Günther Prien

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Template:Use dmy dates Template:Short description Template:Infobox military person Günther Prien (16 January 1908 – presumed 8 March 1941) was a German U-boat commander during World War II. He was the first U-boat commander to receive the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross and the first member of the Kriegsmarine to receive the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves of Nazi Germany. It was Germany's highest military decoration at the time of its presentation to Prien.Template:Refn

Under Prien's command, the submarine Template:GS was credited with sinking over 30 Allied ships totalling about Template:GRT, along with the British battleship Template:HMS at anchor in the Home Fleet's anchorage in Scapa Flow.

Early life and career

Prien was one of three children of a judge and completed his basic education.Template:Sfn At the age of five, Prien had been living with relatives, the notary Carl Hahn and his wife, in Lübeck. There he attended the Katharineum, a humanistic secondary school.Template:Sfn After his parents separated, Prien moved with his mother and siblings to Leipzig where she eked out a living selling peasant lace.Template:Sfn Prien joined the Handelsflotte (German merchant marine) in mid-1923 to ease the financial burden on his family.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn He applied to and joined the Finkenwerder–Hamburg Seaman's School.Template:Sfn After eight years of work and study as a seaman, rising from cabin boy on a sailing ship, Prien passed the required examinations and became the fourth officer on a passenger liner,Template:Sfn the Template:SS.Template:Sfn Prien learned telegraphy, ship handling, leadership, and laws of the sea. In 1931 he became first mate and attended school for a commission. Prien received his sea master's certificate in January 1932.Template:Sfn

File:Königin-Carola-Gymnasium Straßenseite.jpg
The Königin-Carola-Gymnasium in Leipzig was named the Günther Prien School.Template:Sfn

Unable to find work due to the severe contraction of the German shipping industry during the Great Depression, he was forced to turn to the Freiwilliger Arbeitsdienst ('Voluntary Labour Service', FAD). He earned a living dredging fields and digging ditches.Template:Sfn Prien joined the Nazi Party in May 1932, but had to resign his membership upon joining the navy prior to Hitler's ascent to power.Template:Sfn His membership in the party cemented Prien's image as a Nazi supporter, though his actions have been described as career advancing opportunism rather than genuine political conviction; one author wrote "it is hard to determine his politics."Template:Sfn However, Donald Macintyre described Prien as "the most Nazified U-boat captain", "an ardent ruthless Nazi".<ref>article, p. 32 onwards, in issue 4, of War Monthly, Marshall Cavendish 1974</ref> Prien applied to the Reichsmarine in January 1933 when he found the navy was offering officer-candidate programs for merchant marine officers. He was integrated into the Reichsmarine as a member of "Crew 31" (the incoming class of 1931), but had the age and experience of a 1926 class.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn

Prien received his military basic training in the 2nd company in the 2nd department of the standing ship division of the Baltic Sea in Stralsund (16 January 1933 – 31 March 1933).<ref group=Tr>2nd company—2. Kompanie</ref><ref group=Tr>2nd department—II. Abteilung</ref><ref group=Tr>standing ship division—Schiffsstammdivision</ref> During this time he advanced in rank to Fähnrich zur See (naval cadet) on 1 March. He then attended the main cadet course at the Naval Academy Mürwik and various weapons courses for cadets at Kiel (1 April 1933 – 30 September 1934).<ref group=Tr>main cadet course—Hauptlehrgang für Fähnriche</ref><ref group=Tr>weapons course for cadets—Waffenlehrgang für Fähnriche</ref> From 1 October 1934 to 30 September 1935, Prien served as watch and division officer on the light cruiser Königsberg. On this assignment, he was promoted to Oberfähnrich zur See (senior midshipman) on 1 January 1935 and to Leutnant zur See (acting sub-lieutenant) on 1 April 1935.Template:Sfn Prien then joined the U-boat training force.Template:Sfn Prien attended the U-boat school in Kiel from 1 October 1935 to 30 April 1936. His training included a specialized U-boat torpedo course which was held on Template:GS.Template:Sfn

