In 2003, the FSB's responsibilities were expanded by incorporating the Border Guard Service and a major part of the Federal Agency of Government Communication and Information (FAPSI); this would include intelligence activities in countries that were once members of the Soviet Union, work formerly done by the KGB's Fifth Service. The SVR had in 1992 signed an agreement not to spy on those countries; the FSB had made no such commitment.
In 1995, the FSK was renamed and reorganized into the Federal Security Service (FSB) by the Federal Law "On the Federal Security Service" (the title of the law as amended in June 2003<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>) signed by the president on 3 April 1995.<ref name="fedlaw95">ФЕДЕРАЛЬНЫЙ ЗАКОН О ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОЙ СЛУЖБЕ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИTemplate:Webarchive Russian Federation Federal Law No. 40-FZ. Adopted by the State Duma 22 February 1995.</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The FSB reforms were rounded out by decree No. 633, signed by Boris Yeltsin on 23 June 1995. The decree made the tasks of the FSB more specific, giving the FSB substantial rights to conduct cryptographic work, and described the powers of the FSB director. The number of deputy directors was increased to eight: two first deputies, five deputies responsible for departments and directorates and one deputy director heading the Moscow City and Moscow regional directorate. Yeltsin appointed Colonel-General Mikhail Ivanovich Barsukov as the new director of the FSB. In 1998, Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin, a KGB veteran who would later succeed Yeltsin as federal president, as director of the FSB.<ref>Mark Tran. Who is Vladimir Putin?Template:Webarchive Profile: Russia's new prime minister. Guardian Unlimited 9 August 1999.</ref> Putin was reluctant to take over the directorship, but once appointed conducted a thorough reorganization, which included the dismissal of most of the FSB's top personnel.<ref name="sakwa_p98"/> Putin appointed Nikolai Patrushev as the head of FSB in 1999.<ref name="schneider"/>
Role in the Second Chechen War
After the main military offensive of the Second Chechen War ended and the separatists changed tactics to guerilla warfare, overall command of the federal forces in Chechnya was transferred from the military to the FSB in January 2001. While the army lacked technical means of tracking the guerrilla groups, the FSB suffered from insufficient human intelligence due to its inability to build networks of agents and informants. In the autumn of 2002, the separatists launched a massive campaign of terrorism against the Russian civilians, including the Dubrovka theatre attack. The inability of the federal forces to conduct efficient counterterrorist operations led to the government to transfer the responsibility of "maintaining order" in Chechnya from the FSB to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) in July 2003.<ref name="baev">Template:Cite book</ref>
After becoming president, Vladimir Putin launched a major reorganization of the FSB. First, the FSB was placed under direct control of the President by a decree issued on 17 May 2000.<ref name="schneider"/> The internal structure of the agency was reformed by a decree signed on 17 June 2000. In the resulting structure, the FSB was to have a director, a first deputy director and nine other deputy directors, including one possible state secretary and the chiefs of six departments: Economic Security Department, Counterintelligence Department, Organizational and Personnel Service, Department of activity provision, Department for Analysis, Forecasting and Strategic Planning, Department for Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight against Terrorism.
