Nuclear program of Iran
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Template:Nuclear power in Iran Iran's nuclear program, one of the most scrutinized in the world, has sparked intense international concern. While Iran asserts that its nuclear ambitions are purely for civilian purposes, including energy production, the country historically pursued the secretive AMAD nuclear weapons project (paused in 2003 according to U.S. intelligence), reaching the highest known levels among countries without military nuclear programs. This has raised fears that Iran is moving closer to developing nuclear weapons, a prospect that has led to rising tensions, particularly with Israel, the United States, and European nations. The issue remains a critical flashpoint in the Middle East, with ongoing military and diplomatic confrontations. According to The New York Times in 2025, "If Iran is truly pursuing a nuclear weapon—which it officially denies—it is taking more time than any nuclear-armed nation in history."<ref name="s321">Template:Cite web</ref>
Iran's nuclear program began in the 1950s under the Pahlavi dynasty with United States support. It expanded in the 1970s with plans for power reactors, paused after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and resumed secretly during the 1980s Iran–Iraq War. Undeclared enrichment sites at Natanz and Arak were exposed in 2002, and Fordow, an underground fuel enrichment site, was revealed in 2009.
Iran's nuclear program has been a focal point of international scrutiny for decades. In 2003, Iran suspended its formal nuclear weapons program, and claims its program is for peaceful purposes only,<ref name="nocredible">Template:Cite web</ref> yet analysts and the IAEA have refuted such claims. Template:As of Iran was producing enriched uranium at 60% purity, and was accelerating its nuclear advancements by installing more advanced centrifuges. Analysts warn that these activities far exceed any plausible civilian purpose.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Estimates suggest that Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear bomb within a week and accumulate enough for seven within a month, raising fears that its breakout time has shortened drastically.<ref name="economist20240520">Template:Cite news</ref> The destruction of Israel is frequently cited as one of several strategic objectives behind Iran's nuclear ambitions.<ref name="AllinSimon2010">Template:Cite book</ref> Concerns include nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism,<ref name="Winer2012">Template:Cite journal</ref> and increased support for terrorism and insurgency.<ref name="Freilich 2018 83–85">Template:Cite book</ref>
In response to Iran's nuclear program, the international community imposed sanctions that severely impacted its economy, restricting its oil exports and limiting access to global financial systems.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Covert operations such as the Stuxnet cyberattack in 2010 sought to disrupt the program. In 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed, imposing strict limitations on Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In 2018, the United States withdrew from the agreement, leading to re-imposed sanctions.<ref name="nytimes20180508">Template:Cite news</ref> Since then, Iran's nuclear program has expanded dramatically, with enriched uranium stockpiles exceeding JCPOA limits by tens of times, some nearing weapons-grade purity.<ref name="economist20240520" /> In October 2023, an IAEA report estimated Iran had increased its uranium stockpile 22 times over the 2015 agreed JCPOA limit.<ref name="timesofisrael20231116">Template:Cite web</ref> According to the IAEA, Iran is "the only non-nuclear-weapon state to produce such material".<ref name="apnews20250531">Template:Cite web</ref> In the last months of the Biden administration, new intelligence persuaded US officials that Iran was exploring a gun-type fission weapon, a cruder design that could enable Iran to manufacture a nuclear weapon, undeliverable by missile, in a matter of months.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="u701">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="p952">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="b202">Template:Cite web</ref> The US and Iran have engaged in bilateral negotiations since April 2025, aiming to curb Iran's program for sanctions relief, though Iran's leaders have refused to stop enriching uranium.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
On 12 June 2025, the IAEA found Iran non-compliant with its nuclear obligations for the first time in 20 years.<ref name="euronews20250612">Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Atomic watchdog says Iran not complying with nuclear safeguards , UN News, 12 June 2025.</ref> Iran retaliated by launching a new enrichment site and installing advanced centrifuges.<ref name="cnn20250612">Template:Cite web</ref> One day later, Israel, which is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, launched the Iran–Israel war and coordinated strikes across Iran, targeting nuclear facilities and damaging Natanz and other sites.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Eight days later, the United States bombed three Iranian nuclear sites.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
On August 28, 2025, E3 members, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, initiated the process of the snapback mechanism,<ref name=":03">Template:Cite web</ref> stating that despite upholding their own commitments, since 2019 Iran had "increasingly and deliberately ceased performing its JCPOA commitments",<ref name=":53">Template:Cite web</ref> including "the accumulation of a highly enriched uranium stockpile which lacks any credible civilian justification and is unprecedented for a state without a nuclear weapons program".<ref name=":53" />Template:TOC limit On 28 September 2025, UN sanctions were officially reimposed on Iran.<ref>{{#invoke:Cite|news|title=European Powers Warn Iran Against 'Escalatory' Acts As Snapback Sanctions Take Force|url= https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-snapback-sanctions-european-e3-un-nuclear/33543002.html |date=26 September 2025|work=Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty}}</ref>
Motivations
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Iran's nuclear program is commonly viewed as serving several purposes, according to widely cited analyses.<ref name="AllinSimon2010" /> The program is seen as a means to destroy Israel or threaten its existence.<ref name="AllinSimon2010" /> The United States has maintained that a nuclear-capable Iran would likely use its capabilities to attempt the annihilation of Israel.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> It has also been argued that a nuclear-armed Iran would likely intensify its efforts to destroy Israel under the protection of a nuclear deterrent, resulting in catastrophic consequences.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Iran's nuclear program is also believed to function as a tool to protect the Iranian regime and nation from foreign aggression and external dominance.<ref name="AllinSimon2010" /> It may also serve as an instrument of Iranian aggression and hegemony, projecting power in the region.<ref name="AllinSimon2010" /> Scholars argue that a nuclear-armed Iran could feel emboldened to increase its support for terrorism and insurgency, core elements of its strategy, while deterring retaliation through its newfound nuclear leverage.<ref name="Nader2013">Template:Citation</ref> The potential transfer of nuclear technology or weapons to radical states and terrorist organizations heightens fears of nuclear terrorism.<ref name="Winer2012" />
