Leonid Kuchma

Template:Short description Template:Redirect Template:Use dmy dates Template:Infobox officeholder Template:Leonid Kuchma seriesLeonid Danylovych KuchmaTemplate:Family name footnote (Template:Langx, Template:IPA; born 9 August 1938) is a Ukrainian politician who was the second president of Ukraine, serving from 19 July 1994 to 23 January 2005.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The only president of Ukraine to serve two terms, his presidency was marked by economic stabilization and an improvement in Russia–Ukraine relations, but at the same time was accompanied by democratic backsliding and growth of the influence of Ukrainian oligarchs, as well as several scandals.

After a successful career in the machine-building industry of the Soviet Union, Kuchma began his political career in 1990, when he was elected to the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament); he was re-elected in 1994. He served as Prime Minister of Ukraine between October 1992 and September 1993. Kuchma took office after winning the 1994 presidential election against his rival, incumbent President Leonid Kravchuk. Kuchma won re-election for an additional five-year term in 1999. Corruption accelerated after Kuchma's election in 1994, but in 2000–2001, his power began to weaken in the face of exposures in the media.<ref>Adrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2 (March – April 2005), pp. 35–52 in JSTOR</ref>

Kuchma's administration began a campaign of media censorship in 1999, leading to arrests of journalists, the death of Georgiy Gongadze, and the subsequent Cassette Scandal and mass protests.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> The Ukrainian economy continued to decline until 1999, whereas growth was recorded since 2000, bringing relative prosperity to some segments of urban residents. During his presidency, Ukrainian-Russian ties began to improve.<ref>Robert S. Kravchuk, "Kuchma as Economic Reformer," Problems of Post-Communism Vol. 52#5 September–October 2005, pp 48–58</ref> Kuchma declined to seek a third term in office, instead supporting Party of Regions candidate Viktor Yanukovych for the 2004 election. Following public protests over the alleged electoral fraud which escalated into the Orange Revolution, Kuchma took a neutral stance and was a mediator between Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych. Between 2014 and 2020, Kuchma was a special presidential representative of Ukraine at the quasi peace talks regarding the war in Donbas.

Kuchma's legacy has proven controversial, and he has been described as authoritarian by various sources. Widespread corruption and media censorship under Kuchma's administration continue to have an impact on Ukraine today, and he has been accused of promoting oligarchism.

Early life

Leonid Danylovych Kuchma was born in the village of Chaikyne in rural Chernihiv Oblast on 9 August 1938.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> His father, Danylo Prokopovych Kuchma (1901–1942) was wounded in World War II and eventually died of his wounds in the field hospital #756 (near the village of Novoselytsia) when Leonid was four.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> His mother Paraska Trokhymivna Kuchma worked on a kolkhoz.<ref name="Profile: Leonid Kuchma">Template:Cite news</ref>

Kuchma attended the Kostobobriv general education school in the neighboring Semenivka Raion. Later he enrolled in Dnipropetrovsk National University and graduated in 1960 with a degree in mechanical engineering (majoring in aerospace engineering), eventually becoming a candidate of technical sciences.<ref name="Profile: Leonid Kuchma"/> In 1960 he joined the Communist Party of Soviet Union.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

Career before presidency

After graduation, Kuchma worked in the field of aerospace engineering for the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau in Dnipropetrovsk. At 28 he became a testing director for the Bureau deployed at the Baikonur cosmodrome.

Some political observers suggested that Kuchma's early career was significantly boosted by his marriage to Lyudmyla Talalayeva, an adopted daughter of Gennadiy Tumanov, the Yuzhmash chief engineering officer and later the Soviet Minister of Medium Machine Building.<ref>Бондаренко К. Леонід Кучма: портрет на фоні епохи. «Фоліо». Харків, 2007; стр. 21</ref><ref>Деньги к деньгам: браки в украинской политике (UNIAN, 12 July 2007). Unian.net. Retrieved on 6 August 2011.</ref>

