Chaebol

A chaebol (Template:IPAc-en Template:Respell,<ref name="ODE">Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Template:IPAc-en Template:Respell;<ref name="MW">Template:Cite web</ref> Template:Korean Template:IPA, Template:Literal translation) is a large industrial South Korean conglomerate run and controlled by an individual or family.<ref name="MW" /> A chaebol often consists of multiple diversified affiliates, controlled by a person or group.<ref name="Jung 2004 299–303">Template:Cite journal</ref> Several dozen large South Korean family-controlled corporate groups fall under this definition. The term first appeared in English text in 1972.<ref name="MW" />

Chaebol have also played a significant role in South Korean politics. In 1988, a member of a chaebol family, Chung Mong-joon, president of Hyundai Heavy Industries, successfully ran for the National Assembly of South Korea. Other business leaders were also chosen to be members of the National Assembly through proportional representation.<ref name=loc/> Hyundai has made efforts in the thawing of North Korean relations, despite some controversy.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Many South Korean family-run chaebol have been criticised for low dividend payouts and other governance practices that favor controlling shareholders at the expense of ordinary investors.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

Etymology

"Chaebol" is derived from the McCune–Reischauer romanization of the Korean word Template:Lang (chaebŏl), without the breve above the o. In 2000, the South Korean Ministry of Tourism introduced a new system of converting the Korean language into the Roman alphabet called Revised Romanization.<ref name="MoCT2000">Template:Cite web</ref> Under the new transliteration style, Template:Lang is written as jaebeol, not chaebol. Despite McCune–Reischauer being largely abandoned in South Korea, the term is still ubiquitously written as chaebol.

The word originates from the Sino-Japanese term zaibatsu (Template:Lang), where Template:Lang means 'wealth' and Template:Lang means 'clan'.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The Japanese zaibatsu dominated their economy from 1868 until they were dissolved under the American Occupation of Japan in 1945. The rise and proliferation of the Korean chaebol resembles the Japanese zaibatsu at their peak.

The word has been loaned into English since at least 1972.<ref name="MW" />

History

The former headquarters of Hyundai in Seoul

Formation and boom

South Korea's economy was small and predominantly agricultural well into the mid-20th century. However, policies of President Park Chung Hee spurred rapid industrialisation by promoting large businesses, following his seizure of power in 1961. The First Five Year Economic Plan<ref name="Jung 2004 299–303"/> by the government set industrial policy towards new investment, and chaebols were to be guaranteed loans from the banking sector. The chaebol played a key role in developing new industries, markets, and export production, helping make South Korea one of the Four Asian Tigers.

Although South Korea's major industrial programs did not begin until the early 1960s, the origins of the country's entrepreneurial elite were found in the political economy of the 1950s. Very few Koreans owned or managed larger corporations during the Japanese colonial period. After the Japanese left in 1945, some Korean businessmen obtained the assets of some of the Japanese firms, several of which grew into the chaebols of the 1990s.<ref name=loc/>

The Japanese colonial government sometimes sought to co-opt local businessmen and wealthy individuals often linked to land ownership, and a significant minority of industries were jointly owned by Japanese and Korean businesses. A few Korean chaebols, such as Kyungbang, came into existence during this era.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

The companies, as well as certain other firms that were formed in the late 1940s and early 1950s, had close links with Syngman Rhee's First Republic, which lasted from 1948 to 1960. It is confirmed that many of these companies received special treatment from the government in return for kickbacks and other payments.<ref name=loc/>

When the military took over the government in 1961, its leaders announced that they would eradicate the corruption that had plagued the Rhee administration and eliminate "injustice" from society. Some leading industrialists were arrested and charged with corruption, but the new government realized that it would need the help of entrepreneurs if the government's ambitious plans to modernize the economy were to be fulfilled. A compromise was reached, under which many of the accused corporate leaders paid fines to the government. Subsequently, there was increased cooperation between corporate and government leaders in modernizing the economy.<ref name=loc/>Template:Rp

Government-chaebol cooperation was essential to the subsequent economic growth and astounding successes that began in the early 1960s. Driven by the urgent need to turn the economy away from consumer goods and light industries toward heavy, chemical, and import-substitution industries, political leaders and government planners relied on the ideas and cooperation of chaebol leaders. The government provided the blueprints for industrial expansion; the chaebol realized the plans. However, the chaebol-led industrialization accelerated the monopolistic and oligopolistic concentration of capital and economically profitable activities in the hands of a limited number of conglomerates.<ref name=loc/>

Park used the chaebol as a means of economic growth. Exports were encouraged, reversing Rhee's policy of reliance on imports. Performance quotas were established.<ref name=loc/>

Chaebols were able to grow because of two factors: foreign loans and special favours. Access to foreign technology also was critical to the growth of the chaebol through the 1980s. Under the guise of "guided capitalism", the government selected companies to undertake projects and channelled funds from foreign loans. The government guaranteed repayment should a company be unable to repay its foreign creditors. Additional loans were made available from domestic banks. In the late 1980s, chaebols dominated the industrial sector and were especially prevalent in manufacturing, trading, and heavy industries.<ref name=loc/>

Chaebols experienced tremendous growth beginning in the early 1960s in connection with the expansion of South Korean exports. The growth resulted from the production of a diversity of goods rather than just one or two products. Innovation and the willingness to develop new product lines were critical. In the 1950s and early 1960s, chaebols concentrated on wigs and textiles; by the mid-1970s and 1980s, heavy, defence, and chemical industries had become predominant. While these activities were important in the early 1990s, real growth was occurring in the electronics and high-technology industries. Chaebols also were responsible for turning the trade deficit in 1985 into a trade surplus in 1986. The current account balance, however, fell from more than US$14 billion in 1988 to US$5 billion in 1989.<ref name=loc/>

Chaebols continued their explosive growth in export markets in the 1980s. By the late 1980s, they had become financially independent and secure, thereby eliminating the need for further government-sponsored credit and assistance.<ref name=loc/>

1990-present

File:Seoul Square.jpg

Former headquarters of the defunct Daewoo Group, once the second-largest conglomerate in South Korea

By the 1990s, South Korea was one of the largest newly industrialised countries and boasted a standard of living comparable to industrialized countries.