On 11 May 1936, Prien was appointed first Watch Officer on Template:GS, serving under the command of Werner Hartmann after forming a bond at the training school. At Hartmann's request Prien was assigned to his submarine, which served in the Spanish Civil War in 1937.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Prien rose steadily in rank, from midshipman in 1933 to Oberleutnant zur See (sub-lieutenant) on 1 January 1937.Template:Sfn On 1 October 1937, Prien was ordered to the Germaniawerft, the shipbuilding works in Kiel, for construction training of the new Type VIIB Template:GS.Template:Sfn He commissioned U-47 on 17 December 1938 which was part of the Wegener Flotilla. Prien was promoted to Kapitänleutnant (Captain lieutenant) on 1 February 1939.Template:Sfn

Prien married Ingeborg in 1939; the couple had two children. Ingeborg Prien later married an Oberstleutnant in the Bundeswehr and changed her name to Inge Sturm-Prien.Template:Sfn

World War II

World War II commenced during Prien's first patrol in U-47, following the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939. Prien had departed Kiel on 19 August for a patrol lasting 28 days. On 5 September, he sank the British Bosnia of Template:GRT, the second ship of the war to be sunk by a U-boat.Template:Sfn The prize regulations were in force at the time, so Prien was obliged to stop the ship. After identifying her as British he surfaced alongside her and fired a warning shot from the deck gun. The ship turned away to escape and it took six hits and a fire in her hold full of sulphur to bring it to a stop. Prien asked a passing neutral Norwegian ship to take the crew. The damaged ship was finished with a torpedo.Template:Sfn His boat sank two British vessels, Rio Claro of Template:GRT on the 6th, and Gartavon of Template:GRT on the 7th.Template:Sfn The sinkings were notable for Prien's use of the deck gun, which was rare.Template:Sfn U-47 returned to Kiel on 15 September having sunk a total tonnage of Template:GRT.Template:Sfn Prien was recalled by Dönitz to prevent all boats returning simultaneously leaving none on patrol.Template:Sfn

Second patrol: Scapa Flow

On 1 October 1939, Karl Dönitz became a Konteradmiral (rear admiral) and "Commander of the Submarines" (Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote, BdU). Dönitz had been encouraged in operations against warships by the sinking of aircraft carrier Courageous in September 1939. On 28 September 1939 he said, "it is not true Britain possesses the means to eliminate the U-boat menace."Template:Sfn Dönitz was busy convincing Hitler of the need for 300 operational boats to achieve decisive success against Britain.Template:Sfn Dönitz was attracted to the prospect of attacking the Royal Navy anchorage at Scapa Flow at the outbreak of war, to win a victory for his command. In World War I, two German submarines had tried and failed. Undaunted he ordered German submarine U-16 to reconnoitre the region and requested Luftwaffe reconnaissance. From the air and sea reports Dönitz concluded that there was an 18-yard gap in the northeast entrance, between blockships sunk to bar the gap from Lamb Holm and the mainland.Template:Sfn Dönitz selected Prien and U-47 for the task.Template:Sfn Prien was his favourite, and according to Dönitz "possessed all the personal qualities and professional abilities required."Template:Sfn

File:U-47 raid.svg
Infiltration of Scapa Flow by U-47Template:Sfn

Prien left port to navigate the shallow North Sea on 8 October and did not brief his crew until mid-mission.Template:Sfn He avoided all shipping and sat on the sea bed in daylight if possible.Template:Sfn Prien approached Orkney in the evening of the 14 October. He surfaced four hours sailing time from the anchorage. While surfaced Prien observed the aurora borealis, which exposed the German submarine.Template:Sfn In a post-patrol account Prien remarked it was "disgustingly light" and that – in his words – "the whole bay is lit up".Template:Sfn At 22:00 the Orkney navigation lights came on for thirty minutes which allowed Prien to fix his position.Template:Sfn His watch officers spotted a merchant ship and Prien dived to avoid it, but shadowed the vessel and carried out a practice attack. Despite the presence of the lights he could not see the ship through the periscope. With visibility poor while submerged he decided to carry out the attack on the surface.Template:Sfn