At 38 Kuchma became the Communist party chief at Yuzhny Machine-building Plant and a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. He was a delegate of the 27th and 28th Congresses of the Communist Party of Soviet Union. By the end of the 1980s, Kuchma openly criticized the Communist Party.<ref name="BBCProfileKuchma2">Template:Cite news</ref>

In 1982 Kuchma was appointed the first deputy of general design engineer at Yuzhmash, and from 1986 to 1992, he held the position of the company's general director. From 1990 to 1992, Kuchma was a member of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine's parliament). In 1992 he was appointed as Prime Minister of Ukraine.<ref name="BBCProfileKuchma2"/> He resigned a year later, complaining of "slow pace of reform".<ref name="BBCProfileKuchma2"/> He was re-elected into parliament in 1994.<ref name="BBCProfileKuchma">Template:Cite news</ref>

First term as president (1994-1999)

1994 election

File:Вибори 1994.png

Results in the Second round of the 1994 presidential election: Blue – Leonid Kuchma, orange – Leonid Kravchuk

Kuchma resigned from the position of Prime Minister of Ukraine in September 1993 to run for the presidency in 1994 on a platform to boost the economy by restoring economic relations with Russia and faster pro-market reforms. Kuchma won a clear victory against the incumbent President Leonid Kravchuk, receiving strong support from the industrial areas in the east and south. His worst results were in the west of the country.<ref name="BBCProfileKuchma2"/>

Domestic policy

Economic reforms

Kuchma's first presidential campaign had been run on promises of economic reform. After his electoral victory Roman Shpek, the Minister of Economy, was appointed responsible for reforming Ukraine's economy in cooperation with international advisors provided, among others, by the foundation of George Soros, USAID, the European Union's TACIS program, International Monetary Fund, as well as members of the Ukrainian diaspora.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> In October 1994, in his speech to parliament, Kuchma declared his aim of radical market reforms including reduced subsidies, lifting of price controls, lower taxes, privatization of industry and agriculture, and reforms in currency regulation and banking. The parliament approved the plan's main points. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) promised a $360 million loan to initiate reforms. Template:Citation needed

In order to stop hyperinflation, which had peaked at 91% in December 1993, Viktor Yushchenko, then nead of the National Bank of Ukraine, temporarily stopped the issuing of credit, which allowed to stabilize the economy. Price liberalization during Kuchma's first months as president helped to reduce shortages and reinvigorated the agriculture. The abolition of subsidies on gas imports from Russia further reduced the budget deficit. Through a presidential decree, Kuchma also reduced the maximum personal income tax from 90 to 50 percent. In 1994-1995 the parliament adopted a new Law on Taxation and reduced the value-added-tax rate. By March 1995 the financial stabilization allowed the Ministry of Finance to issue treasury bills.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

On 1 March 1995 Kuchma dismissed Communist-aligned Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol, who had opposed his reforms, and promoted his own ally, Yevhen Marchuk, in his place. In his new address to the parliament in April he praised the success of previous reforms and proclaimed his aim to be "state-regulated transition to a social-market economy". In October this declaration was followed by the adoption of a new government program of evolutionary market reform.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Despite the macroeconomic stabilization, Ukrainian economy continued to perform poorly during the latter part of the 1990s due to excessive bureaucracy, corruption, overregulation and lack of foreign investment. Additional problems were caused by the influence of the 1998 Russian financial crisis. A tax reform introduced in 1999 allowed to reduce the size of shadow economy and eventually contributed to the renewal of economic growth in the following years.<ref name=pre/>

Currency reform

Template:Main In July 1995 Kuchma announced the introduction of a new national currency to replace the karbovanets by October of the same year. However, this declaration caused panic and mass selling of currency, which forced authorities to delay the plan.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> In September 1996 hryvnia was launched as Ukraine's national currency, contributing to the stabilization of the economy.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Privatization