The program has also been closely tied to Iranian techno-nationalist pride, symbolizing scientific progress and national independence.<ref name="AllinSimon2010" />
History
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Origins under the Shah (1950s–1970s)
Iran's nuclear ambitions began under the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, with support from the United States and Western Europe. In 1957, Iran and the US signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement as part of President Dwight Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" program. This led to the construction of Iran's first nuclear research facility at Tehran. In November 1967, the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) went critical – a 5 megawatt (thermal) light-water reactor, which initially ran on highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel at 93% U-235, provided by the US, and was later converted in 1993 to use 20% enriched uranium with Argentine. Iran became one of the original signatories of the NPT when it entered into force in March 1970, committing as a non-nuclear-weapon state not to pursue nuclear arms.<ref name="iranwatch20231219">Template:Cite web</ref>
By the mid-1970s, the Shah expanded Iran's nuclear energy ambitions. In 1974 he established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and announced plans to produce 23,000 megawatts of electricity from a network of nuclear power plants over 20 years. Contracts were signed with Western firms: Iran paid over $1 billion for a 10% stake in the French Eurodif consortium's uranium enrichment plant, and West Germany's Kraftwerk Union (Siemens) agreed to build two 1,200 MWe pressurized water reactors at Bushehr. Construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant began in 1975, and Iran also negotiated with France's Framatome to supply additional reactors. Plans were made for a full domestic nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium mining and fuel fabrication, with a new Nuclear Technology Center established at Isfahan.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />
Post-revolution revival and war impact (1979–1980s)
This ambitious program slowed dramatically after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The Shah was deposed and Iran's new leaders under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini were initially hostile to nuclear technology, seeing it as a symbol of Western influence. Many ongoing nuclear projects were shelved or canceled. The Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) derailed the nuclear program: resources were diverted to the war effort, and Iraq targeted Iran's nuclear infrastructure. The partially built Bushehr reactor site was bombed multiple times by Iraqi warplanes, and Siemens withdrew from the project, leaving the reactor shells heavily damaged. By the late 1980s, Iran's nuclear program had effectively been put on hold.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />
Secret expansion and weaponization efforts (1990s–2002)
By the early 1990s, Iran's nuclear program accelerated on two parallel tracks: one overtly civilian and one covert. Openly, Iran continued working with Russia and China to build peaceful nuclear infrastructure. Bushehr's reactor project moved forward under Russian engineers (though plagued by delays until it finally came online in 2011), and China helped Iran with nuclear research and uranium mining expertise.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Less transparently, Iran was building a secret enrichment capability and exploring technologies relevant to nuclear weapons, away from the eyes of inspectors.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />
Iran's covert procurement of enrichment technology bore fruit in the 1990s. Thousands of centrifuge components, tools, and technical drawings obtained from Abdul Qadeer Khan's network were used to set up secret pilot enrichment workshops.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Experiments with uranium hexafluoride gas were conducted in undeclared facilities in Tehran (such as the Kalaye Electric Company) in the late 1990s.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> In 2000, Iran completed a uranium conversion plant at Isfahan, based on a Chinese design, to produce uranium hexafluoride feedstock for enrichment.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> It also developed domestic sources of uranium: the Saghand mine in Yazd province (with Chinese assistance) and the Gchine mine and mill near the Gulf coast. The Gchine uranium mine became operational in 2004 and is now believed to have originally been part of a military-run nuclear effort, kept hidden from the IAEA until revealed in 2003. These steps gave Iran independent access to the raw materials and precursor processes for a weapons-capable nuclear fuel cycle.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />
In the late 1990s Iran launched a nuclear weapons research program, codenamed the AMAD Project, under the aegis of the Iranian Ministry of Defense. According to later IAEA findings, the AMAD Project (led by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a top nuclear scientist) aimed to design and build an arsenal of five nuclear warheads by the mid-2000s.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Between 1999 and 2003, this secret program managed to acquire and improve warhead designs (reportedly including a re-engineered Pakistani design), conducting high-explosive tests and detonator development for an implosion-type bomb, manufacturing some nuclear weapon components with surrogate materials, and integrating a warhead design into Iran's Shahab-3 ballistic missile system.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> The main thing Amad lacked was fissile material, since Iran had not yet produced weapons-grade uranium or plutonium for a bomb core. Still, the scope of Amad demonstrated that Iran was exploring the bomb option in violation of its NPT obligations.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />
Throughout the 1990s, Iranian entities also received steady assistance from foreign sources. Some Russian and Chinese companies provided Iran with expertise and equipment for its nuclear projects.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> For example, Chinese technicians conducted uranium exploration in Iran and allegedly supplied blueprints that aided Iran's construction of the Isfahan conversion facility.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Iran's scientists also gained know-how from Pakistan's secret network and from academic exchanges abroad. That enabled Iran to secretly establish the critical facilities that could produce weapons-usable material: large uranium enrichment plants and a heavy-water reactor project.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />
