1996 Russian presidential election
Template:Short description Template:Expand Russian Template:Use dmy dates Template:Infobox election
Presidential elections were held in Russia on 16 June 1996, with a second round being held on 3 July 1996. It resulted in a victory for the incumbent Russian president Boris Yeltsin, who ran as an independent politician. Yeltsin defeated the Communist Party of the Russian Federation challenger Gennady Zyuganov in the second round, receiving 54.4% of the vote. Yeltsin's second inauguration ceremony took place on 9 August 1996.
Yeltsin would not complete the second term for which he was elected, as he resigned on 31 December 1999, eight months before the scheduled end of his term on 9 August 2000; he was succeeded by his chosen successor, Vladimir Putin, whom he had appointed prime minister of Russia a few months earlier. This was the first presidential election to take place in post-Soviet Russia. As of 2024, this has also been the only Russian presidential election in which no candidate was able to win on the first round, and as such a runoff election was necessary.
Although most contemporaneous reports certified the 1996 election result, the election has been associated with various counts of pro-Yeltsin media bias and foreign influence, as well as allegations of electoral fraud or that it was an unfair election. Critics also argued that Yeltsin had engaged in vote buying by utilizing state finances to fund social programs, to which he responded he was merely doing his duties as president. Others argued that the allegations were exaggerated, and that the then United States government in fact refrained from covert operations and did not grant all of Yeltsin's requests.
Background
In 1991, Boris Yeltsin was elected to a five-year term as president of Russia, which was still a part of the Soviet Union at the time. The next election was scheduled be held sometime in 1996.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In late December 1991, Soviet Russia became a sovereign nation in wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This meant that the scheduled election would now be the first ever presidential election to be held in a fully sovereign Russia.<ref name=depoy>Template:Cite journal</ref>
In a 1993 Russian government referendum question (III), Russian voters rejected holding an early presidential election, and the presidential election remained scheduled to be held in the year 1996. Later in 1993, the Constitution of Russia was adopted. In the constitution, future presidential terms were stipulated to last for four years, meaning that the 1996 election would elect a president to serve a four-year term. When incumbent president Yeltsin launched his re-election campaign in early 1996, he was widely predicted to lose.<ref name=RPFGTP>Template:Cite book</ref> Public opinion of Yeltsin was at a historical low point.<ref name=RPFGTP/> Due to this, there was talk about Yeltsin potentially postponing or canceling the election; he ultimately decided against this.<ref name=polar/>
Shortly before the election campaign, Yeltsin had faced a number of significant political humiliations which harmed his political stature. In the 1995 Russian legislative election, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) had achieved dominance in the State Duma.<ref name=polar/><ref name=RPFGTP/> On 9 January 1996, Chechen rebels seized thousands of hostages in Dagestan and Yeltsin's response to this was viewed as a failure.<ref name=RPFGTP/> Additionally, Yeltsin was overseeing a terrible economy. Russian economy was still contracting and many workers had continued to be unpaid for months.<ref name=RPFGTP/>
By early 1996, Yeltsin's public approval was so poor that he was polling at fifth place among presidential candidates, with only 8 percent support, while CPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov was in the lead with 21 percent support. When Zyuganov showed up at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in February 1996, many Western leaders and the international media were eager to see him, and treated him with regards to believing that he would likely be the next president of Russia.<ref name=RPFGTP/>
Candidates
Registered candidates
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Withdrawn candidates
| Candidate name, age, political party |
Political offices | Campaign | Details | Registration date | Date of withdrawal | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aman Tuleyev (52) Independent |
File:Aman Tuleyev (council.gov.ru).jpg | style="background-color:Template:Party color;" | | Chairman of the Kemerovo Oblast Council of People's Deputies | (campaign) | He was registered as a candidate on 26 April 1996 but withdrew his candidacy on 8 June 1996 to support Gennady Zyuganov. Since Tuleyev withdrew his candidacy after the deadline, he was included in the ballots and received 308 votes during the early voting. | 26 April 1996<ref name=russianelectionwatch1/><ref name=CEC1/> | 8 June 1996 |
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Campaigning
Vladimir Bryntsalov