Template:Main In 1995 privatization vouchers were distributed through Ukraine's state savings bank to 28,5 million citizens (55% of the population). These certificates could either be used by citizens themselves in privatization auctions, or transferred to a state-licensed investment fund. Sale of vouchers was not allowed. The privatization policy was managed by Yuri Yekhanurov, head of the State Property Fund of Ukraine. Throughout Kuchma's early presidency, Ukraine's Communist-dominated parliament attempted to block privatization efforts and issued a list of up to 6000 enterprises excluded from being privatized. The privatization of smaller enterprises had been mostly completed by 1996, but many large-scale and medium enterprises were either appropriated by their managers through insider privatization at minimum cost, or remained state property. Voucher privatization was officially ended in mid-1997 and replaced by cash privatization through outside investors. By that time the share of Ukraine's GDP originating from private sector had risen to 55%, further increasing to 65% after 2002, although some estimates offered the number of 80%.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Constitutional reform

In March 1995 the Ukrainian parliament invalidated the previously adopted separatist Constitution of Crimea, restoring direct Ukrainian control over the peninsula.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> In May the parliament supported Kuchma's Law on State Power and Local Self-Government with amendments, which removed norms on impeachment and dissolution of parliament by the president. Enjoying higher popularity that the legislature, Kuchma repeatedly threatened to issue a decree on a popular referendum, extracting concessions from the deputies. On 8 June 1995 Kuchma and Verkhovna Rada speaker Oleksandr Moroz signed a constitutional agreement, which provided additional powers to the president.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Finally, on 28 June 1996 the new Constitution of Ukraine was adopted through parliamentary vote. The new basic law was a victory for Kuchma, as it subordinated the cabinet of ministers to the president, who nominated the prime minister to be approved by the parliament, and appointed all ministers and regional governors. The president preserved the right to issue economic decrees and veto laws. The constitution guaranteed the right to private property. It declared Ukraine a unitary state and recognized Ukrainian as the sole official language, with Russian being provided a minority status. Executive control over law enforcement was reinforced, and judicial reform received little attention. Although leaving an important role to the legislature, the new constitution awarded the president with excessive powers.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Foreign policy

Kuchma was elected for his first term in 1994 on promises of improving relations with Russia.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> In his inaugural address, he said:

Kuchma signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership with Russia, and endorsed a round of talks with the CIS. Additionally, he referred to Russian as "an official language". Despite this, Kuchma's foreign policy wasn't characterized with any kind of reorientation toward Moscow, and under his presidency Ukraine's involvement into the CIS continued in the same limited manner, as under his predecessor. In 1994 Ukraine joined the Partnership for Peace program. In 1996 Kuchma signed a special partnership agreement with NATO and raised the possibility of Ukraine's membership of the alliance. In 1995 Ukraine also became a member of the Council of Europe.<ref name=pre>Template:Cite web</ref>

Second term as president (1999-2005)

1999 re-election

File:Вибори 1999.png

Results in the Second round of the 1999 presidential election: Blue – Leonid Kuchma, red – Petro Symonenko

Kuchma was re-elected in 1999 to his second term.<ref name="BBCProfileKuchma"/><ref name="BBCProfileKuchma2"/> His opponent in the runoff was Communist leader Petro Symonenko, whose party had significantly improved its result during the previous year's parliamentary election.<ref name=pre/> This time the areas that had given Kuchma strongest support last time voted for his opponents, and the areas which had voted against him during the 1994 election came to his support.<ref name="BBCProfileKuchma2"/> The result of the 1999 election was to a large degree decided by a split in the left-wing opposition and a strong media bias in Kuchma's favour, and was interpreted as a decisive break with Ukraine's Soviet past.<ref name=pre/> According to historian Serhy Yekelchyk, President Kuchma's administration "employed electoral fraud freely" during the 1999 presidential elections and the following 2000 constitutional referendum.<ref>The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know by Serhy Yekelchyk, Oxford University Press, 2015, Template:ISBN (page 87)</ref>

Domestic policy

During its later years, Kuchma's presidential regime was described as a "blackmail state" due to his government's systematic use of blackmail in order to persecute political opponents.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Kuchma's administration closed opposition papers and several journalists and political opponents, such as Viacheslav Chornovil, died in mysterious circumstances.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>"Country profile: Ukraine", BBC News</ref> Opponents accused him of involvement in the killing in 2000 of journalist Georgiy Gongadze, but Kuchma has consistently denied such claims. Critics have also blamed Kuchma for restrictions on press freedom. Kuchma is believed to have played a key role in sacking the Cabinet of Viktor Yushchenko by Verkhovna Rada on 26 April 2001. After his dismissal Yushchenko became the main leader of anti-Kuchma opposition.<ref name=pre/>

Kuchma's Prime Minister from 2002 until early January 2005 was Viktor Yanukovych, after Kuchma dismissed Anatoliy Kinakh, his previous appointee.