By the early 2000s, two key clandestine facilities were nearing completion: a uranium enrichment center at Natanz (in central Iran), built to house thousands of centrifuges, and a heavy water production plant alongside a 40 MW heavy-water reactor (IR-40) near Arak. These facilities, which had been kept secret from the IAEA, were intended for ostensibly civilian purposes but had clear weapons potential. Enrichment at Natanz could yield high-enriched uranium for bombs, while the Arak reactor (once operational) could produce plutonium in its spent fuel, and the heavy water plant would supply the reactor's coolant.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> In August 2002, an exiled Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), exposed the existence of Natanz and Arak.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Satellite imagery soon confirmed construction at these sites. The revelation that Iran had built major nuclear facilities in secret, without required disclosure to the IAEA, ignited an international crisis and raised questions about the program's true aim.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />
Exposure and International Confrontation (2002–2013)
In late 2003, Iran was facing the prospect of censure and agreed to a degree of cooperation. In October 2003, Iran and the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany (the "EU-3") struck the Tehran Agreement: Iran pledged to temporarily suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, allow more intrusive inspections by signing the Additional Protocol, and clarify past nuclear work.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> This deal, reached just ahead of an IAEA Board of Governors deadline, was intended to build confidence while a longer-term solution was negotiated.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> However, Iran's cooperation was halting and incomplete.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />
In 2004 and 2005, the IAEA uncovered inconsistencies and omissions in Iran's disclosures, such as experiments with plutonium separation and advanced P-2 centrifuge designs that Iran had failed to report.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Iran's suspension of enrichment proved short-lived as soon it resumed certain nuclear activities.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> In June 2004, the IAEA's Board rebuked Iran for not fully cooperating.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> By September 2005, the Board found Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards (a formal trigger for UN Security Council involvement).<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Iran reacted by ceasing voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol and restarting enrichment work. In April 2006, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had enriched uranium to 3.5% U-235, low enriched uranium suitable for nuclear fuel, using a cascade of 164 centrifuges at Natanz.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> This marked Iran's first public entry into the nuclear fuel-cycle capability club.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />
The international community responded firmly. In July 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1696 under Chapter VII, demanding Iran suspend all enrichment-related activities or face sanctions.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> When Iran defied this demand, the Security Council proceeded to adopt a series of escalating sanctions between 2006 and 2010.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> The first, Resolution 1737 in December 2006, imposed sanctions targeting sensitive nuclear and missile programs and banned nuclear-related trade with Iran.<ref name="armscontroljanuary2023">Template:Cite web</ref> Further resolutions (1747 in 2007, 1803 in 2008, and 1929 in June 2010) broadened the sanctions to include arms embargoes, asset freezes on key individuals and entities, and restrictions on financial dealings.<ref name="armscontroljanuary2023" /> These measures, backed by the US, Russia, China, and the EU alike, aimed to pressure Iran to halt enrichment. In parallel, the US and EU introduced their own sanctions, including US laws penalizing Iran's oil and gas investment (e.g. the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996) and European moves to restrict trade and eventually embargo Iranian oil by 2012.<ref name="armscontroljanuary2023" />
Diplomatic efforts during 2005–2006 tried to resolve the standoff. The newly formed P5+1 group (China, Russia, France, the UK, the US, plus Germany) offered Iran a package of incentives in mid-2006 to halt enrichment – including nuclear fuel guarantees and economic benefits.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Iran, under the hardline Ahmadinejad administration, rejected the offer, insisting on its "right" to enrich under the NPT. As talks faltered, Iran steadily expanded its enrichment work. By 2007, Iran had installed roughly 3,000 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz and was enriching larger quantities of uranium.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> In 2007, a US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessed with high confidence that while Iran had halted its structured nuclear weapons program in 2003, it was continuing to develop technical capabilities applicable to nuclear weapons.<ref name="armscontroljanuary2023" /> This finding somewhat tempered the urgency of the crisis, but concerns remained over Iran's growing stockpile of enriched uranium and its long-term intentions.
A significant development came in September 2009, when Western leaders exposed yet another secret Iranian facility. US President Barack Obama, joined by France's Nicolas Sarkozy and Britain's Gordon Brown, revealed intelligence on the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, an underground enrichment site being built deep inside a mountain near Qom. Iran had not declared Fordow to the IAEA, violating its safeguards duty to report new facilities at the planning stage.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Fordow's secret construction (begun in 2006) and fortified location heightened fears that Iran sought a secret bomb program resilient to military attack. Iran defended Fordow as a backup enrichment plant and belatedly declared it to the IAEA, but confidence in Iran's transparency was further eroded. The Fordow revelation galvanized international unity for tougher sanctions, manifested in Resolution 1929 (June 2010), which severely tightened economic restrictions on Iran.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />
Meanwhile, covert operations also targeted the program. The Stuxnet cyberattack, a sophisticated computer worm widely attributed to the US and Israel, was discovered in 2010 after it disrupted the control systems at Natanz, crippling a large number of Iran's spinning centrifuges.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Between 2010 and 2012, four Iranian nuclear scientists were assassinated in Tehran, killings Iran blamed on Israeli and Western agents. By mid-2013, Tehran had installed over 18,000 centrifuges (mostly IR-1 models) at Natanz and Fordow, including some 1,000+ more advanced IR-2m machine.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Its stockpile had grown to nearly 10,000 kg of 3.5% low-enriched uranium and about 370 kg of 20% medium-enriched uranium – the latter quantity almost enough, if further enriched to weapons-grade, for one nuclear bomb.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> The world's concern was that Iran's "breakout" time, i.e. the time to produce bomb-grade uranium for a weapon, had shrunk to a matter of a few months.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />
Diplomatic efforts and the JCPOA (2013–2018)
