Bashar al-Assad
Template:Short description Template:Pp Template:Use British English Template:Use dmy dates Template:Family name hatnote Template:Infobox officeholder Template:Bashar al-Assad series Template:Ba'athism sidebar Bashar al-AssadTemplate:Efn (born 11Template:NbspSeptember 1965) is a Syrian former politician, doctor and military officer who served as the president of Syria from 2000 until his overthrow in 2024 after the Syrian civil war. As president, Assad was commander-in-chief of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces and secretary-general of the Central Command of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party. He is the son of Hafez al-Assad, who ruled Syria from 1970 to 2000.
In the 1980s, Assad became a doctor, and in the early 1990s he was training in London as an ophthalmologist. In 1994, after his elder brother Bassel al-Assad died in a car crash, Assad was recalled to Syria to take over Bassel's role as heir apparent. Assad entered the military academy and in 1998 took charge of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon begun by his father. On 17 July 2000, Assad became president, succeeding his father, who had died on 10 June 2000.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Hopes that the UK-educated Assad would bring reform to Syria and relax the occupation of Lebanon<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> were dashed following a series of crackdowns in 2001–2002 that ended the Damascus Spring, a period defined by calls for transparency and democracy. Assad's rule would become more repressive than his father's.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
His first decade in power was marked by extensive censorship, summary executions, forced disappearances, discrimination against ethnic minorities, and extensive surveillance by the Ba'athist secret police. While the Assad government described itself as secular, various political scientists and observers noted that his regime exploited sectarian tensions in the country. Although Assad inherited Hafez's power structures and personality cult, he lacked the loyalty received by his father and faced rising discontent against his rule. As a result, many people from his father's regime resigned or were purged, and the political inner circle was replaced by staunch loyalists from Alawite clans. Assad's early economic liberalisation programs worsened inequalities and centralised the socio-political power of the loyalist Damascene elite of the Assad family, alienating the Syrian rural population, urban working classes, businessmen, industrialists, and people from traditional Ba'ath strongholds. Assad was forced to end the Syrian occupation of Lebanon during the Cedar Revolution in 2005, which was triggered by the assassination of Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri. The Mehlis report implicated Assad's regime in the assassination, with a particular focus on Maher al-Assad, Assef Shawkat, Hassan Khalil, Bahjat Suleiman, and Jamil Al Sayyed.<ref>Template:Cite web.</ref>
After the Syrian revolution began in 2011, Assad led a deadly crackdown against Arab Spring protests which led to outbreak of the Syrian civil war. The Syrian opposition, United States, European Union, and the majority of the Arab League called on him to resign, but he refused and the war escalated. Between 2011 and 2024, over 600,000 people were killed, with pro-Assad forces causing more than 90% of civilian casualties.<ref>Sources:
- Template:Cite web
- Template:Cite web
- Template:Cite web
- Template:Cite web
- Template:Cite web
- Template:Cite web</ref> Throughout the war, the Ba'athist Syrian armed forces carried out several chemical attacks.<ref>
- Template:Cite news
- Template:Cite web
- Template:Cite web</ref> In 2013, the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that findings from a UN inquiry directly implicated Assad in crimes against humanity. The regime's perpetration of war crimes led to international condemnation and isolation,<ref>Multiple sources:
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite news
- Template:Cite news
- Template:Cite web</ref> although Assad maintained power with assistance from Syria's longtime allies Iran and Russia. Iran launched a military intervention in support of his government in 2013 and Russia followed in 2015; by 2021, Assad's regime had regained control over most of the country. In November 2024, a coalition of Syrian rebels mounted several offensives with the intention of ousting Assad.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> On the morning of 8 December, as rebel troops first entered Damascus, Assad fled to Moscow and was granted political asylum by the Russian government.<ref name=":2">Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Later that day, Damascus fell to rebel forces, and Assad's regime collapsed.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Assad's regime was a highly personalist dictatorship<ref>Sources describing the Assad family's rule of Syria as a personalist dictatorship:
- Template:Cite web
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite journal
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="dictator2">Sources characterising Assad as a dictator:Template:Bulleted list</ref> that governed Syria as a totalitarian police state.<ref>Multiple sources:
- Template:Harvard citation no brackets.
- Template:Harvard citation no brackets.
- Template:Cite book</ref> It committed systemic human rights violations and war crimes, making it one of the most repressive regimes in modern times. The regime was consistently ranked among the "worst of the worst" within Freedom House indexes.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> His supporters generally regard him as a determined leader who challenged Western imperialism, opposed Zionism, and resisted Islamic extremism.
Early life, family and education
Bashar al-Assad was born in Damascus on 11 September 1965, as the second son and third child of Anisa Makhlouf and Hafez al-Assad.Template:Sfn al-Assad in Arabic means "the lion". Assad's paternal grandfather, Ali al-Assad, had managed to change his status from peasant to minor notable and, to reflect this, in 1927 he had changed the family name from al-Wahsh (Template:Literal translation) to al-Assad.Template:Sfn
Assad's father, Hafez al-Assad, was born to an impoverished rural family of Alawite background and rose through the Ba'ath Party ranks to take control of the Syrian branch of the Party in the Corrective Revolution, culminating in his rise to the Syrian presidency.Template:Sfn Hafez promoted his supporters within the Ba'ath Party, many of whom were also of Alawite background.Template:Sfn<ref name=guardian>Template:Cite news</ref> After the revolution, Alawite strongmen were installed while Sunnis, Druze, and Ismailis were removed from the army and Ba'ath party.Template:Sfn Hafez al-Assad's 30-year military rule witnessed the transformation of Syria into a dynastic dictatorship. The new political system was led by the Ba'ath party elites dominated by the Alawites, who were fervently loyal to the Assad family and controlled the military, security forces and secret police.<ref name="Allam, Saber 2019 26–27">Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>
The younger Assad had five siblings, three of whom are deceased. A sister named Bushra died in infancy.<ref name=New_Republic_2013/> Assad's younger brother, Majd, was not a public figure and little is known about him other than he was intellectually disabled,<ref name=Bar/> and died in 2009 after a "long illness".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Unlike his brothers Bassel and Maher, and second sister, also named Bushra, Bashar was quiet, reserved and lacked interest in politics or the military.Template:Sfn<ref name="Bar">Template:Cite journal</ref><ref name="Republic">Template:Cite magazine</ref> The Assad children reportedly rarely saw their father,<ref name="Roula">Template:Cite news</ref> and Bashar later stated that he only entered his father's office once while he was president.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> He was described as "soft-spoken",<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> and according to a university friend, he was timid, avoided eye contact and spoke in a low voice.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Assad received his primary and secondary education in the Arab-French al-Hurriya School in Damascus.Template:Sfn In 1982, he graduated from high school and then studied medicine at Damascus University.Template:Sfn
Medical career and rise to power
In 1988, Assad graduated from medical school and began working as an army doctor at Tishrin Military Hospital on the outskirts of Damascus.<ref name=Ladno/><ref name=":6">Template:Cite news</ref> Four years later, he settled in London to start postgraduate training in ophthalmology at Western Eye Hospital.Template:Sfn He was described as a "geeky I.T. guy" during his time in London.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Bashar had few political aspirations,Template:Sfn and his father had been grooming Bashar's older brother Bassel as future president.Template:Sfn Shortly after Bassel died in a car accident in 1994, Bashar was recalled to the Syrian Army. State propaganda soon began elevating Bashar's public image as "the hope of the masses" to prepare the public for a continuation of the rule of the Assad dynasty.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>
Soon after the death of Bassel, Hafez al-Assad decided to make Bashar the new heir apparent.Template:Sfn Over the next six and a half years, until his death in 2000, Hafez prepared Bashar for succession. General Bahjat Suleiman, an officer in the Defense Companies, was entrusted with overseeing preparations for a smooth transition,<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="Roula" /> which were made on three levels. First, support was built up for Bashar in the military and security apparatus. Second, Bashar's image was established with the public. And lastly, Bashar was familiarised with the mechanisms of running the country.Template:Sfn
To establish his credentials in the military, Bashar entered the military academy at Homs in 1994 and was propelled through the ranks to become a colonel of the elite Syrian Republican Guard in January 1999.<ref name=Ladno/>Template:Sfn<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> To establish a power base for Bashar in the military, old divisional commanders were pushed into retirement, and new, young, Alawite officers with loyalties to him took their place.Template:Sfn
_serving_in_the_military,_1990s.jpg){kind=link}
In 1998, Bashar took charge of Syria's Lebanon file, which had since the 1970s been handled by Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, who had until then been a potential contender for president.Template:Sfn By taking charge of Syrian affairs in Lebanon, Bashar was able to push Khaddam aside and establish his own power base in Lebanon.Template:Sfn In the same year, after minor consultation with Lebanese politicians, Bashar installed Emile Lahoud, a loyal ally of his, as the President of Lebanon and pushed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri aside, by not placing his political weight behind his nomination as prime minister.Template:Sfn To further weaken the old Syrian order in Lebanon, Bashar replaced the long-serving de facto Syrian High Commissioner of Lebanon, Ghazi Kanaan, with Rustum Ghazaleh.Template:Sfn
Parallel to his military career, Bashar was engaged in public affairs. He was granted wide powers and became head of the bureau to receive complaints and appeals of citizens, and led a campaign against corruption. As a result of this campaign, many of Bashar's potential rivals for president were put on trial for corruption.<ref name="Ladno">Template:Cite news</ref> Bashar also became the President of the Syrian Computer Society and helped to introduce the internet in Syria, which aided his image as a moderniser and reformer. Ba'athist loyalists in the party, military and the Alawite sect were supportive of Bashar al-Assad, enabling him to become his father's successor.<ref name="facing down rebellion">Template:Cite web</ref>
Presidency
Early presidency (2000–2011)
After the death of Hafez al-Assad on 10 June 2000, the Constitution of Syria was amended. The minimum age requirement for the presidency was lowered from 40 to 34, which was Bashar's age at the time.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The sole candidate of the presidential referendum, Assad was subsequently confirmed president on 10 July 2000, with 97.29% support for his leadership.<ref name="WaPo %"/><ref name="Reuters %"/><ref name="CBS %"/> In line with his role as President of Syria, he was also appointed the commander-in-chief of the Syrian Armed Forces and Regional Secretary of the Ba'ath Party.<ref name="facing down rebellion"/> A series of state elections were held every seven years which Assad won with overwhelming majority of votes. The elections are unanimously regarded by independent observers as a sham process and boycotted by the opposition.Template:EfnTemplate:Efn The last two elections – held in 2014 and 2021 – were conducted only in areas controlled by the Syrian government during the country's ongoing civil war and condemned by the United Nations.<ref name="theguardian.com">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="telegraph.co.uk">Template:Cite newsTemplate:Cbignore</ref><ref name="Kossaify">Template:Cite news</ref> In the five years before 2011 the government of Bashar consolidated state power over the economy and political system. This consolidation went hand in hand with measures which were filled with nepotism and corruption.<ref name=":7">Template:Cite web</ref>
