Suez Crisis

The Suez Crisis,Template:Efn also known as the second Arab–Israeli war,<ref name="Ross20042">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Isacoff20062">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Caplan19832">Template:Cite book</ref> the Tripartite AggressionTemplate:Efn in the Arab world<ref>Template:Cite magazine</ref> and the Sinai WarTemplate:Efn in Israel,Template:Efn was a British–French–Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956. Israel invaded on 29 October, having done so with the primary objective of re-opening the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as the recent tightening of the eight-year-long Egyptian blockade further prevented Israeli passage.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> After issuing a joint ultimatum for a ceasefire, the United Kingdom and France joined the Israelis on 31 October, seeking to depose Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and regain control of the Suez Canal, which Nasser had nationalised earlier in the year.Template:Efn

Shortly after the invasion began, the three countries came under heavy political pressure from both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as from the United Nations, eventually prompting their withdrawal from Egypt.

The crisis demonstrated that the United Kingdom and France could no longer pursue their independent foreign policy without consent from the United States. Israel's four-month-long occupation of the Egyptian-occupied Gaza Strip and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula enabled it to attain freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran, but the Suez Canal was closed from October 1956 to March 1957.<ref name="Pierre20142">Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

The crisis strengthened Nasser's standing and led to international humiliation for the British—with historians arguing that it signified the end of its role as a world superpower—as well as the French amid the Cold War.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite bookTemplate:Page needed</ref><ref name="Economist20062">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Citation</ref><ref name="history_com_12">Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> As a result of the conflict, the UN established an emergency force to police and patrol the Egypt–Israel border. For his diplomatic efforts in resolving the conflict through UN initiatives, Canadian external affairs minister Lester B. Pearson received a Nobel Peace Prize.

Analysts have argued that the crisis may have emboldened the USSR, prompting the Soviet invasion of Hungary.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Background

The Suez Canal before 1945

The location of the Suez Canal, which connects the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean via the Red Sea.

The Suez Canal opened in 1869, financed by the French and Egyptian governments.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> The canal was operated by the Suez Company, an Egyptian-chartered company; the area surrounding the canal remained sovereign Egyptian territory.

The canal was strategically important, as it provided the shortest ocean link between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.

In 1875, as a result of debt and financial crisis, Egypt was forced to sell its shares in the operating company to the British government. They obtained a 44% share in the company for £4 million (equivalent to £Template:Inflation million in Template:Inflation/year). With the 1882 invasion and occupation of Egypt, the UK took de facto control of the country as well as the canal, its finances and operations.

The 1888 Convention of Constantinople declared the canal a neutral zone under British protection.<ref name="SIS: Suez Canal">Template:Cite web</ref> In ratifying it, the Ottoman Empire agreed to permit international shipping to pass freely through the canal, in time of war and peace.<ref name="Sachar">Template:HarvnbTemplate:Page needed</ref>

Despite this convention, Britain closed the canal on several occasions. During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, the British denied the Russian Baltic Fleet use of the canal after the Dogger Bank incident and forced it to sail around Africa, giving the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces time to consolidate their position. During the First World War, Britain and France closed the canal to non-Allied shipping.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

1945-1952

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Britain's military complex at Suez was one of the largest military installations in the world. The Suez base was an important part of Britain's strategic position in the Middle East; however, it became a source of growing tension in Anglo-Egyptian relations.<ref name="Darwin 207"/>

The canal continued to be strategically important after the Second World War for oil shipment.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 12">Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> Western Europe thenTemplate:When imported two million barrels per day from the Middle East, 1,200,000 by tanker through the canal, and another 800,000 via pipeline from the Persian Gulf (Trans-Arabian Pipeline) and Kirkuk (Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline) to the Mediterranean. These pipeline routes were prone to instability, which led British leaders to prefer to use the sea route through the canal.

Egypt's domestic politics were experiencing a radical change. Unrest began to manifest in the growth of radical political groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and an increasingly hostile attitude towards Britain and its presence. Added to this anti-British fervour was the role Britain had played in the creation of Israel.<ref name="Darwin 207">Template:Harvnb</ref>

In October 1951, the Egyptian government unilaterally abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the terms of which granted Britain a lease on the Suez base for 20 more years.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> Britain refused to withdraw from Suez, relying upon its treaty rights, as well as the presence of the Suez garrison. This resulted in an escalation in violent hostility towards Britain and its troops in Egypt.Template:Citation needed

The Egyptian Revolution

In January 1952, British forces attempted to disarm a troublesome auxiliary police force barracks in Ismailia, resulting in the deaths of 41 Egyptians.<ref name="Darwin 208">Template:Harvnb</ref> This led to anti-Western riots in Cairo resulting in damage to property and the deaths of foreigners.<ref name="Darwin 208" /> This proved to be a catalyst for the removal of the Egyptian monarchy. On 23 July 1952 a military coup by the Egyptian nationalist 'Free Officers Movement'—led by Muhammad Neguib and Gamal Abdul Nasser—overthrew King Farouk.

After the 1952 Egyptian Revolution

Egypt and the United States

Template:Main American policy was torn between a desire to maintain good relations with NATO allies such as Britain and France who were major colonial powers, and to align Third World nationalists such as Nasser, who resented British and French influence, with the Free World camp.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref><ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 16732">Template:Harvnb</ref>

The Eisenhower administration saw the Near East as a gap into which Soviet influence could be projected, and which accordingly required an American-supported NATO-type organisation (the Middle East Defense Organization, or MEDO).<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 16732" /><ref name="Sayed-Ahmed 1993, p. 9032">Template:Harvnb</ref><ref name="Burns, William p. 1132">Template:Harvnb</ref> The CIA offered Nasser a $3 million bribe if he would join the proposed Middle East Defense Organization; Nasser took the money, but refused to join.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> Nasser wanted an Egyptian-dominated Arab League to be the principal defence organisation in the Near East, which might be informally associated with the United States.Template:Citation needed

Dulles told Eisenhower in May 1953 that the Arab states believed that the United States would back Israel in aggressive expansion, and that the prestige of Western democracy in the Middle East was very low.<ref name="Neff, Donald p. 4332">Template:Harvnb</ref> The immediate consequence was a new policy of "even-handedness" where the United States very publicly sided with the Arab states in disputes with Israel and Britain in 1953–55.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

Most of all, Nasser wanted the United States to supply arms on a generous scale to Egypt.<ref name="Burns, William p. 24222">Template:Harvnb</ref> Nasser's anti-Zionism rendered it difficult for the Eisenhower administration to get the approval of Congress necessary to sell weapons to Egypt.<ref name="Burns, William pp. 16222">Template:Harvnb</ref>

Egypt and Britain

Britain's desire to mend Anglo-Egyptian relations in the wake of the coup saw the country strive for rapprochement throughout 1953-54. In October 1954, Britain and Egypt concluded the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the phased evacuation of British Armed Forces troops from the Suez base. Great Britain would withdraw all troops within 20 months, maintain the base, and retain a right to return for seven years. The Suez Company would revert to the Egyptian government in 1968.

The Baghdad Pact

Egyptian foreign policy under Nasser saw the entire Middle East as Egypt's rightful sphere of influence, and opposed all Western security initiatives in the Near East. Nasse believed that neither his regime nor Egypt's independence would be safe until Egypt had established itself as head of the Arab world.Template:Citation needed There was a feud between Nasser and the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri al-Said, for Arab leadership. The creation of the Baghdad Pact, (later the Central Treaty Organization) a Middle Eastern anti-Communist alliance of Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Iraq and the UK, in 1955 seemed to confirm Nasser's fears Britain was attempting to draw the Eastern Arab World into a bloc centred upon Iraq and sympathetic to Britain.

The conclusion of the Baghdad Pact occurred almost simultaneously with a dramatic Israeli reprisal operation on the Gaza Strip on 28 February 1955 in retaliation for Palestinian fedayeen raids into Israel.

The close occurrence of the two events was mistakenly interpreted by Nasser as part of coordinated Western effort to push him into joining the Baghdad Pact. The signing of the Baghdad Pact and the Gaza raid marked the beginning of the end of Nasser's good relations with the Americans.Throughout 1955 and 1956, Nasser pursued a number of policies that would frustrate British aims throughout the Middle East, and result in increasing hostility between Britain and Egypt. Nasser also began to align Egypt with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia—whose rulers were hereditary enemies of the Hashemites—in an effort to frustrate British efforts to draw Syria, Jordan and Lebanon into the orbit of the Baghdad Pact.