Template:MainTemplate:See also In 2013, Iran's newly elected president, Hassan Rouhani, a centrist cleric and former nuclear negotiator, campaigned on ending sanctions through diplomacy. He had cautious backing from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Meanwhile, US President Barack Obama, having already authorized secret backchannel talks with Iranian officials in Oman in 2012, was open to a diplomatic solution.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Formal multilateral negotiations resumed in October 2013 between Iran and the P5+1. By November 24, they reached the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), an interim agreement that froze key elements of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for limited sanctions relief.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Iran halted enrichment above 5% U-235, neutralized its 20% stockpile through dilution or conversion, suspended centrifuge installation, and agreed not to fuel or operate the Arak heavy-water reactor. In return, it received access to about $4.2 billion in frozen assets and limited relief on petrochemical and precious metals trade.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> The JPOA, which began in January 2014, was extended several times while talks continued toward a final accord.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />
After 20 months, the parties reached the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Under this framework Iran agreed tentatively to accept restrictions on its nuclear program, all of which would last for at least a decade and some longer, and to submit to an increased intensity of international inspections. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was finally reached on 14 July 2015.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The final agreement is based upon "the rules-based nonproliferation regime created by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and including especially the IAEA safeguards system".<ref name="Carnegie">Template:Cite web</ref>
Enrichment was capped at 3.67% for 15 years, and the enriched uranium stockpile limited to 300 kg. Only 5,060 first-generation IR-1 centrifuges could operate at Natanz, and Fordow was repurposed for non-enrichment research. The Arak IR-40 reactor was to be redesigned and rebuilt, with its original core removed and filled with concrete to eliminate plutonium production capability. Iran agreed to provisionally implement the IAEA Additional Protocol, and accepted enhanced verification, including continuous surveillance of enrichment and conversion facilities, monitoring of uranium mines and mills, and oversight of centrifuge manufacturing. Iran's excess enriched uranium, including the bulk of its 20% material, was to be shipped abroad or down-blended. Over 13,000 centrifuges were dismantled. Limited R&D on advanced centrifuges was allowed under controlled conditions without accumulating enriched uranium.
In exchange, the UN, US, and EU committed to stepwise sanctions relief: UN Security Council Resolution 2231 endorsed the JCPOA. It retained a conventional arms embargo for five years and ballistic missile restrictions for eight, and introduced a "snapback" mechanism allowing reimposition of sanctions in case of noncompliance. US and EU sanctions targeting Iran's energy, finance, shipping, and trade sectors were suspended. On "Implementation Day" (January 16, 2016), the IAEA verified Iranian compliance, leading to the unfreezing of billions in Iranian assets and restoration of access to international banking (e.g., SWIFT).<ref name="Nasrella">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="Chuck">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="Melvin">Template:Cite news</ref> Some US sanctions tied to terrorism and human rights remained in force.
United States withdrawal and Iranian violations (2018–2025)
In 2018, the Mossad reportedly stole nuclear secrets (a cache of documents from Iran's weaponization program) from a secure warehouse in the Turquzabad district of Tehran. According to reports, the agents came in a truck semitrailer at midnight, cut into dozens of safes with "high intensity torches", and carted out "50,000 pages and 163 compact discs of memos, videos and plans" before leaving in time to make their escape when the guards came for the morning shift at 7 am.<ref name="Filkins-iran-5-18-2020">Template:Cite magazine</ref><ref name="NYT-sanger-15-7-2018">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>How Mossad turned the IAEA around on Iran with evidence - analysis, Yonah Jeremy Job, Jerusalem Post, 9 March 2021.</ref> According to a US intelligence official, an "enormous" Iranian "dragnet operation" was unsuccessful in recovering the documents, which escaped through Azerbaijan.<ref name="Filkins-iran-5-18-2020"/> According to the Israelis, the documents and files, which it shared with European countries and the United States,<ref>European intelligence officials briefed in Israel on Iran's nuclear archive The Times of Israel, 5 May 2018</ref> demonstrated that the AMAD Project aimed to develop nuclear weapons,<ref>Mossad's stunning op in Iran overshadows the actual intelligence it stole The Times of Israel, 1 May 2018</ref> that Iran had a nuclear program when it claimed to have "largely suspended it", and that there were two nuclear sites in Iran that had been hidden from inspectors.<ref name="Filkins-iran-5-18-2020" /> Iran claims "the whole thing was a hoax".<ref name="Filkins-iran-5-18-2020" /> This influenced Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the JCPOA and reimpose sanctions on Iran.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
In 2018, the United States withdrew from JCPOA, with President Donald Trump stating that "the heart of the Iran deal was a giant fiction: that a murderous regime desired only a peaceful nuclear energy program".<ref name="nytimes20180508" /> The US also contended that the agreement was inadequate because it did not impose limitations on Iran's ballistic missile program,<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> and failed to curb its backing of proxy groups.<ref name="Washington Post 2015">Template:Cite news</ref>
In February 2019, the IAEA certified that Iran was still abiding by the international Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 2015.<ref name=ReutersFeb19>Template:Cite web</ref> However, on 8 May 2019, Iran announced it would suspend implementation of some parts of the JCPOA, threatening further action in 60 days unless it received protection from US sanctions.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In July 2019, the IAEA confirmed that Iran has breached both the 300 kg enriched uranium stockpile limit and the 3.67% refinement limit.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> On 5 November 2019, Iranian nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi announced that Iran will enrich uranium to 5% at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, adding the country had the capability to enrich uranium to 20% if needed.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Also in November, Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, stated that Iran can enrich up to 60% if needed.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> President Hassan Rouhani declared that Iran's nuclear program would be "limitless" while the country launches the third phase of quitting from the 2015 nuclear deal.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
