Gunboat diplomacy is the pursuit of foreign policy objectives with the aid of conspicuous displays of naval power, implying or constituting a direct threat of warfare should terms not be agreeable to the superior force.<ref>Cable, James. "Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force" Chatto and Windus for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971, p. 10</ref>
The term originated in the 19th century, during the age of imperialism, when Western powers, especially the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the United States would use their superior military capabilities, particularly their naval assets, to intimidate less powerful nations into granting concessions. The mere presence of warships off a country's coast was often enough to have a significant effect, making the actual use of force rarely necessary.
The term "gunboat diplomacy" comes from the nineteenth-century period of imperialism,<ref>The Oxford English Dictionary traces the use of the phrase back as far as 1927: Template:Oed</ref> when Western powersTemplate:Sndfrom Europe and the United StatesTemplate:Sndwouldintimidate other, less powerful entities into granting concessions through a demonstration of Western superior military capabilities, usually represented by their naval assets. A coastal country negotiating with a Western power would notice that a warship or fleet of ships had appeared off its coast. The mere sight of such power almost always had a considerable effect, and it was rarely necessary for such boats to use other measures, such as demonstrations of firepower.Template:Citation needed
The effectiveness of such simple demonstrations of a nation's projection of force capabilities meant that nations with naval power and command of the sea could establish military bases (for example, Diego Garcia, 1940s onwards<ref>
Template:Cite book
</ref>)
and arrange economically advantageous relationships around the world. Aside from military conquest, gunboat diplomacy was the dominant way to establish new trade relationships, colonial outposts, and expansion of empire.Template:Citation needed
Peoples lacking the resources or technological innovations available to Western empires found that their own relationships were readily dismantled in the face of such pressures, and some therefore came to depend on the imperialist nations for access to raw materials or overseas markets.Template:Citation needed
Theory
Diplomat and naval thinker James Cable spelled out the nature of gunboat diplomacy in a series of works published between 1971 and 1993. In these, he defined the phenomenon as "the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state."<ref>J. Cable, Gunboat diplomacy, 1919–1991: political applications of limited naval force (third edition), Basingstoke: Macmillan/IISS, 2016, p. 14.</ref> He further broke down the concept into four key areas:
Definitive Force: the use of gunboat diplomacy to create or remove a fait accompli.
Purposeful Force: application of naval force to change the policy or character of the target government or group.
Catalytic Force: a mechanism designed to buy a breathing space or present policy makers with an increased range of options.
Expressive Force: use of navies to send a political message. This aspect of gunboat diplomacy is undervalued and almost dismissed by Cable.
The term "gunboat" may imply naval power-projection - land-based equivalents may include military mobilisation (as in Europe in the northern-hemisphere summer of 1914), the massing of threatening bodies of troops near international borders (as practised by the German Reich in central Europe in the 1940s), or appropriately timed and situated military manoeuvres ("exercises").