Template:Main Pharmaceutical businessman Vladimir Bryntsalov ran as the candidate of the Russian Socialist Party. Brytsalov argued that his leadership would eliminate the country's poverty, promising that if he were elected, there would be "no poor pensioners, no poor workers, no poor entrepreneurs, no poor farmers."<ref name="Brytsalovcnn" /> His plan, which he dubbed "Russian socialism", was for large companies to begin paying wages comparable to companies in other industrialized nations. The plan anticipated that the employees of the companies would consequentially pay larger income taxes, spend more on consumer goods, and increase their productivity at their jobs. The feasibility of this plan was criticized, as Russian companies were considered to be unable to pay such wages.<ref name="Brytsalovcnn" />
Brytsalov promoted himself with the superlative claim of being "the richest man in Russia" and flaunted his wealth.<ref name="Brytsalovcnn">Template:Cite web</ref> Despite being at the time a recently elected deputy of the State Duma, Brytsalov did not have a voting-record. In his legislative career, he had very low attendance and extremely little participation.<ref>Справочник Вся Дума. — Коммерсант-Власть, 25 January 2000. — № 3</ref> Brytsalov was seen as a marginal candidate, and was generally regarded as unlikely to win the election.<ref name="Brytsalovcnn" />
Mikhail Gorbachev
Template:Main Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev ran as an independent candidate. He ran as a self-proclaimed social democrat,<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> and asserted that, of those running for president, his was the voice of responsibility and moderation.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> His campaign was hampered both by strong public disdain towards him and a strong lack of media coverage for his candidacy.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> At one point, Gorbachev complained that there was less press freedom than when he was leader of the Soviet Union.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Gorbachev subsequently questioned the validity of the election results. While he acknowledged that he had lost by a significant margin, Gorbachev suspected that his actual vote count still exceeded what was reported in the official tally. In 2017, Gorbachev wrote in his book The New Russia that "there have been no fair and free elections in Russia since those of 1989, 1990 and the election of 1991 when Boris Yeltsin became the first president of Russia."<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Svyatoslav Fyodorov
Template:Main Svyatoslav Fyodorov, a politician and renown ophthalmologist, ran as the candidate of the Party of Workers' Self-Government. He was the founder and leader of the party, which at the time was arguably the most influential social-democratic movement in Russia.<ref name=fyo1>Template:Cite web</ref> Fyodorov was considered to be on the center-left of the political spectrum.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In 1994, Fyodorov had described his political objective by stating: "I want peasants to own farms, workers to own factories, physicians to own clinics, and everyone to pay a 30% tax, and the rest is theirs."<ref name="fyo1" />
Fyodorov advocated for the mass creation of joint stock companies to guarantee workers a share of profits and allow them to actively participate in management of their companies. He dubbed this concept "democratic capitalism" or "popular socialism".<ref name="fyo1" /> He had advocated such a policy since as early as 1991.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Fyodorov advocated for economic freedom, simple and moderate taxation, stimulation of production, and a ban on exports of most raw materials.<ref name="fyo1" /> Fyodorov promised that his policies would double the nation's GDP within five years.<ref name="harvard2">Template:Cite web</ref> Fyodorov proclaimed to draw inspiration in his politics from both Ross Perot and Deng Xiaoping.<ref name="fyo1" /> Up until early May 1996, Fyodorov unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate the creation of a third force coalition, with negotiations largely centering on a coalition between him and fellow candidates Yavlinsky and Lebed.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>
Alexander Lebed
Template:Main General Alexander Lebed ran as the nominee of the Congress of Russian Communities, a centrist nationalist party. Lebed promoted himself as an authoritative leader that would introduce law and order, tackle corruption, and allow capitalism to blossom.<ref name=mythmaking>Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="brookingsoccasional">Template:Cite book</ref> While he presented an authoritarian personality, he held moderate positions.<ref name="gazetta1">Obshchaya Gazetta 5/18/95</ref> After reaching an informal agreement with Yeltsin in April (under which Lebed promised to endorse Yeltsin in the second round of the election), Lebed began to see positive news coverage, as well as a greater overall quantity of media coverage. This was done as part of an effort by Yeltsin's camp to promote Lebed in the hopes that he would syphon off votes from other nationalist candidates in the first-round.<ref name="polar" /> Up until early May 1996, Lebed had entertained negotiations with Yavlinsky and Fyodorov to jointly form a third force coalition.<ref name="polar" />
