Second Battle of Sirte

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Template:Use British English Template:Short description {{#invoke:other uses|otheruses}} Template:Use dmy dates Template:Infobox military conflict

The Second Battle of Sirte (on 22 March 1942) was a naval engagement in the Mediterranean Sea, north of the Gulf of Sidra and south-east of Malta, during the Second World War. The escorting warships of a British convoy to Malta held off a much more powerful squadron of the Template:Lang (Italian Navy). The British convoy was composed of four merchant ships, escorted by four light cruisers, one anti-aircraft cruiser and 17 destroyers. The Italian force comprised a battleship, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and ten destroyers.<ref>O'Hara, 2009 p. 163</ref>

Background

Malta

Up to the end of 1941, Template:Nowrap with Template:Cvt of cargo had reached Malta without loss and a reserve of seven months' supplies had been accumulated. Three convoys to Malta in 1941 suffered the loss of only one merchant ship. From January 1941 to August 1942, Template:Nowrap ships had delivered Template:Cvt but Template:Nowrap had been sunk and modern, efficient merchant ships, naval and air forces had been diverted from other routes for long periods; 31 supply runs by submarines had been conducted.Template:Sfn Reinforcements for Malta included Template:Nowrap and dangerous aircraft carrier ferry operations to deliver fighters.Template:Sfn Malta was also a base for air, sea and submarine operations against Axis supply convoys and from 1 June to 31 October 1941, British forces sank about Template:Cvt of Axis shipping on the African convoy routes, Template:Cvt by the navy and Template:Cvt by the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Fleet Air Arm (FAA). Loaded ships sailing to Africa accounted for 90 per cent of the ships sunk and Malta-based squadrons were responsible for about 75 per cent of the ships sunk by aircraft.Template:Sfn Military operations from Malta and using the island as a staging post, led to Axis air campaigns against the island in 1941 and 1942..Template:Sfn

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By early 1942 the Allies had lost the initiative in the central Mediterranean as Italian and German forces isolated Malta and made plans to remove it as a threat.<ref> Bragadin, pp. 155–156</ref> After a series of Allied defeats, the Italian Navy achieved naval superiority in the central Mediterranean by spring 1942.<ref>"The Alexandria operation showed the recovery from the grave crisis under whose menace the Italian Fleet had lain for two months, and indirectly it delineated a definitive Italian victory in the ′first battle of convoys′. In fact, it opened a period of clear Italian naval supremacy in the east-central Mediterranean." Bragadin, p. 152</ref><ref>Sadkovich, p. 219</ref> As Malta was running short of aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, fuel, food and ammunition, convoy MW10 sailed from Alexandria on 21 March.<ref>Woodman, p. 293</ref><ref>Thomas, p. 143</ref> The British expected opposition from German and Italian aircraft as well as Italian surface units. In December 1941, the two battleships (Template:HMS and Template:HMS) stationed in the eastern Mediterranean had been disabled by an attack by Italian frogmen, leaving the fleet with only cruisers and destroyers. A diversion was organised from Gibraltar, on the morning of 20 March, the battleship Template:HMS—with the aircraft carriers Template:HMS and Template:HMS, supported by the cruiser Template:HMS and eight destroyers—sailed. The next day, the squadron aborted the operation and returned to port—the carriers were unable to launch aircraft reinforcements to Malta due to defective long-range fuel tanks.<ref>Woodman, p. 295</ref> The escort of convoy MW10 relied on destroyers—including lighter-built destroyer escorts—to provide anti-submarine protection and included the anti-aircraft cruiser Template:HMS. More destroyers and another light cruiser were sent from Malta.<ref>"With Vian's cruisers, Carlisle and the Hunts, the escort was well provided with anti-aircraft firepower as the entire force united on the morning of 21 March." Woodman, p. 294</ref>

British plan

Admiral Sir Philip Vian, commanding the convoy, organised his ships into six divisions plus a close escort of five Hunt-class destroyers for the convoy <ref name="Playfair165">Playfair (165)</ref>