Prien pressed on and passed through the narrow entrance to the sound. He selected the wrong channel—between Lamb Holm and Burray—recognising the mistake in time. He disregarded Dönitz's idea to pass south of the two blockships and instead sailed between the centre and northern block ship. The tide allowed the entry to be made rapidly. Prien and his crew were temporarily snared, or ran aground. Only by reversing at maximum revolutions did the U-boat free itself. U-47 entered the Flow at 00:27.Template:Sfn Prien and his watch officers found the anchorage to be empty. Eventually they spotted "two battleships", in reality, just one; Template:HMS. The other was the Template:GRT seaplane tender Pegasus. Prien began the attack at 00:55 and concluded it at 01:28.Template:Sfn He fired seven torpedoes, some of which failed or ran widely off target. Nevertheless, the battleship was struck by several of the second salvo and sank in 13 minutes. The sinking killed 835 of her crew, including Rear Admiral Henry Blagrove, commander of the 2nd Battle Squadron.Template:Sfn At 02:15 U-47 exited the Flow and ordered flank speed to escape. He logged in the war diary, "a pity that only one was destroyed."Template:Sfn Prien thought he had damaged the Repulse lying behind Royal Oak, but it was not present—the Pegasus was not hit.Template:Sfn In the U-boat's war diary at 02:15 he wrote, "I still have five torpedoes for any merchant targets that come our way."Template:Sfn

He returned to Germany on 17 October to instant fame.Template:Sfn Prien and his crew were flown to Berlin aboard Hitler's personal aircraft. At the Reich Chancellery the following day, Hitler awarded Prien the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross (Template:Lang). For Dönitz, the operation was a personal triumph. U-boat production did not increase immediately, but he had succeeded in securing Hitler's attention.Template:Sfn Nazi propaganda exploited the success and gloated over damaged British morale.Template:Sfn The Home Fleet did not return to Scapa Flow until March 1940, until the entry points were closed and air defences improved.Template:Sfn The fleet was moved to Loch Ewe, but on the way the battleship Nelson was damaged by a mine laid by U-31.Template:Sfn

Purportedly Prien did not enjoy being a propaganda tool, but he cooperated with the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, and conferenced with Joseph Goebbels.Template:Sfn The conference was unique in that it was the first time the Nazis showcased an individual military success.Template:Sfn American journalist William L. Shirer met Prien but was not impressed by his lack of humility and wrote of Prien that he appeared "cocky" and a "fanatical Nazi."Template:Sfn The story that Prien had simply followed a ship into the harbour was rightly disbelieved; Prien said nothing of his route in.Template:Sfn Prien wrote a book of his experiences during the war, Mein Weg Nach Scapa Flow (My way to Scapa Flow), released in the autumn, 1940.Template:Sfn One historian wrote, "for a story of potentially high propaganda value, it is told with striking restraint."Template:Sfn The media compensated for this apparent modesty. The Illustrierter Beobachter lionised Prien. It provided plenty of images of Prien, his crew and Hitler, exalting him as a hero. These sentiments were picked up and spread throughout Germany by other state-controlled media outlets.Template:Sfn

Prien received the nickname Der Stier von Scapa Flow ("The Bull of Scapa Flow"); the emblem of a snorting bull was painted on the conning tower of U-47 and soon became the emblem of the entire 7th U-boat Flotilla. The reason, given by 1st watch officer Engelbert Endrass for this, was the sight of Prien's demeanour as U-47 entered Scapa Flow, "his frowning face and hunched shoulders reminded him of a bull in a ring."Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn All U-boats had their number removed from the conning tower in wartime, and commanding officers often applied their own motifs.Template:Sfn Two members of the Scapa Flow crew earned the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross during World War II: the chief engineer (Leitender Ingenieur) Johann-Friedrich Wessels and 1st watch officer (I. Wachoffizier) Engelbert Endrass.