Martin Shakkum
Template:Main Martin Shakkum ran as an independent candidate. An associate of radical economist Stanislav Shatalin, Shakkum was on the right wing of the Russian political spectrum.<ref name=brookingsoccasional/> Like Lebed, although he presented himself with an authoritarian personality, he held moderate positions on many social issues.<ref name=gazetta1/>
Aman Tuleyev
Template:Main Independent candidate Aman Tuleyev, a member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), styled himself as a "Muslim Communist".<ref name=por>Template:Cite book</ref> The head of the Kemerovo Oblast legislature, Tuleyev was considered to be charismatic, energetic, and well-liked by the CPRF's political base. Despite the fact that Tuleyev dropped out of the race before the election, he had already been on the ballot during a portion of the early voting period, and he turned-in his signatures the day before the deadline. He was considered to be a fallback CPRF candidate in case Zyuganov's candidacy faltered.<ref name=russianelectionwatch18/> Tuleyev's rhetoric straddled between hardline communism and social democracy. Generally a hardliner, he had nonetheless occasionally taken moderate stances, such as seeking tax cuts. Tuleyev's positions centered upon communism and creating a disciplined and uncorrupt government.<ref name="russianelectionwatch18">Template:Cite web</ref> Tuleyev dropped out of the race on 8 June 1996 and endorsed Zyuganov.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Yury Vlasov
Template:Main Politician and former Olympic weightlifter Yury Vlasov ran as an independent candidate. His politics were characterized as nationalist.<ref name=russianelectionwatch1/><ref name=brookingsoccasional/> Vlasov openly espoused antisemitic rhetoric.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Vlasov dubbed his politics as "people's patriotism".<ref name="rferlMay30">Template:Cite web</ref> His campaign platform proclaimed: "There is only one single force that is able to unite almost all and at the same time become the ideological basis of the Russian state – popular patriotism."<ref>Предвыборная программа кандидата на пост президента России Юрия Власова</ref> While he had been a supporter of democratic reforms in the Soviet Union, Vlasov had embraced authoritarian political views following its collapse.<ref>Rus'bez vozhdya (Soyuz zhurnalistov, Vororonzeh, 1995 pages 97–104, 495–512)</ref> Vlasov likened his politics to Gaullism. He argued that his politics were a more effective unifying force than communist or liberal-democratic ideals.<ref name="rferlMay30"/> Although he was nominally an independent candidate, Vlasov's campaign was supported by the People's National Party; by the end of the election, many in the party grew dissatisfied with Vlasov's campaign style, believing he failed to campaign aggressively enough.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Despite polling at under one percent, Vlasov had stated that he anticipated capturing between six and seven percent of the vote. He swore to refuse supporting either Yeltsin or support Zyuganov in the runoff.<ref name="rferlMay30"/>
Grigory Yavlinsky
Template:Main Grigory Yavlinsky ran as the nominee of Yabloko. Yavlinsky officially accepted Yabloko's nomination on 27 January 1996.<ref name=harvard2/> In terms of social issues, Yavlinsky occupied the political left.<ref name="white2006">Template:Cite book</ref> In terms of economic issues, Yavlinsky occupied the far right of the Russian political spectrum. His ideology most strongly appealed to Russia's population of young intellectuals.<ref name="brookingsoccasional"/> Yabloko had been a programmatic party, as opposed to a populist one. This proved to be a weakness for Yavlinsky's campaign, as he and his party opted to maintain their long-established party positions on many issues rather than reshaping their agenda in order to better capitalize on the political tides. This had also been the case in the preceding 1995 electoral campaign, during which Yabloko similarly had opted to focus on complex economic issues, rather than focusing on bread and butter issues.<ref name="white2006"/> Up until early May 1996, Yavlinsky unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate the creation of a third force coalition, with negotiations largely centering on a coalition between him and fellow candidates Lebed and Fyodorov.<ref name="polar"/>
Boris Yeltsin
Template:Main Template:Further