Damascus Spring
Template:See also Immediately after he took office, a reform movement known as Damascus Spring led by writers, intellectuals, dissidents, cultural activists, etc. made cautious advances, which led to the closing of Mezzeh prison and the declaration of a wide-ranging amnesty releasing hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood affiliated political prisoners.Template:Sfn However, security crackdowns commenced again within the year, turning it into the Damascus Winter.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="Ghadry">Template:Cite journal</ref> Hundreds of intellectuals were arrested, targeted, exiled or sent to prison and the state of emergency was continued. The early concessions were rolled back to tighten authoritarian control, censorship was increased and the Damascus Spring movement was banned under the pretext of "national unity and stability". The regime's policy of a "social market economy" became a symbol of corruption, as Assad loyalists became its sole beneficiaries.<ref name="facing down rebellion"/><ref name="France 24">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Several discussion forums were shut down and many intellectuals were abducted by the Mukhabarat, tortured and killed. Many analysts believe that initial promises of opening up were part of a government strategy to find Syrians who were not supportive of the new leadership.<ref name="Ghadry"/>
During a state visit by British Prime Minister Tony Blair to Syria in October 2001, Bashar publicly condemned the United States invasion of Afghanistan in a joint press conference, stating that "[w]e cannot accept what we see every day on our television screens – the killing of innocent civilians. There are hundreds dying every day." Assad also praised Palestinian militant groups as "freedom fighters" and criticised Israel and the Western world during the conference. British officials subsequently described Assad's political views as being more conciliatory in private, claiming that he criticised the September 11 attacks and accepted the legitimacy of the State of Israel.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Following the September 11 attacks and during the early stages of the US-led war on terror, "Syria had emerged as one of the CIA's most effective intelligence allies in the fight against al-Qaeda,"<ref name="The New Yorker Syrian Bet">Template:Cite magazine</ref> with "the quality and quantity of information from Syria [having] exceeded the Agency's expectations."<ref name="The New Yorker Syrian Bet"/> Syria closely cooperated with the CIA's detention and interrogation program of people deemed "illegal enemy combatants"; Syrian prisons were a major site of extraordinary rendition by the CIA of alleged al-Qaeda members where they were tortured by Syrian interrogators on behalf of the CIA.<ref name="The New Yorker 2005">Template:Cite magazine</ref><ref name="Al Bawaba 2013">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="Washington Post 2013">Template:Cite news</ref> According to a 2013 report by the Open Society Foundations, Syria was one of the "most common destinations for rendered suspects" under the CIA's program.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Assassination of Rafic Hariri and Cedar Revolution
Template:See also Template:Quote box
On 14 February 2005, Rafic Hariri, the former prime minister of Lebanon, was assassinated in a massive truck-bomb explosion in Beirut, killing 22 people. The Christian Science Monitor reported that "Syria was widely blamed for Hariri's murder. In the months leading to the assassination, relations between Hariri and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad plummeted amid an atmosphere of threats and intimidation."<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> Bashar promoted his brother-in-law Assef Shawkat, a key figure suspected of orchestrating the terrorist attack, as the chief of Syrian Military Intelligence Directorate immediately after Hariri's death.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
The killings caused massive uproar, triggering an intifada in Lebanon and hundreds of thousands of protestors poured on the streets to demand total withdrawal of Syrian military forces. After mounting international pressure that called Syria to implement the UNSC Resolution 1559, Bashar al-Assad declared on 5 March that he would order the departure of Syrian soldiers. On 14 March 2005, more than a million Lebanese protestors – Muslims, Christians, and Druze – demonstrated in Beirut, marking the monthly anniversary of Hariri's murder. UN Resolution 1595, adopted on 7 April, sent an international commission to investigate the assassination of Hariri. By 5 May 2005, United Nations had officially confirmed the total departure of all Syrian soldiers, ending the 29-year old military occupation. The uprisings that occurred in these months came to be known as Lebanon's "independence intifada" or the "Cedar Revolution".<ref>Rudy Jaafar and Maria J. Stephan. (2009). "Lebanon's Independence Intifada: How an Unarmed Insurrection Expelled Syrian Forces", in Maria J. Stephan (ed.), Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 169–185.</ref>
UN investigation commission's report published on 20 October 2005 revealed that high-ranking members of Syrian intelligence and Assad family had directly supervised the killing.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The BBC reported in December 2005 that "Damascus has strongly denied involvement in the car bomb which killed Hariri in February".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
On 27 May 2007, Assad was approved for another seven-year term in a referendum on his presidency, with 97.6% of the votes supporting his continued leadership.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Opposition parties were not allowed in the country and Assad was the only candidate in the referendum.<ref name="CBS %">Klatell, James (27 May 2007). "Syrians Vote in Presidential Referendum" Template:Webarchive. CBS News.</ref> Syria's opposition parties under the umbrella of Damascus Declaration denounced the elections as illegitimate and part of the regime's strategy to sustain the "totalitarian system".<ref name="WaPo %2">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="Reuters %2">Template:Cite news</ref> Elections in Ba'athist Syria were officially designated by the state as the event of "renewing the pledge of allegiance" to the Assads and voting was enforced by the Ba'athist military apparatus as a compulsory duty for every citizen. Announcement of the results were typically followed by pro-Assad rallies conducted by the Ba'ath party across the country extolling the regime, wherein participants were forced to declare their "devotion" to the President and celebrate "the virtues" of the Assad dynasty.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Syria began developing a covert nuclear weapons programme with assistance of North Korea during the 2000s, but its suspected nuclear reactor was destroyed by the Israeli Air Force during Operation Outside the Box in September 2007.<ref>Template:Cite magazine</ref><ref name="ifimes.org">Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Syrian civil war (2011–2024)
Protests in Syria began on 26 January 2011 following the Arab Spring protests that called for political reforms and the reinstatement of civil rights, as well as an end to the state of emergency which had been in place since 1963.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> One attempt at a "day of rage" was set for 4–5 February, though it ended uneventfully.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Protests on 18–19 March were the largest to take place in Syria for decades, and the Syrian authority responded with violence against its protesting citizens.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In his first public response to the protests delivered on 30 March 2011, Assad blamed the unrest on "conspiracies" and accused the Syrian opposition and protestors of seditious "fitna", toeing the party-line of framing the Ba'athist state as the victim of an international plot. He also derided the Arab Spring movement, and described those participating in the protests as "germs" and fifth-columnists.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Farge">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="ohchr.org">Template:Cite web</ref>
The U.S. imposed limited sanctions against the Assad government in April 2011, followed by Barack Obama's executive order as of 18 May 2011 targeting Bashar Assad specifically and six other senior officials.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref name=ussanct>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> On 23 May 2011, the EU foreign ministers agreed at a meeting in Brussels to add Assad and nine other officials to a list affected by travel bans and asset freezes.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> On 24 May 2011, Canada imposed sanctions on Syrian leaders, including Assad.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
On 20 June, in response to the demands of protesters and international pressure, Assad promised a national dialogue involving movement toward reform, new parliamentary elections, and greater freedoms. He also urged refugees to return home from Turkey, while assuring them amnesty and blaming all unrest on a small number of saboteurs.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
In July 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Assad had "lost legitimacy" as president.<ref name="ussanct"/> On 18 August 2011, Barack Obama issued a written statement that urged Assad to "step aside".<ref name=mustgo>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref name=whstatem>President Obama: "The future of Syria must be determined by its people, but President Bashar al-Assad is standing in their way." Template:Webarchive The White House website, 18 August 2011.</ref> In August, the cartoonist Ali Farzat, a critic of Assad's government, was attacked. Relatives of the humourist told media outlets that the attackers threatened to break Farzat's bones as a warning for him to stop drawing cartoons of government officials, particularly Assad. Farzat was hospitalised with fractures in both hands and blunt force trauma to the head.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Since October 2011, Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, repeatedly vetoed Western-sponsored draft resolutions in the UN Security Council that would have left open the possibility of UN sanctions, or even military intervention, against the Assad government.<ref name=guardunlegit>Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="Itar-Tass27-1-12">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Russia and China veto draft Security Council resolution on Syria Template:Webarchive UN website, 4 October 2011.</ref>
On 10 January 2012, Assad gave a speech in which he maintained the uprising was engineered by foreign countries and proclaimed that "victory [was] near". He also said that the Arab League, by suspending Syria, revealed that it was no longer Arab. However, Assad also said the country would not "close doors" to an Arab-brokered solution if "national sovereignty" was respected. He also said a referendum on a new constitution could be held in March.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
By the end of January 2012, it was reported by Reuters that over 5,000 civilians and protesters (including armed militants) had been killed by the Syrian army, security agents and militia (Shabiha), while 1,100 people had been killed by "terrorist armed forces".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
On 27 February 2012, Syria claimed that a proposal that a new constitution be drafted received 90% support during the relevant referendum. The referendum introduced a fourteen-year cumulative term limit for the president of Syria. The referendum was pronounced meaningless by foreign nations including the U.S. and Turkey; the EU announced fresh sanctions against key regime figures.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In July 2012, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov denounced Western powers for what he said amounted to blackmail thus provoking a civil war in Syria.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> On 15 July 2012, the International Committee of the Red Cross declared Syria to be in a state of civil war,<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> as the nationwide death toll for all sides was reported to have neared 20,000.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