Egypt and the Communist World

Template:See also Nasser had first broached the subject of buying weapons from the Soviet Union in 1954, as a way of pressuring the Americans into selling him the arms he desired.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref><ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 1713">Template:Harvnb</ref> Instead of siding with either superpower, Nasser tried to have them compete in attempts to buy his friendship.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> During secret talks with the Soviets in 1955, Nasser's demands for weapons were more than amply satisfied.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> The news in September 1955 of the Egyptian purchase of a huge quantity of Soviet arms via Czechoslovakia was seen by the West as a major increase in Soviet influence in the Near East.<ref>Goldman, Marshal Soviet Foreign Aid, New York: Fredrich Prager, 1968, p. 60.</ref> In Britain, the increase of Soviet influence in the Near East was seen as an ominous development that threatened to put an end to British influence in the region.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

Egypt and Israel

Prior to 1955, Nasser had pursued efforts to reach peace with Israel and had worked to prevent cross-border Palestinian attacks.<ref name="Nasr1996p403">Template:Cite book</ref> After the February 1955 Israeli raid on the Egyptian Army headquarters in Gaza in retaliation for a Palestinian fedayeen attack that killed an Israeli civilian, Nasser began allowing raids into Israel by the Palestinian militants.<ref>Benny Morris, Righteous Victims, p. 283</ref><ref name="Nasr1996p403" /> Egypt established fedayeen bases not just in Gaza but also in Jordan and Lebanon.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> The raids triggered a series of Israeli reprisal operations.<ref name="Vatikiotis, P.J. pp. 2523">Template:Harvnb</ref><ref name="Nasr1996p403" />

Israel wanted to occupy and annex both the Gaza Strip and the Sinai and exercise control over the Gulf of Aqaba.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

The Israelis were concerned by Egypt's procurement of large amounts of Soviet weaponry. The influx of this advanced weaponry altered an already shaky balance of power.Template:Sfn Israel believed it had only a narrow window of opportunity to hit Egypt's army.<ref name="Kandil2012p47">Template:Cite book</ref> Additionally, Israel believed Egypt had formed a secret alliance with Jordan and Syria.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Egypt and France

Template:See alsoFrance and Israel were allied against Egypt, in part due to Egyptian support of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) rebels against the French.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Sirrs, Owen L. The Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910–2009 Routledge, 25 Feb 2010</ref> The French saw Nasser as a major threat.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 1152">Template:Harvnb</ref> By early 1955, France was shipping large amounts of weapons to Israel, and by 1956 France agreed to disregard the Tripartite Declaration, and supply even more weapons to Israel.<ref name="Neff, Donald pp. 1622">Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> In 1956, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres informed the French that Israel had decided upon war with Egypt in 1956.<ref name="Neff, Donald p. 2352">Template:Harvnb</ref> Peres claimed that Nasser was a genocidal maniac intent upon not only destroying Israel, but also exterminating its people, and as such, Israel wanted a war before Egypt received even more Soviet weapons, and there was still a possibility of victory for the Jewish state.<ref name="Neff, Donald p. 2352" />

Egyptian policies in 1956

In January 1956, to end the incipient arms race between Egypt, armed by the Soviet Union, and Israel, armed by France, which he saw as opening the Near East to Soviet influence, Eisenhower launched a major effort to make peace between Egypt and Israel. Eisenhower sent his close friend Robert B. Anderson to serve as a secret envoy, who offered large quantities of American aid in exchange for a peace treaty with Israel.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> Nasser and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion had conflicting demands and the meetings were unsuccessful.<ref name="Alteras1993p166">Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

A second round of secret diplomacy by Anderson in February 1956 was equally unsuccessful.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> It is not clear if Nasser was sincerely interested in peace, or just merely saying what the Americans wanted to hear in the hope of obtaining American funding for the Aswan high dam and American weapons.<ref name="Alteras1993p169">Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref><ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> However, the British historian P. J. Vatikitos noted that Nasser's determination to promote Egypt as the world's foremost anti-Zionist state as a way of reinforcing his claim to Arab leadership meant that peace was unlikely.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

Nasser sponsored demonstrations in Amman which led King Hussein of Jordan to dismiss the British Commander of the Arab Legion, John Bagot Glubb (known to the Arabs as Glubb Pasha) in March 1956.<ref name="Kissinger 529">Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> After the sacking of Glubb Pasha, British prime minister Anthony Eden became consumed with an obsessional hatred for Nasser, and from March 1956 onwards, was in private committed to the overthrow of Nasser.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> As one British politician recalled:

The American historian Donald Neff wrote that Eden's often hysterical and overwrought views towards Nasser reflected the influence of the amphetamines to which Eden had become addicted following a botched operation in 1953 together with the related effects of sustained sleep deprivation (Eden slept on average about 5 hours per night in early 1956).<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

On 16 May 1956, Nasser officially recognised the People's Republic of China, which angered the US and Secretary Dulles<ref name="Kissinger 529" /> This move, coupled with the impression that the project was beyond Egypt's economic capabilities, caused Eisenhower to withdraw all American financial aid for the Aswan Dam project on 19 July.<ref name="Kissinger 529" /> The Eisenhower administration believed that if Nasser were able to secure Soviet economic support for the high dam, that would be beyond the capacity of the Soviet Union to support, and in turn would strain Soviet–Egyptian relations.

Nationalisation of the Suez Canal

Template:See also File:1956-07-30 Suez Canal Seized.ogv

Port Said, at the entrance to the Suez Canal from the Mediterranean.

On 26 July 1956, in a speech in Alexandria, Nasser announced the nationalization of the canal. During his speech he used the name of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the builder of the canal, as a code-word for Egyptian forces to seize control of the canal. Egypt closed the canal (and the Straits of Tiran) to Israeli shipping. They also blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba, which was in contravention of the Constantinople Convention of 1888. Many argued that this was also a violation of the 1949 Armistice Agreements.

The Egyptian historian Abd al-Azim Ramadan notes Nasser's decision to nationalise the Suez Canal without political consultation as an example of his predilection for solitary decision-making.<ref name="PodehWinckler2004p105">Template:Cite book</ref>

British response

The nationalisation surprised Britain and its Commonwealth. There had been no discussion of the canal at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in late June and early July.<ref name="eayrs19642">Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Rp Egypt's action threatened British economic and military interests in the region.

Prime Minister Eden was under immense domestic pressure from Conservative MPs who drew direct comparisons between the events of 1956 and those of the Munich Agreement in 1938. Since the US government did not support the British protests, the British government decided in favour of military intervention against Egypt to keep the oil supply flowing<ref name="Thorpe2">Template:Cite news</ref> and avoid the complete collapse of British influence in the region.<ref>Template:Citation</ref>

Eden was hosting a dinner for King Feisal II of Iraq and his prime minister. Leader of the Opposition Hugh Gaitskell was also at the dinner. He immediately agreed that military action might be inevitable, but warned Eden would have to keep the Americans closely informed.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> Eden believed that Parliament would support him; Gaitskell spoke for the Labour Party when he called the nationalisation a "high-handed and totally unjustifiable step".Template:R When Eden made a ministerial broadcast on the nationalisation, Labour declined its right to reply.<ref name="goodwin20052">Template:Cite journal</ref>

However, Gaitskell's support became more cautious as time went on. In two letters to Eden sent on 3 and 10 August 1956, Gaitskell condemned Nasser but warned that he would not support any action that violated the United Nations Charter, including an armed attack.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

Two dozen Labour MPs issued a statement on 8 August stating that forcing Nasser to denationalise the canal against Egypt's wishes would violate the UN charter. Former Labour Foreign Minister Herbert Morrison hinted that he would support unilateral action by the government.Template:R Jo Grimond, who became Leader of the Liberal Party that November, thought if Nasser went unchallenged the whole Middle East would go his way.<ref name="Thorpe2" />

The nationalisation was perceived as a direct threat to British interests. In a letter to the British Ambassador on 10 September 1956, Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office wrote:Template:BlockquoteDirect military intervention, however, ran the risk of angering Washington and damaging Anglo-Arab relations.Template:Citation needed As a result, the British government concluded a secret military pact with France and Israel that was aimed at regaining control over the Suez Canal.Template:Citation needed

French response

The French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, outraged by Nasser's move, determined that Nasser would not get his way.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 144">Template:Harvnb</ref><ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 145">Template:Harvnb</ref> French public opinion very much supported Mollet, and apart from the French Communist Party, all of the criticism of his government came from the right, who very publicly doubted that a socialist like Mollet had the guts to go to war with Nasser.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 144"/>

File:Suez nationalization.ogv

On 29 July 1956, the French Cabinet decided upon military action against Egypt in alliance with Israel. Britain was informed, and invited to co-operate if interested.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 145"/> At the same time, Mollet felt very much offended by what he considered to be the lackadaisical attitude of the Eisenhower administration to the nationalisation.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 156">Template:Harvnb</ref> This was especially the case because France had remained loyal to NATO even after the USSR had offered the French a deal earlier that year in which Paris would remain in NATO but become "semi-neutralist" in the Cold War if Moscow ended its support of the FLN in Algeria.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 156"/> In Mollet's view, his fidelity to NATO had earned him the right to expect firm American support against Egypt, and when that support proved not forthcoming, he became even more determined that if the Americans were not willing to do anything about Nasser, then France would act.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 156" />Template:Additional citation needed

Commonwealth response

By 1956 the Panama Canal was much more important than the Suez to Australia and New Zealand.Template:Citation needed However, many still called the Suez Canal their "lifeline" to Britain or "jugular vein".Template:Citation needed Australian prime minister Robert Menzies and New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland both supported Britain in the early weeks following the seizure. Menzies travelled to London from the United States after hearing of the nationalisation and became an informal member of the British Cabinet discussing the issue.Template:RTemplate:Rp<ref name="ReferenceB">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="ReferenceC">Brian Carroll; From Barton to Fraser; Cassell Australia; 1978</ref>

The "non-white Dominions" saw Egypt's seizing of the canal as an admirable act of anti-imperialism, and Nasser's Arab nationalism as similar to Asian nationalism. As India was a major user of the canal, Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru remained publicly neutral other than warning that any use of force, or threats, could be "disastrous". Pakistan was also cautious about supporting Egypt given their rivalry as leading Islamic nations, but its government did state that Nasser had the right to nationalise.Template:RTemplate:Rp

Diplomatic solutions

Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies led an international committee in negotiations with Nasser in September 1956, which sought to achieve international management of the Suez Canal. The mission was a failure.