Incumbent Boris Yeltsin ran for re-election as an independent candidate. While his prospects of winning were originally faltering, Yeltsin was able to resuscitate his image and pull off a successful campaign.<ref name="polar"/> Yeltsin's original strategy, devised by Oleg Soskovets, involved him pivoting towards the nationalist wing of Russia's politics in order to directly compete for votes with Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky;<ref name="polar">Template:Cite book</ref> this strategy was ultimately abandoned in favor of one devised by reformists and British and American consultants. Yeltsin's new campaign strategy was, essentially, to convince voters that they had to choose him as the lesser of two evils. This strategy sought to recast Yeltsin as an individual single-handedly fighting to stave off Communist control. The campaign framed a narrative that portrayed Yeltsin as Russia's best hope for stability.<ref name="polar" /> The campaign worked to shift the narrative of the election into a referendum on whether voters wanted to return to their Communist past (with Zyuganov), or continue with reforms (with Yeltsin).<ref name="polar" />
Yeltsin was able to leverage the power of his office. This included using government funds to finance campaign promises, utilizing state media organizations, and currying favoritism amongst financial and media oligarchs.<ref name="polar" /> Two days after the conclusion of the first round, Yeltsin appointed former general Alexander Lebed, who had finished third with 14.7% of vote, to the post of Secretary of Security Council of the Russian Federation and the President's National Security Advisor.<ref>Law-and-Order Candidate Finds Himself in Role of Kingmaker, by CAROL J. WILLIAMS, Los Angeles Times, 18 June 1996</ref> Lebed in turn endorsed Yeltsin in the runoff election. Meanwhile, Yeltsin suffered from a serious heart attack and disappeared from public view. His condition was kept secret through the second-round election on 3 July 1996. During this period of time, Yeltsin's campaign team created a "virtual Yeltsin" shown in the media through staged interviews that never happened and pre-recorded radio addresses.<ref name="RPFGTP" />
Vladimir Zhirinovsky
Template:Main The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky campaigned on nationalist rhetoric. After his surprisingly strong third-place finish in the 1991 presidential election and the surprisingly strong first-place performance of the LDPR in the 1993 Russian legislative election, Zhirinivsky had once been seen as a rising force in Russian politics and a future contender for the presidency.<ref name="polar" /><ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="TheRussianPresidency" /> Boorish and outlandish conduct by Zhirinovsky had diminished the public perception of his stature to such a degree that, by 1996, he was seen as a buffoonish figure and was no longer seen as a viable candidate.<ref name="polar" /><ref name="TheRussianPresidency">Template:Cite book</ref>
Gennady Zyuganov
Template:Main The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) leader Gennady Zyuganov successfully advanced to the second-round of the election, where he was defeated by Yeltsin. Coming off of a very successful CPRF performance in the 1995 Russian legislative election, when he launched his campaign, Zyuganov had originally been seen as the frontrunner to win the election.<ref name="polar" />
Conduct
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Contemporary analysis
In their 1996 report, the International Republican Institute stated that their election observers "witnessed no deliberate attempts to commit electoral fraud and, indeed, in the tracking of protocols through the various levels of Russia's electoral system, observed transparency in the process."<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In their 1996 analysis, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs declared that, while the election failed to be "free and fair" in regards to media coverage and campaign financing, it appeared to have largely succeeded in being "free and fair" in regards to the administration of voting and vote-counting.<ref name="harvardassessing">Template:Cite web</ref>
Observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) reported in 1996 that the first round of the election "appeared to be generally well run, and not seriously marred by some problems which occurred in the pre-election campaign. The delegation considered the first round of the Russian Presidential elections to have been conducted in a generally free and fair manner."<ref name="OSCE1">Template:Cite web</ref> The OSCE also reported: "Delegation members considered voter participation in the political campaign to be quite active compared to previous Russian elections. A relatively open flow of information concerning candidates and their platforms was made available to voters during the pre-election campaign; opposition candidates charged that the state controlled electronic broadcast media did not provide fair and balanced coverage, and this was also observed to be the case by delegation members. The bias appeared to be primarily in favor of the President."<ref name="OSCE1" /> The OSCE concluded: "The delegation found that Polling Station Election Committees (PSECs) generally followed proper procedures and enforced the one-man-one-vote principle, although scattered instances of minor irregularities, such as family voting and voting outside of polling booths were observed."<ref name="OSCE1" />