President Kim Young-sam began to challenge the chaebol,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> but it was not until the 1997 Asian financial crisis that the weaknesses of the system were widely understood. Initially, the crisis was caused by a speculative attack on the Thai baht, which lead to a sharp drop in its value and immediate cash flow concerns needed to pay foreign debts; widespread foreign investment and financial deregulation across East Asia allowed foreign investors to attack the values of the national currencies of other countries in the region, including South Korea, which spread the financial crisis to the affected countries and caused a downward spiral in the value of the South Korean won.<ref>Template:Cite report</ref> As a result, chaebols, which at this point were overleveraged in short-term debts and already suffering from falling export prices,<ref>Template:Cite magazine</ref> started going bankrupt: Of the 30 largest chaebols, 11 collapsed during the financial crisis.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

The remaining chaebols also became far more specialized in their focus. For example, with a population ranked 26th in the world, before the crisis, the country had seven major automobile manufacturers. Afterward, only two major manufacturersTemplate:Which remained intact, though two additional ones continued, in a smaller capacity, under General Motors and Renault. Chaebol debts were not only to state industrial banks but also to independent banks and their financial services subsidiaries. The scale of the loan defaults meant that banks could neither foreclose nor write off bad loans without themselves collapsing, so the failure to service these debts quickly caused a systemic banking crisis, and South Korea turned to the IMF for assistance. The most spectacular example came in mid-1999, with the collapse of the Daewoo Group, which had some US$80 billion in unpaid debt. At the time, it was the largest corporate bankruptcy in history.<ref name="Daewoo">Template:Cite news</ref> Investigations also exposed widespread corruption in the chaebols, particularly fraudulent accounting, and bribery.

South Korea recovered quickly from the crisis, and most of the blame for economic problems was shifted to the IMF, which had forced the government to adopt 30% interest rate in exchange for a US$55 billion bailout. The remaining chaebols have grown substantially since the crisis, but they have maintained far lower debt levels.<ref name="Daewoo" />

In 2019, the revenue of the largest chaebol, Samsung, was worth about Template:Percentage of the South Korean GDP<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> with the company holding billions of dollars in cash. In 2023, the revenue of the top four chaebols (Samsung, SK, Hyundai, and LG) was Template:Percentage of the South Korean GDP, and the top thirty chaebol were Template:Percentage of GDP.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Recent financial statements show chaebols are slowly losing power due to either international competition or internal competition from startups.Template:Citation needed The net profit of South Korea's top conglomerates decreased from 2012 to 2015.Template:Citation needed

Ranking

Ranking of Chaebols by assets Template:As of<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