Foreign policy

File:Visit of Leonid Kuchma, President of Ukraine, to the EC.jpg

Kuchma with President of the European Commission Romano Prodi in Brussels, 5 December 1999

In 2002, Kuchma stated that Ukraine wanted to sign an association agreement with the European Union by 2003–2004 and that Ukraine would meet all EU membership requirements by 2007–2011.<ref name=UW28212EUU>EU-Ukraine Summits: 16 Years of Wheel-Spinning, The Ukrainian Week (28 February 2012)</ref> He also hoped for a free trade treaty with the EU.<ref name=UW28212EUU/>

In 2003 Ukraine agreed "in principle" to join the Eurasian Economic Space.<ref name=pre/>

Under Kuchma's leadership, the Armed Forces of Ukraine participated in the Iraq War.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

After Kuchma's popularity at home and abroad sank as he became mired in corruption scandals, he turned to Russia as his new ally.Template:Citation needed From the late 1990s he adopted a foreign policy which he described as "multi-vector", reaching out to Russia, Europe, and the United States.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Critics assessed this policy as manipulating both the West and Russia to the personal benefit of Kuchma and Ukrainian oligarchs.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

On 4 October 2001, Siberia Airlines Flight 1812 was shot down over the Black Sea by the Ukrainian Air Force while en route to Novosibirsk, Russia, from Tel Aviv, Israel. All 78 occupants of the plane, most of whom were Israelis visiting relatives in Russia, were killed.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Following the shootdown, Kuchma initially refused to accept the resignation of Oleksandr Kuzmuk, Minister of Defence of Ukraine, and said, "Look what is happening around the world, in Europe. We are not the first, and we will not be the last. There is no need to make a tragedy out of this. Mistakes happen everywhere, and not only on this scale, but on a much larger, planetary scale."<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> A week later, however, Kuchma announced his willingness to cooperate with Russian investigators, apologised to the governments of Russia and Israel, and accepted Kuzmuk's resignation.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

Murder of Georgiy Gongadze and Cassette Scandal

Template:Main article From 1998 to 2000, Kuchma's bodyguard Mykola Melnychenko was allegedly eavesdropping Kuchma's office, later publishing the recordings. The release of the tapes – dubbed the Cassette Scandal – supposedly revealed Kuchma's numerous crimes, in particular approving the sale of radar systems to Saddam Hussein (among other illegal arms sales)<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> and ordering the death of journalist Georgiy Gongadze.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

File:Ukraine Without Kuchma 6 February.jpg

Ukraine without Kuchma protests, 6 February 2001

In September 2000, Gongadze disappeared and his headless corpse was found mutilated on 3 November 2000. On 28 November, opposition politician Oleksandr Moroz publicised the tape recordings implicating Kuchma in Gongadze's murder. In 2005, the Ukrainian Prosecutor General's office instigated criminal proceedings against Kuchma and members of his former administration in connection with the murder of Gongadze.<ref name=":0">Template:Cite news</ref> In 2005, the press reported that Kuchma had been unofficially granted immunity from prosecution in return for his graceful departure from office.<ref>Crouch, David (6 April 2005). "Secrets of journalist's murder cast long shadow over Ukraine's orange revolution", The Guardian. Retrieved on 6 August 2011.</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Critics of the tapes point to the difficulty of Melnychenko recording 500 hours of dictaphone tape unaided and undetected, the lack of material evidence of said recording equipment, and other doubts which question the authenticity and motive of the release of the tape. Kuchma acknowledged in 2003 that his voice was one of those on the tapes, but claimed the tapes had been selectively edited to distort their meaning.<ref>Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia 2004, (Europa Publications), Routledge, 12 December 2003, Template:ISBN (page 504)</ref>