On January 3, 2020, the US assassinated Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, and Iran responded with missile strikes on US. bases. Two days later, Iran's government declared it would no longer observe any JCPOA limits on uranium enrichment capacity, levels, or stockpile size.<ref>Iran preserves options over the nuclear deal, Mark Fitzpatrick and Mahsa Rouhi, IISS, 6 January 2020.</ref> In March 2020, the IAEA said that Iran had nearly tripled its stockpile of enriched uranium since early November 2019.<ref name="IAEA March 2020">Template:Cite news</ref> In late June and early July 2020, there were several explosions in Iran, including one that damaged the Natanz enrichment plant (see 2020 Iran explosions). In September 2020, the IAEA reported that Iran had accumulated ten times as much enriched uranium as permitted by the JCPOA.<ref>"Iran's enriched uranium stockpile '10 times limit'", BBC News, 4 September 2020</ref> On 27 November 2020, Iran's top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was assassinated in Tehran. Fakhrizadeh was believed to be the primary force behind Iran's covert nuclear program for many decades. The New York Times reported that Israel's Mossad was behind the attack and that Mick Mulroy, the former Deputy Defense Secretary for the Middle East said the death of Fakhirizadeh was "a setback to Iran's nuclear program and he was also a senior officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and that "will magnify Iran's desire to respond by force."<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Throughout 2021 and 2022, Iran installed cascades of advanced centrifuges (IR-2m, IR-4, IR-6) at Natanz and Fordow, significantly increasing its enrichment output.<ref name="jp160321">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> In February 2021, the IAEA reported that Iran stopped allowing access to data from nuclear sites, as well as plans for future sites.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In April 2021, a sabotage attack struck the Natanz enrichment plant, causing an electrical blackout and damaging centrifuges. Iran responded by further upping enrichment: days later, it began producing 60% enriched uranium, an unprecedented level for Iran, just short of weapons-grade (90% and above). This 60% enrichment took place at Natanz, and later at Fordow as well, yielding a stockpile that as of early 2023 exceeded ~70 kg of 60% uranium.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> If Iran chose to enrich this material to 90%, it would be sufficient for several nuclear warheads. The UK, France, and Germany said that Iran has "no credible civilian use for uranium metal" and called the news "deeply concerning" because of its "potentially grave military implications" (as the use of metallic enriched uranium is for bombs).<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> On 25 June 2022, in a meeting with the senior diplomat of the EU, Ali Shamkhani, Iran's top security officer, declared that Iran would continue to advance its nuclear program until the West modifies its "illegal behavior".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
In July 2022, according to an IAEA report seen by Reuters, Iran had increased its uranium enrichment through the use of sophisticated equipment at its underground Fordow plant in a configuration that can more quickly vary between enrichment levels.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In September 2022, Germany, United Kingdom and France expressed doubts over Iran's sincerity in returning to the JCPOA after Tehran insisted that the IAEA close its probes into uranium traces at three undeclared Iranian sites.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The IAEA said it could not guarantee the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, stating there had been "no progress in resolving questions about the past presence of nuclear material at undeclared sites".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres urged Iran to hold "serious dialogue" about nuclear inspections and said IAEA's independence is "essential" in response to Iranian demands to end probes.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In February 2023, the IAEA reported having found uranium in Iran enriched to 84%.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The Iranian government has claimed that this is an "unintended fluctuation" in the enrichment levels, though the Iranians have been openly enriching uranium to 60% purity, a breach of the 2015 nuclear deal.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In 2024, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian expressed interest in reopening discussions with the United States on the nuclear deal.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
In late October 2024, during a series of Israeli airstrikes in Iran carried out in response to a ballistic missile attack earlier that month, Israel reportedly destroyed a top-secret nuclear weapons research facility known as the Taleghan 2 building, located within the Parchin military complex.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In November 2024, Iran announced that it would make new advanced centrifuges after IAEA condemned Iranians' non-compliance and secrecy.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Current status and recent escalations (2025–present)
In January 2025, the exiled opposition group NCRI alleged that Iran is developing long-range missile technology under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with some designs based on North Korean models. The (NCRI) said that these missiles, such as the Ghaem-100 and Simorgh, could carry nuclear warheads and reach targets as far as Template:Convert away, including parts of Europe.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> These allegations have not been independently confirmed, but given that several past NCRI claims were later verified by inspectors, they warrant investigation.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
In March 2025, US President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iran seeking to reopen negotiations.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Ayatollah Ali Khamenei later said, "Some bullying governments insist on negotiations not to resolve issues but to impose their own expectations," which was seen as in response to the letter.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
In late March 2025, Khamenei's top advisor Ali Larijani said Iran would have no choice but to develop nuclear weapons if attacked by the United States, Israel or its allies.<ref name="fr24-nukes-01apr25">Template:Cite news</ref>
In April 2025, Trump revealed that Iran had decided to undertake talks with the United States for an agreement over its nuclear program.<ref>Iran says it will give US talks about nuclear plans a 'genuine chance', Nayera Abdallah, Reuters, 11 April 2025.</ref> On 12 April, both countries held their first high-level meeting in Oman,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> followed by a second meeting on 19 April in Italy.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> On May 16, Trump sent Iran an offer and said they have to move quickly or else bad things would happen.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> On May 17, Khamenei condemned Trump, saying that he lied about wanting peace and that he was not worth responding to, calling the US demands "outrageous nonsense".<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Khamenei also reiterated that Israel is a "cancerous tumour" that must be uprooted.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
