone and emphasised tank and aircraft deliveries. Machine tools, steel and aluminium was needed to replace indigenous resources lost in the invasion. The pressure on the civilian sector of the economy needed to be limited by food deliveries. The Soviets wanted to concentrate the resources that remained on items that the Soviet war economy that had the greatest comparative advantage over the German economy. Aluminium imports allowed aircraft production to a far greater extent than would have been possible using local sources and tank production was emphasised at the expense of lorries and food supplies were squeezed by reliance on what could be obtained from lend–lease. At the Moscow Conference, it was acknowledged that 1.5 million tons of shipping was needed to transport the supplies of the First Protocol and that Soviet sources could provide less than 10 per cent of the carrying capacity.Template:Sfn
The British and Americans accepted that the onus was on them to find most of the shipping, despite their commitments in other theatres. The Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, made a commitment, to send a convoy to the Arctic ports of the USSR every ten days and to deliver Template:Nowrap a month from July 1942 to January 1943, followed by Template:Nowrap and another Template:Nowrap more than already promised.Template:Sfn In November, the US president, Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered Admiral Emory Land of the US Maritime Commission and then the head of the War Shipping Administration that deliveries to Russia should only be limited by 'insurmountable difficulties'.Template:Sfn The first convoy was due at Murmansk around 12 October and the next convoy was to depart Iceland on 22 October. A motley of British, Allied and neutral shipping loaded with military stores and raw materials for the Soviet war effort would be assembled at Hvalfjörður in Iceland, convenient for ships from both sides of the Atlantic.Template:Sfn
From Convoy Dervish to Convoy PQ 11 the supplies to the USSR were mostly from Britain, in British ships defended by the Royal Navy. A fighter force that could defend Murmansk was delivered and protected the Arctic ports and railways into the hinterland. British supplied aircraft and tanks reinforced the Russian defences of Leningrad and Moscow from December 1941. The tanks and aircraft did not save Moscow but were important in the Soviet counter-offensive. The Luftwaffe was by then reduced to 600 operational aircraft on the Eastern Front, to an extent a consequence of Template:Lang being sent to the Mediterranean. British-supplied tanks and aircraft helped the Soviet counter-offensive force back the Germans further than might have been possible and in January and February deliveries of tanks and aircraft allowed the Russians to have a margin of safety should the Germans attempt to counter-attack.Template:Sfn
Post-war criticism of the quality of British supplies contradicted the praise offered to the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, in Moscow in December, of the performance of Hurricane fighters and Valentine tanks; Matilda tanks were admittedly inferior in snow but were expected to operate better in the summer. Deliveries helped to improve the long-term potential of the Soviet war economy, the Template:Cvt of aluminium sent from Britain was the equivalent to the capacity lost in the Soviet Union in the six months from October 1941 and Template:Cvt each of copper and rubber were generally useful to the Soviet economy, especially after rubber from Malaya was cut off by the Malayan campaign (8 December 1941 – 15 February 1942). Radar and Asdic improved Russian anti-aircraft defences and the naval protection of the Arctic ports. In the first winter of the war in Russia the British helped to tide the USSR over at some cost to British grand strategy; the 700 fighters and about 500 tanks sent to Russia in 1941, could have made a substantial difference to British fortunes in the Middle East and Far East. The Germans laid plans to stop the Arctic convoys in 1942.Template:Sfn
Signals intelligence
Bletchley Park
The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts. By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters (Template:Lang) settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the older Template:Lang (Hydra from 1942, Dolphin to the British). By mid-1941, British Y-stations were able to receive and read Luftwaffe W/T transmissions and give advance warning of Luftwaffe operations. Template:Sfnm