However, according to the United States ambassador to Ukraine, Carlos Pascual, that the tapes are genuine, undistorted, unaltered, and not manipulated. His statement was based on the conclusion made by FBI Electronic Research Facility's analysis of the original recording device and the original recording, which found no unusual sounds which would indicate tampering of the recording, detected no breaks in its continuity and no traces of manipulation in the digital files.<ref name=Danske26112002>Template:Cite news</ref><ref name=KuchmaParallelCabinet12102007>Template:Cite web</ref>

The Prosecutor General of Ukraine's Office cancelled its resolution to deny opening of criminal cases against Kuchma and other politicians within the Gongadze-case on 9 October 2010.<ref>"Prosecutor general's office can open criminal cases against former President Leonid Kuchma and other politicians", Kyiv Post (October, 2010)</ref> On 22 March 2011, Ukraine opened an official investigation into the murder of Gongadze and, two days later, Ukrainian prosecutors charged Kuchma with involvement in the murder.<ref name="econ1">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>"Ukraine's ex-leader Kuchma probed over Gongadze murder", BBC News (22 March 2011). Retrieved on 6 August 2011.</ref> A Ukrainian district court ordered prosecutors to drop criminal charges against Kuchma on 14 December 2011 on grounds that evidence linking him to the murder of Gongadze was insufficient.<ref name=":1">"Court clears Kuchma of Gongadze murder charges", Kyiv Post (14 December 2011)</ref> The court rejected Melnychenko's recordings as evidence.<ref>"Court rejects Melnychenko's tapes as evidence in Gongadze case", Kyiv Post (14 December 2011)</ref> Gongadze's widow, Myroslava Gongadze, lodged an appeal against the ruling one week later.<ref>"Gongadze's widow appeals closure of criminal case against Kuchma", Kyiv Post (21 December 2011)</ref>

During the trial of Oleksiy Pukach for the murder of Gongadze, he claimed that Kuchma and Kuchma's head of his Presidential Administration, Volodymyr Lytvyn, were the ones who ordered the murder.<ref name=KPR29113PGC>"Court sentences Pukach to life for murdering Gongadze, disregards claims against Kuchma, Lytvyn", Kyiv Post (29 January 2013)
"Ukraine police officer accuses ex-president after being jailed for life", Reuters (29 January 2013)
Gongadze killer pointed on Kuchma and Lytvyn. "LIGABusinessInform". 2013-1-29</ref><ref>"Former policeman 'carried out Georgiy Gongadze murder on behalf of Leonid Kuchma'", Telegraph.co.uk (1 September 2011)</ref> Pukach was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for his part in the murder of Gongadze.<ref name=KPR29113PGC/>

First Deputy Prosecutor General of Ukraine Renat Kuzmin claimed 20 February 2013 that his office had collected enough evidence confirming Kuchma's responsibility for ordering Gongadze's assassination.<ref name=BBCNKG20213>Ukraine's Leonid Kuchma 'implicated' in Gongadze death, BBC News (20 February 2013)
Kuchma outraged by reports alleging his arrest, Kyiv Post (21 February 2013)</ref> Kuchma's reply the next day was, "This is another banal example of a provocation, which I've heard more than enough in the past 12 years".<ref name=BBCNKG20213/>

2004 Ukrainian presidential election and Orange Revolution

File:Ukrainian Round Table 2004.jpg

Kuchma (seated in the middle) participating in the "round table" talks between Yushchenko, Yanukovych and international representatives during the Orange Revolution, 1 December 2004