Almost immediately after the nationalisation, Eisenhower suggested to Eden a conference of maritime nations that used the canal. The British preferred to invite the most important countries, but the Americans believed that inviting as many as possible amid maximum publicity would affect world opinion. The eight surviving signatories of the Constantinople Convention and the 16 other largest users of the canal were invited: Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, West Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All except Egypt—which sent an observer, and used India and the Soviet Union to represent its interests—and Greece accepted the invitation, and the 22 nations' representatives met in London from 16 to 23 August.<ref name="life195608272">Template:Cite magazine</ref>Template:SfnTemplate:RTemplate:Rp

Fifteen of the nations supported the American-British-French position of international operation of the canal. Ceylon, Indonesia, and the Soviet Union supported India's competing proposal—which Nasser had preapproved—of international supervision only. India criticised Egypt's seizure of the canal, but insisted that its ownership and operation remain in Egyptian hands. The majority of 18 chose five nations to negotiate with Nasser in Cairo led by Menzies, while their proposal for international operation of the canal would go to the Security Council.Template:RTemplate:Rp<ref name="ReferenceB2">Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Sfn

Menzies' argued for compensation for the Suez Canal Company and the "establishment of principles" for the future use of the canal in a 7 September official communique to Nasser, and called for a convention to recognise Egyptian sovereignty of the canal, but for the establishment of an international body to run the canal. Nasser rejected Menzies' proposals.<ref name="ReferenceB2" /> Menzies hinted to Nasser that Britain and France might use force to resolve the crisis, but the US openly opposed the use of force and Menzies left Egypt without success.<ref name="ReferenceC2">Brian Carroll; From Barton to Fraser; Cassell Australia; 1978</ref>

The United States proposed an association of canal users that would set rules for its operation. Fourteen of the other nations, not including Pakistan, agreed. Britain believed that violation of the association rules would result in military force, but the United States opposed military action.Template:RTemplate:Rp Eisenhower felt the crisis had to be handled peacefully; he told Eden that American public opinion, and the international community, "would be outraged" unless all peaceful routes had been exhausted.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> The Americans refused to support any move that could be seen as imperialism or colonialism, seeing the US as the champion of decolonisation.

"The British and French reluctantly agreed to pursue the diplomatic avenue but viewed it as merely an attempt to buy time, during which they continued their military preparations."<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> The British disregarded Eisenhower's argument that the American people would not accept a military solution, and doubted that Eisenhower had a determination to avoid war.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Eden and other leading British officials believed that Nasser's engagement with communist states, support for Palestinian fedayeen, and attempts to destabilise pro-Western Arab regimes, would persuade the Americans to accept British and French actions if they were presented as a fait accompli.Template:Citation needed

Military preparations

Anglo-French planning

Anthony Eden began planning for an invasion in July 1956.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 21">Template:Harvnb</ref> Eden's plan called for the Cyprus-based 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group to seize the canal zone.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 26">Template:Harvnb</ref> The Prime Minister's plan was rejected by Templer and the other service chiefs, who suggested the sea-power based Contingency Plan, which called for the Royal Marines to take Port Said, which would then be used as a base for three British divisions to overrun the canal zone.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 21" />

In early August, the plan was modified by including a strategic bombing campaign that was intended to destroy Egypt's economy and thereby hopefully bring about Nasser's overthrow, as well as achieve air superiority.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 21" /><ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 223">Template:Harvnb</ref> In addition, a role was allocated to the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade, which would lead the assault on Port Said in conjunction with the Royal Marine landing.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 22">Template:Harvnb</ref>

This operation (eventually named Musketeer) would require thousands of troops, leading the British to seek out France as an ally.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 223" /> In place of Port Said, Musketeer called for the capture of Alexandria.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 223" /> Once that city had been taken in assault from the sea, British armoured divisions would engage in a decisive battle of annihilation somewhere south of Alexandria and north of Cairo.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 223" /> To destroy the 300,000-strong Egyptian Army in his planned battle of annihilation, Stockwell estimated that he needed 80,000 troops, while at most the British Army could spare was 50,000 troops; the French could supply the necessary 30,000 troops to make up the shortfall.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 223" />

On 11 August 1956, General Charles Keightley was appointed commander of Musketeer with French Admiral Pierre Barjot as his deputy commander.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 223" /> André Beaufrewould command the French forces. Most of the officers of the Anglo-French Task Force expressed regret that it was Beaufre who was Stockwell's deputy rather the other way around.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 1762">Template:Harvnb</ref>

A major problem both politically and militarily was the one-week interval between sending troops to the eastern Mediterranean and the beginning of the invasion.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 242">Template:Harvnb</ref> In late August 1956, Admiral Barjot suggested that Port Said once again be made the main target, which lessened the number of troops needed and thus reduced the interval between sending forces to the eastern Mediterranean and the invasion.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 252">Template:Harvnb</ref> Beaufre warned that merely capturing the canal zone made for a dangerously ambiguous goal.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 252" />

Additionally, the coming of winter weather to the Mediterranean in late November would render the invasion impossible.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 242" /> An additional problem was Eden, who constantly interfered with the planning and was so obsessed with secrecy that he refused to tell Keightley whether he wanted to retake the Suez Canal or topple Nasser, or both.<ref name="Turner, Barry 2006, p. 2012">Template:Harvnb</ref>

In early September, Keightley embraced Barjot's idea of seizing Port Said, and presented Revise.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 252" /> On 8 September 1956 Revise was approved by the British and French cabinets.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 252" />

Both Stockwell and Beaufre were opposed to Revise as an open-ended plan with no clear goal beyond seizing the canal zone, but was embraced by Eden and Mollet as offering greater political flexibility and the prospect of lesser Egyptian civilian casualties.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 252" />

Franco-Israeli planning

Israeli M4A4 Shermans were also used in the Sinai campaign.

In late September 1956, Guy Mollet had decided to attack Egypt with Britain, and if the British backed out (as Mollet believed that they might), with Israel.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> On 7 August, the French asked Ben Gurion if Israel would attack Egypt together with France; Israel agreed and joint planning began.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref><ref name="Neff, Donald p. 309">Template:Harvnb</ref> On 30 September 1956 secret Franco-Israeli talks started in Paris, based on Britain's non-involvement.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> The French wanted to use British airfields in Cyprus to bomb Egypt, but wanted to use Israeli airfields if the ones in Cyprus were not available.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> Only on 5 October were the British informed of the secret Franco-Israeli alliance.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

Israeli planning

Template:Main In July 1956, IDF chief of staff General Moshe Dayan advised Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion that Israel should attack Egypt at the first chance, but Ben-Gurion stated he preferred to attack Egypt with the aid of France.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

The planning for Operation Kadesh called for the Israeli Air Force to win air superiority, which was to be followed up with "one continuous battle" in the Sinai.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 263">Template:Harvnb</ref> Israeli forces would in a series of swift operations encircle and then take the four main Egyptian strong points in the Sinai: Sharm el-Sheikh, Arish, Abu Uwayulah (Abu Ageila), and the Gaza Strip.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 263" />

After the capture of these four objectives, Israel hope that entire Egyptian Army would fall back into Egypt proper, and British and French forces would then be able to push the Egyptian Army against an Israeli advance, and crush in a decisive encounter.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 2822">Template:Harvnb</ref>

Protocol of Sèvres

France, Israel and the United Kingdom reached a secret agreement regarding political and military cooperation to overthrow Nasser and de-nationalise the Canal during discussions held between 22 and 24 October 1956 in Sèvres, France. Under the terms of the Protocol, Israel would attack Egypt on 29 October. The British and French governments would issue a joint appeal for both Egypt and Israel to cease firing and withdraw 10 miles from the canal. If both forces rejected this demand (a guarantee, since Israel was already aware of it), the French and British militaries would attack on 31 October.