In case of an Italian surface attack, the first five divisions were to stand off from the convoy to face the enemy while the sixth division laid smoke across the wake of the convoy to obscure it.<ref name="Playfair165"/> The first five divisions would act as a rearguard to lay smoke and delay the Template:Lang while Carlisle and the Hunt-class destroyers proceeded with the cargo ships to Malta.<ref>Woodman, p. 298</ref>

Battle

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At 14:30 the next day, the British were faced by a pair of heavy cruisers and escorting destroyers. Admiral Vian immediately implemented his plan; the cargo ships and escorts turned away to the south while the light cruisers and remaining destroyers laid smoke and charged the Italians. After an exchange of fire, the two Italian heavy cruisers backed off in an attempt to lure the British toward the incoming main Italian squadron, and at 16:37 they returned to attack with the battleship Template:Ship, a light cruiser and their screening destroyers.<ref>Woodman, pp. 299–300</ref> The battle raged for two and a half hours, with the British ships leaving the safety of their huge smoke screen to fire a few volleys and then returning to it when the Italian salvos got too close.<ref name="auto">O'Hara, 2009 p. 168</ref>

During one of these exchanges, Template:HMS suffered severe damage from a near-miss when fired at by the Italian battleship Littorio, and was ordered to withdraw from the battle line and join the convoy. At 18:34, Vian decided to send his destroyers in to launch torpedo attacks from about Template:Cvt, the closest the Italians would allow the British to approach. None of the torpedoes found their targets but as Template:HMS turned she was hit by a round that penetrated her boiler room and ignited a fire, temporarily bringing her to a halt.<ref name="auto"/> The battle began with a Template:Cvt wind blowing to the north-west, with the wind continuing to increase during the day, which favoured the gunnery of the larger Italian ships throughout the battle but aided the laying of smokescreens by Vian's ships.<ref>Llewellyn, pp. 37–53.</ref>

Template:HMS was struck by shell splinters from the battleship's main guns that pierced a bulkhead, causing some flooding but no casualties.<ref>Greene & Massignani, p. 220</ref> At 18:55, Littorio had been hit by a 4.7 in (120 mm) shell, with negligible damage. Her floatplane caught fire from the blast from a salvo of her after turret at the same time; this led to the claim by the British that one of the torpedoes had struck.<ref>O'Hara, 2009 p. 167</ref><ref>Bragadin, p. 162</ref> At dusk, before 19:00, the Italians gave up and turned for home; without radar they would have been at a significant disadvantage in a night action, as in the Battle of Cape Matapan.<ref>"However, without radar, Iachino could not exploit his success after the sun had set, and so at 18:41, well before the hit on the Littorio and a half-hour after Rome had ordered him to return if he could not close to Vian, he decided to turn for home." Sadkovich, p. 245</ref> The Italians outgunned their British counterparts but appeared unwilling to close for a decisive blow, perhaps wary of the torpedo threat from the many British destroyers.<ref>"Despite the difficult weather conditions, the Italian ships had manoeuvred perfectly correctly along the lines laid down by their commander, and they fought the long battle with decision and tenacity. The British manoeuvred in a disorganized fashion and with unusual timidity – except for the last courageous attack carried out by their destroyers. It should not be forgotten either, that while the Italians had greater firepower on three of their ships, the British had the advantage in number of units engaged, and this factor was unquestionably important given the particular conditions of the battle." Bragadin, pp. 165–166</ref>

Aftermath

Analysis

File:Gorizia firing on RN destroyers.jpg
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Almost all historians have acknowledged the battle as a British victory, credited to the weak escort of light cruisers and destroyers which prevented the Italians from damaging the convoy, by repulsing an Italian squadron composed of a battleship and two heavy cruisers during massed Axis air attacks.<ref name="Maintained by Woodman,">Archibald: "the best cruiser action of the war" (221)</ref>