2025 Rank	2024 Rank	Change	Group Name	Representative	Affiliates 2025	Affiliates 2024	Assets 2025 (trillion KRW)	Assets 2024 (trillion KRW)	Type
1	1	Template:Steady	Samsung	Lee Jae-yong	63	63	589.1	571.4	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
2	2	Template:Steady	SK	Chey Tae-won	198	219	363	352.1	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
3	3	Template:Steady	Hyundai Motor	Chung Eui-sun	74	70	306.6	297.4	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
4	4	Template:Steady	LG	Koo Kwang-mo	63	60	186.1	180.5	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
5	6	Template:Increase1	Lotte	Shin Dong-bin	92	96	143.3	139	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
6	5	Template:Decrease1	POSCO	POSCO	49	47	137.8	133.7	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
7	7	Template:Steady	Hanwha	Kim Dong-kwan	119	108	125.7	122	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
8	8	Template:Steady	HD Hyundai Heavy Industries	Chung Mong-joon	32	29	88.7	86.1	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
9	10	Template:Increase1	NongHyup	NongHyup	56	54	80.1	77.7	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
10	9	Template:Decrease1	GS	Huh Chang-soo	98	99	79.3	76.9	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
11	11	Template:Steady	Shinsegae	Chung Yong-jin	59	53	63.9	61.9	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
12	14	Template:Increase2	Hanjin	Walter Cho	42	34	58.2	56.4	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
13	12	Template:Decrease1	KT	KT	47	48	46.3	44.9	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
14	13	Template:Decrease1	CJ	Lee Jay-hyun	66	73	39.4	38.2	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
15	16	Template:Increase1	LS	Koo Ja-eun	72	67	36	34.9	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
16	15	Template:Decrease1	Kakao	Kim Beom-soo	115	128	34.8	33.8	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
17	20	Template:Increase3	HMM	HMM	4	5	33.5	32.4	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
18	17	Template:Decrease1	Doosan	Park Jeong-won	24	22	28.2	27.3	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
19	18	Template:Decrease1	DL	Lee Hae-wook	45	45	27	26.2	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
20	21	Template:Increase1	Jeungheung	Jeong Chang-seon	51	53	26.7	25.9	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
21	19	Template:Decrease2	Celltrion	Seo Jung-jin	9	8	26.7	25.9	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
22	23	Template:Increase1	Naver	Lee Hae-jin	45	54	25.5	24.7	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
23	25	Template:Increase2	S-Oil	S-Oil	2	2	24.5	23.8	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
24	22	Template:Decrease2	Mirae-Asset	미래에셋	28	30	23.5	22.8	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
25	27	Template:Increase2	Coupang	Coupang	16	13	22.3	21.6	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
26	24	Template:Decrease2	Hyundai Department Store	현대백화점	24	27	22.3	21.6	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
27	49	Template:Increase22	Hankook & Company	Jo Yang-Rae	25	24	21.5	20.9	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
28	26	Template:Decrease2	Booyoung	Lee Joong-geun	21	21	21.5	20.8	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
29	32	Template:Increase3	Young Poong	Jang Hyung-jin	30	28	20.9	20.3	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
30	29	Template:Decrease1	Harim	Kim Hong-guk	43	45	20	19.4	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
31	33	Template:Increase2	Hyosung	Cho Hyun-joon	60	57	19.8	19.2	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
32	38	Template:Increase6	Sinokor	Jeong Tae-soon	28	27	19.5	18.9	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
33	30	Template:Decrease3	SM	Woo Oh-hyun	58	58	18.3	17.8	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
34	31	Template:Decrease3	HDC	Chung Mong-gyu	34	35	17.5	17	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
35	34	Template:Decrease1	Hoban	Kim Sang-yeol	40	39	16.9	16.4	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
36	53	Template:Increase17	Dunamu	Dunamu	11	12	15.9	15.4	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
37	36	Template:Decrease1	KT&G	KT&G	17	14	15.7	15.3	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
38	40	Template:Increase2	Kolon	Lee Woong-yeol	45	48	15.2	14.7	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
39	37	Template:Decrease2	KCC	Jeong Mong-jin	13	14	15	14.5	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
40	35	Template:Decrease5	DB	Kim Jun-ki	24	25	14.8	14.4	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
41	43	Template:Increase2	Nexon	Yoo Jeong-hyeon	23	19	14.5	14.1	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
42	41	Template:Decrease1	OCI	Lee Woo-hyun	24	24	13.8	13.4	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
43	45	Template:Increase2	LX	Bon-Joon Koo	17	17	12.7	12.3	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
44	44	Template:Steady	SeAH Holdings	Lee Soon-hyung	24	26	12.4	12	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
45	46	Template:Increase1	Netmarble	Bang Jun-hyuk	31	35	11.8	11.4	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
46	48	Template:Increase2	E-Land	Park Seong-su	32	31	11.6	11.3	limited assuranceTemplate:Efn
47	39	Template:Decrease8	Kyobo	Shin Chang-jae	16	14	11.1	10.8	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
48	58	Template:Increase10	GM Korea	GM Korea	3	3	10.8	10.5	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
49	52	Template:Increase3	Daokuwoom	Kim Ik-rae	45	48	10.4	10.1	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
50	51	Template:Increase1	Kumho	Park Chan-gu	16	14	10	9.7	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
51	60	Template:Increase9	Daebang	Gu gyo-un	41	42	10	9.7	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
52	42	Template:Decrease10	Taeyoung	Yoon Seyoung	51	82	9.8	9.5	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
53	54	Template:Increase1	Samchully	Lee Man-deuk	33	47	9.7	9.4	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
54	56	Template:Increase2	KG	Kwak Jae-sun	26	34	9.6	9.3	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
55	47	Template:Decrease8	EcoPro	Lee Dong-chae	17	23	9.4	9.1	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
56	57	Template:Increase1	HL	Chung Mong-won	15	13	9.3	9	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
57	55	Template:Decrease2	Dongwon	Kim Namjeong	23	26	8.9	8.6	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
58	59	Template:Increase1	Amoraepacific	Suh Kyung-bae	15	13	8.7	8.4	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
59	50	Template:Decrease9	Taekwang	Lee Ho-jin	20	20	8.7	8.4	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
60	64	Template:Increase4	Krafton	Chang Byung-gyu	9	8	8.5	8.3	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
61	70	Template:Increase9	Global Sae-A Group	Woonggi Kim	23	20	8.3	8	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
62	61	Template:Decrease1	KAI	KAI	4	4	8.1	7.9	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
63	63	Template:Steady	MDM	Moon Joo-hyun	19	15	8	7.8	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
64	86	Template:Increase22	Sono international	Park Chun-hee	25	23	7.4	7.2	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
65	62	Template:Decrease3	Aekyung	Jang Young-shin	30	31	7.3	7.1	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
66	67	Template:Increase1	Dongkuk	Jang Se-ju	16	12	7.3	7.1	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
67	66	Template:Decrease1	BS	Lee Ki-seung	66	65	7.3	7	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
68	65	Template:Decrease3	Samyang	Kim Yun	13	13	7.1	6.9	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
69	-	New	LIG	Koo Bon-sang	18	-	7.1	6.9	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
70	69	Template:Decrease1	Joongang	Hong Seok-hyun	57	54	6.9	6.7	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
71	72	Template:Increase1	Eugene	Yoo Kyung-seon	63	60	6.8	6.6	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
72	75	Template:Increase3	Korea HC	Park Jeong-seok	26	24	6.7	6.5	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
73	77	Template:Increase4	BGF	Hong Seok-jo	19	18	6.3	6.1	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
74	-	New	Daekwang	Cho Young-hoon	64	-	6.1	5.9	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
75	83	Template:Increase8	Bando	Kwon Hong-sa	15	18	6.1	5.9	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
76	78	Template:Increase2	Dashin	Yang Hong-seok	84	117	6	5.9	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
77	76	Template:Decrease1	Okay	Choi Yun	16	16	5.8	5.6	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
78	79	Template:Increase1	HiteJinro	Park Mun-deok	12	11	5.7	5.6	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
79	80	Template:Increase1	Nongshim	Shin Dong-won	22	23	5.6	5.5	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
80	74	Template:Decrease6	DN	Kim Sang-heon	7	8	5.6	5.5	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
81	68	Template:Decrease13	Hyundai Marine & Fire Insurance	Jeong Mong-yoon	14	13	5.6	5.4	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
82	81	Template:Decrease1	Shinyoung	Jeong Chun-bo	32	33	5.6	5.4	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
83	88	Template:Increase5	Paradise	Jeon Philip	11	14	5.4	5.3	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
84	71	Template:Decrease13	IS	Gwon Hyuk-woon	32	36	5.4	5.2	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
85	85	Template:Steady	Hybe	Bang Si-hyuk	12	15	5.4	5.2	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
86	82	Template:Decrease4	Hansol	Jo Dong-gil	21	21	5.4	5.2	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
87	84	Template:Decrease3	Sampyo	Jeong Do-won	28	33	5.3	5.2	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
88	-	New	Sajo	Joo Jin-woo	40	-	5.3	5.1	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
89	87	Template:Decrease2	Wonik	Lee Young-han	47	54	5.3	5.1	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
90	-	New	Bithumb	Lee Jeong-hoon	20	-	5.2	5.1	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
91	-	New	EUKOR	EUKOR	2	-	5.1	5	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
92	73	Template:Decrease19	Youngone	Sung Gi-hak	20	50	5	4.9	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn
-	-	Excluded	Kumho Asiana	Park Sam-gu	-	24	-	17.4	publicly disclosed corporate groupTemplate:Efn

Corporate governance

Management structure

Some chaebols are one large corporation while others have broken up into loosely connected groups of separate companies sharing a common name. Even in the latter case, each is almost always owned, controlled, or managed by the same family group.

South Korea's chaebols are often compared with Japan's keiretsu business groupings, the successors of the pre-war zaibatsu, but they have some major differences:Template:According to whom

• Chaebols are still largely controlled by their founding families while keiretsu are controlled by groups of professional managers. Chaebols, furthermore, are more family-based and family-oriented than their Japanese counterparts.
• Chaebols are centralized in ownership while keiretsu are more decentralized.
• Chaebols have more often formed subsidiaries to produce components for exports while large Japanese corporations have mostly switched to employing outside contractors.<ref name=loc/>
• The major structural difference between Korean chaebols and Japanese keiretsu is that chaebols do not have affiliated banks for credit access. Most were heavily dependent on government loans and loan guarantees in their early years, and they still have a closer relationship with the government than their Japanese counterparts. Chaebols are largely prohibited from owning private banks, partly to spread risk and partly to increase the government's leverage over the banks in areas such as credit allocation. In 1990, government regulations made it difficult for a chaebol to develop an exclusive banking relationship, but following the cascading collapses of the late 1990s, they were somewhat relaxed.Template:Citation needed Keiretsu have historically worked with an affiliated bank, giving the affiliated companies almost unlimited access to credit,<ref name=loc>Template:Country study</ref> so the economic problems for which the Japanese have been known are zombie banks rather than systemic banking crises. However, many of the largest keiretsu have diversified their debt practices, and public bond sales have become somewhat common.Template:Citation needed