Forces

British

File:1956-08-06 Suez Crisis.ogv

The 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group, which was intended to be the main British strike force against Egypt, had neglected paratroop training in favour of counter-insurgency operations.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 152">Template:Harvnb</ref> The Royal Navy could project formidable power through the guns of its warships and aircraft flown from its carriers, but lacked amphibious capability.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 162">Template:Harvnb</ref>

The Royal Air Force (RAF) had just introduced two long-range bombers, the Vickers Valiant and the English Electric Canberra, but had not yet established proper bombing techniques for these aircraft.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 162" /> General Charles Keightley, the commander of the invasion force, believed that air power alone was sufficient to defeat Egypt.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 162" /> By contrast, General Hugh Stockwell, the Task Force's ground commander, believed that methodical and systematic armoured operations centred on the Centurion battle tank would be the key to victory.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

French

French paratroopers of the elite Regiment de Parachutistes Coloniaux (RPC) were extremely experienced soldiers, who had distinguished themselves in the fighting in Indochina and in Algeria.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 172">Template:Harvnb</ref> They followed a "shoot first, ask questions later" policy towards civilians, which led to the killing of Egyptian civilians.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 172" />

The main French (and Israeli) tank, the AMX-13, was lightly armoured but agile: designed for mobile, flanking operations.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 172" /> The French Navy had a powerful carrier force but, like its British counterpart, suffered from a lack of landing craft.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 172" />

Israeli

An Israeli AMX-13, shown here from the rear and side

American military historian Derek Varble called the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) the "best" military force in the Middle East while at the same time suffering from "deficiencies" such as "immature doctrine, faulty logistics, and technical inadequacies".<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 182">Template:Harvnb</ref> The IDF's Chief of Staff, Major General Moshe Dayan, encouraged aggression, initiative, and ingenuity among the Israeli officer corps while ignoring logistics and armoured operations.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 182" /> Dayan preferred infantry at the expense of armour.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 182" />

The IDF had a disorganised logistics arm, which was put under severe strain when the IDF invaded the Sinai.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 182" /> The main IDF tank was the AMX-13 and the main aircraft were the Dassault Mystère IVA and the Ouragan.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> Superior pilot training gave the Israeli Air Force an edge over their Egyptian opponents.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 182" /> The Israeli Navy consisted of two destroyers, seven frigates, eight minesweepers, several landing craft, and fourteen torpedo boats.Template:Citation needed

Egyptian

In the Egyptian Armed Forces, politics rather than military competence was the main criterion for promotion.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 19">Template:Harvnb</ref> The Egyptian commander, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, was a heavy drinker who was close friends with Nasser and who would prove incompetent as a general during the Crisis.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 19"/> In 1956, the Egyptian military was well equipped with weapons from the Soviet Union such as T-34 and IS-3 tanks, MiG-15 fighters, Ilyushin Il-28 bombers, SU-100 self-propelled guns and assault rifles.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 19"/>

Rigid lines between officers and men in the Egyptian Army led to a mutual "mistrust and contempt" between officers and the men who served under them.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 20">Template:Harvnb</ref> Egyptian troops were excellent in defensive operations, but had little capacity for offensive operations, owing to the lack of "rapport and effective small-unit leadership".<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 20"/>

Operation Kadesh

Anglo-French para drops on the Suez Canal and Israeli conquest of Sinai

The fighting began on 29 October 1956.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> At about 3:00 pm, Israeli Air Force Mustangs launched a series of attacks on Egyptian positions all over the Sinai.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 28">Template:Harvnb</ref> Egyptian commander Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer at first treated the reports of an Israeli incursion into the Sinai as a large raid instead of an invasion, and did not order a general alert.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 28" /> By the time that Amer realised his mistake, the Israelis had made significant advances into the Sinai.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 28" />

Because Israeli intelligence expected Jordan to enter the war on Egypt's side, the Israel Border Police militarised the Israel-Jordan border, including the Green Line with the West Bank.<ref>Benny Morris, Righteous Victims, p. 289</ref> Israeli-Arab villages along the Jordanian border were placed under curfew. This resulted in the killings of 48 civilians in the Arab village of Kafr Qasim in an event known as the Kafr Qasim massacre.

Israeli paratrooper near the Mitla Pass

The Israeli 9th Infantry Brigade captured Ras al-Naqb, an important staging ground for the later attack against Sharm el-Sheikh, during the night of 29-30 October.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 29">Template:Harvnb</ref> Also that night, the 4th Infantry Brigade stormed al-Qusaymah, a jumping off point for the assault against Abu Uwayulah.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 29" /><ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 31">Template:Harvnb</ref>

Israeli paratroopers dig in near the Parker Memorial

A portion of the paratroopers under Ariel Sharon's advanced to meet with the 1st Brigade. En route, Sharon assaulted Themed in a dawn attack, and was able to storm the town with his armour.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 32">Template:Harvnb</ref> Sharon decided to attack the Egyptian positions at Jebel Heitan.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 32" /> The Egyptians were defeated and forced to retreat. A total of 260 Egyptian and 38 Israeli soldiers were killed in the battle.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 33">Template:Harvnb</ref> Although the battle was an Israeli victory, the casualties sustained would surround Sharon with controversy.<ref name="Varble, Derek, pp. 32–33">Template:Harvnb</ref>

The village of Abu Uwayulah served as the road centre for the entire Sinai, and thus was a key Israeli target.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 33" /> To the east of Abu Uwayulah were several ridges that formed a natural defensive zone known to the Israelis as the "Hedgehog".<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 33" /> Holding the "Hedgehog" were 3,000 Egyptians of the 17th and 18th battalions of the 3rd Infantry Division commanded by Colonel Sami Yassa.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 33" /> Over the course of 30 October-1 November, the Israeli military repeatedly assaulted the position. Eventually, the lack of ammunition and water caused the Egyptians to retreat.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 39">Template:Harvnb</ref><ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 35">Template:Harvnb</ref>

Air operations

In air combat, Israeli aircraft shot down between seven and nine Egyptian jets<ref name="Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, p. 138">Template:Harvnb</ref> with the loss of one plane.<ref name="Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, p. 138" /><ref>Nordeen, Lon Fighters Over Israel London 1991, p. 198</ref> On 1 November, President Nasser ordered his pilots to disengage and fly their planes to bases in southern Egypt.

On 3 November, Israeli Dassault Mystère fighter jets attacked a British warship, the Black Swan class sloop HMS Crane as it was patrolling the approaches to the Gulf of Aqaba after it had been mistaken for an Egyptian Navy warship. Three crewmen were wounded in the attack. The ship put up heavy anti-aircraft fire, and there are conflicting accounts as to whether or not it shot down one of the attacking jets.<ref>Midshipman RJH Griffiths, HMS Newfoundland: The Night we sank the Domiat</ref><ref>Template:Hansard</ref><ref>Carter, Geoffrey – Crises do Happen: The Royal Navy and Operation Musketeer, Suez, 1956</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Naval operations

Ibrahim el Awal after its capture by the Israeli Navy

The Egyptian Navy's Ibrahim el Awal, an ex-British Template:Sclass2, was damaged by the Israeli Navy and captured on 31 October after shelling Haifa.<ref name="clodfelter">Clodfelter, Micheal: Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492–2015, 4th ed, p. 573</ref> Also on 31 October, the Egyptian frigate Domiat was destroyed by a British light cruiser.<ref name="clodfelter" /><ref>Pimlott – editor British Military Operations, 1945–1984 London: Guild Publishing 1984 p. 78</ref> On 4 November, a squadron of Egyptian motor torpedo boats attacked a British destroyer off the northeast coast of the Nile Delta. Three torpedo boats were sunk and the rest retreated.<ref name="clodfelter" />

Gaza Strip operations

File:Egypt-Israel Disturbances.ogv The city of Rafah was strategically important to Israel.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 40">Template:Harvnb</ref> Dayan ordered the IDF forces to focus on breaking through rather than reducing every Egyptian strongpoint.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 40" /> French warships led by the cruiser Georges Leygues provided fire support.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 41">Template:Harvnb</ref> In the morning of 1 November, Israeli tanks had encircled the city.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> At that point, the commander of the Egyptian forces, General al-Abd, ordered his forces to abandon their posts outside of Rafah and retreat into the city.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 43">Template:Harvnb</ref>

With Rafah more or less cut off and Israeli forces controlling the northern and eastern roads leading into the city, the 27th Armored Brigade to went west to take al-Arish.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 43" /> By this point, Nasser had ordered his forces to fall back towards the Suez Canal, so at first Bar-Lev and his men met little resistance as they advanced across the northern Sinai.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 43" />

Hearing of the order to withdraw, General al-Abd and his men left Rafah on the morning of 1 November through a gap in the Israeli lines.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 43" /> Three hours later, the Israelis took Rafah.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 43" /> After taking Rafah, Israeli troops killed 111 people, including 103 refugees, in Rafah's Palestinian refugee camp. The circumstances of the killings are disputed.<ref>Special Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East Template:Webarchive, Covering the period 1 November 1956 to mid-December 1956, New York, 1957</ref><ref>Rafah Template:Webarchive, Palestine: Information with Provenance (PIWP database)</ref> On 2 November, Bar-Lev's forces took al-Arish.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 45">Template:Harvnb</ref> The city itself fell without a fight after its defenders retreated.