In 1941, naval Headache personnel, with receivers to eavesdrop on Luftwaffe wireless transmissions, were embarked on warships and from May 1942, ships gained RAF Y computor parties, which sailed with cruiser admirals in command of convoy escorts, to interpret Luftwaffe W/T signals intercepted by the Headaches. The Admiralty sent details of Luftwaffe wireless frequencies, call signs and the daily local codes to the computors, which combined with their knowledge of Luftwaffe procedures, could glean fairly accurate details of German reconnaissance sorties. Sometimes computors predicted attacks twenty minutes before they were detected by radar.Template:Sfnm
B-Dienst
The rival German Template:Lang (Template:Lang, Observation Service) of the Template:Lang Template:Lang (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to help Kriegsmarine ships elude British forces and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941, Template:Lang read signals from the Commander in Chief Western Approaches informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones.Template:Sfn Template:Lang had broken Naval Cypher No 3 in February 1942 and by March was reading up to 80 per cent of the traffic, which continued until 15 December 1943. By coincidence, the British lost access to the Shark cypher and had no information to send in Cypher No 3 which might compromise Ultra.Template:Sfn
Convoy organisation
After the first convoy, Operation Dervish in August 1941, Arctic convoys were labelled PQ (outbound) and QP (return), ran from September 1941 to September 1942. The convoys ran twice monthly, with interruptions in the summer of 1942, when the series was suspended after the disaster of Convoy PQ 17 and again in the autumn after the final convoy of the series, Convoy PQ 18, because of the long daylight hours and the preparations for Operation Torch in November 1942. When the convoys resumed they were called JW (outbound) and RA (return) and ran from December 1942 until the end of the war, with interruptions in the summer of 1943 and in the summer of 1944.Template:Sfn Convoys began at Iceland (usually from Hvalfjörður) and sailed past Jan Mayen Island and Bear Island to Arkhangelsk when the ice permitted in the summer months, shifting south as the pack ice increased and terminating at Murmansk, a warm water port. From February 1942 Arctic convoys assembled and sailed from Loch Ewe in Scotland.Template:Sfn
Outbound and the reciprocal return convoys ran simultaneously with a close escort to the destination, then making the return journey with unloaded ships. A cruiser covering force sailed near the outbound convoy as far as Bear Island then transferred as the outbound and returning convoy crossed. A heavy covering force of aircraft carriers, battleships with cruiser and destroyer escorts guarded against sorties by German heavy ships like Template:Ship.Template:Sfn
The route skirted occupied Norway to the Soviet ports, limited by Polar ice from extensive diversions to the north and risked interception by Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft, bombers and torpedo-bombers, U-boats and ships. Storms, gales, fog, snow and hail were common, hiding the ships but also dispersing convoys, increasing the risk of interception. Currents and layers of cold and warm water, reduced the effectiveness of Asdic and ice could cause severe damage to ships and put them at risk of capsize. The difficulty of ships in convoy of keeping station and of navigating in storms and constant darkness in winter was replaced by the danger of constant air and sea attacks in the permanent daylight of the Midnight sun (22 May to 22 July at Murmansk).Template:Sfn
Convoy formation
Convoys had a standard formation of short columns, number 1 to the left in the direction of travel. Each position in the column was numbered; 11 was the first ship in column 1 and 12 was the second ship in the column; 21 was the first ship in column 2.Template:Sfn
Other supply routes
Persian Corridor
The Arctic route was the shortest, most direct and quickest route for supply convoys to the USSR, though it was also the most dangerous. Some Template:Cvt of goods were sent via the Arctic of which 93 per cent arrived. The route constituted about 23 per cent of the total aid to the USSR during the war. The Persian Corridor was the longest and only all-weather route to the USSR but was not operational until mid-1942. Thereafter it saw the passage of 4,160,000 tons of goods, 27 per cent of the total.Template:Sfnm
Pacific Route
The Pacific Route opened in late summer 1941 but the Attack on Pearl Harbor (7 December 1941) meant that only Soviet-flagged ships could be used on the route. As Japan and the USSR observed a strict neutrality towards each other, only non-military goods could be carried.Template:Sfn A total of 8,244,000 tons of goods went via the Pacific, 50 per cent of the total.Template:Sfn A branch of the Pacific Route began carrying goods through the Bering Strait to the Soviet Arctic coast in June 1942. From July to September, small Soviet convoys assembled in Providence Bay, Siberia to be escorted north through the Bering Strait and west along the Northern Sea Route by icebreakers and Lend-Lease Template:Sclasss. A total of 452,393 tons passed through the Bering Strait aboard 120 ships.Template:Sfn Part of this northern tonnage was fuel for the airfields along the Alaska–Siberia Air Route. Provisions for the airfields were transferred to river vessels and barges in the estuaries of large Siberian rivers.Template:Sfn Remaining ships continued westwards and were the only seaborne cargoes to reach Archangel while the Arctic convoys were suspended during the summers of 1943 and 1944.Template:Sfn