Kept secret by the German naval command was that Prien had fired a total of seven G7e torpedoes at his target; only one from the first salvo hit the target and exploded on the bow, near the anchor chain. The stern torpedo also failed to hit or detonate. The second salvo did strike and explode.Template:Sfn The navy had long-standing problems with their depth, steering and their magnetic detonator systems. These problems continued to bedevil the German submariners for a long time.Template:Sfn In 2002, part of a torpedo fired during the attack resurfaced near to an anchored tanker. The warhead had detached but the missile contained compressed air necessitating its destruction by a bomb disposal team.Template:Sfn

The historian Riederer argues that Sonderunternehmen P (Special Operation P), the codename for the attack on Scapa Flow, was very likely predominantly motivated by Nazi propaganda. Following World War I, the German High Seas Fleet was interned at Scapa Flow under the terms of the Armistice whilst negotiations took place over the fate of the ships. Fearing that all the ships would be seized and divided amongst the Allies, Admiral Ludwig von Reuter decided to scuttle the fleet. Whilst the internment was considered a national humiliation by the Kriegsmarine, the scuttling of the fleet was romanticised as an act ridding the navy of the shame associated with the Kiel mutiny of 3 November 1918. The NS-propaganda spread the interpretation that Prien's success at Scapa Flow turned the symbolic triumph of scuttling the fleet, and had finally rid the older generation from the Scapa Flow traumata.Template:Sfn

Third patrol

U-47 under the command of Prien with 1st watch officer (I. WO) Oberleutnant zur See Engelbert Endrass and chief engineer Oberleutnant (Ing.) Johann-Friedrich Wessels left Kiel on 16 November 1939.Template:Sfn U-47 attacked a British cruiser on 28 November 1939. Prien had identified the ship to be a London-class cruiser. Prien intended to launch a spread of three torpedoes, but only a single torpedo cleared the tube and detonated in the wake of the cruiser. When the periscope cleared the surface, Prien observed what he believed major damage to the stern of the cruiser, her starboard torpedo launchers dislodged and an aircraft tilted. U-47 surfaced and tried to pursue the cruiser but was driven off by depth charges dropped from the escort. It turned out the cruiser was Template:HMS which was not damaged by the detonation. The war diary of the Befehlshaber der U-Boote (BdU) on 17 December 1939 stated that even though a hit was observed the cruiser was not sunk,Template:Sfn but German propaganda broadcast that "The bull of Scapa Flow" had sunk the cruiser. Upon inquiry from the Admiralty, Norfolk reported herself undamaged; she thought the explosion in her wake had been an aircraft bomb.Template:Sfn

On 5 December 1939, U-47 spotted nine merchant vessels escorted by five destroyers. At 14:40, Prien fired one torpedo. U-47 continued to attack Allied shipping in the Western Approaches, however eight out of twelve G7e U-47 carried, failed to detonate either missing or malfunctioning. On 18 December 1939, U-47 returned to Kiel via the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. The claims made by Prien are noted in the war diary of the BdU on 17 December 1939:

  1. steamer of unknown origin Template:GRT
  2. Norwegian tanker Template:GRT
  3. Dutch tanker Template:GRT

for a total of Template:GRT plus one British warship damaged, while the actual tonnage was only Template:GRT.Template:Sfn Three ships were confirmed sunk.Template:Sfn The identity of the vessels were SS Navasota from OB 46 south of Fastnet was the first, tanker MV Britta south of Longships Lighthouse, and finally Tanjandoen south-southeast of The Lizard.Template:Sfn From convoy OB 46, 37 sailors died aboard SS Navasota, another 45 were rescued by other merchant vessels Escapade and Clan Farquhar.Template:Sfn Louis Scheid rescued 62 men from Tanjandoen, but six perished. Britta lost six men, a Belgian ship rescued 25.Template:Sfn

Fourth patrol

Prien's fourth patrol started on 29 February 1940 from Kiel. The former 1st watch officer Endrass had been replaced by Oberleutnant zur See Hans-Werner Kraus. On this patrol, U-47 headed for the North Sea, the Shetland Islands and the Orkney Islands. On 1 March, U-47 arrived in Heligoland for a four-day stop.Template:Sfn Back at sea again on 11 March, U-47 sank the Britta on 25 March. U-47 returned to Wilhelmshaven again on 29 March, ending this patrol.Template:Sfn The ship was torpedoed without warning northwest of Sule Skerry. 13 men died and five were rescued by the Danish ship Nancy.Template:Sfn