In a 1996 post-election analysis published in the journal Presidential Studies Quarterly, Erik Depov asserted: "The inaccuracy of many early predictions was primarily because Yeltsin's successful re-election bid had as much to do with the dynamics of the electoral campaign as with the results of his first term in office. If the 1996 presidential campaign proved anything, it illustrated the danger of underestimating Yeltsin's ability to meet a serious political challenge head on and prevail despite apparently insurmountable odds."<ref name="depoy" /> During the campaign, Yeltsin's opponents criticized his use of state coffers to fund programs that would bolster his approval with voters.<ref name="CNNApril22">Template:Cite web</ref> Yeltsin had been utilizing state finances to fund programs (such as pensions) with the aim of convincing voters of his willingness to fulfill promises he was making on the campaign trail.<ref name="CNNApril22" /> Yeltsin's opponents charged that, in doing this, he was essentially buying votes; in turn, Yeltsin's team argued that he was simply doing his job as president.<ref name="CNNApril22" /> During the second round campaign, Zyuganov asserted in a letter to the parliament, the Central Election Commission, and the media that Yeltsin was buying votes with money that should be used to pay wage and pension arrears and that he had pressured local leaders into working for his campaign. He also alleged that Yeltsin was using "tens of trillions of rubles" from the state budget for campaign purposes. Zyuganov argued that such practices would call into question the results of the voting and urged immediate measures that would insure equal conditions for the candidates.<ref name="rfejun27">Template:Cite web</ref>
Pro-Yeltsin media bias
Yeltsin benefited from an immense media bias favoring his campaign.<ref name=polar/><ref name=harvardaug1>Template:Cite web</ref> In 1991, at the time of the previous presidential election, Russia had only two major television channels. RTR had supported Yeltsin, while ORT had criticized him and provided broad coverage of the views of his opponents. In the 1996 presidential election, none of Russia's major television networks were critical of Yeltsin.<ref name="harvardaug1" /><ref name="harvardassessing"/> Yeltsin had successfully enlisted the national television channels (ORT, RTR, and NTV) and most of the written press to essentially act as agents of his campaign.<ref name="polar" /><ref name="harvardaug1" />
The European Institute for Media found that Yeltsin received 53% of all media coverage of the campaign, while Zyuganov received only 18%. In their evaluation of the biases of news stories, EIM awarded each candidate 1 point for every positive story they received and subtracted a point for every negative story they received. In the first round of the election, Yeltsin scored +492 and Zyuganov scored −313. In the second round of the election, Yeltsin scored +247 and Zyuganov scored −240.<ref name="harvardaug1" /> Television networks marginalized all of Yeltsin's opponents aside from Zyuganov, helping to create the perception that there were only two viable candidates. This allowed Yeltsin to pose as the lesser-evil. Near the end of the election's first-round, the networks began also providing coverage to the candidacy of Lebed,<ref name="harvardassessing" /> who had already agreed to support Yeltsin in the second round.<ref name="polar" />
Supplementing the work of the numerous public relations and media firms that were hired by the Yeltsin campaign, a number of media outlets "volunteered" their services to Yeltsin's re-election effort. For instance, Kommersant (one of the most prominent business newspapers in the country) published an anti-Communist paper called Ne Dai Bog (meaning "God forbid").<ref name="polar" /> At ORT, a special committee was placed in charge of planning a marathon of anti-Communist films and documentaries to be broadcast on the channel ahead of the election.<ref name="polar" /> Led by the efforts of Mikhail Lesin, the media painted a picture of a fateful choice for Russia, between Yeltsin and a "return to totalitarianism". They even played up the threat of civil war if a Communist was elected president.<ref>Борис-боецTemplate:Dead link // The New York Times, 30 April 2007.</ref>
One of the reasons for the media's overwhelming favoritism of Yeltsin was their fear that a Communist government would dismantle Russia's right to a free press.<ref name="harvardaug1" /><ref name="TheRussianPresidency" /> Another factor contributing to the media's support of Yeltsin was that his government still owned two of the national television channels, and still provided the majority of funding to the majority of independent newspapers.<ref name="harvardaug1" /> In addition, Yeltsin's government also was in charge of supplying licenses to media outlets. Yeltsin's government and Yury Luzhkov, the then mayor of Moscow, flexed their power and reminded the owners, publishers, and editors that newspaper licenses and Moscow leases for facilities were "under review".<ref name="harvardaug1" /> There were also instances of direct payments made for positive coverage ("dollar journalism").<ref name="harvardaug1" />