Aftermath
Analysis
Cargo included tanks, fighter aircraft, fuel, ammunition, raw materials and food.Template:Sfn The early convoys in particular delivered armoured vehicles and Hurricanes to make up for shortages in the Soviet Union.Template:Sfn The Arctic convoys caused changes to naval dispositions on both sides, which arguably had a big impact on events in other theatres of war. As a result of early raids by destroyers on German coastal shipping and the Operation Archery the Commando raid on Vågsøy, Hitler was led to believe that the British intended to invade Norway again. This, together with the obvious need to stop convoy supplies reaching the Soviet Union, caused him to direct that heavier ships, especially the battleship Tirpitz, be sent to Norway. The Channel Dash in early 1942 was partly undertaken for this reason.Template:Sfn
Tirpitz and the other German capital ships tied down British resources which might have been better used elsewhere, for example combating the Japanese in the Indian Ocean. The success of Template:Ship and Template:Ship in Operation Berlin during early 1941 had demonstrated the potential German threat. As the Allies closed the Mid-Atlantic gap, the air gap over the North Atlantic with very long range aircraft, Huff-Duff (radio triangulation equipment) improved airborne centimetric radar was introduced and convoys received escort carrier protection, the scope for commerce raiding diminished. To defend Norway German ships and U-boats were withdrawn from Atlantic bases and became responsible for offensive operations against the Arctic convoys Template:Sfn
Aside from an abortive attempt to interdict Convoy PQ 12 in March 1942 and a raid on Spitzbergen in September 1943, Tirpitz spent most of the Second World War in Norwegian fjords. She was penned in and repeatedly attacked until she was finally sunk in Tromsø fjord on 12 November 1944 by the Royal Air Force (RAF). Other Template:Lang capital ships, like Gneisenau, either never reached Norway, were chased off or were sunk (Scharnhorst). The failed attack on Convoy JW 51B, the Battle of the Barents Sea, where a strong German naval force failed to defeat a British escort of cruisers and destroyers, infuriated Hitler and led to the strategic change from surface raiders to submarines. Some capital ships were physically dismantled and armament used in coastal defences.Template:Sfn The Siege of Leningrad was one of important destinations for supplies from the convoys. From 1941, food and munitions were delivered from British convoys to Leningrad by trains, barges and trucks. Many supplies were destroyed by the Luftwaffe and by Naval Detachment K en route. Convoys continued to deliver food in 1942, 1943 and 1944.Template:Sfn
British intelligence
Ultra signals intelligence gained from the German Enigma code-breakers at Bletchley Park played an important part in the success of the convoys. German documents related to the Enigma coding machine were captured during the commando raids of Operation Archery and Operation Anklet (27 December 1941). The documents enabled the British to read messages on the home waters naval Enigma used by surface ships and U-boats in the Arctic (Heimisch, later Hydra network; Dolphin to the British) for the rest of the war.Template:Sfn In January 1942 reinforcements of Luftwaffe bombers, torpedo-bombers and long range reconnaissance aircraft were sent to northern Norway and new command organisations established at Stavanger and Kirkenes, followed by Fliegerführer Lofoten who was charged with the defence of Norway and offensive operations against Allied convoys.Template:Sfn
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The three U-boats in the area were increased to nine and another six were distributed between Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik to reconnoitre and oppose Allied landings. In May, all the U-boats came under Arctic Command and on 23 May, Admiral Scheer and Prinz Eugen joined Tirpitz at Trondheim, followed by Admiral Hipper; by 26 May Lützow had arrived at Narvik. The British read these moves from Ultra intercepts and traffic analysis from the RAF Y-station at RAF Cheadle, which eavesdropped on communications between Luftwaffe aircraft and ground stations. The reinforcement of the U-boat force in the Arctic to 12 in March and 21 in August (the real number was later found to be 23) was followed, along with the transfer orders to the large German ships.Template:Sfn