Whilst acknowledging the British success, some authors write of the battle as a partial Italian success in delaying and turning the convoy aside.<ref>Belot (162–163), Bernotti (79), Bauer & Young (762), Llewellyn (52), Macintyre (136), De la Sierra (365), Stephen (115) and Wilmott & Fowler (45) </ref> Nearly all sources agree that the Italian fleet inflicted significant damage and several casualties on the British squadron while suffering minimal damage and no casualties in return.<ref>Cunningham, p. 454: "Nor must the mistake be made of thinking the Italians were inefficient in this action. Our destroyers...were received by heavy and accurate fire, and was only by the mercy of Providence that many were not sunk and still more severely damage."</ref><ref>Bragadin, p. 164: "As far as the balance sheet of the shooting is concerned, no Italian ship was damaged in the least, disregarding some scratches on the Littorio's deck caused by shell fragments. On the other hand, the Italian gunfire, in spite of its handicaps, caused considerably more damage to the enemy."</ref><ref>"However qualified, Iachino had certainly won a moral victory." (Sadkovich, p. 247) </ref><ref>Sus oponentes se retiraban, conscientes ya de los peligros de la noche pero no vencidos. ("Their adversaries [the Italians] withdrew, aware of the dangers of the night, but undefeated.") (de la Sierra, p. 365)</ref>

In the following days, Axis aircraft caught the convoy at sea and chased the surviving steamers to the harbour; more than 80 per cent of the supplies were lost, making the British convoy operation a strategic failure.<ref>Woodman, p. 316: "Although the squadron had achieved a noteworthy tactical victory against considerable odds, as Vian's immediate knighthood attested, Operation MG1 as a whole had been a strategic failure."</ref><ref>Stephen, p. 115: "In many ways the Battle of Sirte is like the Glorious First of June 1794. Tactically it was a brilliant success for the British but operationally and strategically it was a failure. Iachino had succeeded in forcing the convoy to manoeuvre so far south that Axis air power was able to act in synergy to ensure its destruction."</ref>

Orders of battle

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Merchant Navy

Royal Navy

Battle damage

According to British reports, "Template:HMS was struck on the after part of the bridge at 16:44"<ref>Harwood, section 2, paragraph 12.</ref> by a Template:Cvt hit from the light cruiser Template:Ship; 16 seamen were killed.<ref>Llewellyn, p. 43: "The shell hit the starboard side of the Air Defense position, putting it out of action, also W/T and radar. One officer and fourteen ratings were killed; one officer and four ratings were seriously wounded. Splinters from near misses killed one rating and caused superficial damage."</ref><ref>Template:Citation</ref><ref>Greene & Massignani, p. 219</ref> According to Admiral Iachino, the hit was instead achieved by Littorio's secondary guns, based on the range between the opposite warships at the time.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Cruisers Template:HMS<ref>Woodman, p. 301</ref> and Template:HMS were also damaged, with Euryalus straddled by Littorio at 16:43 and at 18:41.<ref>O'Hara, 2009 pp. 165, 168</ref> Kingston was hit amidships by a shell from Littorio that killed 15 men of her crew.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Llewellyn. p. 49: "A 15-in. shell hit Kingston as she was about to turn..."</ref><ref name=NHIS>Template:Citation</ref> and left the destroyer dead in the water, with her starboard whaleboat torn apart, her anti-aircraft guns, searchlight tower and torpedo launchers shattered by the explosion. Some sources claim that she was hit by the guns of the heavy cruiser Template:Ship.<ref>O'Hara, 2009 p. 168: "Kingston had been hit in the battle by an Template:Cvt shell fired by the Italian heavy cruiser Gorizia"</ref>

Although Kingston had an engine in flames and a flooded boiler, she managed to get back up to speed, reaching Malta the next day.<ref>Thomas, p. 152</ref> Havock was also badly damaged in a boiler by a near miss from Littorio at 17:20;<ref>O'Hara, 2009 p. 166</ref> eight sailors died.<ref name=NHIS/> Lively was forced to retreat to Tobruk for repairs at 18:55, after a near miss' splinter from LittorioTemplate:'s aft turret holed her hull, resulting in some flooding.<ref name="O'Hara, 2009 p. 169">O'Hara, 2009 p. 169</ref><ref>Sierra, p. 364 (probably from Vian, Adm. Philip: Action this day, London, Frederick Mueller Ltd., 1960). Also Template:London Gazette: "At 2248 Lively reported that she was unable to maintain more than 17 knots and she was detached to Tobruk where it was considered she could repair damage before proceeding to Alexandria."</ref> Three more destroyers—Template:HMS, Template:HMS and Template:HMS—suffered lesser damage from Template:Cvt cruiser fire.<ref>Woodman, pp. 301–305</ref> The Italian fleet expended 1,511 rounds of all calibres upon the British squadron; the only Italian destroyer to open fire was Template:Ship.<ref>Greene & Massignani, p. 221</ref> The British cruisers had replied with 1,553 rounds and the destroyers with about 1,300 rounds as well as 38 torpedoes.<ref name="O'Hara, 2009 p. 169"/><ref>Llewellyn, p. 51: The cruisers fired the following number of main armament rounds: Cleopatra; 868, Dido; 200, Euraylus; 421 and Penelope; 64. The destroyers fired 275 4 inch rounds, with the remainder being 4.7 inch.</ref> Axis aircraft made continual attacks, mainly against the convoy, throughout the naval action and Royal Navy AA gunners claimed the destruction of seven Axis aircraft and damage to several more.<ref>Llewellyn, p. 51.</ref>