In 2003, the agency's responsibilities were considerably widened. The Border Guard Service of Russia, with its staff of 210,000, was integrated to the FSB via a decree signed on 11 March 2003. The merger was completed by 1 July 2003. In addition, The Federal Agency of Government Communication and Information (FAPSI) was abolished, and the FSB was granted a major part of its functions, while other parts went to the Ministry of Defense.<ref name="schneider"/> Among the reasons for this strengthening of the FSB were the enhanced need for security after increased terror attacks against Russian civilians starting with the Moscow theater hostage crisis; the need to end the permanent infighting between the FSB, FAPSI and the Border Guards due to their overlapping functions; and the need for more efficient response to migration, drug trafficking and illegal arms trading. In addition, the FSB was the sole power base of the new president, so the restructuring strengthened his position (see Political groups under Vladimir Putin's presidency).<ref name="schneider"/>
On 28 June 2004, in a speech to high-ranking FSB officers, Putin emphasized three major tasks of the agency: neutralizing foreign espionage, safeguarding the economic and financial security of the country, and combating organized crime.<ref name="schneider"/> In September 2006, the FSB was shaken up by a major reshuffle. Combined with some earlier reassignments – most notably those of FSB Deputy Directors Yury Zaostrovtsev and Vladimir Anisimov in 2004 and 2005 – the changes were widely believed to be linked to the Three Whales Corruption Scandal that had slowly unfolded since 2000. Some analysts considered the changes to be an attempt to undermine FSB Director Nikolay Patrushev's influence, as his team from the Karelian KGB Directorate of the late 1980s to early 1990s suffered most, and he had been on vacations during the events.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>
By 2008, the agency had one Director, two First Deputy Directors and 5 Deputy Directors. It had the following 9 divisions:<ref name="schneider"/>
Beginning with the Moscow theater hostage crisis in 2002, Russia was faced with increased levels of terrorism. FSB Spetsnaz units Alpha Group and Vympel played a key role in hostage rescue operations during the Moscow theater siege and the Beslan school siege.Template:Citation needed Their performance was criticised due to the high number of hostage casualties. In 2006, the FSB killed Shamil Basayev, who was behind the Beslan tragedy and several other high-profile terrorist acts. According to the FSB, the operation was planned over six months and made possible due to the FSB's increased activities in foreign countries that were supplying arms to the terrorists. Basayev was tracked via surveillance of this arms trafficking. He and other militants were preparing to carry out a terrorist attack in Ingushetia when FSB agents destroyed their convoy; 12 militants were killed.<ref name="independent_basayev">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="bbc_basayev">Template:Cite news</ref>
During the last years of the Vladimir Putin's second presidency (2006–2008), terrorist attacks in Russia dwindled, falling from 257 in 2005 to 48 in 2007. Military analyst Vitaly Shlykov praised the effectiveness of Russia's security agencies, saying that the experience learned in Chechnya and Dagestan had been key to the success. In 2008, the American Carnegie Endowment's Foreign Policy magazine named Russia as "the worst place to be a terrorist" and highlighted especially Russia's willingness to prioritize national security over civil rights.<ref name="rp_biberman">Template:Cite web</ref> By 2010, Russian forces led by the FSB had managed to eliminate the top level leadership of the Chechen insurgency, except for Dokka Umarov.<ref name="saradzhyan_eliminating">Template:Cite web</ref>
Increased terrorism and expansion of the FSB's powers
Starting from 2009, the level of terrorism in Russia increased again, particularly suicide attacks. Between February 2005 and August 2008, no civilians were killed in such attacks. In 2008, at least 17 were killed, and in 2009 the number rose to 45.<ref name="saradzhyan_increase">Template:Cite web</ref>
In March 2010, Islamist militants organised the 2010 Moscow Metro bombings, which killed 40 people. One of the two blasts took place at Lubyanka station, near the FSB headquarters. Militant leader Doku Umarov—dubbed "Russia's Osama Bin Laden"—took responsibility for the attacks.
In July 2010, President Dmitry Medvedev expanded the FSB's powers in its fight against terrorism. FSB officers received the power to issue warnings to citizens on actions that could lead to committing crimes and arrest people for 15 days if they fail to comply with legitimate orders given by the officers. The bill was harshly criticized by human rights organizations.Template:Citation needed
Role in Ukraine
Since 2014, the FSB devoted substantial resources in preparing for a Russian takeover of Ukraine.<ref name="Times0309Infur">Template:Cite news</ref> Although Russia's SVR and GRU (foreign and military intelligence services) were also involved, FSB had a lead role on "intelligence and influence operations".<ref name="BBC_KillList">Template:Cite news</ref>