Meanwhile, the IDF attacked the Egyptian defences outside of Gaza City late on 1 November.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 45" /> Joined by infantry, the armour attacked the al-Muntar fortress outside of Gaza City, killing or capturing 3,500 Egyptian National Guard troops.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 45" /> By noon of 2 November, there was no more Egyptian opposition in the Gaza City area.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 45" /> By noon of 3 November, the Israelis had control of almost the entire Gaza Strip save for a few isolated strong points, which were soon attacked and taken.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 46">Template:Harvnb</ref>

The UN estimated that in total 447 to 550 Palestinian civilians were killed by Israeli troops during the first weeks of Israeli occupation of the strip. The manner in which these people were killed is disputed.<ref name="BM93">Morris, Benny (1993) Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956. Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War. Oxford University Press, Template:ISBN. p. 408. "On 3 November, the day Khan Yunis was conquered, IDF troops shot dead hundreds of Palestinian refugees and local inhabitants in the town. One UN report speaks of 'some 135 local resident' and '140 refugees' killed as IDF troops moved through the town and its refugee camp 'searching for people in possession of arms'. In Rafah, which fell to the IDF on 1–2 November, Israeli troops killed between forty-eight and one hundred refugees and several local residents, and wounded another sixty-one during a massive screening operation on 12 November, in which they sought to identify former Egyptian and Palestinian soldiers and Fedayeen hiding among the local population.... Another sixty-six Palestinians, probably Fedayeen, were executed in a number of other incidents during screening operations in the Gaza Strip between 2 and 20 November.... The United Nations estimated that, all told, Israeli troops killed between 447 and 550 Arab civilians in the first three weeks of the occupation of the Strip."</ref> A number of Palestinians were killed after the town of Khan Yunis was taken on 3 November.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 45" /><ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 46" /> Israel maintains that the Palestinians were killed in street-fighting, while the Palestinians claimed that they were unarmed civilians executed by Israeli troops.<ref name="lat">Joe Sacco produces comics from the hot zones. New York Times.</ref> The Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency later reported that 275 people were killed.<ref>"UNRWA Report to the UN General Assembly November 1 – December 14, 1956" Template:Webarchive</ref><ref name="Sacco">Template:Cite book</ref>

In both Gaza City and Khan Yunis, street-fighting led to the deaths of "dozens, perhaps hundreds, of non-combatants".<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 86">Template:Harvnb</ref> Food and medicine distribution for refugees in need of assistance was complicated when some Palestinians ransacked the warehouses belonging to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 86" /> This was compounded by a widespread view in Israel that the responsibility for the care of the Palestinian refugees rested with the UNRWA, not Israel, which led the Israelis to be slow with providing aid.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

Sharm el-Sheikh operations

By 3 November, Sharm el-Sheikh was the last Israeli objective.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 46" /> The Egyptian forces at Sharm el-Sheikh had the advantage of holding one of the most strongly fortified positions in the entire Sinai, but had been subjected to heavy Israeli air attacks from the beginning of the war.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 48">Template:Harvnb</ref> The main difficulty faced by Colonel Abraham Yoffe's 9th Infantry Brigade was logistical.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 46" /> There were no good roads linking Ras an-Naqb to Sharm el-Sheikh.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 46" />

After numerous skirmishes on the outskirts of Sharm el-Sheikh, Yoffe ordered an attack on the port around midnight on 4 November.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 49">Template:Harvnb</ref> After four hours of heavy fighting, Yoffe ordered his men to retreat.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 49" /> On the morning of 5 November, Israeli forces launched a massive artillery barrage and napalm strikes against Egyptian forces defending Sharm el-Sheikh.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 49" /> At 9:30 am on 5 November, the Egyptian commander, Colonel Raouf Mahfouz Zaki, surrendered Sharm el-Sheikh.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 49" /> The Israelis had lost 10 killed and 32 wounded, while the Egyptians had lost about 100 killed and 31 wounded. Another 864 Egyptian soldiers were taken prisoner.<ref name="clodfelter" />

Casualties

The Israeli losses were 172 dead and 817 wounded. The number of Egyptians killed was "never reliably established".<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 912">Template:Harvnb</ref> Egyptian casualties to the Israeli invasion were estimated at 1,000–3,000 dead and 4,000 wounded, while losses to the Anglo-French operation were estimated at 650 dead and 900 wounded.Template:Sfn<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> 1,000 Egyptian civilians are estimated to have died.

Anglo-French Canal invasion

A battle-damaged de Havilland Sea Venom on Template:HMS

The Anglo-French military action had two phases: Operation Musketeer and Operation Telescope.

Operation Musketeer Revise (often referred to as Operation Revise) was in two phases:

• Phase I: Anglo-French air forces to gain air supremacy over Egypt's skies.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 2522">Template:Harvnb</ref>
• Phase II: Anglo-French air forces were to launch a 10-day "aero-psychological" campaign that would destroy the Egyptian economy.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 2522" />

To support the invasion, large air forces had been deployed to Cyprus and Malta by Britain and France and many aircraft carriers were deployed. The two airbases on Cyprus were so congested that a third field which was in dubious condition had to be brought into use for French aircraft.

Operation Telescope consisted of air- and sea-borne landings to capture the Canal Zone.

Operation Revise

Template:Main In the morning of 30 October Britain and France sent ultimatums to Egypt and Israel. Eden and Mollet ordered Phase I of Operation Revise to begin 13 hours after the Anglo-French ultimatum with a bombing campaign.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 53">Template:Harvnb</ref><ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 50">Template:Harvnb</ref>

Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer ordered Egyptian troops in the Sinai to stay put, as Amer confidently assured Nasser that the Egyptians could defeat the Israelis in the Sinai and then defeat the Anglo-French forces once they came ashore in the canal zone.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 51">Template:Harvnb</ref> Amer also advised Nasser to send more troops into the Sinai to inflict his promised defeat on Israel.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 51" /> Not until late on 31 October did Nasser disregard Amer's rosy assessment and ordered his forces to disengage in the Sinai and to retreat back to the canal zone to face the expected Anglo-French invasion.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 51" />

A Hawker Sea Hawk of 899 Naval Air Squadron, armed with rockets, about to be launched from the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle for a strike on an Egyptian airfield

British night bombing proved ineffective.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 53" />Starting on the morning of 1 November, carrier-based planes began a series of daytime strikes on Egypt.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 53" /> By the night of 1 November the Egyptian Air Force had lost 200 planes.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 53" />

With the destruction of Egypt's air force, Keightley ordered the beginning of Revise Phase II, a wide-ranging interdiction campaign.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> By 3 November, Beaufre convinced Keightley and Stockwell to seize the canal zone with airborne landings instead of waiting the planned ten days for Revise II, and gained the approval for Operation Telescope, as Beaufre had code-named the airborne assault on the canal zone.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref><ref name="Varble, Derek 2003, p. 52">Template:Harvnb</ref>

Paratroop attack on Port Said

Smoke rises from oil tanks beside the Suez Canal hit during the initial Anglo-French assault on Port Said, 5 November 1956.

Template:Main In the early morning of 5 November, an advance element of the 3rd Battalion of the British Parachute Regiment dropped on El Gamil Airfield, led by Brigadier M.A.H. Butler.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Chateau-Jobert landed with a force of the 2nd RPC at Raswa.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 60">Template:Harvnb</ref>

The British forces moved up towards Port Said with air support before digging in at 13:00 to hold until the beach assault.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 60" /> Overall, the British paratroopers had managed to inflict a decisive defeat on the Egyptians for the loss of 4 dead and 32 wounded.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

The French paratroopers swiftly secured the western bridge. With close-air-support, the French paratroopers stormed and took Port Said's waterworks that morning.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 60" /> Chateau-Jobert followed up this success by beginning an attack on Port Fuad, which became a rout.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 61">Template:Harvnb</ref> During the fighting in the canal zone, the French paratroopers often executed Egyptian POWs.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

The Egyptian commander at Port Said, General Salahedin Moguy then proposed a truce.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 61" /> Moguy had no interest in surrendering and had only made the truce offer to buy time for his men to dig in.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 62">Template:Harvnb</ref> As the paratroopers alone were not enough to take the city, Beaufre and British Admiral Manley Laurence Power urged that the sea-borne landings be accelerated and that Allied forces land the very next day.<ref name="eayrs1964">Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Rp<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 62" />

Royal Marines come ashore at Port Said

Troops of the Parachute Regiment escort a captured Egyptian soldier at Port Said

At first light on 6 November, Royal Marines of No. 42 and 40 Commando stormed the beaches<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 65">Template:Harvnb</ref> The battle group standing offshore opened fire, giving covering fire for the landings. The town of Port Said sustained great damage and was seen to be alight.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 65" />

The men of 42 Commando as much as possible chose to by-pass Egyptian positions and focused on trying to break through inland.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 65" />Upon entering downtown Port Said, the Marines became engaged in fierce urban combat.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 66">Template:Harvnb</ref>

In the afternoon, 522 additional French paratroopers were dropped near Port Fuad. These were also constantly supported by the Corsairs of the French Aéronavale. The French were aided by AMX-13 light tanks.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 77">Template:Harvnb</ref>

British Royal Marines of No. 45 Commando assaulted by helicopter, meeting stiff resistance, with shore batteries striking several helicopters, while friendly fire from British carrier-borne aircraft also mistakenly hit 45 Commando and HQ. One Marine was killed and 15 wounded when a carrier-based Wyvern mistakenly fired into a concentration of Marines.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref><ref name="polmar">Template:Cite book</ref> This was the first time helicopters were used by British forces to lift men directly into a combat zone.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

Nasser proclaimed the Suez War to be a "people's war".<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> As such, Egyptian troops were ordered to don civilian clothes while guns were freely handed out to Egyptian civilians.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> From Nasser's point of view, this presented the British and French with an unsolvable dilemma: cause deaths of innocent civilians and bring world sympathy to his cause while weakening morale in Britain and France, or fall prey to snipers attacking "with near impunity by hiding among crowds of apparent non-combatants".<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 88">Template:Harvnb</ref>

These tactics worked especially well against the British.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 88" /> British leaders, especially Eden and the First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Louis Mountbatten, sincerely attempted to limit Egyptian civilian deaths.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 88" /> Despite Eden's best efforts, British bombing still killed hundreds of Egyptian civilians during Revise II, though these deaths were due more to imprecise aiming rather than a deliberate policy of "area bombing" such as that employed against Germany in World War II.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> At Port Said, the heavy fighting in the streets and the resulting fires destroyed much of the city, killing many civilians.