Subsequent operations

File:HMS Kingston (F64).jpg
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Most of the escort force, short of fuel and ammunition and unable to find the convoy, turned back for Alexandria.<ref>Woodman, pp. 307–308; Llewellyn, pp. 51–52</ref> The damaged destroyers and the cargo ships were sent on to Malta, with Carlisle, Penelope and Legion. The next day, they were subjected to continuous air attacks. The cargo ship Template:SS was sunk Template:Cvt from harbour and the oil tanker Template:MV was too damaged to reach Valletta.

The merchantmen, Talabot and steamer Pampas, reached Grand Harbour virtually unharmed. Pampas had been hit by two bombs but these failed to explode.<ref>Llewellyn (52), Thomas (150), Roskill (55), Playfair (170–171), Macintyre (136), Holland (246), Bradford (206), and Greene & Massignani (220–221). Woodman (309) claims a near-miss from a Ju 88 on Pampas that shook the ship and caused the taking of water aft. On the other hand, Belot (162–163) maintains that Clan Campbell and Breconshire were sunk on 23 March, while Sadkovich (245) has all four convoy ships sunk on 23 March.</ref> Penelope attempted to tow Breconshire, but the tow parted in heavy seas.<ref>Breconshire at RedDuster.co.uk Template:Webarchive</ref> She anchored short of the protective minefields and the destroyer Southwold attempted to take her in tow, hitting a mine in the process. She was eventually towed into Marsaxlokk Bay by tugs.<ref>Green & Massignani, pp. 220–221.</ref>

Axis air raids against Malta on 24 and 25 March failed to damage the three surviving convoy ships.<ref>Bragadin strongly implies that Breconshire, Talabot, and Pampas were all sunk sometime between 24 and 25 March. Shores, Cull, and Malizia (145, 148), state that Axis aircraft failed to hit the ships on those days.</ref> On 26 March, German dive bombers hit all three ships, sinking Talabot and Pampas that day with Breconshire capsizing on 27 March.<ref>For Talabot and Pampas: Playfair (172), Macintyre (139), Shores, Cull, and Malizia (150), Bradford (207), Woodman (313–314), Greene and Massignani (221), Llewellyn (52), Thomas (151), and Holland (245–246). For Breconshire: Roskill (55), Playfair (171–172), Macintyre (221), Shores, Cull, and Malizia (151), Bradford (206), Greene and Massignani (221), and Llewellyn (52). However, Holland (248) avers that Breconshire sank on 26 March.</ref> Much of Breconshire′s oil was salvaged through the hole in her hull. Only about Template:Cvt of cargo had been unloaded, of the Template:Cvt that had been loaded in Alexandria.<ref>O'Hara, 2009 p. 170</ref> The Italian fleet units were no luckier after the battle. After failing to destroy the convoy, they were caught en route to their bases by a severe storm that sank the destroyers Template:Ship and Template:Ship.<ref>Thomas, p. 150</ref> While under repair in dry dock at Malta, Kingston was attacked a few days later by German aircraft and suffered further damage, this time beyond repair. She was scrapped in situ in the following months.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Whilst docked at Malta, Havock, was a target for Axis aircraft and sustained further damage. On 3 April the ship was ordered to Gibraltar before her repairs were complete. Havock ran aground off Kelibia, Tunisia, in the Strait of Sicily on 6 April and was wrecked, with one crewman killed in the incident. Another one died from wounds in the following days.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> On 8 April an Italian boarding party from the tug Instancabile (former Royal Yugoslav Navy Spasilac) searched the wreck looking for secret information.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Havock's crew and passengers were interned by the Vichy French at Laghouat in the Sahara but were released in November as a result of Operation Torch.