Torpedo failures still afflicted the U-boat fleet but the number of sinkings rose in the first months of 1940. U-boat commanders, determined to enter the ranks of "aces" such as Prien, were prepared to take greater risks, most often attacking at night on the surface—the Admiralty noted that by February 1940 these reached 58 percent.Template:Sfn

Fifth patrol: Weserübung

In April 1940 the OKM planned Operationsbefehl Hartmut to support Operation Weserübung, the invasions of Denmark and Norway.Template:Sfn The purpose was to provide seaborne protection for the German amphibious landings on Norway's large coast line from the Royal Navy and French Navy. The German surface fleet could not fight a large-scale surface action against the British and win. Dönitz hoped the U-boats could compensate for this weakness. The faulty G7e torpedo rendered the German submarine fleet useless for the duration of Weserübung.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn The failure of torpedoes was a factor in the German naval defeat in the Battles of Narvik.Template:Sfn

Prien formed part of a group patrolling east of the Shetland Islands, Vagsfjord and Trondheim. U-47 left Wilhelmhaven on its fifth patrol on 3 April, which ended on 26 April in Kiel. Prien's 1st watch officer was again Oberleutnant zur See Kraus.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn The boat formed part of a 28-strong fleet, practically the entire operational force, committed to waters off the Norwegian and British coast.Template:Sfn The German operation attracted an immediate counterattack by the Royal Navy, intense battles were fought at Narvik. The BdU's opposition, the Royal Navy Submarine Service, achieved some success: the Karlsruhe was crippled and scuttled off Kristiansand.Template:Sfn

Prien succeeded in penetrating an Allied-held anchorage again at Vagsfjord fjord. Prien counted three large and three small transport ships, two cruisers, all slightly overlapping—he described it as a "wall of ships".Template:Sfn Prien fired eight torpedoes, but none hit.Template:Sfn The first four were fired at two of the large transports and two cruisers under the cover of darkness from ranges of 750–1,500 metres.Template:Sfn Unable to explain the failure, Prien surfaced after no discernible action was taken by the British. He went over the torpedoes and firing control data personally before another four-missile salvo was fired. The same result was observed. The torpedoes either missed, failed to detonate or struck rocks after running off course. While on manoeuvres to fire his stern torpedo on the surface, he ran aground damaging his starboard diesel engine as he attempted to break free. He could not wait for high tide to assist while within range of British guns, and daybreak, he noted, was only hours away. His crew eventually rocked the U-boat loose and U-47 escaped.Template:Sfn

On the way home Prien intercepted the battleship Warspite on 19 April. He stalked her and fired two torpedoes with the same result—one exploded at the end of its run, alerting the escorts which counterattacked with depth charges. A convoy was sighted later, but Prien did not bother attacking; he had lost faith in his main weapons. Prien angrily signalled Dönitz to tell him they had been sent into battle with "wooden rifles."Template:Sfn A full report was made by Prien: "we found ourselves equipped with a torpedo which refused to function in northern waters either with contact or magnetic pistols. To all intents and purposes, the, U-boats were without a weapon." The report was crushing to Dönitz.Template:Sfn

The commander-in-chief of U-boats conceded of the U-boat operation, "I doubt whether men have ever had to rely on such a useless weapon."Template:Sfn In no fewer than 40 attacks on Allied warships, not a single sinking was achieved.Template:Sfn Dönitz appealed to Erich Raeder, and he was forced to agree on the hopeless situation. He ordered all but three submarines to port. The remaining trio were ordered to continue reconnaissance patrols.Template:Sfn

Sixth patrol

On his sixth war patrol (3 June – 6 July 1940), Prien intercepted Convoy HX 47, part of the HX convoys. This patrol, again Kraus served as 1st watch officer, started and ended in Kiel and targeted the shipping routes in the North Atlantic and the Bay of Biscay west of the English Channel.Template:Sfn