The chaebol model is heavily reliant on a complex system of interlocking ownership. The owner, with the help of family members, family-owned charities, and senior managers from subsidiaries, has to control only three or four public companies, which control other companies that in turn control subsidiaries. A good example of this practice would be the owner of Doosan, who controlled more than 20 subsidiaries with only minor participation in about 5 companies.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

Equity

The chairman of a typical chaebol possesses a small portion of the equity in the companies under the large umbrella of the chaebol but is very powerful in making decisions and controls all management. For example, Samsung owns Template:Percentage of the group's listed firms. This demonstrates a weakness in the rule of law.<ref name="Jung 2004 299–303" /> The method that allows this type of possession is called cross-holding, which is a horizontal and vertical structure that enhances the control of the chairman.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

Workplace culture

The typical culture of a chaebol is highly paternalistic. Much of the environment is defined by the chairman who acts as a "fatherly figure" to his subordinates. This can be traced back to Neo-Confucian values that permeate Korean society.Template:Citation needed A chaebol head's demeanour towards his employee can be described as "loving" while maintaining "sternness and a sense of responsibility". Workers commit to long hours, most notably on weekends and holidays, to appease their superiors.<ref name=":0">Template:Cite book</ref> Company outings and drinking sessions tend to be compulsory to foster a sense of family and belonging among employees. Employers believe that enhancing a common bond between them will translate into prosperity and productivity for the company. Other practices that would be uncommon for Western workplaces to engage in include gift-giving to employees and arranging dates for workers in search of relationships or marriage.Template:Citation needed

Chaebols are notoriously hierarchical. As such, it is unusual for an individual to challenge or question the decision-making of his or her boss. This dynamic adds to the culture that orients itself around whoever is in charge but can lead to undesirable circumstances. For example, the Asiana flight 214 crash led critics to speculate that cultural factors prevented a pilot on board from aborting the low-speed landing and thus straying from his superior's commands.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Promotion is rarely merit-based. Rather, it is through the order of age and time served to the conglomerate. This is reflected by the fact that most executives are far older than their employees. If a worker does not attain an executive or senior-management role by the age of fifty, he or she is commonly forced to resign. Again, this is attributable to the age-hierarchy dynamics in Korean Confucian culture. A typical firm heavily emphasizes loyalty to the firm, as demonstrated in the standard recruiting process. Newly acquired employees undergo an intense initiation that includes activities such as training camps and singing company-unique songs that reiterate the production goals of the firm.<ref name=":0" />

Emergence and inflation

The origins of the modern chaebol system in South Korea came as a consequence of the Korean War. The war resulted in much destruction and halted industrial production, which led the government to print money to pay for the war and meet the requirements of the United Nations forces for the Korean currency,Template:Clarify all of which caused mass inflation. This inflation caused many commodity prices to double every six months.

The government had to react and so devised a plan in providing strong financial incentives to private companies between the 1960s and 1970s. These included the government's choosing to select various family businesses to distribute the incentives (imported raw materials, commodities, bank loans). The impact was immediate, and most of the businesses flourished rapidly. The protection of infant companies allowed them to develop because of the highly regulated market, which prevented foreign companies from entering.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> Many companies that were not in the circle of businesses saw the system as flawed and corrupted.<ref name="Jung 2004 299–303" /> Corruption scandals have occurred periodically in all chaebols. Such incidents suggest a form of "crony capitalism" which is common in developing countries.

Internal market transactions accountability

Because the government gave out incentives to help businesses, it had a lot of control over them. However, there was no way to ensure the businesses would use the incentives effectively and efficiently.<ref name="Jung 2004 299–303"/> In other words, there was no external monitoring system to monitor chaebols and ensure that they were efficient in the allocation of resources.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> All businesses undertake internal market transactions, which constitute "purchase and sale of intermediate inputs, the provision and receipt of loan collaterals, and the provision and receipt of payment guarantees among member firms in a business group".<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> There is the question of efficiency, especially in production and management. Therefore, the chaebol system was not very transparent. Behind the scenes, businesses were provided with subsidiary financing and intragroup transactions. This allowed them easy loans to cover their deficits, and before the 1997 Asian financial crisis, huge debts had accumulated, many of which were hidden. That gave the illusion that the system was flourishing into the 1990s.<ref name="Jung 2004 299–303"/>

Relationship with foreign investors

According to the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, the majority of South Korea's economy is driven by exports.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> South Korea is one of the leading exporters worldwide. Additionally, the majority of investors in the Korean stock market are foreign investors. Out of 711 listed companies in the Korean stock market, approximately 683 have shares that are held by foreign investors.<ref name=":4">Template:Cite journal</ref> Nearly a third of the market's value is owned by foreigners, a trend that is expected to continue.

Because of their major role in the Korean stock market, foreign investors play a massive part in whether or not chaebol conglomerates remain financially successful. Foreign investors tend to avoid chaebols, especially those that displayed heavy political influence in South Korea, like Samsung and Hyundai. Investors are reluctant to invest in large control-ownership disparity businesses because these companies tended to cheat shareholders to have higher personal financial gain.<ref name=":4" /> This information is extremely helpful, especially when it comes to determining how these corrupt conglomerates are still heavily supported, considering foreign investors show little interest in them. However, a study published in the Journal of the Japanese and International Economies found that after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, foreign investment behavioural patterns changed drastically. While foreign investors like to hold shares in large companies with high profit and liquidity margins, they do not show any particular interest in either chaebol or non-chaebol companies.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> As of January 2025, many Chaebol corporations have a high share of foreign investors, with Samsung Electronics at Template:Percentage,<ref name="한국거래소">Template:Cite web</ref> Hyundai Motors at Template:Percentage,<ref name="한국거래소"/> and SK Hynics at Template:Percentage.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Nonetheless, chaebols are still able to survive, highlighting just how much power and aid they receive from the Korean government.

"Too big to fail"

Template:Further During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, bankers feared that chaebols would go bankrupt so they allowed these businesses to roll over their loans each time they were unable to repay their debts. Many did not believe that the chaebols were capable of collapsing and that the more they borrowed, the safer they were.