Ultra led to the ambush of Prinz Eugen by the submarine Template:HMS off Trondheim on 23 February. Prinz Eugen was badly damaged by a torpedo and the Admiralty was informed of the hit by an Enigma intercept the next day.Template:Sfn The information could not always be acted upon because much of it was obtained at short notice but the intelligence did give the Royal Navy time to prepare. The interception and sinking of Scharnhorst by Template:HMS was greatly assisted by ULTRA intercepts.Template:Sfn
Literary depictions
The 1955 novel HMS Ulysses by Scottish writer Alistair MacLean, and the 1967 novel The Captain by Dutch author Jan de Hartog, are set during the Arctic convoys.Template:Sfnm The 1958 novel The Midnight Sea by Ian Cameron (pseudonym of Donald G. Payne, who was a Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm pilot during the convoys) is set during an Arctic Convoy on the fictitious escort carrier HMS Viper in late 1944.Template:Sfn The 1967 Norwegian historic account One in Ten Had to Die (Template:Lang) by Per Hansson is based on the experience of the Norwegian sailor Leif Heimstad and other members of the Norwegian merchant fleet during the second World War.Template:Sfn The 1973 Russian novel Requiem for Convoy PQ-17 (Template:Lang) by Valentin Pikul depicts the mission of Convoy PQ 17.Template:Sfn
Notable convoys
Operation Dervish
The Dervish convoy assembled at Hvalfjörður and sailed on 21 August 1941.Template:Sfn It arrived at its destination, Arkhangelsk, ten days later. The convoy consisted of six merchant ships: Lancastrian Prince, New Westminster City, Esneh, Trehata, the elderly Llanstephan Castle, the fleet oiler Aldersdale and the Dutch freighter Alchiba. The Commodore was Captain J. C. K. Dowding RNR. The escorts comprised the destroyers Template:HMS, Template:HMS and Template:HMS, the Template:Sclasss Template:HMS, Template:HMS and Template:HMS and the anti-submarine trawlers Template:HMS, Template:HMS and Template:HMS. As evidence of Churchill's astute mastery of propaganda, on board Llanstephan Castle were two journalists and the artist Felix Topolski.Template:Sfn
Convoy PQ 16
Template:Main On 30 May 1942, the surviving ships of Convoy PQ 16 arrived, most ships to Murmansk and eight to Archangel; the convoy was such a success in war stores delivered that the Germans made greater efforts against the following convoys. The crane ships from Convoy PQ 16 including SS Empire Elgar stayed at Arkhangelsk and Molotovsk (now Severodvinsk) unloading ships for over 14 months.Template:Sfn
Convoy PQ 17
Template:Main In July 1942, Convoy PQ 17 suffered the worst losses of any Allied convoy in the Second World War. Under attack from German aircraft and U-boats, the convoy was ordered to scatter following reports that a battle group, which included the battleship Template:Ship, had sailed to intercept the convoy (the German group did not leave port until the following day, and was soon ordered to return). Eleven of the 35 merchant ships in the convoy managed to run the gauntlet of U-boats and German bombers.Template:Sfn
Battle of the Barents Sea
Template:Main In December 1942, German surface forces, including the heavy cruiser Template:Ship and pocket battleship Template:Ship, sailed to intercept Convoy JW 51B. The German force was driven off by a combined force of cruisers and destroyers.Template:Sfn
Convoy JW 55B
Template:Main In December 1943, Convoy JW 55B was attacked by the battleship Template:Ship. Two British forces were in the area. In the Battle of the North Cape, Scharnhorst encountered British cruisers and was then sunk by Template:HMS and her escorts in a night action, before it could return to port. German destroyers missed the convoy, which had been diverted north, based on intelligence from the Norwegian resistance movement.Template:Sfn
Memorials
The town of Poolewe on the north-west coast of Scotland was an important port in this route. Today there are several plaques commemorating this work. A brewery commemorates the Arctic Convoys by a special brand beer named Arctic Convoy IPA.Template:Cn Template:Clear
Tables
1941
| Out | Notes | Home | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dervish | Hvalfjörður–Arkhangelsk, 21–31 August | ||
| PQ 1 | Hvalfjörður–Arkhangelsk, 29 September – 11 October | QP 1 | Arkhangelsk–Scapa Flow, 28 September – 10 October |
| PQ 2 | Liverpool–Arkhangelsk, 13–30 October | ||
| PQ 3 | Hvalfjörður–Arkhangelsk, 9–22 November | QP 2 | Arkhangelsk–Kirkwall, 3–17 November |
| PQ 4 | Hvalfjörður–Arkhangelsk, 17–28 November | ||
| PQ 5 | Hvalfjörður–Arkhangelsk, 27 November – 13 December | QP 3 | Arkhangelsk – dispersed, 27 November – 3 December |