The FSB's Fifth Service, also referred to as the "Department for Operational Information" and "Operational Information and International Relations Service" is stated by the BBC and Radio Free Europe as counterintelligence in former territories of the Soviet Union, work formerly done by the KGB's Fifth Service. Its Ninth Directorate of the Fifth Service targets Ukraine.<ref name="RFE0311" /><ref name="BBC_KillList" /><ref name="2022_0225RUSI"/> Putin was persuaded to invade Ukraine by a small group of his closest associates, especially Nikolai Patrushev, Yury Kovalchuk and Alexander Bortnikov.<ref name="trio">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> According to some experts, Bortnikov played a key role in Putin's decision to invade Ukraine.<ref name="trio"/>
According to a report of the Royal United Services Institute citing interviews of officers and analysts of Security Service of Ukraine, the FSB Ukraine team greatly expanded in July 2021, and by February 2022 it had "around 200 officers" although most teams consist of only 10–20.<ref name="RUSI_SpecialReport">Template:Cite web</ref> Before the 2022 invasion, intelligence agencies in Ukraine, Germany, the UK, and the US reported that the FSB planned to replace elected leaders of Ukraine with Ukrainians living in Russia.<ref name="Gdn0213Coup">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
In 2014, according to a Russian military analyst, the FSB badly misled Putin with claims that Ukrainians would welcome a Russian invasion of Crimea to free them from "fascists".<ref name="BBC2016_FSB2014">Template:Cite news</ref> According to Radio Free Europe, in 2022, the FSB again promised easy victory if Russia invaded Ukraine.<ref name="RFE0311">Template:Cite web</ref>
Since the start of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian counterintelligence has repeatedly asserted that the FSB suffered failures of operations security, including acts of insubordination and possible sabotage. In March 2022, Russia's encrypted communication system in Ukraine became useless after the Russian military destroyed cellphone towers; unencrypted phone calls from the FSB in Ukraine to superiors in Moscow discussing the death of Vitaly Gerasimov were tapped and released publicly. Ukrainian intelligence reported that FSB members were leaking intelligence to them, including the location of the Chechen commandos sent to assassinate Zelensky. In late March, Ukrainian intelligence posted online the names, addresses, phone numbers, and more of 620 people they identified as FSB agents. None of these reports have been confirmed by the FSB.<ref name="Gerasimov0307">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="GerasiPhones0309">Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="620Names">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="TimesBreach329">Template:Cite news</ref>
On 11 April 2022, the Times of London, citing unnamed sources who had spoken to Bellingcat executive director Christo Grozev, reported that Beseda was transferred to Lefortovo Prison, the scene of mass executions during Stalin's purges. The same report claims that up over 100 FSB agents from the Fifth Service had been sacked. The Times of London also reports that "it is thought that" the Fifth Service is now headed by Beseda's former subordinate, Grigory Grishaev.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
According to an article in the 11 April 2022 issue of The Washington Post:<ref name="WaPo0411">Template:Cite news</ref>
Several current and former officials described the Russian security service as rife with corruption, beset by bureaucratic bloat and ultimately out of touch. A Ukrainian intelligence official said the FSB had spent millions recruiting a network of pro-Russian collaborators who ultimately told Putin and his top advisers, among them the current FSB director, what they wanted to hear.
A series of alleged leaked letters from FSB analysts, made public after the invasion began, report the same kind of problem. For example: "You have to write the analysis in a way that makes Russia the victor ... otherwise you get questioned for not doing good work."<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Russian-American ballet dancer Ksenia Karelina was arrested in early 2024 in Yekaterinburg and charged with "treason" for sending $51.80 to Razom, a New York City-based nonprofit organization that sends humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The FSB accused Karelina of taking part in "public actions to support the Kyiv regime."<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> She initially faced life in prison, but pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 12 years in prison.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
In August 2024, a "counter-terrorism" operational regime under the FSB was introduced in Kursk, Bryansk and Belgorod Oblasts. This means in practice that "movement is restricted, vehicles can be seized, phone calls can be monitored, areas are declared no-go zones, checkpoints introduced, and security is beefed up at key infrastructure sites."<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
In 2011, the FSB said it had exposed 199 foreign spies, including 41 professional spies and 158 agents employed by foreign intelligence services.Template:Citation needed The number has risen in recent years: in 2006 the FSB reportedly caught about 27 foreign intelligence officers and 89 foreign agents.<ref name="Day">Template:Cite web</ref> Comparing the number of exposed spies historically, the then–FSB Director Nikolay Kovalyov said in 1996: "There has never been such a number of spies arrested by us since the time when German agents were sent in during the years of World War II." The 2011 figure is similar to what was reported in 1995–1996, when around 400 foreign intelligence agents were uncovered during the two-year period.Template:Citation needed