Prien was a Wolfpack leader and made the tactical decisions for this patrol line. Wolfpack Prien planned to attack HX 47, Template:Convert west of Lorient prior to its rendezvous with its home–home bound escort.Template:Sfn He sank the Template:GRT ship Balmoralwood.Template:Sfn The merchant had fallen behind. The ship carried 8,730 tons of wheat and four aircraft.Template:Sfn

The Template:GRT San Fernando from HX 49 was sunk on 21 June.Template:Sfn The ship carried 13,500 tons of crude oil and 4,200 tons of fuel oil; all the crew appear to have survived the sinking.Template:Sfn The patrol yielded another six ships sunk.Template:Sfn The most notable victim was the passenger liner Arandora Star,Template:Sfn sunk west of the Aran Islands.Template:Sfn The 14-year old ship sank with heavy loss of life. It was transporting hundreds of German and Italian internees to Canada.Template:Sfn Of the approximately 1,300 people, 200 guards, and 174 crew on board, 805 died.Template:Sfn The BdU credited Prien with ten ships sunk totalling Template:GRT. This made Prien's sixth war patrol the most successful U-boat operation to date.Template:Sfn

Seventh patrol

U-47 remained in Kiel until 27 August 1940 when it sortied again. The 1st watch officer on Prien's seventh patrol was again Kraus. Upon the conclusion of the patrol, which had taken U-47 into the North Atlantic west of the Hebrides, Prien was ordered to the U-boat base at Lorient, in occupied France where it arrived on 26 September 1940.Template:Sfn The Battle of France and the occupation of the Atlantic coast afforded the BdU bases. They allowed German submarines to strike deeper into the Atlantic and spend much longer on patrol.Template:Sfn

Prien accounted for the destruction of six ships plus a further vessel damaged.Template:Sfn His largest victim was Titan, over Template:GRT from convoy OA 207. Prien lost one man overboard during the patrol. 89 men survived and six were killed.Template:Sfn His greatest success was against the large Convoy SC 2. He attacked and claimed four ships sunk after U-65 led him to the scene.Template:Sfn The attacks were carried out on the surface in dark Atlantic night during poor weather.Template:Sfn U-28 sank another ship, but Otto Kretschmer in U-99 failed. Dönitz was disappointed, it was not the annihilation battle he hoped for.Template:Sfn Dönitz ordered Prien to act as a weather-boat at a point 23° west, mainly for Luftwaffe air fleets engaged in the Battle of Britain.Template:Sfn

The signals from the 53-strong convoy were decoded on 30 August which gave the time, position and arrival times enabling the BdU to order Prien and a Wolfpack into action.Template:Sfn Prien had known where to search. Dönitz and the BdU were reading Admiralty codes and this information had been passed to Prien. The information led to the sinking of Ville de Mons in ten minutes. All but one of the crew were saved. The captain reported the sighting of three U-boats, two of which approached him and asked for his ship's identity. They were eventually rescued by an Allied merchant ship. Template:Sfn The U-boats were forced to abandon the attack when a Short Sunderland appeared and they lost contact with the convoy.Template:Sfn

Prien formed part of a Wolfpack that attacked Convoy HX 72. While searching for the previous convoy they ran into HX 72. While the operation was a German success, Prien damaged only one ship with his only remaining torpedo. Six ships were sunk by other U-boats.Template:Sfn The Germans waited for the sole escort, Jervis Bay to turn away. Prien maintained contact to guide U-29, U-43, U-46, U-48 and U-65 into attack. 12 ships were sunk from the convoy amounting to Template:GRT. On the patrol Prien sank Template:GRT of shipping, with another 5,156 damaged.Template:Sfn On 21 September U-48 relieved Prien on shadowing duties.Template:Sfn