On 6 January 2013, Assad, in his first major speech since June, said that the conflict in his country was due to "enemies" outside of Syria who would "go to Hell" and that they would "be taught a lesson". However, he said that he was still open to a political solution saying that failed attempts at a solution "does not mean we are not interested in a political solution."<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In July 2014, Assad renewed his third term of presidency after voting process conducted in pro-regime territories which were boycotted by the opposition and condemned by the United Nations.<ref name="theguardian.com"/><ref name="telegraph.co.uk"/><ref name="Kossaify"/> According to Joshua Landis: "He's (Assad) going to say: 'I am the state, I am Syria, and if the West wants access to Syrians, they have to come through me.'"<ref name="telegraph.co.uk"/>
In 2013, reports emerged about an assassination attempt on Bashar that may have motivated a chemical weapons strike by the Assad regime. NBC News reported that the United States conducted investigations to determine whether a failed attempt on his life had influenced the decision to deploy such weapons.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> During the early stages of the Syrian Civil War in 2012, multiple reports of assassination attempts were made. These allegations coincided with intensifying conflict and growing opposition to Assad's rule.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
After the fall of four military bases in September 2014,<ref name="AssadWeak">Template:Cite news</ref> which were the last government footholds in the Raqqa Governorate, Assad received significant criticism from his Alawite base of support.<ref name="Dissent2014">Template:Cite news</ref> This included remarks made by Douraid al-Assad, cousin of Bashar al-Assad, demanding the resignation of the Syrian Defence Minister, Fahd Jassem al-Freij, following the massacre by the Islamic State of hundreds of government troops captured after the IS victory at Tabqa Airbase.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> This was shortly followed by Alawite protests in Homs demanding the resignation of the governor,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> and the dismissal of Assad's cousin Hafez Makhlouf from his security position leading to his subsequent exile to Belarus.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Growing resentment towards Assad among Alawites was fuelled by the disproportionate number of soldiers killed in fighting hailing from Alawite areas,<ref name="BurySons">Template:Cite news</ref> a sense that the Assad regime has abandoned them,<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> as well as the failing economic situation.<ref name="AlawitesVoice">Template:Cite news</ref> Figures close to Assad began voicing concerns regarding the likelihood of its survival, with one saying in late 2014; "I don't see the current situation as sustainable ... I think Damascus will collapse at some point."<ref name="AssadWeak" />
In 2015, several members of the Assad family died in Latakia under unclear circumstances.<ref>Template:Cite newsTemplate:Cbignore</ref> On 14 March, an influential cousin of Assad and founder of the shabiha, Mohammed Toufic al-Assad, was assassinated with five bullets to the head in a dispute over influence in QardahaTemplate:Sndthe ancestral home of the Assad family.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In April 2015, Assad ordered the arrest of his cousin Munther al-Assad in Alzirah, Latakia.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> It remains unclear whether the arrest was due to actual crimes.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
After a string of government defeats in northern and southern Syria, analysts noted growing government instability coupled with continued waning support for the Assad government among its core Alawite base of support.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Reports indicated that Assad's relatives, Alawites, and businessmen were increasingly fleeing Damascus for Latakia and foreign countries.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Intelligence chief Ali Mamlouk was placed under house arrest sometime in April and stood accused of plotting with Assad's exiled uncle Rifaat al-Assad to replace Bashar as president.<ref>Template:Cite newsTemplate:Cbignore</ref> Further high-profile deaths included the commanders of the Fourth Armoured Division, the Belli military airbase, the army's special forces and of the First Armoured Division, with an errant air strike during the Palmyra offensive killing two officers who were reportedly related to Assad.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Presidency after Russian intervention (2015–2024)
_02.jpg){kind=link}
On 4 September 2015, when prospects of Assad's survival looked bleak, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russia was providing the Assad government with sufficiently "serious" help: with both logistical and military support.<ref>Template:Cite newsTemplate:Cbignore</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="Borshchevskaya 2022 69–88">Template:Cite book</ref> Shortly after the start of direct military intervention by Russia on 30 September 2015 at the formal request of the Syrian government, Putin stated the military operation had been thoroughly prepared in advance and defined Russia's goal in Syria as "stabilising the legitimate power in Syria and creating the conditions for political compromise".<ref name="goalstabilis">Template:Cite news</ref> Putin's intervention saved the Assad regime at a time when it was on the verge of a looming collapse. It also enabled Moscow to achieve its key geo-strategic objectives such as total control of Syrian airspace, naval bases that granted permanent martial reach across the Eastern Mediterranean and easier access to intervene in Libya.<ref name="Borshchevskaya 2022 69–88"/>
In November 2015, Assad reiterated that a diplomatic process to bring the country's civil war to an end could not begin while it was occupied by "terrorists", although it was considered by BBC News to be unclear whether he meant only ISIL or Western-supported rebels as well.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> On 22 November, Assad said that within two months of its air campaign Russia had achieved more in its fight against ISIL than the U.S.-led coalition had achieved in a year.<ref>Template:Cite magazine</ref> In an interview with Czech Television on 1 December, he said that the leaders who demanded his resignation were of no interest to him, as nobody takes them seriously because they are "shallow" and controlled by the United States.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> At the end of December 2015, senior U.S. officials privately admitted that Russia had achieved its central goal of stabilising Syria and, with the expenses relatively low, could sustain the operation at this level for years to come.<ref name="reutersstabilis">Template:Cite news</ref>
In December 2015, Putin stated that Russia was supporting Assad's forces and was ready to back anti-Assad rebels in a joint fight against IS.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
On 22 January 2016, the Financial Times, citing anonymous "senior western intelligence officials", claimed that Russian general Igor Sergun, the director of GRU, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, had shortly before his sudden death on 3 January 2016 been sent to Damascus with a message from Vladimir Putin asking that President Assad step aside.<ref name="ftresign">Template:Cite web</ref> The Financial Times' report was denied by Putin's spokesman.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
It was reported in December 2016 that Assad's forces had retaken half of rebel-held Aleppo, ending a 6-year stalemate in the city.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> On 15 December, as it was reported government forces were on the brink of retaking all of AleppoTemplate:Snda "turning point" in the civil war, Assad celebrated the "liberation" of the city, and stated, "History is being written by every Syrian citizen."<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
After the election of Donald Trump, the priority of the U.S. concerning Assad was unlike the priority of the Obama administration, and in March 2017, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley stated the U.S. was no longer focused on "getting Assad out",<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> but this position changed in the wake of the 2017 Khan Shaykhun chemical attack.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Following the missile strikes on a Syrian airbase on the orders of President Trump, Assad's spokesperson described the U.S.' behaviour as "unjust and arrogant aggression" and stated that the missile strikes "do not change the deep policies" of the Syrian government.<ref>Template:Cite magazine</ref> President Assad also told the Agence France-Presse that Syria's military had given up all its chemical weapons in 2013, and would not have used them if they still retained any, and stated that the chemical attack was a "100 percent fabrication" used to justify a U.S. airstrike.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In June 2017, Russian President Putin said "Assad didn't use the [chemical weapons]" and that the chemical attack was "done by people who wanted to blame him for that".<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> UN and international chemical weapons inspectors from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) found the attack was the work of the Assad regime.<ref name="CNN sarin report"/>
On 7 November 2017, the Syrian government announced that it had signed the Paris Climate Agreement.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In May 2018, it recognised the independence of Russian-occupied separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, leading to backlash from the European Union, United States, Canada and other countries.<ref name="Deutsche Welle">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> On 30 August 2020, the First Hussein Arnous government was formed, which included a new Council of Ministers.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
In the 2021 presidential elections held on 26 May, Assad secured his fourth 7-year tenure; by winning 95.2% of the eligible votes. The elections were boycotted by the opposition and SDF; while the refugees and internally displaced citizens were disqualified to vote; enabling only 38% of Syrians to participate in the process. Independent international observers as well as representatives of Western countries described the elections as a farce. United Nations condemned the elections for directly violating Resolution 2254; and announced that it has "no mandate".<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="auto">Template:Cite news</ref>
On 10 August 2021, the Second Hussein Arnous government was formed.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Under Assad, Syria became a strong supporter of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and was one of the five countries that opposed the UN General Assembly resolution denouncing the invasion, which called upon Russia to pull back its troops. Three days prior to the invasion, Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad was dispatched to Moscow to affirm Syria's recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk separatist republics. A day after the invasion, Bashar al-Assad praised the invasion as "a correction of history and a restoration of balance in the global order after the fall of the Soviet Union" in a phone call with Vladimir Putin.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Syria became the first country after Russia to officially recognise the "independence and sovereignty" of the two breakaway regions in June 2022.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Syria formally broke its diplomatic ties to Ukraine on 20 July 2022, citing the principle of reciprocity.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
On the 12th anniversary of beginning of the protests of Syrian Revolution, Bashar al-Assad held a meeting with Vladimir Putin during an official visit to Russia. In a televised broadcast with Putin, Assad defended Russia's "special military operation" as a war against "neo-Nazis and old Nazis" of Ukraine.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="rferl.org">Template:Cite web</ref> He recognised the Russian annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts and ratified the new Russian borders, claiming that the territories were "historically Russian". Assad also urged Russia to expand its military presence in Syria by establishing new bases and deploying more troops on the ground, strengthening its military role in Syria.Template:Efn
.svg){kind=link}
Territories held by the SDF (yellow), IS (grey), the Syrian Army (red), the SNA and Turkey (light green), Tahrir al-Sham (white), the SFA and the United States (teal).