| PQ 6 | Hvalfjörður–Murmansk, 8–20 December 1941 | QP 6 | Murmansk–Scapa Flow, 24–28 January 1942 |
| PQ 7a | Hvalfjörður–Murmansk, 26 December – 12 January 1942 | QP 4 | Arkhangelsk – dispersed, 29 December – 9 January |
| PQ 7b | Hvalfjörður–Murmansk, 31 December – 11 January |
1942
| Out | Notes | Home | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| PQ 8 | Hvalfjörður–Arkhangelsk, 8–17 January | QP 5 | Murmansk – dispersed, 13–19 January |
| Template:Nowrap | Reykjavík–Murmansk, 1–10 February | QP 6 | Murmansk–dispersed, 24–28 January |
| PQ 11 | Loch Ewe–Kirkwall–Murmansk, 7–14–22 February | QP 7 | Murmansk – dispersed, 12–15 February |
| PQ 12 | Reykjavík–Murmansk, 1–12 March | QP 8 | Murmansk–Reykjavík, 1–11 March |
| PQ 13 | Reykjavík–Murmansk, 20–31 March | QP 9 | Kola Inlet–Reykjavík, 21 March – 3 April |
| PQ 14 | Oban–Murmansk, 26 March – 19 April | QP 10 | Kola Inlet–Reykjavík, 10–21 April |
| PQ 15 | Oban–Murmansk, 10 April – 5 May | QP 11 | Murmansk–Reykjavík, 28 April – 7 May |
| PQ 16 | Reykjavík–Murmansk, 21–30 May | QP 12 | Kola Inlet–Reykjavík, 21–29 May |
| PQ 17 | Reykjavik – dispersed, 27 June – 4 July | QP 13 | Arkhangelsk–Reykjavík, 26 June – 7 July |
| August sailing postponed | August sailing postponed | ||
| PQ 18 | Loch Ewe–Arkhangelsk, 2–21 SeptemberTemplate:Efn | QP 14 | Arkhangelsk–Loch Ewe 13–26 September |
| (PQ cycle terminated) | QP 15 | Kola–Loch Ewe, 17–30 November | |
| FB | Independent sailings, 29 October – 9 November | QP convoys ended | |
| JW 51A | Liverpool–Kola, 15–25 December | ||
| JW 51B | Liverpool–Kola, 22 December – 4 January 1943, Barents Sea | RA 51 | Kola–Loch Ewe, 30 December – 11 January |
1943
| Out | Notes | Home | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| JW 52 | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 17–27 January | RA 52 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 29 January – 9 February |
| JW 53 | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 15–27 February | RA 53 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 1–14 March |
| Convoys postponed | Convoys postponed | ||
| JW 54A | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 15–24 November | RA 54A | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 1–14 November |
| JW 54B | Liverpool–Arkhangelsk, 22 November – 3 December | RA 54B | Arkhangelsk–Loch Ewe, 26 November – 9 December |
| JW 55A | Liverpool–Arkhangelsk, 12–22 December | RA 55A | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 22 December – 1 January 1944 |
| JW 55B | Liverpool–Archangel, 20–30 DecemberTemplate:Efn | RA 55B | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 31 December – 8 January |
1944
| Out | Notes | Home | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| JW 56A | Liverpool–Archangel, 12–28 January | ||
| JW 56B | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 22 January – 1 February | RA 56 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 3–11 February |
| JW 57 | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 20–28 February | RA 57 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 2–10 March |
| JW 58 | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 27 March – 4 April | RA 58 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 7–14 April |
| Escorts only to Murmansk | RA 59 | Kola Inlet– Loch Ewe, 28 April – 6 May | |
| Convoys postponed | Convoys postponed | ||
| JW 59 | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 15–25 August | RA 59A | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 28 August – 5 September |
| JW 60 | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 15–23 September | RA 60 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 28 September – 5 October |
| JW 61 | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 20 October – 28 October | RA 61 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 2–9 November |
| JW 61A | Liverpool–Murmansk, 31 October – 6 November | RA 61A | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 11–17 November |
| JW 62 | Loch Ewe–Kola Inlet, 29 November – 7 December | RA 62 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 10–19 December |
| JW 63 | Loch Ewe–Kola Inlet, 30 December – 8 January 1945 | RA 63 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 11–21 January |
1945
| Out | Notes | Home | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| JW 64 | Clyde–Kola Inlet, 3–15 February | RA 64 | Kola Inlet−Loch Ewe, 17–28 February |
| JW 65 | Clyde–Kola Inlet, 11–21 March | RA 65 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 23 March – 1 April |
| JW 66 | Clyde–Kola Inlet, 16–25 April | RA 66 | Kola Inlet–Clyde, 29 April – 8 May |
| JW 67 | Clyde–Kola Inlet, 12–20 May | RA 67 | Kola Inlet–Clyde, 23–30 May |
| Convoy sailings ceased at midnight 28/29 May 1945 | Convoy sailings ceased at midnight 28/29 May 1945 |