However, the theory was proven wrong when many businesses collapsed during the crisis. Since they were linked through debt guarantees, many of the companies fell into a chain reaction.<ref name="Jung 2004 299–303" /> The focus on capacity expansion created debt that was manageable when the economy was growing. However, when the economy stalled, debt-to-equity ratios became a huge problem.<ref>Template:Cite journalTemplate:Dead link</ref>

Since the crisis, chaebols had less debt and were less vulnerable to similar crises, as was demonstrated in the 2008 crisis. With the growth of the fewer remaining chaebols, however, each of them occupies a larger portion of the economy, with the largest chaebols making up (by sales revenue) a substantial portion of South Korea's GDP.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

Monopolistic behavior

The protectionist policies and preferable government treatment granted chaebols the ability to exhibit monopolistic behaviour. The absence of a market free of intervention meant that "true competition" became a rarity in South Korea. Especially in the era before the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the only products available to the Korean people were those made by chaebols. Therefore, the social fabric of the country lacked a welcoming culture toward entrepreneurship. The intensity and extent of market concentration became evident as Template:Percentage of the country's GDP is derived from chaebols. The largest of the group, Samsung, exports Template:Percentage of South Korea's goods and services alone. Although no longer financially supported by the government, these firms have attained economies of scale on such a massive level that it is extremely difficult for a startup or small or medium enterprise (SME) to surmount the high barriers to entry. A majority of these smaller companies ended up becoming acquired by the chaebols, thereby further stacking their size and economic dominance. During recent years a growing trend to scale globally has increased among aspiring Korean entrepreneurs.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Conversely, chaebols have also been moving money abroad with the tacit endorsement of the South Korean government and investing in commercial enterprises, particularly in Koreatown Manhattan, New York City.<ref name=ChaebolsKoreatownManhattan>Template:Cite web</ref>

To this day, chaebols maintain dominance across all industries. Reductions in tariffs and the removal of trade regulations designed to protect Korean conglomerates have led to increased competition from abroad. However, among domestic firms, chaebols have kept their market share intact. Most notably, Apple's entry into the smartphone market pressured rival Samsung into diversifying its revenue streams from overseas. All but 3 of the top 50 firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange are designated as chaebols,<ref name=":0" /> and despite chaebols only accounting for just over 10 per cent of the country's workers, the four largest chaebols hold 70 per cent of total market capitalization, and all chaebols together holding 77 per cent as of the late 2010s.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Consequently, chaebols have more bargaining power and often take pricing action that squeezes both suppliers and consumers. Typically the firms down the supply chain fail to increase their profit margins enough to expand and thus never see growth. Collusion among chaebols is commonplace. Price-fixing acts mean consumers expect to pay an inflated value for most goods and services.<ref name=":0" /> For instance, in 2012 Samsung and LG Electronics were fined for colluding to raise prices for home appliances.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

Government ties, corruption, and abuse of power

South Korean President Park Geun-hye at a breakfast meeting with business magnates Lee Kun-hee and Chung Mong-koo

Since the inception of the chaebol, the government has been closely involved in its affairs. Many of the reforms enacted over the years, especially those under President Kim Dae-Jung, have cracked down on kickbacks and preferential treatment. Moreover, the state is no longer a majority shareholder of any chaebol.<ref name=":0" /> But their sheer size and wealth have been used to gain influence. For the most part, the government sees the function of chaebols as crucial to the Korean economy. When President Lee Myung-Bak took office, he pardoned Samsung Group chairman Lee Kun-Hee for tax evasion. President Lee then proceeded to champion pro-chaebol deals, including a nuclear energy contract with the city of Abu Dhabi, and loosened laws preventing the conglomerates from owning financial services companies.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Samsung's leader is not the only chaebol chairman to be excused from a criminal conviction. Choi Tae-Won of SK Group, Chung Mong-Koo of Hyundai, Kim Seung-Youn of Hanwha, and Shin Dong-bin of Lotte<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> are a few examples of chairmen who have been charged, convicted, or are currently serving a prison sentence for white-collar crime. Accusations include bribery, tax evasion, accounting fraud, embezzlement, and violent crime.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Typically chaebol chairmen are pardoned of any crimes. In the rare case that an executive is sentenced to prison, as the CEOs of SK and CJ Group were, it is typically a relatively light punishment of up to 4 years depending on the charge.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

Collusion between chaebol members and the government granted preferential statuses to the companies. A chaebol would funnel bribes to politicians and bureaucrats through slush funds and illegal donations. This could help maintain the government's position of power, allowing them to secure contracts for major government projects and provide favourable treatment to the donor firm.<ref name=":1">Template:Cite journal</ref> Examples of this type of corruption were widespread in the years leading up to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Many of the firms that benefited from this relationship were too indebted, had poor corporate governance, and were inefficient. There was a huge inflow of capital and a bending of regulation in favour of these problematic firms. For example, in the 1990s, Hanbo Group, formerly South Korea's second-largest steel-maker, paid for special arrangements with high-ranking politicians so that it could secure contracts for large government projects over its competitors. Hanbo went bankrupt in 1997 after defaulting on debt payments along with other governance issues. Numerous chaebol companies had similar private agreements with the government in this fashion. It would be most common in companies dealing with heavy industries or projects that involved government procurement and urban planning. In the past, most successful political elections were won with chaebol support. Each time a new administration or regime stepped in, it would gear its policy platform towards chaebol revitalization.<ref name=":1" /> This was under the claim that to be a competitive economy more power must be given to the chaebols. In recent years, the leading political parties of South Korea have shifted their focus from supporting large corporations to promoting economic diversification.

Reforms

Different reforms have been proposed or enacted to deal with the influence, power, and corruption associated with the chaebols, though it has been questioned whether real reform is possible.<ref name="Is real reform possible at South Korea's chaebols?">Template:Cite web</ref>