On May 31, 2025, IAEA reported that Iran had sharply increased its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% purity, just below weapons-grade, reaching over 408 kilograms, a nearly 50% rise since February.<ref name="apnews20250612">Template:Cite web</ref> The agency warned that this amount is enough for multiple nuclear weapons if further enriched. It also noted that Iran remains the only non-nuclear-weapon state to produce such material, calling the situation a "serious concern".<ref name="apnews20250612" /> In June 2025, the NCRI said Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons through a new program called the "Kavir Plan". According to the NCRI, the new project involves six sites in Semnan province working on warheads and related technology, succeeding the previous AMAD Project.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
On June 10, Trump stated that Iran was becoming "much more aggressive" in the negotiations.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> On 11 June, the Iranian regime threatened US bases in the Middle East, with Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh stating, "If a conflict is imposed on us... all US bases are within our reach, and we will boldly target them in host countries."<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The US embassy in Iraq evacuated all personnel.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The Iran-backed Yemen-based Houthi movement threatened to attack the United States if a strike on Iran were to occur.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> CENTCOM presented a wide range of military options for an attack on Iran.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> UK issued threat advisory for ships on Arabian Gulf.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth told Congress that Iran was attempting a nuclear breakout.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
On 12 June 2025, IAEA found Iran non-compliant with its nuclear obligations for the first time in 20 years.<ref name="euronews20250612" /> Iran retaliated by announcing it would launch a new enrichment site and install advanced centrifuges.<ref name="cnn20250612" /> On the night of June 13, Israel has initiated Operation Rising Lion, a large‑scale aerial assault targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, missile factories, military sites, and commanders across cities including Tehran and Natanz.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
On 13 June 2025, Israel attacked the plant as part of the June 2025 Israeli strikes on Iran. Iranian forces said they had shot down an Israeli drone.<ref name=reuters-damage-13jun25>Template:Cite news</ref> On 21 June, the US bombed the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, the Natanz Nuclear Facility, and the Isfahan nuclear technology center.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In an address from the White House, Trump claimed responsibility for the destruction of the Fordow facility, stating "Iran's key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated."<ref name="abc-obliterated-22jun25">Template:Cite news</ref>
In early July 2025, Iran suspended co-operation with the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).<ref name="abc-no-iaea-2jul25">Template:Cite news</ref> and all IAEA inspectors left Iran by July 4.<ref name="reuter-insp-out-5jul25">Template:Cite news</ref>
In August 2025, Iran and European nations reached an agreement to recommence discussions focused on the complete restoration of Tehran's nuclear enrichment operations.
France, Britain, and Germany have indicated that they may reinstate UN sanctions on Iran through a "quick return" mechanism should Tehran fail to engage in negotiations.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
On August 28, 2025, E3 members, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, initiated the process of the snapback mechanism, with the prospect of freezing Iranian overseas assets, blocking arms deals with Iran, imposing penal action against development of Iran's ballistic missile program and further restricting Iran's military and nuclear activities.<ref name=":0">Template:Cite web</ref> In a letter addressed to the president of the UN Security Council, the foreign ministers of the E3 stated that since 2019, Iran had "increasingly and deliberately ceased performing its JCPOA commitments", including "the accumulation of a highly enriched uranium stockpile which lacks any credible civilian justification and is unprecedented for a state without a nuclear weapons program". The letter detailed additional Iranian violations of the agreement despite the fact that the E3 "have consistently upheld their agreements under the terms of the JCPOA".<ref name=":5">Template:Cite web</ref> The activation opened a 30-day window, intended to reengage Iran, "whose refusal to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) inspectors started the crisis", in diplomatic negotiations before full restoration of sanctions. According to Euronews, Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared that it was "unjustified, illegal, and lacking any legal basis" and promised that "The Islamic Republic of Iran will respond appropriately".<ref name=":4">Template:Cite web</ref>
In September 2025, Iran signed a $25 billion agreement with Russia to build four nuclear reactors in Sirik in Iran. The Generation III reactors are expected to produce 5 GW of electricity. Iran, which suffers power shortages at times of high demand, currently has one operating nuclear power plant, in Bushehr. Also built by Russia, it has a capacity of 1 GW.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> On 28 September, UN sanctions were officially reimposed on Iran.<ref>{{#invoke:Cite|news|title=European Powers Warn Iran Against 'Escalatory' Acts As Snapback Sanctions Take Force|url= https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-snapback-sanctions-european-e3-un-nuclear/33543002.html |date=26 September 2025|work=Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty}}</ref>
In October 2025, former defence minister and current political adviser to the Supreme Leader, Ali Shamkhani, stated "If I returned to the defence portfolio, I would move toward building an atomic bomb",<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> and declared that if he could return to the 1990s, "we would definitely build the atomic bomb".<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Main facilities
Natanz
Template:Main Natanz, located about Template:Convert south-east of Tehran, is Iran's main uranium enrichment site.<ref name="apnews20250522">Template:Cite web</ref> The facility includes an underground Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) housing large cascades of gas centrifuges, as well as a smaller Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) above the ground. Iran has installed thousands of first-generation IR-1 centrifuges and more advanced models (IR-2m, IR-4, IR-6) here. Template:As of, Natanz was enriching uranium up to 60% Template:Chem, a level approaching weapons-grade.<ref name="reuters20241128">Template:Cite news</ref>
In the past, the site saw multiple sabotage attacks (such as the Stuxnet cyberattack and unexplained explosions).<ref name="apnews20250522" /> On 13 June 2025, the site was struck by Israeli airstrikes during the opening stages of the Iran–Israel war (Operation Rising Lion).<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> On 22 June 2025, the facility was bombed by the United States military.
Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La ("Pickaxe Mountain")
Another site excavated by Iran is described as a future centrifuge assembly facility deep beneath Kūh-e Kolang Gaz Lā ("Pickaxe Mountain"), near the Natanz nuclear complex. The installation, still under construction, has been reinforced and gradually expanded since around 2021.<ref name="apnews20250522" /><ref name=":1">Template:Cite news</ref>
According to an analysis of satellite images by the Washington Post, after the American strikes on June 22, Iran began accelerating construction on the underground site of Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La tunneled into the Zagros mountain range approximately one mile to the south of the Natanz nuclear facility.<ref name=":02">Template:Cite news</ref> Although work on the site began in 2020, international inspectors were never given access,<ref name=":02" /> and when IAEA director Rafael Grossi enquired about the site, he was answered with "It's none of your business".<ref name=":1" /> According to analysts who monitor the site's development, its depth may exceed that of the Natanz Site, at 260-330 feet,<ref name=":02" /> significantly reducing the effectivity of bunker-buster bombs, such as those dropped on Fordow.<ref name=":1" /> The mountain above the site is nearly 650 metres taller than that over Fordow,<ref name=":1" /> providing more protection and larger chambers for nuclear operations,<ref name=":1" /> and it is potentially intended for the secure storage of Iran's stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium or for covert uranium enrichment.<ref name=":02" /> The site's footprint aboveground covers an area of approximately one square mile, and features two pairs of entrance tunnels, one to the east and one to the west.<ref name=":02" /> Satellite images reveal major changes made to the site between 30 June and 18 September: construction of a 4000 foot security wall which completed the enclosure, reinforcement of one of the tunnel entrances, increased piles of excavated spoil indicating underground expansion, as well as the grading of the road parallel to the perimeter.<ref name=":02" />
Fordow
Template:Main Fordow (near the city of Qom, approximately 100 km southwest of Tehran) is an underground enrichment site built inside a mountain.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> Originally designed to host about 3,000 centrifuges, Fordow was revealed in 2009 and appears engineered to withstand airstrikes.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> It was re-purposed under the 2015 nuclear deal as a research facility with no enrichment, but Iran resumed enrichment at Fordow after 2019. By 2025, Iran is using Fordow to enrich uranium up to 60% U-235 as well, deploying advanced IR-6 centrifuges.<ref name="reuters20241128" /><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Fordow's smaller size and heavy fortification make it a particular proliferation concern. The IAEA still inspects Fordow, but Iran's suspension of the Additional Protocol means inspectors no longer have daily access.<ref name="armscontrolfebruary2025">Template:Cite web</ref> In June 2025, Iran revealed plans to install advanced centrifuges at the facility.<ref name="apnews20250612" />
Bushehr
Template:Main Bushehr is Iran's only commercial nuclear power station, situated on the Persian Gulf coast in southern Iran.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> The site's first unit, a 1000 MWe pressurized water reactor (VVER-1000) built with Russian assistance, began operation in 2011–2013. Russia supplies the enriched fuel for Bushehr-1 and removes the spent fuel, an arrangement that minimizes proliferation risk.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> Iran is constructing two additional VVER-1000 reactors at Bushehr with Russian collaboration, slated to come online in the late 2020s.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> Bushehr is under full IAEA safeguards. Its operation is closely monitored by the Agency, and Iran, like any NPT party, must report and permit inspection of the reactor and its fuel.<ref name="apnews20250522" />
Arak
Arak, about 250 km southwest of Tehran, is the site of Iran's IR-40 heavy water reactor and associated heavy water production plant.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> The 40 MW (thermal) reactor, still under construction, is designed to use natural uranium fuel and heavy water moderation, which would produce plutonium as a byproduct in the spent fuel.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> In its original configuration, the Arak reactor could have yielded enough plutonium for roughly 1–2 nuclear weapons per year if Iran built a reprocessing facility (which it does not have).<ref name="world-nuclear">Template:Cite web</ref> Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to halt work on Arak and redesign the reactor to a smaller, proliferation-resistant version. In January 2016, Iran removed and filled Arak's original reactor core with concrete, disabling it.<ref name="world-nuclear" /> As of mid-2025, Iran, with international input, has been modifying the reactor design to limit its plutonium output, and the reactor has not yet become operational.<ref name="armscontrolfebruary2025" /> A heavy water production plant at the Arak site continues to operate (25 tons/year capacity), supplying heavy water for the reactor and medical research; Iran's heavy water stockpile is under IAEA monitoring per its safeguards commitments.<ref name="world-nuclear" />
Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center
Template:Main Isfahan, located ~350 km south of Tehran, is another major hub of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle and research activities. The site hosts the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) where yellowcake (uranium ore concentrate) is converted into uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas – the feedstock for enrichment.<ref name="world-nuclear" /> The UCF at Isfahan has produced hundreds of tons of UF6 for Natanz and Fordow.<ref name="world-nuclear" /> Isfahan also houses a Fuel Fabrication Plant for producing nuclear fuel (e.g. fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor and prototype fuel for Arak).<ref name="world-nuclear" /> In addition, the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center includes laboratories and several small research reactors, supplied by China, used for research and isotope production.<ref name="apnews20250522" />
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