Distinctions
Gunboat diplomacy contrasts with views held prior to the 18th century and influenced by Hugo Grotius, who in De jure belli ac pacis (1625) circumscribed the right to resort to force with what he described as "temperamenta".<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>
Gunboat diplomacy is considered a form of hegemony.<ref>Rowlands, K. (2012). "Decided Preponderance at Sea”: Naval Diplomacy in Strategic Thought. Naval War College Review, 65(4), 5–5. Retrieved from [1] Link to article: [2]</ref> As the United States became a military power in the first decade of the 20th century, the Rooseveltian version of gunboat diplomacy, Big Stick Diplomacy, was partially superseded by dollar diplomacy: replacing the big stick with the "juicy carrot" of American private investment. However, during Woodrow Wilson's presidency, conventional gunboat diplomacy did occur, most notably in the case of the U.S. Army's occupation of Veracruz in 1914, during the Mexican Revolution.<ref>Rowlands, K. (2012). "Decided Preponderance at Sea”: Naval Diplomacy in Strategic Thought. Naval War College Review, 65(4), 5–5. Retrieved from [3] Link to article: [4]</ref>
Gunboat diplomacy in the post-Cold War world is still largely based on naval forces, owing to the U.S. Navy's overwhelming sea power. U.S. administrations have frequently changed the disposition of their major naval fleets to influence opinion in foreign capitals.Template:Citation needed More urgent diplomatic points were made by the Clintonadministration in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s (in alliance with the Blair administration) and elsewhere, using sea-launched Tomahawk missiles,<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> and E-3 AWACS airborne surveillance aircraft in a more passive display of military presence.<ref>Smith, Perry M., "Assignment Pentagon: Pentagon: A Guide to the Potomac Puzzle Palace", Brassey's Publishing, 2001, p. 50.</ref><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation
|CitationClass=web
}}</ref><ref>Colombia, Gun Boat Diplomacy, The floating worldTemplate:Webarchive</ref> Henry Kissinger, during his tenure as United States Secretary of State, summed up the concept as thus: "An aircraft carrier is 100,000 tons of diplomacy."<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation
|CitationClass=web
}}</ref>
Notable examples
18th century
Anson's visit to Canton in 1741<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation
Cable, James: Gunboat diplomacy. Political Applications of Limited Naval Forces, London 1971 (re-edited 1981 and 1994)
Graham-Yooll, Andrew. Imperial skirmishes: war and gunboat diplomacy in Latin America (2002).
Healy, D. Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era. The U.S. Navy in Haiti 1915–1916, Madison WIS 1976.
Hagan, K. J. American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy 1877–1889, Westport/London 1973.
Preston, A. and J. Major. Send a Gunboat! A study of the Gunboat and its role in British policy, 1854–1904, London 1967.
Articles
Long, D. F.: "Martial Thunder": The First Official American Armed Intervention in Asia, in: Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 42, 1973, pp. 143–162.
Willock, R.: Gunboat Diplomacy: Operations of the (British) North America and West Indies Squadron, 1875–1915, Part 2, in: American Neptune, Vol. XXVIII, 1968, pp. 85–112.
Bauer, K. J.: The "Sancala" Affair: Captain Voorhees Seizes an Argentine Squadron, in: American Neptune, Vol. XXIV, 1969, pp. 174–186
In German
Krüger, Henning: Zwischen Küstenverteidigung und Weltpolitik. Die politische Geschichte der preußischen Marine 1848 bis 1867 (Between coastal defence and world policy. The political history of the prussian navy 1848 to 1867), Bochum 2008.
Wiechmann, Gerhard: Die preußisch-deutsche Marine in Lateinamerika 1866–1914. Eine Studie deutscher Kanonenbootpolitik (The Prussian-German Navy in Latin America 1866–1914. A study of German Gunboat diplomacy), Bremen 2002.
Wiechmann, Gerhard: Die Königlich Preußische Marine in Lateinamerika 1851 bis 1867. Ein Versuch deutscher Kanonenbootpolitik (The royal Prussian navy in Latin America 1851 to 1867. An attempt of German gunboat diplomacy), in: Sandra Carreras/Günther Maihold (ed.): Preußen und Lateinamerika. Im Spannungsfeld von Kommerz, Macht und Kultur, p. 105–144, Münster 2004.
Eberspächer, Cord: Die deutsche Yangtse-Patrouille. Deutsche Kanonenbootpolitik in China im Zeitalter des Imperialismus (The German Yangtse patrol. German Gunboat diplomacy in China in the age of imperialism), Bochum 2004.
N.N.: Die Vernichtung des haitianischen Rebellenkreuzers "Crete à Pierrot" durch S.M.Kbt. "Panther" (The destruction of the Haitian rebel cruiser "Crete à Pierrot" through His Majesty´s gunboat "Panther"), in: Marine-Rundschau, 13. Jahrgang, 1902, pp. 1189–1197.
Rheder: Die militärische Unternehmung S.M.S.S. "Charlotte" und "Stein" gegen Haiti im Dezember 1897 (The military enterprise of His Majesty´s schoolships "Charlotte" and "Stein" against Haiti in December 1897), in: Marine-Rundschau, 41. Jahrgang, 1937, pp. 761–765.
.jpg){kind=link}