A British link up between the 3rd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, and the Commandos at the Coast Guard barracks in Port Said. The paratroopers have with them a captured SU-100 tank destroyer, and the Commandos a Buffalo amphibious assault vehicle.

Most Egyptian soldiers wore civilian clothing and operated in small groups, but remained organized. Civilians who took up arms as guerrillas were organized into eight groups with five additional groups joining them from outside the city. The Egyptians were gradually pushed back as the British took key objectives.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 69">Template:Harvnb</ref> Egyptian sniper attacks and the need to clear every building led 3 Para to be slowed in their attempts to link up with the Royal Marines.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> The link-up of British and French forces occurred close to the offices of the Suez Canal Company.

Both Stockwell and Beaufre spent the day in Port Said, and were thus cut off from the news.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 77" /> Only late in the day did Beaufre and Stockwell learn of the acceptance of the United Nations ceasefire.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 77" /> The British forces were at al-Cap, a small village four miles north of al-Qantarah at 2:00 am, when the ceasefire came into effect.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

Total Royal Marine casualties in the Port Said landings were 9 killed and 60 wounded.<ref name="polmar" />

Responses to military action

Domestic British response

File:1956-11-12 Near East Crisis.ogv

Eden's obsession with secrecy meant that the government did nothing in the months running up to the attack to explain to the British people or the reservists called up for their National Service in the summer and fall of 1956 why the war was necessary.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> Only one British soldier, however, refused to fight.Template:R

According to some historians, the majority of British people were on Eden's side.<ref name="fairhall201106302">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> According to public opinion polls at the time, 37% of the British people supported the war while 44% were opposed.<ref name="Walsh 20062">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="Adamthwaite pages 449-4642">Template:Harvnb</ref> On 10 and 11 November an opinion poll found 53% supported the war, with 32% opposed.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Although the public believed the British government's justification of the invasion as a separation of Israeli and Egyptian forces,Template:R protests against the war occurred in Britain after it began. Stormy and violent debates in the House of Commons on 1 November 1956 almost degenerated into fist-fights after several Labour MPs compared Eden to Hitler.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> The British government pressured the BBC to support the war,Template:R and seriously considered taking over the network.Template:R

The majority of Conservative constituency associations passed resolutions of support to "Sir Anthony".<ref name="Adamthwaite pages 4493">Template:Harvnb</ref> The majority of letters written to MPs from their constituents were against the Suez attack.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> Significantly, many of the letters came from voters who identified as Conservatives.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

The Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress organised nation-wide anti-war protests, starting on 1 November.<ref name="Walsh 20062" /> On 4 November, at an anti-war rally in Trafalgar Square attended by 30,000 people (making it easily the biggest rally in London since 1945), the Labour MP Aneurin Bevan accused the government of "a policy of bankruptcy and despair".<ref name="Aneurin Bevan 19562">Template:Cite web</ref> Inspired by Bevan's speech, the crowd at Trafalgar Square then marched on 10 Downing Street chanting "Eden Must Go!", and attempted to storm the Prime Minister's residence.<ref name="Kyle, Keith 2011, p. 4412">Template:Harvnb</ref> The ensuing clashes between the police and the demonstrators which were captured by television cameras had a huge demoralising effect on the Eden cabinet,<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> which was meeting there.<ref name="Kyle, Keith 2011, p. 4412" />

The conflict exposed the division within the Labour Party between its middle-class internationalist intelligentsia who opposed the conflict, and working-class voters who supported it.<ref>Sandbrook, p. 19.</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>Template:Efn The Labour MP Richard Crossman said that "when the Labour Party leadership tried to organise demonstrations in the Provinces of the kind they'd held in Trafalgar Square, there was great reluctance among the working classes, because we were at war. It was Munich in reverse." Another Labour MP, Barbara Castle, recalled that Labour's protest against the conflict was "drowned in a wave of public jingoism".<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> The Suez Crisis played a key role in the reconciliation of the Gaitskellite and Bevanite factions of the Labour Party, which both condemned the invasion, after the 1955 leadership election.<ref name=":022">Template:Cite book</ref>

International responses

Responses by Western governments

File:1956-08-09 Press Parley.ogv Along with the Suez crisis, the United States was also dealing with the near-simultaneous Hungarian revolution. Vice-President Richard Nixon later explained: "We couldn't on one hand, complain about the Soviets intervening in Hungary and, on the other hand, approve of the British and the French picking that particular time to intervene against Nasser".<ref name="BorhiContRoll2">Template:Cite journal</ref> Eisenhower also believed that if the United States supported the attack on Egypt, that the resulting backlash in the Arab world might win the Arabs over to the Soviet Union.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

The United States put financial pressure on the UK to end the invasion. Because the Bank of England had lost $45 million between 30 October and 2 November, and Britain's oil supply had been restricted by the closing of the Suez Canal, the British sought immediate assistance from the IMF, but it was denied by the United States.

In addition, Eisenhower ordered his Secretary of the Treasury, George M. Humphrey, to prepare to sell part of the US government's sterling bond holdings.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, told Eden that Britain's foreign exchange reserves could not sustain the devaluation of the pound that would come after the United States' actions; and that within weeks of such a move, the country would be unable to import sufficient food and energy supplies. However, there were suspicions in the Cabinet that Macmillan had deliberately overstated the financial situation in order to force Eden out. What Treasury officials had told Macmillan was far less serious than what he told the Cabinet.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

Despite having no commercial or military interest in the area, many countries were concerned with the growing rift between Western allied nations.

When Israel refused to withdraw its troops from the Gaza Strip and Sharm el-Sheikh, Eisenhower sought UN-backed efforts to impose economic sanctions on Israel until it fully withdrew from Egyptian territory. The Democratic Party-controlled Senate would not co-operate with Eisenhower's position on Israel.<ref name="Divine2">Template:Cite book</ref>

A rare example of support for the Anglo-French actions against Egypt came from West Germany. Though his Cabinet was divided, West Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer told his Cabinet on 7 November that Nasser was a pro-Soviet force that needed to be cut down to size, and in his view the attack on Egypt was completely justified.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter p. 2422">Template:Cite book</ref> Adenauer feared that the United States and Soviet Union would "carve up the world" according to their own interests.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter p. 2442">Template:Cite book</ref> Because of this, Adenauer strengthened his relationship with Mollet and France.<ref name="Dietl 2008, p. 2732">Template:Harvnb</ref>

Responses in the Muslim world

The attack on Egypt greatly offended many in the Muslim world. In Pakistan, 300,000 people took part in a rally in Lahore to show solidarity with Egypt, and a violent mob in Karachi chanting anti-British slogans burned down the British High Commission.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> In Syria, the government blew up the Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline, which had allowed Iraqi oil to reach tankers in the Mediterranean, to punish Iraq for supporting the invasion and to cut Britain off from one of its main routes for taking delivery of Iraqi oil.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> In concert with US actions, Saudi Arabia started an oil embargo against Britain and France. The US refused to fill the gap until Britain and France agreed to a rapid withdrawal. Other NATO members refused to sell oil they received from Arab nations to Britain or France.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

UN General Assembly Resolution 997

Presidents Eisenhower and Nasser meeting in New York, 1960

On 30 October, the Security Council submitted a draft resolution calling upon Israel immediately to withdraw its armed forces behind the established armistice lines. It was not adopted because of British and French vetoes. A similar draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union was also rejected.<ref name="UNEFbkgr">Template:Cite web</ref> On 31 October, as planned, France and the UK launched their attacks against targets in Egypt. Later that day, the Security Council passed Resolution 119, calling an emergency special session of the General Assembly for the first time, in order to make appropriate recommendations to end the fighting.<ref name="UNEFbkgr"/>

File:1956-04-12 Full Scale War Looms.ogv The emergency special session was convened on 1 November. The same day Nasser requested diplomatic assistance from the US, without requesting the same from the Soviet Union.<ref name="Love557">Template:Harvnb</ref>

In the early hours of 2 November, the General Assembly adopted the United States' proposal for Resolution 997. It called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines, an arms embargo, and the reopening of the Suez Canal, which was now blocked.<ref name="UNEFbkgr" /> The vote was 64 in favour and 5 opposed (Australia, New Zealand, Britain, France, and Israel) with 6 abstentions.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Over the next several days, the emergency special session established the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).<ref name="UNGAfschwaESSs">Template:Cite web</ref> This proposal of the emergency force and the resulting cease-fire was made possible primarily through the efforts of Lester B. Pearson, the Secretary of External Affairs of Canada, and Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Britain and France agreed to withdraw from Egypt within a week; Israel did not.