IMF agreement

Under Kim Dae-Jung and after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, many reforms were made to the chaebols. Most of these changes pertained to corporate structure, transparency in financial reporting, cuts in government subsidies, corporate governance, and debt stabilization.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In 1997, the IMF provided a bailout loan of $60 billion conditional on revision.<ref name=":0" /> Distressed financial institutions were to be closed down and those that were deemed viable were to be restructured and recapitalized by the levels it set forth. This affected the chaebol because it severely restricted its easy access to financing which led to over-leveraged balance sheets.<ref name=":2">Template:Cite web</ref> Lenient accounting practices and disclosure rules were to be strengthened and standardized for international practice. Hence, transparency was increased to what would be expected from a public company. The chaebols agreed to be subject to independent auditors and were obligated to provide consolidated financial statements regularly.<ref name=":1" /> The IMF agreement brought about the following changes. First, the authority to establish and implement accounting standards, previously centered on financial supervisory authorities and the government, was transferred to a private, independent organization.<ref>KAI 연혁. https://www.kasb.or.kr/front/board/historyList.do. 2025년 11월 8일 확인.</ref> Second, the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Adapted to the domestic context, these standards were adopted as K-IFRS, which was selectively applied starting in 2009 and then expanded to include listed companies and others in 2011, gradually expanding their application. This brought about changes that enhanced the international comparability of financial information and the accuracy of disclosure.<ref>한국채택국제회계기준(K-IFRS) 도입 2년의 평가와 향후 과제 (2013년 7월 4일).https://www.fsc.go.kr/po010101/70762 . 2025년 11월 8일 확인.</ref> Third, the external audit and disclosure system was strengthened. The revision of the External Audit Act mandated consolidated financial statements, introduced provisions related to internal accounting management, and expanded auditors' responsibility for internal accounting audits.<ref>주식회사의 외부감사에 관한 법률(2013년 5월 28일)https://law.go.kr/LSW/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=140589#0000 . 2025년 11월 8일 확인.</ref> To overcome the chaebol-dominated oligarchy, the accounting and disclosure improvements introduced by the IMF agreement primarily reduced information asymmetry and strengthened external oversight. As accounting and disclosure standards were standardized, investors, creditors, and regulators were able to more accurately assess a company's financial status, which increased market surveillance pressure on insiders. <ref>김태동, 이윤아, 배창현(2016). 특수관계자 거래와 기업의 공시수준 - 재무제표 주석을 중심으로 -</ref> Furthermore, the strengthened disclosure requirements for corporate transactions made it easier for external parties to verify abnormal transactions within the group, reducing incentives for insider-only (tunneling) activities. Finally, accurate accounting information helped supervisory agencies like the Financial Supervisory Service identify links between insolvent companies and affiliates, thereby weakening collusion between politics and business. <ref>유병규(2004), 기업지배구조와 기업범죄</ref>

Government-led reforms and the 2008 crisis

Kim Dae-Jung enacted what is known as the "Five Principles of Corporate Governance".<ref name=":2" /> These were the enhancement of management transparency, strengthening owner-manager accountability, elimination of cross-debt guarantees among chaebol affiliates, improvement of capital structures, and consolidation of core business areas. In his plans, debt-to-equity ratios was to be below Template:Percentage. Chaebol subsidiaries that were debt-laden or on the verge of bankruptcy were instructed to be either liquidated, sold, or put up for merger. Each chaebol-holding group had to break up its subsidiaries and operations so that they were more manageable.<ref name=":1" /> By the end of 1997, each had an average of 26.8 subsidiaries. It was hoped that if there were fewer activities, the quality of the remaining businesses would see improvement. Many unrelated branches to their core competencies were swiftly shed. If any of the conglomerates failed to meet the conditions by the set deadlines, strict sanctions would be passed against them. During the 2008 financial crisis, many of these reforms ensured chaebols' quick recovery.<ref name=":2" /> Having had exposure to a massive recession before, they learned to cope better than those in foreign countries. With significantly healthier balance sheets and higher cash reserves, the chaebols were able to avoid any liquidity issues. Moreover, with fewer subsidiaries, they were less exposed to the full scope of the crisis and thus helped keep the Korean economy afloat.<ref name=":1" /> President Kim Dae-jung's five principles of corporate governance had several impacts on mitigating the chaebol oligarchy. First, they enhanced management transparency. Strengthening the board of directors and auditing functions, along with defining management accountability, could provide institutional restraints against the autocracy of the owner family. Second, they established a professional management system. The five principles of corporate governance created pressure to limit the direct management of the owner family and expand the decision-making power of professional managers. This can be seen in President Kim Dae-jung's strong insistence that Korean Air be transformed into a professional management system.<ref>"대한항공, 전문경영인 체제로 바뀌어야"...김대통령 밝혀 (1994년 4월 20일),https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artiId=ART001506284</ref> This professional management system effectively limited the personal power of chaebol leaders, i.e., their political and economic oligarchy.<ref>박경서, 주요 토픽 분석 Ⅰ. 지배주주경영과 전문경영자경영의 대체성과 보완성</ref> Furthermore, the ban on cross-subsidy guarantees between affiliates and the strengthened disclosure of related-party transactions weakened the political and financial safeguards against excessive leverage by chaebols.<ref>진태홍(2000), 재벌의 지배구조와 상호지급보증</ref>

President Roh Moo Hyun pushed for even more extensive reform.<ref name=":2" /> His administration passed stringent regulations on fraudulent accounting, stock manipulation, and irregular wealth succession. Chaebols were forced to improve objectivity on their board of directors. Rather than having the decision-makers be insiders, affiliates, or family members, chaebols were expected to hold representation that reflected the interests of investors, especially minority shareholders who gained a significant number of rights. As a result, it became easier for chaebols to raise capital through equity rather than riskier debt. This is because the new transparency laws and restructuring boosted investor confidence from abroad.<ref name=":0" /> The Roh Moo-hyun administration also took steps to strengthen oversight and enhance transparency of corporations and chaebols. Specifically, it revised the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act). It also enacted the Securities Class Action Act. Furthermore, it revised the Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Acts, demonstrating efforts to improve the governance, investment structure, and disclosure practices of chaebols. However, some argue that the pace of reform slowed in the latter half of his term, and the total investment limit system was never fully implemented.<ref>주재현(2014), 노무현 정부의 이념적 지향과 정책현실: 주요 쟁점에 대한 대응을 중심으로</ref>

Regulation

Template:Unreferenced section Some competition laws were passed to attempt to limit the expansion of chaebol:

• Law for separate finance from industry (Template:Korean): Chaebols may no longer have banks since 1982

During the government-led growth process, a structure emerged in which industrial capital, such as conglomerates, owned or controlled financial companies, posing a risk of industrial capital dominating finance.<ref>이병윤(2006), 금산분리 관련 제도의 현황과 논점.</ref> This could lead to affiliate-centered internal transactions, low-interest loans, and preferential lending, further expanding the economic power and capital control of a small number of conglomerates. In essence, this would lead to an oligarchy-like governance structure centered on conglomerates, which could threaten the soundness of the entire financial system.<ref>배윤정(2012), 금융계열회사 분리제도의 의의 및 주요내용.</ref> To prevent this, the Financial and Industrial Separation Act was introduced to separate financial and industrial capital. This system began to be institutionalized in Korea in the 1980s, restricting industrial capital from owning a certain percentage of bank shares. Since then, the Financial Holding Companies Act and the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act have developed institutional frameworks to restrict industrial capital's control over financial companies and financial capital's control over industrial capital. Recent discussions are examining strengthening measures, such as the separation of financial affiliates and stock ownership restrictions for general and financial holding companies. These regulations on the separation of finance and industry have served to institutionally control the internal capital transfers, low-cost lending, and unfair support for affiliates that arise from the ownership and control of financial companies by conglomerates through industrial capital. These regulations have also served to limit the oligarchic structure in which conglomerates use financial companies as their private vaults to simultaneously expand their economic and political power.<ref>CGS(2008), CG 리뷰 Vol.37. </ref>

