Peremptory norm

Template:Short description Template:EngvarB Template:Judicial interpretation A peremptory norm (also called Template:Langx)<ref>or Template:Langx Template:IPAc-en; Latin for "compelling law" Template:Cite web</ref> is a fundamental principle of international law that is accepted by the international community of states as a norm from which no derogation is permitted. Thought to be so fundamental that it even invalidates rules drawn from treaty or custom, “norms of this character, therefore, cannot be derogated from by the will of the contracting parties."<ref>Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 Am. J. Int’l L. 571-572 (1937).</ref> The possibility of such a fundamental law is hotly controverted by legal positivists who rely exclusively on state consent for the making of international law. Functionally, a rule of jus cogens is, by its nature, a rule so fundamental to the international community of states as a whole that the rule constitutes a basis for the community’s legal system.

There is no universal agreement regarding precisely which norms are jus cogens nor how a norm reaches that status, but it is generally accepted that jus cogens bans genocide, maritime piracy, enslaving in general (i.e. slavery as well as slave trade), wars of aggression and territorial aggrandizement, and generally as well torture, and refoulement.<ref>M. Cherif Bassiouni. (Autumn 1996) "International Crimes: 'Jus Cogens' and 'Obligatio Erga OmnesTemplate:'". Law and Contemporary Problems. Vol. 59, No. 4, p. 68.</ref>

Historically, it is significant that the proponents of the idea of peremptory norms invalidating treaty rules were, in no small measure, reacting to the abuses of Nazism during World War II.<ref>E. Jiménez de Arechaga, El derecho internacional contemporáneo 79 (1980).</ref> They rejected the positivist proposition that state acts, even the making of treaties, should always be thought capable of making binding law.

Status of peremptory norms under international law

Unlike ordinary customary law, which has traditionally required consent and allows the alteration of its obligations between states through treaties, peremptory norms may not be violated by any state "through international treaties or local or special customs or even general customary rules not endowed with the same normative force".<ref name="Prosecutor v. Furundžija 2002">Prosecutor v. Furundžija, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2002, 121 International Law Reports 213 (2002).</ref>

Discussions of the necessity of such norms could be traced back as far as 1758 (in Vattel's The Law of Nations) and 1764 (in Christian Wolff's Jus Gentium), clearly rooted in principles of natural law. But it was the judgments of the Permanent Court of International Justice that indicate the existence of such a peremptory norm, in the S.S. Wimbledon case in 1923, not mentioning peremptory norms explicitly but stating how state sovereignty is not inalienable.<ref>Cherif Bassiouni. 2011. Crimes Against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 266. See also Wimbledon Case, p. 25.</ref>

Under Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, championed by Third World and socialist states during the 1960s,<ref>Umut Özsu, Completing Humanity: The International Law of Decolonization, 1960-82 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), ch. 2.</ref> any treaty that conflicts with a peremptory norm is void.<ref>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331, 8 International Legal Materials 679 (1969).</ref> The treaty allows for the emergence of new peremptory norms,<ref>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 64, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331, 8 International Legal Materials 679 (1969).</ref> but does not specify any peremptory norms. It does mention the prohibition on the threat of use of force and on the use of coercion to conclude an agreement:

A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.<ref>U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 Am. J. Int'l L. 875 (1969).</ref>

The Convention also provides that a new peremptory norm voids and terminates previously existing treaties with which it comes into conflict.<ref>U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 Am. J. Int’l L. 875 (1969), art. 64.</ref> Per Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, a rule of jus cogens is ordinarily nonderogable and invalidates subsequent norms generated by treaty or by custom—that is, by the ordinary consensual forms of international legislation. Thus, it is a sort of international law that once ensconced, cannot be displaced by states, either in their practice or in their treaties. Therefore, some argue that jus cogens functions like a natural or constitutional law that is so fundamental that states cannot avoid its force, a viewpoint supported both in history and by function.

The number of peremptory norms is considered limited but not exclusively catalogued. They are not listed or defined by any authoritative body, but arise out of case law and changing social and political attitudes. Generally included are prohibitions on waging aggressive war, crimes against humanity, war crimes, maritime piracy, genocide,<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> apartheid, slavery, and torture. As an example, international tribunals have held that it is impermissible for a state to acquire territory through war.<ref>Marc Bossuyt and Jan Wouters (2005). Grondlijnen van internationaal recht, Intersentia, Antwerp etc., p. 92.</ref><ref name="Prosecutor v. Furundžija 2002" />

Despite the seemingly clear weight of condemnation of such practices, some critics disagree with the division of international legal norms into a hierarchy. There is also disagreement over how such norms are recognized or established. The relatively new concept of peremptory norms seems to be at odds with the traditionally consensual nature of international law considered necessary to state sovereignty.