In March 2023, he visited the United Arab Emirates and met with UAE's President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In May 2023, he attended the Arab League summit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where he was welcomed by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> He met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and other Arab leaders.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In September 2023, Assad attended the Asian Games opening ceremony in Hangzhou and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> They announced the establishment of a China–Syria strategic partnership.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
In November 2023, Assad attended the Arab–Islamic extraordinary summit in Riyadh.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In May 2024, he attended the Arab League summit in Bahrain.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In this time period the government refused any major incentives for reconciliation and repatriation of the "former" rebel groups. Bashar was encouraged to do so by its allies, such as those in the Axis of Resistance, but he did not follow up on these suggestions leaving the society polarised.<ref name=":7" />
Overthrow and exile
.jpg){kind=link}
In December 2024, the United States, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom urged for de-escalation in Syria as violence flared up once again. Rebel factions, led by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), had taken control of Aleppo, prompting a retaliatory airstrike campaign by President Assad and his Russian allies. The strikes, which targeted population centers and several hospitals in the rebel-held city of Idlib, resulted in at least 25 deaths, according to the White Helmets rescue group. NATO countries issued a joint statement calling for the protection of civilians and critical infrastructure to prevent further displacement and ensure humanitarian access. They stressed the urgent need for a Syrian-led political solution, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254, which advocates for dialogue between the Syrian government and opposition forces. The rebel offensive, which had begun on 27 November 2024, continued its advance into Hama Governorate following their capture of Aleppo.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
On 4 December 2024, fierce clashes erupted in Hama Governorate as the Syrian army engaged Islamist-led insurgents in a bid to halt their advance on the key city of Hama. Government forces claimed to have launched a counteroffensive with air support, pushing back rebel factions, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), around six miles from the city. However, despite reinforcements, the rebels captured the city on 5 December.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The fighting led to widespread displacement, with nearly 50,000 people fleeing the area and over 600 casualties reported, including 104 civilians.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> On 6 December, rebels began encircling the capital Damascus.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> On 7 December, rebels captured the strategic city of Homs, cutting off Damascus from regime strongholds on the coast.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> A few hours later in the early morning of 8 December, Assad fled Damascus just before its fall to the rebels,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> ending 54 years of the Assad family's rule.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The Russian government said that Assad had "stepped down" as president following a personal decision and had left Syria.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Following efforts by Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov to facilitate his departure, Assad, who left under great secrecy, was reported to have gone first to the Russian-operated Khmeimim Air Base near Latakia before proceeding to Moscow.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Interfax, quoting an unnamed source at the Kremlin, said that Assad and his family had arrived in Moscow and that the Russian government had granted them asylum "on humanitarian grounds".<ref name=":2" />
On 16 December, the Telegram account of the Syrian presidency published a statement attributed to Assad saying that he had gone to a Russian military base in Latakia Governorate "to oversee combat operations" following the fall of Damascus but was evacuated out of the country by Russia after coming under siege from rebel forces, adding that he had no intention of resigning or going into exile.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
On 7 April 2025, Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev told the Islamic Republic News Agency that Assad's settlement in Moscow was conditional on his total withdrawal from media and political activities. He added that the asylum granted to Assad and his family had been personally ordered by Russian president Vladimir Putin and would remain unchanged.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In an interview with The New York Times in April 2025, Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa said that Syrian officials requested Russia to extradite Assad as a condition for allowing their military presence in Syria, but Russia refused.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
On 20 September 2025, while in exile in Moscow, Assad was hospitalized in critical condition. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights has alleged he was poisoned in his home, though not specifying whether this was intentional or accidental. He was eventually discharged nine days later.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> On 13 October 2025, Lavrov denied reports that Assad was poisoned, saying Russia granted asylum to Assad and his family for humanitarian reasons and that Assad “has no issues living in our capital.”<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
On 8 October 2025, the German outlet Die Zeit reported that Assad and his family had settled into a luxury skyscraper apartment, where he reportedly made occasional visits to a shopping mall and spent much of his time playing online games while remaining under Putin's protection and control.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite magazine</ref> During the meeting with Putin on 15 October 2025, Syrian President al-Sharaa requested the extradition of Assad to Syria.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Controversies
Corruption
At the onset of the Syrian revolution, corruption in Syria was endemic, and the country was ranked 129th in the 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Since the 1970s, Syria's economy has been dominated by the patronage networks of Ba'ath party elites and Alawite loyalists of the Assad family, who established control over Syria's public sectors based on kinship and nepotism. The pervasive nature of corruption had been a source of controversy within the Ba'ath party circles and the wider public; as early as the 1980s.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>
Bashar al-Assad's economic liberalisation program during the 2000s became a symbol of corruption and nepotism, as the scheme's beneficiaries were Alawite loyalists who seized a significant portion of the privatised sectors and business assets. The government's actions alienated the vast majority of the Syrian public, particularly the rural and urban working classes, who strongly disliked the resulting economic disparities that became overtly visible.<ref name="Allam, Saber 2019 26–27"/><ref name="France 24"/> Assad's cousin Rami Makhlouf was the regime's most favored oligarch during this period, marked by the institutionalisation of corruption, handicapping of small businesses and casting down private entrepreneurship.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The persistence of corruption, sectarian bias towards Alawites, nepotism and widespread bribery that existed in party, bureaucracy and military led to popular anger that resulted in the eruption of the 2011 Syrian Revolution. The protests were the most fierce in working-class neighbourhoods, which had long bore the brunt of the regime's exploitation policies that privileged its own loyalists.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>
According to ABC News, as a result of the Syrian civil war, "government-controlled Syria is truncated in size, battered and impoverished."<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Economic sanctions (the Syria Accountability Act) were applied long before the Syrian civil war by the U.S. and were joined by the EU at the outbreak of the civil war, causing disintegration of the Syrian economy.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> These sanctions were reinforced in October 2014 by the EU and U.S.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Industry in parts of the country that are still held by the government is heavily state-controlled, with economic liberalisation being reversed during the current conflict.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The London School of Economics has stated that as a result of the Syrian civil war, a war economy has developed in Syria.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> A 2014 European Council on Foreign Relations report also stated that a war economy has formed:
A UN commissioned report by the Syrian Centre for Policy Research states that two-thirds of the Syrian population now lives in "extreme poverty".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Unemployment stands at 50 percent.<ref name="SurvivalMode">Template:Cite news</ref> In October 2014, a $50 million mall opened in Tartus which provoked criticism from government supporters and was seen as part of an Assad government policy of attempting to project a sense of normalcy throughout the civil war.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> A government policy to give preference to families of slain soldiers for government jobs was cancelled after it caused an uproar<ref name="BurySons"/> while rising accusations of corruption caused protests.<ref name="AlawitesVoice"/> In December 2014, the EU banned sales of jet fuel to the Assad government, forcing the government to buy more expensive uninsured jet fuel shipments in the future.<ref>Template:Cite newsTemplate:Cbignore</ref>
Taking advantage of the increased role of the state as a result of the civil war, Bashar and his wife Asma have begun annexing Syria's economic assets from their loyalists, seeking to displace the old business elites and monopolise their direct control of the economy. Maher al-Assad, the brother of Bashar, has also become wealthy by overseeing the operations of Syria's state-sponsored captagon drug industry and seizing much of the spoils of war. The ruling couple currently owns vast swathes of Syria's shipping, real estate, telecommunications and banking sectors.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Significant changes have been happening to Syrian economy since the government's confiscation campaigns launched in 2019, which involved major economic assets being transferred to the Presidential couple to project their power and influence. Particularly noteworthy dynamic has been the rise of Asma al-Assad, who heads Syria's clandestine economic council and is thought to have become "a central funnel of economic power in Syria". Through her Syria Trust NGO, the backbone of her financial network, Asma vets the foreign aid coming to Syria; since the government authorises UN organisations only if it works under state agencies.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Corruption has been rising sporadically in recent years, with Syria being considered the most corrupt country in the Arab World.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> As of 2022, Syria is the ranked second worst globally in the Corruption Perceptions Index.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Sectarianism
Template:See also Hafez al-Assad's government was widely counted amongst the most repressive Arab dictatorships of the 20th century. As Bashar inherited his father's mantle, he sought to implement "authoritarian upgrading" by purging those from his father's generation and staffing the party and military with loyalist Alawite officers, further entrenching the sectarianism within the system.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="auto2">Template:Cite news</ref> While officially the Ba'athist government adheres to a strict secularist doctrine, in practice it has implemented sectarian engineering policies in the society to suppress dissent and monopolise its absolute power.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
The regime has attempted to portray itself to the outside world as "the protector of minorities" and instills the fear of the majority rule in the society to mobilise loyalists from minorities.<ref name="NPR_APRIL_2015">Template:Cite web</ref> Assad loyalist figures like Michel Samaha have advocated sectarian mobilisation to defend the regime from what he labelled as the "sea of Sunnis". Assad regime has unleashed sectarian violence through private Alawite militias like the Shabiha, particularly in Sunni areas. Alawite religious iconography and communal sentiments are common themes used by Alawite warrior-shaykhs who lead the Alawite militias; as justification to commit massacres, abductions and torture in opposition strongholds.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Various development policies adopted by the regime had followed a sectarian pattern. An urbanisation scheme implemented by the government in the city of Homs led to expulsions of thousands of Sunni residents during the 2000s, while Alawite majority areas were left intact.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Even as Syrian Ba'athism absorbed diverse communal identities into the homogenous unifying discourse of the state; socio-political power became monopolised by Alawite loyalists. Despite officially adhering to non-confessionalism, Syrian Armed Forces have also been institutionally sectarianised. While the conscripts and lower-ranks are overwhelmingly non-Alawite, the higher ranks are packed by Alawite loyalists who effectively control the logistics and security policy. Elite units of the Syrian military such as the Tiger Forces, Republican Guard, 4th Armoured Division, etc. regarded by the government as crucial for its survival; are composed mostly of Alawites. Sunni officers are under constant surveillance by the secret police, with most of them being assigned with Alawite assistants who monitor their movements. Pro-regime paramilitary groups such as the National Defense Force are also organised around sectarian loyalty to the Ba'athist government. During the Syrian Revolution uprisings, the Ba'athist government deployed a securitisation strategy that depended on sectarian mobilisation, unleashing violence on protestors and extensive crackdowns across the country, prompting opposition groups to turn to armed revolt. Syrian society was further sectarianised following the Iranian intervention in the Syrian civil war, which witnessed numerous Khomeinist militant groups sponsored by Iran fight in the side of the Assad government.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="Robson"/>