Eighth patrol: Oak Leaves

Prien took U-47 on its eighth war patrol on 14 October 1940, the last with Kraus as 1st watch officer, patrolling the sea routes in the North Atlantic, from the North Channel to Rockall.Template:Sfn A five-strong U-boat pack that were too far away to tackle Convoy SC 7 was called into assist.Template:Sfn Prien, who was trying to reach SC 7,Template:Sfn formed a wolfpack with U-28, U-38, U-48 and U-100. Convoy HX 79 was spotted by U-47 in the morning of the 19 October, just as its 10-ship anti-submarine escort arrived. Only U-28 failed to get into an attack position by evening.Template:Sfn On 20 October 1940, Prien attacked Convoy HX 79 and sank the transports La Estancia, Bilderdijk and Wandby. Shirak is also believed to have been sunk by Prien and his crew in the battle.Template:Sfn When added to Prien's hits, the Focke-Wulf Fw 200s of I. Gruppe of Kampfgeschwader 40 increased the tally to 12 ships sunk.Template:Sfn

While at sea, Prien received the message on 21 October that he had been awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves (Template:Lang) the day before. He was the fifth member of the Wehrmacht and first of the Kriegsmarine to be so honored.Template:Sfn U-47 returned to Lorient on 23 October.Template:Sfn

Heinz Rühmann, Hans Brausewetter and Josef Sieber sang a persiflage of the 1939 song "Das kann doch einen Seemann nicht erschüttern" ("That won't shake a sailor"), written by Michael Jary from the film Paradies der Junggesellen—Bachelor's Paradise, on occasion of the Oak Leaves presentation to Prien. The reworded lyrics are "Das muss den ersten Seelord doch erschüttern" ("That must shake the First Sea Lord", alluding to Winston Churchill).Template:SfnTemplate:Refn The lyrics also refer to Neville Chamberlain and mock the song Rule, Britannia! by adapting an English phrase into German: "die Waves zu rulen ist jetzt schluß" ("the rule of the waves is over").Template:Sfn

Ninth patrol

The ninth war patrol began on 3 November 1940 from Lorient and took U-47 to the North Atlantic, west of the North Channel. After 34 days at sea, U-47 returned to Lorient on 6 December.Template:Sfn On this patrol, Prien damaged the Gonçalo Velho on 8 November,Template:Sfn and sank the Ville d'Arlon and damaged Conch on 2 December 1940.Template:Sfn The tanker survived Prien's attack, then withstood a three torpedo salvo from U-95. The ship finally sank after a single torpedo from Otto Kretschmer's U-99.Template:Sfn

Tenth patrol and death

On 20 February 1941, U-47 departed from Lorient on its tenth and final war patrol.Template:Sfn Prien located well south of the main wolfpack concentrations. He intercepted and repeatedly attacked convoy OB 290. The solitary attacks sank two ships. Prien continued to pursue the convoy but did not succeed again. West of Ireland, Fw 200s sank seven ships from this convoy making it the most successful intervention of German aircraft in the Atlantic.Template:Sfn The success of the Fw 200s, well out to sea, depredations of U-boat concentrations between Iceland and Britain simultaneously with Operation Berlin, in which battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau cruised the convoy lanes was an anxious and operationally complex period for the German Admiralty.Template:Sfn

U-47 went missing after intercepting Convoy OB 293 on 7 March. His attack prompted a five-hour chase from 00:23 on 8 March. At 05:19 Prien was caught on the surface and dived but could not escape the rapid depth charge attack from the escorts. Template:Sfn U-47 has generally been thought to have been sunk by the British destroyer Template:HMS west of Ireland; the submarine was attacked by Wolverine and Template:HMS, which took turns covering each other's ASDIC blind spots and dropping patterns of depth charges until U-47 rose almost to the surface before sinking and then exploded with an orange flash visible from the surface.Template:Sfn Other British reports of the action mention a large red glow appearing deep below the surface amid the depth charge explosions.Template:Sfn

To date, there is no official record of what happened to U-47 or her 45 crewmen, though a variety of possibilities exists, including mines, a mechanical failure, falling victim to her own torpedoes, and possibly a later attack that did not confirm any kills by the corvette team of Template:HMS and Template:HMS.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn Posthumously on 18 March, Prien was promoted to Korvettenkapitän (corvette captain/lieutenant commander), effective as of 1 March 1941.Template:Sfn