Post-invasion Israeli initiatives

On 7 November, David Ben-Gurion addressed the Knesset and declared a great victory, saying that the 1949 armistice agreement with Egypt was dead and buried, and that the armistice lines were no longer valid and could not be restored. Under no circumstances would Israel agree to the stationing of UN forces on its territory or in any area it occupied.<ref name="AlterasIkeIsr">Template:Harvnb</ref><ref name="PerlmRestl">Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Rp He also made an oblique reference to his intention to annex the Sinai Peninsula.<ref name="AlterasIkeIsr"/> Isaac Alteras writes that Ben-Gurion "was carried away by the resounding victory against Egypt" and while "a statesman well known for his sober realism, [he] took flight in dreams of grandeur".

The speech marked the beginning of a four-month-long diplomatic struggle, culminating in withdrawal from all territory, under conditions far less palatable than those envisioned in the speech, but with conditions for sea access to Eilat and a UNEF presence on Egyptian soil.<ref name="AlterasIkeIsr"/> The speech immediately drew increased international pressure on Israel to withdraw.<ref name="PerlmRestl"/> That day in New York, the emergency session passed Resolution 1002, again calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops to behind the armistice lines, and for the immediate withdrawal of British and French troops from Egyptian territory.<ref name="UNEFbkgr"/> After a long Israeli cabinet meeting late on 8 November, Ben-Gurion informed Eisenhower that Israel declared its willingness to accept withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai, "when satisfactory arrangements are made with the international force that is about to enter the canal zone".<ref name="AlterasIkeIsr"/>

Soviet response

Premier Nikolai Bulganin threatened to intervene on the Egyptian side, and to launch rocket attacks on Britain, France and Israel.<ref name="AlterasIkeIsr2">Template:Harvnb</ref><ref name="Shlaim1812">Template:Cite book</ref> It was later learned that the Soviets did not have the ICBMs necessary to launch this attack, but the West did not know this at the time.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>Template:Sfn

The Soviet threat to send troops to Egypt to fight the Allies led Eisenhower to fear that this might be the beginning of World War III.<ref name="Neff, Donald p. 4033">Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>Template:Sfn Eisenhower immediately ordered Lockheed U-2 flights over Syria and Israel to search for any Soviet air forces on Syrian bases. The Americans excluded Israel from the guarantee against Soviet attack, however, alarming the Israeli government.Template:R The U-2 showed that Soviet aircraft were not in Syria despite the threats.<ref name="cia19922">Template:Cite book</ref>

Ceasefire

File:1957-02-14 Tel Aviv Israel.ogv

Anthony Eden announced a cease fire on 6 November, warning neither France nor Israel beforehand. Troops were still in Port Said and on operational manoeuvres. Port Said had been overrun, and the military assessment was that the Suez Canal could have been completely taken within 24 hours.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Eisenhower was not in favour of an immediate withdrawal of British, French and Israeli troops until the US ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. pushed for it. Without further guarantee, the Anglo-French Task Force had to finish withdrawing by 22 December 1956, to be replaced by Danish and Colombian units of the UNEF.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

The Israelis refused to host any UN force on Israeli-controlled territory and withdrew from the Sinai and Gaza in March 1957. Before the withdrawal the Israeli forces systematically destroyed infrastructure in the Sinai peninsula such as roads, railways and telephone lines, and all houses in the villages of Abu Ageila and El Quseima.<ref name="Chomsk">Template:Cite book</ref> Israeli troops confiscated Egyptian National Railways equipment for use by Israel Railways.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

The UNEF was formed by forces from countries that were not part of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Canadian Armed Forces troops participated in later years, since Canada had spearheaded the idea of a neutral force. By 24 April 1957, the canal was fully reopened to shipping.<ref name="ucsb">Template:Cite web</ref><ref name="usatoday">Template:Cite news</ref>

Aftermath

File:Suez Crisis aftermath.ogvThe conflict resulted in a military victory for the Coalition,<ref name="Tal2">Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> but a political victory for Egypt.<ref name="Tal2" /> Egypt maintained control of the canal.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Israel

In the context of the massive armament of Egypt via Czechoslovakia, Israel had been expecting an Egyptian invasion in either March or April 1957, as well as a Soviet invasion of Syria, neither of which occurred after this war.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> The fight over the canal also laid the groundwork for the Six-Day War in 1967 due to the lack of a peace settlement following the 1956 war and rising of tensions between Egypt and Israel.<ref name="novaonline.nvcc.edu2">Template:Cite webTemplate:Better source needed</ref>

The Israel Defense Forces gained confidence from the campaign.Template:According to whom<ref name="lrb.co.uk2">Template:Cite book

Cited in Template:Cite news</ref>

An Israeli soldier stands next to an Egyptian gun that had blocked the Tiran Straits.

The Straits of Tiran, closed by Egypt since 1950,<ref name="Pierre20143">Template:Cite book</ref> were re-opened to Israeli shipping. The Israelis also secured the presence of UN Peacekeepers in Sinai. Operation Kadesh bought Israel an eleven-year lull on its southern border with Egypt.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

In addition, its refusal to withdraw without guarantees, even in defiance of the United States and United Nations, ended all Western efforts, mainly American and British ones, to impose a political settlement in the Middle East without taking Israel's security needs into consideration.<ref name="Alteras2">Template:Harvnb</ref>

In October 1965 Eisenhower told Jewish fundraiser and Republican party supporter Max M. Fisher that he greatly regretted forcing Israel to withdraw from the Sinai peninsula.<ref name="Alteras2" />

Soviet Union

The Soviet Union made major gains with regards to influence in the Middle East.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 1732">Template:Harvnb</ref> Nikita Khrushchev's much publicised threat expressed through letters written by Nikolai Bulganin to begin rocket attacks on 5 November on Britain, France, and Israel if they did not withdraw from Egypt was widely believed at the time to have forced a ceasefire.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 1732" /><ref name="war&peace2">Template:Cite book</ref> Accordingly, it enhanced the prestige of the Soviet Union in Egypt, the Arab world, and the Third World, who believed the USSR was prepared to launch a nuclear attack on Britain, France, and Israel for the sake of Egypt. Though Nasser in private admitted that it was American economic pressure that had saved him, it was Khrushchev, not Eisenhower, whom Nasser publicly thanked as Egypt's saviour and special friend.

Shortly after it reopened, the canal was traversed by the first Soviet Navy warships since World War I. The Soviets' burgeoning influence in the Middle East, although it was not to last, included acquiring Mediterranean bases, and supporting the budding Palestinian liberation movement.<ref name="militaria.forum-xl.com2">MILITARIA Toon onderwerp – Suez Crisis: Operation Musketeer (Template:Webarchive). Militaria.forum-xl.com. Retrieved on 8 September 2011.</ref>Template:Unreliable source?

Statue of Ferdinand de Lesseps, a Frenchman who was lead developer in the construction of the Suez Canal, being removed following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>Template:Sfn

Khrushchev took the view that the Suez crisis had been a great triumph for Soviet nuclear brinkmanship, arguing publicly and privately that his threat to use nuclear weapons was what had saved Egypt.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 2362">Template:Harvnb</ref><ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> Therefore, a long period of crises began, starting with the Berlin crisis, beginning later in November 1958, and culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

The Soviet Union was able to avoid most repercussions from its concurrent violent suppression of the rebellion in Hungary, and were able to present an image at the United Nations as a defender of small powers against imperialism.<ref>Delauche, Frederic Illustrated History of Europe: A Unique Guide to Europe's Common Heritage (1992) p. 357</ref>

United States

The crisis may also have hastened decolonisation, as many of the remaining British and French colonies gained independence over the next few years. Some argued that the imposed ending to the Crisis led to over-hasty decolonisation in Africa, increasing the chance of civil wars and military dictatorships in newly independent countries.<ref name="news.bbc.co.uk2">Template:Cite news</ref>

US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles perceived a power vacuum in the Middle East, and he thought the United States should fill it. AIn order to prevent further Soviet expansion in the region, Eisenhower asked Congress on 5 January 1957 for authorisation to use military force if requested by any Middle Eastern nation to check aggression and, secondly, to set aside $200 million to help Middle Eastern countries that desired aid from the United States. Congress granted both requests and this policy became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.<ref name="novaonline.nvcc.edu2" />

Nasser saw the Eisenhower Doctrine as a heavy-handed American attempt to dominate the Middle East and led him to ally Egypt with the Soviet Union as an effective counter-weight. It was only with the abandonment of the Eisenhower Doctrine in mid-1958 that Nasser started pulling away from the Soviet Union to resume his preferred role as an opportunist who tried to use both superpowers to his advantage.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, pp. 174–1752">Template:Harvnb</ref>

The American historian Arthur L. Herman said that the episode ruined the usefulness of the United Nations to support American geopolitical aims.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Europe