Human rights
The Ba'athist government ruled Syria as a totalitarian state, policing every aspect of Syrian society until 2024.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The president made key decisions with counsel from a small number of security advisors, ministers, and senior members of the ruling Ba’ath Party, with scant regard for punishing, arresting, or prosecuting officials who violated human rights.<ref>https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/186661.pdf</ref> The surveillance system of the Mukhabarat was pervasive, with the total number of agents working for its various branches estimated to be as high as 1:158 ratio with the civilian population. Security services shut down civil society organisations, curtailed freedom of movement within the country and banned non-Ba'athist political literature and symbols.<ref name="ifimes.org"/><ref name="Hill">Template:Cite news</ref> In 2010, Human Rights Watch published the report "A Wasted Decade" documenting repression during Assad's first decade of emergency rule; marked by arbitrary arrests, censorship and discrimination against Syrian Kurds.<ref name="Hill"/><ref name="hrw.org">Template:Cite web</ref>
Throughout the 2000s, Mukhabarat agents carried out routine abductions, arbitrary detentions and torture of civilians. Numerous show trials were conducted against dissidents, filling Syrian prisons with journalists and human rights activists. Members of Syria's General Intelligence Directorate had long enjoyed broad privileges to carry out extrajudicial actions and they have immunity from criminal offences. In 2008, Assad extended this immunity to other departments of security forces.<ref name="hrw.org"/> Human Rights groups, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have detailed how the Assad government's secret police tortured, imprisoned, and killed political opponents, and those who speak out against the government.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In addition, some 600 Lebanese political prisoners were thought to be held in government prisons since the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, with some held for as long as over 30 years.<ref>Template:Cite webTemplate:Dead linkTemplate:Cbignore</ref> From 2006, the Assad government expanded the use of travel bans against political dissidents.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In an interview with ABC News in 2007, Assad stated: "We don't have such [things as] political prisoners," though The New York Times reported the arrest of 30 Syrian political dissidents who were organising a joint opposition front in December 2007, with 3 members of this group considered to be opposition leaders being remanded in custody.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
The government also denied permission for human rights organisations and independent NGOs to work in the country.<ref name="hrw.org"/> In 2010, Syria banned face veils at universities.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> Following the protests of the Syrian revolution in 2011, Assad partially relaxed the veil ban.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
_Montreal_Syrian_solidarity_demonstration_March_27.jpg){kind=link}
Foreign Affairs journal released an editorial on the Syrian situation in the wake of the 2011 protests:<ref name="The Sturdy House That Assad Built">Template:Cite journal</ref>
Between 2011 and 2013, the state security apparatus was believed to have tortured and killed over 10,000 civil activists, political dissidents, journalists, civil defense volunteers and those accused of treason and terror charges, as part of a campaign of deadly crackdown ordered by Assad.<ref name="Entous, Nissenbaum">Template:Cite news</ref> In June 2023, UN General Assembly voted in favour of establishing an independent body to investigate the whereabouts of hundreds of thousands of missing civilians who have been forcibly disappeared, killed or languishing in Assad regime's dungeons and torture chambers. The vote was condemned by Russia, North Korea and Iran.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
In 2023, Canada and Netherlands filed a lawsuit against Syria at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), charging the latter with violating the United Nations Convention Against Torture. The joint petition accused the Syrian regime of organizing "unimaginable physical and mental pain and suffering" as a strategy to collectively punish the Syrian population.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Russia vetoed UN Security Council efforts to prosecute Bashar al-Assad at the International Criminal Court.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Repression of Kurds
Template:Further Ba'athist Syria had long banned Kurdish language in schools and public institutions; and discrimination against Kurds steadily increased during the rule of Bashar al-Assad. State policy officially suppressed Kurdish culture; with more than 300,000 Syrian Kurds being rendered stateless. Kurdish grievances against state persecution eventually culminated in the 2004 Qamishli Uprisings, which were crushed down violently after sending Syrian military forces. The ensuing crackdown resulted in the killings of more than 36 Kurds and injuring at least 160 demonstrators. More than 2000 civilians were arrested and tortured in government detention centres. Restrictions on Kurdish activities were further tightened following the Qamishli massacre, with the Assad regime virtually banning all Kurdish cultural gatherings and political activism under the charges of "inciting strife" or "weakening national sentiment". During 2005–2010, Human Rights Watch verified security crackdowns on at least 14 Kurdish political and cultural gatherings.<ref name="hrw.org"/><ref name="Hill"/> In March 2008, Syrian military opened fire at a Kurdish gathering in Qamishli that marked Nowruz, killing three and injuring five civilians.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Censorship
On 22 September 2001, Assad decreed a Press Law that tightened government control over all literature printed or published in Syria; ranging from newspapers to books, pamphlets and periodicals. Publishers, writers, editors, distributors, journalists and other individuals accused of violating the Press Law are imprisoned or fined. Censorship has also been expanded into the cyberspace, and various websites are banned. Numerous bloggers and content creators have been arrested under various "national security" charges.<ref name="hrw.org"/>
A 2007 law requires internet cafés to record all the comments users post on chat forums.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Another decree in 2008 obligated internet cafes to keep records of their customers and report them routinely to the police.<ref name="10 Worst Countries to be a Blogger">Template:Cite web</ref> Websites such as Arabic Wikipedia, YouTube, and Facebook were blocked intermittently between 2008 and February 2011.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) ranked Syria as the third dangerous country to be an online blogger in 2009. Individuals are arrested based on a wide variety of accusations; ranging from undermining "national unity" to posting or sharing "false" content.<ref name="hrw.org"/><ref name="10 Worst Countries to be a Blogger"/>
Syria was ranked as the third most censored country in CPJ's 2012 report. Apart from restrictions for international journalists that prohibit their entry, domestic press is controlled by state agencies that promote Ba'athist ideology. From 2011, the Syrian government has issued a complete media blackout and foreign correspondents were quickly detained, abducted or tortured. As a result, the outside world is able to know of situations happening inside Syria only through videos of independent civilian journalists. The Assad government has shut down internet coverage, mobile networks as well as telephone lines in areas under its control to prevent any news that has its attempts to monopolise information related to Syria.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Crackdowns, ethnic cleansing, and forced disappearances
Template:Further The crackdown ordered by Bashar al-Assad against Syrian protesters was the most ruthless of all military clampdowns in the entire Arab Spring. As violence deteriorated and death toll mounted to the thousands; the European Union, Arab League and United States began imposing wide range of sanctions against Assad regime. By December 2011, United Nations had declared the situation in Syria to be a "civil war".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> By this point, all the protestors and armed resistance groups had viewed the unconditional resignation of Bashar al-Assad as part of their core demands. In July 2012, Arab League held an emergency session demanding the "swift resignation" of Assad and promised "safe exit" if he accepted the offer.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Assad rebuffed the offers, instead seeking foreign military support from Iran and Russia to defend his embattled regime through scorched-earth tactics, massacres, sieges, forced starvations, ethnic cleansing, etc.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
The crackdowns and extermination campaigns of Assad regime resulted in the Syrian refugee crisis; causing the forced displacement of 14 million Syrians, with around 7.2 million refugees.<ref name="Syria Refugee Crisis Explained">Template:Cite web</ref> This has made the Syrian refugee crisis the largest refugee crisis in the world; and UNHCR High Commissioner Filippo Grandi has described it as "the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time and a continuing cause for suffering."<ref name="Syria Refugee Crisis Explained" /><ref name=":0">Template:Cite web</ref>
Ethnic cleansing
Eva Koulouriotis has described Bashar al-Assad as the "master of ethnic cleansing in the 21st century".<ref name="J. Koulouriotis">Template:Cite web</ref> During the course of the civil war, Assad ordered depopulation campaigns throughout the country to re-shape its demography in favor of his regime and the military tactics have been compared to the persecutions of the Bosnian war. Between 2011 and 2015, Ba'athist militias are reported to have committed 49 ethno-sectarian massacres for the purpose of implementing its social engineering agenda in the country. Alawite loyalist militias known as the Shabiha have been launched into Sunni villages and towns, perpetrating numerous anti-Sunni massacres. These include the Houla, Bayda and Baniyas massacres, Al-Qubeir massacre, Al-Hasawiya massacre, and others which have resulted in hundreds of deaths with hundreds of thousands of residents fleeing under threats of regime persecution and sexual violence. Pogroms and deportations were pronounced in central Syrian regions and Alawite majority coastal areas where the Syrian military and Hezbollah prioritise the establishment of strategic control by expelling Sunni residents and bringing in Iran-backed Shia militants.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="J. Koulouriotis"/><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In 2016, UN officials criticised Bashar al-Assad for pursuing demographic engineering and ethnic cleansing in Darayya district in Damascus under the guise of de-escalation deals.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
War crimes
Template:Further Template:Quote box
Syrian government forces have pursued mass-killings of civilian populations as part of its war strategy throughout the conflict and is responsible for inflicting more than 90% of the total civilian deaths in the Syrian civil war.<ref name="auto1">*Template:Cite news
- Template:Cite web
- Template:Cite news
- Template:Cite web
- Template:Cite web
- Template:Cite web</ref> The UN estimates a minimum of 306,000 civilian deaths occurred between 2011 and 2021.<ref name="Farge"/><ref name="ohchr.org"/> As of 2022, the total death toll has risen to approximately 580,000.<ref name="GCR2P2">Template:Cite web</ref> An additional 154,000 civilians have been forcibly disappeared or subject to arbitrary detentions across Syria between 2011 and 2023. As of 2023, more than 135,000 individuals are being tortured, incarcerated or dead in Ba'athist prison networks, including thousands of women and children.<ref>* Template:Cite news
- Template:Cite web
- Template:Cite news
- Template:Cite web
- Template:Cite web</ref>