Convoy details
| Convoys | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 | Total | Tonnage |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PQ/JW | 8 | 13 | 6 | 9 | 4 | 40 | |
| Ships | 64 | 256 | 112 | 284 | 95 | 811 | 5,200,000 sent |
| QP/RA | 4 | 13 | 6 | 9 | 5 | 37 | |
| Ships | 49 | 188 | 93 | 249 | 136 | 715 | 4,500,000 arr. |
Deliveries 1941–1945
| Route | GT sent | % Arr |
% lost |
|---|---|---|---|
| North Russia | 3,964,000 | 93 | 7 |
| Persian Gulf | 4,160,000 | 96 | 4 |
| Black Sea | 681,000 | 99 | 1 |
| Far East | 8,244,000 | 99 | 1 |
| Soviet Arctic | 452,000 | 100 | 0 |
| Arr. UK–USSR | 343,000 | — | — |
| Totals | 17,501,000 | 16,587,000 | 488,000 |
Ship losses
| Sunk | UK | US | Panama | USSR | Holland | Norway | Total | GRT |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Outbound | 21 | 29 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 58 | 353,366 |
| Return | 6 | 15 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 29 | 178,317 |
| Independent | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 42,002 |
| Port | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 27,278 |
| Other | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4,872 |
| Total | 35 | 47 | 7 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 100 | 604,837 |
Convoy losses by cause
| Cause | Out | Ret'n | Escorted |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ship | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| U-boat | 23 | 18 | 24 |
| Bomb | 17 | 2 | 9 |
| Torpedo | 17 | 1 | 17 |
| Mine | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| Foundered | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Wrecked | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 58 | 29 | 56 |
| Cause | Straggler | Out | Ret'n |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ship | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| U-boat | 17 | 4 | 0 |
| Bomb | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| Torpedo | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Mine | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Foundered | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Wrecked | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Total | 31 | 5 | 1 |
Allied warship losses
German warship losses
| Name | Flag | Type | Sunk |
|---|---|---|---|
| Template:Ship | Template:Naval | Template:Sclass | 26 December 1943, Home Fleet |
| Friedrich Eckoldt | Template:Naval | Template:Sclass2 | 31 December 1942, Template:HMS |
| Template:Ship | Template:Naval | Training ship | 7 September 1941, Template:HMS, Template:HMS |
| Template:Ship | Template:Naval | minelayer | 25 August 1942, Template:HMS, Template:HMS, Template:HMS |
U-boat losses
See also
- Template:Lang naval operation against Convoy PQ 17
- Northwest Staging Route – Aircraft supply route from North America to Siberia
- Template:Lang
- List of merchant ships lost in Convoy PQ 17
- Arctic Ocean operations of World War II
- Arctic Star
- Don't Play the Fool... – A Russian comedy partly based on the life of a war veteran in Arctic convoys.
Notes
Footnotes
Bibliography
- Template:Cite book
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Further reading
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External links
- Allies and Lend-Lease Museum, Moscow
- German account of Rösselsprung Template:Webarchive
- Soviet account on the war in Arctic and the convoys: Admiral Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov
- The Quiet Courage of Chief Steward Horace Carswell DSM, MM, BEM during Convoy PQ.17
- Coxswain Sid Kerslake, "Northern Gem" and the Russian Convoys
- Convoy PQ.17 Primary source diary and supporting material by Jack Bowman, ERA aboard HMS La Malouine.
- Lend-Lease, Northern Convoys from the Voice of Russia website
- The Norwegian Merchant Fleet
- Pathe Newsreel video of HMS Scylla fighting the Luftwaffe during Convoy PQ 18
- Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War
- Thank you, Brave Comrade
- online review of Arctic Convoys: Bletchley Park and the War for the Seas
Template:Arctic convoys Template:World War II Template:Soviet Union–United States relations
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- Arctic convoys of World War II
- Arctic naval operations of World War II
- Economic aid during World War II
- Military in the Arctic
- Soviet Union–United States military relations
- Soviet Union–United Kingdom military relations
- Foreign trade of the Soviet Union
- Naval battles and operations of World War II involving the United Kingdom
- Battles and operations of World War II involving Norway
- Battles and operations of World War II involving France
- Battles and operations of World War II involving Canada
- Battles and operations of World War II involving the United States
- Logistics routes of World War II