Kuchma's role in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election and subsequent Orange Revolution is not entirely clear. In the run-up to the elections, oligarchs opposed to Leonid Kuchma contributed about $150 million to opposition political parties. According to Michael McFaul, U.S. ambassador to Russia from 2012 to 2014 and architect of Barack Obama's policy in the region, the U.S. government spent more than $18 million on "democracy promotion" in the two years leading up to the election.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Kuchma, who had been cleared by the Constitutional Court to run for a third term, eventually refused to take part in the elections and endorsed the candidacy of Viktor Yanukovych, who was also supported by Russian president Vladimir Putin.<ref name=pre/> After the second round on 22 November 2004, it appeared that Yanukovych had won the election by fraud, which caused the opposition and independent observers to dispute the results, leading to the Orange Revolution.<ref name="Time">Paul Quinn-Judge, Yuri Zarakhovich, The Orange Revolution Template:Webarchive, Time, 28 November 2004</ref><ref name="wiretap">Template:Cite web, Ukrainska Pravda, 24 November 2004.</ref>

Kuchma was urged by Yanukovych and Viktor Medvedchuk (the head of the presidential office) to declare a state of emergency and hold the inauguration of Yanukovych. He denied the request. Later, Yanukovych publicly accused Kuchma of a betrayal. Kuchma refused to officially dismiss Prime Minister Yanukovych after the parliament passed a motion of no confidence against the Cabinet on 1 December 2004. Soon after, Kuchma left the country. He returned to Ukraine in March 2005.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

In September 2011, Kuchma stated that he believed that Yanukovych was the real winner of the 2004 election.<ref>Kuchma: Orange Revolution defines Ukrainians as Europeans, Kyiv Post (17 September 2011)</ref>

Post-presidency

File:Леоніда Кучми, 2019, 2 (cropped).jpg

Kuchma in 2019

Leonid Kuchma has been active in politics since his presidency ended. He aligned himself with President Viktor Yushchenko in 2005,<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> but later raised concerns about the president in correspondence with then U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, John Tefft.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Kuchma said in October 2009 that he would vote for Victor Yanukovych in the 2010 Ukrainian presidential election and endorsed him during the presidential campaign.<ref>Kuchma says he'll vote for Yanukovych as Ukraine's president, Kyiv Post (16 October 2009)</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In a document dated 2 February 2010 and uncovered during the United States diplomatic cables leak, Kuchma, in a conversation with United States Ambassador to Ukraine John F. Tefft, called the voters' choice between Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko during the second round of the 2010 presidential election as a choice between "bad and very bad" and praised (the candidate eliminated in the first round of the election) Arseniy Yatsenyuk instead.<ref name="WLKuchmalovesYatsenyuk">"Kuchma: Yanukovych-Tymoshenko contest a choice between 'bad and very bad'", Kyiv Post (3 December 2010)</ref>

Involvement in the 2014 pro-Russian conflict in Ukraine

Template:Main Kuchma represented Ukraine at negotiations with the armed separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces on 21 June 2014 to discuss President Petro Poroshenko's peace plan.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="washingtonpost.com">Template:Cite news</ref> His role as a diplomat was received positively by the west and Russia as well as by the public in Ukraine.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

On 11 February 2015, Kuchma was one of the signatories of a draft plan to end the conflict in Donbas. The summit was known as Minsk II. The plan ensured that a ceasefire was implemented; reaction from leaders in Europe was generally positive.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

In March 2015, Kuchma delivered an address calling on the west for greater involvement in the region.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> He criticized the action of Russian-backed forces in the attempt to seize the town of Debaltseve.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

In September 2015, Kuchma was again appointed as the representative for Ukraine at the Trilateral Contact Group. The group met in Belarus to discuss ending the conflict in Donbas. In early 2017, Kuchma spoke out against the transport blockade of Donbas.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In March 2017 at the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) in Minsk, he demanded that the Russian Federation repeal their decree on the recognition of passports issued in separatist-held areas.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

On 2 October 2018, Kuchma stepped down as Ukraine's representative in the Trilateral Contact Group due to his age.<ref>Ukraine's envoy to Minsk talks Kuchma going to quit, UNIAN (29 September 2018)
Kuchma concludes work as Ukraine's envoy to Minsk talks, UNIAN (2 October 2018)</ref> He returned to the talks in June 2019, at the request of newly elected Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy and after mediation by Victor Pinchuk.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> According to American sources, he left the post again in July 2020, citing fatigue. He was replaced by Leonid Kravchuk.<ref name="Service 2020">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="Jamestown 2020">Template:Cite news</ref>

