Patrimonialism
Template:Short description Template:Forms of government Patrimonialism is a form of governance in which the ruler governs on the basis of personal loyalties which are derived from patron-client relations, personal allegiances, kin ties and combinations thereof.<ref name=":0">Template:Cite journal</ref> Patrimonialism is closely related to corruption, opportunism and machine politics.<ref name=":1">Template:Cite journal</ref> It can contribute to underdevelopment and weak state capacity.<ref name=":2">Template:Cite journal</ref>
In contrast to many other systems of governance, the ruler does not derive legitimacy from personal charisma or a sense of mission, but primarily through the ability to dole out rewards and punishments.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" /> Initially coined by Max Weber, patrimonialism stands in contrast to rational-legal bureaucracies, as there is no objective of efficiency in public administration and government staff are not advanced based on merit, experience and training.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":3">Template:Cite journal</ref><ref name=":0" />
While patrimonialism is common in authoritarian regimes, it is not a necessary component of them.<ref name=":1" /> Democratic governments can also be characterized by patrimonial rule, in particular in fragile and underdeveloped states.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3" /> Some scholars have noted an increased prevalence of patrimonialism across the world since the turn of the 21st century and especially since the 2010s, both in authoritarian and democratic states.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>
A related term, neopatrimonialism, has been used to describe governance systems in various African countries.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>
Descriptions by scholars
Max Weber
Template:See also Julia Adams states: "In Weber's Economy and Society, patrimonialism mainly refers to forms of government that are based on rulers' family-households. The ruler's authority is personal-familial, and the mechanics of the household are the model for political administration. The concept of patrimonialism captures a distinctive style of regulation and administration that contrasts with Weber's ideal-typical rational-legal bureaucracy". She states that Weber has used patrimonialism to describe, among other systems, "estatistTemplate:Clarify and absolutist politics of early modern Europe". For Weber, patriarchy is at the centre of patrimonalism and is its model and origin.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>
Schmuel Eisenstadt
Schmuel Eisenstadt coined the term neopatrimonialism to distinguish historical patrimonial regimes from the "post-traditional" societies of Latin America, South Asia and the Middle East.<ref name=":2" />
Richard Pipes
Richard Pipes, a historian and Professor Emeritus of Russian history at Harvard University defines patrimonial as "a regime where the rights of sovereignty and those of ownership blend to the point of being indistinguishable, and political power is exercised in the same manner as economic power."<ref>Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime, page 22</ref>
J. I. Bakker
J. I. Bakker, a sociologist at the University of Guelph, states:<ref>Template:Cite encyclopedia</ref>
Francis Fukuyama
In his The Origins of Political Order, Francis Fukuyama states on the matter:
Natural human sociability is built around two principles, kin selection and reciprocal altruism. The principle of kin selection or inclusive fitness states that human beings will act altruistically toward genetic relatives (or individuals believed to be genetic relatives) in rough proportion to their shared genes. The principle of reciprocal altruism says that human beings will tend to develop relationships of mutual benefit or mutual harm as they interact with other individuals over time. Reciprocal altruism, unlike kin selection, does not depend on genetic relatedness; it does, however, depend on repeated, direct personal interaction and the trust relationships generated out of such interactions. These forms of social cooperation are the default ways human beings interact in the absence of incentives to adhere to other, more impersonal institutions. When impersonal institutions decay, these are the forms of cooperation that always reemerge because they are natural to human beings. What I have labeled patrimonialism is political recruitment based on either of these two principles. Thus, when bureaucratic offices were filled with the kinsmen of rulers at the end of the Han dynasty in China, when the Janissaries wanted their sons to enter the corps, or when offices were sold as heritable property in ancien régime France, a natural patrimonial principle was simply reasserting itself.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>
Examples
Richard Pipes cited the Egyptian Ptolemies and the Attalids of Pergamon as early patrimonial monarchies, both successor states to Alexander the Great's empire.<ref>Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime, page 23</ref>
Pipes argues that the Russia between the twelfth and seventeenth century, and with certain modifications until 1917, was a patrimonial system.<ref>Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime, page 24</ref>
Jean Bodin described seigneurial monarchies in the Six Books of the Commonwealth (1576–1586), where the monarch owns all the land. He claimed that Turkey and Muscovy were the only European examples.<ref>Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime, page 65</ref>
Indonesia, before and during the Suharto administration, is often cited as being patrimonial in its political-economy.<ref>Schwarz, Adam. 2004. A Nation in Waiting. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.</ref><ref>Bakker, J. I. (Hans). 1988. Patrimonialism, Involution, and the Agrarian Question in Java: A Weberian Analysis of Class Relations and Servile Labour. State and Society. London, UK: Unwin Hyman.</ref>
Randall Collins argued, based on Max Weber's definition, that organized crime groups like gangs and mafia are patrimonial political organizations, as contrasted with the bureaucratic nature of modern states.<ref name="e853">Template:Cite journal</ref>
On Trumpism
Political sociology professor Dylan John Riley characterized Trumpism as "neo-Bonapartist patrimonialism" in 2019.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Jonathan Rauch claimed that Donald Trump (particularly during his second administration), along with Narendra Modi, Viktor Orbán, and Vladimir Putin, were patrimonial due in part to what Rauch describes as Putin's use of "propaganda, subversion", and other methods to "make the world safe" for his model by spreading it abroad.<ref name="rauch-atlantic-2-24-25">Template:Cite web</ref>
Weakness
Jonathan Rauch notes that the opposite of patrimonialism is not democracy but "bureaucratic proceduralism". The weakness of patrimonialism is that as it undermines bureaucracy it “weakens and eventually cripples” the state. Skilled, or just competent people are replaced by obedient ones dependent on the ruler's support; corruption is accelerated as contractors, grant-givers, civil servants become accustomed to currying favor.<ref name=rauch-atlantic-2-24-25/>
Bureaucracy is necessary for an advanced, complicated society to operate well, but it seeks expertise, functions according to laws and rules, interfering with the whims of the father-ruler to dispense favors and punishments.<ref name=rauch-atlantic-2-24-25/> Eventually at some point the public's instinctual antagonism to corruption (the giving of service to others and not to the public) and incompetence will be triggered and bring the regime down.<ref name=rauch-atlantic-2-24-25/>
See also
- Clientelism
- Crony capitalism
- Neo-patrimonialism
- Tsarist autocracy
- Pater familias
- Political particularism
- Spoils system
- Pork barrel
- Votebank
- Vote buying