See also

  • Malta convoys
  • Margit Johnsen
  • The Ship (1943) by C. S. Forester is a fictionalised account of the battle, seeing the action through the eyes of the crew of a Royal Navy light cruiser "HMS Artemis" (it is dedicated to "the officers and ship's company of H.M.S. Penelope"). It depicts the Italians as inept and cowardly, even though deploying a superior force of two battleships, three heavy and four light cruisers; but it seems fairly accurate on the action (while overstating the accuracy of British fire) and gives an excellent account of the roles of different crew members. Published in 1943, the novel did have a propaganda/morale-raising aspect, stressing that everyone's efforts were important, and not mentioning the loss of merchant ships afterwards. Forester, best known for his Hornblower R.N. novels, sailed with both the British and American navies during the Second World War to gather material.

Footnotes

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Sources

  • Bauer, Eddy; James L. Collins, Jr; and Peter Young: The Marshall Cavendish Encyclopedia of World War Two. Marshall Cavendish, 1985. Template:ISBN.
  • Bradford, Ernle: Siege: Malta 1940–1943, William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York, 1986. Template:ISBN.
  • Bragadin, Marc'Antonio: The Italian Navy in World War II, United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, 1957. Template:OCLC.
  • Cunningham, Andrew: A Sailor's Life, New York, 1955.
  • Greene, Jack & Massignani, Alessandro: The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1943, Chatham Publishing, London, 1998. Template:ISBN.
  • Gigli, Guido: La Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Laterza, 1964. Template:In lang
  • Guglielmotti, Umberto: Storia della marina italiana. V. Bianco, 1961 Template:In lang
  • Harwood, Admiral Sir Henry H., Despatch on the Battle of Sirte 1942 Mar. 22., Supplement to the London Gazette, 18 September 1947.
  • Holland, James: Fortress Malta: An Island Under Siege, 1940–1943, Miramax Books, New York, 2003. Template:ISBN.
  • Hough, Richard Alexander:The longest battle: the war at sea, 1939–45. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986
  • Jellison, Charles A.: Besieged: The World War II Ordeal of Malta, 1940–1942, University Press of New England, 1984. Template:ISBN.
  • Llewellyn, M. J.: The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Convoys: A Naval Staff History, Naval Staff History series, Routledge, London, 2007. Template:ISBN.
  • Macintyre, Donald: The Battle for the Mediterranean. Norton ed., New York, 1965.
  • O'Hara, Vincent P.: Struggle for the Middle Sea, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2009. Template:ISBN.
  • Template:Cite book
  • Template:Cite book
  • Template:Cite book
  • Sadkovich, James: The Italian Navy in World War II, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1994. Template:ISBN.
  • Secchia, Pietro: Enciclopedia dell'antifascismo e della Resistenza. La Pietra, 1989.
  • Shores, Christopher and Brian Cull with Nicola Malizia: Malta: The Spitfire Year, 1942. Grub Street, London, 1991. Template:ISBN.
  • Sierra, Luis de la: La guerra naval en el Mediterráneo, 1940–1943, Ed. Juventud, Barcelona, 1976. Template:ISBN. Template:In lang
  • Simpson, Michael: A life of Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham. A Twentieth-century Naval Leader. Routledge Ed., 2004. Template:ISBN.
  • Stephen, Martin; Grove, Erik: Sea Battles in Close-up: World War Two. Naval Institute press, 1988. Template:ISBN.
  • Thomas, David A.: Malta Convoys, Leo Cooper Ed., South Yorkshire, 1999. Template:ISBN.
  • Wilmott, Ned & Fowler, Will: Strategy & tactics of sea warfare. Marshall Cavendish, 1979. Template:ISBN
  • Woodman, Richard: Malta Convoys, 1940–1943, Jack Murray Ltd., London, 2000. Template:ISBN.

Further reading

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