In a high-profile case of foreign espionage, the FSB said in February 2012 that an engineer working at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, Russia's main space center for military launches, had been sentenced to 13 years in prison on charges of state treason. A court judged that the engineer had sold information about the testing of new Russian strategic missile systems to the American CIA.Template:Citation needed
A number of scientists have been accused of espionage and illegal technology exports by the FSB since it was established; instances include researcher Igor Sutyagin,<ref name="Sytyagin">Template:Cite web</ref> physicist Valentin Danilov,<ref name="Danilov">Template:Cite web</ref> physical chemist Oleg Korobeinichev,<ref name="Korob">Template:Cite web</ref> academician Oskar Kaibyshev,<ref name="Kaibyshev">Template:Cite webTemplate:Dead link</ref> and physicist Yury Ryzhov.<ref name="Ryzov">Template:Cite web</ref> Ecologist and journalist Alexander Nikitin, who worked with the Bellona Foundation, was accused of espionage. He published material exposing hazards posed by the Russian Navy's nuclear fleet. He was acquitted in 1999 after spending several years in prison (his case was sent for re-investigation 13 times while he remained in prison). In August 2021, the FSB arrested plasma physics expert Alexander Kuranov, chief designer of the Hypersonic Systems Research Center (NIPGS in Russian) in St. Petersburg. Kuranov is suspected of passing secret information to a foreigner about hypersonic technology; he oversaw concept design on the Ayaks/Ajax hypersonic aircraft and has run a Russia-US scientific symposium for several years.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Other arrested people include Viktor Orekhov, a former KGB officer who assisted Soviet dissidents, Vladimir Kazantsev, who disclosed illegal purchases of eavesdropping devices from foreign firms, and Vil Mirzayanov, who had written that Russia was working on a nerve-gas weapon.Template:Citation needed
According to the Royal United Services Institute, FSB's Department for Operational Information "is responsible for compiling data on Russia's 'near abroadTemplate:'", having taken over the work of KGB's Fifth Service, which ran counterintelligence inside territories of the Soviet Union.<ref name="2022_0225RUSI"/>
In the summer of 2006, the FSB was given the legal power to engage in targeted killing of terrorism suspects overseas if ordered by the president.<ref name="Finn2">Template:Cite news</ref>
The FSB is engaged in the development of Russia's export control strategy and examines drafts of international agreements related to the transfer of dual-use and military commodities and technologies. Its primary role in the nonproliferation sphere is to collect information to prevent the illegal export of controlled nuclear technology and materials.<ref>"Status of the State Licensing System of Control over Exports of Nuclear Materials, Dual-use Commodities and Technologies in Russia: Manual for foreign associates in Russia", International Business Relations Corporation, Department of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Fuel Cycle (Moscow, 2002).</ref>
Surveillance
In September 2017, WikiLeaks released "Spy Files Russia", revealing how a company called Peter-Service helped state entities gather data on Russian mobile phone users as part of an online surveillance system called the System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM) with close collaboration with the FSB.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> SORM-1 is for wiretapping phones. SORM-2 intercepts electronic correspondence and Internet traffic. Beginning in the summer of 2014, SORM-3 has been "on guard" and integrates all telecommunication services in real time.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Cyber Units
In recent years, the FSB has expanded its mission to include foreign intelligence collection and offensive cyber operations. Cyber analysts have referred to FSB hackers as Berserk Bear, Energetic Bear, Gamaredon, TeamSpy, Dragonfly, Havex, Crouching Yeti, and Koala.
The FSB reportedly has two primary centers overseeing its information security and cyber operations. The first is the 16th Center, which houses most of the FSB's signals intelligence capabilities. The FSB also includes the 18th Center for Information Security, which oversees domestic operations and security but conducts foreign operations as well. The U.S. government indicted 18th Center FSB officers in 2017 for breaching Yahoo! and millions of email accounts. In 2021, Ukrainian intelligence released information and recordings of 18th Center FSB officers based in Crimea as part of the "Gamaredon" hacking group.
Media reporting indicates FSB units are capable of manufacturing their own advanced malware tools and have been documented manipulating exposed malware to mimic other hacking teams and conceal their activities. Reporting indicates the FSB oversees training and research institutes, which directly support the FSB's cyber mission.
One FSB team reportedly focuses on penetrating infrastructure and energy sector targets. Most operations linked to this team appear to be reconnaissance or clandestine surveillance. The targeting of the energy sector has raised concern within the U.S. government. The Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have documented the unit's reconnaissance and noted the possibility of inserting malware to cause future damage in an attack. The U.S. government also has linked the unit to attempts to penetrate state and local government networks in 2020.