Yeltsin had managed to enlist Russia's emerging business elite to work in his campaign, including those who ran media corporations. This included Vladimir Gusinsky, owner of Most Bank, Independent Television and NTV. NTV which had, prior to the campaign, been critical towards Yeltsin's actions in Chechnya, changed the tone of their coverage. Igor Malashenko, Gusinsky's appointed head of NTV, even joined the Yeltsin campaign and led its media relations in a rather visible conflict of interest.<ref name=harvardaug1/> In early 1996, Gusinsky and his political rival Boris Berezovsky (chairman of the Board of ORT) decided that they would put aside their differences in order to work together to support the re-election of Yeltsin.<ref name=polar/> By mid-1996, Yeltsin had recruited a team of a handful of financial and media oligarchs to bankroll the Yeltsin campaign and guarantee favorable media coverage the president on national television and in leading newspapers.<ref>Template:Cite magazine</ref> In return, Yeltsin's presidential administration allowed well-connected Russian business leaders to acquire majority stakes in some of Russia's most valuable state-owned assets.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>
To further guarantee consistent media coverage, Yeltsin had fired the chairperson of the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and replaced him with Eduard Sagalaev in February 1996.<ref>Скандал вокруг ВГТРК разрастается. Госдума намерена вызвать Сагалаева на ковер</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> While the anti-Communist pro-Yeltsin media bias certainly contributed to Yeltsin's victory, it was not the sole factor. A similar anti-Communist media bias in the run-up to the 1995 parliamentary elections had failed to prevent a Communist victory.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> Additionally, Yeltsin himself had been able to win the 1991 presidential election in spite of a strongly unfavorable media bias towards him.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Violations of campaign laws
Following the election, a financial fraud investigation (the Xerox affair) was launched against Yeltsin's campaign. Yeltsin's campaign disregarded numerous campaign regulations. Analysis has indicated that Yeltsin's campaign spent well in excess of spending limits.<ref name=polar/> Yeltsin also violated a law against broadcasting advertisements before 15 March.<ref name=harvardmay15>Template:Cite web</ref> Yeltsin undertook many abuses of his power in order to assist his campaign effort.<ref name=authoritarian>Template:Cite book</ref>
Fraud
Some instances of fraud were indicated to have taken place; the various political actors, including the opposition, did not challenge the result.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> The Central Election Commission (CEC) found in 1996 that the original second-round results reported from Mordovia were falsified. A significant number of votes that had been cast for Zyuganov were recorded as "Against All Candidates". The vote totals from Mordovia were subsequently adjusted by the CEC in order to remedy this.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The CEC also discovered fraud in Dagestan, an ethnic republic which had experienced a very improbable change in voting patterns between rounds,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> and the vote totals were revised to remedy this.<ref name="calmit">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="derailed">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="caltech1">Template:Cite web</ref> Another instance of fraud was discovered in Karachay-Cherkessia by the CEC. The vote totals were adjusted to remedy for this as well.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Allegations of unfairness and fraud
There have been a number of allegations claiming further and greater instances of fraud than the instances that had been discovered by the CEC. They include a number of allegations that assert that the election was unfair and favored Yeltsin, as well as some allegations that go as far as to assert that the entire election was fraudulent.<ref name=timstl>Template:Cite magazine</ref> In addition to federal subjects in which fraud was discovered by the CEC, some results, such as those from Russia's ethnic republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, showed highly-unlikely changes in voting patterns between the two rounds of voting. That has aroused suspicions of election fraud,<ref name="calmit" /><ref name="derailed" /><ref name="caltech1" /> although any fraud that may have contributed to those discrepancies is unlikely to have had a material effect on the outcome of the election.<ref name="logeco">Template:Cite book</ref> One hypothesis that has been given for the dramatic increase in support that Yeltsin saw in some regions was that prior to the second round vote, administrative pressure was applied in those regions to coerce voters into supporting Yeltsin.<ref name="authoritarian" /><ref name="cameronross">Template:Cite book</ref>