Since 2011, the Assad regime has arrested and detained children without trial until the age of 18, after which they are transferred to Syrian military field courts and killed. A 2024 investigative report by the Syrian Investigative Journalism Unit (SIRAJ) identified 24 Syrian children who were forcibly disappeared, had their assets confiscated, detained and later killed after they reached the age of 18. The report, based on inside sources within the Assad government, interviews with victims' families, and public sources, estimated that more than 6,000 detainees under the age of 18 were sentenced to death in the Sednaya Prison and an Assadist military field court in Al-Dimas between 2014 and 2017, citing eyewitness accounts of an insider within the Ba'athist military police.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Numerous politicians, dissidents, authors and journalists have nicknamed Assad as the "butcher" of Syria for his war-crimes, anti-Sunni sectarian mass-killings, chemical weapons attacks and ethnic cleansing campaigns.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> The Federal Bureau of Investigation has stated that at least 10 European citizens were tortured by the Assad government while detained during the Syrian civil war, potentially leaving Assad open to prosecution by individual European countries for war crimes.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="CNN sarin report" /> UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay stated in December 2013 that UN investigations directly implicated Bashar al-Assad in perpetrating crimes against humanity and pursuing an extermination strategy developed "at the highest level of government, including the head of state."<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Stephen Rapp, the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, stated in 2014 that the crimes committed by Assad are the worst seen since those of Nazi Germany.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In March 2015, Rapp further stated that the case against Assad is "much better" than those against Slobodan Milošević of Serbia or Charles Taylor of Liberia, both of whom were indicted by international tribunals.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Charles Lister, Director of the Countering Terror and Extremism Program at Middle East Institute, describes Bashar al-Assad as the "21st century's biggest war criminal".<ref name="auto"/>
In a February 2015 interview with the BBC, Assad dismissed accusations that the Syrian Arab Air Force used barrel bombs as "childish", claiming that his forces have never used these types of "barrel" bombs and responded with a joke about not using "cooking pots" either.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The BBC Middle East editor conducting the interview, Jeremy Bowen, later described Assad's statement regarding barrel bombs as "patently not true".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> As soon as demonstrations arose in 2011–2012, Bashar al-Assad opted to implement the "Samson option", the characteristic approach of the Neo-ba'athist regime since the era of Hafez al-Assad; wherein protests were violently suppressed and demonstrators were shot and fired at directly by the armed forces. However, unlike Hafez; Bashar had even less loyalty and was politically fragile, exacerbated by alienation of the majority of the population. As a result, Bashar chose to crack down on dissent far more comprehensively and harshly than his father; and a mere allegation of collaboration was reason enough to get assassinated.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>
Nadim Shehadi, the director of The Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies, stated that "In the early 1990s, Saddam Hussein was massacring his people and we were worried about the weapons inspectors," and claimed that "Assad did that too. He kept us busy with chemical weapons when he massacred his people."<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Contrasting the policies of Hafez al-Assad and that of his son Bashar, former Syrian vice-president and Ba'athist dissident Abdul Halim Khaddam states:
The Father had a mind and the Son has a loss of reason. How could the army use its force and the security apparatus with all its might to destroy Syria because of a protest against the mistakes of one of your security officials. The father would act differently. Father Hafez hit Hama after he encircled it, warned and then hit Hama after a long siege... But his son is different. On the subject of Daraa, Bashar gave instructions to open fire on the demonstrators.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>
Human rights organisations and criminal investigators have documented Assad's war crimes and sent it to the International Criminal Court for indictment.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Since Syria is not a party to the Rome Statute, International Criminal Court requires authorisation from the UN Security Council to send Bashar al-Assad to tribunal. As this gets consistently vetoed by Assad's primary backer Russia, ICC prosecutions have not transpired. On the other hand, courts in various European countries have begun prosecuting and convicting senior Ba'ath party members, Syrian military commanders and Mukhabarat officials charged with war crimes.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In September 2015, France began an inquiry into Assad for crimes against humanity, with French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius stating "Faced with these crimes that offend the human conscience, this bureaucracy of horror, faced with this denial of the values of humanity, it is our responsibility to act against the impunity of the killers".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
In February 2016, head of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, Paulo Pinheiro, told reporters: "The mass scale of deaths of detainees suggests that the government of Syria is responsible for acts that amount to extermination as a crime against humanity." The UN Commission reported finding "unimaginable abuses", including women and children as young as seven perishing while being held by Syrian authorities. The report also stated: "There are reasonable grounds to believe that high-ranking officersTemplate:Sndincluding the heads of branches and directoratesTemplate:Sndcommanding these detention facilities, those in charge of the military police, as well as their civilian superiors, knew of the vast number of deaths occurring in detention facilities ... yet did not take action to prevent abuse, investigate allegations or prosecute those responsible".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
In March 2016, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs led by New Jersey Rep. Chris Smith called on the Obama administration to create a war crimes tribunal to investigate and prosecute violations "whether committed by the officials of the Government of Syria or other parties to the civil war".<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
In June 2018, Germany's chief prosecutor issued an international arrest warrant for one of Assad's most senior military officials, Jamil Hassan.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Hassan is the head of Syria's powerful Air Force Intelligence Directorate. Detention centers run by Air Force Intelligence are among the most notorious in Syria, and thousands are believed to have died because of torture or neglect. Charges filed against Hassan claim he had command responsibility over the facilities and therefore knew of the abuse. The move against Hassan marked an important milestone of prosecutors trying to bring senior members of Assad's inner circle to trial for war crimes.
In an investigative report about the Tadamon Massacre, Professors Uğur Ümit Üngör and Annsar Shahhoud found witnesses who attested that Assad gave orders for the Syrian Military Intelligence to direct the Shabiha to kill civilians.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
2023–2025 arrest warrant and legal proceedings
On 15 November 2023, France issued an arrest warrant against Assad over the use of banned chemical weapons against civilians in Syria.<ref name=":1">Template:Cite news</ref> In May 2024, French anti-terrorism prosecutors requested the Paris appeals court to consider revoking Assad's arrest warrant, asserting his absolute immunity as a serving head of state.<ref name=":3">Template:Cite news</ref> On 26 June 2024, the Paris appeals court determined that the international arrest warrant issued by France against Assad for alleged complicity in war crimes during the Syrian civil war remains valid. This decision was confirmed by attorneys involved in the case, who said the ruling marked the first instance where a national court acknowledged that the personal immunity of a serving head of state is not absolute.<ref name=":3" /> On 25 July 2025, the French Court of Cassation annulled Assad's arrest warrant, saying that he enjoyed presidential immunity at the time of the attack, but allowed the investigations against him to continue and new warrants to be issued against him.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
On 20 January 2025, a French court issued an arrest warrant against Assad for the 2017 killing of 59-year old dual French-Syrian national Salah Abou Nabout in a bombing in Deraa.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> On 2 September 2025, a French court issued an arrest warrant against Assad for the 2012 killings of journalists Marie Colvin and Remi Ochlik in Homs.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> On 27 September 2025, a Syrian court issued an arrest warrant for Assad over the 2011 Daraa incidents, paving the way for its circulation through Interpol and international prosecution. The arrest warrant cited charges such as premeditated murder, torture leading to death, and deprivation of liberty, and was based on lawsuits submitted by the families of victims in Daraa governorate over events that occurred in November 2011.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Chemical attacks
Template:See also The Syrian military has deployed chemical warfare as a systematic military strategy in the Syrian civil war, and is estimated to have committed over 300 chemical attacks, targeting civilian populations throughout the course of the conflict.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Investigation conducted by the GPPi research institute documented 336 confirmed attacks involving chemical weapons in Syria between 23 December 2012 and 18 January 2019. The study attributed 98% of the total verified chemical attacks to the Assad's regime. Almost 90% of the attacks had occurred after the Ghouta chemical attack in August 2013.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
.JPG){kind=link}
Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention and OPCW member state in October 2013, and there are currently three OPCW missions with UN mandates to investigate chemical weapons issues in Syria. These are the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to verify Syrian declarations of CW Programme; OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) tasked to identify the chemical attacks and type of weapons used; and the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) which investigates the perpetrators of the chemical attacks. The conclusions are submitted to the United Nations bodies.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
In April 2021, Syria was suspended from OPCW through the public vote of member states, for not co-operating with the body's Investigation Identification Team (IIT) and violating the Chemical Weapons Convention.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Findings of another investigation report published the OPCW-IIT in July 2021 concluded that the Syrian regime had engaged in confirmed chemical attacks at least 17 times, out of the reported 77 chemical weapon attacks attributed to Assadist forces.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> As of March 2023, independent United Nations inquiry commissions have confirmed at least nine chemical attacks committed by forces loyal to the Assad government.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
.JPG){kind=link}
The deadliest chemical attack have been the Ghouta chemical attacks, when Assad government forces launched the nerve agent sarin into civilian areas during its brutal Siege of Eastern Ghouta in early hours of 21 August 2013. Thousands of infected and dying victims flooded the nearby hospitals, showing symptoms such as foaming, body convulsions and other neurotoxic symptoms. An estimated 1,100–1,500 civilians; including women and children, are estimated to have been killed in the attacks.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The attack was internationally condemned and represented the deadliest use of chemical weapons since the Iran-Iraq war.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> On 21 August 2022, United States government marked the ninth anniversary of Ghouta Chemical attacks stating: "United States remembers and honors the victims and survivors of the Ghouta attack and the many other chemical attacks we assess the Assad regime has launched. We condemn in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone, under any circumstances... The United States calls on the Assad regime to fully declare and destroy its chemical weapons program... and for the regime to allow the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' Declaration Assessment Team."<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
In April 2017, a sarin chemical attack on Khan Sheikhoun killed more than 80 people.Template:Sfn<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="Entous, Nissenbaum" /> In response, U.S. president Donald Trump ordered an missile strike against the Syrian Shayrat base.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="WhyWasSharyatAirbaseBombed">Template:Cite news</ref> A joint report from the UN and international chemical weapons inspectors concluded that Assad regime perpetrated the sarin attack.<ref name="CNN sarin report">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="ReutersSyriaChemicalWeaponsKhanSheikhoun">Template:Cite news</ref>
In April 2018, a chemical attack occurred in Douma, prompting the U.S. and its allies to accuse Assad of violating international law and initiated joint missile strikes at chemical weapons facilities in Damascus and Homs. Both Syria and Russia denied involvement.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The third report published on 27 January 2023 by the OPCW-IIT concluded that the Assad regime was responsible for the 2018 Douma chemical attack which killed at least 43 civilians.Template:Efn
Holocaust denial