Prien's death was kept secret until 23 May.Template:Sfn Churchill had personally announced it to the House of Commons, and propaganda broadcasts to Germany had repeatedly taunted listeners with the question "Where is Prien?" until Germany was forced to acknowledge his loss.Template:Sfn The announcement was made in the Wehrmachtbericht on 24 May 1941 stating: "The U-boat under the command of Korvettenkapitän Günter Prien did not return from his last patrol against the enemy. The loss of the boat has to be assumed."Template:Sfn The importance of Prien was known to the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. To offset the negative impact his death might have on the German population, the message was hidden among the information about the tonnage sunk by U-boats.Template:Sfn

According to one biographer, in contrast with Kretschmer, Prien was purportedly a strict disciplinarian who rarely allowed humanity to compromise or interfere with the running of his boat. His crew despised him for it. He harboured much bitterness because of his difficult beginning. He could be genial among fellow officers but his reputation among subordinates was low.Template:Sf

The 1958 war film U 47 – Kapitänleutnant Prien, directed by Harald Reinl, was loosely based on Prien's combat record and command of U-47. Prien was portrayed by the German actor Dieter Eppler.Template:Sfn Prien was portrayed by Werner Klemperer in the 1957 US TV series The Silent Service in the episode, "The U-47 in Scapa Flow".<ref>Template:IMDb name</ref>

File:Heikendorf U-Boot Ehrenmal 2015d b.jpg
The plaque commemorating Prien and the crew of U-47 at the Möltenort U-Boat Memorial
File:Günther-Prien-Straße.jpg
Road sign in Schönberg, Plön

Prien was a subject of a hagiographic 1981 account by German author Franz Kurowski, Günther Prien, der Wolf und sein Admiral (Günther Prien, the Wolf and his Admiral). The German scholar Template:Illm classifies Kurowski's book, published by extreme right-wing publisher Template:Illm, as an "almost perfect example of a skillful distillation of the Nazi understanding of the Second World War".Template:Sfn The Canadian historian Michael Hadley commented on the narrative's goals as follows:Template:Sfn

Here he [Kurowski] wished to commemorate the "meritorious soldier and human being Günther Prien [who is] forgotten neither by the old submariners nor" —and this would have startled most observers in Germany today [in 1995] —"by the young submariners of the Federal German Navy".

The West German navy, at the time named the Bundesmarine (Federal Navy), had considered Prien as namesake for the 1967 commissioned guided missile destroyer Lütjens. However the legend surrounding Prien, that he had distanced himself from Nazism and had become an active member of the German resistance and was held captive at the Wehrmachtgefängnis Torgau (Torgau Wehrmacht Prison), turned out to be false. Consequently, the name Lütjens, named after Admiral Günther Lütjens, was chosen instead.Template:Sfn

The street "Günther-Prien-Straße" in Schönberg, Plön, is named after him.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Summary of career

According to Busch and Röll, Prien sailed on ten war patrols and sank 30 commercial ships of Template:GRT, one warship with a displacement of Template:Convert, and damaged eight commercial ships for Template:GRT and one warship of Template:Convert.Template:Sfn According to Blair, the one warship of 10,035 long tons, the heavy cruiser Norfolk was not damaged.Template:Sfn

Awards

Dates of rank

1 March 1933: Fähnrich zur See (naval cadet)Template:Sfn
1 January 1935: Oberfähnrich zur See (senior midshipman)Template:Sfn
1 April 1935: Leutnant zur See (acting sub-lieutenant)Template:Sfn
1 January 1937: Oberleutnant zur See (sub-lieutenant)Template:Sfn
1 February 1939: Kapitänleutnant (captain lieutenant/lieutenant)Template:Sfn
18 March 1941: Korvettenkapitän (corvette captain/lieutenant commander), effective as of 1 March 1941Template:Sfn

Translation notes

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Notes

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References

Citations

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Bibliography

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