Russian invasion of Ukraine

Template:Main When Russia began its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Kuchma said that he would remain to help defend the country: "I stay at home, in Ukraine, because we are all in our Homeland, there is no other. And we will defend it together until the very victory – without division into party columns, without personal interests and old arguments. United we stand around the Flag, the Army, and the President. Ukraine is not Russia. And it will never become Russia. No matter how hard they want this. We are already winning. And this can’t be stopped. And I will only say to the Russian Federation that I agree with the words of my compatriots who say in one voice: damn you all!".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

In November 2023, Kuchma presented his new book Ukraine is Not Russia: Twenty Years Later.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Family and personal life

File:Kuchma and Pinchuk, 12 September 2014.jpg

Kuchma with his son-in-law Viktor Pinchuk in 2014

Kuchma has been married to Lyudmyla Talalayeva since 1967.<ref name=UKPresWifes>First ladies of Ukraine, ITAR-TASS (6 June 2014)</ref> is the Honorary President of the National Fund of Social Protection of Mothers and Children, "Ukraine to Children"<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> and is also known as a paralympic movement in Ukraine supporter.<ref name=UKPresWifes/>

Kuchma's only child, daughter Olena Pinchuk, is married to Viktor Pinchuk, an industrialist and philanthropist whose Victor Pinchuk Foundation regularly hosts Ukraine-dedicated and philanthropic forums at the annual World Economic Forum in Davos. Victor Pinchuk made headlines when it was revealed that one of his lobbyists was previously picked by Donald Trump for national security aide.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

Kuchma was an amateur guitar player in his younger years. He was also known for his skill at the complicated card game preferans.

In 2003, he published his book, Template:Ill.

After retirement, Kuchma was allowed to keep the state-owned dacha in Koncha-Zaspa for his personal use upon completion of his state duties.<ref>Ukrayinska Pravda exposes president’s Mezhygirya deal, Kyiv Post (6 May 2009)</ref> Government order #15-r, which allowed Kuchma to keep his estate, was signed by acting Prime Minister Mykola Azarov on 19 January 2005. Kuchma was also allowed to keep his full presidential salary and all service personnel, along with two state-owned vehicles. That order also stated that these costs would be paid out of the state budget.

Legacy

Kuchma's legacy as President of Ukraine has proven divisive and controversial. He has been commonly referred to as authoritarian,<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> and his attacks on independent media, as well as his economic reforms, have continued to impact Ukraine in the years since he left office.

Ideology

Political advisor Dmytro Vydrin and first head of Kuchma's presidential administration Dmytro Tabachnyk claimed Kuchma to be a representative of centrist forces supported by Ukraine's industrial establishment, and denied his allegiance to any particular ideology. According to them, during his presidency Kuchma combined his functions as a political leader with those of a manager, seeing Ukraine as a stabilizing force on the post-Soviet space and as an equal participant in the global market.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> Kuchma himself didn't deny Ukraine's need for a national idea, but refused to see it in exclusively ethnonationalist terms.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> According to Taras Kuzio, Kuchma's refusal to sacrifice Ukraine's nation- and state-building despite his policies of normalizing relations with Russia, proved that the allegiance of his Russophone voters to the idea of an independent Ukrainian state was not weaker than that of Ukrainiphone Ukrainians.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

Economic and political legacy

Kuchma's detractors have accused him of establishing the Ukrainian oligarchs with his economic reforms, and many oligarchs entered politics during his presidency, among them Kuchma's son-in-law Viktor Pinchuk, Viktor Medvedchuk, Ihor Bakai, Kostyantyn Zhevago and Heorhiy Kirpa.<ref name=":2">Template:Cite news</ref>