Template:See also In a speech delivered at the Ba'ath party's central committee meeting in December 2023, Bashar al-Assad claimed that there was "no evidence" of the killings of six million Jews during the Holocaust. Emphasising that Jews were not the sole victims of Nazi extermination campaigns, Assad alleged that the Holocaust was "politicized" by Allied powers to facilitate the mass-deportation of European Jews to Palestine, and that it was used as an excuse to justify the creation of Israel. Assad also accused the U.S. government of financially and militarily sponsoring the rise of Nazism during the inter-war period.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Public image
Domestic opposition and support
.svg){kind=link}
The secular resistance to Assad rule is mainly represented by the Syrian National Council and National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, two political bodies that constitute a coalition of centre-left and right-wing conservative factions of the Syrian opposition. Military commanders and civilian leaders of Free Syrian Army militias are represented in these councils. The coalition represents the political wing of the Syrian Interim Government and seeks the democratic transition of Syria through grass-roots activism, protests and armed resistance to overthrow the Ba'athist dictatorship.<ref name="nahex">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="cnn">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> A less influential faction within the Syrian opposition is the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC), a coalition of left-wing socialist parties that seek to end the rule of Assad family but without foreign involvement. Established in June 2011, major parties in the NCC coalition are the Democratic Arab Socialist Union, Syrian Democratic People's Party and the Communist Labour Party.<ref name="Guide to the Syrian opposition">Template:Cite news</ref>
National Democratic Rally (NDR) was an older left-wing opposition coalition of socialist parties formed in 1980, but banned by the Baathist government. NDR was active during the nationwide protests of the 1980s and the Damascus Spring of the 2000s.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> During the early years of the civil war, the Druze in Syria primarily sought to remain neutral, "seeking to stay out of the conflict". Druze-Israeli politician Majalli Wahabi claimed in 2016 that over half support the Assad government despite its relative weakness in Druze areas.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The "Men of Dignity" movement, which had sought to remain neutral and to defend Druze areas,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> blamed the government after its leader Sheikh Wahid al-Balous was assassinated and organised large scale protests which left six government security personnel dead.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Druze community became fervently opposed to the Assad government over time and has been vocal about its opposition to increasing Iranian interference in Syria.<ref name="Abdulhamid">Template:Cite journal</ref> In August 2023, mass protests against Assad regime erupted in the Druze-majority city of Suweida,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="Sinjab">Template:Cite news</ref> which eventually spread to other regions of Southern Syria.<ref name="Sinjab"/><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Druze cleric Hikmat al-Hajiri, religious leader of Syrian Druze community, has declared war against "Iranian invasion of the country".<ref name="Abdulhamid"/> Syrian Sufi scholar Muhammad al-Yaqoubi, a fervent opponent of both the Ba'athist regime and Islamic State group, has described Assad's rule as a "reign of terror" that wreaked havoc and enormous misery on the Syrian populace.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
The regime's support base consisted of Ba'athist loyalists who dominate Syrian politics, trade unions, youth organisations, students unions, bureaucracy and armed forces.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Ba'ath party institutions and its political activities form the "vital pillars of regime survival". Family networks of politicians in the Ba'ath party-led National Progressive Front (NPF) and businessmen loyal to the Assad family form another pole of support. Electoral listing is supervised by Ba'ath party leadership which expels candidates not deemed "sufficiently loyal".<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Although it has been reported at various stages of the Syrian civil war that religious minorities such as the Alawites and Christians in Syria favour the Assad government because of its secularism,<ref>"Loyalty to Assad runs deep on Syrian coast Template:Webarchive". The Christian Science Monitor. 22 January 2014.</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> opposition exists among Assyrian Christians who have claimed that the Assad government seeks to use them as "puppets" and deny their distinct ethnicity, which is non-Arab.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Although Syria's Alawite community forms Bashar al-Assad's core support base and dominate the military and security apparatus,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Syria's Alawites: The People Behind Assad Template:Webarchive The Wall Street Journal, 25 June 2015.</ref> in April 2016, BBC News reported that Alawite leaders released a document seeking to distance themselves from Assad.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Kurdish Supreme Committee was a coalition of 13 Kurdish political parties opposed to Assad regime. Before its dissolution in 2015, the committee consisted of KNC and PYD.<ref name="Guide to the Syrian opposition"/> Circassians in Syria have also become strong opponents of the regime as Ba'athist crackdowns and massacres across Syria intensified viciously; and members of Circassian ethnic minority have attempted to escape Syria, fearing persecution.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> In 2014, the Christian Syriac Military Council, the largest Christian organisation in Syria, allied with the Free Syrian Army opposed to Assad,<ref name="SyriacMilitaryCouncil">Template:Cite web</ref> joining other Syrian Christian militias such as the Sutoro who had joined the Syrian opposition against the Assad government.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, commander of the Tahrir al-Sham rebel militia, condemned Assad regime for converting Syria "into an ongoing earthquake the past 12 years", in the context of the 2023 Turkey–Syria earthquakes.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
In June 2014, Assad won a disputed presidential election held in government-controlled areas (and boycotted in opposition-held areas<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> and Kurdish areas governed by the Democratic Union Party<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>) with 88.7% of the vote. Turnout was estimated to be 73.42% of eligible voters, including those in rebel-controlled areas.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The regime's electoral commission also disqualified millions of Syrian citizens displaced outside the country from voting.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Independent observers and academic scholarship unanimously describe the event as a sham election organised to legitimise Assad's rule.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In his inauguration ceremony, Bashar denounced the opposition as "terrorists" and "traitors"; while attacking the West for backing what he described as the "fake Arab spring".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Times of Israel reported that although various individuals interviewed in a "Sunni-dominated, middle-class neighborhood of central Damascus" exhibited fealty for Assad; it was not possible to discern the actual support for the regime due to the ubiquitous influence of the secret police in the society.<ref>"Syria's Assad reelected with 88.7% of vote Template:Webarchive". The Times of Israel. 4 June 2014.</ref> Ba'athist dissident Abdul Halim Khaddam who had served as Syrian Vice President during the tenures of both Hafez and Bashar, disparaged Bashar al-Assad as a pawn in Iran's imperial scheme. Contrasting the power dynamics that existed under both the autocrats, Khaddam stated:
[Bashar] is not like his father.. He never allowed the Iranians to intervene in Syrian affairs.. During Hafez Assad's time, an Iranian delegation arrived in Syria and attempted to convert some of the Muslim Alawite Syrians to Shia Islam... Assad ordered his minister of foreign Affairs to summon the Iranian ambassador to deliver an ultimatum: The delegation has 24 hours to exit Syria.... They had no power [during Hafez's rule], unlike Bashar who gave them [Iranians] power and control.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
International opposition
Foreign journalists and political observers who travelled to Syria have described it as the most "ruthless police state" in the Arab World. Assad's violent repression of Damascus Spring of the early 2000s and the publication of a UN report that implicated him in the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, exacerbated Syria's post-Cold War isolation.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Fisher">Template:Cite news</ref> Following global outrage against Assad regime's deadly crackdown on the Arab Spring protestors which led to the Syrian civil war, scorched-earth policy against the civilian populations resulting in more than half a million deaths, mass murders and systematic deployment of chemical warfare throughout the conflict; Bashar al-Assad became an international pariah and numerous world leaders have urged him to resign.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Fisher"/><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>
Since 2011, Bashar al-Assad has lost recognition from several international organisations such as the Arab League (in 2011),<ref name="NYT Arab League">Template:Cite news</ref> Union for the Mediterranean (in 2011)<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> and Organisation of Islamic Co-operation (in 2012).<ref name="CNN OIC">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> United States, European Union, Turkey, Arab League and various countries began enforcing broad sets of sanctions against Syrian regime from 2011, with the objective of forcing Assad to resign and assist in a political solution to the crisis.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> International bodies have criticised one-sided elections organised by Assad government during the conflict. In the 2014 London conference of countries of the Friends of Syria group, British Foreign Secretary William Hague characterised Syrian elections as a "parody of democracy" and denounced the regime's "utter disregard for human life" for perpetrating war-crimes and state-terror on the Syrian population.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Assad's policy of holding elections under the circumstances of an ongoing civil war were also rebuked by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.<ref name="UN">Template:Cite news</ref>
Georgia suspended all relations with Syria following Bashar al-Assad's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, condemning his government as a "Russian-manipulated regime" that supported Russian occupation and "ethnic cleansing".Template:Efn Following Assad's strong backing of Russian invasion of Ukraine and recognition of the breakaway separatist republics, Ukraine cut off all diplomatic relations with Syria in June 2022. Describing Assad's policies as "worthless", Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy pledged to expand further sanctions against Syria.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In March 2023, National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine put into effect a range of sanctions targeting 141 firms and 300 individuals linked to Assad regime, Russian weapons manufacturers and Iranian dronemakers. This was days after Assad's visit to Moscow, wherein he justified Russian invasion of Ukraine as a fight against "old and new Nazis". Bashar al-Assad, Prime Minister Hussein Arnous and Foreign Minister Faisal Mikdad were amongst the individuals who were sanctioned.Template:Efn Sanctions also involved freezing of all Syrian state properties in Ukraine, curtailment of monetary transactions, termination of economic commitments and recision of all official Ukrainian awards.<ref name="The New Arab"/> Syria formally broke its diplomatic ties to Ukraine on 20 July, citing the principle of reciprocity.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
3.jpg){kind=link}
In April 2023, a French court declared three high-ranking Ba'athist security officials guilty of crimes against humanity, torture, and various war-crimes against French-Syrian citizens. These included Ali Mamlouk, director of National Security Bureau of Syrian Ba'ath party and Jamil Hassan, former head of the Syrian Air Force Intelligence Directorate.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> France had issued international arrest warrants against the three officers over the case in 2018.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In May 2023, French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna publicly demanded the prosecution of Bashar al-Assad for engaging in chemical warfare and killing hundreds of thousands of people; branding him as "the enemy of his own people".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> On 15 November 2023, France issued an arrest warrant against Assad for use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria.<ref name=":1" />
Left-wing
Bashar al-Assad is widely criticised by left-wing activists and intellectuals world-wide for appropriating leftist ideologies and its socialist, progressive slogans as a cover for his own family rule and to empower a loyalist clique of elites at the expense of ordinary Syrians. His close alliance with clergy-ruled Khomeinist, Iran and its sectarian militant networks; while simultaneously pursuing a policy of locking up left-wing critics of Assad family has been subject to heavy criticism.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