• Law for the limit of investment (Template:Korean): A chaebol's growth by M&A was limited until 2009

The Investment Limit Act is more accurately known as the Total Investment Limit System. Korean conglomerates have created a structure in which minority owners and controlling shareholders control numerous affiliates with relatively small stakes through circular investment among affiliates, expanded equity investment, and a control structure through investment. This was recognized as an oligarchic concentration of economic power and a chain reaction of risks across the entire group. The Total Investment Limit System was introduced as an institutional mechanism to control this structural risk.<ref>한국민족문화대백과사전 출자총액제한제도, https://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Article/E0080959. 2025년 11월 8일 확인.</ref> This system was first introduced through the amendment to the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act in December 1986 and went into effect in April 1987. The core provision of the Act is a ceiling provision that prohibits companies belonging to large conglomerates from using more than a certain percentage of their net assets for equity investments in other domestic companies. This provision was later abolished in 1998 due to concerns about its effectiveness and changing economic conditions, but was reintroduced in 1999.<ref>행정안전부 국가기록원 출자총액제한제도 (2007년 12월 1일), https://www.archives.go.kr/next/newsearch/listSubjectDescription.do?id=005099&pageFlag=&sitePage. 2025년 11월 8일 확인.</ref> Opinions are divided on the effectiveness of the system in alleviating oligarchy. Some argue that excessive investment by large conglomerates is gradually being curbed, with the investment-to-net-asset ratio approaching 25%. However, others argue that it is difficult to assess the improvement in investment behavior, as there are instances of intensified circular investment among affiliates.<ref>대한민국 정책브리핑 출자총액제한제도 공정위 입장 (2003년 8월 4일), https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148745433. 2025년 11월 8일 확인.</ref>

• Law for the limit of assurance (Template:Korean): Defends the insolvency of a chaebol's affiliates

The correct name for the Guarantee Limit Act is the "Debt Guarantee Limit System." Debt guarantees and cross-guarantees among affiliates of Korean conglomerates were feared to pose risks to financial supervision and the concentration of economic power. To prevent this, the Debt Guarantee Limit System was introduced.<ref>시사경제용어사전 채무보증제한제도 (2020년 11월 3일). https://www.moef.go.kr/sisa/dictionary/detail?idx=2449. 2025년 11월 8일 확인.</ref> Article 24 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act stipulates, "Domestic companies belonging to conglomerates subject to cross-shareholding restrictions shall not guarantee the debt of their affiliates."<ref>독점규제 및 공정거래에 관한 법률(2025년 10월 1일), https://www.law.go.kr/lsLawLinkInfo.do?chrClsCd=010202&lsJoLnkSeq=1000527862. 2025년 11월 8일 확인.</ref> However, this prohibits "inter-affiliate debt guarantees" for conglomerates with a certain total asset value. For example, this applies to groups with total assets exceeding 5 trillion won. This system served to institutionally control the mechanism by which conglomerates, through guarantees between affiliates, transferred internal funds and shared risks across the entire group, thereby strengthening the concentration of economic power. Indeed, since the system's introduction in 1998, the amount of inter-affiliate debt guarantees within conglomerates subject to cross-shareholding restrictions has steadily declined. Previously, conglomerates provided low-interest guarantees to their affiliates, which in turn formed a circulating capital network for the entire conglomerate. Therefore, this system served as an institutional mechanism to weaken the oligarchic control established by a small number of conglomerate owners through guarantees and investment networks between affiliates.<ref>기업집단국 기업집단정책과(2020), 2020년 상호출자제한기업집단 채무보증 현황 및 금융･보험사의 의결권 행사현황 정보공개 실시.</ref>

Formally, the Korea Fair Trade Commission announces a limited chaebol list every year by size of industrial assets (not including financial companies).<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

• Appointment: Korea Fair Trade Commission
• Inclusion: industrial groups (assets: 5 trillion won or more)
• Exclusion: bank and financial groups

Chaebols with limited assurance (Template:Korean)

Year	Chaebols	Affiliates	Assets
2007	62	1,196 Ent	979.7 trillion won (Not including bank and financial group by South Korean law)
2008	79	1,680 Ent	1,161.5 trillion won (more than 2 trillion won)
2009	48	1,137 Ent	1,310.6 trillion won (more than 5 trillion won)
Samsung Group's total assets are 317 trillion won, but the FTC recognizes only 174 trillion won, which excludes financial subsidiaries.

The following tables list chaebols by category.

Owned by family groups

List of major chaebols by family group

Family group	Operating groups
Lee Byung-chul family group	Samsung Group, Shinsegae Group, CJ Group, JoongAng Group, BGF Group, Hansol Group, and others
Chung Ju-yung family group	Hyundai Motor Group, Hyundai Heavy Industries Group, Hyundai Department Store Group, Hyundai Marine & Fire, Hyundai Sungmoo Holding, Halla Group, HDC Group, HL Mando, KCC Corporation, and others
Koo In-hwoi family group	LG, GS Group, LS Group, LX Group, LIG Group, Ourhome Corp, LF Group, LT Group, Heesung Electronics, and others
Shin Kyuk-ho family group	Lotte Group, Nongshim, Pulemil, and others
Cho Choong-hoon family group	Hanjin Group, Meritz Financial Group, and others
Park In-chon family group	Kumho Asiana Group, Kumho Petrochemical, Kumho Tire and others
Other chaebols	SK Group, Hanwha Group, Doosan Group, Hankook, HiteJinro, POSCO, Amorepacific Corporation, E-Land Group, Kyobo Life Insurance, Samyang Group, KG Group, OCI Group, Hyosung Group, Daelim Group, Young Poong Group, Dongwon Group,DB Group, Kolon Industries, Taekwang Group, Seah Holdings, SeAh Steel Holdings, Dongkuk Steel, Aekyung Group, Eugene Group, Iljin Group, Booyoung Group, Harim Group, Taeyoung Engineering, Hoban Construction, etc.