Media reporting has documented close connections between the FSB and criminal and civilian hackers, which the FSB reportedly uses to augment and staff its cyber units. The US Department of Justice has indicted multiple Russian hackers for a variety of criminal and state-sponsored cyber activities. Many of these indictments describe the close relationship between criminal hackers and the FSB.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>
Below the nationwide level, the FSB has regional offices in all the federal subjects of Russia. It also has administrations in the armed forces and other military institutions. Sub-departments exist for areas such as aviation, special training centers, forensic expertise, military medicine, etc.<ref name="schneider"/>
Operational Information and International Relations Service (Analysis, Forecasting, and Strategic Planning Department) – chiefs: Sergey Beseda (since 2009), Viktor Komogorov (1999–2009), Sergei Ivanov (1998–1999); The successor of the KGB's Fifth Service, this department is in charge of counterintelligence operations against territories of the former Soviet Union.<ref name="2022_0225RUSI">Template:Cite web</ref>
Organizational and Personnel Service (Department) – chiefs: Yevgeny Lovyrev (since 2001), Yevgeny Solovyov (before Lovyrev)
Besides the services (departments) and directorates of the federal office, the territorial directorates of FSB in the federal subjects are also subordinate to it. Of these, St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast Directorate of FSB and its predecessors (historically covering both Leningrad/Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast) have played especially important roles in the history of this organization, as many of the officers of the Directorate, including Vladimir Putin and Nikolay Patrushev, later assumed important positions within the federal FSB office or other government bodies. After the last Chief of the Soviet time, Anatoly Kurkov, the St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast Directorate were led by Sergei Stepashin (29 November 1991 – 1992), Viktor Cherkesov (1992 –1998), Alexander Grigoryev (1 October 1998 – 5 January 2001), Sergei Smirnov (5 January 2001 – June 2003), Alexander Bortnikov (June 2003 – March 2004) and Yury Ignashchenkov (since March 2004).
After the annexation of Crimea, the FSB may also have been responsible for the forced disappearances and torture of Crimean Tatar activists and public figures. According to the United Nations, in occupied Crimea, the FSB used torture with elements of sexual violence against pro-Ukrainian activists, forcing them to confess to crimes related to terrorism. The detainees were, allegedly, beaten, tortured with electric shocks in the genitals and threatened with rape.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="UNHCR_2017">Template:Cite web</ref> Some, such as Oleh Sentsov, have been detained and accused in politically motivated kangaroo courts.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The FSB spied on and filmed a gathering of members of the Jehovah's Witnesses while they were about to undergo baptism rites, with the videos used as evidence in a trial against the defendants in 2021; Jehovah's Witnesses have been banned as a group in Russia since 2017 for "extremism".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
In spite of various anti-corruption actions of the Russian government, FSB operatives and officials are routinely found in the center of various fraud, racket and corruption scandals.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> FSB officers have been frequently accused of torture,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="urlCrimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars Intensifies | Human Rights Watch">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="urlRussian Terrorism Suspects Allege Torture at Secret FSB Site">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="url“You should understand: FSB officers always get their way!”: Anti-fascist Viktor Filinkov reveals how he was tortured by Russian security services | openDemocracy">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="urlCrimean Tatar Close To Dzhemilev Says He Was Tortured By Russian FSB">Template:Cite news</ref> extortion, bribery and illegal takeovers of private companies, often working together with tax inspection officers. Active and former FSB officers are also present as "curators" in "almost every single large enterprise", both in public and private sectors.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Several unnamed current and former officials described the FSB as less effective than the KGB, describing it as "rife with corruption, beset by bureaucratic bloat and ultimately out of touch", in a report by The Washington Post in 2022.<ref name="WaPo0411" />
On 29 December 2016, the White House accused and sanctioned the FSB and several other Russian companies for what the US intelligence agencies said was their role in helping the Russian military intelligence service, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) disrupt and spread disinformation during the 2016 US presidential election. In addition, the State Department also declared 35 Russian diplomats and officials persona non-grata and denied Russian government officials access to two Russian-owned installations in Maryland and New York.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Template:Main
Following the broadcast of a documentary film alleging systematic doping in Russia, World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) president Craig Reedie authorized an Independent Commission (IC) to investigate the issues brought up by the documentary in 2015. The IC authorized a review of practices on whether there were any breaches by the Russian Anti-Doping Agency.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The report found direct interference into the laboratory's operations by the Russian State undermined the laboratory's independence and that tests conducted by the laboratory were highly suspect. The report elaborates on the role of the FSB:Template:Blockquote