The Egyptian branch of the Iraqi Ba'ath movement has declared its strong support to the Syrian revolution; denouncing Ba'athist Syria as a repressive dictatorship controlled by the "Assad gang". It has attacked Assad family's Ba'athist credentials, accusing the Syrian Ba'ath party of acting as the borderguards of Israel ever since its overthrowal of the Ba'athist National Command during the 1966 coup d'état. Describing Bashar al-Assad as a disgraceful person for inviting hostile powers like Iran to Syria, Egyptian Ba'athists have urged the Syrian revolutionaries to unite in their efforts to overthrow the Assad regime and resist foreign imperialism.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Describing Assad's regime as a mafia state that thrives on corruption and sectarianism, Lebanese socialist academic Gilbert Achcar stated:
Bashar Assad's cousin became the richest man in the country, controlling – it is widely believed – over half of the economy. And that's only one member of the ruling clan... The clan functions as a real mafia, and has been ruling the country for several decades. This constitutes the deep root of the explosion, in combination with the fact that the Syrian regime is one of the most despotic in the region. Compared to Assad's Syria, Mubarak's Egypt was a beacon of democracy and political freedom!... What is specific to this regime is that Assad's father has reshaped and reconstructed the state apparatus, especially its hard nucleus – the armed forces – in order to create a Pretorian guard for itself. The army, especially its elite forces, is tied to the regime itself in various ways, most prominently through the use of sectarianism. Even people who had never heard of Syria before know now that the regime is based on one minority in the country – about 10% of the population; the Alawites.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) in Lebanon has taken an anti-Assad stance and organised mass-protests in support of the Syrian revolution. In August 2012, PSP publicly denounced the Assad government as a "killing machine" engaged in slaughtering Syrian people. PSP leader Ayman Kamaleddine demanded the expulsion of the Syrian ambassador from Lebanon, describing him as "the representative of the murderer regime in Lebanon".Template:Citation needed
International support
Left-wing
Left-wing support for Assad had been split since the start of the Syrian civil war;Template:SfnTemplate:Update inline the Assad government was accused of cynically manipulating sectarian identity and anti-imperialism to continue its worst activities.Template:Sfn
In 2017, then-Democratic congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard met with then-president Bashar al-Assad on an unannounced visit to Syria.<ref name=":4">Template:Cite news</ref> The visit was the first by a U.S. lawmaker since 2011,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> and made under a travel warning issued by the United States Department of State, which continues to warn U.S. citizens against all travel to the country.<ref name=":5">Template:Cite web</ref> Gabbard did not consult with the House speaker or State Department before meeting with Assad.<ref name=":5" /> The meeting came after Gabbard introduced legislation that would, in her words, "end our country's illegal war to overthrow the Syrian government."<ref name=":5" /> She said that Assad is "a brutal dictator. Just like Saddam Hussein. Just like Gadhafi in Libya. The reason that I'm so outspoken on this issue of ending these wasteful regime-change wars is because I have seen firsthand this high human cost of war and the impact that it has on my fellow brothers and sisters in uniform."<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Following her visit to Syria, Gabbard expressed doubts that the Assad regime was behind chemical weapons attacks in Syria.<ref name=":4" /><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Gabbard has continued to defend her comments, and in 2019 stated that Assad was "not the enemy of the United States because Syria does not pose a direct threat to the United States".<ref name=":4" />
Some heads of state or governments declared their support for Assad, including North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> After declaring victory in the 2014 elections, Assad received congratulations from President of Venezuela Nicolás Maduro,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> President of Algeria Abdelaziz Bouteflika,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> President of Guyana Donald Ramotar,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> President of South Africa Jacob Zuma,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> President of Nicaragua Daniel Ortega,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> and Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of Fatah and President of the State of Palestine.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Palestinian Marxist–Leninist militant group Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) supported Assad during the Syrian civil war. As a result of this stance, the Iranian government increased its military and financial funding to the PFLP.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Right-wing
Bashar al-Assad's regime has received support from prominent white nationalist, neo-Nazi and far-right figures in Europe, who were attracted by his "war on terror" discourse against Islamists during the period of European refugee crisis. Assad's bombings of Syrian cities are admired in the Islamophobic discourse of far-right circles, which considers Muslims as a civilisational enemy. American white supremacists often praise Assad as an authoritarian bulwark against what they view as the forces of "Islamic extremism" and globalism; and several pro-Assad slogans were chanted in the neo-Nazi Unite the Right rally held in Charlottesville in 2017.Template:Efn<ref name=":8" />
Nick Griffin, the former leader of the British National Party (BNP), was formerly an official ambassador and guest of the Syrian government;<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> due to public controversy, the Assad government publicly disassociated itself from him after his trip to Syria in 2014.<ref name=":8">Template:Cite news</ref>
International public relations
.jpg){kind=link}
_06.jpg){kind=link}
In order to promote their image and media-portrayal overseas, Bashar al-Assad and his wife Asma al-Assad hired U.S. and UK based PR firms and consultants.<ref name=turnedtowest>Template:Cite news</ref> In particular, these secured photoshoots for Asma al-Assad with fashion and celebrity magazines, including VogueTemplate:'s March 2011 "A Rose in the Desert".<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> These firms included Bell Pottinger and Brown Lloyd James, with the latter being paid $5,000 a month for their services.<ref name=turnedtowest/><ref name=PRcomeback/>
At the outset of the Syrian civil war, Syrian government networks were hacked by the group Anonymous, revealing that an ex-Al Jazeera journalist had been hired to advise Assad on how to manipulate the public opinion of the U.S. Among the advice was the suggestion to compare the popular uprising against the regime to the Occupy Wall Street protests.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In a separate email leak several months later by the Supreme Council of the Syrian Revolution, which were published by The Guardian, it was revealed that Assad's consultants had coordinated with an Iranian government media advisor.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In March 2015, an expanded version of the aforementioned leaks was handed to the Lebanese NOW News website and published the following month.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
After the Syrian civil war began, the Assads started a social media campaign which included building a presence on Facebook, YouTube, and most notably Instagram.<ref name="PRcomeback">Template:Cite news</ref> A Twitter account for Assad was reportedly activated; however, it remained unverified.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> This resulted in much criticism, and was described by The Atlantic Wire as "a propaganda campaign that ultimately has made the [Assad] family look worse".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The Assad government has also allegedly arrested activists for creating Facebook groups that the government disapproved of,<ref name=Dissent2014/> and has appealed directly to Twitter to remove accounts it disliked.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The social media campaign, as well as the previously leaked emails, led to comparisons with Hannah Arendt's A Report on the Banality of Evil by The Guardian, The New York Times and the Financial Times.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
In October 2014, 27,000 photographs depicting torture committed by the Assad government were put on display at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Lawyers were hired to write a report on the images by the British law firm Carter-Ruck, which in turn was funded by the Government of Qatar.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In November 2014, the Quilliam Foundation reported that a propaganda campaign, which they claimed had the "full backing of Assad", spread false reports about the deaths of Western-born jihadists in order to deflect attention from the government's alleged war crimes. Using a picture of a Chechen fighter from the Second Chechen War, pro-Assad media reports disseminated to Western media outlets, leading them to publish a false story regarding the death of a non-existent British jihadist.<ref name="Simpson 2014">Template:Cite news</ref>
In 2015, Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war in support of Assad, and on 21 October 2015, Assad flew to Moscow and met with Russian president Vladimir Putin, who said regarding the civil war: "this decision can be made only by the Syrian people. Syria is a friendly country. And we are ready to support it not only militarily but politically as well."<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Personal life
Assad speaks fluent English and basic conversational French, having studied at the Franco-Arab al-Hurriyah school in Damascus.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Bashar al-Assad is an Alawite Muslim.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> Bashar performed the hajj pilgrimage twice, in 1999 and in 2000.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>
In December 2000, Assad married Asma Akhras, a British citizen of Syrian origin from Acton, London.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite newsTemplate:Cbignore</ref> In 2001, Asma gave birth to their first child, a son named Hafez after the child's grandfather Hafez al-Assad. Bashar al-Assad's son Hafez graduated from Moscow State University in the summer of 2023 with a master's thesis in number theory.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Their daughter Zein was born in 2003, followed by their second son Karim in 2004.<ref name=New_Republic_2013/>
Assad's sister, Bushra al-Assad, and mother, Anisa Makhlouf, left Syria in 2012 and 2013, respectively, to live in the United Arab Emirates.<ref name="New_Republic_2013">Template:Cite magazine</ref> Makhlouf died in Damascus in 2016.<ref name=aje>Template:Cite news</ref>
On 23 December 2024, it was reported that Asma al-Assad had filed for divorce after being dissatisfied with life in Moscow.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> However, the reports were denied by the Russian government.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
Electoral history
| Year | Office | Party | Votes received | Result | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | % | Template:Abbr. | Swing | |||||
| 2000 | President of Syria | rowspan="4" style="background:Template:Party color;" | | Ba'ath Party | 8,689,871 | 99.74% | 1st | Template:N/a | Template:Won |
| 2007 | 11,199,445 | 99.82% | 1st | +0.08 | Template:Won | |||
| 2014 | 10,319,723 | 92.90% | 1st | -6.92 | Template:Won | |||
| 2021 | 13,540,860 | 95.19% | 1st | +2.29 | Template:Won | |||
Awards and honours
Template:Color box Revoked and returned awards and honours. Template:Clear
See also
- List of international presidential trips made by Bashar al-Assad
- Presidency of Hafez al-Assad
- Foreign Policy of Bashar al-Assad
- Proposed handover of Bashar al-Assad to Syria
Explanatory notes
References
Citations
General and cited references
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
- Template:Cite book
Further reading
Reports
Articles
- Template:Cite web
- Template:Cite news
- Template:Cite journal
- Template:Cite web
- Template:Cite web
- Template:Cite web
- Template:Cite web
External links
- Template:Official website
- Template:C-SPAN
- Template:Guardian topic
- Template:NYTtopic
- Template:IMDb name
Template:S-start Template:S-off Template:S-bef Template:S-ttl Template:S-aft |- Template:S-ppo Template:S-bef Template:S-ttl Template:S-aft |- Template:S-end
Template:Presidents of Syria Template:Ba'ath Party Template:Arab Spring Template:Syrian Civil War Template:Arab nationalism Template:Portal bar Template:Authority control
- Pages with broken file links
- Bashar al-Assad
- 1965 births
- Living people
- 20th-century Syrian politicians
- 21st-century Syrian politicians
- Anti-American sentiment in the Middle East
- Antisemitism in Syria
- Anti-Zionism in the Arab world
- Assad family
- Ba'athism
- Children of presidents of Syria
- Damascus University alumni
- Exiled politicians
- Left-wing politics in Asia
- Fugitives wanted by France
- Fugitives wanted on crimes against humanity charges
- Fugitives wanted on war crimes charges
- Grand Cordons of the National Order of the Cedar
- Syrian Holocaust deniers
- Homs Military Academy alumni
- Leaders of political parties
- Members of the National Command of the Ba'ath Party (Syrian-dominated faction)
- Members of the Regional Command of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Syria Region
- Muslim socialists
- People of the Syrian civil war
- People stripped of honorary degrees
- Politicians from Damascus
- Politicide perpetrators
- Presidents of Syria
- Recipients of the Order of Prince Yaroslav the Wise, 1st class
- Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List
- Syrian Alawites
- Syrian Arab nationalists
- Syrian exiles
- Syrian expatriates in Russia
- Syrian expatriates in the United Kingdom
- Syrian mass murderers
- Syrian nationalists
- Syrian male writers
- Syrian ophthalmologists
- Syrian war criminals