Some peremptory norms define criminal offences considered to be enforceable against not only states but also individuals. That has been increasingly accepted since the Nuremberg Trials (the first enforcement in world history of international norms upon individuals) and now might be considered uncontroversial. However, the language of peremptory norms was not used in connection with these trials; rather, the basis of criminalisation and punishment of Nazi atrocities was that civilisation could not tolerate their being ignored because it could not survive their being repeated.

There are often disagreements over whether a particular case violates a peremptory norm. As in other areas of law, states generally reserve the right to interpret the concept for themselves.

Many large states have accepted this concept. Some of them have ratified the Vienna Convention, while others have stated in their official statements that they accept the Vienna Convention as "codificatory". Some have applied the concept in their dealings with international organizations and other states.

Examples

There have been frequent assertions by judges, states, and others that certain principles of law are so fundamental as to be considered jus cogens. For example, there are the principles of Articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter, which guarantee the sovereignty of states. There are also some human rights that are claimed to be protected by rules of jus cogens.<ref>Robledo, Le jus cogens international: se genése, sa nature, ses fonctions, 172 Hague Recueil 9, 167-87 (1981).</ref>

Execution of juvenile offenders

In 1987, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found the United States in violation of jus cogens for permitting the execution of two persons convicted of crimes committed before their 18th birthdays.<ref>Fox, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Finds United States in Violation, 82 Am. J. Int’l L. 601 (1988).</ref> The case of Michael Domingues v. United States provides an example of an international body's opinion that a particular norm is of a jus cogens nature. Michael Domingues had been convicted and sentenced to death in Nevada, United States for two murders committed when he was 16 years old. Domingues brought the case in front of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights which delivered a non-legally binding report.<ref name="The Michael Domingues Case 2001">The Michael Domingues Case: Argument of the United States, Office of the Legal Adviser, United States Department of State, Digest of United States Practice in International Law 2001, pp. 303, 310–313.</ref> The United States argued that there was no jus cogens norm that "establishes eighteen years as the minimum age at which an offender can receive a sentence of death".<ref name="The Michael Domingues Case 2001"/> The Commission concluded that there was a "jus cogens norm not to impose capital punishment on individuals who committed their crimes when they had not yet reached 18 years of age".<ref>The Michael Domingues Case: Report on the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 62/02, Merits, Case 12.285 (2002).</ref>

The United States has subsequently banned the execution of juvenile offenders. Although not necessarily in response to the above non-binding report, the Supreme Court cited evolving international norms as one of the reasons for the ban (Roper v. Simmons).

Torture

The prohibition of torture is a rule of customary international law regarded as jus cogens.<ref>International Court of Justice, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment of 20 July 2012, § 99; European Court of Human Rights, Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763/97, § 60, ECHR 2001 XI.</ref>

In 2002, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia stated in Prosecutor v. Furundžija that there is a jus cogens for the prohibition against torture.<ref name="Prosecutor v. Furundžija 2002"/> The court has stated:

Clearly, the jus cogens nature of the prohibition against torture articulates the notion that the prohibition has now become one of the most fundamental standards of the international community. Furthermore, this prohibition is designed to produce a deterrent effect, in that it signals to all members of the international community and the individuals over whom they wield authority that the prohibition of torture is an absolute value from which nobody must deviate.<ref>Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case IT-95-17/1 (Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2002), 121 Int’l L. Rep. 213 (2002).</ref>

It also stated that every state is entitled "to investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite individuals accused of torture, who are present in a territory under its jurisdiction".<ref>International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija (Trial Judgement), (IT-95-17/1-T), 10 December 1998, §§ 144 and 153-57.</ref> The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala that "the torturer has become, like the pirate and the slave trader before him, hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind".<ref>Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (2d Cir.1980).</ref>

See also

• Actio popularis
• Natural law
• Customary international law
• Customary international humanitarian law
• Entrenched clause
• Erga omnes
• List of treaties by number of parties
• Universal jurisdiction

External links

• Jus cogens (bibliography)