The Bulganin letters showcased Europe's dependence upon the United States for security against Soviet nuclear threats while at the same time seeming to show that the American nuclear umbrella was not as reliable as had been advertised.Template:SfnTemplate:POV statement

As a result, the French became determined to acquire their own nuclear weapons rather than rely upon the Americans, while Germany became even more interested in the idea of a European "Third Force" in the Cold War. This helped to lead to the formation of the European Economic Community, which was intended to be the foundation of the European "Third Force".Template:Sfn

Egypt

Presidents Shukri al-Quwatli (left) and Gamal Abdel Nasser (right) clasp hands in front of jubilant crowds in Damascus days after the union of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic, 1958

Egypt kept control of the Suez Canal.<ref name="Economist20063">Template:Cite news</ref> The British historian D. R. Thorpe wrote that the outcome gave Nasser "an inflated view of his own power",<ref name="Thorpe3">Template:Cite news</ref> thinking he had overcome the combined forces of the United Kingdom, France and Israel, failing to attribute their withdrawal to pressure from the superpowers.<ref name="Thorpe3" /><ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 842">Template:Harvnb</ref>

American historian Derek Varble commented, "Although Egyptian forces fought with mediocre skill during the conflict, many Arabs saw Nasser as the conqueror of European colonialism and Zionism, simply because Britain, France and Israel left the Sinai and the northern Canal Zone."<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 842" /> The fighting at Port Said became a symbol of Egyptian victory, linked to a global anti-colonial struggle.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

Crackdown on Egyptian Jews

Template:Further Template:Jewish exodus from Arab and Muslim countriesIn October 1956, Nasser brought in a set of sweeping regulations abolishing civil liberties and allowing the state to stage mass arrests without charge and strip away Egyptian citizenship from any group it desired; these measures were mostly directed against the Jews of Egypt. As part of its new policy, 1,000 Jews were arrested and 500 Jewish businesses were seized by the government.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

A statement branding the Jews as "Zionists and enemies of the state" was read out in the mosques of Cairo and Alexandria. Jewish bank accounts were confiscated and many Jews lost their jobs. Lawyers, engineers, doctors and teachers were not allowed to work in their professions. Thousands of Jews were ordered to leave the country.<ref name="Laskier 1995, p. 5812">Template:Harvnb</ref>

They were allowed to take only one suitcase and a small sum of cash, and forced to sign declarations "donating" their property to the Egyptian government. Some 25,000 Jews, almost half of the Jewish community, left Egypt, mainly for Israel, Europe, the United States and South America. By 1957, the Jewish population of Egypt had fallen to 15,000.<ref name="JVL2">Template:Cite web</ref>

Britain

Nasser and Harold Macmillan, 1960

The political and psychological impact of the crisis had a fundamental impact on British politics. Anthony Eden was accused of misleading parliament and resigned from office on 9 January 1957.<ref>WWII Behind Closed Doors: Stalin, the Nazis and the West . Biographies . Anthony Eden Template:Webarchive. PBS. Retrieved on 8 September 2011.</ref>

Though British influence continued in the Middle East, Suez was a blow to British prestige in the Near East from which the country never recovered.<ref name="autogenerated4492">Template:Harvnb</ref> Britain evacuated all positions East of Suez by 1971, though this was due mainly to economic factors.

Eden's successor, Harold Macmillan, accelerated the process of decolonisation and sought to restore Britain's special relationship with the United States.<ref>Template:CitationTemplate:Page needed</ref>Template:Page needed Benefiting from his personal popularity and a healthy economy, Macmillan's government increased its Parliamentary majority in the 1959 general election.<ref name="autogenerated4492" />

During the 1960s there was much speculation that Prime Minister Harold Wilson's refusals to send British troops to the Vietnam War, were partially due to the Americans not supporting Britain during the Suez Crisis.Template:Citation needed In 1973, Prime Minister Edward Heath refused the US permission to use any of the UK's air bases to resupply during the Yom Kippur War,<ref>US-UK Special Relationship 06 | Intelligence Analysis and Reporting Template:Webarchive. Spyinggame.wordpress.com (30 July 2011). Retrieved on 8 September 2011.</ref> or to allow the Americans to gather intelligence from British bases in Cyprus.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

However, the British relationship with the United States did not suffer lasting consequences from the crisis.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> One example came with Britain's first hydrogen bomb test Operation Grapple which led to the 1958 US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> Six years after the crisis, the Americans sold Britain state-of-the-art missile technology at a moderate cost, which became the UK Polaris programme.<ref name="jstor20098412">Template:Cite journal</ref>

The war led to the eviction of GCHQ from several of its best foreign signals intelligence collection sites.<ref name="aldrich-20112">Template:Cite book</ref>

France

Risse-Kappen argued that Franco-American ties never recovered from the Suez crisis. Previously there had already been strains in the Franco-American relationship triggered by what Paris considered US betrayal of the French war effort in Indochina in 1954.<ref name="ReferenceA2">Template:Harvnb</ref> From the point of view of General Charles de Gaulle, the Suez events demonstrated to France that it could not rely on its allies. The British had initiated a ceasefire in the midst of the battle without consulting the French, while the Americans had opposed Paris politically. The damage to the ties between Paris and Washington, D.C., "culminated in President de Gaulle's 1966 decision to withdraw from the military integration of NATO".<ref name="auto2">Template:Harvnb</ref>

Much of the French Army officer corps felt that they had been "betrayed" by politicians in Paris when they were on the verge of victory, just as they believed they had been "betrayed" in Vietnam in 1954, and accordingly became more determined to win the war in Algeria, even if it meant overthrowing the Fourth Republic to do so. The Suez crisis thus helped to set the stage for the military disillusionment with the Fourth Republic, which was to lead to the collapse of the republic in 1958.<ref name="Sowerwine, Charles p. 2782">Sowerwine, Charles France Since 1870, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009 p. 278.</ref>

Canada

Lester B. Pearson, who would later become the Prime Minister of Canada, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his efforts in creating a mandate for a United Nations Peacekeeping Force, and he is considered the father of the modern concept of peacekeeping.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The Suez Crisis contributed to the adoption of a new national flag of Canada in 1965, as the Egyptian government had objected to Canadian peacekeeping troops on the grounds that their flag at that time included a British ensign.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Page needed

Military thought

Template:One source The military lesson that was reinforced by the Suez War was the extent that the desert favoured highly fluid, mobile operations and the power of aerial interdiction. To operate in the open desert without air supremacy proved to be suicidal for the Egyptian forces in the Sinai. The Royal Marine helicopter assault at Port Said "showed promise as a technique for transporting troops into small landing zones".<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 913">Template:Harvnb</ref> Egyptian urban warfare tactics at Port Said proved to be effective at slowing down the Allied advance.

See also

• 1956 riots in Iraq
• Closure of the Suez Canal (1967–1975)
• Egyptian National Military Museum 1956 war hall
• Operation Tarnegol
• Protocol of Sèvres

General

• France–United Kingdom relations
• France–United States relations
• Israel–United States relations
• Israeli casualties of war
• List of modern conflicts in the Middle East
• United Kingdom–United States relations

References

Works cited

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• Bromberger, Merry and Serge Secrets of Suez Sidgwick & Jackson London 1957 (translated from French Les Secrets de l'Expedition d'Egypte by James Cameron)
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• Doran, Michael. Ike's Gamble, Free Press. Oct.2016.
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• Pearson, Jonathan. (2002) Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble (Springer, 2002). online
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• Shlaim, Avi. "The Protocol of Sevres, 1956: Anatomy of a War Plot." International Affairs 73#3 1997, pp. 509–530. online.
• Smith, Simon C. ed. Reassessing Suez 1956: New perspectives on the crisis and its aftermath (Routledge, 2016).
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• Troen, S. Ilan. "The Protocol of Sèvres: British/French/Israeli Collusion Against Egypt, 1956." Israel Studies 1.2 (1996): 122-139 online.
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• Template:Cite book. Chapter 24 is devoted entirely to the Suez Crisis.

Further reading

• Template:Cite book
• Template:Cite book (translated from French by Richard Barry)
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External links

• Israel's Second War of Independence, essay in Azure magazine.
• A Man, A Plan and A Canal by Arthur L. Herman
• Sinai Campaign 1956
• Canada and the Suez Crisis
• July 2006, BBC, Suez 50 years on
• Suez and the high tide of Arab nationalism International Socialism 112 (2006)
• Detailed report on the Suez campaign by Ground Forces Chief of Staff General Beaufre, French Defense Ministry archive (French)
• Bodleian Library Suez Crisis Fiftieth anniversary exhibition Template:Webarchive
• Suez index at Britains-smallwars.com—accounts by British servicemen who were present
• 26 July speech by Gamal Abdel Nasser (French translation)
• Speech by Gamal Abdel Nasser Template:Webarchive (Original text in Arabic)
• Template:Internet Archive short film

Media links

• Newsreel film, British Prime Minister's broadcast Template:Webarchive at Britishpathe.com
• Blue Vanguard (1957), National Film Board of Canada film for the United Nations about its role in restoring peace after the Suez Crisis (60 min, Ian MacNeill, dir.)