Kuchma's political legacy has also been impactful. Each of his successors except Volodymyr Zelenskyy began their political career under and with the support of Kuchma.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>"The countries of the former Soviet Union at the turn of the twenty-first century: the Baltic and European states in transition" (page 556) by Ian Jeffries, Template:ISBN, 9780415252300 (published in 2004)</ref><ref name="BOOKTURCHY">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="PoroWP2">Template:Cite news</ref> Several other politicians, such as Medvedchuk, Volodymyr Lytvyn, Leonid Derkach, Volodymyr Horbulin, and Oleksandr Omelchenko also were promoted by Kuchma during his tenure in office.<ref name=":2" />

Criminal persecution

Despite numerous human rights abuses during his tenure, such as vote rigging in the 2004 presidential election, and the mysterious deaths of numerous political opponents, among them Gongadze and Viacheslav Chornovil, Kuchma has never been charged with a crime, and numerous attempts to do so have proven unsuccessful.<ref>Ukraine on its meandering path between East and West Template:Webarchive by Andrej Lushnycky and Mykola Riabchuk, Peter Lang, 2009, Template:ISBN (page 52)</ref><ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" />

Awards

File:Coat of Arms of Leonid-Kuchma (Spanish Order of the Civil Merit).svg

Arms of Leonid Kuchma as knight of the Order of Civil Merit (Spain)

Kuchma was awarded the Azerbaijani Istiglal Order for his contributions to Azerbaijan-Ukraine relations and strategic cooperation between the states by President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev on 6 August 1999.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Ukrainian Honours

• Order of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) of St. Ilya of Murom, 1st class (2004)
• Honorary Citizen of the Donetsk Oblast (2002)

Foreign Honours

• Knight Grand Cross with Grand Cordon of the Order of Merit of the Italian Republic (3 May 1995)
• Knight Collar of the Order of Civil Merit (4 October 1996)<ref>BOE-A-1996-22150</ref>
• Order of Merit for the Fatherland, 1st class (Russia, 20 April 2004) – for his contribution to strengthening friendship and cooperation between Russia and Ukraine
• Grand Cross of the Order of Vytautas the Great (Lithuania, 20 September 1996)<ref name="Lith">Lithuanian Presidency Template:Webarchive, Lithuanian Orders searching form</ref>
• Grand Cross of the Order of the Lithuanian Grand Duke Gediminas (Lithuania, 4 November 1998, Ludmila too)<ref name="Lith" />
• Order of the Golden Eagle (Kazakhstan, 1999)
• Grand Cross with Chain of the Order of the Star of Romania (Romania, 2000)
• Order of the Republic (Moldova, 2003)
• Order Laila Utama Dardzha Kerabat, 1st class (Brunei, 2004)
• Chain of the Order of Prince Henry (Portugal, 16 April 1998)<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> 3 February 1999
• Order of the "Star of Bethlehem" (State of Palestine, 2000)

Further reading

• Åslund, Anders, and Michael McFaul.Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough. (2006)
• Aslund, Anders. How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy. (2009)
• Birch, Sarah. Elections and Democratization in Ukraine. (2000) online edition
• Kubicek, Paul. The History of Ukraine. (2008) excerpt and text search
• Kuzio, Taras. Ukraine: State and Nation Building (1998) online edition Template:Webarchive
• Sochor, Zenovia A. "Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Elections in Ukraine 1994." in: Tismăneanu, Vladmir (ed.). 1995. Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. (1994) Template:ISBN. pp. 208–224.
• Whitmore, Sarah. State Building in Ukraine: The Ukrainian Parliament, 1990–2003. Routledge, 2004 online edition Template:Webarchive
• Wilson, Andrew. Ukraine's Orange Revolution. (2005)
• Wilson, Andrew. The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. 2nd ed. 2002; online excerpts at Amazon
• Wolczuk, Roman. Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy 1991–2000. (2002) excerpt and text search
• Zon, Hans van. The Political Economy of Independent Ukraine. 2000 online edition Template:Webarchive

External links

• Liudmyla Shanghina, "UKRAINE IS NOT AMERICA", Razumkov
• "Yushchenko Won the Competition of Personalities", (Kuchma's 2005 interview), Vremia Novostey (Russia) Template:In lang
• Korzh, H. Leonid Kuchma: Real biography of the second President of Ukraine Template:Webarchive.
• Template:Webarchive
• Template:C-SPAN

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