Allegations have been made by some that in the first round of the election, several regions of Russia committed electoral fraud in favor of Zyuganov.<ref name="newsletter1">Template:Cite web</ref> It has also been further alleged by some that several of the republics switched the direction of their fraud during the second round to favor Yeltsin instead.<ref name="newsletter1" /> Mikhail Gorbachev voiced a belief that the results of the election were falsified. He stated that he believes that the results underreported his actual share of the vote.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> At a meeting with opposition leaders in 2012, the then Russian president Dmitry Medvedev was reported to have said: "There is hardly any doubt who won [that race]. It was not Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin."<ref name="timstl" />
American influence
After the election, a group of American consultants that worked for the Yeltsin campaign sought to take credit for Yeltsin's successful re-election in a profile published in the July 1996 issue of Time magazine with the headline "Yanks to the Rescue".<ref name="time">[ https://archive.org/details/TimeUSMeddlingOnRussia TIME Exclusive Yanks To The Rescue], Time. July 1996.</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Their account was later the basis of the 2003 comedy Spinning Boris; there was reporting that indicated that their work for Yeltsin's campaign did not play a consequential role in shaping the campaign, with Time receiving accusations of poor journalism and sensationalism for publishing the consultants' claims about their importance to the campaign without practicing skepticism.<ref name=didthey>Template:Cite web</ref><ref name=bragbite>Template:Cite web</ref> Additionally, it had not at all been unusual for foreign consultants to work on campaigns in the nation's fledgling electoral politics.<ref name=wpjul7>Template:Cite news</ref>
Knowing that his voter base was pro-Western, Yeltsin lobbied the then United States president Bill Clinton to speak in praising terms of Russia's transition to democracy. Yeltsin believed that this would strengthen his support from voters.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Yeltsin warned Clinton of the possible ramifications of a Zyuganov victory, saying: "There is a U.S. press campaign suggesting that people should not be afraid of the communists; that they are good, honorable and kind people. I warn people not to believe this. More than half of them are fanatics; they would destroy everything. It would mean civil war. They would abolish the boundaries between the republics. They want to take back Crimea; they even make claims against Alaska. ... There are two paths for Russia's development. I do not need power. But when I felt the threat of communism, I decided that I had to run. We will prevent it."<ref name="solid">Template:Cite web</ref> In their conversations, Clinton assured Yeltsin that he would give him his publicly declared personal endorsement, saying: "I've been trying to find a way to say to the Russian people 'this election will have consequences,' and we are clear about what it is we support."<ref name=solid/><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Yeltsin made other requests, such as admission into the G8 (not granted), a $2.5 billion direct cash loan to the government (not granted), and a delay in NATO expansion (granted). Clinton refrained from undertaking covert operations to support Yeltsin in order to prevent spurring backlash if such efforts were to be discovered.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
In January 1997, observing the support Yeltsin had received in 1996 from the Clinton administration, former candidate Alexander Lebed visited the United States to rally support from American businesses for a potential run in the 2000 Russian presidential election. As one analyst wrote at the time, "[Lebed] may perceive that Yeltsin benefited greatly from support from the Americans in the last campaign. Clinton made a trip to Moscow during the campaign. And the International Monetary Fund extended loans that enabled the Government to make credible promises to pay wages."<ref name="trump">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite magazine</ref> Some argued that the role of the Clinton administration in securing an International Monetary Fund loan for Russia had an impact on the election, with some critics characterizing it as an act of foreign electoral intervention.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="guardianA">Template:Cite news</ref>
Opinion polls
Results
Template:Election results Template:Notelist
See also
- Red Belt (Russia), term describing federal subjects that had strong support for Zyuganov's Communist Party of the Russian Federation
- Third force (1996 Russian presidential election), a proposed electoral bloc
References
Template:Candidates in the Russian presidential election, 1996 Template:Russian elections