In July 2016, the first McLaren Report found that "beyond a reasonable doubt" the Russian Ministry of Sport, the Centre of Sports Preparation of the National Teams of Russia, the FSB, and the WADA-accredited laboratory in Moscow "operated for the protection of doped Russian athletes" within a "state-directed failsafe system" using "the disappearing positive [test] methodology".<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="NYT160718">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In a second McLaren Report released December 2016, it was found that
In the period before the Sochi Games, a "clean urine bank" was established at the FSB Command Centre, which was situated immediately adjacent to the Sochi Laboratory. Inside that building a dedicated room containing several large freezers was set up for the purpose of storing the clean urine samples.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
On 7 March the United States Embassy in Moscow warned that "extremists have imminent plans to target large gatherings in Moscow, to include concerts".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> That day, the US also privately warned Russian officials of the danger of an impending attack from IS–KP from intelligence gathered earlier in March, under the US intelligence community's "duty to warn" requirement,<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> specifically mentioning the Crocus City Hall venue.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Ten days after the attack it was reported that Iran had also warned Russia that a major "terrorist operation" was being planned, based on information gathered from IS militants arrested after the 2024 Kerman bombings.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Three days before the Crocus City Hall attack, President Vladimir Putin told the board of the FSB that Western warnings of a potential attack inside Russia were "provocative" and "resemble outright blackmail and the intention to intimidate and destabilise our society".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
On 22 March 2024, four Tajik ISIS–K gunmen launched an attack on a concert hall in Krasnogorsk, Russia, with rifles and incendiaries.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The attack, claimed by ISIS–K, killed 144 and injured 551 and marked the deadliest attack on Russian soil since the Beslan school siege in 2004. Putin and the FSB suggested that Ukraine was involved in the attack, without offering evidence.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Alexander Bortnikov, the head of the FSB, said that "radical Islamists" prepared the attack with help from Ukrainian and Western "special services".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Bortnikov claimed that the US warning was "of a general nature".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
IS-affiliated Amaq News Agency published a video filmed by one of the attackers.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Ukraine denied any involvement in the attack, and described the FSB's claims that the perpetrators of the Crocus City Hall attack tried to escape to Ukraine as "very doubtful and primitive" disinformation, recalling that the border is heavily guarded by soldiers and drones, mined in many areas, and constantly shelled from both sides.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> A short video on Telegram allegedly showed one of the suspects being tortured by FSB agents, who cut off his ear and forced him to eat it.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Navalny associate Ivan Zhdanov criticized Russian security services for their "catastrophic incompetence" and the FSB for being "busy with everything except its direct responsibilities – killing their political opponents, spying on citizens and prosecuting people who are against the war." Another associate, Leonid Volkov, said that the FSB "can't do the only job it really should be doing: preventing a real, nightmarish terrorist attack."<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Novaya Gazeta EuropeTemplate:'s chief editor, Kirill Martynov, criticized Putin for dismissing Western intelligence warnings and focusing resources on "LGBT extremists" and the war with Ukraine instead of guarding against "real threats".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Ukrainian invasion of the Kursk Oblast
Template:See also
In August 2024, Ukrainian forces crossed the border into Kursk Oblast during the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine resulting in part of the oblast becoming under Ukrainian occupation. All legal national borders of Russia are controlled by the FSB Border Guard under the command of FSB director Alexander Bortnikov.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Since most of the best Russian troops were deployed in Ukraine, most of the men guarding the border in the Kursk Oblast were young, inexperienced conscripts from the FSB Border Service and lightly equipped army infantry units (all male citizens of Russia aged 18–30 are subject to conscription for 1 year of active duty military service),<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> who suffered heavy losses in combat with experienced Ukrainian troops.<ref name="thebarentsobserver">Template:Cite news</ref> Some of the conscripts stationed on the border with Ukraine were even purportedly unarmed.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
FSB detention centers
In July 2025, the State Duma passed a law officially restoring the FSB's authority to operate its own detention centers.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Russian investigative journalists Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan described the legislation as "a foundation for a new Gulag” and predicted a major expansion of political repression in Russia: "Special railcars, ships, aircraft, powers to transport prisoners, and the authority to rule and punish within prison walls — all of this, under FSB control, points to preparations for repressions on a scale we haven't yet seen."<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> FSB detention centers would hold prisoners accused of treason, espionage, terrorism, and extremism. According to human rights activist Ivan Astashin, "The transfer of some detention centres to the FSB's jurisdiction will lead to them effectively becoming unaccountable to supervisory bodies."<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
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