Multiple monopolies

Business area: chaebols that have several monopolies

Group	Number of affiliates	Major businesses
Samsung Group	60	Electronics, semiconductors, batteries, IT Solutions, construction, shipbuilding, insurance
SK Group	186	Energy, chemicals, telecom, semiconductors, batteries, trading, biopharmaceuticals
Hyundai Motor Group	57	Automobiles, auto parts, steel, construction, logistics, credit card
LG	73	Electronics, batteries, chemicals, telecom, display, food, cosmetics
Lotte Group	85	Retail, food, entertainment, hotels, chemicals, construction, tourism
Hanwha Group	91	Explosives, aerospace, energy, insurance, chemicals, hotels, construction
GS Group	93	Energy, retail, hotels, construction, trading
Hyundai Heavy Industries Group	36	Shipbuilding, engineering, heavy industries, construction equipment, energy, robotics
Shinsegae Group	53	Retail, food, hotels, entertainment, fashion
CJ Group	85	Food, retail, logistics, biopharmaceuticals, entertainment
Hanjin Group	33	Aviation, logistics, transportation, hotels, info systems, airports

Affiliates

List of well-known chaebol affiliates (revenue and assets in 2021)

Unit	Parent	Revenue (trillion KRW)	Total assets (trillion KRW)	Industries
Samsung Electronics	Samsung Group	279.6	426.6	Electronics, semiconductors, smartphones, appliances
Samsung Life Insurance	Samsung Group	35.1	341.4	Insurance
Samsung C&T	Samsung Group	34.5	55.2	Construction, trading, hotels
Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance	Samsung Group	24.4	94.9	Insurance
Samsung SDI	Samsung Group	13.6	25.8	Batteries
Samsung SDS	Samsung Group	13.6	10.5	IT Solutions
Samsung Electro-Mechanics	Samsung Group	9.7	9.9	Electronics, electronic components
Hotel Shilla	Samsung Group	3.8	2.6	Hotels, duty-free, entertainment
Hyundai Motor Company	Hyundai Motor Group	117.6	233.6	Automobiles
Kia	Hyundai Motor Group	69.9	66.8	Automobiles
Hyundai Mobis	Hyundai Motor Group	41.7	51.5	Auto parts
Hyundai Steel	Hyundai Motor Group	22.8	37.1	Steel
Hyundai Engineering & Construction	Hyundai Motor Group	18.1	19.6	Construction
Hyundai Glovis	Hyundai Motor Group	21.8	12.2	Logistics
SK Hynix	SK Group	42.9	96.3	Semiconductors
SK Innovation	SK Group	46.8	49.5	Energy, batteries,
SK Telecom	SK Group	16.7	30.9	Telecom
SK Networks	SK Group	11.1	9.4	Trading, logistics
LG Electronics	LG Group	74.7	53.5	Electronics
LG Chem	LG Group	42.7	51.1	Chemicals
LG Display	LG Group	29.8	38.2	Display
LG Energy Solution	LG	17.9	23.8	Batteries
LG Uplus	LG	13.9	19.4	Telecom
Lotte Shopping	Lotte Group	15.6	33.4	Retail
Lotte Chemical	Lotte Group	18.1	22.9	Chemicals
Lotte Hotels & Resorts	Lotte Group	4.2	18.3	Hotels
Lotte Life Insurance	Lotte Group	3.5	18.9	Insurance
Lotte Chilsung	Lotte Group	2.5	3.6	Food
Hanwha Corporation	Hanwha Group	52.8	202.3	Defense systems, explosives, aerospace
Hanwha Life Insurance	Hanwha Group	27.1	163.6	Insurance
Hanwha Solutions	Hanwha Group	10.7	20.0	Renewable energy
GS Caltex	GS Group	34.5	23.6	Energy
GS Construction	GS Group	9.1	15.2	Construction
GS Retail	GS Group	9.8	9.5	Retail
Hyundai Heavy Industries	Hyundai Heavy Industries Group	8.3	13.8	shipbuilding, heavy industries
Hyundai Mipo Dockyard	Hyundai Heavy Industries Group	2.9	4.3	shipbuilding, heavy industries
Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries	Hyundai Heavy Industries Group	4.1	5.0	shipbuilding, heavy industries
Hyundai Oilbank	Hyundai Heavy Industries Group	20.6	18.2	Energy
Shinsegae	Shinsegae Group	6.3	13.6	Retail, duty-free, department stores
E-mart	Shinsegae Group	24.9	31.2	Retail, food
Josun Hotels & Resorts	Shinsegae Group	0.3107	1.6	Hotels
CJ CheilJedang	CJ Group	26.3	26.9	Food, biochemicals
CJ Daehan Express	CJ Group	11.3	8.9	Logistics
CJ E&M	CJ Group	3.6	7.9	Entertainment
CJ CGV	CJ Group	0.736	3.8	Movie theaters
Korean Air	Hanjin Group	9.1	26.7	Airlines
Asiana Airlines	Hanjin Group	4.3	13.1	Airlines
Hanjin	Hanjin Group	2.5	3.9	Logistics

Depictions in popular culture

Like many other conglomerates across the world, Korean chaebols have a presence in popular media. There are a large number of K-dramas that feature chaebols and chaebol family members. Some of these shows, including A Business Proposal, Coffee Prince, What's Wrong with Secretary Kim, King the Land, and The Heirs, depict chaebol family members being competent and attractive. Other dramas, however, depict chaebol family members being materialistic and arrogant, including Innocent Defendant, Remember, Vincenzo, Reborn Rich, and Big Mouth, reflecting the massive income inequality and political corruption related to chaebols in South Korea.

In addition, many chaebol family members have taken to social media outlets like Instagram and Twitter, where they publish snippets of their personal lives. Some chaebols also partake in popular social media trends like mukbangs, as seen on Ham Yon-Ji's YouTube channel, 햄연지 YONJIHAM. Some have suggested that these attempts at humanizing chaebols are purely financial strategies.<ref>Template:Cite AV mediaTemplate:Cbignore</ref>

See also

• Conglomerate
• Economy of South Korea
• Family business
• Four big families of Hong Kong
• Four big families of the Republic of China
• Holding company
• Horizontal integration
• Keiretsu
• List of South Korean companies
• Megacorporation
• Miracle on the Han River
• National champions
• Vertical integration
• Zaibatsu

References

General and cited references

• Beck, Peter M. "Are Korea's Chaebol Serious About Restructuring?" Presentation at the Korea 2000 conference, 30 May 2000. Korea Economic Institute of America
• "Unfinished Business," The Economist, 17 April 2003
• "Web site: South Korean conglomerates," The Economist, 11 December 1997
• Whitmore, Stuart and Nakarmi, Laxmi. "Guide to the Groups: The pecking order of the top 20 chaebols," Asiaweek, 10 October 1997.
• S.Korea's Samsung president resigns over corruption scandal