Located in Tehran at the headquarters of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, the Tehran Research Reactor is a 5 MW pool-type research reactor.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> It was provided by the United States in 1967 as part of the "Atoms for Peace" program.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> Originally fueled with highly enriched uranium (HEU), the TRR was converted in 1987 to use 19.75% enriched uranium (LEU).<ref name="apnews20250522" /> The TRR is used to produce medical isotopes (such as molybdenum-99) and for scientific research. Its need for 20% LEU fuel became a point of contention when Iran's external fuel supply ran low in 2009, prompting the decision to enrich uranium to 20%.<ref name="world-nuclear" />
Other sites
According to a May 2025 report by IAEA, several undeclared locations in Iran remain at the center of its investigation into Iran's past nuclear activities. These include Turquzabad, first identified publicly in 2018 when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed it was a secret nuclear warehouse. Inspectors later detected man-made uranium particles there in 2019.<ref name="apnews20250531" /> Two other sites, Varamin and Marivan, also yielded traces of undeclared nuclear material when IAEA inspectors were granted access in 2020.<ref name="apnews20250531" /> A fourth site, Lavisan-Shian, has been under scrutiny as well, though inspectors were never able to visit it because it was demolished after 2003.<ref name="apnews20250531" /> IAEA concluded that these locations, and possibly others too, were part of an undeclared nuclear program conducted by Iran up until the early 2000s.<ref name="apnews20250531" />
On 12 June 2025, a day before the start of the Iran–Israel war, Iran announced the activation of a third main uranium enrichment site with active centrifuges following the IAEA's first formal censure of Iran in two decades. While the location has not been disclosed, Iranian officials described it as "secure and invulnerable".<ref name="apnews20250612" /><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="nuclearweapon">Template:Cite news</ref> Iran has vowed to continue enriching uranium following the Iran–Israel war.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Views on Iran's nuclear power program
Template:MainMost Western analysts and researchers say that a nuclear-armed Iran poses significant global security risks and undermines the stability of the Middle East. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi warns that an Iranian nuclear weapon could trigger broad nuclear proliferation, as other countries, particularly in the Middle East, may seek similar capabilities in response. Concerns also exist that Iran's nuclear assets could fall into the hands of extremist factions due to internal instability or regime change.<ref name="Freilich 2018 83–85"/> Additionally, the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons has raised concerns about a regional arms race, with countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey indicating they might pursue nuclear capabilities if Iran were to develop them.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> The potential transfer of nuclear technology or weapons to radical states and terrorist organizations heightens fears of nuclear terrorism.<ref name="Winer2012" />
Scholars argue that a nuclear-armed Iran could feel emboldened to increase its support for terrorism and insurgency, core elements of its strategy, while deterring retaliation through its newfound nuclear leverage.<ref name="Nader2013" />
According to a survey conducted in September 2025 by the GAMAAN Institute, involving 30,000 Iranians, 47% agree that "to prevent another war, the Islamic Republic should stop enriching uranium". Additionally, 49% oppose Iran developing nuclear weapons.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Cost
Direct financial expenditures
Estimating the direct costs of Iran's nuclear program is complicated by secrecy, but available assessments suggest significant expenditures.
| Category | Estimated cost | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Bushehr nuclear plant | >$10 billion (vs $2B official) | <ref name="iranfocus20250415">Template:Cite web</ref> |
| Broader nuclear infrastructure | >$100 billion | <ref name="iranfocus20250415" /> |
| Eurodif take (1970s) | $1 billion | <ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> |
| Hormozgan plant (planned) | >$20 billion | <ref name="iaea20250531">Template:Cite web</ref> |
| Annual operational costs | $250–$300 million | <ref name="iaea20250531" /><ref name="carnegieendowment20130425">Template:Cite web</ref> |
| Total spending estimate | >$30 billion | <ref name="carnegieendowment20130425" /> |
Indirect economic burdens and opportunity costs
The sanctions and lost economic opportunities far outweigh direct spending:
| Cost area | Estimated value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Lost economic opportunity | $2–3 trillion | <ref name="iranfocus20250415" /> |
| Lost oil revenues | >$450 billion | <ref name="iaea20250531" /> |
| Lost foreign investment | >$100 billion | <ref>Template:Cite web</ref> |
| Rial devaluation (2014–2025) | ~95% | <ref>Template:Cite web</ref> |
| Energy renovation cost (alternative) | ~$54 billion | <ref name="gulfif20210425">Template:Cite web</ref> |
Despite the vast reserves of natural gas and abundant solar and renewable energy potential, Iran continues to invest in extremely high-cost nuclear projects. Former Foreign Minister Zarif admitted that financial expenditures spent on nuclear projects could have upgraded the entire energy sector over 20 times.<ref name="gulfif20210425" />
See also
- Iran and weapons of mass destruction
- Israel and weapons of mass destruction
- Iran-Israel war
- Iran's ballistic missiles program
- Israeli missile program
- Iran and state-sponsored terrorism
- Israel and state-sponsored terrorism
Malware:
People
- Akbar Etemad, the "father of Iran's nuclear program"
- Mehdi Sarram, nuclear scientist
- List of Iranian nuclear negotiators
References
External links
- The first-ever English-language website about Iran's nuclear energy program
- Iran's Atomic Energy Organization
- In Focus: IAEA and Iran, IAEA
- Iran's Nuclear Program collected news and commentary at The New York Times
- Iran Nuclear Resources, parstimes.com
- Annotated bibliography for the Iranian nuclear weapons program from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues
Template:Energy in Iran Template:Nuclear power by country Template:Iran–United States relations Template:Iran–Israel proxy conflict